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CONGO OPERATION

MILITARY ANNEX

US Military Unit in Support of UNOCBasic Considerations

1. This annex is predicated on the assumption that the US will provide US military forces in support of the UNOC as an expression of US intent to underwrite, as necessary, UN objectives in respect to the Republic of ^{The} Congo.
2. The US objective is, by insertion of US power, to prevent an increase in Soviet Bloc influence in the Congo, to reintegrate Katanga, and to strengthen and maintain a moderate and effective government in Leopoldville.
3. A US decision to place in the Congo now a limited and discriminate US military force would support and might well achieve this objective. This force should be adequate both to show the US and UN flag, and to accomplish, swiftly and effectively, the military tasks which might arise. The most demanding military contingency that might arise is if Tshombe were to elect to initiate military action. Should this contingency develop, the UNOC should be able to achieve rapid and complete domination of the air over the area of operations. This would both facilitate UN ground operations in Katanga and serve as a deterrent to outside intervention.
4. The US force deployed into the Congo should be positioned in the Katanga Province where it will be a positive and visible evidence to Tshombe of the US determination to support the United Nations. Only Kamina and

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Elisabethville airfields, in Katanga, have runways of sufficient length to support US air operations. Of these two, Kamina is better able to support air logistic movements because of its greater runway load capacity and closer proximity to logistic support from the Leopoldville area.

5. The Katanga air force is estimated to consist of the following:

Jet

| | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Vampire fighters | 1-2 |
| Fouga Magister fighter-trainers | 1 possible, as many as 6 reported |

Conventional:

| | |
|---------------|-----------------------------|
| AT-6 trainers | 7 confirmed; 10-12 possible |
| Helicopters | 1-2 |
| Transports | 18-27 assorted types |

TAB A contains combat characteristics of combat aircraft.

COMPOSITION OF US MILITARY ELEMENT

1. A limited US tactical air force could accomplish the show of force mission. Considering the Katanga air capability, such a force could also accomplish the destruction of this capability. A composite air strike unit of the following aircraft is considered appropriate:

8 F-100 fighter aircraft

2 RF-101 reconnaissance aircraft

Combat characteristics of the F-100 are shown in Tab B. The personnel involved in this unit will approximate 300. Preliminary estimates of air strike unit deployment requirements are at Tab C.

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2. Deployment of the Composite Air Strike Unit to the Congo will require that adequate ground control, security communications and other support personnel be provided. The strength of such a force will approximate 600 personnel. In the deployment of this force it is assumed that UNOC ground forces now in the Congo will provide tactical security and are adequate to cope with the threat posed by Katangan gendarmerie to the air base where the US forces are deployed.

3. It is estimated that the total forces contemplated could be positioned at Kamina Air Base in the Congo within 48 to 72 hours after the order for their deployment is issued. Total air lift requirements for the necessary ground support personnel and equipment are estimated to be about 40 transport aircraft. The deployment of this force can be accomplished via Adana, Turkey thence via Aden to Kamina or Wheelus, Tripoli thence via Leopoldville to Kamina (Tab D).

Capabilities

1. The foregoing composite air strike force, operating either alone or in conjunction with other UN air forces (6 to 8 combat aircraft) possesses the capability to accomplish the following tasks:

- a. To demonstrate US presence.
- b. To provide limited air defense for Kamina and Elisabethville against the Katanga air forces. A fully effective air defense system would require considerable personnel and equipment not warranted under the current situation.

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- c. To destroy the Katanga air force in the air and on the ground.
 - d. To interdict the established routes of communication into Elisabethville.
 - e. To provide limited air cover for the movement of UN forces.
2. If the situation should deteriorate to the degree that the accomplishment of the UN objectives is in jeopardy, additional force build-up could be accomplished incrementally up to the scale contemplated in CINCLANT contingency plans. This might include an airborne task force of two battle groups, portion of a Marine Division/Wing Team, a carrier task force, two tactical fighter squadrons, and a composite reconnaissance squadron with an additional Army division and the remainder of the Marine Division/Wing Team on call.

Logistic Support

1. Support for the forces proposed for deployment will be provided by air lines of communication from CONUS.
2. The major logistic requirement for support of the forces is POL. Direct ground refueling of eight F-100 aircraft flying two sorties per day can be accomplished by four KC-135 tanker aircraft shuttling between Leopoldville and Kamina. Alternatively, ten C-124 sorties daily carrying POL in drums from Leopoldville to Kamina will support these aircraft.

Command Control

1. These operations would be conducted under the operational control of CINCLANT. through the commander of the US unit in the Congo. For this purpose a US joint task force will be organized for support of the UNOC. Air missions will be flown at the request of the UNOC Commander but the US commander will decide whether to fly each mission in accordance with

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his terms of reference and the US-approved rules of engagement. This would be a command control arrangement similar to the existing State-JCS arrangements for USAF transport aircraft flying on intra-Congo missions in support of UNOC.

2. CINCLANT is developing detailed operational plans in accordance with the broad concepts outlined herein.

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TAB A

FOREIGN AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS

1. FOUCA MAGISTER (FRANCE)

- a. Light two seat turbojet monoplane.
- b. Armament two 7.5mm machine guns, four 55 lb air-to-surface rockets or one SS-11 rocket under each wing.
- c. Speed 403-443 MPH.
- d. Rate of climb: 980 ft per minute.
- e. Range: 575 to 735 miles.

2. VAMPIRE (BRITISH)

- a. Jet fighter
- b. Armament four 20mm cannon. Rocket and bombs in addition to cannon.
- c. Speed: 538-549 MPH.
- d. Rate of climb: 4,500 ft per minute

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TAB B

F-100 AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE

1. Single-seat supersonic fighter bomber single turbojet engine.
2. Armament four 20mm cannon (200 rounds for each), 6,000 lbs HE or napalm bombs. Twenty-four five-inch rockets. Sidewinder air-to-air rockets. Pods of 2.75" air-to-air rockets.
3. Speed: Max 822 MPH.
4. Combat radius: 575 miles.

Appendix B

TAB C

AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF A
US JOINT TASK FORCE TO THE CONGO

AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS

| <u>1. Air Force:</u> | <u>C-130</u> | <u>C-124</u> | <u>C-135</u> |
|---|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| F-100 Personnel and Airlift Requirements | 1 | 10 | 1 |
| 16 officers | | | |
| 150 airmen | | | |
| 220,000 lbs material | | | |
| 22,000 cubic feet | | | |
| RF-101 TAC Recce Personnel and Airlift Requirements: | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| 6 officers | | | |
| 30 airmen | | | |
| 50,000 lbs material | | | |
| 3,000 cubic feet | | | |
| UHF and GCA augmentation requirements for 24 hours operation capability: | | 3 | |
| 34 personnel | | | |
| 65,000 lbs | | | |
| Command Element (Airlifted with TAC Recce): | | | |
| 13 officers | | | |
| 18 airmen | | | |
| Talking Bird | | | |
| <u>2. Army Support Elements</u> | | | |
| Support units (headquarters, security, communications, logistical elements) | 9 | 5 | 6 |
| <u>3. Total Airlift Requirements:</u> | 12 | 20 | 8 |

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Appendix C

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TAB D

PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS AND ROUTES

1. Standard TAC (F-100 and RF-101) deployment to Wheelus, Tripoli or to Adana, Turkey, Other elements direct or as required.

Primary Route - Adana to Kamina

Minimizes diplomatic clearance problems

More operationally supportable and adaptable

Depart Adana - EFR* - land Aden

Depart Aden - IFR* - land Kamina

Depart Adana - IFR (twice) - land Kamina

Secondary Route - Tripoli to Kamina

Depart Tripoli - IFR - land Leopoldville

Depart Leopoldville - land Kamina

Primary route is operationally feasible and may be accomplished non-stop utilizing KC-135's.

2. If decision made to implement, entire task force can be in place:

In 72 hours using KB-50 refueling

In 48 hours using KC-135 refueling

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Appendix C