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 0820BB5104759646852562A1005085FF

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**Subject:** FBI foreign counterintelligence postponements

It seems to me likely that eventually we will be facing a White House appeal by the FBI on this issue. An important part of the FBI's position appears to be the proposition that current foreign relations with countries that were the targets of the FBI's counterintelligence efforts thirty-some years ago would be harmed by disclosing information about those efforts. As you know, this argument (grounded in Section 6(1)(C)) is distinct from "sources and methods" concerns (based on Section 6(1)(B)). In my view, canvassing contemporary open-source materials (e.g., Director Hoover's annual reports, publications like the Law Enforcement Bulletinand Masters of Deceit, Warren Commission exhibits and testimony from FBI officials) should yield a number of examples of the FBI's boasting about its successful targeting of specific nations (the ones we're mostly concerned about), and maybe even the diplomatic establishments and personnel, journalists, etc. of those nations. These should assist us in persuasively arguing that it was never a secret -- and was repeatedly officially acknowledged at the time -- who our Cold War enemies were, that the FBI's counterintelligence efforts were principally directed at them, and that the FBI paid particular attention to the diplomatic establishments, personnel, press corps, etc., of those nations. Do you think it is premature at this stage to have

**Body:** FBI team members (Laura and Tammi, maybe?) begin collecting examples of this type of thing?

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