

**NR\_key\_name:** EF4F25BC24D4A515852563AB00434376

**SendTo:** CN=David Marwell/O=ARRB @ ARRB

**CopyTo:**

**DisplayBlindCopyTo:**

**BlindCopyTo:** CN=R ecord/O=ARRB

**From:** CN=Jeremy Gunn/O=ARRB

**DisplayFromDomain:**

**DisplayDate:** 09/20/1996

**DisplayDate\_Time:** 8:14:53 AM

**ComposedDate:** 09/20/1996

**ComposedDate\_Time:** 8:14:42 AM

**Subject:** Setting up a personal meeting

FROM: Bill Wray/ARRB, Jeremy Gunn/ARRB, Douglas Hottel/ARRB, Dave Montague/ARRB FROM:

Christopher Barger/ARRB Date: 09/17/96 01:05:26 PM Subject: Setting up a personal meeting  
CALL REPORT:  
PUBLIC Document's Author: Christopher Barger/ARRB Date Created: 09/17/96  
The Players Who initiated the call? Review Board's representative in the call: Christopher Barger  
Witnesses/Consultants's representative in the call: Donald Monier  
Description of the Call Date: 09/17/96  
Subject: Setting up a personal meeting  
Summary of the Call:  
I called Monier to try and set up a face-to-face meeting with him where we could have him make a sworn statement regarding the things he discussed with us the last time we talked to him. He expressed surprise that we wanted to talk to him, since he had been out of the Army and out of Dallas by the time of the assassination. I told him that we wanted to discuss with him other things that he had mentioned; specifically, the Code 30 allegations. Monier was very reluctant to discuss this with us; he said that "if the Navy hasn't 'fessed up to that, then I don't want to be the one talking about it in a sworn statement." I tried to reassure him that we could waive his security oath, that anyone coming to interview him would be TS/SCI cleared, and that we indeed had a "need to know." I don't believe that this eased his concern much. Several times, he asked how that information was relevant to our work. I told him that if, however improbable, it was possible that LHO had been part of a program like that, it became our responsibility to check into it, and that if we found no evidence of Oswald's involvement, the program would remain unreleased. He suggested that we look further into the FOI operation that occurred in Dallas that he had referred to in the first contact. He felt that this operation might have a more direct, though admittedly speculative, connection to the assassination story. He gave me what he believed to be the name of the officer from Holabird who ran the operation (a Major Mayo). It is very important to emphasize that Monier did not back off of his statements or retract his story once he learned we wanted to go for a sworn statement. Rather, he just became much more reluctant to discuss it, as if he were worried about letting an important cat out of the bag. I told him that I understood his reticence, and that I would discuss his concerns with my superiors before I called him back. This is what I think we should do: 1) Separate Coyle and Monier. Their stories and aspects of the record are not related anyway; furthermore, Coyle is ready to talk to us now, and any further delay might lessen his willingness to do so. I believe that there is homework we can do before following up with Monier. Thus, we should continue planning to meet with Coyle in the near future, while leaving Monier for later. 2) Do the "homework" on Monier's aspect before we recontact him. We should check out as much as possible on his allegations. We need to a) check his ONI personnel file at Suitland to see what unit he was in, and get the unit records and a Record

**Body:**

**recstat:**

**DeliveryPriority:** N

**DeliveryReport:** B

**ReturnReceipt:**

**Categories:**