

NR_key_name: D885304E8998EB2A85256354004ED1EF
SendTo: pdscott @ violet.berkeley.edu @ internet @ WORLDCOM
CopyTo:
DisplayBlindCopyTo:
BlindCopyTo: CN=R ecord/O=ARRB
From: CN=Tom Samoluk/O=ARRB
DisplayFromDomain:
DisplayDate: 06/25/1996
DisplayDate_Time: 10:25:15 AM
ComposedDate: 06/25/1996
ComposedDate_Time: 10:20:56 AM
Subject: Re: -No Subject-
 Dear Peter, Your email and faxed version of your June 21, 1996 letter have been received at the ARRB offices. I have shared copies with the Chairman, the Executive Director and appropriate staff members for review. Thank you for writing and for your information. Sincerely, Thomas Samoluk
 To: Tom_Samoluk @ jfk-arrb.gov @ internetcc: [b]cc: Tom Samoluk/ARRB)From: pdscott @ violet.berkeley.edu @ internet @ WORLDCOM Date: 06/21/96 11:25:32 AM CDTSubject: [b]No Subject-.LP.DS LJune 21, 1996Thomas E. Samoluk, Esq.Assassination Records Review Board600 E Street NW, Second FloorWashington, DC 20530.DE
 Dear Thomas Samoluk, I have been working on a lengthy request for missing Marine records to submit to you, including a preliminary inventory from Marine G-2 files which I can email in advance if you do not choose to wait for my prose explanation of it. This is why I have not yet thanked you for the reconsideration of some of the LIENVOY-related documents, a Board action for which I am grateful even if not yet totally satisfied. Meanwhile I wish to draw the Board's attention to what I believe are assassination-related records in a wholly different area: records from September to December 1963 on presidential policy-making on Vietnam. The criterion to be applied here is that of the Board's Guidance (Sec. 1400.1 [a]): "events reasonably related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy." There are three possible grounds for arguing that Vietnamese policy planning is so "reasonably related." The first would be that conflict over Vietnam policy is an explanation for the murder. The second, that a shift in Vietnam policy was a major consequence of President Kennedy's death, regardless of how this was caused. The third ground, which along with the second is the major contention of this letter, is that undoubted anomalies in the documentary record on Oswald can be best explained in the light of profound policy differences inside the Kennedy Administration, which in late 1963 came to a head over Vietnam and Cuba. I want to make it clear that my argument has nothing to do with the first ground. I have said in print, and still believe, that the fundamental change in Vietnam policy "which occurred between November 21 [1963] (under JFK) and on November 24 (under LBJ) does "nothing to prove the contention that differences over Vietnam became a motive for killing Kennedy" (\fIDeep Politics\fr, p. 30). I do wish however to strengthen the argument I made in the same pages that a fundamental change in policy did occur at that time: Kennedy's announced policy of phased withdrawal was replaced two days after his death by Johnson's policy of planning for phased escalation, in support of a commitment to win. The change of Presidents (a change "reasonably related to the assassination") made in this area a major difference to American history. This particular reasonable relationship to the President's death and its consequences would exist, even if the President had died of a heart attack. Support for this argument (long a minority position) has
Body:
recstat: Record
DeliveryPriority: N
DeliveryReport: B
ReturnReceipt:
Categories: