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
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Studies in Intelligence

Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009)

Journal of the American Intelligence Professional



Military Intelligence in WW I

"The Intelligence Section, A.E.F"

Operation IFEKTION:
The Soviet Bloc AIDS
Disinformation Campaign

Solving Real World Intelligence
Problems on the College Campus

The James Angleton Phenomenon

Reviewed:

- The Accidental Guerrilla*
- Vietnam Declassified*
- OSS Training in National Parks*
- The Secret War in El Paso*

The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Books Reviewed in 2009

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Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign

Thomas Boghardt

“

Our friends in Moscow call it ‘dezinformatsiya.’ Our enemies in America call it ‘active measures,’ and I, dear friends, call it ‘my favorite pastime.’

”

—Col. Rolf Wagenbreth, director of Department X (disinformation) of East German foreign intelligence¹

The practice of intelligence differed considerably between East and West during the Cold War. Western intelligence services were most commonly tasked with gathering information, but their Soviet bloc counterparts placed much greater emphasis on deception operations to influence opinions or actions of individuals and governments.²

These “active measures” (aktivnyye meropriatia, as the Soviets called them) included manipulation and media control, written and oral disinformation, use of foreign communist parties and front organizations, clandestine radio broadcasting, manipulation of the economy, kidnappings, paramilitary operations, and support of guerrilla groups and terrorist organizations. Under Joseph Stalin, active measures also included political assassinations.³ The basic goal of Soviet active measures was to

weaken the USSR’s opponents—first and foremost the “main enemy” (glavny protivnik), the United States—and to create a favorable environment for advancing Moscow’s views and international objectives worldwide.

This is the story of one such measure—a campaign to implicate the United States in the emergence of the AIDS pandemic that appeared in the early 1980s. The story both illustrates the nature of Soviet and communist bloc disinformation programs and demonstrates the potential long-term consequences.

Editor’s Note: This article was the recipient of an Annual Studies in Intelligence Award in 2009. The references to end notes seen in this text are included only in the article’s .PDF versions posted in the Studies in Intelligence collection in www.cia.gov.

Organizational Basics

The KGB’s Service A was the unit tasked with conducting active measures, and numerous KGB residencies abroad were assigned officers dealing exclusively with them. Moreover, each officer of the First Chief

Directorate (foreign intelligence) was expected to spend 25 percent of his time conceiving and implementing them.⁴ But active measures were well integrated into Soviet policy and involved virtually every element of the Soviet party and

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.

Deteriorating East-West relations formed the backdrop to Moscow's decision to embark on an aggressive active measures campaign.

state structure, not only the KGB.

Active measures specialists used newspapers, radio stations, embassies, and other official institutions for implementation and diffusion. Services allied to the Soviets, such as East Germany's Ministry for State Security (MfS), were frequently enlisted as well. In 1980, a conservative CIA estimate put the annual cost of Soviet active measures at \$3 billion.⁶

A Note about Intelligence Sources

With the end of the Cold War, former Soviet and East German intelligence officers confirmed their services' sponsorship of the AIDS disinformation campaign. In 1990, the German TV news magazine *Panorama* featured an anonymous former intelligence officer—probably Günter Bohnsack—who revealed his department's participation in the campaign. Later that year, Bohnsack and a fellow retired intelligence officer published more details of their department's activities against the West, including the AIDS disinformation campaign.⁵ And in 1992, SVR (Russian foreign intelligence) director Yevgeny Primakov confirmed the KGB's participation. Over the next years, the European and the North American media repeatedly reported on Soviet bloc intelligence sponsorship of the AIDS conspiracy theory. Archival sources, interviews, and other material were used in this article as well.

Moscow's "total" approach to influence and deception operations contrasted starkly with the American concept of covert action, which was carried out by a single agency—the CIA—whose budget for such operations made up a fraction of its overall expenditure and paled in comparison to what the Soviets spent on active measures.⁷

Disinformation (*dezinformatsiya*) was a particularly effective weapon in the armory of Soviet bloc active measures. The term *dezinformatsiya* denoted a variety of techniques and activities to purvey false or misleading information that Soviet bloc active measures specialists sought to leak into the foreign media. From the Western perspective, disinformation was a politically motivated lie, but Soviet bloc propagandists believed their disinformation campaigns merely highlighted greater truths by exposing the real nature of capitalism.

For example, the KGB began spreading rumors about FBI and CIA involvement in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy because the Soviets earnestly believed the US military-industrial complex was involved in Kennedy's murder. Likewise, East German intelligence routinely floated disinformation depicting West German politicians as former Nazis, because, from East Berlin's perspective, the Federal Republic

of Germany was merely an incarnation of the Third Reich.⁸

In conducting disinformation campaigns, Soviet bloc intelligence had to be mindful of the concerns, fears, and expectations of their target audience. As Ladislav Bittman, deputy chief of the Czechoslovak intelligence service's disinformation department from 1964 to 1966, pointed out: in order to succeed "every disinformation message must at least partially correspond to reality or generally accepted views."⁹

The AIDS Campaign's Backdrop and Origins

Deteriorating East-West relations formed the backdrop to Moscow's decision to embark on an aggressive active measures campaign in the 1980s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 ended what was left of détente, and the newly elected US president, Ronald Reagan, adopted a hard line against the USSR. At his first press conference, Reagan declared: "They [the Soviets] reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat in order to attain [world revolution]."

In short order, the new president increased the defense budget by 10 percent, suspended arms reduction talks, and reinstated work on MX missiles and B-1 bombers. The Reagan administration's hawkish stance, in turn, stoked Soviet paranoia, especially after Yuri Andropov's election as general secretary of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union in 1982. A former KGB chairman, Andropov was intelligent and well-versed in foreign affairs, but he was also a hardliner with a proclivity for conspiracy theories, a trait perhaps exacerbated by his terminal illness.

During his short reign, Andropov became convinced that the United States planned for nuclear war, and KGB residencies in Western capitals were instructed to look for signs of a first strike. In keeping with Andropov's hostility toward the Reagan administration, the KGB's First Chief Directorate on 30 September 1982 instructed its residencies in the United States to counterattack Washington's aggressive stance with active measures.¹⁰

Soviet active measures worked best when pre-existing plans fit neatly into political-cultural environments and specific events.¹¹ In this case, Moscow had long realized that chemical and biological warfare was of great concern to Western publics and could be exploited for disinformation purposes. During the Korean War, the Chinese and North Koreans had broadcast "confessions" of captured American pilots about the alleged US use of germ warfare.¹⁷ During the Vietnam War, the KGB circulated a forged letter purporting to come from Gordon Goldstein of the US Office of Naval Research. First published in the *Bombay Free Press Journal* in 1968, the letter "revealed" the existence of American bacterio-

The Soviet Active Measures Process

Center gives **strategic go-ahead** for a disinformation campaign.

Ideas would be generated by residency officers assigned to read local press, books, and magazines for material that could be used for disinformation purposes.¹²

Center would **evaluate** the ideas. According to a senior East European intelligence officer who defected in 1968,

*Individual suggestions for special operations [active measures] which came from stations abroad were submitted for preliminary assessment...the majority of the suggestions were discarded in the first stage of the selection process, leaving only those whose conception corresponded with our long-range plans and whose projected consequences suggested positive results. The suggestions were then transmitted to a panel...where the author of the proposal faced many questions and much criticism in an attempt to uncover any weakness. The composition of the critical board varied from case to case although several Department D employees and experts on particular regions were permanent members. Further supplemented and polished, the proposal was then submitted to the intelligence chief for approval.*¹³

Still at the Center, **preparation** involved disinformation specialists writing in their native language, **approvals** by managers, and **translation**.

Targeting followed. The Center typically sought to launch a story **outside the Soviet bloc-controlled press** to conceal Moscow's hand. This was done frequently through **anonymous letters** and newspaper **articles** in the **Third World**.¹⁴

Once published abroad, the **Soviet media** might pick up and further **propagate** the item by referring to its non-Soviet source.

Types of Active Measures

According to the defector, two types of active measures existed:

*The first category includes operations initiated and designed within KGB ranks and usually employs such traditional disinformation techniques as forgeries or agents of influence. The KGB conducts hundreds of these categories every year even though their impact is rather limited.*¹⁵

Such single pieces of disinformation were not reinforced by additional propagation efforts.

The second type was the result of a strategic decision at the top of the Soviet active measures pyramid and directly approved by the Politburo. Campaigns were usually planned to last several years and encompassed many elements of the Soviet state, including the International Information Department (IID), which directed official press organs, such as TASS, Novosti, and Radio Moscow; and the International Department (ID), responsible for liaison with foreign communist parties, international communist front organizations, and clandestine radios.

The KGB, ID, and IID would cooperate closely in executing a particular campaign with the means available to each—the KGB's Service A, responsible for forgeries and spreading rumors ("black propaganda"), the IID's press organs for official stories ("white propaganda"), the ID for clandestine radio broadcasts and the use of international front organizations ("gray propaganda").¹⁶

In their conspiracy-driven world view, it was plausible to assume that AIDS was indeed the result of US biological warfare experiments.

logical warfare weapons in Vietnam and Thailand.¹⁸

Moreover, Americans had shown themselves politically sensitive to the behavior of their own government. In the 1970s, a spate of press and congressional investigations publicized several actual instances of US biological warfare research early in the Cold War. One example was the secret Special Operations Division (SOD) at the premier US chemical and biological warfare research facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland, which had created a number of germ weapons for the CIA (codename MKNAOMI). Later, an SOD report surfaced, detailing a simulated biological warfare attack in New York in the summer of 1966—Army personnel had released aerosol clouds of a “harmless simulant agent” into subway stations along the 7th and 8th Avenue lines to assess the vulnerability of subway systems to covert biological attacks and to explore “methods of delivery that could be used offensively.”¹⁹

In this environment, the key event was the emergence in the early 1980s of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, AIDS, as a national health crisis. Scientists had named the disease in 1982, and the following year a causative virus (HIV) was identified. However, the origins of HIV/AIDS were still obscure. The lack of verifiable facts and the strong emotional

response to the discoveries opened the door to rumors.²⁰ The emergence of the mysterious illness so soon after revelations about US biological warfare experiments therefore provided Soviet active measures specialists an opening to exploit.

In addition, the Soviets were extremely sensitive to charges against them concerning biological weapons. A US State Department report released on 22 March 1982 accused Moscow of using chemical toxin weapons (“yellow rain”) in Southeast Asia. This allegation may have provided an impetus for the KGB to respond in kind.²¹

All Moscow had to do was add a twist to its time-tested biological warfare disinformation theme by introducing the idea that US government scientists had created the AIDS virus. In the words of two former Soviet bloc disinformation officers, the AIDS disinformation campaign “virtually conceptualized itself.”²²

As in earlier disinformation campaigns, the propagandists sought to expose what they considered a greater truth about the “main enemy”—i.e., that the United States was an imperialistic, reactionary power controlled by a war-mongering arms industry. In their conspiracy-driven world view, it was plausible to assume that AIDS

was indeed the result of US biological warfare experiments. But ultimately, the true origins of AIDS were of secondary importance.²³ According to Yevgeny Primakov, at the time the first deputy chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, a foreign propaganda front organization, the KGB conducted the AIDS disinformation campaign to expose the “perfidious” work of US military scientists.²⁴

The Campaign Opens

The opening salvo of the AIDS disinformation campaign was fired on 17 July 1983, when an obscure newspaper in India, the *Patriot*, printed an anonymous letter headlined “AIDS may invade India: Mystery disease caused by US experiments.” The letter, allegedly written by a “well-known American scientist and anthropologist” in New York, claimed that “AIDS...is believed to be the result of the Pentagon’s experiments to develop new and dangerous biological weapons.” It went on to state that the United States was about to transfer these experiments to sites in Pakistan, where they would pose a grave threat to neighboring India.

- Citing a number of publicly available sources, the article recounted a series of well-established facts about AIDS—that there was great concern about contaminated blood donations; that AIDS was probably caused by a virus; and that AIDS regis-

tered its first major outbreak in the United States.

- The author then listed elements of the US biological warfare program known to the public: government records obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by the Church of Scientology, which had documented biological agent experiments in the 1950s; CIA-sponsored testing of drugs on humans during the same time period; and the development of biological weapons until the late 1960s at Fort Detrick.
- Even though President Richard Nixon had banned US offensive bacteriological weapons research by executive order in 1969, the letter in the *Patriot* stated that the Pentagon had “never abandoned these weapons” and claimed that Fort Detrick had discovered AIDS by analyzing samples of “highly pathogenic viruses” collected by American scientists in Africa and Latin America.
- It concluded by quoting statistics and publications on the spread and lethality of AIDS, and its particular threat to developing nations.²⁵

Indicators of Soviet Inspiration

There can be little doubt about the KGB’s authorship of the letter. The letter’s arguments built on earlier disinformation campaigns involving US bacteriological warfare and specifically picked up on false

The idea for the AIDS disinformation campaign would have been approved and polished at KGB headquarters.

charges made in 1982 in the Soviet media to the effect that a research laboratory sponsored by the University of Maryland in Lahore, Pakistan, was in fact a bacteriological warfare facility.²⁶ AIDS itself was not of much concern to the average Indian in 1983, but any mention of schemes involving India’s arch-foe Pakistan could be expected to draw attention on the subcontinent.

The 17 July letter’s extensive quoting of US sources—e.g., *U.S. News & World Report*, *Associated Press*, and *Army Research, Development & Acquisition* magazine—suggests that US-based KGB officers initiated the AIDS campaign, or at least collected the material that triggered the idea. The KGB had large residencies in New York City and Washington, DC, both of which were assigned officers who worked solely on active measures.²⁷

One especially clear indicator of the US origins of the effort is the *Patriot* letter’s reference to *Army Research, Development & Acquisition*, which was not widely available and would make unusual reading for a “well-known American scientist” who also described himself as an “anthropologist.” The journal would be a typical source for a KGB officer seeking material for a disinformation campaign, however. In fact, the magazine’s July/August 1982 issue focused on “The Role

of Army Labs in RDA” and specifically referred to “the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Md,” which had—the journal asserted—placed particular emphasis “on problems associated with medical defense against potential biological warfare agents, or naturally occurring diseases of particular military importance and on the highly virulent pathogenic microorganisms which require special containment facilities.”²⁸

Once conceived, the idea for the AIDS disinformation campaign would have been approved and polished at KGB headquarters (the Center) in the Moscow suburb of Yasenovo. (See box on Soviet active measures process.) The task of pulling pertinent material together and generating the letter would have fallen to the KGB’s disinformation specialists of Service A, under General Ivan Ivanovich Agayants. By 1985, the service employed roughly 80 officers at Yasenovo and another 30 to 40 in the Novosti Press offices at Pushkin Square.²⁹

Although they had no particular training in psychology, these specialists had honed their skills over several decades and understood the dynamics of rumor campaigns intuitively. The responsible officer(s) would have composed the text first in Russian and then commissioned a translation into

As an opening salvo, the letter was a dud.

English by KGB-translators. Some translators were native-speakers, but most were Russian speakers schooled in English for this purpose.

The use of non-native speakers who may not have had much exposure to spoken English, occasionally resulted in stilted and syntactically incorrect translations, as appeared in the *Patriot* letter. The text included several grammatical errors, including a reference to the “virus flu,” rather than “flu virus.” Such linguistic slip-ups were typical giveaways of Soviet bloc disinformation stories.³⁰

Placement

Composed, approved, and translated, the letter needed to be inserted covertly into the media. India, as a large, non-aligned country with a diverse English-language press, was an ideal staging ground. The Indian government put few restrictions on the influx of Soviet officials, and in the 1980s more than 150 KGB and GRU (military intelligence) officers served on the subcontinent. Many of them were busy planting biased or false stories in Indian papers. According to KGB archivist and defector Vasili Mitrokhin, the KGB planted 5,510 stories in this way in 1975 alone and controlled 10 Indian newspapers and one news agency. KGB officers boasted to one another that there was no shortage of

Indian journalists and politicians willing to take money.³¹

With respect to the left-wing *Patriot*, the KGB had been involved in setting it up in 1967 for the very purpose of circulating Soviet-inspired articles. With a circulation of about 35,000, the *Patriot* was small by Indian standards, but it quickly gained a reputation in intelligence circles as Moscow’s mouthpiece.³²

As an opening salvo, the letter was a dud. Though carefully prepared and planted, no media outlet picked it up at the time. Even though the letter mentioned Pakistan, the Indian press probably ignored it simply because AIDS was not then an issue on the subcontinent.³³ That the Soviet media failed to follow up, on the other hand, may have been because the letter had fallen into that secondary category of disinformation, a single, if clever, piece conceived at the bottom of the Soviet active measures’ pyramid and not reinforced by additional support measures.

Reemergence of the Campaign.

The *Patriot* letter lay largely unnoticed for nearly three years. By 1985, a lot had changed. First, a new, dynamic general secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, had, with KGB support, taken over and ended the USSR’s period of leadership disarray. (Gorbachev’s reform agenda would

eventually lead to the dissolution of the USSR, but at the time he refrained from interfering with the KGB active measures program and generally supported its agenda.³⁴) Second, the spread of AIDS had become a much greater global concern and made it a potentially more powerful disinformation weapon than two years earlier.

Three events in 1985 might have contributed to a Soviet decision to reactivate the AIDS campaign.

- A US government report released in February 1985 claimed that the Soviets had broken the Geneva Convention by producing biological weapons.³⁵
- An article in Lyndon H. LaRouche Jr.’s *Executive Intelligence Review* accused the USSR of blocking the battle against AIDS.³⁶
- Concern about the spread of AIDS within the USSR may have prompted the leadership to attempt to redirect domestic concerns abroad.³⁷

The campaign reopened with an article in the newspaper *Liternaya Gazeta*, the KGB’s “prime conduit in the Soviet press for propaganda and disinformation.”³⁸ On 30 October 1985, the paper published an article by Valentin Zapevalov, titled “Panic in the West or What Is Hiding behind the Sensation Surrounding AIDS.”³⁹

Zapevalov began his lengthy piece by reminding readers that AIDS was apparently spreading from the United States to the rest of the world (in fact, most early AIDS cases were reported among US homosexual men). He went on to accurately describe the disease, quoting well-known publications such as *U.S. News & World Report* for statistical evidence. He then veered back to his initial contention about the provenance of AIDS, chronicling in some detail the early spread of the disease, and asking rhetorically: “Why [did] AIDS...appear in the USA and start spreading above all in towns along the East Coast?” This leading question was followed by a laundry list of covert US biological warfare programs of the 1950s and 1960s already noted in the *Patriot* letter; CIA-authorized testing of drugs for mind-control purposes; the case of Frank Olson, a Special Operations Division (SOD) bio weapons expert who committed suicide after he was administered LSD without his knowledge; and the delivery of a toxic substance by CIA officer Sidney Gottlieb to the Agency’s station chief in Congo for use in assassinating President Patrice Lumumba.⁴⁰

In the last third of the article, the author reminded readers of the biological warfare programs at Fort Detrick and stated that these experiments continued notwithstanding President Nixon’s 1969 ban. The *Patriot* letter from 1983 was referenced as a source for the alleged creation of AIDS at

Fort Detrick. As a result of tests on unsuspecting victims—people from the US “satellite country” Haiti, drug addicts, homosexuals and homeless people—the virus was then allegedly unleashed. Zapevalov concluded by suggesting that US military personnel were potential carriers of the virus and expressed the hope that “one of the victims” would sue the CIA or the Pentagon to show the world that “all victims of AIDS are the result of a monstrous experiment.”

The structure of the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* article bears a striking resemblance to the *Patriot* letter. While both publications claimed that AIDS was made in the USA, most of the information given in the text was accurate—an essential ingredient of a successful disinformation campaign. Much of the data was taken from published sources. As had the authors of the *Patriot* letter, Zapevalov used verifiable facts about early Cold War US experiments as circumstantial evidence for his claim that AIDS was the result of similar tests.

Enter East Germany and Dr. Jakob Segal

The Soviets frequently involved allied intelligence services and their disinformation departments in their disinformation campaigns. In this case, in turning to East Germany and to a particular East German, the Soviets injected their campaign with an energy even they may not have expected.

East Germany’s Ministry for State Security

Modeled on the KGB, East Germany’s MfS was a massive security and espionage agency that included secret police and foreign intelligence components. The foreign intelligence branch (HVA, or *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung*—chief reconnaissance division) was headed for many years by the urbane Markus Wolf. In the early 1960s, the HVA set up its own disinformation section, Department X (or HVA X). By the 1980s, the department had grown to include roughly 60 officers, based at MfS headquarters in the Normannenstrasse in East Berlin.

Headed throughout its history by Col. Rolf Wagenbreth, HVA X focused primarily on West Germany, but it was also active in the Third World. (By the late 1970s it had expanded its overseas activities to include China and the United States.) In the mid-1960s, the KGB introduced structural reforms in the Soviet bloc intelligence network, permitting individual KGB departments to work directly with their territorial, counterintelligence and disinformation counterparts in Eastern Europe. Henceforth, HVA X informed the KGB directly of active measures planned by East Berlin, and HVA and KGB held annual bilateral meetings, alternating between Berlin and Moscow, to discuss operations against the United States and other nations.⁴⁴

The rest of this story is largely about the role played by a dedicated East German scientist known to the KGB and East Germany’s Ministry for State Security, the MfS (colloquially known as the Stasi) and the Soviet and East German prac-

tice of exploiting unwitting servants of seemingly good causes for their own ends.

While most of the KGB's junior partner services conducted active measures to some extent, by the 1980s, East German intelligence had emerged as the KGB's most valuable partner in loyalty, professionalism, and technical expertise. Having decided to revive the AIDS campaign, the KGB informed its East German counterpart unambiguously that Moscow expected it to participate.⁴¹

The East Germans were told specifically to employ a "scientific approach"⁴² and produce disinformation contending the AIDS virus had been developed at Fort Detrick, from where it spread to the general population through human testing. Beyond those obligatory details, the East Germans were given a free hand in devising their own strategy and spreading the story. The HVA code named the operation INFEKTION and VORWÄRTS II [Forward II] and henceforth was the KGB's junior partner and main ally regarding AIDS.⁴³

The KGB was particularly keen on employing another of its standard active-measure practices, the use of unwitting agents who were held in high esteem in their home countries. Such individuals did Moscow's or East Berlin's bidding through their speeches, publications, and personal networks. Often, these individuals were journalists, scientists, or other public figures with left-wing

The Segal Arguments in AIDS—its nature and origins

Segal and his coauthors mixed truth, to establish professional credentials, and fiction—the heart of their story. At the outset, the three detailed well established facts about the illness, including that it was caused by the HIV virus and disabled a body's immune system.

Rejecting theories about the simian origins of the virus, the three asserted that Fort Detrick was "for a long time...the central laboratory of the Pentagon for the development of biological agents of war" and operated a "P-4 type" high security laboratory for gene manipulation in "building 550" since 1977.⁴⁹ There, voluntary human test subjects were probably infected with the AIDS virus, which they alleged was the product of two natural, artificially synthesized ("recombined") viruses, VISNA and HTLV-I. When the test subjects showed no symptoms for six to 12 months, due to AIDS' long incubation period, the Pentagon concluded its virus was ineffective, and the infected volunteers were released.

Since the test subjects were criminals who had spent a long time in jail deprived of female companionship, the three argued, most of them had become homosexuals. Many of the infected volunteers headed for New York, mixing with the local gay population, thus initiating the epidemic whose first victims were registered among homosexuals in that city in 1979—two years after the alleged Fort Detrick experiments. Displaying a wobbly grasp of US urban reality, they added that it "was logical for the released prisoners to seek out a major city close by, but not Washington, where the political climate is rather unsuitable for criminals [in fact, Washington, D.C. had one of the highest crime rates of the nation in the 1980s]. New York with its developed underworld was more promising."⁵⁰

views who were not openly pro-Soviet. Bloc intelligence referred to them as "agents of influence," "subconscious multipliers," or simply as "useful idiots."⁴⁵

The agent of choice in this case was the retired East German biophysicist Professor Jakob Segal. Born in St. Petersburg in 1911, Segal grew up in interwar Germany, where he studied biology, but as a Jew and communist he was forced to flee to France when the Nazis assumed power. According to Segal, he completed his PhD at Sorbonne University in Paris, just before the German invasion in 1940 and joined the French resistance during the occupation. His connection with Soviet intelli-

gence probably originated in those years. After the war, Segal settled in East Berlin, where he became head of the Institute for Applied Bacteriology at East Berlin's Humboldt University in 1953.⁴⁶ After his retirement, he and his wife Lilli—also a scientist—developed an interest in AIDS, although neither of them was an expert on the subject.⁴⁷ Both Segals were unwavering believers in international communism and staunch supporters of the GDR. As an established KGB contact and an MfS informer (*Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter*, or IM),⁴⁸ Segal was a known quantity, and Soviet bloc intelligence had enough information to judge him politically reliable.

How Segal was actually brought into the process is not known with certainty, but in all likelihood “evidence” of the US origins of AIDS would have been given to him in personal meetings, perhaps with a professional colleague previously briefed by the MfS. In this first meeting, Segal would not have been told explicitly that the material came from Soviet bloc intelligence or that it was part of a disinformation campaign. Rather, he simply would have been encouraged to look into the matter. Given Segal’s background, he would have been expected to reach the intended conclusion. While Segal may have suspected the real source of the AIDS material, it was common practice in the GDR for authorities to share “background information” quasi-conspiratorially in one-on-one conversations. Its validity was typically not questioned.⁵¹

Segal’s selection as the campaign’s frontman was a masterstroke. As a German, he could speak unfiltered to the population of a major member of the Western alliance, and as an established scientist, he possessed professional authority. By concealing their hand, the intelligence services ensured that Segal would speak convincingly, with the voice of a true believer not that of a paid informant.

In the event, Segal became genuinely and passionately devoted to his cause, and many people found him winsome and convincing. A Montreal *Gazette* reporter, who interviewed him in 1992, wrote: “For those who

Segal became genuinely and passionately devoted to his cause, and many people found him winsome and convincing.

have met him, the theory’s appeal [about the origins of AIDS] may lie in the man himself. Engaging and well-read, he is sympathetic to AIDS sufferers and wants to help out in the fight against the disease.”⁵²

The Segal Contributions

Segal’s first major contribution to the AIDS disinformation campaign was a 47-page pamphlet titled *AIDS—its nature and origin*, co-authored by his wife Lilli and Ronald Dehmlow, a fellow retired Humboldt University professor.⁵³ In it, the authors went to great lengths to refute the more and more widely accepted theory about the African origins of AIDS, inter alia by pointing to the fact that the epidemic’s first cases were reported among the gay populations of New York and San Francisco, not in Africa. Like the *Patriot* letter and Zapevalov’s article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Segal’s pamphlet tediously detailed several well-established facts about AIDS, and he described accurately how Western scientists had identified HIV. Having demonstrated his professional expertise on the subject matter, Segal then detailed his theory about US government experimentation, specifically among homosexual prisoners who went on to infect gay populations in New York City and San Francisco. (See text box on facing page: Segal Arguments.) Even though Segal and his coauthors

conceded that the theory was based on circumstantial evidence, they concluded that the “assumption that AIDS is a product of the preparation of biological warfare can therefore be quite plainly expressed.” According to press reports, Segal subsequently claimed the project was code-named “MK-Naomi.”⁵⁴

HVA X had provided Segal with much of the material for his pamphlet,⁵⁵ which began circulating in Harare, Zimbabwe, on the eve of the Eighth Conference of NonAligned Nations (1–6 September 1986). The conference was attended by representatives of more than 100 Third World countries—as well as four HVA and 20 KGB officers, who were busily distributing Segal’s paper to the press and delegates.⁵⁶ Segal’s explicit repudiation of the thesis that AIDS originated in Africa was tailor-made for an African audience, and his claims subsequently appeared in the press of 25 African countries. The East German communist party leadership was delighted to see Segal’s theses included in the conference’s final report and heaped praise on the HVA for the operation.⁵⁷

Disappointment at the Politburo

Meanwhile, Segal began aggressively pushing his theory at home. In late summer of 1986, he asked for a meeting

Segal Memorandums to the Ministry of Health

1. If AIDS spread at the current rate, Segal predicted, American hospitals would soon be overwhelmed, as every AIDS patient “is on average being hospitalized for 82 days until death and costs on average \$49,348.” By 1990, the cost of care for patients would “ruin the country economically.” If one could persuade Americans that AIDS was the result of war preparations, Segal argued, the epidemic could become “an important political factor.” And since a majority of AIDS victims were young men eligible for military service, the disease would lead to “a military and economic weakening.... Overall, the United States is facing a decade of gravest economic problems.” Since AIDS spread exponentially, countries currently less affected—such as the Warsaw Pact states—would be much better off for many years. “This optimistic prognosis, however, has a reverse side,” Segal cautioned. Due to the expected rapid spread of AIDS in the West, the Americans would lose their capability to wage war against Moscow in the next 10 years. When the American president became aware of this decline, “would he not contemplate the idea of a preemptive strike in the next years? With [President Ronald] Reagan and [Vice President George H.W.] Bush, such a reaction cannot be ruled out.”⁵⁸

2. In the second memo, Segal took swipes at his critics. One of these, Professor Niels Sönnichsen, representing the GDR at an AIDS summit of the World Health Organization in Graz, Austria, in April 1986, had concluded his lecture by saying that AIDS originated—“as we know”—in Africa. “This statement is, as a matter of fact, false,” Segal commented and added: “[Sönnichsen’s] remarks can only be viewed as a formal kowtow to the US-supported thesis.” Then Segal took on Professor Viktor Zhdanov, director of the Ivanovsky Institute of Virology, the Soviet Union’s top AIDS expert, at the second international conference on AIDS in Paris in June 1986. Zhdanov had reported on the case of a 14-year-old girl who had contracted lymphadenopathy, an early indicator of infection with HIV. Soviet scientists had traced the girl’s infection to a series of blood transfusions in 1974 and concluded the AIDS virus must already have existed at that time—a blow to Segal’s theory of its 1979 origins in the United States. Segal indignantly pointed out, “One could infer [from Zhdanov’s statement] that AIDS did not spread from New York to the rest of the world but was imported to America from the Soviet Union.” He then accused Zhdanov of lying.⁵⁹

with Hermann Axen, the East German Politburo member responsible for foreign affairs, and offered two memorandums for consideration. The first memorandum demonstrated that Segal deemed AIDS to be both a medical problem and a political weapon. As a medical problem for the United States, he predicted, AIDS would eventually overwhelm the nation’s economy, and, if Americans could be made to believe their government had caused the

disaster, the US political situation would change drastically. At the same time, he warned, the economic consequences would lead US leaders into desperate and warlike acts. (See Segal Memorandums in text box.)

In the other memorandum, Segal took on East German and Soviet scientists who contradicted him. Segal charged the East German with being subservient to the United States

for having agreed that the HIV virus had originated in Africa. After detailing what was wrong with the Soviet scientist—the USSR’s top AIDS expert had in 1986 pinpointed a case of HIV infection in the USSR that preceded the virus’s supposed birth at Fort Detrick—Segal accused him of lying.

It is evident from the second memorandum that Segal was solely interested in bringing political pressure to bear upon colleagues from bloc countries with opinions that differed from his own, rather than engage them in a professional dialogue. Indeed, as a political activist, Segal had reason to be upset with Zhdanov. The Soviet scientist’s comments threatened to pull the rug from underneath Segal’s own theory. When asked by a reporter whether the United States had developed the AIDS virus, Zhdanov replied bluntly: “That is a ridiculous question. Perhaps it was the Martians.”⁶⁰

Axen referred Segal to Karl Seidel, head of the health department of the central committee of the SED (East Germany’s ruling communist party), and the two met on 17 September 1986. In this meeting, Segal reiterated his “assumption” (underlined in the minutes of the meeting) that AIDS was the result of biological warfare experiments at Fort Detrick. Segal conceded that this assertion was merely “a hypothesis, albeit a probable one.” Since the Soviet bloc was only minimally affected by AIDS, Segal argued the GDR

should abandon its “defensive publishing practice” and begin denouncing the “true culprit” of the AIDS epidemic, i.e., the United States.

Segal solicited guidance from the SED central committee as to how he should proceed and expressed interest in working with the Ministry of Health AIDS task force under Professor Sönnichsen—even though one of Segal’s memorandums disparaged Sönnichsen. Segal also expressed disappointment that officials had not paid sufficient attention to his own work.

Seidel briefed Kurt Hager, a hard-line Politburo member and the SED’s chief ideologue, on the meeting and suggested how to deal with Segal and the AIDS issue. Seidel pointed out that Segal’s theses, even if only partially substantiated, would portend the “unmasking of steps for biological war preparations of US imperialism, which is politically highly explosive. Especially the well-founded polemics against the long-tailed-monkey theory of the origins of AIDS [in Africa], should reinforce anti-imperialist sentiments and activities of numerous political forces in Africa who must perceive this theory as an insult and disparagement by the schemes of US imperialism.” He recommended that Segal be allowed to pursue his work without restrictions and that he and his wife become consultants to the AIDS task force. He also suggested that the GDR publish more material on AIDS, which “also takes into account the above-

West German media reported a mysterious visit of two “US diplomats” to Jakob and Lilli Segal in East Berlin.

mentioned anti-imperialist goal.”⁶¹

Hager may not have been aware of the details of the AIDS disinformation campaign, but he probably knew about it in general.⁶² In any event, he rejected most of Seidel’s recommendations, although he authorized the Segals’ participation in the AIDS task force. Hager concluded that the GDR should maintain its restrictive AIDS information policy, and “since Comrade Segal himself speaks of a hypothesis, reproduction [of his theses] in official GDR publications must be avoided. I do not know to what extent his assumptions can be published in relevant foreign journals. Of course, he alone would be answerable for them.”⁶³

For Segal, support from the SED leadership would have carried obvious advantages. His AIDS hypothesis offered him the chance of a lifetime—advancing the cause of communism while increasing his own name recognition far beyond the scientific community and East Germany. Segal doubtlessly also realized that his work would endear him to the SED leadership, which would have supported his research efforts and sponsored trips abroad, a major perk for a GDR citizen.

But why did Hager turn down most of Segal’s proposals and avoid anything that could be

construed as an official endorsement? In fact, Hager’s decision to keep Segal at arm’s length was a clever move from a disinformation operation perspective. By keeping Segal at a distance, Hager maintained at least a semblance of scientific independence for the AIDS campaign’s front man and denied Western observers the opportunity to quickly dismiss Segal’s utterances as state-controlled propaganda. Another reason for Hager’s reluctance to endorse Segal was probably East German leader Erich Honecker’s angling for an official state visit to Washington, DC. The last thing Honecker needed was to have an anti-American active measure of his own secret service blow up and derail his cherished project.⁶⁴

A Mysterious Visit

Shortly after Segal’s correspondence with the SED leadership, West German media reported a mysterious visit of two “US diplomats” to Jakob and Lilli Segal in East Berlin. According to a report in the weekly *Der Spiegel*—apparently based on an interview with Segal—the two showed up at his doorstep in mid-October 1986, flashed their credentials, politely asked for permission to enter, and began to “cross-examine” Segal for two hours about his hypothesis. Segal was “certain they were from the CIA.”⁶⁵ He later elaborated that the two visitors “wanted to

Heym's words carried significant moral weight ... and his enlistment in the AIDS campaign was a major coup.

know where we got our information. They were interested to know whether the information was correct or not. They were merely looking for the traitor [who had revealed the secrets to Segal]. In turn, they offered us wonderful working conditions, which we did not accept, though.”⁶⁶

Segal appears not to have questioned the credentials of his visitors. With his conspiratorial mindset, the incident must have confirmed his worst suspicions; the appearance of the two “CIA men” showed US authorities to be totally unconcerned about the consequences of their “actions” and merely interested in tracking and presumably punishing those responsible for leaking the secret.

However, the story can hardly be taken at face value. For one thing, it is virtually inconceivable that CIA officers would have “cross-examined” a well-known East German scientist with connections to MfS and KGB in one of the best monitored cities of the Soviet bloc. As one former CIA station chief in Germany wrote, “East Germany’s ubiquitous security service had such an iron grip on its people that almost no one dared spy for the Americans.”⁶⁷ Had the CIA really wished to contact Segal, it could have done so easily on one of his trips abroad. But why would it? US intelligence knew Segal’s theory was humbug and therefore

had no incentive to have him “cross-examined,” in Berlin or elsewhere.

In all likelihood Segal’s visitors were HVA officers intent on building up Segal’s resolve by *posing* as CIA men visiting in diplomatic guise and raising questions that allowed Segal to conclude that his theory had struck a nerve in Washington.

Segal was unlikely to have invented the story. By this time he was a sincere believer in the veracity of his theory, and the invention of such a fairy tale does not correspond with his missionary zeal for spreading the “truth.” Moreover, a yarn about CIA operations in East Berlin, published in the Western media, would have gotten him into serious trouble with the GDR security apparatus. Yet there were no repercussions for Segal.

Only one organization in East Germany, the MfS, had the authority and wherewithal to carry out a deception operation—if that is what it was. Günter Bohnsack, a former HVA X officer deeply involved in the East German AIDS disinformation campaign, has little doubt that the two visitors were from the HVA, and he recalls “overhearing comments from M. Wolf to the effect that the dear professor needed to be ‘propped up.’ ... This ‘CIA visit’ was certainly staged.”⁶⁸ Given that Segal repeatedly referred to the “CIA visit,” the HVA

operation must be rated a success.

Another Dupe

On 18 February 1987, the major West German daily newspaper *tageszeitung* published a lengthy interview by the famous East German author Stefan Heym with Jakob Segal on AIDS.⁶⁹ Segal and Heym had much in common. Like Segal, Heym was a German of Jewish descent with communist sympathies, and like Segal he left Germany when the Nazis came to power in 1933. Heym emigrated to the United States in 1935, became a US citizen, and served in a psychological warfare unit of the US Army in World War II. In 1952, he returned all his American military commendations in protest of the Korean War, moved to Prague, and in the following year to East Germany, where he quickly became a literary and political icon.

Heym’s words carried significant moral weight in East Germany and beyond, and his enlistment in the AIDS campaign was a major coup for Segal and the HVA. Heym looked favorably on Segal’s theses, but like his interviewee, he was probably unaware of HVA involvement. The *tageszeitung* was an anti-status-quo, left-of-center newspaper, independent of Moscow but critical of the United States. As such, it represented the perfect vehicle for Segal and the HVA, and the interview had the intended

effect. As a contemporary reader observed:

Consider the peculiarity of the situation: Two well-known, respected East Germans publish a theory propounding the notion that AIDS is caused by a man-made virus produced by American biological warfare researchers—but they do so in West Berlin. They are not permitted to publish their theory in newspapers in their own country, which is officially anti-American and especially vituperative about the CIA. It is impossible to give a verifiable explanation for this reticence, but one may surmise that in the GDR the politics of AIDS has remained the province of medical personnel rather than political propagandists.⁷⁰

This naive conclusion by a Western academic would have pleased intelligence headquarters in East Berlin.

Still Another Dupe

The HVA's biggest coup was yet to come. In the mid-1980s, the Austrian-born best-selling author Johannes Mario Simmel mulled over a book project on the perils of genetic manipulation and biological warfare. By that time, Simmel had already authored 20 novels, numerous screenplays, and various short stories and children's books. His works had been translated into 25 languages and sold over 65 million copies. By sheer coincidence, HVA Department III (elec-

The naive conclusion by a Western academic would have pleased intelligence headquarters in East Berlin.

tronic surveillance) recorded a phone conversation referencing Simmel's project and forwarded a copy to Department X. The disinformation specialists spotted an opportunity and decided to anonymously send Simmel material pertaining to Segal's AIDS theory.⁷¹

The result was, from the East German perspective, phenomenal. Released in mid-1987, Simmel's 500-page novel, *Doch mit den Clowns kamen die Tränen* [Along with the clowns came the tears] revolved around a biological arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two superpowers were portrayed as equally cynical, ruthless, and unethical in their pursuit of a super germ. In the foreword, Simmel insisted that "The monstrous experiments I report on have already been successfully conducted by some scientists." One protagonist cites Heym's interview with Segal in the *ta-geszeitung* as evidence for the monstrosity of the superpowers' goals:

He [Segal] is convinced that genetic scientists at Fort Detrick have experimentally generated the AIDS virus HTLV III [sic]. However, since the infection's initial effect is minor and the incubation period lasts two to five years, they didn't consider the virus viable in humans and sent the infected test persons—yes, yes, yes, they work with test persons there, in this

case long-term inmates of a prison for men!—back to their cells.⁷²

The book quickly became a bestseller and spawned a popular three-part TV program. Raving about his agency's coup, Markus Wolf proudly piled 10 copies of Simmel's novel on his desk. Bohnsack and his colleagues were both happy and surprised that Simmel accepted the HVA material as genuine and made such extensive use of it.⁷³

Simmel's uncritical acceptance of the HVA's disinformation package most likely was the product of naivety, moralistic zeal, and eagerness to tell a good story. Shortly after the book was released, Simmel said about himself more insightfully than he would have realized at the time: "Simmel is in a fatal way naive and starry-eyed. He may come across as cunning and clever, but he steps into every trap that's out there."⁷⁴

Back to the USSR

Meanwhile, the Soviets' own propaganda machine went into high gear. Moscow understood that repetition of a particular theme over an extended period of time was key to a successful disinformation campaign,⁷⁵ and the Soviets promoted the AIDS story's worldwide dissemination through radio broadcasts, rumors, posters, handbills, forgeries, and leaflets (some of which displayed pornographic

The merger of the ethnic weapons and AIDS campaigns created a powerful narrative in Africa.

caricatures of US soldiers). Soviet propagandists even lifted some stories about the US government's alleged creation of AIDS verbatim from a New York gay magazine, the *New York Native*, which in November 1986 called for a US congressional investigation into the origins of AIDS.⁷⁶

Soviet efforts promptly paid off. Third World media reported the AIDS falsehood widely, and even the established British newspapers *Sunday Express* and *Daily Telegraph* recounted Segal's "findings" uncritically. By late 1987, the story had circulated in the media of 80 countries, appearing in over 200 periodicals in 25 languages.⁷⁷ "If media replay is an indication of success," noted a US official, "then this campaign has been very successful."⁷⁸

The Soviets paid special attention to countries with US military bases on their soil. In late 1985, North Korea began its own AIDS propaganda operation, portraying US troops in South Korea as carriers of the epidemic. Turkish broadcasts emanating from the USSR urged the closure of US bases because they were allegedly breeding grounds for AIDS. And an English-language, Soviet-inspired broadcast in Asia alleged that outbreaks of AIDS "are as a rule registered in the areas near American war bases."⁷⁹ By targeting nations where American troops were based, such as South Korea and

Turkey, the Soviets sought to stir concern among the local population, create pressure on US allies to send American troops packing, and generally discourage contact with American citizens.⁸⁰

The Soviets also began to broaden the campaign's focus, merging it with other disinformation campaigns. A particularly effective twist was the claim that the US government had designed AIDS as an ethnic weapon against black people. The "ethnic weapon" theme had first appeared around 1980 in the Soviet active measures repertoire. In an effort to hitch the United States to the widely detested South African apartheid regime, Moscow spread the rumor that Washington was aiding Pretoria in the development of weapons to eliminate nonwhites.⁸¹

Since these claims were baseless, the Soviets employed the well-established technique of propping up their conspiracy theories with circumstantial evidence. For example, an American military manual had indeed noted in 1975 that "it is theoretically possible to develop so-called 'ethnic chemical weapons,' which would be designed to exploit naturally occurring differences in vulnerability among specific population groups. Thus, such a weapon would be capable of incapacitating or killing a selected enemy population to a significantly

greater extent than the population of friendly forces."⁸²

In June 1987, Novosti news agency editor Valentin Falin told a USIA official slyly: "And given the US treatment of American Indians, putting smallpox blankets on them, and the placement of Japanese-Americans in detention during the Second World War, the development of an ethnic weapon by the US sounds pretty logical."⁸³

The Impact in Africa

The merger of the ethnic weapons and AIDS campaigns created a powerful narrative that threatened to undermine America's reputation in Africa. Allegations that Washington was using AIDS as a racial weapon against Africans began circulating across the continent in the wake of the nonaligned nations summit in Harare in 1986, where HVA and KGB had promoted Segal's paper so diligently.⁸⁴ On 7 June 1987, the *Patriot* rejoined the fray with an article accusing the US Department of Defense of conducting experiments in Africa to determine the "depopulating effect" of AIDS in strategically important areas of the continent like Zaire.

In early 1988, a Nigerian newspaper varied the theme somewhat by claiming that the spread of AIDS in central and western Africa was the result of rich Americans testing contaminated polio vaccine on poor blacks during the 1960s.⁸⁵ The tale was told and retold in a

number of variations in media reports across the continent.

The US Watch over the Story

In 1981, the US government created the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG), an interagency committee chaired by the Department of State, and including representatives of the CIA, USIA, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the Departments of Defense and Justice.⁸⁶ AMWG officials monitored Soviet disinformation campaigns, issued regularly updated reports, talked to the Western press, personally called editors of newspapers that ran Soviet-sponsored disinformation stories, and occasionally confronted Soviet officials directly about particular active measures. Herbert Romerstein, who joined USIA in 1982, and his assistant Todd Leventhal, played a critical role in monitoring and countering the AIDS campaign for AMWG.⁸⁷

The disinformation campaign first appeared on AMWG's radar with its resumption in the pages of the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* in October 1985. Zapevalov's reference to the *Patriot* as source of his allegations, led USIA to take a closer look at the Indian newspaper. The agency was aware that the *Patriot* was being financed by the KGB and that its editor was the recipient of the Stalin peace prize.⁸⁸ However, the Americans were initially unable to locate the original *Patriot* let-

Because the AIDS disinformation campaign jeopardized cooperation with US scientists, Moscow began to listen to Washington's complaints.

ter. Zapevalov had not mentioned the date of the item, and USIA only searched back to 1 January 1984. State Department spokesman Charles E. Redman responded in early November 1986 that no such article had ever appeared in the *Patriot*.⁸⁹

The Soviets took advantage of the mistake with gusto. On 19 November, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* printed a lengthy article titled, "It Existed, It Existed, Boy" that triumphantly reproduced the first page of the *Patriot* letter. Turning the US effort to pillory the Soviets' disinformation campaign on its head, the paper referred to AMWG as a bureau for "disinformation, analysis and retaliatory measures" and lambasted Redman for his erroneous claim: "We don't know whether Redman is part of the personnel of the bureau of disinformation, but one could boldly recommend him. He has mastered the methods of disinformation."⁹⁰

Undeterred, US officials continued their counter-campaign. USIA officers repeatedly discussed the techniques and goals of Soviet disinformation with the media.⁹¹ And AMWG spent time and effort dissecting Segal's theses and highlighting their inconsistencies and contradictions to lawmakers and the public. For one, they argued, the two viruses Segal claimed were used to create the

AIDS virus—VISNA and HTLV-I—were too distinct from one another to be cut and spliced together. The State Department also pointed to recent findings that suggested AIDS had existed in human populations since at least 1959—long before the AIDS virus, per Segal's contention, had been created at Fort Detrick.

In addition, AMWG collected opinions from reputable AIDS experts who contradicted Segal. The Americans were especially keen on airing the comments of scientists from the Soviet bloc, such as Segal's nemeses Dr. Zhdanov, who stated categorically that "an AIDS virus has not been obtained artificially," and Dr. Sönnichsen, who told *Der Spiegel* that "Segal's comment is nothing but a hypothesis, and not a very original one at that. Others before him have claimed the same. If you open Meyer's Dictionary under the term 'hypothesis' you can read: hypothesis is an opinion unproven by facts. That is my comment."⁹²

The Environment Shifts

In the late 1980s, AIDS began spreading through the Soviet Union, and Moscow developed a greater interest in exchanging medical research on the subject than it had a few years before. Because the AIDS disinformation campaign jeopardized cooperation with US scientists,

As Moscow shifted its focus to subjects other than AIDS, the East Germans became the campaign's primary sponsor.

Moscow began to listen to Washington's complaints. In a 23 October 1987, meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, US Secretary of State George Shultz charged that the USSR had peddled "bum dope" on the AIDS subject.

Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Academy of Sciences, through the government's official newspaper *Izvestia*, disavowed the thesis that AIDS was artificially created.⁹³ In the summer of 1988, the Academy's president, Dr. Vadim I. Pokrovskiy followed up in an interview with the Russian federation's official newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, by stating that "not a single Soviet scientist, not a single medical or scientific institution, shares this position."⁹⁴

The End of the Campaign?

But did the Soviets genuinely believe in the wisdom of discontinuing their AIDS disinformation campaign and did they really tell their active measures apparatus to stand down? For one, Moscow had never publicly acknowledged authorship of the campaign. The Soviet Academy of Sciences merely confirmed what many respectable Soviet and East European scientists believed anyway and had uttered before—that AIDS was not artificially created.

But the Academy's statement could not and did not commit Soviet intelligence and propa-

gandists to stop saying the opposite. Soviet media coverage of Segal's theses did decline markedly in late 1987, but it did not disappear altogether. On the same day that *Izvestia* published the Academy's disavowal, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* repeated the AIDS disinformation claims and defended the Soviet media's right to "report different views."⁹⁵ And on 13 February 1988, Radio Moscow broadcast an uncritical interview with Segal who reiterated his theses.⁹⁶

Even though Soviet bloc media broadcasting of the AIDS disinformation campaign had largely ceased by summer 1988, the story continued to appear in Third World papers with reputed Soviet links. On 3 July 1988, the Ghanaian weekly *Echo* reiterated a Novosti article about the alleged link between AIDS and US biological research, as did the Indian *Maharashtra Herald* on 26 August 1988. When confronted by US officials two months later, Novosti chief Falin issued a standard defense by quoting alleged "foreign sources" and freedom of the Soviet press under *glasnost*.⁹⁷ As late as 1989, AIDS disinformation appeared in over a dozen media reports throughout the world, including in the Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, West Germany, Brazil, Panama, Yugoslavia, Peru, Turkey, Great Britain, and Zambia.⁹⁸

Concurrently, the Soviets conceived other, no less vicious disinformation themes. In January 1987, Moscow launched a campaign to assign responsibility for the mass-suicide of over 900 members of the People's Temple in Guyana in 1978 to the CIA. Its centerpiece was the book *The Death of Jonestown: Crime of the CIA* by three Soviet journalists who contended that CIA hirelings had killed the cult members "for their intent to gain asylum in the USSR."

Another heinous disinformation campaign was initiated in April 1987 when the Soviet media began reporting false allegations to the effect that wealthy Americans were importing children from Latin America and had them butchered in order to use their body parts for organ transplants.⁹⁹ Like the AIDS disinformation campaign, these disinformation themes were designed to tarnish America's image in the world, and particularly to alienate developing countries from Washington.

HVA X and Segal Still at It

As Moscow shifted its active measures focus to subjects other than AIDS, the East Germans became the AIDS campaign's primary sponsor. Around 1987, HVA X gave Segal material "from secret service circles" on the 1969 congressional testimony of Donald MacArthur, then deputy director of research and engineering in the Office of the Secretary of

Defense. In his testimony, MacArthur stated that “within a period of five to 10 years it would be possible to produce a synthetic biological agent, an agent that does not naturally exist and for which no natural immunity could have been acquired.” He elaborated further that “A research program to explore the feasibility of this could be completed in approximately five years at a total cost of \$10 million.”¹⁰⁰

For Segal, the MacArthur testimony was near-certain evidence that the Pentagon had not only contemplated an HIV-type virus since 1969 but also had gone through with the project within the 10-year time frame MacArthur had suggested. Henceforth, MacArthur’s testimony became a cornerstone of Segal’s conspiracy theory. Segal ignored the fact that MacArthur left the Pentagon one year after his testimony to go into private business.¹⁰¹

Segal also continued to brush aside President Richard Nixon’s 1969 ban of offensive biological research by contending that such programs continued unabated under the guise of the National Cancer Institute (NCI). Part of the Bethesda-based National Institutes of Health, NCI opened a branch at Fort Detrick in 1971, which focused on identifying the causes of cancer, AIDS, and related diseases—more than enough circumstantial evidence to earn the institute a prominent place in Segal’s conspiracy theory.¹⁰²

An HVA X influence agent in West Germany did the East Germans’ bidding with loyalty and little regard for the historic changes sweeping through Europe.

The reference to NCI led Segal straight to another “villain.” It so happened that Robert Gallo, one of the pioneer scientists involved in the identification of HIV, was appointed head of the NCI’s Laboratory of Tumor Cell Biology in 1971. In his earlier publications and utterances, Segal had dispassionately and largely accurately described Gallo’s contribution to the identification of HIV, but he sharply changed his tack in the late 1980s, when Gallo became the key figure in Segal’s theory. In his final years, Segal developed an apparent pathological hatred of Gallo as the man personally responsible for creating AIDS, and he seized every opportunity to lambast the American scientist.

In 1989, just one year before East Germany’s demise, Segal went on a lecture tour across West Germany. Even though the SED leadership had avoided endorsing Segal and he did not travel as an official GDR representative, his trip was inconceivable without the Politburo’s knowledge and approval. In his presentations, Segal touted his latest piece of evidence—the MacArthur hearing of 1969—and pilloried Gallo.¹⁰³ According to the recollections of one of his listeners, Segal referred to Gallo as “a huge gangster” [*ein ganz grosser Gangster*] who was responsible for creating the virus.¹⁰⁴

West German and British TV picked up Segal’s story. The West German TV production “AIDS: The African Legend” uncritically featured Segal’s disinformation claims. The “documentary” was broadcast by Westdeutscher and Hessischer Rundfunk in the first half of 1989, and by Britain’s Channel Four in January 1990.¹⁰⁵ There is no evidence of direct HVA X involvement in this production, but East Berlin certainly rated the broadcasting of their disinformation by gullible Western journalists—the “useful idiots” of Soviet bloc intelligence—a major success.

HVA X also used a tested vehicle to spread Segal’s thesis directly in the West German media. One of the department’s influence agents in West Germany was Michael Opperskalski, listed under the code name “Abraham” in HVA X records.¹⁰⁶ Opperskalski’s Cologne-based magazine *Geheim* and its English-language edition *Top Secret* published crude Soviet bloc disinformation stories throughout the late 1980s. “Abraham” did the East Germans’ bidding with loyalty and little regard for the historic changes sweeping through Europe. The summer/autumn 1990 issue of *Top Secret*, published on the eve of German reunification, carried an article by Jakob and Lilli Segal, titled “AIDS—Its Nature and Origins.”¹⁰⁷

Segal died in 1995, completely unrepentant and utterly convinced of the American origins of AIDS.

Segal's last major accomplishment during the Cold War was the publication in 1990 of his book *AIDS—die Spur führt ins Pentagon* [AIDS—the trail leads to the Pentagon], which incorporated the bits on Gallo and the MacArthur hearing into his original thesis. The book was published by *Neuer Weg*, a publishing house closely associated with the far-left, Maoist Marxist Leninist Party of Germany (MLPD).

By then, the HVA was already dissolving, and its employees spent much of their time shredding files. In the book's appendix is an anonymous letter addressed to Segal and his wife, dated 8 October 1989 (one month before the fall of the Berlin Wall). The letter's author relays information allegedly obtained from someone linked to the US "military intelligence establishment." This person confirmed "everything you [Segal] have said—the Pentagon grant, the work at Ft. Detrick, the experiment on prisoners who first brought the virus to the streets of New York." The writer insinuated that it would be too risky to reveal his contact's name because "he truly recounts so many amazing things....My God, it's easy to become paranoid when looking into these matters. These shit-heads [*Diese Scheisskerle!*]"¹⁰⁸ Whether the letter constituted a final active measure of HVA X disinformation or not, it was certainly the kind of material that had been fed to Segal throughout the late 1980s.¹⁰⁹

Post-Cold War

The end of the Cold War threw the KGB into disarray, and the MfS disappeared altogether. Yet Segal continued his crusade as vigorously as ever. In May 1991, he gave a lengthy interview to the left-of-center Berlin weekly *Freitag*. He reiterated many of his earlier theories and claimed that "in Germany, only a single publication has contradicted us." In August 1991, the Swedish channel TV-2 featured an uncritical news program with Segal. In a February 1992 interview with the Montreal *Gazette*, Segal, echoing past arguments, focused on the economic ramifications of his thesis: "If the United States were recognized as the producer of the AIDS virus, it would destroy the economy. Think of the compensation claims! This is why they will never admit it."

When confronted by critics, Segal stood his ground. A former USIA consultant, who interviewed Segal in 1991, recalled that the retired professor "presented himself as a die-hard Marxist, totally incapable of accepting the demise of communist East Germany. Segal, then 80 years old, insisted that his information on the origin of the HIV virus was solid, and he denied having any contact with the Stasi."¹¹⁰ Segal died in 1995, completely unrepentant and utterly convinced of the American origins of AIDS.

Still Kicking, but Why?

Neither the end of the KGB HVA campaign, nor Jakob Segal's death, or the "confessions" of those responsible for the AIDS disinformation campaign stopped the further diffusion of the theory. Whence its longevity?

A few individuals involved in the original campaign carried on after the end of the Cold War.¹¹¹ More importantly, however, the conspiracy theory assumed a life of its own. In sub-Saharan Africa, where KGB and HVA had directed much of their firepower, media and word of mouth spread and developed the legend of AIDS as a biological weapon, often adding bizarre twists to the story. In March 1991, for example, a letter to the Zimbabwean daily *Bulawayo Chronicle* charged not only that the United States had invented AIDS, but that the CIA had exported "AIDS-oiled condoms" to other countries in 1986.¹¹²

As AIDS took a progressively greater toll on Africans, the notion of a conspiracy became more deeply entrenched on the continent. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe once described AIDS as a "white man's plot." And in 2004, Kenyan biologist and Nobel peace prize winner Wangari Maathai reportedly ascribed AIDS to the machinations of "evil-minded scientists" and contended that the disease was meant to "wipe out the black race."¹¹³ Even though reliable statistics are hard to come by, it seems rea-

sonable to conclude that many Africans believe the claims.¹¹⁴

The AIDS conspiracy theory has a firm hold in other places. In 1992, 15 percent of randomly selected Americans considered definitely or probably true the statement “the AIDS virus was created deliberately in a government laboratory.” African Americans were particularly prone to subscribe to the AIDS conspiracy theory. A 1997 survey found that 29 percent of African Americans considered the statement “AIDS was deliberately created in a laboratory to infect black people” true or possibly true. And a 2005 study by the RAND Corporation and Oregon State University revealed that nearly 50 percent of African Americans thought AIDS was man-made, with over a quarter considering AIDS the product of a government lab. Twelve percent believed it was created and spread by the CIA, and 15 percent opined AIDS was a form of genocide against black people.¹¹⁵

Certainly, beliefs in a government conspiracy to create and/or spread AIDS cannot be ascribed solely to the Soviet bloc disinformation campaign. The marginalization of homosexuals and the long history of oppression and discrimination of blacks made these groups inherently suspicious of government institutions. And some disclosures—e.g. the infamous Tuskegee experiment sponsored by the US Public Health Service, which deliberately left several hundred African Americans suffering from syphilis untreated in order to

Soviet bloc intelligence had created a monster that has outlived its creators.

observe the natural progression of the disease—not surprisingly leave African Americans predisposed to believe the AIDS conspiracy theory.¹¹⁶

In addition, since the scientific community was initially unable to explain the outbreak and spread of AIDS, groups disproportionately affected—such as homosexuals and blacks—predictably sought a communal interpretation of the mysterious disease. Indeed, conspiracy theories about the US government’s responsibility for creating AIDS cropped up independently of KGB and HVA manipulation in gay communities in the early 1980s.¹¹⁷

In Sum

Yet it would be mistaken to dismiss the Soviet bloc disinformation campaign as irrelevant or as the US government’s knee-jerk reflex to “blame the Russians.”¹¹⁸ Studies have shown that whoever makes the first assertion about an event or occurrence has a large advantage over those who deny it later.¹¹⁹ When AIDS emerged in the early 1980s, Soviet bloc disinformation specialists quickly recognized the opportunity the mysterious epidemic offered, acted with alacrity, and planted disinformation only months after the scientific community had coined the term “AIDS” and established the existence of a causative virus. Equipped with an intuitive understanding of the human

psyche, Soviet and East German disinformation specialists applied the techniques that stimulate the growth and spread of rumors and conspiracy theories—simplistic scapegoating, endless repetition, and the clever mixing of lies and half-truths with undeniable facts. Once the AIDS conspiracy theory was lodged in the global subconscious, it became a pandemic in its own right. Like any good story, it traveled mostly by word of mouth, especially within the most affected sub-groups. Having effectively harnessed the dynamics of rumors and conspiracy theories, Soviet bloc intelligence had created a monster that has outlived its creators.¹²⁰



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Endnotes

1. In a lecture to Department X recruits in 1986, cited in: Günter Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer, *Auftrag: Irreführung: Wie die Stasi Politik im Westen machte* (Hamburg: Carlsen, 1992), 19.
2. Michael Herman, *Intelligence and Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55f.
3. House Committee on Intelligence, *Soviet Active Measures*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 31.
4. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *Instructions from the Center: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations 1975–1985* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), 3.
5. For the Panorama broadcast of 28 January 1991, see *Rote Fahne*, 30 December 2004, and Bohnsack letter to author, 22 September 2008; Bohnsack and Brehmer, *Auftrag: Irreführung*.
6. Statement by CIA Deputy Director of Operations John McMahon, House Committee on Intelligence, *Soviet Covert Action: The Forgery Offensive*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 6.
7. According to Michael Herman, in 1987, only 3 percent of the CIA's staff was involved in covert action, and only 5 percent of the agency's budget went into it. (Hermann, *Intelligence Power*; 56.)
8. For information on the KGB's planting of the Kennedy conspiracy theory, see Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 343–50; for East German Nazi disinformation campaigns against West Germany, see Hubertus Knabe, *Die unterwanderte Republik. Stasi im Westen* (Berlin: Propyläen, 1999), 121–52.
9. Ladislav Bittman, *The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), 49. In the same vein, see Ilya Dzhirkvelov, *Secret Servant: My Life with the KGB and the Soviet Elite* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 304f.
10. Operation RYAN (the KGB codename) had KGB officers in Western capitals carry out a regular census of the number of cars and lighted windows at all hours at government buildings and military installations possibly involved in preparations for nuclear war and to report immediately any deviations from the norm. See Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, 589.
11. House Intelligence Committee, *Soviet Covert Action*, 30.
12. Bittman, *Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Research Corp., 1972), 125.
13. Bittman, *Deception Game*, 125.
14. The West German security service publication *Innere Sicherheit*, 1 (20 March 1985), 2, noted that such letters were typically provided not as originals but as photographs of alleged originals, so as to make it more difficult to detect the forgery.
15. Bittman, *KGB and Soviet Disinformation*, 44.
16. *Innere Sicherheit* 1, (3 March 1985), 2; US Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda 1986–87* (Washington, DC: Department of State Publications, 1987), ix, 4; US Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1987–1988* (Washington, DC: Department of State Publications, 1989), 23.
17. US Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities... 1986–87*, 34f. The “confessions” had no basis in fact.
18. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, 503f. Again, the Soviet claim was spurious.
19. *Washington Post*, 22 April 1980.
20. Lee Richards, “Whispers of War: The British World War II Rumor Campaign,” *The Intelligencer* 16, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 54.
21. Jonathan B. Tucker, “The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 8 (Spring 2001): 31.
22. Bohnsack and Brehmer, *Auftrag: Irreführung*, 219.
23. Bohnsack letter to author, 6 March 2009.
24. Primakov, then SVR (Russian foreign intelligence) director, made his remarks to graduate students in Moscow during an SVR recruitment drive in 1992; *Boston Globe*, 19 March 1992; *Izvestiya*, 19 March 1992.
25. *Patriot*, 17 July 1983.
26. “Interagency Intelligence Study,” cited in House Intelligence Committee, *Soviet Active Measures*, 55.

These charges were intended to undermine the regime of the Pakistani president, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, a pivotal ally in Washington's efforts to assist anti-Soviet Afghan mujahideen.

27. Interviews with KGB Major-General (ret.) Oleg Kalugin, 1 October and 22 December 2008.

28. *Army Research, Development & Acquisition* 23, no. 4 (July–August 1982): 48f.

29. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, 628.

30. Bittman, *Deception Game*, 227; Todd Leventhal, "The origins of AIDS disinformation," January 9, 2009, available online at <http://blogs.america.gov/rumors/2009/01/09/the-origins-of-aids-disinformation/>. Additional comments on the KGB's use of non-native speakers as translators were provided to the author by Todd Leventhal, 25 February 2009.

31. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 324; Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, 507.

32. The *Patriot* was established under the auspices of the KGB resident in New Delhi, Radomir Aleksandrovich Bogdanov, with the assistance of KGB officer Ilya Dzhirkvelov, see Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, 503, and Dzhirkvelov, *Secret Servant*, 303f. For a US assessment of the *Patriot*, see State Department, *Soviet Influence Activities... 1986–87*, 44.

33. David A. Spetrino, "Aids Disinformation," *Studies in Intelligence* 32, no. 4 (1988): 10.

34. Andrew and Gordievsky, *KGB*, 608, 628.

35. Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities... 1986–87*, 34f.

36. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 30 October 1985. I am grateful to Kristina N. Terzieva for an English translation of this and a later article.

37. Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities... 1986–87*, 40.

38. Oleg Kalugin, *The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 158. See a statement to the same effect by Martin C. Portman of the CIA's Directorate of Operations in House Intelligence Committee, *Soviet Active Measures*, 21.

39. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 30 October 1985. Zapevalov's name was not a pseudonym. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, he became a successful businessman, author, and spokesman for Russia's arms-export agency Rosvooruzhenie.

40. The station chief, Larry Devlin, decided not to carry out the assignment. Lumumba was later killed by local rivals. See Larry Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo: A Memoir of 1960–67* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 94–97, 113–14.

41. Bohnsack and Brehmer, *Auftrag: Irreführung*, 219.

42. Bohnsack letter to author, 14 August 2008.

43. Bohnsack and Brehmer, *Auftrag: Irreführung*, 219f; Bohnsack letters to author, 25 July and 14 August 2008.

44. Bittman, *Deception Game*, 141; Bohnsack and Brehmer, *Auftrag: Irreführung*, 40f, 218; Oleg Gordievsky e-mail to author, 20 September 2008; Oleg Gordievsky, *Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky* (London: Macmillan, 1995), 183.

45. *Innere Sicherheit*, 1 (March 20, 1985), 3; Bohnsack letter to author, 14 August 2008.

46. Segal provided his biographical data to edition monochrom in 1993, <http://www.monochrom.at/segal>. See also John O. Koehler, *Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 2000), 260f.

47. Aktennotiz (note for the record) by Kurt Seidel on conversation with Jakob Segal, 17 September 1986, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/vorl.SED 36832 [henceforth SAPMO].

48. Bohnsack letter to author, 25 July 2008. Bohnsack describes Segal as "partly a convinced scientist, partly an operative assistant [*operativer Helfer*], probably a colorful mix."

49. According to Todd Leventhal, who visited Fort Detrick and saw building 550, it was an ordinary looking bungalow with a front porch; interview with Todd Leventhal and Oleg Kalugin, 22 December 2008. Segal may have thought of building 470, locally referred to as "anthrax tower," a pilot plant for testing optimal fermentor and bacterial purification technologies. It was torn down in 2003. Also, he evidently meant "BSL-4" or "Level-4" rather than "P-4" laboratories. BSL-4 or Level-4 laboratories handle

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- deadly diseases that have no cure; see House Committee on Energy and Commerce, *Germs, Viruses and Secrets: The Silent Proliferation of Bio-Laboratories in the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 1, 54.
50. Jakob Segal and Lilli Segal, *AIDS-Die Spur führt ins Pentagon*, second edition (Essen: Verlag Neuer Weg, 1990), 138.
51. Behling e-mails to author, 30 and 31 March 2009.
52. Michael D. Morrissey letter to Noam Chomsky, 14 September 1989, <http://educate-yourself.org/cn/morrisseycorrespondencewithnoamchomsky.shtml>; *Gazette*, 16 February 1992. However, others considered Segal a “pompous ass” (*pene-tranter Wichtiguer*), Behling e-mail to author, 18 November 2008.
53. Jakob Segal, Lilli Segal, and Ronald Dehmlow, *AIDS-its nature and origin* (no place, no date [1986]). I am grateful to US Department of State Anti-Misinformation Officer Todd Leventhal for a copy of the pamphlet.
54. Stefan Nickels, “Geheimprojekt ‘Naomi’: Um den Ursprung von Aids ranken sich seit langem obskure Hypothesen,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*, 17 October 2004. As mentioned earlier, MKNAOMI was the CIA codename for an early Cold War bacteriological weapons research program at Fort Detrick.
55. Behling e-mail to author, 15 July 2008, based on an interview with Bohnsack. In his 1986 pamphlet, Segal quotes an East German publication for his allegations about Fort Detrick: Reinhard Pieckocki, *Genmanipulation: Frevel oder Fortschritt* (Leipzig, Jena, Berlin: Urania Verlag, 1983).
56. Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities...1986-87*, 35; Bohnsack letters to author, 25 July and 14 August 2008. According to Bohnsack, the HVA deployed Capt. Hans Pfeiffer and “officer on special assignment” [Offizier im besonderen Einsatz or OibE] Horst Schoetzki, officially a journalist representing the GDR magazine *Horizont*, to the conference. See also Christhard Läßle, *Verrat verjährt nicht: Lebensgeschichten aus einem einst geteilten Land* (Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe, 2008), 299f.
57. Bohnsack letter to author, 25 July 2008; Spet-rino, “Aids Disinformation,” 11.
58. Segal to Axen, 8 September 1986, memorandum regarding economic aspects of AIDS, SAPMO.
59. Segal to Axen, 27 August 1986, SAPMO.
60. Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities...1986-87*, 37.
61. Kurt Seidel, note for the record, 17 September 1986, SAPMO.
62. Bohnsack letter to author, 26 November 2008. Bohnsack writes that MfS director Erich Mielke did not necessarily inform his Politburo colleagues about ongoing active measures but that Hager was probably aware of the AIDS campaign.
63. Hager to Seidel, 26 September 1986, with copy to General Axen, SAPMO.
64. Bohnsack letter to author, 26 November 2008.
65. *Der Spiegel*, 10 November 1986.
66. Jakob Segal interview, *Freitag*, 17 May 1991.
67. Milt Bearden and James Risen, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Show-down with the KGB* (New York: Random House, 2003), 385.
68. Bohnsack letter to author, 26 November 2008. Between 1970 and 1989, Bohnsack was HVA X liaison with the KGB and was thus informed about joint East German/Soviet disinformation campaigns. Bohnsack letter to author, 14 August 2008.
69. The interview was subsequently published in book form in Kuno Kruse (ed.), *Aids-Erreger aus dem Genlabor? Die Diskussion der rätselhaften Krankheit, die die Welt bedroht* (Berlin: Simon & Leutner, 1987), 15-27.
70. John Borneman, “AIDS in the Two Berlins,” in Douglas Crimp (ed.), *AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 234.
71. Klaus Behling, *Kundschafter a.D.: Das Ende der DDR-Spionage* (Stuttgart, Leipzig: Hohenheim Verlag, 2003), 252f.
72. Johannes Mario Simmel, *Doch mit den Clowns kamen die Tränen* (Munich: Droemer Knauer, 1987), 9, 110f.
73. Wolf resigned his directorship in 1986 but, according to Bohnsack, retained his secret service ID card, personal driver, and assistant and remained as consultant and “guiding spirit” at HVA headquarters; Bohnsack letter, 25 July 2008.
74. *Der Spiegel*, 7 September 1987.
75. Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities...1986-1987*, 29; Shankar Vedantam, “Persis-

tence of Myths Could Alter Public Policy Approach," *Washington Post*, 4 September 2007.

76. Alvin A. Snyder, *Warriors of Disinformation: American Propaganda, Soviet Lies, and the Winning of the Cold War: An Insider's Account* (New York: Arcade, 1995), 113f; Ladislav Bittman, *The New Image-Makers: Soviet Propaganda & Disinformation Today* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), 25.

77. Spetrino, "Aids Disinformation," 9, 11; *Sunday Express*, 26 October 1986; *Daily Telegraph*, 27 October 1986. On the other hand, the *London Times*, 31 October 1986, lambasted the *Express* for giving Segal a platform.

78. USIA official Herbert Romerstein, quoted in *Toronto Star*; 28 April 1987.

79. *Times*, 31 October 1986. See also *Der Spiegel*, 10 November 1986.

80. Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities...1986-87*, 33.

81. United States Information Agency (USIA), *Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost: A Report to Congress* (March 1988), 12; Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities...1986-87*, 35.

82. Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, *A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 240.

83. Snyder, *Warriors of Disinformation*, 116.

84. Spetrino, "Aids Disinformation," 11.

85. Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities...1986-87*, 40; Spetrino, "Aids Disinformation," 14.

86. USIA, *Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost*, 82, 86; Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities...1986-87*, iii. The West Germans established a similar group, *Innere Sicherheit* [internal security], which included representatives from foreign intelligence (BND) and counterintelligence (BfV) agencies; Bohnsack letter, 25 July 2008.

87. Snyder, *Warriors of Disinformation*, 93, 113.

88. Koehler, *Stasi*, 260. Koehler was then working as a consultant to USIA director Charles Z. Wick.

89. Murray Feshbach, "The Early Days of HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the Former Soviet Union" (paper prepared for the conference "Health and Demography in the Former Soviet Union," Harvard University, April 2005), 9, argues that the 1983 *Patriot* letter was a "ghost source" generated by Service A specialists to enable Soviet propagandist to quote a non-Soviet source. Even though the technique of using "ghost sources" was not unknown to Soviet bloc intelligence, it was not employed in this instance. The Indian National Library at Kolkata holds a copy of the *Patriot*, dated 17 July 1983, which carries the AIDS letter.

90. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 19 November 1986. (Translation by Kristina N. Terzieva.)

91. See, for instance, *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 December 1986, and *New York Times*, 8 April 1987.

92. Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities...1987-88*, 33-36; *Der Spiegel*, 9 March 1987.

93. *New York Times*, 5 November 1987.

94. Snyder, *Warriors of Disinformation*, 182f.

95. USIA, *Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost*, 11.

96. Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities...1987-1988*, 2f.

97. Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities...1987-1988*, 4.

98. USIA, *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era 1988-1991: A Report Prepared at the Request of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1992), 71-75. Pagination according to online edition.

99. USIA, *Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost*, 12-49.

100. Behling, *Kundschafter a.D.*, 253; House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1970* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), 129. The text of MacArthur's testimony was made available to the public long before Segal "discovered" it. Paxman and Harris, *A Higher Form of Killing*, 241, also quote from it.

101. Obituary, Donald Malcolm MacArthur, *Washington Post*, 29 November 1988. After leaving government, MacArthur founded Dynamac, which

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helped conduct anthrax sampling after the anonymous attacks in 2001 and performed cleanup at two anthrax-contaminated federal buildings in Washington, DC.

102. Segal mentioned the MacArthur testimony first in a reply to his critics in 1987, see Kruse, *Aids*, 51, 55. Disinformation on the NCI's alleged role was provided by HVA X, see Behling, *Kundschafter a.D.*, 253.

103. Raimund Geene, *AIDS-Politik: Ein neues Krankheitsbild zwischen Medizin, Politik und Gesundheitsförderung* (Frankfurt a.M.: Mabuse, 2000), 294.

104. Michael D. Morrissey letter to Noam Chomsky, 14 September 1989; Chomsky replied that the MacArthur testimony "sends a chill up the spine," Chomsky letter to Morrissey, 28 December 1989; <http://educate-yourself.org/cn/morrisseycorrespondencewithnoamchomsky.shtml>.

105. USIA, *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era*, 70, 73, 75. The producer, Malte Rauch, did not respond to an inquiry from this author regarding the making of his documentary.

106. Knabe, *Der diskrete Charme*, 170.

107. USIA, *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era*, 62.

108. Segal and Segal, *AIDS-die Spur führt ins Pentagon*, 243. The book also contains a censorious essay on U.S. biological warfare research, titled "Biokrieg." The author, Manuel Kiper, subsequently served as a Green Party member of the German parliament from 1994 to 1998.

109. Bohnsack comments: "Maybe he [Segal] wrote it himself, maybe the HVA did. Heaven knows, I don't have a clue." Bohnsack letter to author, 19 January 2009.

110. *Freitag*, 17 May 1991; USIA, *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era*, 64; *Gazette*, 16 February 1992; Koehler, *Stasi*, 261.

111. Gordon Schaffer, *Baby in the Bathwater: Memories of a Political Journalist* (Sussex: Book Guild, 1996), 240, 244; Schaffer was London correspondent

of the *Patriot*. See also the MLPD newspaper *Rote Fahne*, 30 December 2004.

112. USIA, *Soviet Active Measures in the "Post-Cold War" Era*, 66.

113. Peta Thornycroft, "Mugabe Highlights HIV/AIDS Crisis in Zimbabwe," *Voice of America News*, 5 December 2006; *New York Times*, 10 December 2004. Maathai subsequently said her words were taken out of context, but the African journalist who first reported her remarks stood by his original report.

114. Laura M. Bogart, Seth C. Kalichman, Leikness C. Simbayi, letter to the editor, "Endorsement of a Genocidal HIV Conspiracy as a Barrier to HIV Testing in South Africa," *Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiencies* 49, no. 1 (1 September 2008): 115f.

115. Ted Goertzel, "Belief in Conspiracy Theories," *Political Psychology* 15, no. 4 (December 1994): 731–33; Anita M. Waters, "Conspiracy Theories as Ethnosociologies: Explanation and Intention in African American Political Culture," *Journal of Black Studies* 28, no. 1 (September 1997): 117; Laura M. Bogart and Sheryl Thorburn, "Are HIV/AIDS Conspiracy Beliefs a Barrier to HIV Prevention Among African Americans?" *Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes* 38, no. 2 (February 1, 2005): 215.

116. Goertzel, "Belief in Conspiracy Theories," 740.

117. Kruse, *Aids*, 3.

118. Cf. Patricia A. Turner, *I Heard It through the Grapevine: Rumor in African-American Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 156, dismissing a statement by the CIA's Coordinator for Academic Affairs Arthur S. Hulnick, who wrote her on 23 August 1988 that his agency believed rumors linking the CIA to AIDS were the result of Soviet disinformation.

119. Vedantam, "Persistence of Myths," *Washington Post*, 4 September 2007.

120. For an analysis of rumor dynamics, see Robert H. Knapp, "A Psychology of Rumor," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (Spring 1944): especially 26f on the importance of sub-groups.



Military Intelligence at the Front, 1914–18

Terrence J. Finnegan, Col., USAFR (Ret.)

“
Military leaders learned that approaching battle through in-depth study and analysis would prove far more effective than reliance on élan.
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Introduction

Military intelligence at the front advanced remarkably during the Great War, adopting methods and technologies that would remain in place through the 20th century. Before the modern era, national and strategic intelligence (*renseignement* and *Nachricht*, French and German, respectively) came mainly from espionage. With the introduction of aerial reconnaissance deep behind enemy lines, the tools of a modern era would contribute to shaping strategy and assessing enemy intentions.

On the World War I battlefield, as traditional sources—including the military commander’s favorite force arm for intelligence, mobile cavalry—were rendered impotent, armies became entrenched along hundreds of miles of front. With each passing day of 1914, as opposing forces commenced a strategy of positional war, demand mounted for a constant stream of accurate and timely information to target field artillery, the most important weapon in the contemporary arsenal. This demand created new sources of intelligence derived from technologies that were

familiar to Europeans of the day but which had not yet been effectively employed in warfare.

At the front, the conservative military culture was forced to grapple with its tradition and make sense of combat in the new stationary environment. In the face of catastrophic casualties, military leaders soon learned that approaching battle through in-depth study and analysis would prove far more effective than reliance on the élan that spurred the first waves of soldiers to rush forward into walls of lead from machine guns.

They learned that access to accurate and timely information was essential to gain advantage in battle. Their command and control came to depend on constantly collected intelligence from a rapidly expanding list of sources to support decisions from the planning stages to their execution. Leading exponents of military intelligence reinforced this thinking. Within the first year, a French intelligence visionary portrayed intelligence information’s contribution in simple terms—to *follow the destructive work of our artillery and to reg-*

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By late 1915, intelligence information, especially that acquired from airplanes, had demonstrated that it was credible.

ister the victorious advance of our infantry.¹

By late 1915, intelligence information, especially that acquired from airplanes, had demonstrated that it was credible and contributed effectively to the conduct of battle. Traditionalists, who had been skeptical of new intelligence sources at the beginning of the conflict, became firm disciples for the remainder of the war. The words of two British intelligence officers reflect the shift. The first was offered in 1915; the second after the war.

Intelligence is very frequently looked upon as an affair that has nothing to do with regimental officers and men. A very general opinion seems to be that information about the enemy is obtained in some mysterious way from spies or other persons of doubtful character, but of surprising intelligence.²

...[The] results [of intelligence] are produced by hard work, great diligence and untiring watchfulness, and the painstaking collection and collation of every possible form of information. Nothing is too small to be unworthy of the attention of I. D. [Intelligence Department] and no problem too big for it.³

By 1918, sector surveillance of the positional battlefield had become a refined art, employing both traditional methods

and a host of new technologies. Continuous, timely, and accurate information made military intelligence at the front a lethal weapon beyond the contemporary arsenal—a major force multiplier, in today's parlance—increasing lethality with an array of new technologies that made use of the light spectrum, photogrammetry, and sound and radio waves.

Along with exploitation of intelligence came improvements in communicating data to decisionmakers and combatants, which in turn led intelligence collectors and analysts to focus on communication networks throughout the trenches and rear echelons. Electronic technology, then in its infancy, was rapidly assimilated in the front lines and became a common fixture for all combatants. Radio transmitters achieved a role above the battlefield through airplanes.

The most lethal force arm, artillery, received three-dimensional, near-real-time updates of its accuracy. All conceivable ways of transmitting messages within the trenches were tried, including telephones, runners, carrier pigeons, messenger dogs and small rockets. In the absence of radio, airplanes operated from landing grounds and directly supported headquarters by dropping containers with message updates.

Major advances in camouflage and deception appeared, offering fascinating glimpses into the cognitive processes of modern war. With the stereoscope serving as the instrument of choice in the war of perceptions, imagery transformed the battlefield. In the trenches, deception was employed wherever possible and reinforced by cover of darkness and activities below ground. Above ground, master artists perpetuated illusion through a vast array of camouflage netting.

Radio deception was also employed. Techniques like the generation of intense radio traffic in quiet sectors and the reduction of wireless activity in the area of a planned attack were common practices. In the forward areas, construction of dummy trenches and artillery batteries, along with feints from raids and maneuvering artillery, contributed to the war of illusion.

Eleven Primary Sources at the Front

Radio Intercept and Radiogoniometry

Radio intercept and radiogoniometry (direction finding) was the first of the modern sources to have a decisive impact on battle during a period of intense mobile warfare. Radio intercept had been evolving as an intelligence discipline before the war started, but its value was clearly demonstrated with

the interception of open radio transmissions at the battles at Tannenberg in eastern Poland and the First Marne, northeast of Paris. Tannenberg became the first battle in history in which interception of enemy radio traffic played the decisive role.⁴ Success came to the Germans when they intercepted Russian radio transmissions containing exact force dispositions. French cryptological experts were never able to convince the Russians that their codes were easy to read and required better protection with frequent code and cipher changes.⁵

Aerial reconnaissance reinforced German command decisions at Tannenberg, but did not play as critical a role. Ironically for the Germans, Allied radio intercepts of transmissions a few days later at the First Marne undermined the German offensive near Paris. French intelligence intercepts led to successful analysis of German intentions. Partial credit went to the German lack of discipline in radio operation. By 4 September 1914, French intelligence had confirmed that the German First Army was not moving toward Paris. It also discovered the extent of German fatigue and logistical shortfalls. Finally, the French monitored German General Alexander von Kluck's order to withdraw and knew that the German retreat had commenced.⁶



The Eiffel Tower, served as a French collection site for enemy radio transmissions. The chief of staff to the French military commander of the Paris sector recognized its service in his description of events during the first Marne battle. He cited Gen. Johannes Georg von der Marwitz, the German cavalry commander of the First Army, violating radio discipline on 9 September by transmitting, "Tell me exactly where you are and what you are doing. Hurry up, I am going to bolt." French intelligence triangulated the transmission site and later found abandoned stacks of munitions, vehicles, and a field kitchen with a great store of flour and dough half-kneaded.⁷ (Photo, 1910 © Bettman Corbis)

The successes at Tannenberg and the Marne clearly illustrated the value of radio intercept and radiogoniometric methods to the combatants. Positional war refined their role and value and created a processing cycle for evolving signals intelligence. Message interception, analysis to determine the originator, cryptanalysis, and event reporting all matured the discipline. Monitoring of units in fixed locations at the front allowed cryptanalysts to group emitters within a particular echelon—division, corps, or army. This analysis became a highly favored method for confirming enemy order of battle (OOB) and determining the depth of echelons in a given sector,

allowing combatants to position their own forces in response. Traffic analysis focused on enemy radio procedures and call signs.⁸

By 1915, incessant artillery fire had obliterated most communication networks at the front. As a result ground telegraphy was used within the trenches. However, electromagnetic currents of comparatively low frequency could still be detected directly by the telephone receiver. Wire-tapping units intercepted ground telegraph lines (French term for this ground telegraphy operation was *télégraphie par le sol* [T.P.S.]).⁹ Three kilometers was the normal range for transmissions, enough to support the

average front line sector. In turn, intercept stations working from the most forward trenches tapped the lines to listen in to enemy telephone conversations in the opposite trenches. Their reporting provided indication of enemy relief and warning of imminent attacks.¹⁰ By war's end a large part of the interceptions were of signals in Morse code.¹¹

Codes and ciphers for secure communications were developed to unprecedented levels during the war. At first, this was primarily the domain of the French, who had established radio intercept stations against Germany before the war. British advances in the discipline focused on naval intelligence.¹²

Conversely, the Germans lagged in the field. They did not emphasize cryptanalysis for the first two years of the war. The Germans, forced to operate on captured French territory with radios, were more vulnerable to intercepts. The French, on the other hand, had at their disposal a well-established system of less vulnerable wire networks adjacent to their front on home territory. In addition, with French and British experience in analyzing German phraseology and idiosyncrasies, the Allies had an advantage they never lost.¹³

By the last year of the war, interception and decoding had become fully integrated components of the Allied intelligence discipline. As novice American

forces arrived in late 1917, the French army provided the equipment and technical support the newcomers needed. In mid-1917 senior American officers were discreetly informed by General Philippe Pétain's staff that the Germans were not aware of the success the French cipher section was having in breaking German codes—an insight not shared with the rest of the French army for fear of leaks.¹⁴

The culture of sharing intelligence within a limited circle of experts proved beneficial. American radio intercepts discovered that German battle preparations included implementation of a new code, known as the ADFGVX cipher, on 11 March 1918. The Americans immediately forwarded the information to French and British cryptanalysis staffs. The brilliant French cryptanalyst, Captain Georges Jean Painvin broke the code on 6 April.¹⁵ In the subsequent weeks Painvin's analysis was combined with intelligence reports from aerial reconnaissance and prisoner interrogations. The resulting analysis led to an effective French counter to Gen. Erich Ludendorff's 9 June 1918

GNEISENAU offensive at Montdidier and Compiègne.¹⁷

Front line security called for the most stringent enforcement of radio discipline. Soldiers were warned that the enemy overheard all telephone conversations. Radio intercept operators not only listened for enemy conversations but also kept track of communication violations by friendly forces. One friendly operator was able to deduce the entire US OOB for the St. Mihiel assault by listening to the complaints of a US switchboard operator that his communication lines were being broken by tanks and heavy artillery moving up for the attack.¹⁸

CONFIDENTIAL ORDER No. 1.
[classified SECRET]
Published by Headquarters, 26th Division,
American Expeditionary Force, in France,
February 16, 1918.

1. It is safe to assume that all telephone conversations within one thousand yards of the front line will be heard by the enemy. This necessitates great care in the use of the telephone. To prevent, as far as possible, the enemy gaining information through indiscreet use of our telephone, the following rules will be strictly observed:
 - (a) REFERENCE TO LOCATION will never be telephoned.
 - (b) From regimental P.C. forward, the telephone will be used for tactical purposes only; administrative matters will be transacted other than by telephone.
 - (c) Messages referring to movements or operations of whatever size must be in cipher (except in attack, when secrecy will give way to urgency).
 - (d) The designations of stations as used by the French will continue to be used; in all cases this represents a location and not an organization and does not change when new organizations occupy the locations.¹⁶

The newly established third dimension of warfare, aerial, also took on signal intelligence collection. Triangulated intercepts of radio transmissions from enemy artillery observers in airplanes provided intercept location data for pursuit escadrilles and squadrons.

Intercepted radio transmissions from goniometric stations also helped counter strategic aerial bombardment by Zeppelins, Gotha bombers, and Zepelin-Staaken (*Riesenflugzeug*) giants. Radio transmissions from German ground stations providing bearings to aerial navigators were intercepted, location determined, and data passed to British defense squadrons.¹⁹

Prisoner Interrogations

The most voluminous source of intelligence information in positional war came from the interrogation of prisoners. (According to popular estimates, some 8 million men on all sides were captured during the war.) The capture and retention of prisoners took place during all levels of operations on both sides of No Man's Land. Not only was a captive one less threat, prisoners were often treasure troves of information on critical issues that other forms of collection threw no light on. One senior British intelligence officer described the process:

Most of the information which a prisoner has is information in detail regarding the enemy

*defensive works on his own immediate front. To extract this information from him requires time. It is sometimes necessary to take the prisoner back in the front line trenches or to Observation Posts and almost always necessary to examine him with the assistance of aeroplane photographs.*²⁰

Ludendorff's chief intelligence manager at the front, Oberstleutnant Walter Nicolai, testified to the value of prisoner interrogations, saying, "Our greatest and most valuable source of news in the western theatre of war—and at the front line the only one—was furnished by prisoners of war."²¹

Interrogation became a science of human emotion and psychology. German military intelligence was aware that the British had been told to expect beatings and other ordeals, and so "prisoners who, still feeling the violent emotions of battle, found themselves humanely treated ... spoke more willingly even than the deserters."²²

Interrogation centers took great care in separating prisoners by ethnic origins. Polish and Alsace-Lorraine prisoners were kept in separate locations to promulgate their anger toward Germans, reinforced by better treatment and food, "which nearly always loosens their tongues."²³ At one French interrogation center, most of the staff were professors and lawyers, "who obviously make the best [interrogators], because

they are the most experienced, questioners."²⁴

Interrogators used data from detailed photographic mosaics of his sector to trace with sources (prisoner or deserter) their itineraries from the rear to the front line trench network, confirming statements with specific details from photographs to include an isolated tree, house, or any other visible feature.²⁵

Personal letters, documents, and correspondence taken from prisoners helped in identifying opposing units and provided information for tactical and strategic analysis.²⁶ A good example with German prisoners was the *Soldbuch* or paybook. It served not only to identify the prisoner, but the military record it contained provided discussion material for the first interrogation.²⁷

Interrogated prisoners of both sides provided stereotypical responses. Officers regretted being captured. Privates were glad to be out of the hell of the trenches. German prisoners were confident in the success of German arms, at least early on. One Bavarian summed up the Allies in his interrogation by saying,

*The French have done wonderfully. They are the enemies that we like the best. We hate the English. We have regret for the French.*²⁸

The first Americans became prisoners on 17 November



"Treachery was in the air day and night. This sector was full of German agent and spies. Special orders were issued to us and all were placed on guard, challenging everyone at night, both on cross-roads and at points entering our lines."—from a WW I memoir.²⁹ A German agent about to be executed by a British unit. (Photo: ©Corbis/Bettman) (Photo, 1915 © Bettman Corbis)

1917. Initially, during the their first six months in combat, American soldiers were not asked about their combat arms. Rather, discussions focused on the numbers of Americans in theater and en route across the Atlantic. Concerned about sustaining combat in the face of the arrival of new and fresh forces, the Germans were after everything they could get about the American reinforcements that would help shape their battle strategies for the remainder of 1918.

Spies

Spies in the Great War provided intrigue, both in the minds of the combatants and of the practitioners of the art. The intelligence officer was responsible for preventing these agents of espionage from finding out anything about "ourselves." *Contre-Espionage*

required a disciplined, self-controlled existence, in the trenches and the rear. Keeping noise to a minimum was a requirement. Personal letters were potential intelligence documents detailing morale, locations, personal observations, and other relevant data. Censorship was imposed to curtail any chance of an enemy acquiring a critical snippet of information.

A British intelligence officer commented on this environment: "The enemy has many soldiers who speak English perfectly, and they recognize by our accent what part of the country we come from." The trench culture thus mandated that every combatant play a role in gathering information. "Every man should, therefore, look upon himself as a collecting agent of information," wrote a British

officer.³⁰ Concern about spying created a culture of distrust and uncertainty throughout the front. British warnings reflected a somewhat chaotic, even paranoid, culture:

Because a man is dressed in British, French or Belgian uniform, do not necessarily assume that he is what he appears to be. Such a disguise is by far the most effective and safe one for a German spy, and there is little doubt that it has been frequently made use of. No matter who the man is, if he acts suspiciously—wants to know too much about the troops—detain him.

Moreover, French and Belgian citizens near the front were also suspect.

*Barbers, cafe proprietors, waiters and waitresses may all be looked upon as potential spies, and it is most important that they should have no opportunity of picking up odd scraps of information.*³¹

Information from Refugees—Repatriated Agents

Human intelligence also came from the interrogation of repatriated civilians who crossed through Allied lines from German-held territory. Interviews were normally conducted by intelligence personnel in the sector in which they crossed for whatever information the refugees had on nearby German activity and intentions.³² After local French authorities confirmed that the repatriated

were authentic, follow-on interviews sought to gather more information on German activity seen in aerial photography or reported by other sources. The intelligence was applied to artillery target lists and documents. One example follows:

The two French civilians who came into our lines near Pont-a-Mousson on Sept 2, have described in detail a water supply system by which water from the Fontaine du Soiron, 66.8-48.3, is pumped to reservoirs at 3 points.... This system is partly visible on photos, where it has the appearance of buried cable trenches, and it has been so represented on maps. The civilian's statement is entirely consistent with the photographic evidence and indicates that the further strengthening of the Hindenburg line is to be looked for at the points indicated.³³

Patrol Reports

Everyday combat operations at every echelon, especially by infantry and artillery elements, led to intelligence collection opportunities. Each combat unit had its own patrol procedures requiring collection and dissemination of information within its sector. Reports generated by daily operations supplemented other material, including aerial photography, and contributed to three intelligence objectives: understanding of the layout of one's own front line; detailed knowledge of the configuration of No Man's Land up to enemy wire; and exact analysis of enemy lines,

Everyday combat operations at every echelon, especially by infantry and artillery elements, led to intelligence collection opportunities.

including locations of saps (trench construction into No Man's Land), mine locations, and forward listening posts.³⁴

When information was needed to refine operations, trench raids were mounted to capture prisoners for interrogation or to gather material from enemy trenches. Raiding parties were given prioritized requirements. Objectives might have included, for example, taking note of trench and revetment configurations. Any article of equipment was potentially valuable. Captured helmets, caps, rifles, shoulder straps, and identity discs complemented analysis of other sources. Patrols also had a counterintelligence component when they were instructed to look for the antennae of enemy listening devices.³⁵

Ground Observation— Reporting from Infantry and Artillery

Positional war meant continual observation of the enemy through a network of stations along both sides of the front line. The French referred to this as the *service des renseignements de l'observation du terrain* (SROT).³⁶ Incessant focus on one enemy sector day after day led to fleeting opportunities that became intelligence for artillery unit and local ground commanders. Among the tools observers used were the scissor telescope, the subterra-

nean microphone, the perpendicular and horizontal range finder, and the elongated three-power French binocular.³⁷ Panorama photographs, pasted together to form mosaics along the horizon were generated to provide photographic detail for infantry analysis. The panoramic mosaics were annotated to show compass bearings to recognized permanent points as reference points for all observations.

Ground observers, usually highly experienced infantrymen, were required to maintain total concentration. With the experience of combat, these observers could piece together an evolving situation and report back quickly with artillery targeting data or other information.³⁸ Additional tasks included keeping the lines of communication in working order at all times and under any and all conditions.³⁹

An American observer trained and deployed to an SROT observation post before the St. Mihiel offensive provided insight into the French observation process:

They showed us how to locate German batteries, machine gun nests, railroads, troop movements, supply trains, aerial activity, observation balloons, etc. We paid particular attention to watching how often Hun airplanes arose,



The Salmson 2A2 was one of the finest airplanes of the Great War. The aerial camera is a French, 26 cm “Grand Champ.” This airplane was assigned to the US Air Service’s 1st Aero Squadron. Today, the US Air Force’s 1st Reconnaissance Squadron operates the Lockheed U-2 and the RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance aircraft. (Original image at USAF Academy Library, Davis Collection, SMS 54)

*where they crossed our lines, whether or not they were fired on by our anti-aircraft guns, the number of Hun planes in the air; the purpose of their flights, etc. It was particularly important to get the point where the German aviators crossed the Allied lines.*⁴⁰

Sound-ranging

Target acquisition of enemy artillery evolved as a science in the Great War using principles of sound and light. The process became so refined on both sides that by the time of the armistice once an enemy artillery battery commenced fire it was quickly registered to a precisely known location and became a target for counterbattery fire.⁴¹ Sound-ranging microphones—usually composed of six-microphones set up


along a 9,000-yard sector—recorded the sounds of artillery rounds as they traveled from their guns. With the rounds travelling at 1,100 feet per second, the sounds created measurable arcs that were plotted on sector maps. The signals from the microphones were tracked and superimposed on a regional map. The data were synthesized using a mechanical device called a “computer.” The resulting information was sent to friendly artillery units over telephones. Sound-ranging equipment was also used to track and correct friendly fire.⁴²

The German sound-ranging section (*Schallmesstrupp*) posts did not possess automated capabilities. Interrogated *Schallmesstrupp* prisoners credited the Allies with better

collection because of the technological sophistication of their networks. According to Allied intelligence the *Schallmesstrupp* inventory included a stopwatch, telephone, anemometer (wind-gauge), weather vane, and thermometer. As each post heard a definitive report from an artillery piece, operators started their watches. When the warning post linked to the section started vibrating, the watches were stopped. Their calculations took into consideration measurements of atmospheric conditions, temperature, and the direction and velocity of the wind. The results were sent to the central post for final calculations with the targeting data forwarded to the heavy artillery unit commander for counterbattery salvos.⁴³

Flash-Spotting

Flash-spotting (*Licht-Messstellen*) applied optical measurements to locate enemy artillery. The essential equipment for flash-spotting control at headquarters was the Flash and Buzzer Board and the plotting board—generally a 1/10,000 map for tracing and synchronizing responses from posts. A telephone switchboard provided connectivity. All calculations on identified artillery batteries were forwarded to artillery for counterbattery operations.⁴⁴ The combination of sound-ranging and flash-spotting proved to be a vital part of front-line intelligence networks supporting artillery targeting. Aerial reconnais-



An example of a Plan Directeur targeting map that intelligence specialists updated daily. This one shows a portion of the Somme Sector. (Original in Library of Congress.)

sance complemented these collection systems.

The German flash-spotting Section [*Lichtmesstrupp*] comprised a central station and eight observation stations over a 20-km front. Each post had eight men, with four providing relief every two days. Observation was accomplished by one individual at a time. Each post had a pair of periscopic field glasses, a device called an alidade that allowed one to sight a distant object and use the line of sight to perform the required computational task, an ordinary pair of field glasses,

a chronometer, and telephone. Like sound-ranging, the central station reported observations to the heavy artillery unit commander for counterbattery targeting.⁴⁵

Captured Documents

Captured documents were gold mines for intelligence analysis on both sides of the lines. The French described enemy documents as “perfect interpretation,” particularly when aerial photographs matched dates and items noted in documents. Sometimes sketches with notes about machine guns, trench mortars (*Minenwerfer*),

dummy complexes, and other projects of interest were found. By correlating aerial photographs with captured documents, analysts identified more features. Photo interpreters required detailed knowledge of trench organization, such as could be found in published German regulations and other captured documents. Their tactical approaches often found the keys to enemy intentions. Analysis of strategic aspects would be done by the intelligence staff.

French manuals included reminders about the impor-

Balloons with forward aerial observers were the prized resource of artillery.

tance of handling documents properly, noting, for example, that a commander's responsibilities included reviewing captured documents for indications concerning every possible phase of attack or defense, including lines of approach and lines of defense.⁴⁶

On the German side, captured documents were no less important. In 1918, for example, General Ludendorff referred to a captured British guide to photo interpretation, *Notes on the Interpretation of Aeroplane Photographs* (SS 550), which was one of the most important documents on the subject prepared during the war. In his directive to forces engaged in an operation against British forces in the Cambrai Salient, Ludendorff quoted from the document's description of German practices:

It is evident that increasing care is taken to conceal emplacements and to defeat the camera. As, however, the Germans usually start to construct camouflage after a battery emplacement has been completed, their attempts are rendered abortive, owing to the fact that the emplacement will probably have been photographed several times during the various stages of construction.⁴⁷

German actions before the operation demonstrated that they took Ludendorff's admoni-

tion seriously. Priority was given to maintaining proper camouflage and deception, and officers were assigned to arrange for aerial photography of emplacement sites *before* construction was begun and during and after construction to test camouflage.⁴⁸

Toward the end of the conflict during the Meuse-Argonne campaign, captured German documents provided American intelligence analysts (in a unit known as the Enemy Works Subdivision) with information, including orders, weapon system manuals, tactics for defeating tanks, intelligence summaries, and reports on the interrogations of prisoners. The data provided a concise view of the German estimate of the strength of Allied forces and demonstrated that late in the war German leaders had come to fear the effects of Allied propaganda and had issued repeated orders to soldiers to turn in papers dropped by Allied airplanes.⁴⁹

Aerial Observation from Balloons

A natural extension of the ground observation reporting system was the captive balloon or kite balloon (*Drach ballon*), which allowed observers from both sides to spy on more distant enemy locations than could be seen from ground sites. Reports from balloon observation covered enemy infantry,

artillery, and aeronautical activity; movements on road and rail; and sightings of explosions—all within the limits imposed by terrain, weather, and countering enemy activity.⁵⁰ Balloons with forward aerial observers were the prized resource of artillery. Balloons had one advantage over airplanes: instant telephone connections to those in need of the information. Notably, the Germans extensively employed aerial cameras from captive balloons to provide coverage of the front.

Balloons were assigned to support army- to division-level requirements. A German balloon detachment was tactically under the command of every division on the front. Since these tasks also belonged to the aviators, the commander of the balloons had to keep in constant contact with the Army Aviation Commander (*Kommandeur der Fliegertruppen*) to allocate work among aircraft and balloons.⁵¹

German long-range artillery groups (*Fernkampfar tiller- iegruppen*) firing on key strategic targets such as command centers, lines of communication, and ammunition dumps had their own dedicated aerial observers and balloon sections.⁵² French and British aligned their balloons units to the army echelon requiring support. American balloons assigned at the army echelon were attached to a "Balloon Group," which reallocated

observation to the lower echelons. Balloons supporting divisions helped regulate divisional artillery fire as well as provide surveillance and liaison for the infantry divisions.⁵³

Observation from Airplanes

The primary and most lucrative military intelligence resource in the Great War was aerial photography. From 1915 to 1918, aerial photography was the cornerstone of military intelligence at the front. In cases of conflicting data, the photograph was acknowledged by the French as the one source for settling discrepancies.⁵⁴ As one American instructor summed up intelligence:

*Under the conditions of modern warfare, no army can long exist without using every possible means of gathering information; and of all these means aerial photographs present probably the best medium.*⁵⁵

It not only provided the viewer with a concise portrayal of the threat that existed at a particular moment in time; the interpreted information could be effectively and accurately applied to the most important medium of the Great War, the targeting map. Photographs provided all combatants with the ability to wage positional war in the most effective and devastating manner.

Aerial observations (*observation aérienne* and *Fliegerbeobachtung*) played key roles during the first months of the

Aerial photographic interpretation was a team effort.

mobile campaigns on both Eastern and Western Fronts; the evolution and extensive use of aerial cameras and photography proved to be decisive in shaping the battlefield throughout the war; and in subordinate roles, such as infantry contact (*Infanterie-Flieger*), aircrew observations added to a battlefield commander's timely update of forces in contact.


Notwithstanding its enormous importance, the aerial reconnaissance inventory on both sides of the front has been ignored or forgotten. Airplanes such as the Maurice Farman (MF) 11, Farman Experimental (FE) 2b, Albatros C.I, Reconnaissance Experimental (RE) 8, Breguet 14 A2, Halberstadt C.V and Salmson 2 A2, to name a few, delivered the information necessary to make critical battlefield decisions. Indeed, many airplanes of this era, in particular those of the French and Germans, were specifically designed to house cameras within their fuselages. For most of the war the British relied on smaller cameras attached to the outside of their airframes. Americans generally flew aerial reconnaissance missions in French aircraft.

Aerial photographic interpretation was a team effort. An intelligence officer usually identified sets of photographs for exploitation; draftsmen compared duplicate sets with the history of

coverage to detect new works or defenses.⁵⁶ The exploitation process was accomplished by placing tracing paper over photographs and tracing objects requiring further attention. Sketches of important items were then completed and delivered along with photographic prints to command staffs.

Draftsmen sketched the features of new positions and points of interest in coordination with the aerial observers who flew the missions. Short notes attached to the maps included impressions of the enemy's organization gained from the study of photographs and of the ground. By war's end, US military leaders, like the French, had concluded that photographs taken from airplanes could be considered the final intelligence on enemy works, regardless of other information acquired.⁵⁷

Strategic analysis at the front focused on the enemy's ability to sustain major operations. In 1918 Supreme Allied Commander Marshall Ferdinand Foch tasked his best reconnaissance pilot, Capt. Paul-Louis Weiller, to command a group of three escadrilles to monitor key targets in a given sector for changes related to operations at the front. Weiller was supported by an elite team of strategic aerial photographic interpreter/analysts based in Paris. When his Weiller Grouping converted to aerial reconnaissance of tar-



The complexity of the World War I intelligence enterprise is evident in the contemporary schematic above, which shows American Expeditionary Force division-level intelligence supported by corps architecture in 1918. (Original at NARA, RG 120; also accessed through Footnote.com, NARA M923 The Supreme War Council.)

The skills of the people needed in this enterprise were neatly described after the war by British General Macdonogh.

*Intelligence personnel may be divided into two main groups, a very large one which collects information and whose main characteristic is acquisitiveness, and a very small one which extracts the substance from that mass of facts and fiction. The mental requisites of this last class are: (1) clearness of thought, (2) grasp of detail, (3) a retentive memory, (4) knowledge of the enemy, (5) the power of projection into his mind, (6) imagination tempered by the strongest common sense, (7) indefatigability, (8) good health, including the absence of nerves, and (9) above all others, absolute impartiality. A high intelligence officer who allows himself to have any preconceived notions or prejudices is useless. He must look at friend, foe and neutral alike—that is, merely as pieces on the chessboard.*⁶⁴

gets well beyond the front, they institutionalized an intelligence collection and analysis process that remains to the present day. In turn, Foch developed an operational strategy of determining offensive operations based on what the strategical assessment portrayed.⁵⁸

Analysis

Analysis was aimed at deepening understanding of tactical and strategic situations—including events in progress, the value of planned friendly operations, and details of enemy forces on the opposite

side of No Man's Land. Ultimately, intelligence officers were called on to validate all military activity planned against the enemy.

Analysts had to remain abreast of the status quo on the front lines to recognize changes

that would permit timely discovery of enemy plans.⁵⁹ Thus, the search for signatures associated with an enemy offensive operation was a top priority. Signatures included construction of roads and railroads, increased presence of supply depots, new artillery battery positions, and new trench work into No Man's Land. Confronted with deception, analysts depended on aerial reconnaissance and photographic interpretation as the ultimate arbiters of uncertainty. Whether on the defensive or on the offensive, planning required currency of analysis at all times, and experience demonstrated that time spent on proper surveillance and intelligence was essential to ensure that "the enemy cannot pass by unperceived."⁶⁰

French analysts went further, based on the belief that the German adversary was methodical, and closely followed senior headquarters [*Grosses Hauptquartier*] policies.⁶¹ Thus, *Deuxième Bureau* colleagues roleplayed German leaders in attempts to better understand German decisionmaking as lines changed hands, troops moved among sectors, and artillery targets shifted. They applied logic to defensive strategies in attempts to allow maximum resistance with minimum personnel at hand.

As understanding of the status quo was also achieved by having clear knowledge of German OOB, a singular focus on

The persistent emphasis on order of battle led to frustration because such detailed knowledge of the enemy never led to decisive breakthroughs and victory.

the subject—especially on the part of the British—plagued intelligence analysis. A senior UK analyst justified the protracted attention by saying:

As everyone knows, the basis [of intelligence work] is the building up of the enemy's order of battle, for when this has been done the identification of one unit is prima facie evidence of the presence of the division to which it belongs and possibly also of the corps or even army."⁶²

One of the most brilliant senior intelligence officers in the war, Lt. Gen. Sir George Macdonogh, the British War Office's Director of Military Intelligence, would echo this after the war in the *Infantry Journal*.

If you were to ask me which is the most important function of the offensive intelligence [intelligence on the enemy], I should probably surprise you by saying that it is the building up and constant verification of the enemy's order of battle."⁶³

In the final analysis, the persistent emphasis on order of battle led to frustration because such detailed knowledge of the enemy never led to decisive breakthroughs and victory.

Collaboration

Interaction among the Allied experts became an important part of reaching understanding

of enemy intentions and sharing trends in analysis. Conferences enabled intelligence and photographic specialists to share ideas and techniques for collection and analysis, a phenomenon that led to closer cooperation between the infantry combatant and the affiliated arms, including artillery and aviation.⁶⁵

Production and Dissemination

Military intelligence generally was packaged into two mediums. Cartography was the primary form, with written reports providing greater detail. The core Allied targeting map comprised either the French *Plan Directeur* or the British firing map (also known as the trench map). Both provided commanders with updates of the situation they faced. The *Plan Directeur* was the focal point for French battle planning.⁶⁶ Maps ranged in scale from 1/5,000 to 1/50,000.⁶⁷

British GHQ's intelligence was disseminated in two products, the *Daily Intelligence Summary* and the *Daily Summary of Information*. Both were geared to serve the commander-in-chief on developments in the war in the British theater. The content of the *Summary* was established by General Macdonogh, who dictated that it contain only information on

Thanks in part to the expansion of military intelligence and its exploitation of science, the Great War became the harvest of death for which it is remembered to this day.

adversaries and nothing about Allied forces.⁶⁸

The Germans developed a comprehensive array of battle maps at the headquarters for each army through their survey detachments (*Vermessungs-Abteilungen*) and subordinate map-printing section (*Karten-Felddruckerei*). The Germans created topographical sections (*Kartenstelle*) to complete observations of the artillery survey sections and evaluate the topographical implications of reconnaissance information from aircraft and balloons. Their equivalent of the French *Plan Directeur* was called the *Messplan*. The Germans worked with 1/80,000 maps for general purposes and the 1/25,000 as the normal trench map. Trench maps as detailed as 1/5,000 were also issued. When the Germans acquired captured *Plan Directeurs*, the maps were copied and sometimes combined with enlargements from smaller scale maps.⁶⁹

Conclusion

Military intelligence evolved as a significant force arm from the first shots of August 1914 to the Armistice more than four

years later. Traditional intelligence methods quickly gave way to a juggernaut of technological innovation involving a spectrum of scientific principles applied to the rigorous demand for battlefield knowledge. Most significantly, aviation defined the role of intelligence in industrial age warfare. In addition, the miracles of mass production made available the tools of intelligence—aircraft, cameras, radio intercept equipment, sensors, printing presses, and much more—across the battlefield and provided the most effective means of acquiring timely, detailed, and readily understood intelligence.

With each advanced source and method, the institution of intelligence assumed greater stature, and commanders realized that the intelligence component of warfare had progressed far beyond their early imagining. Further testament to the expanding intelligence art was the fact that advances made known in the field were quickly copied by all the combatants, and camouflage and deception aimed at overcoming these advances, especially in aerial observa-

tion, became critical facets of all operations. Finally, the ability of the new tools to see beyond the front lines began to affect strategy and the deployment of forces on a strategic scale.

In all probability few in 1918 would have seen the long-term implications of their experience, least of all those who might have thought there would be no second world war. For most, intelligence was about winning or losing that particular conflict. As General Macdonogh wrote in 1922:

I will venture to say that the chief reason why the Germans lost the war was because they had a bad intelligence system ... and it failed from the very outset of the campaign.⁷⁰

Thanks in part to the expansion of military intelligence and its exploitation of science, the Great War became the harvest of death for which it is remembered to this day. Today's intelligence challenges, however, go well beyond a narrow strip of devastation separating enemies. Instead, military intelligence at the 21st century front covers every facet of human existence. It remains to be seen how such knowledge and ability will shape the future.

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Developing STORM, a Methodology for Evaluating Transit Routes of Transnational Terrorists and Criminals

Mark T. Clark and Brian Janiskee

“
The IFA asked the group to assess why terrorist groups or criminal transnational organizations select certain transit countries for their purposes.
”

Introduction

In July 2008, a California State University (CSU) consortium became the first academic organization to accept a “challenge project” from the NSA’s Institute for Analysis (IFA). A challenge project consists of a question for which the IFA seeks a fresh answer from outside the Intelligence Community (IC). The challenge process begins with individual NSA analysts who approach the IFA with particularly vexing questions. IFA then evaluates these for their importance, timeliness, and suitability to outside research. Once the IFA approves a question for a challenge project, the question is reframed to make it suitable for open-source research by whatever group is assigned the challenge project.

Challenge projects vary in complexity. Some involve a direct, one-time answer to a highly specialized question. Others, however, are more extensive and require the group taking the challenge not only to answer the question but also to provide a reproducible methodology. Customarily, these challenges are contracted out to

private firms. However, the IFA recently opened the process to universities identified by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as “Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence” (IC CAE).^a The CSU consortium is one of these centers and accepted the first such challenge offered to a university group.

The Problem

The project CSU took on was labeled the “Transit Country Problem.” In a nutshell, the IFA asked the group to assess why terrorist groups or criminal transnational organizations select certain transit countries for their purposes. The report was due in the spring of 2009.

^a Through its ICCAE program office, the ODNI awards grants competitively to universities nationwide to develop and diversify the pool of potential applicants for careers in intelligence. As of this writing, 31 universities participate in the program. The California State University IC CAE program is unique in that it is a consortium of seven California state universities in southern California. For more information in the ODNI’s Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence program, please see: <http://www.dni.gov/cae>

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Our approach from the beginning was to incorporate the challenge project into classrooms.

Our initial goal in CSU was to focus on the terrorist component of the problem and only later develop a methodology to include criminal organizations.

The Approach

In thinking about how we would meet the challenge, we decided to answer the question collaboratively by exploiting what we believe in the CSU IC CAE is a comparative advantage in collaborative work. First, we had experience in working collaboratively as a consortium of seven universities in the CSU system on the goals and objectives of the IC CAE grant received from the ODNI in September 2006.^a This relationship requires the coordination of faculty, staff, and students across seven campuses, in different disciplines, and in very different academic cultures.^b As importantly, the director of the program must coordinate the efforts of the

consortium with the CSU Chancellor's Office and the ODNI. Second, we have a diverse talent pool of faculty and students—in graduate and undergraduate programs—who specialize in the following key subject areas: terrorism, intelligence studies, research methods, the sociology of terrorism, and geographic information systems.

Given the academic mission of the CSU consortium, our approach from the beginning was to incorporate the challenge project into classrooms. The faculty members who participated in the project ensured that the project would add significant academic value to the student experience.

Three courses seemed to fit best the scope and subject matter in the challenge. Two were in the graduate program in national security studies at CSU San Bernardino. One was in the undergraduate sociology program at CSU Northridge. The two graduate courses selected at CSU San Bernardino were Tracking Terrorism and American Foreign Policy. The undergraduate course selected at CSU Northridge was Sociology of Terrorism. On standby at CSU Long Beach, we had faculty and graduate assistants available for any geographic information systems (GIS) work we may have needed.

Organization

Our initial organizational structure for the project was in place by September 2008. (Our report was due to the IFA in January 2009.) The director of the CSU consortium served as the overall coordinator. The three course instructors were team leaders responsible for supervising the research process in each class. These instructors divided their classes into research subteams to further analyze specific elements of the research question. A graduate student provided assistance to the director. Later, another faculty member was brought in as a principal analyst.

Getting Started

Representatives of the IFA came to Southern California to brief the faculty and students on the transit country project and the contribution the consortium could make to solve the puzzle. For one class—the graduate course on American Foreign Policy—the IFA representatives were present for the first class meeting. The professor introduced the consortium director, who told the students about the challenge project and the role they would play in it. After the director's background discussion of the project, the IFA representatives addressed the class. They made it clear that this was an opportunity for the students and faculty to work on a real

^a The seven universities include the following California State University system campuses: Bakersfield, Cal Poly Pomona, Dominguez Hills, Fullerton, Long Beach, Northridge, and San Bernardino. The program is directed out of CSU San Bernardino's national security studies (MA) program, which is housed in the Department of Political Science. Please see: www.csu-ace.org.

^b The disciplines include computer science, criminal justice, geographic information systems, political science and sociology at the undergraduate level, and national security studies at the graduate (MA) level.

question in need of fresh answers. To put it mildly, the students were surprised and a little intimidated by the prospect of researching the challenge. Once they got into it, however, the students were energized by working on the question in the classroom, knowing that there would be a final report to the IFA and, if the quality was good enough, that it would contribute to the overall mission of the IC. We made clear to the students that each professor would be free to approach the challenge in his or her own way and that the students were allowed, indeed encouraged, to explore novel approaches.

On the second day of the IFA visit, we held a video teleconference (VTC) from the San Bernardino campus to brief the faculty researchers on the other campuses about the challenge project. We conducted two more VTCs that fall involving the same teams to ensure we were on track and to discuss issues or answer questions that arose during the students' research. At no time, however, did anyone from the IFA ask for or intimate an "acceptable" outcome for the project. Representatives repeatedly indicated they wanted our research to be genuinely free of influence from an "IC" perspective. To that end, faculty who had access to *Intellipedia* and proprietary sources of information rigorously avoided using that data or steering students toward it. Furthermore, IFA representa-

Faculty who had access to Intellipedia and proprietary sources of information rigorously avoided using that data or steering students toward it.

tives reiterated several times that even a "failure" to find an acceptable answer to the challenge would be a useful answer in itself.

One Question, Three Research Teams: Diversity of Viewpoint and Redundant Systems

The research approaches the faculty took were unique. For the American Foreign Policy class, the faculty decided to have students research eight different countries as potential transit points and three major pathologies that could be associated with potential transit countries. Some students approached the question with the nation as the object of analysis, while others made a specific pathology the object of analysis, following the trouble wherever the research led. The eight countries were: the Bahamas, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Georgia, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey. The three pathologies were weapons smuggling, nuclear materials smuggling, and human trafficking. Students were divided into country study teams and pathology teams. The teams were expected to provide weekly reports to their professors.

For the Tracking Terrorism class, the professor changed the definition of a key term, and

then organized teams of students to conduct research. The professor thought that the term *transit country* was not particularly well defined. He developed a new term: "terrorist node of operation (TNOP)." He defined a TNOP as "a physical area possessing certain geographic, structural, and socio-political characteristics making it useful for a terrorist organization to operate." The professor thought the term *transit country* implied a subset of countries that was too small and the term itself was too narrow to answer the question fully.

The professor then divided the students into three teams. The first, the Terrorist Threat Group Team, looked at the question from the point of view of the terrorist group. This resembled the focus of the pathology team in the American Foreign Policy class. The students on the Terrorist Threat Group Team followed the research results to wherever they led, without having in mind a particular set of TNOPs. The second group, the TNOP Focus Group, looked at specific countries in particular regions—such as the Middle East, Europe, North and Trans-Saharan Africa—to determine what qualities they had that would make them useful to terrorists. The third group, the Exploitation Team, had access

We decided on multiple approaches ... to cast the net widely to capture as many good ideas as possible.

to the ongoing research of the first two teams. Its job was to synthesize the results into a coherent report.

The third class to participate in the challenge project was the Sociology of Terrorism course. As was the case with the other two classes, the professor took yet another approach. He organized the research project so students would develop something resembling a transit countries indicators and warnings (I&W) model. He then used four measures by which the students could evaluate chains of transit countries for the movement of terrorist groups. The measures were guns (arms smuggling and dealing), drugs (traditional routes for the movement of illegal drugs), human trafficking, and corruption.

The professor also recommended that students engage in two novel approaches. The first was “internet treble hooking.” A single student or group of students would monitor open source information from a specific country for activities once that country was deemed to be a potential conduit for illegal transit activities. The second approach was “spark plugging.” This involves a targeted dialogue—on message boards, for example—with specific experts familiar with a particular country or activity under consideration.

We decided on multiple avenues of research for two reasons. First, we wanted to cast the net widely to capture as many good ideas as possible. The multiple approaches taken to this problem would help ensure thoroughness in research and avoid some of the inherent biases that may come from a single approach. Second, we wanted to ensure the delivery of a product. With three separate groups working on the project, a research roadblock faced by one class would not, accordingly, jeopardize the whole endeavor.

We took our responsibility to deliver a product with the utmost seriousness. Redundancy would allow us to carry on if one part of the project, for whatever reason, was interrupted.^a

As a multicampus consortium, though we collaborate on the overall goals of the ODNI grant, we allow individual dif-

^a The need for redundancy was very nearly realized. One of the participating professors, a military reservist, was unexpectedly recalled to active duty. He received news of this just a few weeks before the project deadline. Fortunately, he insisted on seeing the project through to completion and his final class report was turned in two days before he shipped out. In this instance, we did not suffer a failure in one of our systems, but we had confirmed the wisdom, in projects of this scope, to expect the unexpected and to take organizational steps to ensure that a product is delivered.

ferences to flourish. We seek to benefit from different disciplinary approaches and different educational cultures on our campuses and leave plenty of room for local innovations. Notwithstanding our experience in collaboration, we had never attempted to collaborate on such a large project before and, frankly, did not really know whether one or more approach would actually produce something of value or whether one or more faculty members would shepherd their projects to timely conclusions.

As the fall term came to an end and the three teams were in the process of delivering their final results, the overall coordinator of the project faced the task of getting a single product to the IFA. We would not be satisfied with a straightforward compilation of several reports for the IFA. We sought to integrate the classroom research products into a single approach with a reproducible methodology. The director of the CSU program feared that this would expose the biggest potential weakness in our collaboration—a lack of cohesion. We needed to forge the answers achieved in the three approaches into a single answer with a robust methodology that could be useful to intelligence analysts in their day-to-day work.

Three Research Teams, One Product: The Role of the Principal Analyst

Fortuitously, however, one faculty member who was aware of the process but uninvolved in classroom research for it offered his services at the right time to help integrate the reports. He also brought to the table considerable methodological skills. We had promised to have something by late January, so this individual had to work overtime during his winter break to develop our final approach. In collaboration with the coordinator, usually by phone, but also over lunch, our principal analyst read, analyzed, and synthesized faculty and student reports—well over 400 pages—into a creative, and useful methodology we called STORM (Security threat, Target, Operation, Resources, Movement pattern).

The need for a principal analyst for a multiteam project like this became evident early in the process. Students across all groups quickly discovered that a significant number of open source metrics were bad, corrupted, or simply unreliable. For example, the subject of human trafficking is fraught with difficulties. Some countries try to combat it, others ignore it, and still others hide it. Yet every student group reported finding metrics for it. More troubling, the definition of human trafficking was found to be different across databases. In some databases, anyone

The need for a principal analyst for a multi-team project like this became evident early in the process.

involved in the sex trade was counted as part of the overall human trafficking pattern. In others, anyone who ever accepted “pay” for sex acts were not counted as victims of human trafficking, even if they were first forced into sex slavery. Moreover, only a few nations try to track it and those that do—like the United States, which has spent over \$371 million since 2001 on this issue—have no assessment on whether such efforts have prevented any human trafficking. The same was true for databases on political corruption, arms smuggling, and drug smuggling. So, when the principal analyst began evaluating all the data, it became clear to us that we needed to substitute qualitative proxies for poor, incomplete, or unreliable quantitative measures. But the proxies he identified had to be able to accommodate quantitative data of high quality, once they could be identified.

STORM

The methodology’s name, STORM, served as a mnemonic device to help analysts methodically identify potential “nodes of operation.”^a In coming up with the acronym, we, in essence, determined that asking questions about transit countries was not the preferred first step. The concept of a transit country implies that there

are a limited number of countries that can act as conduits for terrorist or criminal activity. Instead, we thought that any country in the world could serve as a transit country, depending on a number of conditions. In the STORM process, we first had the analyst ask questions about the group, its goals, its objectives, and its resource needs before asking which countries might become transit countries, or nodes of operation.

The different approaches to the problem paid off here as well. After having developed the term *terrorist node of operation* in one class, the principal analyst determined that it suited the purposes of the overall report better simply to use *node of operation* to include terrorist groups and criminal transnational organizations.

Second, we also determined that because open-source data can be corrupted, we used qualitative proxies for various pathologies. For example, if the data for arms trafficking are bad, qualitative proxies such as the presence of civil wars or insurgencies could be used. (A

^a See the unclassified Intellipedia article on transit country and the report, “STORM: A Methodology for Evaluating Transit Routes for Terrorist Groups and Criminal Transnational Organizations” at https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Transit_Country. The IFA has authorized its distribution on the public Intellipedia.

The methodology was sensitive to potential changes in a group's condition, goals, membership, or planned operations.

qualitative proxy is one that is highly correlated to bad or suspect behavior.) We also provided a methodology, or template, by which analysts can assess the relative importance of certain countries to various groups, depending upon a number of conditions discovered by first working through the STORM process.

The methodology was sensitive to potential changes in a group's condition, goals, membership, or planned operation. As each component of the process changed, the potential nodes of operation for that group could change as well. In addition, the methodology could be used to plot potential nodes of operation for all terrorist and criminal groups: past, present, or future under varying conditions. Furthermore, the STORM methodology is scalable, so that future iterations could involve not only national units of analysis but regional and local ones as well.

Our one major disappointment was our inability to use our GIS Team. We simply ran out of time. We were unable to complete the project early enough to give our geographers time to work with the results. Part of this was due to the unfamiliarity that most of our researchers have with the capabilities of GIS. Another element was our selection of the country as the unit of analysis.

During our VTCs, our geographers told us that if the country is the unit of analysis, then a spreadsheet approach would be sufficient; that GIS can help when the analysis focuses on sub- or transnational activities. Our selection of the country as the unit of analysis from the beginning, however, was in part a direct response to the assumptions behind the challenge question itself: that there is a distinct subset of all states in the international system that can be classified as transit countries. The question itself biased our approach in answering the challenge.

The three reports became one. We sent the IFA our final product on time and briefed it to them by VTC in January 2009. Involved were representatives from the IFA, several senior intelligence professionals from the ODNI, coparticipants at the various campuses, and a group of students and faculty at the CSU San Bernardino campus, where the VTC was broadcast. While the researchers answered pointed questions from the IFA, it became clear to the participants that the project was well-received and had been a success. The students in attendance, many of whom had been intimidated at the first briefing in September, were excited to witness the project's successful completion, but beyond that, they were elated that intelligence professionals evaluated

the results as highly as they did.

In April 2009, the project coordinator and principal analyst delivered a briefing on STORM at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade to a packed room of analysts. The briefing was also recorded for future training. The methodology received high praise from that group as well. The following was all we needed to hear about the mood of the analysts as they left the briefing: we were told that the analysts came in skeptics but went out believers. (See IFA director's letter on facing page.)

Lessons Learned

The lessons we learned in this collaborative effort could be helpful to those working on similar projects. *For the project itself—and we imagine for intelligence analysts in general—the question drives the research.* How a question is posed can lead to biases in how to answer it. As mentioned above, the research strategies in all three classes were designed specifically around countries as the units of analysis and the assumption that there were likely to be clear indicators of what makes a country a “transit country.” Realizing that the concept of a transit country was too limited, we followed our instincts and recast our approach to better capture the phenomenon under question. This reassessment of a key term in the question itself was, in and

Letter from the Director of the Institute for Analysis at NSA, Donn L. Treese.

To the faculty and students of the California State University Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence:

Very well done. What I see in this project is a very good microcosm of what we actually do and, even better, an insight into the way it should be done.

For the former, like us, your students and faculty were somewhat daunted by the task and the lack of specificity right up front. They were asking themselves exactly what was expected and where do they get started. What kind of data is available? Where might it lead me? Sounds familiar to an analyst. Does the question make sense? Also familiar to an analyst. What happens if I get this wrong? Not enough analysts ask themselves this question.

For the latter, what you described is a near perfect union of disciplines and collaboration. It was very smart, in my opinion, to involve others (even though time ran out, you had them on the hook) and not present any predisposed ideas or biases. Even more so, instilling this behavior as the best way to achieve a task such as this, to me, is the best outcome of this whole project.

I must add that your presentation at NSA was very well received. I heard comments to the effect that this tradecraft would indeed be incorporated into the daily analysis activities of a number of attending analysts. One discussion even focused on automation of this methodology. In short, this work was very well received.

What I hope your students bring to my agency when they get here is simple enough, I think: I need them to understand that egos are not helpful; that even though we typically are tasked individually, we must find and work with others to get the best intel product on the street; we often have incomplete data sets and no time to complete them; open and creative thinking is a staple of the job; and to ask for a better question if the one received lacks sensibility. One more thing: The job is to understand the past, work the present, and suggest the future. Some analysts get 24 hours to do that. Some get 24 months. What you all accomplished during a semester is indeed pretty remarkable. Thanks for your role in ushering this along to its great outcome.

of itself, a contribution to the dialogue. By encouraging our teams to be creative, we were able to come to this important result. Since we were asked to provide a perspective outside of the IC, we were not afraid to seek an unconventional approach. This is a key lesson. *Follow the data where they lead,*

even if they compel one to alter a key premise of the question itself.

Building in redundancy in a research design can be useful for a variety of reasons. Doing so helped us avoid reliance on only one person or class, with its higher potential for failure. But redundancy also gave us multiple angles on our subject.

Having different faculty members apply different ways to get at our challenge revealed the depth of the problem associated with relying on the open-source data. Across all classes, students found problems with the data that faculty members had believed would be necessary for solving the challenge. Having multiple approaches also helped us avoid problems associated with the potential bias of a single approach. We also had an added feature to ensure the integrity of the process. By permission of the two CSUSB instructors, the project coordinator solicited weekly reports on the research progress from two students who were not aware of each other's efforts, keeping the process honest.

An overall coordinator, a shepherd for the whole project, was useful as well. In fact, it is hard to see how the project could have come together without the unobtrusive, guiding hand of one person with a vested interest in completing it. The coordinator organized the VTCs, checked up on the process through his two classroom contacts, offered help and encouragement to the professors, and maintained communication with IFA representatives. Furthermore, he was able to bring in a principal analyst, who stood outside the three in-class projects. When the principal analyst was brought in to evaluate the research and integrate it into a coherent whole, the coordinator worked with

It was important for the students to realize that, despite [the uncertainties], the faculty and students would be expected to produce a result—just as any working analyst must.

the analyst to discuss the ideas and strategies the analyst would bring to the product. In addition, the coordinator advised the principal analyst on how best to present this information to the eventual consumers of the product.

In retrospect, after the challenge was completed and briefed to the IFA, *the faculty agreed that it was good for students to see the research process in its entirety because the process resembles the way in which faculty members conduct their research and, we imagine, how intelligence analysts conduct theirs as well.* It was important, pedagogically, for the students to grasp fully the uncertainties, and anxieties, of a research process in which there is no predetermined outcome and there is a high level of uncertainty about whether the research will be academically useful or accepted by their peers. Yet it was also important for the students to realize that, despite this, the faculty and students would be expected to produce a result—just as any working analyst must.

Finally, it helps to have people who bring their “A-game” to the project. No one person’s ego stood in the way of the project as a whole. Everyone—from the

faculty and student researchers, to the coordinator, to the geographers who waited for an opportunity to help, to the principal analyst—wanted the project to succeed. All were willing to admit where they believed their efforts or their research or research design was weak in the supporting reports. In an environment where egos sometimes get in the way of success, this was a huge factor.

Conclusion

Where will we go from here? Our efforts to collaborate are only beginning. We envision more opportunities to bring more faculty and students into future challenge projects. We are also testing how to make Wikis—with their capacity to accommodate multiple authors and ability to show changes over time—available for collaborative efforts. At the CSUSB campus, we annually produce a mock, competitive National Intelligence Estimate in our graduate program. We use a two-team format—Teams A and B—in which students represent different IC agencies on their team. We have been doing these NIE exercises for more than a dozen years.^a In the past, the students have worked on the NIE in the traditional fashion, each individual

writing his or her own paper, with the final team product being a compilation of the papers. This year, we intend to collaborate through the use of a Wiki, to simulate the type of collaboration that Intellipedia offers to analysts in the IC.

As a test, the coauthors of this article worked on this manuscript using Wiki technology. Each entry by a coauthor was tracked and was immediately available to all who had access to the site. Through this we hoped to find out what works and what does not and why. Our ultimate goal is to have more students who can bring the new tools of Web 2.0 to potential careers in the IC. In the process, we are also learning new and better ways to collaborate.



^a Our PSCI 621: Strategic Intelligence course requires students to learn photographic interpretation, the writing of the *President’s Daily Brief*, and the team research approach in a competitive NIE. Each year, the instructor selects a new topic based on reasonable approximations of real-world problems. For example, over the past several years, our NIEs have included *The Prospects for China’s Domestic Stability over the Next Five, Ten and Fifteen Years*, *Russia After the Election*, and this year, *North Korea After Kim Jong-Il*.

“Cunning Passages, Contrived Corridors”: Wandering in the Angletonian Wilderness

David Robarge

Angleton was CIA's answer to the Delphic Oracle: seldom seen but with an awesome reputation nurtured over the years by word of mouth and intermediaries padding out of his office with pronouncements which we seldom professed to understand fully but accepted on faith anyway.


—David Atlee Phillips¹

There's no doubt you are easily the most interesting and fascinating figure the intelligence world has produced, and a living legend.

—Clair Booth Luce²

Mr. A. is an institution.

—William Colby³



Whatever genre they work in—history, journalism, literature, or film—observers of the intelligence scene find James Angleton endlessly fascinating.⁴ The longtime head of counterintelligence (CI) at the Central Intelligence Agency has been the subject, in whole or substantial part, of dozens of books, articles, and films, including five in the past three years. Beyond the vicarious appeal of looking at the shadowy world of moles, double agents, traitors, and deceptions, the enduring interest in Angleton is understandable, for he was one of the most influential and divisive intelligence officers in US history. He shaped CIA counterintelligence for better or worse for 20 years from 1954 to 1974—nearly half of the

¹ David Phillips, *The Night Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977), 189.

² Tom Mangold, *Cold Warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 30.

³ *Ibid.*, 307. At the time Colby was head of CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO).

⁴ The title of this article is derived from one of Angleton's favorite poems, "Gerontion" by T.S. Eliot: "After such knowledge, what forgiveness? Think Now/History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors/ And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions/Guides us by vanities. Think now." Angleton took his signature phrase "wilderness of mirrors" from this poem.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Agency's Cold War existence—and his eccentricities and excesses have been widely portrayed as paradigmatic of how *not* to conduct counterintelligence.

Angleton's career ended abruptly amid controversy over damaging disclosures about Agency domestic operations that forever changed the place of intelligence in the American political system. Angleton's real and perceived legacy still influences counterintelligence practices in the US government and public perceptions of CIA.

Yet the lore about Angleton is more familiar than his ideas, accomplishments, and true shortcomings because much of the publicly available information about him is highly partisan, generated by a range of intelligence veterans, scholars, journalists, and fiction and film writers who have maligned or embellished his career to the point that much of what is supposedly known of him is a mix of fact and fiction.

Delving into the Angletonian library is a Rashomon-like experience. As one scholar of Angleton has written with only mild exaggeration, "One could ask a hundred people about [him] and receive a hundred lightly shaded different replies that ranged from utter denunciation to unadulterated hero worship. That the positions could occupy these extremes spoke of the significance and the ambiguity of the role he had played."⁵

What do we know, and what do we think we know, about perhaps the Agency's most compelling and caricatured figure, and what else can we reliably say until still unrevealed information about him becomes available?

Biographical Backdrop

Before venturing into an analysis of how others have depicted Angleton, the salient facts of his biography should be presented.⁶ Angleton was born in Boise, Idaho, in 1917 and grew up mostly in Italy, where his father owned the National Cash Register subsidiary. He attended an English preparatory school before entering Yale in 1937. He majored in English Literature and edited a poetry review called *Furioso* that published the works of T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and others. He entered Harvard Law School and then joined the Army in 1943.

Angleton was recruited into the Office of Strategic Services and first worked in the super-secret X-2 counterintelligence branch in London. It was here that Angleton learned to be so hyperconscious about security. X-2 was the only OSS component cleared to receive raw ULTRA material, intercepted German military communications sent via the Enigma encryption machine. He also knew about the DOUBLE CROSS and FORTITUDE deception operations that were paving

⁵ Robin W. Winks, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961* (New York: William Morrow, 1987), 437.

⁶ One persistent misunderstanding about Angleton to dispense with straight away involves his middle name, Jesus. Practically everyone who writes or talks about Angleton uses it—to what end is unclear—but he never did, and as an Anglophile, he avoided calling attention to that prominent reminder of his half-Mexican parentage. He always signed documents just with "James Angleton," in a crabbed, slightly shaky script that would fascinate graphologists.

the way for the Normandy invasion. The success of these operations was one reason for his later belief in Soviet “strategic deception.”

Angleton next served in the X-2 unit in Rome, where he was codenamed ARTIFICE.⁷ He was an innovative field operative and rose to be chief of all X-2 operations in Italy by the end of the war. When the OSS disbanded in 1945, Angleton stayed in Italy to run operations for the successor organizations to OSS. After he moved into CIA’s espionage and counterintelligence component in 1947, he became the Agency’s liaison to Western counterpart services. In 1954, he became the head of the new Counterintelligence Staff. He would remain in that job for the rest of his career.

Separating Fable and Fact

From this biography, Angleton’s portrayals have drawn frequently contradictory and unverifiable information and assertions that almost seem too great for one person to embody. Angleton, some of them say, was a paranoid who effectively shut down Agency operations against the Soviet Union for years during his Ahab-like quest for the mole in CIA. He received copies of all operational cables so he could veto recruitments and squelch reports from sources he delusively thought were bad. He had a “no knock” privilege to enter the DCI’s office unannounced any time he pleased. He ordered the incarceration and hostile interrogation of KGB defector Yuri Nosenko. And he had a bevy of nicknames that included “Mother,” “Virginia Slim,” “Skinny Jim,” “the Gray Ghost,” “the Black Knight,” “the Fisherman,” and “Scarecrow.” None of these claims is completely true or demonstrable.⁸

What is known for sure about Angleton is more complicated and captivating. He looked like a character in a spy novel and had unconventional work habits and mannerisms. A magazine profile of him aptly stated that “If John le Carré and Graham Greene had collaborated on a superspy, the result might have been James Jesus Angleton.”⁹

Angleton possessed a brilliant intellect and extensive knowledge of current and historical Soviet operations, although his sometimes convoluted descriptions of case histories affected people differently. While his colleague William Hood said that he “would sometimes add a full dimension” to an operational discussion, former DCI James Schlesinger recalled that listening to him was “like looking at an Impressionist painting.”¹⁰ Angleton was fervently anti-communist, continually discoursing on “the nature of the [Soviet] threat,” and ardently supported Israel; his control of that country’s account at CIA, an administrative anomaly,

⁷ See Timothy J. Naftali, “ARTIFICE: James Angleton and X-2 Operations in Italy,” in *The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II*, ed. George C. Chalou (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), 218–45.

⁸ The only nickname that others are reliably said to have used for Angleton was “the Cadaver,” by some men in his unit just after World War II ended, referring to his gaunt appearance. Winks, “Artifice” 372.

⁹ David C. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 216.

¹⁰ Working Group on Intelligence Reform, *Myths Surrounding James Angleton* (Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 15; Mangold, 153.

was one of the foundations of his influence. The two qualities were interrelated operationally, as he saw Israel as a bastion against the Soviet Union.

Secretive and suspicious, Angleton had a compulsive approach to anything he took on—whether hunting spies, raising orchids, or catching trout—and surrounded himself and his staff with an aura of mystery, hinting at dark secrets and intrigues too sensitive to share. Some of that mystique carried over from his OSS days, and some of it he cultivated as a tactic to advance his interests at CIA. He ran vest pocket operations and compiled extensive files that he kept out of the regular Agency records system. He believed the values of Western democracies left them vulnerable to intelligence attack—especially deception—and so he sat on some actionable information if he thought it was unverifiable or counterfeit.

Angleton often was arrogant, tactless, dismissive, and even threatening toward professional colleagues who disagreed with him. Outside the bounds of Agency business, which for him were expansive and caused his family life to suffer, Angleton could be charming and had many close and loyal friends and a wide assortment of interests. One way or another, he always left a lasting impression on those who met him.

An even-handed assessment of Angleton's career would discern two distinct phases to it, although most of his detractors concentrate on the second. From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, he and his staff provided a useful voice of caution in an Agency seized with piercing the Iron Curtain to learn about Soviet intentions and capabilities. For roughly the next 10 years, distracted by unsubstantiated theories of Soviet "strategic deception," Angleton and his staff embarked on counterproductive and sometimes harmful efforts to find moles and prove Moscow's malevolent designs.

What makes Angleton such a conundrum for the historian and biographer is that he was losing his sense of proportion and his ability to live with uncertainty right around the time, 1959–63, when it became startlingly evident—agents compromised, operations blown, spies uncovered—that something was seriously amiss with Western intelligence and more aggressive CI and security were needed.¹¹ Given the Soviets' record of success at penetration and deception operations going back to the 1920s, and with no current evidence to the contrary, Angleton was justified in presuming CIA also was victimized. However, there was no other source, human or technical, that he could use to guide him on the molehunt—only his favored source, KGB defector Anatoli Golitsyn, and their symbiotic relationship soon became professionally unbalanced as the manipulative and self-promoting defector's allegations of international treachery grew more fantastical.

Overall, Angleton's negatives outweighed his positives. First, among the latter: While he was running CIA counterintelligence, there were no known Soviet penetrations of the Agency besides "Sasha" (the extent to which Angleton deserves credit for that is arguable). Information from, or assistance by, him and the CI

¹¹ The defection to the Soviet Union of Angleton's erstwhile friend, MI6 officer "Kim" Philby, in 1963 confirmed years of suspicion that he was a KGB agent and certainly reinforced Angleton's sense that Western intelligence had been pervasively betrayed to Moscow.

Staff helped uncover, or prepared the way for later discovery of, Soviet espionage operations in several Western countries. He maintained good relations with the FBI at the working level, helping mitigate longstanding interagency hostility fostered mostly by J. Edgar Hoover. And he contributed to the establishment of counterintelligence as an independent discipline of the intelligence profession with resources and influence at CIA.

The negatives preponderate, however. By fixating on the Soviets, Angleton largely ignored the threat that other hostile services posed—notably the East Germans, Czechs, Chinese, and Cubans. His operational officers were so deeply involved with defensive CI (molehunting) that they did not contribute nearly enough to offensive (counterespionage) operations. He became far too dependent on Golitsyn and consequently mishandled some cases (although in two of them, in Norway and Canada, the real spies were found eventually). He held to his disinformation-based interpretations of certain world events—the Sino-Soviet split, Tito's estrangement from Moscow—long after they were discredited. His skill at bureaucratic infighting belied his administrative sloppiness. Lastly, he grew too isolated later in his career, and his security consciousness became self-consuming and stultifying for his staff.

Even without the sensational *New York Times* front-page story by Seymour Hersh in December 1974 about CIA domestic operations that prompted Angleton's dismissal, it was more than time for him to go, as even his longtime defender Richard Helms came to admit.¹² Many people will remember Angleton only for two of his last publicized appearances: drunk, disheveled, and disoriented when a media mob confronted him at his home the morning after he was fired; and cagey, elusive, and defiant while testifying before the Church Committee several months later.¹³ Very quickly after he left Langley, an anti-Angleton orthodoxy set in at the Agency and coincided with the intelligence scandals of the mid-1970s and a public backlash against CIA that profoundly influenced subsequent interpretations of Angleton.

The "Real" Angleton

Historians and journalists have produced what seems in overview to be a workable bibliography on Angleton,¹⁴ but it has gaps in coverage and flaws in scholarship and lacks focus. This nonfiction corpus began appearing after Angleton's

¹² Seymour Hersh, "Huge CIA Operation Reported in US Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years," *New York Times*, 22 December 1974: A1; Richard Helms with William Hood, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency* (New York: Random House, 2003), 284.

¹³ It was in the latter circumstance that Angleton confirmed that in a deposition he had asserted "It is inconceivable that a secret intelligence arm of the government has to comply with all the overt orders of the government," and then backpedaled from it, saying, "If it is accurate, it should not have been said...I had been imprudent in making those remarks...I withdraw that statement...the entire speculation should not have been engaged in." *Hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, 94th Congress, First Session, Volume 2, Huston Plan* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 72, 73.

¹⁴ This writer's previous foray into the subject was "Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angleton and CIA Counterintelligence," *Journal of Intelligence History* 3:2 (Winter 2003): 21–49, posted on cia.gov, along with this issue, with the journal's permission.

high-profile firing generated extensive interest in the mysteries of counterintelligence, and pro- and anti-Angleton voices made themselves heard. Because most of the documentation for the cases Angleton worked on remains classified, these accounts rely heavily on interviews—many of them unattributed—and unsourced information from former US intelligence officers who generally agree with the authors' perspectives. There are at least several dozen nonfiction works that deal with Angleton in some detail, so only those that are about him principally or exclusively will be described here.¹⁵

Edward Jay Epstein, *Legend and Deception*.¹⁶

Epstein, a journalist and currently a columnist for *Slate*, became Angleton's most prolific ally in his post-dismissal, behind-the-scenes campaign for vindication. In *Legend*, Epstein first publicized the clashes inside CIA over the bona fides of Yuri Nosenko and drew attention to the deception and penetration theories of Angleton and his prize source, Anatoli Golitsyn. Angleton and like-minded former Agency and FBI officers provided Epstein with much unsourced, still-classified information for *Legend*. He acknowledged their assistance in *Deception*, published two years after Angleton died in 1987. In later articles, Epstein continued with most of the same apologetic themes but did become more skeptical of the Angleton-Golitsyn interpretation of Soviet foreign policy. Most recently, he noted that the observation of Aldrich Ames's KGB handler that Angleton's suspicions about a mole inside CIA "has the exquisite irony of a stalker following his victim in order to tell him he is not being followed."

David C. Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors*.¹⁷

Martin has been a national security reporter for CBS News since 1993 and had covered intelligence affairs for the Associated Press and *Newsweek* when this seminal book was published nearly 30 years ago. Despite its age, *Wilderness of Mirrors* remains the most balanced treatment of Angleton and CIA counterintelligence. It helped deflate the emerging Angleton mythology and established a more objective frame of reference within which to evaluate the merits of the dueling defectors Golitsyn and Nosenko. The book is not solely about Angleton, however—it examines in parallel, and sometimes disjointedly, CIA covert actions against Castro and the career of FBI agent and CIA officer William Harvey—and it lacks sourcing—there are no footnotes or bibliography, and Martin does not identify where he got much of his specific information. Angleton initially cooperated with Martin but cut off contact when he learned that the author also was in touch with some of his critics. One of them was Clare Petty, an ex-CI Staff officer who had come to believe that Angleton was either a fraud or a KGB asset.

¹⁵ Turn to the end of this article for a list of other books, articles, and a Web site for materials on Angleton that are worth noting for their facts and often starkly varying perspectives.

¹⁶ Edward Jay Epstein, *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978) and *Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989). See also Epstein's articles "The War Within the CIA," *Commentary*, August 1978; "Who Killed the CIA?," *ibid.*, October 1985; "Was Angleton Right?," *Wall Street Journal*, 30 December 2004; and "Through the Looking Glass" (undated), all posted on his Web site, www.edwardjayepstein.com. The quote that follows comes from the *Wall Street Journal* piece.

¹⁷ New York: Harper and Row, 1980. The 2003 paperback reprint adds the overwrought subtitle *Intrigue, Deception, and the Secrets That Destroyed Two of the Cold War's Most Important Agents*.

Yuri Nosenko, *KGB*.¹⁸

An unusual early entrant into the nonfiction (with an asterisk) category was a made-for-television movie that appeared on BBC-TV in the United Kingdom and HBO in the United States in 1986. It tells the Nosenko story through the eyes of the CIA case officer who initially ran him but, when confronted with Angleton's Golitsyn-inspired suspicions, turns on the defector and tries to "break" him through hostile interrogation and solitary confinement. The well-staged docudrama avoids emotionalism, gets most of the atmospheric and personalities right, and features remarkable look-alikes for Angleton and Helms. Some minor historical and tradecraft errors will be apparent to knowledgeable viewers. Epstein served as a "program consultant," which explains the film's pro-Angleton slant.¹⁹

Robin Winks, *Cloak and Gown*.²⁰

In a chapter titled "The Theorist," the late Yale history professor presented the most insightful biographical sketch of Angleton yet written (in part derived from conversations with its subject). Winks avoided the sinister allusions and arm-chair psychology that mar other accounts. His detailed examination of Angleton in the OSS captured the formative effect that fighting World War II from the cloister of X-2 had on the fledgling operations officer's conceptions of CI theory and practice.

Tom Mangold, *Cold Warrior*.²¹

A BBC correspondent at the time, Mangold produced what still is the most factually detailed, thoroughly researched study of Angleton. *Cold Warrior* is not, however, a cradle-to-grave biography and does not cover all aspects of Angleton's CIA career. Rather, it is the "prosecution's brief" against him for the molehunt. Mangold is unsparingly critical, rendering all either/or judgments in the negative. He concludes that counterintelligence in several Western services suffered at Angleton's hands—notably during his later years—when its practitioners most needed to exhibit intellectual honesty and operational discernment. Journalistic flourishes, such as clipped prose and catchy "sign-off lines" that more properly belong on a newscast, and a derogatory designation of Angleton and his kindred spirits as "fundamentalists" detract from an otherwise readable book. More overdrawn but still worth watching is the spin-off documentary *Spyhunter* that aired on the Public Broadcasting Service's "Frontline" series in May 1991.

David Wise, *Molehunt*.²²

The doyen of intelligence journalists, Wise started a biography of Angleton, but when Mangold beat him to it, he salvaged his project by focusing on the search for "Sasha"—the alleged Soviet mole inside the CIA. Wise drew on many of Martin's and Mangold's sources but also turned up new information from previously

¹⁸ Directed by Mick Jackson; screenplay by Stephen Davis; US release 7 September 1986.

¹⁹ The movie set off a spirited exchange among some Agency veterans—Mark Wyatt, Leonard McCoy, "Steve Daley" (the screen name for Nosenko's handler, Tennent H. Bagley), and Joseph Evans—in the pages of the Central Intelligence Retirees Association newsletter during 1986–87.

²⁰ See note 5.

²¹ See note 2.

²² *Molehunt: The Secret Search for Traitors That Shattered the CIA* (New York: Random House, 1992).

silent Agency officers and in formerly classified records, including about compensation provided to victims of the molehunt. Wise also revealed details about the penetration agent, who did not damage CIA nearly as much as Angleton feared or as the molehunt itself did—although he goes well beyond the facts to claim that the search “shattered” the Agency.

Cleveland Cram, *Of Moles and Molehunters*.²³

Cram was a career CIA operations officer who returned to the Agency after Angleton was gone to write a lengthy, still-classified history of the CI Staff. In public remarks and writings based on his research, Cram strongly disparaged Angleton. That attitude sometimes is displayed in *Of Moles and Molehunters*, a unique and valuable historiographical survey of counterintelligence publications from the late 1970s to the early 1990s.

**Robert M. Hathaway and Russell Jack Smith,
Richard Helms as DCI.²⁴**

In this formerly classified publication of the CIA History Staff, then-Agency historian Hathaway wrote a highly unfavorable chapter on Angleton based not on in-depth archival research but mainly on critical internal surveys prepared in the years soon after his dismissal and on interviews mostly with CIA retirees unfavorably disposed to him. Another limitation of Hathaway’s treatment as a contribution to Angleton scholarship is that, in keeping with the focus of the book, Helms’s attitudes toward the CI chief and the practice of counterintelligence get as much attention as Angleton and the prominent cases he was associated with at the time. The MHCHAOS domestic espionage program, for example, is handled in that matter, so Angleton’s limited role in it—overstated in Hersh’s exposé—does not get emphasized.

**Working Group on Intelligence Reform,
Myths Surrounding James Angleton.²⁵**

Underscoring the bipolar nature of perceptions about Angleton, two former CIA officers and an FBI senior manager who knew and worked with him—William Hood, Samuel Halpern, and James Nolan—offered mainly sympathetic observations of him at a symposium held the same year that Hathaway’s critique was published. In the discussion afterward, their undocumented recollections and assessments got a mixed reception from the intelligence professionals in attendance—many of whom likewise knew and worked with Angleton.

²³ *Of Moles and Molehunters: A Review of Counterintelligence Literature, 1977–92* (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1993). The monograph is available on cia.gov at <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/index.html>.

²⁴ *Richard Helms as Director of Central Intelligence, 1966–1973* (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, 1993); declassified in July 2006 and available on CIA’s public Web site at www.foia.cia.gov. The book carries the disclaimer that “while this is an official publication of the CIA History Staff, the views expressed...are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the CIA” (ix).

²⁵ Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994.

Gérald Arboit, *James Angleton, le Contre-espion de la CIA*.²⁶

Arboit, a historian at the University of Strasbourg, has written the only book about Angleton in French. Beyond that and some thoughts on portrayals of Angleton in popular culture, its stereotyped depiction of him and CIA counterintelligence as deranged—Arboit uses “paranoid” and “madness” liberally—adds little to an understanding of a complex story.

Tennent H. Bagley, *Spy Wars*.²⁷

The CIA operations officer who had the dubious fortune of handling Nosenko has written a combative and sometimes confusing rebuttal to the criticisms of how Angleton and others approached that case—the presumption that Nosenko was a false defector dispatched to discredit Golitsyn and assert that the KGB had nothing to do with the JFK assassination. Bagley denies the oft-repeated charge that he initially believed Nosenko was bona fide but then fell under Angleton’s and Golitsyn’s sway and embraced their conspiratorial world view that would later be called “sick think.”

Instead, in a detailed and often hard-to-follow case review, Bagley insists that Nosenko’s first contact with CIA in 1962 was designed to conceal the presence of Soviet penetration agents who had been operating in US intelligence since at least the late 1950s and that his reappearance barely two months after the JFK murder was a risky change in the operation. Bagley unsparingly attacks the defector’s defenders, who he believes have besmirched his own reputation, and he has challenged them to answer 20 questions about the case, claiming that a “no” to any one of them would be enough to discredit Nosenko and substantiate Angleton’s view that the defector was dispatched. Critics of *Spy Wars* have noted Bagley’s reliance on unnamed former KGB officers as sources for essential (some would say convenient) information.

Michael Holzman, *James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, and the Craft of Intelligence*.²⁸

Holzman is an independent scholar with a doctorate in literature who, he says, set out to write a study of an interpretive school of literary thought called the New Criticism that was prominent at Yale when Angleton attended, and then decided to use it as a way to divine the meaning of Angleton’s approach to counterintelligence. In essence, Holzman contends that only people trained in the New Criticism, which emphasized ambiguity and multiple simultaneous levels of meaning, could think they really understood all the nuances and intricacies of CI. Whatever the intellectual cause and effect the school had on Angleton, Winks deals with it more economically and less esoterically.

Holzman offers some new information on Angleton’s personal life and poetic interests, but his recounting of Angleton’s intelligence career follows the usual well-worn

²⁶ Paris: Nouveau Monde, 2007. Translated, the title reads “James Angleton: CIA Counterspy.” Arboit has distilled most of the book’s discussion of Angleton’s notorious molehunt in an article, “In His Defector He Trusted: How the CIA Counterintelligence Staff Broke the Western Intelligence Community for Ten Years,” posted on the Web site of the Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement, www.cf2r.org/fr.

²⁷ *Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2007).

²⁸ Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008.

tracks. He does, however, give the earlier years their due instead of hurtling into the 1960s like most other writers. Holzman's research is reasonably thorough,²⁹ but for a literary critic he uses secondary sources with a surprisingly unquestioning attitude, and he makes many careless mistakes with dates, organizations, and people. The narrative is cluttered with several pedantic or politically loaded asides and digressions into CIA and FBI activities that Angleton was aware of but not directly involved in, such as anti-Castro plots and COINTELPRO. The extensive treatment of MHCHAOS repeats much of what has been known since the Church Committee report of 1976 and serves as a set piece for Holzman to express his moral outrage at the "STASI-like mentality" (44) behind the US government's post-9/11 counterterrorism and internal security measures.

The Fictional Angleton

Angleton looms so large in modern American intelligence that he has transcended mere history and entered the realm of book and film fiction. One reason why the conventional wisdom about him is so tenaciously held is that the clichéd image of him purveyed in several novels and films has reached a wider audience than nonfiction works. Literary license has obscured historical reality and made achieving an understanding of him all the harder. Characters in some novels, such as Norman Mailer's *Harlot's Ghost* and David Morrell's *The Brotherhood of the Rose*, are loosely based on Angleton, and he appears postmortem in Chris Petit's *The Passenger*.³⁰ This discussion will look only at novels and movies in which Angleton clearly is portrayed as a major character, whether in fictional or true name, in a realistic setting.

Aaron Latham, *Orchids for Mother*.³¹

One reviewer's blurb on the paperback edition of this roman à clef declares that "some things can only be said in fiction, but that doesn't mean they are not true." The problem with that statement is that little the book says about its main character is true. Latham's often outrageous novel about the bureaucratic feud between counterintelligence chief "Francis Xavier Kimball" and DCI "Ernest O'Hara" (William Colby) is the source of more misconceptions about Angleton than any other work—starting with the title containing his supposed nickname, which nobody ever used for him.³²

Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss, *The Spike*.³³

The writers—friends and admirers of Angleton—place him in this conspiracist tale in the role of a counterintelligence sage, dismissed from service, who uses

²⁹ Although he cites some, Holzman appears unfamiliar with the publications of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which he claims "can be relied upon as accurate depictions of what the Agency wishes to be known and thought about its activities" (337 n. 92). Regular users of CSI products know that they often are critical of CIA's performance in many areas.

³⁰ Winks, an aficionado of spy fiction, identified many others in *Cloak and Gown*, 539 n. 14.

³¹ Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.

³² Some Web sites, including until recently Wikipedia, say that Angleton's CIA cryptonym was KUMOTHER, but no such term existed. The pseudonym used for him in Agency cable traffic was Hugh N. Ashmead. Wise, 32.

³³ New York: Crown Publishers, 1980.

revelations from a high-level KGB defector to save the United States from an evil Kremlin plot that employs Soviet agents infiltrated throughout the US government. The book is as far-fetched and misguided about Angleton from its right-wing perspective as *Orchids for Mother* is from Latham's leftist viewpoint.

William F. Buckley, Jr., *Spytime*.³⁴

Buckley—oddly, given his conservative views—appropriates most of Latham's motifs and perpetuates some of their inaccuracies in this clumsy and contrived work that is far inferior to the entertaining Blackford Oakes tales. Whereas some of Latham's off-the-wall statements can be attributed to parody, Buckley's approach is too sober to allow that excuse. His Angleton is dull and unappealing, and he resuscitates the unoriginal idea that Colby, who fired Angleton, is the long-sought Soviet mole in CIA (and, more imaginatively, the "Fifth Man" in the Cambridge spy ring). As one reviewer wrote, "Both deserve better treatment than their reputations receive in this book."³⁵

Robert Littell, *The Company*.³⁶

Reviewers have touted Littell as "the American le Carré," and although his prose is far inferior to that of George Smiley's creator, he generally displays a sophisticated sense of tradecraft in his usually stark plots. However, in this bloated saga of the Cold War CIA, Littell propagates much folklore and misinformation about Angleton, who appears in true name along with other Agency luminaries such as Frank Wisner, Allen Dulles, and Colby. Littell's portrayals of Angleton's idiosyncrasies occasionally border on the (unintentionally) comical, and the idea that the CI Staff chief could order the imprisonment and torture of an Agency officer suspected of being a Soviet mole is preposterous. The TNT television network's film version of the book by the same name that appeared in 2007 is much better.³⁷ Some suspension of disbelief is required to watch Michael Keaton in a trench coat and homburg instead of a Batman costume, but he captures Angleton's quirky habits and often obsessive personality just about right.

***The Good Shepherd*.**³⁸

This 2006 film was marketed as the "untold story" and "hidden history" of CIA, unlike other movies that used the Agency as a vehicle to present a transparently fictional plot or as part of a historical backdrop for made-up characters acting in real-life settings. However, as the CIA History Staff has indicated in this publication,³⁹ *The Good Shepherd* is a "propagandamentary" similar to Oliver Stone's *JFK* that mangles and fabricates history for political purposes. Its lifeless main character, "Edward Wilson," purportedly is based on Angleton—when the plot requires he also stands in for other Agency operatives—but to borrow from the standard movie disclaimer, any resemblance between Wilson and persons living or dead is mostly coincidental.⁴⁰

³⁴ *Spytime: The Undoing of James Jesus Angleton* (New York: Harcourt, 2000).

³⁵ Benjamin B. Fischer, review of *Spytime* in *CIRA Newsletter* 26 (Spring 2001), 55.

³⁶ Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2002.

³⁷ Directed by Mikael Salomon; teleplay by Ken Nolan; released 5 August 2007.

³⁸ Directed by Robert DeNiro; screenplay by Eric Roth; released 22 December 2006.

³⁹ *Studies in Intelligence* 51, no. 1 (2007): 47–54.

What's Left to Say?

Michael Holzman has perceptively pointed out that the open literature on Angleton

is narrowly focused on the Great Molehunt, which is an indication, among other things, of the interests of his former colleagues, the ultimate source of much of that literature. It is, in its way, insiders' history, concerned with the internal history of the Central Intelligence Agency, concerned with continuing bureaucratic battles among the file cabinets and between the covers of books, some scholarly, some not. It is, ultimately, not the history of the winners, but simply that of the survivors."⁴¹

His comment addresses the perennial challenge for those who approach any historical topic: the inadequacies of the available evidence. Documentation is incomplete and not fully trustworthy, and memories are fallible and subject to bias.

Coming to a reasonable degree of historical closure is more difficult in a case like Angleton's, where emotions are involved and reputations are at stake; where people and institutions have established unwavering positions on controversial subjects; and where evidence is sparse or no longer available,⁴² and what does exist is open to different interpretations. Declassification of the primary case files is essential to fully understand the Angleton era and its impact; synopses and analyses derived from file research are useful only up to a point. How, for example, can the Golitsyn-Nosenko dispute be resolved when scholars are limited to weighing Tennent Bagley's "Evaluation of the Bona Fides of Yuri Nosenko" against John Hart's "Monster Plot"?⁴³ They are incompatible versions of the same information and events and cannot be compounded into a synthesis. Like chemistry, the historical imagination has its limits.

But the raw details of CI operations are among any service's most closely guarded secrets, and properly so. Angleton reportedly once said that "if you control counter-intelligence, you control the intelligence service."⁴⁴ The same may well apply to a historical understanding of CIA counterintelligence. Necessary restrictions on information about the enterprise that he considered the foundation of all other intelligence work probably will prevent us from seeing the reality of him and instead consign us to continue looking at shadows and reflections. Angleton may remain to history, as he fancied himself in life, an enigma.



⁴⁰ Most recently on film (2009), an Angleton-like character (tall, thin, trench coat, brimmed hat) appears as a senior CIA executive in *An American Affair*, which is loosely based on the real-life relationship between President John F. Kennedy and Mary Pinchot Meyer, ex-wife of Agency covert action chief Cord Meyer. Mary Meyer was killed in 1964 under strange circumstances, and Angleton had an odd role afterward in keeping the presidential affair quiet. See Nina Burleigh, *A Very Private Woman: The Life and Unsolved Murder of Presidential Mistress Mary Meyer* (New York: Bantam Books, 1998), 245–49. Presumably in the same vein, Angleton is listed as appearing in a forthcoming (2010) documentary, *Murder on Fifth Helena Drive*, about the death of the Kennedy brothers' alleged paramour, Marilyn Monroe. See the Internet Movie Database at www.imdb.com/title/tt1083463.

⁴¹ Holzman, 224.

⁴² Many records on Angleton's freelance activities and the CI Staff's domestic operations were destroyed after his dismissal.

⁴³ Both documents are posted on the Agency's FOIA Web site. John Hart was a former Agency operations officer who DCI Stansfield Turner brought out of retirement to review CIA's handling of Nosenko.

⁴⁴ Mangold, 47.

Also Worth Reading

- Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988)
- William Colby and Peter Forbath, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978)
- Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1995)
- John Hart, *The CIA's Russians* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003)
- Richard Helms with William Hood, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency* (New York: Random House, 2003)
- Burton Hersh, *The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992)
- Seymour Hersh, "The Angleton Story," *New York Times Magazine*, 25 June 1978: 13–18ff.
- Angus MacKenzie, *Secrets: The CIA's War at Home* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997)
- Ted Morgan, *A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone: Communist, Anti-Communist, and Spymaster* (New York: Random House, 1997)
- Thomas Powers, "Spook of Spooks," *New York Review of Books*, 17 August 1989: 40–43, reprinted as "The Riddle Inside the Enigma" in Powers, *Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to al-Qaeda* (New York: New York Review Books, 2002), 109–25
- Mark Reibling, *Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994)
- Nigel West, *A Matter of Trust: MI5, 1945–1972* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982) and *The Circus: MI5 Operations, 1945–1972* (New York: Stein and Day, 1983)
- Peter Wright with Paul Greenglass, *Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987)
- The Web site of the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies (www.cicentre.org), which provides CI training to the federal government, contains a large variety of materials on Angleton—declassified documents, interviews, speeches, quotes, articles, book reviews, and reading lists—that is exclusively critical of him.



The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One

By David Kilcullen. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 340 pp., index.

Reviewed by Matthew P.

David Kilcullen's *Accidental Guerrilla* is at once an intellectual memoir of the author's field research, a contribution to the academic discourse on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and a prescription for the Western establishment to manage more smartly the many smaller conflicts included in the so-called war on terror. Kilcullen—a former Australian army officer who has served as a civilian adviser to the US government on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, including during the 2007 surge of US forces in Iraq—argues that the vast majority of persons the West faces in these conflicts had no initial intention of fighting but instead were moved to action by an extremist minority. Therefore the West should pursue courses that counteract the conditions that allow extremists to manipulate segments of populations into becoming “accidental” guerrillas rather than targeting certain individuals or groups. Engaging conflicts in the way Kilcullen suggests would have profound implications for intelligence.

Kilcullen examines recent activity in several theaters, primarily Afghanistan (2006–2008) and Iraq (2006–2007), and to lesser extents East Timor (1999–2000), southern Thailand (2004–2007), the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan (2006–2008), and immigrant communities in Europe. Though not all of Kilcullen's case studies are in Muslim areas, Islam figures prominently because of the frequency with which insurgent or terrorist activity is a function of *takfiri* Islam, which professes conversion to Islam by force and death for the unwilling—as a recurring script for violent resistance.

In looking at these cases the author uses a medical analogy suggesting phases of an infectious disease: “infection”—the entry of extremists into a vulnerable area; “contagion”—the spread of extremist influence; “intervention”—the engagement of establishment, often Western-partnered, security services; “rejection”—the hoped-for elimination of the insurgent or terrorist group by the population.

What does Kilcullen suggest? Western intervention—if done at all—should be low-profile and should demonstrate that the West is advocating the well-being of populations and not imposing outside systems—no matter how altruistic or rational in Western eyes. Strategies should emphasize the population: building trust, creating good governance, establishing credible security services, maintaining relationships with local officials, and marketing the success of all of the above to those in the population who are wavering. Overwhelming use of force and search-and-destroy techniques that risk high collateral damage and rally locals in oppo-

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sition should be avoided—though he does not dismiss selective operations against terrorist or insurgent leaders.

Kilcullen's case study of the construction of the road through Afghanistan's Kunar Province during 2007–2008 illustrates how these practices can be carried out and demonstrated that the engagement of the local population in the planning, construction, and security of the operation mattered more than the road itself. Similarly, he points out, success in Iraq involved bringing tribes and insurgent groups into sanctioned security arrangements and gave locals alternatives to the extremist option.

The success of Kilcullen's approach would seem to require intense partnering of intervening forces with the governments, especially the security and intelligence services, of the host countries, a subject that would benefit from further study. Local governments themselves must consider the repercussions of moves against violent Islamist movements in their borders. In some cases, a host government or security service might actually *want* to perpetuate traditional Western counterterrorist practices and lexicon—for example, by getting its internal oppositionists on certain terrorist lists or military classifications (foreign terrorist, common enemy, etc.) a host government may acquire new Western funding, legal authorities, and more powerful tools with which the host government can suppress its internal opposition. Kilcullen's thesis would have applications here, and it would be profitable to inquire further into how to manage these host interests.

Given the profound role intelligence would have to play, Kilcullen says surprisingly little of specific intelligence entities, though at one point he lauds the World War II-era US Office of Strategic Services as a model for civilian-military interaction with a strategic purpose. As he stresses, counteracting conditions that extremists exploit requires intimacy with the local environments. Collecting, analyzing, and articulating objective ground truth to decisionmakers are essential. Also important are covert, unconventional warfare options—an “indirect approach that ruthlessly minimizes American presence” (285). These might include propaganda and counterpropaganda; increased liaison relationships with (and presumably, penetrations of) host-country intelligence services; assistance to selected local leaders or groups to increase their patronage and authority to serve as vessels of influence; support to community programs, e.g. civic centers; health care; moderate (in the case of religious-based) educational institutions; and, more broadly, elevation of expertise in the Western intelligence community.

Overall, Kilcullen's thesis is convincing, and the book is a notable addition to the literature of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in providing another antidote to the “enemy-centric” doctrines that have often failed and to the oversimplification of the lexicon of the war on terror. Both have tended to obscure the complex realities of local conditions and prevented adoption of the best solutions. Even if concepts Kilcullen has raised are familiar to recent Western military and intelligence practitioners and students of guerrilla conflict, *The Accidental Guerrilla* presents a systematic way of looking, based on smart analysis and research, at the complexities of global strategy in this age.



Vietnam Declassified: CIA and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam

Thomas L. Ahern, Jr. (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 480 pp., index.

Hayden Peake

In his preface to *Vietnam Declassified*, Thomas Ahern writes that when he left Vietnam in 1965, “I knew we were losing, but I had no idea why the Saigon government was in retreat in the countryside, and the VC ascendant.”¹² In this book, originally published internally in 2001 as a classified history entitled *CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam*, Ahern provides many answers, formed with the benefit of hindsight, deep research into classified documents, candid and revealing interviews, and his own experience as a clandestine service officer.¹

Vietnam Declassified is narrowly focused on operations related to “the struggle to suppress the Viet Cong and win the loyalty of the peasantry”⁹, although major military and political events are mentioned for context. The story is told from the perspective of the CIA officers involved—many of whom are named—the insurgents they battled, and the peasants they labored to empower. The narrative covers six chronological periods. In the first, from 1954 to 1956, the Agency, as a temporary expedient to get things going, dismissed orthodoxy and operated with two distinct stations. One, labeled the *Saigon Military Mission* (SMM), was headed by Col. Edward Lansdale, who reported to Allen Dulles. Its mission was to establish military and civic action programs in the countryside where none existed. The conventional station, subordinate to the Far East Division of the Directorate of Plans (since renamed the Directorate of Operations and then the National Clandestine Service), focused on rural political mobilization. While the two stations cooperated on some projects, for the most part they operated in parallel, often with the reluctant toleration of the Diem government, which was struggling to consolidate power on its terms. By the end of 1956 the SMM, having laid some groundwork with the Diem government, left Vietnam, while the conventional station continued the work in the provinces.

¹ Ahern was an operations officer in the CIA for 35 years. He served five tours in Asia, including three in Indochina. Since retirement, he has served as a CIA contract historian. A slightly redacted version of *Rural Pacification* was released in 2006. Five other Ahern histories of CIA efforts in the region were declassified with varying degrees of redaction in 2009. All six can be found at <http://today.ttu.edu/2009/03/cia-releases-documents-of-vietnam-war-era-intelligence/>. Published in-house by the CIA History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence between 2001 and 2006, Ahern’s works have been widely used in the Intelligence Community for education and training purposes. The last of the series, *Undercover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos, 1961–1973*, is the most frequently accessed history book CSI has produced.

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Agency activity diminished during the second period (1956–61) as Diem attempted to destroy communist elements in the countryside, alienating peasants in the process. The station reasserted itself in the third period (1961–63) by “launching a series of programs designed either to stimulate village self-defense or attack the insurgent organization at the village level.”(17) Internal Vietnamese conflicts persisted and Diem was overthrown in November 1963.

During the fourth period (1963–65) the Vietnamese generals competed for power while station officers worked at the provincial level trying to find a successful pacification formula. The fifth period (1966–69) was characterized by an expansion of the pacification effort and the massive military buildup of US troops, which eventually led to the unification of intelligence and countryside action programs under the Military Assistance Command (Vietnam) or MACV.

The final period (1969–75) brought the Nixon policy of Vietnamization, which sought to turn over CIA-sponsored programs to the Vietnamese. A major element of this period was the Phoenix program—called *Phung Hoang* by the Vietnamese. Its objective was to integrate “all government of Vietnam activities against the VC” aimed at penetration of the VC and the collection of intelligence.(295) The CIA provided advisory support. Ahern devotes considerable space to the bureaucratic machinations from which this program evolved, its operations in the field, and details of CIA support.

In the end, of course, CIA efforts to help the South Vietnamese in the countryside failed. The reasons are evident in the pages of *Vietnam Declassified*. Ahern quotes exchanges with Headquarters, cites conflicts with MACV, and documents the complex political terrain. From the CIA standpoint, it battled for success with two constituencies, one American, the other Vietnamese, and yet it never conducted a comprehensive analysis of the insurgency’s political dynamics. The Americans, under MACV’s rigid bureaucracy, first resisted involvement in and then demanded control of all intelligence and counterinsurgency operations, often with methods the CIA station considered counterproductive. The Vietnamese insisted on the final say on all programs—it was, after all, their country. But they could never control their own bureaucracies, whose competing equities led them to interfere with agreed-upon CIA operations that were seen as challenges to power.

The story is not one of unremitting failure, however. The success of the People’s Action Teams (PATs), described in chapter 10, is an example of what could be achieved. Informants were recruited to identify communist cadres and a civic action program trained security teams and strengthened provincial administration. Roads were repaired, haircuts given, security provided, and the villagers responded by informing on VC forces. For a while it appeared that a workable formula had been found for replacing the VC infrastructure and expanding “the government’s popular base in the countryside.”(169) But attempts to sustain and expand the program and others like it—the Rural Development (RD) operations conducted by the Marines, for example—failed in battles of competing bureaucracies.

Ahern identifies many reasons for the collapse of the pacification efforts. Some South Vietnamese recognized them as well. One general noted that commanders in the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) were actively “sabotaging pacification,” charging the government itself with “preferring to let the US bear the burden of the

war.”(313) Others cited “indifference and lack of empathy at all levels among Vietnamese officials”(328), and there was corruption like the phantom platoons that existed only on payrolls. It wasn’t until after the Tet Offensive of 1968 that national mobilization was decreed, but it was never vigorously enforced. Despite all the programs designed to disrupt VC infrastructure, it remained virtually intact. One complicating factor was the decision of the Vietnamese government to treat captured VC as criminals, not prisoners of war, with the result that after short sentences they were free to return to the fight. (339) The Provincial Interrogation Centers posed additional difficulties. Cases of brutality resulted when old traditions among the Vietnamese prevailed, a problem aggravated by the lack of trained interrogators. The CIA regarded the practices “as not only inhumane but counterproductive.”(367) In the end, Ahern concludes, “Whatever the theoretical merits of democracy, the GVN version could not compete with the communists’ discipline and cohesiveness, which the democratic forces lack.” (337)

Experiments conducted under flawed assumptions are likely to provide unsatisfactory outcomes. In the final chapter Ahern discusses what he believes to have been the fatally flawed assumptions of the war in Southeast Asia, for example, conflict in Vietnam was between communism and democracy rather than a battle for national liberation—this prejudiced policy and operations. Likewise, the tenacity of the North Vietnamese was consistently misjudged, and operations based on the assumption that resistance could be overcome by winning “hearts and minds” had little chance of success, especially absent government efforts to “mobilize the countryside.”(426) The assumption that the peasants abhorred VC-style communism and longed for democracy also proved unjustified.

In this edition, Ahern includes a preface that reflects on the Vietnam precedents and the lessons they suggest for battling insurgencies. The circumstances are not identical, but the similarities are significant, though complicated by the magnitude and complexities of an insurgency incorporating fanatical religious beliefs. Still, the United States again faces the problems of foreign forces trying to protect populations that do not fully participate in their own defense and the alienation brought on by the destruction inherent in counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations. Ahern does not provide answers for today’s dilemmas, but he makes vividly clear what did not work when one nation tried to fight another nation’s war. He also provides the foundation for a greater understanding of the CIA’s potential roles in counterinsurgencies.



OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II

By John Whiteclay Chambers, II. (Washington, DC: US National Park Service, 2008), 616 pages, with maps and illustrations. Online at http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/oss/index.htm

Reviewed by Clayton D. Laurie

Ostensibly a history of OSS interaction with the National Park Service (NPS), specifically the use of parks as training grounds, *OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II*, by Rutgers University history professor John Whiteclay Chambers, II, is a much more comprehensive and detailed account of the OSS than the title implies. Indeed, it is one of the more extensive and well-researched histories to have appeared in several years, and it stands to become one of the seminal books on the OSS when published by Rutgers University Press, as currently planned. Commissioned in 2004 to write just a NPS-OSS study, Chambers convinced the park service of the need for a much broader history that placed OSS training activities in the overall context of OSS activities during World War II and its importance as the first centralized intelligence organization in US history. The original concept expanded into the 600-plus-page manuscript available on the NPS Web site. Given this online availability, Chamber's history may well become one of the more popular and widely read works on the OSS.

The first two chapters retell the familiar story of OSS origins. Chambers recounts the background of founder William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan; the connections between those interested in intelligence, "fifth column" activities, and psychological or "political warfare" in Great Britain and the United States; and the fitful start for such endeavors with the formation of the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) in July 1941. All this, of course, took place amid monumental bureaucratic turf wars between Donovan and the military intelligence offices and the FBI, which claimed responsibility for the nation's intelligence missions but performed them badly. Six months after US entry into World War II, as Chambers details, the much larger and more sophisticated OSS replaced the COI and began organizing and training for global operations. While there is not much new in this traditional interpretation, Chambers covers the terrain well, citing a tremendous number of published and archival sources in a clear writing style that always keeps the reader's attention.

The next five chapters on training are the strongest part of the study and a significant contribution to the existing scholarly literature—filling a gap in OSS history that has existed for far too long and which could form a stand alone scholarly publication. Chambers fully describes OSS-NPS agreements that culminated in the establishment of two large training facilities on park service

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property in the Catoctin Mountains near Thurmont, Maryland (near the presidential retreat then called Shangri-La, now Camp David), and in Northern Virginia's Prince William Forest Park near Quantico (on Chopawamsic and Quantico Creeks). Although many existing histories mention OSS training areas in passing, Chambers covers the topic in great depth—from physical descriptions of the parks, to the hiring of instructors for the OSS Schools and Training Branch and subsequent course development, to the construction of barracks, mess halls, firing ranges, and classrooms.

This history focuses exclusively on the specialized training provided those destined for the OSS operational arms—the Special Operations and Communications Branches and Operational Groups. The work deals less with those slated for service in Morale Operations, Secret Intelligence, or Counterintelligence Branches, or the Maritime Units, who received most of their training elsewhere in the United States or abroad (Research and Analysis Branch members from academic backgrounds generally had the necessary background to perform their duties without additional training). Chambers discusses other OSS training locations, such as Congressional Country Club, and smaller facilities in the Washington suburbs or in Baltimore but keeps the focus on the bigger bases. While covering OSS training on the macro level, these chapters also represent fine examples of local history, relying heavily on many new oral history interviews of veterans who were there.

The final two chapters describe the results of OSS training, as intelligence and paramilitary teams fanned out to the operational theaters in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East. Although Chambers includes mostly standard fare, he does describe new operations, based on oral history interviews, and draws a direct connection between the realistic training recruits received and OSS operational success abroad. He notes that the methods developed during World War II proved so realistic and practical that they reappeared in postwar training programs of the Central Intelligence Agency and military special operations commands. Chamber's summary and conclusion, wide-ranging and beyond just the OSS-NPS connection, is sober and accurate. He notes failures, as well as accomplishments of the 13,000-member OSS, whose contributions to the Allied war effort, and to the future of American intelligence, far exceeded what proponents and critics alike would have expected from a wartime agency only slightly smaller than a typical US army infantry division.

Of particular note are the many excellent oral history interviews Chambers conducted of OSS veterans who trained in the areas he describes. They personalize the history in ways that archival sources cannot and become especially important as the decades pass and surviving veterans become ever fewer in number. Chambers notes that OSS members, so successful during the war, went on to lives and careers that were equally successful—many of the veterans interviewed for this study are now in their 80s and 90s and remain as active as they were in decades past.

In addition to these rich new oral histories, Chambers has compiled perhaps the most comprehensive bibliography of published and archival material available anywhere on the OSS. Only a few pertinent works are missing from this otherwise exhaustive list. One hopes that revised online and print versions will include these few omissions. Nonetheless, Chambers has thoroughly mined the

records at the National Archives, the Roosevelt and Truman Presidential Libraries, the Library of Congress Manuscript Division, and personal papers held at Princeton University, the US Army Military History Institute, and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. The online version of the history contains an intriguing portfolio of maps of the training areas, as well as several score photographs obtained from OSS veterans. (Warning: Readers will need broadband service to download the nearly 7 MB file of illustrations.)

In spite of the rather understated title, *OSS Training in the National Parks* is highly recommended for general audiences interested in a detailed one-volume history describing the origins, people, and operations of the OSS during World War II. Having the searchable manuscript online at the National Park Service Web site is an added bonus. Scholars will find the chapters on training a welcome and long overdue addition to the existing historiography of intelligence and to our understanding of the OSS, while the comprehensive bibliography will prove invaluable to researchers. Although many historians may find much of the early and later chapters in this large manuscript a familiar retelling of oft-told OSS tales that could have profited from judicious editing, these portions do surround some wonderful new and original research on OSS training that is well worth examining.



The Secret War in El Paso: Mexico Revolutionary Intrigue, 1906–1920

Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 488 pages, photos, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Mark Benbow

Professors emeritus from New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, Charles Harris and Louis Sadler are (or should be) familiar names to anyone studying pre-1940s intelligence history. They have published several excellent studies, including *The Archaeologist Was a Spy: Sylvanus G. Morley and the Office of Naval Intelligence* (2003) and *The Border and the Revolution: Clandestine Activities of the Mexican Revolution 1910-1920* (1988). The two began work on *Secret War* several decades ago as a history of gunrunning in El Paso during the Mexican Revolution. However, as such studies often do, this one expanded as they discovered that gunrunning was only part of a much larger picture—an intelligence battle between US agencies and a kaleidoscope of contending Mexican factions.

Harris and Sadler's work breaks interesting new ground because they have carefully sifted through records not previously explored in great depth. They combed declassified records from the FBI, Naval Intelligence, the Department of Justice, the United States Secret Service, and the Mexican archives—not always an easy task. Together they form an elaborate intelligence puzzle. Their work shows how a careful reconstruction from such disparate records can illuminate a long-forgotten piece of US intelligence history.

Like good historians, or intelligence officers, Harris and Sadler let the evidence lead them to the story. An example is the frequently ignored meeting of President William Howard Taft and Mexican President Porfirio Díaz in El Paso in 1910, when primitive intelligence-sharing prevented a major diplomatic crisis. At the time of the meeting, Díaz was facing growing opposition, and informants had reported assassination plots against him. Despite the dubious provenance of many of the reports, a heavier presence of Mexican and US troops at the meeting than had been originally planned as well as a “private, ‘off-the-books’ security force” recruited by one of Taft's friends prevented an attempt on Díaz's life.(15) Had Díaz been assassinated on US soil, the ensuing crisis could have propelled the United States into much more involvement in Mexican affairs.

The intelligence sharing established a precedent that would be repeated throughout the decade. After Mexican reformer Francisco Madero replaced Díaz in 1911, US officials took an even more active role in cooperating with the Mexican government to obstruct revolutionary activity on US soil. The “most striking aspect,” the authors note, “was the degree to which US and Mexican intelligence agencies cooperated.”(377) While liaison cooperation never entirely stopped ille-

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gal arms shipments across the border, even the partially effective embargo made it more difficult—and more expensive—to buy arms in the United States for use in Mexico.

Because neither country had experienced intelligence officers in today's sense of the word, the role of intelligence was largely a contest between amateurs. Harris and Sadler cite the example of the Thiel Detective Service, an American company operating in El Paso. Hired by Madero's government to report on counter-revolutionaries based in the city, Thiel's agents passed copies of their reports to US officials without the knowledge of Madero's government. (82) Such multiple allegiances were common, as neither country had established protocols to vet sources. In addition, double agents were often uncovered by accident or were betrayed by other double agents trying to earn a reward.

A notable amateur was Felix Sommerfeld, an agent who worked for several Mexican factions, switching loyalties as conditions changed. A German who had been decorated by the Kaiser's government for his actions during the Chinese Boxer Rebellion in 1900, Sommerfeld had by 1912 become a mining engineer with experience in Mexico and the United States—he also served as a reporter for the Associated Press. The authors observe that “Sommerfeld would move through the Mexican Revolution like a wraith...,” (76) attaching himself to Madero, then to anti-Huerta Constitutionalists, then to revolutionary Venustiano Carranza, and, finally, Pancho Villa. All the while he cooperated with the United States when it served the interests of the faction he was backing.

What we would call HUMINT dominated the type of information gathered by agents on each side, although there were a few attempts at using emerging technologies to acquire COMINT. Harris and Sadler note that US officials tried to plant recording devices such as Dictaphones in hotel rooms. The information received was unreliable and sometimes deliberately intended for Washington's ears by factions hoping to win official favor. The only topic Harris and Sadler failed to discuss in sufficient detail, in my judgment, is the role of third-party actors, in particular the Europeans. They mention German actions in the border area after the United States entered the Great War in April 1917, but they could have covered what the Germans (and British) were doing in the border region during the rest of the decade. Maybe there wasn't much, but the accounts of activity elsewhere as covered by Frederick Katz in *The Secret War in Mexico* (1983) and Barbara Tuchman in *The Zimmerman Telegram*, (1958) suggest otherwise.

Covering their topic in largely chronological order, Harris and Sadler introduce an enormous roster of actors. A who's who would have been helpful, as I occasionally found myself referring to the index to refresh my memory—though I think the index is too short and probably inadequate to meet the needs of follow-on researchers. The story flows smoothly, however, and the authors write with wit and humor. Their bibliography is impressive, including the major works on the United States and the Mexican Revolution. The illustrations include numerous unique photos. In sum, the book is well-done and should be read by anyone interested in the Mexican Revolution or in American intelligence operations in the years before the development of formal intelligence processes.



The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

Current

Intelligence for an Age of Terror, Gregory F. Treverton

Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities Of National Intelligence, Robert Kennedy

Vaults, Mirrors and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence, Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (eds.)

General Intelligence

The Real Spy's Guide to Becoming A Spy, Peter Earnest with Suzanne Harper

Historical

The Attack on the Liberty: The Untold Story of Israel's Deadly 1967 Assault on a U.S. Spy Ship, James Scott

My Life As A Spy: One of America's Most Notorious Spies Finally Tells His Story, John A. Walker, Jr.

Nathan Hale: The Life and Death of America's First Spy, M. William Phelps

The Spy Who Tried To Stop A War: Katharine Gun and the Secret Plot to Sanction the Iraq Invasion, Marcia and Thomas Mitchell

Intelligence Abroad

Historical Dictionary of Middle Eastern Intelligence, Ephraim Kahana & Muhammad Suwaed

Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the Rise of Hamas, Paul McGeough

Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan, 1904–05: Secret Operations on Land and at Sea, Evgeny Sergeev

SPOOKS: The Unofficial History of MI5, Thomas Hennessey and Claire Thomas

Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders, and Cover-ups—Six Decades of Espionage Against America and Great Britain, Chapman Pincher

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Current

Gregory F. Treverton, *Intelligence for an Age of Terror* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 306 pp., endnotes, index.

In his 2001 book—completed before 9/11—*Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information*, Gregory Treverton suggested changes needed in an era of globalization. He then prophesied that only two events might alter his recommendations: “a major terrorist attack on the United States...a global economic collapse.” (vii) This book extends his previous recommendations in light of the events since 9/11. He argues from a perspective formed by service on the Church Committee—right out of college in 1975—the National Security Council, and as vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council when it reported to the director of central intelligence. His experience also includes service as a Rand consultant to the FBI on the Hanssen case and to congressional committees regarding the advisability of establishing a separate domestic intelligence service, and his current position as director of the Rand Corporation’s Center for Global Risk and Security.

A basic premise of the book is that US intelligence agencies generally were not ready for 9/11, after which “the task of intelligence changed dramatically.” From this it follows that the reshaping begun by reforms enacted in 2004 was only “the bare beginning” of what is needed. (1) The nine chapters of the book examine a series of changes needed in the intelligence landscape to meet the challenges presented by Islamic terrorism. These include dealing with the “tyranny of the ‘stovepipes’”—a Cold War legacy that prevented necessary cooperation among agencies— an enhanced DNI role, modifications in organization—a separate domestic intelligence agency is not recommended—and the challenges to analysts when dealing with masses of information coupled with the problem of conflating security and sharing of data. With regard to the latter point, Treverton suggests that “fresh analytic insights are likely to arise precisely from those...with a fresh perspective who have *no* need to know.” (12) There is also a chapter dealing with an expanded customer base—what Treverton calls the “policy tribes”—and the security issues involved. The issue of security and civil liberties in a democracy surfaces throughout the book but is dealt with in depth in the final chapter, “Rebuilding the Social Contract.” Here Treverton invokes experiences of other nations—mainly Great Britain—to argue for more transparency, accountability, and oversight. The final sentence in the book is less than optimistic on this point: “I do not fear the terrorist, I do sometimes fear us.” (261)

Intelligence for an Age of Terror is a top-down examination of the topic in the current environment, with an agenda for the future. Intelligence officers, however, while agreeing with many of the issues raised, may well conclude that proposed changes must first be tempered with a view from the bottom up.

Robert Kennedy, *Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities of National Intelligence* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008), 261 pp., endnotes, appendices, index.

In his 35 years of government service, Robert Kennedy has taught at the Army War College, served as a foreign affairs officer at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was civilian deputy of the NATO Defense College, Rome, and is currently a professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology. In *Of Knowledge and Power* he has applied this experience to the intelligence profession in the post 9/11 era, essentially providing a primer for management or people new to the problems of intelligence.

Kennedy recognizes the new threats of our age, but he does not examine the mechanics of dealing with them or offer any solutions. Similarly, he identifies the difficulties posed by today's increased volume of data, the impact of budget cuts, the criticality of training and creative thinking, the risks of cognitive bias with historical examples, and the problem of politicizing—intelligence to please—but leaves solutions to others. The final chapter, "The Struggle for Congressional Oversight," is particularly interesting in this regard. He notes the problems of workload, lack of time to "probe the quality of intelligence," the tendency to infuse political demands where they don't belong, and the "willingness to take intelligence at face value." (203) How congressional staffs can overcome these problems with their limited resources is not discussed.

With one exception, *Of Knowledge and Power* clearly identifies the problems facing the Intelligence Community today. The exception, is counterintelligence, a topic he doesn't mention. Nevertheless, for an overview of what intelligence management faces, it is a good start.

Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (eds.), *Vaults, Mirrors and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 310 pp., end of chapter notes, index.

The title of this book raises a question author Jennifer Sims answers in the first paragraph. Counterintelligence (CI) functions by "exploiting, disrupting, denying, or manipulating the intelligence activities of others." The tools employed "include security systems, deception, and disguise: vaults, mirrors, and masks." This unusual conceptualization is indicative of the book overall. It is not about CI cases or operations but rather considers questions of CI policy, organizational relationships and strategy, the connection between CI, civil liberties and culture, and the need for greater congressional oversight. Each of the 13 chapters takes into account these issues to some degree from various points of view—academia, law enforcement, the military, judiciary, Congress, and the professional intelligence officer.

The quality of the contributions varies. At the outset, the need for a *new* "national counterintelligence strategy" is assumed—but not demonstrated—nor is the difference with the current national CI strategy made clear. Subsequent chapters offer solutions to "the thorniest problems...confronting coun-

terintelligence in democracies.” Five identified are: the “dominance of defensive CI...and the disconnect between policy makers and CI community,” the lack of a common approach to CI among various agencies, “the absence of homes for strategic CI planning and operations...in broader service to national security policy,” the lack of CI understanding and training among agencies, and the absence of oversight. (10–11)

Unfortunately, the authors have identified problems, but they have neither fully substantiated their existence nor proffered solutions for them. For example, the chapter on the theoretical basis for reform stresses the “mission-based” approach to CI. While those words may stimulate vigorous debate, the elements and value of the theory are not made clear, nor does the narrative indicate how a new mission-based approach differs from the existing mission-based approach. The chapter “Defense Counterintelligence, Reconceptualized” also invokes theory without adding clarity and discusses putative organizational CI problems without providing solutions or establishing that problems really exist. It then offers such illuminating conclusions as “counterintelligence is an inseparable subset of intelligence.”

The contribution by Judge Richard Posner, “Counterintelligence, Counterterrorism, Civil Liberties, and the Domestic Intelligence Controversy,” offers clear articulation of the issues, suggestions for resolution, and a direct challenge to the view that “any curtailment of liberty operates as a ratchet, or more dramatically as placing us on a sharp downward slope, at the bottom of which is tyranny.” (278)

The final chapter offers six recommendations for improving CI in the future. The first, “do no harm,” suggests limiting the federal footprint at the local level while focusing on networking rather than creating new organizations. The second, “at the federal level, reconnect CI with national security strategy and decisionmaking,” is more ambiguous, suggesting that this can be accomplished by reducing “the influence of law enforcement directives over the role and agenda of the NCIX [National Counterintelligence Executive].” The third argues for greater diversity in the workforce. The fourth deals with the need to redesign declassification policies. The final two are concerned with improving congressional oversight.

It is not self-evident that the ultimate conclusion of the book, “reform of the US counterintelligence effort is urgent,” has been demonstrated, however. *Vaults, Mirrors and Masks* has raised many issues worthy of discussion, but nothing about counterintelligence has been “rediscovered.”

General Intelligence

Peter Earnest with Suzanne Harper, ***The Real Spy's Guide to Becoming a Spy*** (New York: Abrams Books, 2009), 144 pp., bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

In his preface to *The Craft of Intelligence*, Allen Dulles, tells of listening to his family discuss the Boer War and then writing his own pro-Boer views on the matter. Discovered by his elders, the views were published as a booklet, misspellings and all. At the age of eight, he was fond of telling young officer trainees, he was taken seriously; it was a lesson he said he never forgot. Retired CIA case officer, Peter Earnest has not forgotten it either. *The Real Spy's Guide* is a serious book aimed at those who may at some point in their formative years consider becoming an intelligence officer—a spy in popular parlance.

The seven chapters explain why spying is necessary, what spies do and do not do, the qualifications required, the terminology used, and how to apply to the intelligence agency of your choice—the internet, of course—Web addresses are included. Several chapters end with short multiple-choice quizzes to help readers decide if they have the “right stuff” and what career options—espionage, analysis, technical, support—fit best. For those considering an overseas career in the CIA, the chapter on training discusses tradecraft—surveillance, recruitment techniques, working under cover, bugs, dead drops, codes and the like. There is also a chapter that answers the question: what do I do until I am old enough to apply? The importance of foreign language and writing skills are stressed. In each chapter are short stories of actual espionage cases that emphasize the risks and excitement one may expect.

The Real Spy's Guide answers questions often asked but seldom answered in one place. Students, teachers and parents will find it useful.

Historical

James Scott, ***The Attack on the Liberty: The Untold Story of Israel's Deadly 1967 Assault on a U.S. Spy Ship*** (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 374 pp.

On 8 June 1967, in the middle of the Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats attacked the USS *Liberty* while her crew was collecting SIGINT in international waters off the Gaza Strip. It was a clear day, the 350-foot *Liberty* was sailing at 10 knots and flying a large US flag. The ship's name was on the stern, and its number was on the bow. Except for several small caliber machine guns, the *Liberty* was unarmed. Israeli aircraft fired rockets and cannons and dropped napalm bombs. The torpedo boats launched at least five torpedoes, one of which tore a 34-foot hole in the bulkhead and decimated the cryptologic center staffed mainly by

NSA linguists. The attack lasted about an hour. Thirty four were killed, 171 were wounded. These basic facts are no longer disputed.

Shortly after the attack, the survivors were sworn to secrecy, told to stay away from the press, and then decorated—in secret. The *Liberty's* captain, William L. McGonagle, was awarded the Medal of Honor, but the president refused to follow tradition and make the presentation. The security restrictions notwithstanding, books questioning the official position that the attack was an accident began appearing in 1968 and have reappeared periodically since then. Some were written by survivors. *The Attack on the Liberty* is by the son of a survivor.¹

James Scott's account is an expanded version of events based on interviews with crew, letters, and recently released government documents. He makes clear that the survivors all thought the attack was intentional, though the reason was obscure. The Israeli government insisted it was an unfortunate accident. Initially, some officials in the US government accepted this explanation. But eventually, many—CIA Director Richard Helms, CIA Deputy Director Admiral Rufus Taylor, Admiral Thomas Moorer, presidential adviser Clark Clifford, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk—to name a few, concluded it could not have been accidental. Many members of Congress agreed but would not take a public position and declined to conduct hearings or an investigation. The short Navy hearing was conducted before some of the wounded could testify. The panel initially tended to blame the crew. The only person who really mattered, President Johnson, accepted the Israeli account and that became the official result.

The sad impact of the attack on the lives of the survivors is evident. The situation was aggravated when Israelis at first blamed the attack on the *Liberty*, then reversed themselves and agreed to pay reparations to survivors and families. But they delayed payment for more than 10 years. In the end, Scott speculates on two important points. First, he looks at the strategic impact of lessons not learned by keeping details of the attack secret. For example, he asks whether a Navy-wide review of the facts might have prevented the capture by North Korea of the USS *Pueblo* seven months later. Second, and more important, he considers possible reasons the president behaved as he did—the stresses of the Vietnam War, the need for Jewish support in America, and support in Congress are just three possibilities.

As with all incidents, there are at least two sides. Scott makes all the positions clear, though there is little doubt he agrees with the crew. *The Attack on the Liberty* is skillfully written and admirably documented, but it leaves little hope that the complete truth will be known any time soon.

¹ Anthony Pearson, *Conspiracy of Silence* (London: Quartet Books, 1968).

John A. Walker, Jr., *My Life As A Spy: One of America's Most Notorious Spies Finally Tells His Story* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2008), 340 pp., no index.

In his foreword, prisoner # 22449-037 explains that he began this book in 1994 as an apology to his children, as an acknowledgement of regret to the nation, and as a means of making public “in exhaustive detail” the real reasons for his traitorous behavior. For those uninterested in the detail, the disingenuous Walker asks readers to believe these reasons: (1) his exposure to vast amounts of government secrets, (2) President Kennedy’s assassination by “powerful government officials,” and (3) the failure of the US Navy to defend the USS *Liberty*. But he goes on to argue that in spite of these factors, he never would have spied had it not been for the “the fraudulent cold war” and his unsuccessful marriage, for which he assigns blame to his wife’s “blatant infidelity.”

There is very little new in the two stories he tells in this book. The first story concerns his decision to give secrets to the Soviets in the late 1960s, how he did it for so long, the roles of those he recruited to help him, how he got caught, and why his actions actually contributed to peace. The second story concerns his family life, which he pictures as rather normal except for his wife’s behavior. Both are covered in more detail by Pete Earley in *Family of Spies*, which is based on interviews with Walker and some of the KGB officers involved—by far the best treatment of the case. Earley’s depiction of Walker’s family life is one of constant conflict and abuse by Walker, an aspect absent from Walker’s account. The one new detail Walker adds occurs in a short chapter titled “A CIA Mole.” In it he claims that he had told the KGB he was thinking of applying to the CIA after he left the Navy. Worried about the polygraph, he says the KGB gave him the name of a KGB mole in the CIA who would help him avoid the ordeal. Walker offers no evidence for this apocrypha. John Walker is eligible for parole in 2015 if he survives the diabetes that has cost him his eyesight.

M. William Phelps, *Nathan Hale: The Life and Death of America's First Spy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008), 306 pp., endnotes, bibliography, index.

Nathan Hale was America’s first spy. On 22 September 1776, age 21, he was hanged by the British in Artillery Park, New York City. Forts, parks, and schools, have been named in his honor. In 1925 a stamp (1/2 cent) was issued with his likeness. Three statues were sculpted in his memory, one stands at Tulane University Law School, another at New York City Hall, and the most famous, by Bela Lyon Pratt, at Yale University, from which Hale graduated in 1773. Six copies of the Pratt likeness have been made, one stands in front of CIA headquarters. At least 100 books have told Hale’s story; what, one might ask, can another add to the tale?

The simple answer is a lot. Phelps has formed a more complete account in one book than any other of Hale’s life, from his early days on the family farm, to his life at Yale, his short career as a teacher begun at age 18, and his equally brief service in the revolutionary army. Phelps draws on letters to and from family and friends, diaries, the Yale archives, and contempo-

rary accounts. The portrait that emerges is one of a young man who decided that life as a farmer was not for him and for whom teaching became a passion. At Yale he joined the *Linonia Society*, a group of scholars that met to discuss “slavery, astronomy, literature, women’s rights, and other important social and academic issues.” (17) His later correspondence with Yale classmates provides much detail about his life as a young man and his decision to serve his country in time of war.

Three episodes are of particular interest in this account. Hale’s meeting with Washington and his decision to volunteer to go behind British lines to collect tactical intelligence, the mission itself, and his last words before being hanged. There are several versions of Hale’s meeting with Washington, and Phelps evaluates each. His treatment of the espionage mission dismisses claims that Hale was captured in New York City and presents a well-documented account of the circumstances that led to his capture just before he was due to return to his unit after having acquired the intelligence he set out to collect. The most controversial element of the Hale story continues to be the words he spoke before giving his life. Phelps recounts the various versions that have appeared in the literature. Acknowledging that there is no first-hand account, he concludes that the line most often attributed to him—“I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country”—is probably only a “paraphrase of what Nathan actually said.” (192)

Hale’s hanging was meant as an example to all those considering espionage against Britain. But the greater result was the creation of a martyr, hero-patriot who set a standard by risking his life for intelligence service to his country.

Marcia and Thomas Mitchell, *The Spy Who Tried To Stop A War: Katharine Gun and the Secret Plot to Sanction the Iraq Invasion* (Sausalito, CA: Poli-Point Press, 2008), 210 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

On 31 January 2003, British GCHQ employee and Chinese Mandarin linguist, Katharine Gun, read an e-mail from NSA that she decided described “illegal intelligence operations against UN Security Council members that would have an impact on the upcoming invasion of Iraq.” (7) “I must admit that the decision to leak the e-mail was instantly in my mind” Gun told the authors; she never invoked the internal security procedures established for such a situation. (9) Instead, she leaked the e-mail to a friend, and its prompt publication caused a furor in Britain. When first questioned in the inevitable investigation, she denied responsibility, but after her conscience got the better of her she confessed. Dismissed from GCHQ, she was taken to court, but the government withdrew the case, arguing it could not reveal the secrets necessary to prosecute.

The Mitchells, in an admittedly pro-whistle-blower account, fill in the details and assail the media in the United States for the less-than-extensive coverage of the case received here. They relate Ms. Gun’s life from her birth in Taiwan to her GCHQ career and the trying ordeal to which she

subjected herself. The underlying theme of the book is that a whistle-blower's "conscience tells us we must reveal what we know," especially when it is judged to be misleading or false. (171) It then goes on to advise the governments involved on Middle East policy.

The Spy Who Tried To Stop A War is an apologia for Katharine Gun that explicitly encourages others to decide on their own that they know best when it comes to security.

Intelligence Abroad

Ephraim Kahana & Muhammad Suwaed, ***Historical Dictionary of Middle Eastern Intelligence*** (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 359 pp., bibliography, no index.

The authors of this latest contribution to the Scarecrow Press Historical Dictionary of Intelligence and Counterintelligence series are Israeli academics specializing in national security issues. In their preface, they identify the geographic area they consider and set out their objectives: discuss the important intelligence events, organizations, and principal players that have influenced the current situation in the region. An overview of the events covered can be quickly assessed by scanning the chronology and the introduction, which outline the use of intelligence from ancient times until the present.

The 325-page dictionary is arranged alphabetically and mixes personalities and organizations. In most cases the national intelligence organizations are listed by country and described in their incarnations from their origins until the present. There are separate entries for the nuclear weapon programs of Iraq, Iran, and, surprisingly, Israel, but not for Pakistan—there is no entry for India, or Afghanistan for that matter. The CIA is mentioned frequently but it does not have a separate entry, though some of the officers who played roles in various events do. Similarly, the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), also known as the Shin Bet, is included but does not have its own entry, though the Mossad does. There are also entries covering the numerous terrorist organizations that threaten regional stability and non-Muslim nations—al Qaeda is found under 'Q.' There is an entry for the Yemen Civil War, but it does not discuss its intelligence organizations or terrorist activities. A good index would have been helpful in locating the many players and organizations.

As with the previous volumes in this series, no sources are cited in the entries, and errors have crept in. For example: Dudley Clarke was not a brigadier and did not "replace General Wavell;"² (1) and William Buckley was the CIA chief of station, not a "US Army colonel." (205) There is an extensive bib-

² See Thaddeus Holt, *The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

liography that includes mostly English sources—books, articles, and Web sites—though some Israeli and Arabic citations are included.

Overall this is a valuable contribution for those concerned with intelligence in the Middle Eastern countries.

Paul McGeough, *Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the Rise of Hamas* (New York: The New Press, 2009), 477 pp., endnotes, chronology, photos, index.

In October 1997, Sheik Ahmad Yassin, the 61-year-old quadriplegic leader of Hamas in the Gaza strip, arrived home after serving nearly eight years of a life sentence in an Israeli prison. The early release of the terrorist leader was not an Israeli government gesture of goodwill; the Israelis were pressured by King Hussein of Jordan with the support of President Bill Clinton. The triggering event was a failed attempt to assassinate Hamas leader, Khalid Mishal, in Amman, Jordan, on 25 September 1997. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had approved the mission, and Mossad, given the task, bungled it badly.

Australian Middle East specialist, Paul McGeough, tells how the assassins went about “methodically rehearsing” the operation, with one exception: the delivery appliance—the liquid poison “bullet” hidden in a camera-like device—had not been used in such a mission before. The operational concept was to pass Khalid in the street and hold the “camera” near his ear and release the poison that was supposed to kill him several days later—after the assassins, dressed as tourists, had returned to Israel. But the delivery was off target. Khalid’s bodyguards caught two of the team with their fake Canadian passports. They were exposed as Israelis and detained. Two others took refuge in the Israeli embassy. As Khalid became sick, he was taken to a hospital, but the doctors could not determine what was wrong. Informed of the Israeli attempt, King Hussein, furious that the attack had taken place in Jordan, phoned Netanyahu and demanded an antidote or the captives would be tried. Then, for good measure, he called President Clinton and asked for his help—which he got. In the negotiations that followed, Yassin’s release was arranged, the antidote was reluctantly provided, Khalid survived, and Hamas achieved greater status than it had ever enjoyed.

The final part of the book tells how Khalid took advantage of these circumstances to eliminate his competition within Hamas and eventually become its leader. Khalid did not achieve this objective without a battle with Arafat and Fatah and terrorist attacks on Israel. McGeough describes in considerable detail the complex infighting and the roles played by the United States, the Arab nations in the area, and Iran. In the process he provides biographic background on the principal players on both the Hamas and Israeli sides. The story is fascinating and well told. *Kill Khalid* exposes the intricacies of dealing with Middle East nations and factions, is well documented, and a most valuable contribution.

Evgeny Sergeev, *Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan, 1904-05: Secret Operations on Land and at Sea* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 252 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendix, photos, index.

The second episode of the 1983 TV series, *Reilly, Ace of Spies*, starring Sam Neill as Sidney Reilly, dramatized the story of Reilly's role as a British secret agent in Port Arthur prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904. Reilly is shown warning the British and the Russians of the upcoming Japanese attack—they ignored him—while at the same time giving crucial secrets to Japan that made the surprise attack a success. It was splendid entertainment but sorry history. In his thoroughly documented *Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan*, historian Evgeny Sergeev sets the record straight from the Russian point of view and at the same time tells the story of the development of Russian military intelligence.

While acknowledging a role for secret agents—Reilly is mentioned in passing—Sergeev's account first describes Russian military intelligence prior to the war. He goes on to show what Russia knew about Japan's military and political intentions and why the surprise attack succeeded—a success due in part to Japan's many secret agents in Port Arthur. He then depicts the role of Russian military intelligence (tactical and strategic) in the naval and land battles that followed—all won by Japan. At the same time, he explains, specially trained military and naval attachés—conducted operations in most countries in Europe and Asia to keep abreast of and influence diplomatic developments and weapon purchases headed for Japan. The attachés were supported by “shoulder-strapped” diplomats—co-opted in today's terminology—who were very successful in breaking Japanese codes.

For political reasons, the Japanese made the initial overtures for peace at a point when Russian losses were so costly militarily and financially that the tsar was forced to accept President Theodore Roosevelt's offer to mediate. While Sergeev addresses the political factors involved in this first clash of Western and oriental empires, his emphasis is on the impact of the war on Russian military intelligence and the reforms—tactical and strategic—that the Bolsheviks would institute and capitalize on when they came to power.

Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan uses Russian primary sources that became available after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Japanese sources that have not appeared in English. In exploiting these sources, Sergeev makes evident why Soviet military intelligence had the upper hand in foreign intelligence in the early years of the Soviet Union. Sergeev has produced a fine history of the intelligence war and the lessons the Soviets learned.

Thomas Hennessey and Claire Thomas, *SPOOKS: The Unofficial History of MI5* (Gloucestershire, UK: Amberley Publishing, 2009), 662 pp. endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

For Americans, the term *spooks* suggests Halloween, horror movies, and perhaps spies. In Britain, the BBC drama series of the same name about MI5 is what jumps to mind. *SPOOKS*, the book, is also about MI5 but from a non-fiction, historical perspective. It is not the first book on the subject, John Bulloch and Nigel West made previous contributions.³ Its reign as the most recent was shortlived, with the publication this fall of Christopher Andrew's "authorized" history, *Defend The Realm*.⁴ Given that MI5 and MI6 both have marked 100th anniversaries this year, it is odd that there is no preface to explain why *SPOOKS* was published at this time. A glance at the endnotes suggests the authors capitalized on the recent release of MI5 files to the National Archives—most of the extensive notes cite specific Security Service documents.

The book's introduction recalls the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, the failure of MI5 to prevent them, and the important "life and death" role of the Security Service. The 37 chapters that follow cover in great detail the origins of the service and the many espionage and counterterrorism cases—mainly "The Troubles" in Ireland—with which it has been involved. Chapter 37, "A New World Disorder: 9/11 to 7/7 and Beyond," draws more on parliamentary reports and other open sources, as no MI5 documents have been released covering these events. The short final chapter, "Reflections," summarizes MI5 achievements, its continuing respect for individual liberties, and emphasizes that its successes will only be revealed by future historians.

Perhaps inevitably in a work of this magnitude, a few errors have crept in. For example, the VENONA project was not the consequence of Finnish intelligence discovering NKVD codebooks in 1939. (519) Likewise, Guy Burgess did not join the Communist Party while at university or any other time (550), Kim Philby defected in 1963, not 1967 (552), and Oleg Gordievsky was not a double agent. Other shortcomings are its very small print and narrow margins—which are not conducive to easy reading—and a grossly inadequate index.

SPOOKS offers a comprehensive view of MI5's early years. There is plenty of material here to stimulate the scholarly research necessary to judge its accuracy.

³ John Bulloch, *The Origins and History of the British Counterespionage Service MI5* (London: Arthur Barker, Ltd, 1963); Nigel West, *MI5: British Security Service Operations, 1909–1945* (London: The Bodley Head, 1981) and *A Matter of Trust: MI5, 1945–72* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982).

⁴ Andrew's book was released too late for review in this issue of *Studies*.

Chapman Pincher, *Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders, and Cover-ups—Six Decades of Espionage Against America and Great Britain* (New York: Random House, 2009), note on sources, bibliography, appendix, index.

In his 1981 book, *Their Trade Is Treachery*, British journalist Chapman Pincher claimed that Soviet intelligence had penetrated the British government to an extent greater than previously thought. The most sensational charge levied was that former MI5 Director-General Sir Roger Hollis was suspected of being a Soviet mole while on active duty. Pincher expanded his case in 1984 in another book, *Too Secret Too Long*. His source, not revealed at the time, turned out to be Peter Wright, a disgruntled MI5 retiree who published his own book with amplifying details, *Spycatcher*, in 1987, after winning a long court battle with the government. That same year, in his book *Molehunt*, intelligence historian Nigel West took an opposing view on Hollis. In 1990, Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky argued that Hollis had been “mistakenly accused.”⁵ There the matter has rested until its resurrection in this book by the 94-year-old Pincher. *Treachery* is a 600-page speculative treatise devoted to the conclusion that Hollis may have been a GRU agent throughout his MI5 career, or, at the very least, concealed his relationship with the Communist Party before he joined the service.

Treachery is a chronological account of Roger Hollis’s life and career in MI5. Pincher discusses many of the cases in which Hollis was actively involved or declined to play a role and points out what he suggests are numerous incidents in which Hollis protected GRU agents in Britain, all the while very likely passing counterintelligence data to the GRU. He admits there is no “smoking gun evidence” of Hollis’s guilt and relies on a succession of coincidences that, if true, could make his case. But it is not until the final four chapters that Pincher really strengthens his case. In those chapters he reveals information in a 1996 book by an Estonian émigré in the UK, Einar Sanden,⁶ that reports a debriefing of a GRU agent who claimed Hollis was recruited as an agent while he was in China in the 1930s. That is not conclusive evidence, but it does raise doubts and deserves scholarly followup. There the matter now rests.

Treachery has no endnotes, but Pincher does provide a 13-page “Note on Sources” that explains how he went about his work. He states that most of his allegations are based on MI5 documents recently released by the British National Archives and those wishing to check his data should consult the primary sources he lists in the bibliography. Despite its length and his detailed analysis, *Treachery* does not close the case on the Hollis saga. But it is a fascinating book and illustrates the challenges faced by counterespionage officers in every service.



⁵ Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990), p. 27.

⁶ Einar Sanden, *An Estonian Saga* (Cardiff, UK: Boreas, 1996).

In Defense of John Honeyman (and George Washington)

Kenneth A. Daigler, aka P.K. Rose

In the June 2008 issue of *Studies in Intelligence* Alexander Rose, author of *General Washington's Spies*, made the case that John Honeyman—widely held to be a key agent of George Washington in Trenton, New Jersey, in 1776—was “no spy.”¹ From a purely academic perspective, I can understand his thinking, but I do not believe he has made his case. Since neither of us can produce documentation to support—or conclusively refute—the story written by Honeyman’s grandson nearly 100 years after the events of Trenton, we must both rely on indirect evidence and understanding of George Washington’s conduct of intelligence late in 1776.

Mr. Rose recognized my perspective as author of a monograph on Washington and his role in intelligence by noting, “Intelligence historians, perhaps paradoxically, tend to give more credence to Honeyman’s achievements.” He mentions the work of George O’Toole, a former CIA analyst, and me, a retired CIA case officer, as examples. While Mr. Rose has raised interesting questions, my career experiences and research in the field of early American intelligence history have convinced me that even in the case of Revolutionary War spies, Honeyman included, seldom will the public, including academic researchers, find documentation regarding successful intelligence activities. Obviously, a key aspect of conducting intelligence activities is to keep them secret. All intelligence professionals know only too well that the failures become public while the successes remain secret. Thus, if Honeyman provided intelligence of value regarding the Hessian positions and activities around Trenton, his mission would have been a success and his involvement worth keeping from the public.

Guarded treatment of such information would have been Washington’s approach. We know Washington was very security conscious, and formal records identifying “sources and methods” information were not routinely kept, particularly during this phase of the war, when Washington was being chased about the middle colonies by the British. Researchers studying Washington’s official records and those of other

¹ Alexander Rose, “The Strange Case of John Honeyman and Revolutionary War Espionage” in *Studies* 52, no. 2 <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol52no2/the-spy-who-never-was.html>. Rose’s book (published, 2000) focuses on details of the Culper Ring and mentions other intelligence related activities during the Revolutionary War. P.K. Rose is the pen name I used in my pamphlet about George Washington’s intelligence activity published for CIA, *The Founding Father of American Intelligence*. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/the-founding-fathers-of-american-intelligence/art-1.html>

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

army commanders and the Continental Congress find few specifics of intelligence activities other than scouting and reconnaissance at this time.

I believe the real weaknesses behind Mr. Rose's argument are his beliefs that Washington was not capable in December 1776 of conducting an intelligence operation like the Honeyman operation and that Washington would undertake an attack on Trenton without intelligence of the enemy's situation. On the first point, it appears that Mr. Rose does not believe it was possible to run an agent like Honeyman behind enemy lines without a developed network and "case officers," which Washington would not have until later. While it is true that running agent networks requires more organizational skills and resources than those required to handle a singleton agent—and I agree with Mr. Rose that at this point in the war such capabilities were not as developed as they would be by the time of the Culper Ring in New York City—Honeyman was a singleton agent, and given the time that he served Washington, about two months, he need not have been part of a network to serve successfully.

Secondly, by November 1776, Washington had already demonstrated skill as a manager of assets like Honeyman. He had already implemented singleton collection activities against the British in several areas and had carried out intelligence tasks like Honeyman's some 20 years earlier, both personally through observation and elicitation and with "agents" sent behind enemy lines. Washington's first experience in intelligence collection related to French activities before the start of the French and Indian War. In 1753, while delivering official correspondence to the French in the Ohio Valley and awaiting a reply, he obtained, through observation and elicitation, details of French plans and intentions in the area. His use of Indian "agents" to collect intelligence on French facilities, capabilities, and plans and intentions during this period is well documented in his diary. For example, his entry of 21 June 1754 discusses dispatch of agents not only to collect intelligence but also to try to stimulate a mass desertion by French troops.²

During the French and Indian War, Washington continued to collect tactical intelligence from Indian allies and French deserters regarding French movements and fortifications. Arguably the most influential intelligence teaching point in Washington's early military career related to an intelligence failure at the battle of Fort Duquesne, where he served under British General Edward Braddock. Braddock failed to collect adequate intelligence on the French and Indian forces in the area, was ambushed, and his forces mauled. Washington is given credit for reorganizing the troops after Braddock was wounded and saving the force from disaster. His experiences during this period led to his well known quote: "There is nothing more necessary than good intelligence to frustrate a designing enemy, and nothing that requires greater pains to obtain."³

The documentary record suggests that Washington applied the lessons of these experiences as the commander of the colonial army. Less than two weeks after taking command he recorded his first payment for intelligence collection. On 15 July

² John C. Fitzpatrick, A.M. (ed.), *The Diaries of George Washington 1748-1799*, Vol. I (Cranbury, NJ: The Scholar's Bookshelf, 2005), 54–55 and 97–101.

³ Washington to Robert Hunter Morris, 5 January 1766 in *The Writings of George Washington*, Vol. I. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1931–44), 268.

1775 he provided \$333 to an unidentified officer to go to Boston to establish secret correspondence for the purpose of providing intelligence on British movements and intentions. In a note to this entry Washington stated, “The Names of Persons who are employed within the Enemy’s Lines or who may fall within their power cannot be inserted”—and thus he established the pattern of generally not revealing the identity of his sources.⁴ By April 1776 he had expended \$5,232 on intelligence. This same determination to collect on the British was evident around Trenton. Mr. Rose cites one letter, of 14 December 1776, demonstrating Washington’s interest in acquiring intelligence on British plans and locations, but there was a greater effort. Col. Joseph Reed, Washington’s adjutant, was also active collecting information on the military situation in New Jersey.⁵ All of this hardly suggests, as Mr. Rose implies, that Washington depended on luck to take Trenton.

What of the story’s origins? Mr. Rose theorizes that “Aunt Jane,” the sole source of the Honeyman story, was inspired by James Fenimore Cooper’s *The Spy* and its hero, Harvey Birch. While this is possible, at the time of the novel’s publication, the speculation, widely publicized and debated, was that the Birch character was based on Enoch Crosby, a counterintelligence agent working for John Jay’s New York State Committee for Detecting Conspiracies in the “neutral ground.” Aunt Jane could have believed anything she wanted, but the novel’s plot and Birch’s activities bear only faint resemblance to the collection activities described in the Honeyman story.

Finally, one small, to me personal, point: Mr. Rose opined that Nathaniel Sackett, another one of Jay’s counterintelligence agents, who ran collection agents in New York City, deserved to be designated as the “founding father” of intelligence collection. Here, I must strongly disagree. Sackett was not the first individual to run an agent collection network against the British—the leaders of the “Mechanics” in Boston during 1774–75 clearly hold this distinction.⁶ Sackett certainly was not as experienced or as skilled a “case officer” or intelligence manager as Benjamin Tallmadge, the officer in charge of the Culper Ring, who also played a vital if serendipitous role in the capture of Major André, Benedict Arnold’s British contact.

As the individual in charge of creating new liaison meeting facilities at CIA Headquarters, I had to name the suites. I took this responsibility seriously and believed that in the Agency’s dealings with older intelligence services it was important to demonstrate that even as a relatively “young” nation we had a solid history of intelligence activities. *The Founding Father of American Intelligence* was written with this in mind. My selection of George Washington as the Founding Father of intelligence collection was based upon his creation of an American intelligence collection capability that he managed and directed throughout the war. I believed then, and still do today, that no officer of the period had the breadth of experience in intelligence operations that George Washington did.



⁴ Marvin Kitman, *George Washington’s Expense Account* (New York: Grove Press, 2001), 119.

⁵ David Hackett Fischer, *Washington’s Crossing* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 201.

⁶ Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, *A Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution into The New Millennium*, Vol. I, 2–3.

Books, Film, and Television Reviewed in *Studies in Intelligence* 2009

Current Topics and Issues

The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One by David Kilcullen (53 4 [December], Matthew P.)

The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq by John M. Diamond (53 1 [March], Roger Z. George)

The Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a Band of US Soldiers Who Rode to Victory in Afghanistan by Doug Stanton. (53 3 [September], J.R. Seeger)

Intelligence for an Age of Terror by Gregory F. Treverton (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Of Knowledge and Power: The Complexities of National Intelligence by Robert Kennedy (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Secret Intelligence: A Reader, Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark (eds.) (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Terrorism 2005–2007: A Chronology by Edward F. Mickolus (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Vaults, Mirrors and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence, Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (eds.) (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

General Intelligence

Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, Stuart Farson, and Shlomo Shpiro, eds. (53 2 [June], Michael Warner)

Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership: A Practical Guide by Gary Berntsen, (53 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates, Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark Phythian, eds. (53 2 [June], J.M. Webb)

The Real Spy's Guide to Becoming A Spy by Peter Earnest with Suzanne Harper (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers and Users by Don McDowell (53 3 [September], Peter C. Oleson)

Thwarting Enemies at Home and Abroad: How to Be A Counterintelligence Officer by William R. Johnson, (53 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Following book titles and author names are the *Studies in Intelligence* issue in which the review appeared and the name of the reviewer. All Bookshelf reviews are by Hayden Peake.

Historical

The Attack on the Liberty: The Untold Story of Israel's Deadly 1967 Assault on a U.S. Spy Ship by James Scott (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

The Central Intelligence Agency: A Documentary History by Scott C. Monje (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Churchill's Wizards: The British Genius for Deception 1914-1945 by Nicholas Rankin (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations by Richard C. S. Trahair and Robert C. Miller (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)

L'espionne: Virginia Hall, une Américaine dans la guerre by Vincent Nouzille. (In French) (53 1 [March], M.R.D. Foot)

Historical Dictionary of Air Intelligence by Glenmore S. Trenear-Harvey (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of Sexspionage by Nigel West, (53 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Hunting Eichmann: How a Band of Survivors and a Young Spy Agency Chased Down the World's Most Notorious Nazi by Neal Bascomb (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)

The Irregulars: Roald Dahl and the British Spy Ring in Wartime Washington by Jennet Conant (53 1 [March], Bookshelf)

James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, & the Craft of Counterintelligence by Michael Holzman (53 3 [September], Bookshelf) See also David Robarge's review of James Angleton's appearances in literatures and film in *Studies* 53 4 (December)

The Lost Spy: An American in Stalin's Secret Service by Andrew Meier (53 2 [June], Bookshelf)

My Life As A Spy: One of America's Most Notorious Spies Finally Tells His Story by John A. Walker, Jr. (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Nathan Hale: The Life and Death of America's First Spy by M. William Phelps (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Operation Kronstadt: The Greatest True Tale of Espionage to Come Out of the Early Years of MI6 by Harry Ferguson (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)

OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II by John Whiteclay Chambers, II (53 4 [December], Clayton D. Laurie)

The Secret War in El Paso: Mexico Revolutionary Intrigue, 1906-1920 by Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler. (53 4 [December], Mark Benbow)

Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service by Frederic Wakeman, Jr. (53 1 [March], Bob Bergin)

SPYMASTER: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West by Oleg Kalugin (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)

The Spy Who Came in from the Co-op: Melita Norwood and the Ending of Cold War Espionage by David Burke (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)

The Spy Who Tried To Stop A War: Katharine Gun and the Secret Plot to Sanction the Iraq Invasion by Marcia and Thomas Mitchell (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Vietnam Declassified: CIA and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam by Thomas L. Ahern, Jr. (53 4 [December], Hayden Peake)

Intelligence Around the World

British Intelligence: Secrets, Spies and Sources by Stephen Twigge, Edward Hampshire, and Graham Macklin (53 1 [March], Bookshelf)

CIA's Eye on South Asia by Anuj Dhar (53 2 [June], Bookshelf)

Historical Dictionary of Middle Eastern Intelligence, by Ephraim Kahana and Muhammad Suwaed (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the Rise of Hamas by Paul McGeough (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Intelligence Around the World (continued)

Memorias de un Soldado Cubano: Vida y Muerte de la Revolucion [Memories of a Cuban Soldier: Life and Death of the Revolution], by Dariel Alarcon Ramirez aka “Benigno” (53 3 [September], Juan)

Russian Military Intelligence in the War with Japan, 1904–05: Secret Operations on Land and at Sea, Evgeny Sergeev (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Secret Wars: One Hundred Years of British Intelligence Inside MI5 and MI6 by Gordon Thomas (53 3 [September], Bookshelf)

SPOOKS: The Unofficial History of MI5 by Thomas Hennessey and Claire Thomas (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Treachery: Betrayals, Blunders, and Cover-ups—Six Decades of Espionage Against America and Great Britain by Chapman Pincher (53 4 [December], Bookshelf)

Fiction

North from Calcutta by Duane Evans (53 3 [September] Bookshelf)

Special Review Issue

See also *Studies in Intelligence Special Review Supplement*, Summer 2009, in which the following fictional works in literature, film, and television are discussed by numerous reviewers (not listed here).

Master and Commander et al. by Patrick O’Brian

The Spy Who Came in from the Cold by John le Carré

Crescent Moon Rising by Kerry Collison

Stormbreaker by Anthony Horowitz

Rogue’s March by W. T. Tyler

The Hunt for Red October by Tom Clancy

The Kite Runner by Khaled Hosseini

One Day in September (movie)

Munich (movie)

The Siege (movie)

9/11 Documentary (movie)

Hamburg Cell (movie)

Baghdad ER—The 86th Combat Support Hospital in Iraq (HBO documentary)

Body of Lies (movie)

The Bourne Identity (movie)

Burn Notice (television)

The Recruit (movie)

Taken (movie)

