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Studies in Intelligence

Journal of the American Intelligence Professional

Unclassified articles from *Studies in Intelligence* Volume 54, Number 1
(March 2010)

**Intelligence Reform, 2001–2009:
*Requiescat in Pace?***

**The Scope of FBIS and BBC Open
Source Media Coverage, 1979–2008**

Reviews:

***Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs
the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence***

***U.S. Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy:
Truman, Secret Warfare, and the CIA, 1945–53***

Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5

***Japanese Intelligence in World War II and
Nihongun no Interijensu: Naze Joho ga
Ikasarenai no ka* [Japanese Military Intelligence:
Why Is Intelligence Not Used?]**

The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf



Center for the Study of Intelligence

Report Documentation Page

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Contributors

Nicholas Dujmovic is a CIA historian and author of *The Literary Spy* and numerous articles for *Studies in Intelligence*.

John Ehrman is CIA Directorate of Intelligence officer who specializes in counterintelligence. He is a frequent contributor.

Kalev Leetaru is Coordinator of Information Technology and Research at the University of Illinois Cline Center for Democracy and Chief Technology Advisor to the Illinois Center for Computing in Humanities, Arts, and Social Science.

Mark Mansfield served as CIA's director of public affairs from July 2006 until May 2009. He is currently officer-in-residence at the University of Miami.

Stephen C. Mercado is an analyst in the Open Source Center. He is a frequent contributor to *Studies in Intelligence* and is the author of *The Shadow Warriors of Nakano*.

Patrick C. Neary is the Principal Deputy ADDNI for Strategy, Plans, and Requirements. His article originally appeared in the classified edition of September 2009. It was awarded a *Studies in Intelligence* Annual Award in December 2009.

Hayden Peake is curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection. He served in the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations.

Studies in Intelligence Award Winners for 2009

In addition to Mr. Neary's article, the following articles were recognized in 2009.

"The KGB, the Stasi, and Operation INFECTION: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and its AIDS Disinformation Campaign, 1982–," *Studies* 53, no. 4, by Thomas Boghardt.

"Fiasco in Nairobi: Greek Intelligence and the Capture of PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999," *Studies* 53 no. 1, by Miron Varouhakis (Walter Pforzheimer Award for the Best Student Essay)

"Book Review: *The Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a Band of US Soldiers Who Rode to Victory in Afghanistan*," *Studies* 53 no. 3, by J. R. Seeger.

Correction in *Studies* 53 4: Page 54 of "The James Angleton Phenomenon" in the printed edition had two errors. The correct title of Bagley's evaluation of the Nosenko case is "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a Soviet Defector." Footnote 43 indicated that the Bagley and Hart papers on the case were available on CIA's FOIA site. They have been declassified but are not available there.

Intelligence Reform, 2001–2009: *Requiescat in Pace?*

Patrick C. Neary

“
*With the passage of time
and hard-earned
perspective, perhaps real
change is now possible.*
”

*History repeats itself, first as
tragedy, second as farce.*

—Karl Marx

On 26 July 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed into law the National Security Act, which served as the organizational basis for the US conduct of the Cold War. The intelligence provisions of that bill (creating the CIA and the Director of Central Intelligence [DCI]) were tied to events six years earlier, namely 7 December 1941. That infamous date did provoke some immediate change in our intelligence operations in the Second World War. More importantly, it provided the spark that developed into a white-hot flame for change after the war. As a result, the United States redoubled its commitment to conducting intelligence activities during peacetime—and did so just in time to prepare for the Cold War. This article suggests that once again a national intelligence failure—9/11—has engendered a lukewarm version of intelligence reform that has since its inception virtually run its course. With the passage of time and hard-earned

perspective, perhaps real change is now possible.

The analogy to Pearl Harbor and the 1947 act is imperfect.¹ While the events of 11 September 2001 were emotionally jolting—and the intelligence failure equally shocking—the country did not face an existential threat that reordered the daily lives of millions of citizens. The 9/11 and WMD Commission reports made well-documented arguments for fundamental changes in the scope, authorities, organization, and activities of the US Intelligence Community. While the community has improved in response to the call for intelligence reform, it remains fundamentally unreformed. Three conditions conspired to thwart reform: conflicting motivations in those considering it; environmental challenges at initiation; and failures of leadership. Understanding these factors and seeing where gains have been made suggest that real

¹ See Dr. Michael Warner's extensive comparison, "Legal Echoes: The National Security Act of 1947 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004," in the *Stanford Law & Policy Review*, Vol. XX.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

The president agreed that some change was needed, but he remained concerned that the community must not be broken in the attempt to improve it.

change might still occur, but only if some difficult choices are made while opportunities exist to make them.

Orthogonal Motives

The Intelligence Community is first and foremost a creature of the executive branch, so then-President George W. Bush's moderate support for intelligence reform set an important precedent.² The 9/11 Commission clearly favored structural changes toward greater centralization of the community. The president agreed that some change was needed, but he remained concerned that the community must not be broken in the attempt to improve it. The effect was to set whatever came out of the 9/11 Commission—and later the WMD Commission—as a ceiling for intelligence reform.

If the executive branch appeared ambivalent to intelligence reform, the legislative branch was of two minds. In the

Senate, the enacting legislation fell to the Governmental Affairs Committee, under Senators Susan Collins (R-ME) and Joe Lieberman (D-CT). The Senate came fairly early to the bipartisan conclusion that the community required a strong, central, and independent leader, distinct from the CIA director. While discussion of a "Department of Intelligence" never jelled, the Senate was prepared to give a new director of national intelligence (DNI) substantially greater authority over intelligence resources and capabilities. In the House, Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-CA), leader of the House Armed Services Committee, and others led an impassioned effort to rein in reform lest it imperil intelligence support "to the war-fighter." He appeared to be advocating for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who stood to lose some of the Defense Department's (DOD's) traditional prerogatives in managing intelligence support for the military if reform resulted in an empowered DNI.³

As is so often the case, the resulting Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 was a compro-

mise. The new DNI was separate from the CIA, had more budgetary authority than the DCI, and greater discretion with respect to community policy. However, the IRTPA also included language (section 1018 on presidential guidelines and "preservation of authorities" [see graphic on next page]) that effectively checked the DNI's power to affect existing departments. This challenging compromise was exacerbated by the later behavior of the two chambers of Congress. The Senate acted as if the DNI was a departmental secretary, while the House acted as if all that had changed was a single letter (DCI to DNI). Attempts to satisfy one perspective were sure to annoy the other.

The community approached the notion of reform from another direction: cognitive dissonance. While a minority clamored for fundamental change, many professionals looked at the reform brouhaha with detached bemusement, believing reform would result in no meaningful change.⁴ There was ample historical evidence for this view: the community had been the subject of 14 studies in its first 60 years, with the vast majority resulting in little substantial change.⁵ One striking example:

² For a detailed description of both the White House and Congressional run-up to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, see Laurie West Van Hook, "Reforming Intelligence: the Passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act," National Intelligence University. Also, in this issue see Deborah Barger's Oral History account of the congressional deliberations leading up to the IRTPA.

³ Rumsfeld stated, "There may be ways we can strengthen intelligence, but centralization is most certainly not one of them." Van Hook, 5.

⁴ See Deborah Barger, *Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs* (Los Angeles, CA: RAND Corporation, June 2004).

⁵ Michael Warner and J. Kenneth McDonald, *US Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, April 2005).

as early as 1949, with the ink on the National Security Act of 1947 barely dry, the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report found that the DCI could not effectively manage both the CIA and the fledgling community. Sweeping remedies to this weakness—suggested in study after study—took 57 years to appear.

The widespread view among intelligence professionals that reform was more apparent than real was also fed by the defensive psychological crouch the community took after the WMD Commission report. The commission reported to the president on 31 March 2005, as the ODNI was standing up. It called the community's performance "one of the most public—and most damaging—intelligence failures in recent American history."⁶ Commission findings cited "an almost perfect record of resisting external recommendations" and found that the National Ground Intelligence Center, DIA's Defense HUMINT Service, and CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Non-Proliferation, and Arms Control Center performed so poorly in their core mission areas that they should be "reconstituted, substantially reorganized, or made subject to detailed oversight." This finding, too, was resisted. Some intelligence professionals felt that the growing unpopularity of the Iraq war

⁶ Report to the President of the United States, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The net effect of presidential ambivalence, congressional disagreement, and community dissonance was to weaken the structural basis for intelligence reform.

somehow exonerated collective failure: it was a bad policy, after all, and not our fault.⁷

The net effect of presidential ambivalence, congressional disagreement, and community dissonance was to weaken the structural basis for intelligence reform. While both the 9/11 and WMD Commissions called for fundamental reform, the IRTPA did not lay out the statutory structure to enable it. Reform would not occur by legislative or executive fiat; the new DNI would have to drive it.

Environmental Challenges

Newborn babies are cute but defenseless; newborn organizations are just defenseless. The notion that the DNI and his new Office of the DNI could drive intelligence reform was flawed. The ODNI faced significant departmental resistance, antagonism from community elements, and a self-inflicted wound in choosing where to consolidate.

Fifteen of the community's 16 elements reside in six different executive branch departments: Defense (DIA, NSA, NGA,

⁷ In the interest of full disclosure, the author takes some personal responsibility. As research director of the DIA/DI in the years leading up to these failures, I ask myself if I could have done something more or different to have avoided them.

NRO, and the intelligence components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps), Justice (elements of FBI and DEA), Homeland Security (I&A, Coast Guard intelligence), State (INR), Energy (IN), and Treasury (OIA). Defense and Justice proved to be the most resistant to DNI inroads into what they saw as their secretary's statutory authorities. Here the aforementioned section 1018 language came into play: it stipulated that in implementing the IRTPA, the president would issue no guidelines that "abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments" and that the DNI's responsibilities would be consistent with section 1018.

Seemingly innocuous, this provision created the potential for agencies to stall ODNI initiatives—save those related to the National Intelligence Program (NIP)—by asserting the activity impinged on their secretary's prerogatives and thus they would not participate in the process in question. This prompted legal reviews by lawyers of various agencies and departments. The situation was ameliorated by President Bush's July 2008 revision of Executive Order 12333, effectively making cabinet secretaries the *only* individuals who could invoke the charge of abrogation. Nearly three years

If the CIA director does not work for the DNI, for whom does he work?

passed before the White House effected this policy, however.

The one community element that did not have cover from IRTPA section 1018 was the CIA. However, some CIA lawyers asserted that the Agency did not work for the DNI, since the DNI did not have day-to-day operational oversight as a cabinet secretary has over a department. The original language of the 1947 National Security Act stated that there is “under the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency,” establishing the CIA’s status as an independent organization.⁸ By the end of the IRTPA and preceding amendments, this phrase simply stated, “There is a Central Intelligence Agency,” with the DNI as the “head of the intelligence community.”⁹ Nevertheless, the assertion of CIA independence developed into Agency gospel: after many community presentations, CIA personnel would dutifully come up to me and privately correct me for suggesting the CIA did work for the DNI.

The IRTPA states the CIA director “shall report to the DNI regarding the activities of

⁸ Section 102(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as displayed in *The CIA under Harry Truman* (Washington, DC: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994).

⁹ Sections 104(a) and 102(a)(2)(B) of the IRTPA respectively.

the CIA,” and the Congressional Record clearly supports the subordination of the CIA director and the CIA to the DNI.¹⁰ If the CIA director does not work for the DNI, for whom does he work? All this was in full view in February 2009, when DCIA nominee Leon Panetta attempted several circumlocutions at his confirmation hearing until pinned by a persistent Sen. Christopher Bond (R-MO) into admitting, “the DNI is my boss.”¹¹ The question persists: Who is in charge?

¹⁰ Section 104(b) of the IRTPA; see the dialogue between Senators Collins and Lieberman, Congressional Record Volume 150, December 8th, 2004, No. 139, S11969-11970.

The last factor minimizing the DNI’s early performance at pushing reform was the unfortunate decision to consolidate many of the various ODNI elements at the newly-built Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) expansion building at Bolling Air Force Base. Normally, location is not a transcendent issue, but in this case it carried significant baggage. The proximate cause was IRTPA language prohibiting the ODNI from being co-located with the headquarters of any other community element. This unusual provision was due to opinion in the community and in Congress that the old Community Manage-

¹¹ “Panetta Promises a Break with the Past at his CIA Confirmation hearing,” Tim Starks, CQ.com, 5 February 2009.

SEC. 1018. PRESIDENTIAL GUIDELINES ON IMPLEMENTATION AND PRESERVATION OF AUTHORITIES.

The President shall issue guidelines to ensure the effective implementation and execution within the executive branch of the authorities granted to the Director of National Intelligence by this title and the amendments made by this title, in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of the departments of the United States Government concerning such departments, including, but not limited to:

- (1) the authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and
- (2) the authority of the principal officers of the executive departments as heads of their respective departments, including, but not limited to, under—
 - (A) section 199 of the Revised Statutes (22 U.S.C. 2651);
 - (B) title II of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7131 et seq.);
 - (C) the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956;
 - (D) section 102(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 112(a)); and
 - (E) sections 301 of title 5, 113(b) and 162(b) of title 10, 503 of title 28, and 301(b) of title 31, United States Code.

ment Staff (CMS) was just an extension of the CIA. The restriction intended to prevent the ODNI from the same fate. Unfortunately, the provision also had a short deadline, which forced the DNI to choose among a series of unfavorable, temporary alternatives. The result was a full-scale move from CIA's Langley campus to Bolling Air Force Base (in the District of Columbia) for two years, followed by a move back to Northern Virginia.

In Washington, life revolves around traffic. Job satisfaction, titles, pay, and promotion are all aspects of selecting where you work, but the commute dominates. Long-time CIA employees serving rotational assignments with the CMS (and now ODNI) were not going to commute to Bolling, situated across two bridges in an isolated part of the District. As ODNI was just starting, it suddenly lost at least 10 percent of its staff, disrupting routine operations. On top of this was the change in basic infrastructure (IT, etc.), which made even simple activities hard. Having discomfited DIA for two years, ODNI then returned to Virginia. Now the DIA employees who had flocked up to backfill ODNI vacancies faced multi-hour commutes across the Wilson Bridge. While the losses did not reach the 10-percent level this time, they were substantial and were again accompanied by routine operational dislocation due to infra-

For 60 years, the community had one form of management—the DCI with (eventually) a CMS—and that model failed to integrate the community.

structure changes. The locational merry-go-round ensured the staff never found its feet.

A high-performing staff with good morale and stable infrastructure would have been severely challenged by the combined effects of departmental resistance and agency antipathy. The new ODNI struggled to support the new community leadership in the mission of intelligence reform. The final piece of the puzzle was the inability of community leaders to lead the staff to organizational maturity and mission success.

Leadership's Lost Opportunities

The weakness inherent in the original intentions and the unfriendly environment would have required a superb leader to overcome. The initial DNI leadership teams comprised strong leaders with solid credentials, yet they were unable to surmount the obstacles they faced. It began with an inability to clearly articulate the ODNI's mission and later was compounded by simple mistakes in structure and accountability. Rather than the engine of change, the ODNI became the fulcrum of competing notions of reform, devolving to something larger but only a lit-

tle better than the CMS it replaced.

For 60 years, the community had one form of management—the DCI with (eventually) a CMS—and that model failed to integrate the community. The burden fell to the DNI to define a new model. The lack of a clearly defined ODNI mission and, by association, the management model to integrate the community was the single biggest impediment to reform. Given the uncertainty over legislative intent and the active resistance of departments and community elements alike, it is easy to see why any DNI might shy away from authoritative assertions. The first DNI, Ambassador John Negroponte, did a remarkable job—using the management skills of Ambassador Pat Kennedy—of starting up the ODNI. Director Michael McConnell had a very successful intelligence career and recent business experience to call upon; his focus on actions and timelines was the community's introduction to strategic planning. Yet neither leader clearly articulated how the ODNI might differ from its CMS predecessor.¹²

A new organization lacking strong culture or mission will self-organize around existing structures and personalities. The CMS structure included a powerful budgeting element

The CMS structure, upon which the ODNI was built, was not neutral with respect to the community management mission.

dedicated to building the then-National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) out of the various component programs. The key was to ensure the agencies programmed enough resources to pay for the capabilities required, that the books closed, and that the NFIP could be justified as a coherent whole with some appropriate “chapeau” text. The component program managers were given great leeway to determine what they needed and when; the DCI worked the margins and settled disputes. The CMS also contained elements dedicated to managing the functions of analysis and collection. In most cases, these elements took a hands-off approach, giving the members of each subcommunity great autonomy with a veneer of oversight. The exceptions (for example, when Charlie Allen was ADCI/Collection) were often personality-based, proving the rule.

The CMS structure, upon which the ODNI was built, was not neutral with respect to the community management mis-

sion: it developed under a DCI construct and was optimized for coordinating the community to work together *when the community chose to do so*. It was not designed to, nor did it prove capable of, integrating the community absent that volition. Yet this structure remains the base structure of the ODNI today (see graphic below). The current ODNI structure can create staff coordinated responses, but it struggles to reliably produce in-depth analyses to support the DNI’s strategic decision-making.¹³ It oversees the activities of the community and guides the policies limiting or authorizing those activities. If the DNI is a “coordinator of


intelligence” as Director McConnell once lamented, then the existing structure is suitable. The ODNI is not organized to be the “Joint Staff” for intelligence.¹⁴

The final nail in the coffin of intelligence reform as it was envisaged in 2004 was the failure at several levels of leadership to hold intelligence officers accountable for their perfor-

¹³ This is reinforced by the fact that the current DNI, Admiral Dennis Blair, is reviewing the existing IC-Strategic Enterprise Management (IC-SEM) model and created an ADNI for Systems & Resource Analysis to provide such analysis.

¹⁴ Having served twice on the Joint Staff and in the ODNI, I can confirm that there is great similarity between the purposes of these two organizations. However, the ODNI has never been staffed, trained, or organized accordingly.

¹² The failure to provide strong guidance on the mission of the ODNI, and the DNI’s management philosophy, was strongly cited in two IG reports. See “Critical Intelligence Community Management Challenges,” 12 November 2008, from the Office of the Inspector General, ODNI. In mitigation, both DNIs experienced significant periods without a deputy (PDDNI), straining their ability to attend to all their responsibilities.



mance *and* behavior. The community writ large, including the ODNI staff, has witnessed a rash of unprofessional behavior in the past five years. Insider intelligence “leaks” to media professionals have become commonplace.¹⁵ Former intelligence officers publish breathless, tell-all exposés, appear on magazine covers, and get their 15 minutes of fame. On a mundane level, I witnessed a decline in good order and discipline: office shouting matches, walkouts from meetings, and organizations refusing to acknowledge each other’s existence. I even received an official reply from an agency that later refused to confirm or deny whether their leadership stood behind the response. The right or wrong of these instances is irrelevant: the issue is that in many cases, the behaviors were (officially or unofficially) sanctioned by leaders. When personnel misbehave and are rewarded (bonuses, promotions, or other

¹⁵ For example, David Ignatius has regularly cited “intelligence insiders” and “I’m told” storylines which echo criticisms found inside CIA, starting with a 21 October 2005, *Washington Post* article entitled “Danger Point in Spy Reform,” which cites former head of the Directorate of Operations Richard Stoltz decrying how “adding more layers causes indecision and confusion.” See also “Repairing America’s Spy Shop” (6 April, 2008), which repeats the complaint that allied services will be confused about who is in charge, and “Intelligence Turf War has to be reconciled” (14 June 2009), which avers the DNI staff duplicates “jobs that used to be done by the CIA” and overreached in seeking “greater oversight of the CIA’s covert action mission.”

It is unsurprising that intelligence reform appears moribund. The paradox is that we are safer today than we were before reform was attempted.

signs of official approval), morale and trust are compromised.¹⁶ The community functions best when it sustains a high degree of trust in its interpersonal relationships and avoids being “in the news.”

Diagnosis

It’s always darkest just before it goes pitch black.

—DeMotivators poster @
Despair.com

Given competing motivations, a hostile environment, and initial missteps, it is unsurprising that intelligence reform appears moribund. The paradox is that we are safer today than we were before reform was attempted. Our improved security owes overwhelmingly to the

¹⁶ The IC holds annual employee climate surveys. Between 2006 and 2007, the ODNI staff reported a 13-percent decline in ODNI employee “satisfaction with the policies and practices of ODNI senior leaders” and a 10-percent decline in those reporting a “high level of respect for ODNI senior leaders,” as noted in the November 2008 ODNI IG report. The ODNI chief human capital officer found in the 2008 IC Climate Survey that for the third straight year, the IC “needs to improve linkage of pay and promotions to performance, (and) do a better job of holding poor performers accountable.” The IC did rank as one of the 2009 Best Places to Work in the federal government, but it is telling that the lowest IC results were in leadership and performance culture and that the IC scores in these areas closely tracked with the rest of the US government.

fact that in the past eight years, US intelligence spending has roughly doubled.¹⁷ While the community of 2001 had many failings, it *was* an effective intelligence operation; how could doubling its resources *not* result in real improvements?

If the nation is safer, what difference does it make whether intelligence is reformed? Simply put, the largesse that undergirded improved performance will end, and the recommendations noted in the 9/11 and WMD Commissions remain perfectly resisted. Even the signature successes of recent intelligence activities bear witness to our continuing problems acting as an integrated enterprise. Consider the following initiatives, which the ODNI cites as evidence of progress: Joint Duty; the National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) and Unified Collection Strategies; and Analytic Transformation. Each represents real, positive improvement in community capabilities or performance. Yet close scrutiny shows that each demonstrates the limits of change thus far and points the way to the possibility for fundamental change in the future.

¹⁷ The DNI publicly released the figure of \$47.5 billion for the FY2008 National Intelligence Program. An earlier release, FY1998 showed a \$26.7 billion aggregate budget for NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA.

The key to jointness is the change in behavior that occurs when a professional is put in an entirely different operating environment.

Joint Duty

Jointness was the secret ingredient behind the success of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms in DOD since 1986, and the IRTPA expressly called for an analogous program for the community. In June 2007 ODNI Chief of Human Capital Ron Sanders negotiated with six Departments and the CIA to build the basis for the exchange of personnel, training and development, and all the other administrative activities comprising joint duty. The community is gradually implementing the concept, making joint duty a requirement for the most senior positions and then walking the requirement down the career ladder while employees are given a chance to gain joint experience and compete for senior positions. This approach succeeded in DOD; why not in the Intelligence Community?

The key to jointness is the change in behavior that occurs when a professional is put in an entirely different operating environment (think of a Navy officer in a mostly Army command, or officers of all services working in a joint culture). Joint duty as it is being implemented in the community will not generate significant behavioral change because many intelligence officers are being shielded from the requirement to operate in an unfamiliar

environment. There are no joint civilian intelligence commands, and many intelligence professionals will become joint-qualified without ever serving outside their home agencies. The CIA, NGA, and NSA each has more than 500 *internal* positions that are joint-duty qualifying (i.e., the incumbents and certain predecessors are “joint qualified” simply by virtue of having been in the positions). If these positions actually changed the culture, there would have been no need to establish a joint duty program in the first place. The grandfathering process produced—in CIA’s case alone more than 1,400 personnel who are already joint-qualified, with the possibility of hundreds more every year.

The Community Joint Duty Program has the form of its successful DOD predecessor, but not the substance. Joint duty is a means to an end: a change in the community’s culture that emphasizes enterprise mission accomplishment over agency performance. It is unclear how that change will occur without a significant change in the assignment patterns of our professional workforce.

NIC-C and Unified Collection Strategies

DNI McConnell established the National Intelligence Coor-

dination Center (NIC-C) to “direct and integrate collection activities of all national, defense, and domestic intelligence organizations.”¹⁸ It was designed to provide “the DNI with a mechanism to optimize collection to satisfy the country’s most important intelligence priorities,” and for “enhancing situational awareness.” It may one day achieve that goal. For now, the NIC-C remains a simple staff element, conducting manual data calls and reliant on the voluntary compliance of the large collection agencies. There is no real-time feed (or operational status) of SIGINT, HUMINT, GEOINT, or even open source information into the NIC-C. There is no comprehensive collection dashboard display, no 24-hour operational capability,¹⁹ and no immediate mechanism to issue directive changes. NIC-C guidance is transmitted by the National Intelligence Collection Board (or NICB), the same group which has coordinated collection for 16 years. The NIC-C represents a cautious improvement in overall management of the collection enterprise.

¹⁸ This and all subsequent quotes in this section come from the US Intelligence Community 500-Day Plan (for) Integration and Collaboration, signed by DNI McConnell on 10 October 2007.

¹⁹ The NIC-C is co-located with the Defense Intelligence Operations Center (DIOC), which does have some operational connections, but the linkage between the two elements is manual and fragile.

Unified Collection Strategies is an effort to conduct in-depth studies of our collection posture against our toughest intelligence challenges, with an eye to fostering integrated approaches. The collection strategies effort drew on well-established best practices in engaging the key collection partners but also innovated by bringing analytic voices to the table. While these strategies contain real value, they are fundamentally like the many efforts (e.g., hard target boards) which preceded them. They are time intensive: the first strategy took almost a year to complete, and the collection staff does not have the resources to accomplish more than one or two strategies per year.

The NIC-C and Unified Collection Strategies represent a consensual, artisan's approach—crafted for the occasion with traditional methods—to management of the collection enterprise, consistent with how collection was handled under the DCI. While each is successful at one level, both fall short of the fundamental change needed to manage an integrated, agile collection enterprise. Such an enterprise should provide the DNI full, continuous, and immediate situational awareness of our collection posture.

Analytic Transformation

Analytic Transformation (AT) has as its tag line “unleashing

Unified Collection Strategies is an effort to conduct in-depth studies of our collection posture against the toughest intelligence challenges.

the potential of a community of analysts.” AT is one of the most ambitious reform efforts sponsored by the ODNI; it comprises an authoritative repository of disseminated intelligence (the Library of National Intelligence [LNI]), a collaborative analytic network workspace (A-Space), a discovery toolset to address data overload (Catalyst), and a variety of other efforts.²⁰ While each of these initiatives will—if and when they are successfully deployed—improve the daily routine of community analysts, it is entirely unclear when a transformation in analysis will occur. As in the past, analysts struggle to gain access to all sources. They author products built around an article or book format with time-consuming editing and supervision. They must “coordinate” these products, first with a variety of associates within and outside their organization, and finally in a final product where agencies or organizations must give formal concurrence. Assuming success for the LNI, A-Space, and Catalyst et al., analysts might find some aspects of their daily grind eased, but the process not transformed.

The progress of AT to date does not bode well for its prospects for leading to a fundamental change. The LNI is furthest along, with nearly all IC elements contributing. Its success (with over 1.8 million products) is due in part to the fact it remains a virtual card catalogue. The LNI is still a prototype; full capacity would include all disseminated intelligence, along with useful metrics on topics/types of product, and an interface to request access to the products. The LNI's transformational potential relies on a significant shift in access control away from agencies—an enormous change that remains to be implemented.

A-Space, a virtual collaborative work environment for analysts at the TS/SI-G/TK/HCS level, achieved public acclaim as one of *Time* magazine's “top 50 innovations of 2008.” Along with an expanding suite of tools, A-Space lets analysts “think out loud” and develop their analysis collaboratively from the start. Many cutting-edge analysts on Intellipedia were initially critical of A-Space as another top-down, “build it and they will come” effort, but they warmed to its improved usability and responsive development. However, like Intellipedia before it, there is no off-ramp for analysts to move from the work environment (i.e., A-Space) to the

²⁰ Descriptions drawn from *Analytic Transformation: Unleashing the Potential of a Community of Analysts*, a pamphlet published by the DDNI/Analysis, 1 September 2008.

Joint Duty, NIC-C/Unified Collection Strategies, and Analytic Transformation all have potential to further intelligence reform.

existing agency product approval process. No agency acknowledges A-Space coordination as official, and there are no A-Space “products.”

While LNI, A-Space, and other AT efforts are undeniably innovative, they will fail to “unleash the community of analysts” because they target symptoms rather than root causes. While the AT initiatives are necessary preconditions to analytic reform, they do not address the decentralized management of analysis or the product-centric analytic process. Real reform in analysis will require agencies to give up proprietary products and share customer relationships, establish new rules facilitating on-line collaboration, and focus more on intelligence as a service than a product. Much like Intellipedia today, LNI, A-Space, et al., may exceed all their initial expectations only to arrive back where they started, asking why things have not fundamentally changed.

Joint Duty, NIC-C/Unified Collection Strategies, and Analytic Transformation all have potential to further intelligence reform. Each has thus far produced an incremental improvement over past efforts. The inability to realize their full reform potential illuminates a number of challenges: How do we become “joint” in the absence of joint commands like

the military? How do we drive change beyond simple incremental improvements? Where is integration most needed (or perhaps, most resisted)? If an agency-based approach to personnel, culture, and operations could have answered these questions, there would have been no need for a DNI or intelligence reform.

Remedies

It is too early to tell.

—Zhou Enlai, when asked his views about the outcome of the French Revolution

Perhaps I am premature in elegizing intelligence reform. During the community’s preparation for the presidential transition after the November 2008 election, senior intelligence officials advised that the community was suffering “reform fatigue” and that the new leadership should avoid any grand plans for change. I believe that the only people suffering reform fatigue were reform opponents: it must be exhausting impeding every change that develops! The community has improved, yet fundamental change has proved illusive. The solutions to the four key challenges left unanswered by our progress to date could propel the community into real, fundamental change. The challenges are:

Who is in charge? How do we become “joint?” How do we continue to drive change? and Where is integration most needed? Any of the following four remedies would be a major step toward fundamental change; collectively, they would greatly accelerate the move from an Intelligence Community to an Intelligence Enterprise.

Who Is in Charge?

We do not need a Department of Intelligence, but we must make clear that the DNI is in charge. *The most direct approach is to move the large all-intelligence elements (CIA, DIA, NSA, NGA, and NRO) directly under the DNI.* The DNI could continue to share hire-and-fire authority for the leaders of the former defense agencies with the secretary of defense but with the roles reversed (DNI as primary, Sec-Def must concur). Under this approach, there is little reason for the CIA director (DCIA) to continue to be a congressionally confirmed presidential appointee; no other head of a major community element is.²¹ That continuing status leads to confusion within the community and with foreign intelligence services.²² This consolidation eliminates the

²¹ Some flag officers are confirmed by the senate for their positions (e.g., DIRNSA), as are some leaders of smaller departmental intelligence elements (e.g., under secretary for information and analysis, DHS)

prospect of future friction over who is in charge in both DOD and the CIA.

The authority decision should be accompanied by completion of the neglected reform of intelligence oversight. The recent furor over CIA's congressional notification on the use of enhanced interrogation techniques is symptomatic of the problem, and an opportunity for change. Hill leaders must choose one of the many options²³ to create meaningful oversight distinct from that provided by (defense) intelligence authorizing and appropriating committees. Working with the administration, they should move the National Intelligence Program out of the defense budget and declassify the top line. Traditional security and counterintelligence concerns on total intelligence funding are made moot by recent legislation requiring release after each fiscal year ends.

The key is to hold the empowered DNI accountable both to the president and the Congress. DOD retains ample influence within the commu-

²² Interestingly, the "DNI is causing confusion by getting into CIA's turf" argument was first raised by "US intelligence officials familiar with the (EO12333) negotiations" in a 31 May 2008 *Los Angeles Times* article by Greg Miller ("Intelligence Agencies Resist Plan to Shift Power"). Clearly subordinating the DCIA will end that confusion, although not in the manner the original complainants imagined.

²³ See the *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, July 2004.

We do not need a Department of Intelligence, but we must make clear that the DNI is in charge.

nity through its dual-hatted undersecretary of defense for intelligence (USD(I)) (also the Director for Defense Intelligence, or DDI, under the DNI), and by retaining the Military Intelligence Program (a separate appropriation to ensure intelligence gets to/from the warfighter). Unitary control of the community's core organizations and a separate appropriation will complement the DNI's existing authority to determine the program and conduct reprogramming. The increased transparency will create an incentive for the DNI to explain (to the Office of Management and Budget and the Hill) what precisely the US public gets for billions in annual intelligence spending—which exceeds the discretionary funding for all federal departments save Defense, Education, and Health and Human Services.²⁴ Finally, these changes are absolutely essential as we approach a period of declining intelligence budgets. During past budgetary reductions, the DCI's inability to exert direct control led to salami-slicing that undermined intelligence capabilities.

The proposed change in status of the DCIA will raise the politically charged issue of con-

²⁴ Based on 2008 data from the FY2009 Federal Budget, at www.GPOAccess.gov.

gressional oversight of covert action. Rather than debate who, how many, or when members of Congress are briefed, perhaps a completely new approach is needed. What the current oversight approach lacks is an independent voice to consider the moral or ethical implications of the actions. One could argue that the DCIA serves this purpose, yet the DCIA leads the element executing the action. The DNI is—arguably—also an interested party. Congressional notification does provide for independent review, although it is unclear if members of Congress would be comfortable formally providing a moral or ethical judgment on the proposed activities.

The DNI should propose the creation of an independent, presidentially appointed and congressionally confirmed ethics monitor for covert activities. Consultation with the monitor would be mandatory before covert action programs are finally approved and undertaken; while the monitor would not have a veto, any president would pause before approving an activity the monitor found suspect. The DNI could also submit other aspects of community operations to the monitor to consider their moral and ethical implications.

While some may question such a novel approach, covert action is undoubtedly one of the

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most novel activities of our republic, and our existing oversight process has proved contentious at best.²⁵ A monitor could provide an independent voice, and a firebreak for both the inevitable political and legislative-executive branch frictions. One might also have proved useful in the past, for example, in cases involving the recruitment of sources with poor human rights records, alleged associations with drug-traffickers, and more recently with enhanced interrogation techniques.²⁶ The ideal candidate for the monitor would be a distinguished individual with a long, spotless career record. Ideally, he or she should be familiar with the ways of Washington but probably not a recent member of the community. Former political leaders on the Hill, past presidential appointees, and successful civil servants would form a potential pool of candidates, although outsiders with unquestioned

moral authority (e.g., religious figures, doctors) should also be competitive.

The introduction of a monitor should accompany a comprehensive review and streamlining of the multilayered covert action oversight process: we need improved oversight, not necessarily more oversight. The monitor is not a panacea for the difficulty inherent in dealing in the shadows of intelligence, but it would shine an independent, ethical light into those shadows.

How Do We Become "Joint?"

We become joint by embracing mission management as an organizing and operating principle across the community. The IRTPA called for a Goldwater-Nichols reform of the community, but today's community is more like the defense establishment of the 1940s than that of the 1980s. The CIA, NSA, DIA, and NGA function as the original military services, building culture and capabilities and then deploying and operating those capabilities as they see fit. They coordinate with each other as necessary, provide assistance, but "fight" (i.e., conduct HUMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, etc.) independently. The functional centers (NCTC, NCPC, NCIX) have tried to integrate operations within

their functional purview but have faced varying degrees of agency resistance. Even NCTC, the most mature and robust center, lacks control over the community's counterterrorism analytic efforts: the Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA) in CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) produces independent analysis, as does DIA's Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT).²⁷

While the concept of strong mission management is established under an Intelligence Community Directive (ICD 900), there are five different approaches:

- Functional centers (NCTC, NCPC, NCIX)
- Country managers (Iran, North Korea)
- National intelligence officers (NIOs) acting as mission managers for their regions/functions
- Senior officers in DDNI/Analysis and DDNI/Collection who serve as mission managers for areas otherwise not covered by a mission manager
- A new associate DNI for Afghanistan/Pakistan

At one point in time this could be considered experimentation

²⁵ There are precedents for taking into account moral or ethical considerations. The Office of Government Ethics provides the entire executive branch with binding rulings on legal limits and advice on avoiding even the appearance of impropriety. Presidents Clinton and Bush (43) used the National Bioethics Advisory Commission and the President's Council on Bioethics (respectively) to address the thorny moral and ethical challenges in biotechnology.

²⁶ To be clear, these examples fall under the "other aspects" the DNI could submit to the ethics monitor, not covert action.

²⁷ While a case can be made for competing analyses, there is no excuse for multiple products independently produced from the same background material, uncoordinated, on the same topic.

(à la DOD's Unified and Specified Commands in the 1980s and 1990s), but it remains difficult to explain. With the exception of NCTC (and the nascent ADNI for Afghanistan/Pakistan), these mission managers exert a coordinating authority over agency efforts rather than directive control.

What the community desperately needs are structures analogous to the military's joint commands to serve as the integrators of "enterprise" (the community's term for joint) operations and incubators of culture change. After establishing some common principles for mission management, the DNI could sponsor new mission centers throughout the community. They would be led by mission managers or via an executive agency. Such centers would require the mixing of analysts and collectors across agency lines,²⁸ by reassigning operational control or even collocating (perhaps NGA's eventually vacant Bethesda campus might serve as a ready-made home).

These centers would not only focus on mission accomplishment but would also further the notion of enterprise operations and provide a true joint duty

²⁸ The mixing of analysts and collectors is a necessary but insufficient element of jointness. Fusing analysis and collection is an intelligence best practice, but most closely resembles the military notion of combined arms (e.g., infantry and artillery, or submarines and carrier air working together) more than jointness.

The DNI should propose the creation of an independent, presidentially appointed and congressionally confirmed ethics monitor for covert activities.

experience. Not every country or function needs a mission manager, and the substantial rest-of-world coverage should be left to the agencies to conduct (and hopefully experiment with other means to develop jointness). Where we create centers, we must also establish hard metrics for success and mission completion, so as to avoid becoming permanent entities.²⁹ Mission centers would be the complementary counterparts to the existing agencies, giving intelligence personnel the environment to rotate through and develop into joint professionals.

To oversee this substantial change and to ensure situational awareness, the DNI would need a chief operating officer, J-3, or DDNI for mission management. Some critics point out that the DNI should not have an operational role. *A DNI without operational oversight is by definition a bureaucratic layer of no additional value; why would any president want a DNI who cannot immediately answer the question "What is our intelligence status?"* Some question the concept because the combined functions of collection and anal-

²⁹ A not insignificant example: after how many years of no attacks does the NCTC revert to being a traditional intelligence function not requiring a center: Ten? Twenty? Fifty?

ysis are too large and complex for a single individual to oversee. Coincidentally, this was the same argument opponents of jointness in the military tried: no single service officer could ever master the complexities of all the services.

The new DDNI would oversee the start-up of mission managers or centers, monitor the operations of existing ones (or agencies assigned coverage roles), and supervise the completion of those no longer needed. Operational oversight would require transparency on existing analysis and collection capabilities, which could be achieved by transforming the NIC-C into a real operations center. These organizational changes would go a long way toward eliminating the duplicative staff actions and overlapping functional responsibilities critics have cited in the existing ODNI organization.

How Do We Continue to Drive Change?

To continue driving change, we need a focal point for future experimentation, doctrinal development, and enterprise professionalism. The military experience in using the existing service—and building joint—professionalism institutions is instructive. No matter how well intentioned, the military services could never have

We need a focal point for future experimentation, doctrinal development, and enterprise professionalism.

independently trained and developed their personnel into a joint culture. DOD seized some assets outright,³⁰ mandated and supervised joint instruction throughout the established service's professional architecture, and even went as far as to transform a geographic operational command (Atlantic Command) into a developmental organization (Joint Forces Command). None of these initiatives created immediate change, but they established the conditions for jointness to be institutionalized and to grow.

By comparison, there is little institutional enterprise momentum within the community. The National Intelligence University (NIU) has been (in four short years) everything from a "virtual university," to a "state university system," to a "bricks-and-mortar" facility, to now a force for professionalism. When the DDNI/Analysis tried to follow the military model by creating a mandatory training course to level the playing field for all new analysts, some agencies refused to participate and worked against the training.³¹ We have no community focal

point dedicated to innovation or enterprise concepts. At the agency level, innovation elements are under siege: in CIA alone, IN-Q-Tel waxes and wanes, the Center for Mission Innovation died, ID8 hangs on by a thread, and the Global Futures Partnership is on life support under State/INR. Activities like the DNI's Galileo Awards (for innovation) or the Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (QICR) have no dedicated element they can turn to in order to further polish the rough, conceptual diamonds they uncover.

To rectify this problem, the DNI should designate an enterprise lead for innovation, experimentation, and doctrinal (or tradecraft) development. NRO, which has at times served as a community innovator, might be ideal, as it is not tied to any single intelligence discipline. The enterprise lead should be directed to build a real NIU, take on professionalization activities of common concern (e.g., joint training), and estab-

³¹ Analysis 101 was a month-long course for new analysts to establish professional networks while building a common analytic framework. After receiving positive initial feedback, DDNI/A sought to make it mandatory. Some agencies responded by trying to eliminate it. The compromise shortened the training to two weeks and made it optional, with DIA acting as executive agent; CIA stopped participating in it.

lish an organizational structure (including resource lines) to experiment with and develop future capabilities. This will also require a review of the separate agency training and capabilities-development activities, and directive guidance where coordination is necessary and where duplication will be permitted. While this mission would be a substantial challenge to any existing community element, it is an essential service of common concern for the development and future health of the enterprise.

Where Is Integration Most Needed?

Few would argue with the assertion that human-source intelligence (HUMINT) is the most independent activity in the community, and the National Clandestine Service (NCS) the most independent organization. *Bringing HUMINT "in from the cold" would represent a major step toward integration.* The challenges to HUMINT were well delineated by both the 9/11 and WMD Commissions.

In 2004, President Bush directed a 50-percent increase in CIA analysts, case officers, and proficiency in mission-critical language capability.³² Yet the

³² White House Press Release, "President Directs CIA to Increase Analysts, Operatives," 18 November 2004.

CIA admits that just 13 percent of all employees and only 28 percent of NCS personnel speak a foreign language,³³ and former case officer veterans continue to call for urgent reform.³⁴

Reforming HUMINT in an active operational environment is like retraining infantrymen in a war zone. The challenges of recruiting acceptable foreign-language capabilities and training new case officers are well understood by the NCS and best left to the professionals to address. Fundamental change is necessary regarding how HUMINT activities relate to the rest of the community and the policy-making apparatus, however; this is one area NCS has not addressed—and may be incapable of addressing.

CIA has only recently and grudgingly acknowledged DNI oversight of HUMINT; the first logical step is for the DNI to review NCS progress to date and establish firm metrics for success. What has the president's emphasis purchased the country in terms of HUMINT capability? How has the move

³³ "Despite heavy recruitment, CIA still short on bilingual staff," Pete Eisler, *USA Today*, 19 April 2009.

³⁴ The latest of many examples, "The CIA's National Clandestine Service urgently needs reform," Joseph Augustyn OpEd in *CSMonitor.com*, 7 April 2009.

Reforming HUMINT in an active operational environment is like retraining infantrymen in a war zone.

to out-of-embassy operations and nonofficial cover improved collection against the most important targets? What approaches have failed and been discontinued? Which have worked and been broadened or reinforced? While it is right and proper for the NCS to run HUMINT, it is right, proper, and necessary for the DNI to oversee their stewardship in light of the community's overall performance.

The DNI should also review the unique manner in which HUMINT is offered directly to customers. More so than any other collection discipline, HUMINT has cultivated a direct flow, via the *President's Daily Brief* (PDB), to senior policy officials. HUMINT reports often have an aura of insider gossip, and senior officials genuinely enjoy reading them. Since 2001, every senior director for intelligence on the NSC staff has been a former Directorate of Operations or NCS professional. While it is natural to have someone familiar with handling sensitive material in the role, it also has the unintended consequence of feeding the policymakers' appetite for timely, actionable intelligence.³⁵ The DNI should

require a rigorous accounting of how much HUMINT is delivered directly to senior officials, by whom, and for what purpose.

These remedies would go a long way to realizing the type of intelligence reform intended by the 9/11 and WMD Commissions. The result would be a definitive DNI in charge, ending the needless and debilitating squabbles over authorities. That DNI would be clearly accountable to the president and Congress and would own a mission mechanism to guide the community, measure its performance, and provide the opportunity for joint service. The community would gain a proponent for future enterprise development, freeing the agencies to concentrate on trade-craft excellence and mission accomplishment. The integration of HUMINT would assist both the other collection disciplines and the analytic community. Finally, the existence of an ethics monitor could remove some of the heat from the ongoing firestorm over congressional oversight of covert action.

³⁵ I have heard more than one case officer state that senior policy officials are their primary customers.

We are now at a critical point: without fresh commitment, the community will relapse into old habits.

In Sum

*It is futile to talk of reform
without reference to form.*

—G.K. Chesterton.

The preceding short history of intelligence reform is not exhaustive. There are other examples of positive change, from the mundane (the single IC badge) to the profound (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act modernization), but they do not alter my basic premise that fundamental change (reform) is not realized. President Bush's changes to Executive Order 12333 ameliorated some of the challenges from the IRTPA and past practices. A new administration with strong majorities in both houses provides additional impetus.

The DCI model was tried and found wanting; a secretary of intelligence was never seriously considered. Reducing the ODNI in authority and scope would simply return the community to its condition on 10 September 2001. Clearly, an

empowered DNI is required to drive the community toward a real enterprise.

Our customers, from the president to policymakers, diplomats, warfighters, law enforcers, and homeland security officers, should know that US intelligence is better than it was in 2001, but that improvement has been neither fundamental nor inexpensive. We are now at a critical point: without fresh commitment, the community will relapse into old habits. The eventual end of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, success in overseas contingency operations (nee the Global War on Terror), and inevitable budget cuts must sap the will to change; such fruits of an intelligence enterprise that have germinated since 2005 will wither. The American people should know that the quiet they sense is not the peace of security assured by the best intelligence, but the deadly silence of the graveyard we are collectively whistling by.



The Scope of FBIS and BBC Open-Source Media Coverage, 1979–2008 (U)

Kalev Leetaru

For nearly 70 years, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) monitored the world's airwaves and other news outlets, transcribing and translating selected content into English and in the process creating a multi-million-page historical archive of the global news media. Yet, FBIS material has not been widely utilized in the academic content analysis community, perhaps because relatively little is known about the scope of the content that is digitally available to researchers in this field. This article, researched and written by a specialist in the field, contains a brief overview of the service—reestablished as the Open Source Center in 2004—and a statistical examination of the unclassified FBIS material produced from July 1993 through July 2004—a period during which FBIS produced and distributed CDs of its selected material. Examined are language preferences, distribution of monitored sources, and topical and geographic emphases. The author examines the output of a similar service provided by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), known as the Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB). Its digital files permit the tracing of coverage trends from January 1979 through December 2008 and invite comparison with FBIS efforts.

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Archival practices of usual news sources constrain scholarship, especially on cross national issues.
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Social scientists rely heavily on archival news sources, but the selection and archival practices of these sources constrain scholarship, especially on cross-national issues. Contemporary news aggregators like Lexis Nexis focus on compiling large numbers of news sources into a single, searchable archive, but their historical files are limited. Historical sources like the Proquest Historical Newspapers Database offer news content back to the mid-19th century or earlier, but they include only a few publications. Both rely nearly exclusively on English-language Western news sources.

Global news databases like News-Bank's Access World

News primarily emphasize English-language “international” editions of major foreign newspapers, which often do not represent the views of a nation's vernacular news content. Nor do these services maintain the output of foreign broadcast media, especially critical in regions with low literacy rates. These limitations, for example, make it difficult to examine such questions as, how the international press cover the 2002 collapse of the American communications giant WorldCom or, in what ways did different regions of the world deal with the fallout and its impact on their domestic economies? Answering such questions on a truly international scale requires researchers to

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

FBIS and BBC have served as strategic resources, maintaining relatively even monitoring volume across the globe on a broad range of topics.

have the ability to examine representative samples of news reports in countries from across the world—print, broadcast, and Internet.¹

The contents of FBIS and SWB collections currently available to academic researchers provide the material the commercial aggregators do not. During the period studied for this article (1993–2004 for FBIS and 1979–2008 for SWB) the services have served as strategic resources, maintaining relatively even monitoring volume across the globe on a broad range of topics, and thus provide an ideal foundation for cross-national content analysis.

In addition, the focus of the two services on broadcast material has offered critical visibility into regions where broadcasts are the predominant form of popular news distribution. The ability to select material by geographic and topical emphasis and to access English translations of vernacular content in print, broadcast, and Internet sources has made FBIS material, in particular, an unparalleled resource for content analysis of foreign media.

A Brief Historical Overview

Since the beginning of World War II, the United States and Great Britain have operated

the world's most extensive media monitoring services. Known eventually as open source intelligence (OSINT)—the collection and exploitation of noncovert information sources, including television and radio broadcasts, newspapers, trade publications, Internet Web sites, and nearly any other form of public dissemination. The two services have paid particular attention to vernacular-language sources aimed at domestic populations.

In some cases OSINT has been used simply to gauge local reaction to events. In other cases, it has been used to support estimates of future events or to identify rhetorical patterns or broadcast schedules to support intelligence analysis. One of the greatest benefits of OSINT over traditional covert intelligence has been its nearly real-time nature (material could be examined very soon after it was produced) and the relative ease and minimal risk of its acquisition and dissemination.

Newswire services like the Associated Press collect news from around the world, but they do so primarily through their own reporting staffs or stringers. A protest covered in a remote province of China is likely to be seen through the eyes of a Western-trained writer or photographer and

reflect Western views. A domestic broadcast or newspaper article, on the other hand, reflects the perspectives of local populations or local authorities, depending on the degree of government control of the media, both in its factual reporting and the words used to convey that information. The global news media form a very nonhomogeneous distribution layer and news outlets are subject to strong cultural and contextual influences that may be explored through the ways in which they cover events.²

Known affectionately as “America’s window on the world,”³ FBIS was the backbone of OSINT collection in the US Intelligence Community (IC), acting as the US government’s primary instrument for collecting, translating, and disseminating open-source information. FBIS analysts also played primary roles in analyzing open source information and synthesized large amounts of material into targeted reports. The importance of FBIS to the modern intelligence world was summed up in a *Washington Times* article in 2001: “so much of what the CIA learns is collected from newspaper clippings that the director of the agency ought to be called the Pastemaster General.”⁴

Wartime

The roots of institutionalized OSINT collection in the United States can be traced back to the Princeton Listening Center located in the Princeton Univer-

sity School of Public and International Affairs. Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation⁵ the center began operations in November 1939 with a mission to “monitor, transcribe, translate, and analyze shortwave propaganda broadcast[s] from Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, and, to some extent, Moscow.”⁶

A wide range of radio products was monitored, including “news bulletins, weekly topical talks, radio news reels, features and dramatizations.” Its limited staff could only record and analyze a sampling of broadcasts for propaganda content. Topics covered included how “propaganda varied between countries, as well as from one show to another within the same country ... the way in which specific incidents were reported, atrocity references, attitudes toward various countries, and the way this propaganda affected US listeners.” By April 1941, the listening center had compiled over 15 million words of transcribed material from English, German, French, and Italian shortwave broadcasts.

On 26 February 1941, President Roosevelt established the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS) with orders to monitor foreign shortwave radio broadcasts from “belligerent, occupied, and neutral countries” directed at the United States.⁷ FBMS transcribed these broadcasts and used them to perform “trend analysis to discover shifts in tenor or con-

Intelligence gathering in the uncertain post-WW II world required sweeping up a wider range of international media broadcasts—too great a task for FBIS to realistically take on by itself.

tent that might imply changes in Japanese intentions.” The Princeton Listening Center became the core of the new agency and by the end of 1942, it was translating 500,000 words a day from 25 broadcasting stations in 15 languages.⁸ FBMS published its first transcription report on 18 November 1941 and its very first analytical report, dated 6 December 1941, contained the poignant statement:

Japanese radio intensifies still further its defiant, hostile tone; in contrast to its behavior during earlier periods of Pacific tension, Radio Tokyo makes no peace appeals. Comment on the United States is bitter and increased; it is broadcast not only to this country, but to Latin America and Southeastern Asia.⁹

The Cold War

On 15 August 1945 FBIS recorded Emperor Hirohito’s surrender announcement to the Japanese people, and on 14 December it published its final wartime daily report, having proved its utility to intelligence during the war. With the approbation of the *Washington Post*, which called the service “one of the most vital units in a sound postwar intelligence operation,” the service was transferred to the Central Intelligence Group of the National

Intelligence Authority, forerunners of the CIA.¹⁰

Wartime intelligence gathering required significant resources, but they could be directed toward a small number of countries and sources. Intelligence gathering in the uncertain post-WW II world required sweeping up a wider range of international media broadcasts—too great a task for FBIS to realistically take on by itself. Fortunately for Allied postwar intelligence, the United Kingdom had developed its own open source intelligence service, the British Broadcast Monitoring Service, just prior to the war. From its founding on 22 August 1939, it produced a foreign broadcast compilation called the *Digest of World Broadcasts*—renamed the *Summary of World Broadcasts* in May 1947.¹¹

By 1945, the BBC service was monitoring 1.25 million words per day in 30 languages, although limited resources allowed translation into English of only 300,000. FBIS, on the other hand, transcribed and translated the majority of the content it monitored.¹² Subsequently, a British-US agreement led to a cooperative media coverage and sharing arrangement that has lasted to the present day.¹³ As a result of the agreement, BBC has generally focused on Central Asia and

The power of OSINT to peer into closed societies, to predict major events, and to offer real-time updates cannot be overstated.

nations that were part of the Soviet Union; FBIS has handled the Far East and Latin America, and the two services jointly have covered Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. The agencies also agreed to operate under similar “operational and editorial standards.”¹⁴

Radio broadcasts and press agency transmissions were the original focus of FBIS, which added television coverage as it became more popular. Print material became a focus of FBIS only in 1967, and by 1992, its mission had expanded to include commercial and governmental public-access databases, and gray literature (“private or public symposia proceedings and academic studies”).¹⁵ Even though it did not adopt print material until 1967, substantial news reports were usually carried by press agencies on their wirefeeds, which FBIS monitored nearly from the beginning. By 1992, the service had developed a network of 19 regional bureaus, which served as collection, processing, and distribution points for their geographic areas.¹⁶

FBIS and BBC have emphasized historically reliable or authoritative sources, but FBIS continually adds new sources and a “not insignificant amount of [its] total effort is spent identifying and assessing sources to ensure the reliability, accuracy,

responsiveness, and completeness of ... coverage.”¹⁷ By 1992, FBIS was monitoring more than 3,500 publications in 55 languages and 790 hours of television a week in 29 languages from 50 countries.¹⁸

The power of OSINT to peer into closed societies, to predict major events and to offer real-time updates cannot be overstated. Its utility in the intelligence analysis process has been the subject of numerous studies and the testimony of any number of senior intelligence officials. Suffice it to say here that former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence William Studeman estimated in a 1992 speech frequently cited in this essay that more than 80 percent of many intelligence needs could be met through open sources.¹⁹ By the late 1990s, FBIS was serving much more than IC needs: a 1997 study showed that the Law Library of Congress was relying heavily on FBIS to provide “quality and [timely] information to Congress about legal, legal-political and legal-economic developments abroad.”²⁰

The “basket of sources” nature of OSINT has allowed it to leverage the combined reporting power of multiple sources, reaching beyond the limitations of any single source. A 2006 study examining the use of OSINT material for event

identification from news material found the *Summary of World Broadcasts* to be dramatically superior in volume and breadth to traditional commercial newswires.²¹ Newswires, with their larger reporting infrastructure and geographic coverage than newspapers, still rely on a single set of reporters to cover every country. OSINT compilations like FBIS and SWB, on the other hand, repackage content from across the entire globe, combining the viewpoints of multiple outlets while maintaining fairly comprehensive coverage of national presses.²²

Having briefly, in 1996, faced extinction, FBIS was reborn in the wake of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 as the Open Source Center under a newly created Office of the Director of National Intelligence. In his remarks at a ceremony marking OSC’s creation, General Michael Hayden, then the deputy director of national intelligence, noted that OSC “will advance the Intelligence Community’s exploitation of openly available information to include the Internet, databases, press, radio, television, video, geospatial data, photos and commercial imagery.”²³

By 2006, OSC reportedly had “stepped up data collection and analysis to include bloggers worldwide and [was] developing new methods to gauge the reliability of the content.” The report noted that in order to

expand OSINT efforts, OSC had doubled its staff and become a clearing house for material from 32 different US government OSINT units, and its translators turned more than 30 million words a month into English from languages across the world.²⁴

FBIS as the Public's Open Source

Designed to provide the Allies an advantage during WW II, FBIS, and its successor, has the added potential to be a critical resource for academic scholars, yet the scholarly community's lack of familiarity with open source methods and the FBIS collection in particular, has limited academic use of the FBIS archive. That archive already includes some of the material mentioned in Hayden's speech—print, broadcast, and Internet-derived material—translated into English and tagged by country and topic and is an unparalleled resource for understanding news content throughout the world across the last half-century.

FBIS reports became widely available for public use, in print and microfiche forms, in 1974, when the Commerce Department's National Technical Information Service (NTIS) began commercial distribution of the material.²⁵ In his 1992 speech, Admiral Studeman indicated a strong appreciation of the private-sector and academic research that had arisen

[FBIS'] customers ... value the work of private sector scholars and analysts who avail themselves of our material and contribute to the national debate on contemporary issues.

out of FBIS's availability outside the US government and expressed a commitment to its continued availability. As he noted, "FBIS's customers in both the intelligence and policy communities ... value the work of private-sector scholars and analysts who avail themselves of our material and contribute significantly to the national debate on contemporary issues."²⁶

The following year, 1993, FBIS began to distribute CDs of its material to Federal Depository Libraries, a practice that lasted until June 2004, when FBIS began Internet-only distribution through Dialog Corporation's World News Connection (WNC) service (<http://wnc.fed-world.gov/>), which licenses the material from the US government. This Web-based portal offers hourly updates and full text keyword searching of FBIS material from January 1996 to the present.

The CD collection allows greater flexibility in accessing reports than the Dialog interface. Dialog only displays 10 results at a time and offers limited interactive refinement capabilities. The inaugural CD issued in 1993 covers a period of nearly one year, but only a small number of reports are included for the period November 1992–June 1993. July–September 1993 is fully covered.

Thereafter, into June 2004, each distributed CD covered periods of three months.



The FBIS Dashboard


The Pulse of Activity

FBIS collection during the decade following the end of the Cold War, as seen in figure 1, reflects a relatively stable monthly volume through the end of 1996, when growth started climbing steadily into early 2001, when it stabilized again. As noted above, FBIS faced severe cuts in 1996, before an outpouring of public support contributed to its survival. This graph indicates that the service not only survived but found ways (and resources) to allow it to more than double its monthly output during in the next five years.

The Nature of the Material


While its primary focus is on news material, FBIS also captures editorial content and commentaries, which its monitors tag at the beginning of reports. Such reports constitute 6.3 percent of the collection—3.5 percent are flagged as editorial content and 2.8 percent as commentaries. Editorial and commentary content represented 5–6 percent of each year's total reports through 1999, but in 2000 the percentage increased nearly 1 percent each year to a

Figure 1: Monthly FBIS Volume, November 1992–June 2004



During this period, FBIS compiled 4,393,121 reports. The monthly distribution of these reports as collected in the CDs is shown in blue. The low number in the first months reflects the small number of reports transferred to CD at the beginning of the effort. The magenta points show the number of titles listed in an index of printed FBIS reports prepared under contract by NewsBank, Inc. Newsbank's index shows a lower volume of reports (about 30 percent less on average per month), possibly because apparent duplicate reports were not listed. (No copy of CD #39 (May/June 2002) could be located and could not be included in this analysis.)

Figure 2: Daily FBIS Volume, June 1995–August 1995.



Daily reporting volumes, as seen in this three-month snapshot from 1995, indicate that FBIS daily reporting patterns resemble those of major news aggregators, except that FBIS' lowest volumes occur on Sundays instead of Saturdays. This may reflect FBIS staffing patterns or other factors in international news activity.

Table 1: Top 25 Source Languages

Origin Language	Report Count	% All Reports
English	2021021	46.00
Russian	371106	8.45
Arabic	271326	6.18
Spanish	197451	4.49
French	138046	3.14
Serbo-Croatian	135805	3.09
Chinese	124014	2.82
Persian	80720	1.84
German	76688	1.75
Portuguese	66003	1.50
Turkish	65951	1.50
Hebrew	51670	1.18
Japanese	50509	1.15
Korean	47113	1.07
Albanian	40898	0.93
Italian	39060	0.89
Urdu	31705	0.72
Ukrainian	31608	0.72
Indonesian	29359	0.67
Greek	28564	0.65
Polish	28372	0.65
Hungarian	26392	0.60
Slovak	22980	0.52
Bulgarian	22920	0.52

Table 2: Topics Covered, 1999--2004

Topic	Report Count	% Reports
Domestic Political	1204515	44.94
International Political	1164586	43.45
Leader	927241	34.59
Military	459898	17.16
Domestic Economic	411593	15.36
International Economic	357610	13.34
Terrorism	277667	10.36
Urgent	245054	9.14
Human Rights	196205	7.32
Political	187128	6.98
Crime	129829	4.84
International	128016	4.78
Domestic	116710	4.35
Dissent	101710	3.79
Media	84157	3.14
Energy	83920	3.13
Technology	63072	2.35
Proliferation	63003	2.35
Peacekeeping	59076	2.20
Environment	55814	2.08
Economic	55157	2.06
Health	49847	1.86
Migration	40435	1.51
Telecom	37711	1.41
Narcotics	35017	1.31
Conflict	32656	1.22

Table 3: Top 25 Media Outlets

Source	Report Count	% All Reports
Beijing XINHUA	194316	4.42
Moscow ITAR-TASS	155925	3.55
Tokyo KYODO	123404	2.81
Seoul YONHAP	92722	2.11
Tehran IRNA	57857	1.32
Paris AFP	56286	1.28
Hong Kong AFP	44390	1.01
Prague CTK	39201	0.89
Ankara Anatolia	31436	0.72
P'yongyang KCNA	29824	0.68
Moscow INTERFAX	29141	0.66
Belgrade BETA	28717	0.65
Belgrade TANJUG	28381	0.65
Cairo MENA	26764	0.61
Pyongyang KCNA	26230	0.60
Zagreb HINA	23013	0.52
Taipei Central News Agency WWW-Text	22983	0.52
Moscow RIA	22071	0.50
Tokyo Jiji Press	21508	0.49
Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta	20371	0.46
Moscow Agentstvo Vovennykh Novostey WWW-Text	19931	0.45
Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el	19896	0.45
Madrid EFE	18973	0.43
Warsaw PAP	17903	0.41

peak of just over 9 percent in 2003.

The proportion of excerpted reports over the study period was relatively low, —averaging around 5.6 percent per year—making FBIS material ideal for content analysis. Longer broadcast or print reports are excerpted when only portions of an item are relevant to targeted subject areas. For example, a Radio France International broadcast might have been excerpted to transcribe just those comments about an African country’s denunciation of a trade embargo against it or a brief mention of a party official’s death in a People’s Republic of China radio broadcast might be extracted from other unimportant material.²⁷

Language

English-language material comprises approximately 46

percent of the material FBIS collects. Such material represents a saving in translation expenses and, when coming from media controlled by authoritarian regimes, potentially authoritative messages to US and other Western governments. Table 1 shows the top 25 source languages for FBIS reports during 1992–2004. After English, Russian and Arabic reports were the most frequently collected.

Topics

On 1 January 1999, FBIS began to include topical category tags in its reports, each of which could have as many tags as necessary to fully describe its contents. As table 2 shows, however, political issues topped FBIS collection, comprising nearly 83 percent of all content. Economic issues accounted for 26 percent. From January to July 1999, reports were also categorized sepa-

rately as “international” or “domestic” and “political” or “economic.” In August 1999 the specialized categories “domestic political,” “international political,” “domestic economic,” and “international economic” were introduced. All other categories ran continuously from January 1999 until the end of this sampling period.

Media Outlets

Content analysts must consider the volume of material produced by each source to ensure that no one media outlet dominates in their analyses. Table 3 lists the top 25 media outlets from which FBIS selected content during the study period from a universe exceeding 32,000 sources. (Because FBIS citations often distinguish between Web and print editions of a source and between different editions of a source—international, regional, local, weekend editions—the

Understanding the physical location of each source is critical to exploring possible geographic biases in monitoring.

actual number of unique sources noted in the table is probably significantly lower than the number shown.) In any case, taken together, selections from the top 25 outlets accounted for more than a quarter of all FBIS-selected material during this period. Though this small proportion of the world's media outlets dominated FBIS collection, they are outlets with national stature and international importance.

The Geography of Coverage

Understanding the physical location of each source is critical to exploring possible geographic biases in monitoring. Unfortunately, while FBIS source references do indicate the geographic location of sources, they do not do so in a regular format, so an extensive machine geocoding system was used to automatically extract and compute GIS-compatible latitude and longitude coordinates for each FBIS source. In all, coordinates were calculated for 97.5 percent of reports and a random sample of 100 entries checked by hand showed no errors.

The maps on the following pages (figures 3–6) subdivide sources by geographic location, situating each in its listed city of origin. Immediately noticeable are the strong similarities between the maps, showing that FBIS heavily overlapped its coverage in each region,

combining broadcast, print, and Internet sources together. This mitigated the potential biases of any one distribution format. For example, in the Arab media, low general literacy rates mean that broadcast media formed the primary distribution channel for the masses and so is subjected to greater censorship than print media, which targets the elite.²⁸

After print material was added to FBIS collection in 1967, it became the dominant source for FBIS reports, constituting just over one-half of FBIS sources during the study period. (See figure 4.) To determine the source type of each outlet, the full reference field of each report was examined. Any reference that contained a time stamp (such as 1130 GMT) was considered a broadcast source, while those containing the keywords “Internet,” “electronic,” or “www” were flagged as Internet editions. All remaining sources were assumed to be print sources.

As table 3 illustrates, some sources contributed a much larger volume than others, so the total number of reports gathered from sources of each type was also computed. A total of 25 percent of reports were from print sources, 25 percent were from Internet sources, and 51 percent were from broadcast sources. (See figures 5 and 6.) Thus, more than half of all

reports during the study period were attributed to broadcast outlets, in keeping with the FBIS broadcast heritage. This also makes conceptual sense in that broadcast outlets traditionally operate 24/7, while print outlets usually issue only a single edition each day, meaning there is far more broadcast material to monitor. A smaller number of broadcast stations transmitting throughout the day will be able to generate far more content than a large number of print outlets with a limited amount of page space.

Figure 7 shows the geographic distribution, by country, of monitored reports. It is important to note that developed countries (for example, France) may act as reporting surrogates for lesser developed neighbors or for countries in which their sources have interest. The sources in the developed countries, of course, also have better established media distribution networks. Since there is no independent, authoritative master list of media outlets by country that covers print, broadcast, and Internet sources, there is no way of knowing what percentage of the media in each country and the total news volume they generated was captured by FBIS.

In January 1994, FBIS editors began assigning geographic tags to their reports. Geographic tags describe the geographic focus of a report—not the location of a report's




Figure 3: Locations of all sources monitored by FBIS during 1992–2004. About 83 percent of the shown locations are national capitals.




Figure 4: FBIS broadcast sources (TV, radio, shortwave), 1992-2004. Broadcast sources constituted 15 percent of the sources FBIS monitored during the period.




Figure 5: FBIS Internet source locations. These include Internet-only and Internet editions of print sources monitored during 1992–2004.




Figure 6: Locations of FBIS print sources monitored during 1992–2004. Although print sources constituted 51 percent of monitored sources, only 25 percent of issued reports were sourced to print material (see graph on right). Broadcast material still ranked first as sources for published reports.




Figure 7: Reports by source country, 1992–2004.

source. A Chinese newspaper article describing events in India would have a tag only for India and not China, unless China played a major role in the report’s contents. Combining the geographic information from the source reference with the geographic tags makes it possible to search for reports from one country that describe events in another country. Despite the potential for bias toward activities related to the United States, only 12 percent of articles published during this period actually had geographic tags for the United States, although the United States is the most frequently applied tag. (See table 5.) During this

period, Russia was the second most frequently tagged country.

A critical question in the study of this material is whether there has been any systematic bias toward monitoring a greater number of sources or gathering a greater number of reports in countries deemed to be hot spots by the United States. Alternatively, FBIS might have gathered reports uniformly across the world but focused primarily on those about the United States. Figure 7 shows that China and Russia provided the most material, more than 20 percent of all reports in the CDs from this period. Together with the

Table 4: Top 25 countries by number of articles from sources in that country, 1994–2004

Country	Report Count	% Reports
Russia	478817	10.90
China	466682	10.62
Japan	216446	4.93
Iran	170214	3.87
South Korea	152083	3.46
France	145677	3.32
Serbia & Montenegro	143009	3.26
United Kingdom	93609	2.13
Turkey	81982	1.87
North Korea	78845	1.79
India	74019	1.68
Belgium	69070	1.57
Germany	66887	1.52
Israel	62254	1.42
Bangladesh	60994	1.39
Egypt	59810	1.36
Bosnia & Herzegovina	58579	1.33
South Africa	58273	1.33
Czech Republic	58209	1.33
Italy	54091	1.23
Bulgaria	47388	1.08
Indonesia	45243	1.03
Ukraine	43632	0.99
Romania	43015	0.98
Poland	42309	0.96




Figure 8: Report Focus by Country, 1994–2004.

Table 5: Top 25 countries mentioned in all reporting, 1994–2004


Country	Report Count	% Reports
United States	473726	12.20
Russia	420446	10.83
China	337852	8.70
Japan	247578	6.38
Iran	193618	4.99
Israel	188803	4.86
South Korea	179029	4.61
Iraq	173234	4.46
North Korea	138658	3.57
India	134086	3.45
Pakistan	131563	3.39
United Kingdom	124512	3.21
Turkey	114355	2.95
West Bank & Gaza Strip	110829	2.86
Afghanistan	102059	2.63
France	96178	2.48
Germany	89763	2.31
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	82788	2.13
Taiwan	82115	2.12
Serbia	78144	2.01
Kosovo	75940	1.96
Egypt	71914	1.85
Bosnia Herzegovina	70565	1.82
Italy	63011	1.62
Indonesia	58845	1.52

United States, China and Russia account for more than 30 percent of the geographic focus of all reports. (See figure 8.) However, Russia and China are also regional superpowers having significant interaction with their neighbors in the Eastern Hemisphere and thus are ideally positioned to report on events in that region.

Since reports collected in a given country are not necessarily about that country, useful is a comparison of the percentage of all reports sourced from a country with those having a geographic topic tag for that country. Figure 9 shows geographic sources and sinks—countries (in blue) about which

more reports are collected from outside their borders than from within their borders. South America is net neutral overall, with similar volumes of reports being sourced from each country as are monitored and reported about that country.

Africa as a whole is a net sink, with many more reports produced about that continent than are sourced from it. This is both the result of relatively underdeveloped media distribution networks and greater barriers to collection of material from African locations. This reality presents significant challenges to analysts, who must deal with content about these nations collected from



outside their borders and subject to foreign, rather than domestic, views on internal events. By contrast, France is a net source, largely because of the presence of Agence France Presse (AFP) wire service. Similarly, BETA and TANJUG news agencies in Belgrade contributed to Serbia’s ranking as a net source during this period.

The coverage statistics do not appear to indicate that FBIS appreciably favored regions in which the United States was actively engaged during 1994–2004. The figures reflect a fairly even coverage outside Russia and China without redirecting resources toward more prob-

lematic regions. This suggests that FBIS provided a strategic service, monitoring all regions of the world relatively evenly rather than a tactical resource focused on troublesome areas. This is a critical attribute for using this material in content analysis.

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BBC Summary of World Broadcasts

Whereas public access to historical digital FBIS content only began in July 1993, and public access to content after 2004 is limited by the technical constraints of the Dialog search interface, material from the SWB service has been available since 1 January 1979 through LexisNexis. Like FBIS, SWB today monitors media from 150 countries in more than 100 languages from over 3,000 sources. It has overseas bureaus in Azerbaijan, Egypt, India, Kenya, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan and a staff of around 500.²⁹ It has a wide cor-




Figure 10: Distribution of FBIS Reports by Country, 1994–2004.

porate following, first appearing in the Reuters Business Briefing newswire in 1983, and in 2001 was one of the 10 most popular news sources in that service.³⁰

SWB’s mission is to focus on “political, economic, security, and media news, comment, and reaction.” The service acknowledges geographic prioritization: Iraq and Afghanistan are “priority one countries,” and the volume of coverage of Pakistani media has more than tripled since 2003 as greater monitoring resources were brought to bear on that region.³¹

Unlike FBIS, whose budget fell under the secrecy guidelines of

the intelligence community that housed it, BBC publishes basic annual financial figures, offering some insights into the scope of its operations. During 2008/2009, its total budget was approximately £28.7 million (\$45.9 million), of which £24.6 million came from the British government, £1.4 million from commercial licensing, and £2.6 million from lessees, interest, and income from the Open Source Center. Expenditures included £15.1 million for staff, £3.6 million for “accommodation, services, communications, maintenance, and IT,” £479,000 for copyright clearances, £3.8 million for “other” and £3 million for depreciation.³² The governmental portion of its funding

for 1994/95 was approximately £18.4 million (\$28.7 million), suggesting generally stable levels of governmental support over the past decade and a half.³³

Editorial Process

FBIS and SWB are renowned for the extremely high quality of their translations, which often capture the tone and nuance of the original vernacular. Such translation quality requires a high level of editorial input, including iterative revision processes in both services. Changes in translation, however, manifest themselves in ways that complicate con-




Figure 11: Distribution of BBC Summary of World Broadcast Reports by Country, 1994–2004.

tent analysis of the FBIS and SWB databases.

In FBIS it is possible that an editor or a downstream consumer might inquire about aspects of a given translation for clarification or amplification and prompt a retranslation. This is especially prevalent with broadcast transmissions, which can suffer from interference that make passages unclear.

But FBIS methods for accounting for such changes were inconsistent. An FBIS translation or transcription that was substantially changed might have been reissued to the wire. In some cases a notation

was provided, such as a 1998 FBIS report drawn from Radio France Internationale that noted at the beginning: “Corrected version of item originally filed as ab0909100698;³⁴ editorial notes within body of item explained changes made.” The corrected report was assigned its own unique FBIS ID, AB0909113898, and since no structured field existed in the database system on the CDs to connect the two reports, an analyst would have to read the note in order to recognize that reports are the same item. Researchers conducting automated queries, such as a time-series analysis, would find this item double counted.

Unfortunately, acknowledgment of revisions in both collections is the exception rather than the norm. The FBIS reports studied show duplication of about 1 to 2 percent per day. In some cases, it is only the title that changes or a duplicate report may simply have been an error, such as a 5,530-word report from 2001 that was reissued later the same day without the last 731 words.³⁵ In another case, a 1 January 2001 article about NATO changed “Foreign Minister” Colin Powell to “Secretary of State” and the fate of the “enlargement” of the North Atlantic Alliance became simply the fate of the “Alliance itself.”³⁶ A sentence was also moved down in the

first paragraph, together with several other smaller changes, altering nearly 10 percent of the total text. In both cases, the duplicate reports had their own unique identifiers but contain no information linking them to their originals.

For the entire period 1979–2008, the Lexis SWB archive contains 4,694,122 reports (discounting separate summary reports of fuller accounts). Analysis of the reports showed that nearly 1 million of these reports were duplicates.

SWB content accessed through Lexis for the years 1998–2002 showcases this revision process and underscores the challenges for content analysts. Curiously, explanations for this duplication differ over two periods of time over these five years. The easier period to explain is the period from March 2001–December 2002, when nearly half of all reporting was duplicated. Duplicates during this period are in most instances identical copies of earlier reports, with the exception of some extraneous formatting characters. Simple textual comparison of all reports issued on each day identified the duplicates. This accounted for about 700,000 duplicates.

The remaining reports, which run from January 1998 through March 2001, present a much more significant analytical challenge. The duplicates during this period are not identical copies. They are retranslations of earlier reports. Some only have changes in titles, for example, “inaugurated” becoming “set up” or “Montenegrin

outgoing president” changing to “outgoing president.”³⁴ However, most include changes to the body text itself, such as a 24 January 1998 Romanian Radio broadcast that first appeared in Lexis on the 25th, with a revised edition issued the following day.³⁵ Seven changes were made to the body text, including “make” changed to “do” and “make the reform” becoming “carry out reforms.” Several words were changed from singular to plural or vice-versa, while monitor’s comments were inserted to indicate the speaker for different passages. In all, nearly 4 percent of the report’s total text was changed.

Linking articles containing multiple substantive changes of this kind is a non-trivial task: sentence order may be revised, words changed, and phrases added or deleted. Simple textual comparison will not suffice and more advanced detection tools are required. Titles can also change. Unfortunately, SWB uses the same timestamp in the source citations of all reports from the same broadcast, meaning that header fields do not provide information to help distinguish duplicates. Instead, full text document clustering is required, a technique that computes overlap in word usage between every possible combination of documents for a given day. If two documents overlap by 90 percent or more, they are considered duplicates.

Such an approach allows for fully automated detection and removal of duplicates, with extremely high accuracy (a ran-

dom sample of days checked, for example, revealed no false positives). In all, the 38 months of this period exhibit an average of 42-percent duplication, with a high of nearly 65 percent in January 2001. With clustered duplicates removed, a total of 3,700,761 unique reports remain from the original nearly 4.7 million reports.

Even this approach can only identify reports with relatively minor alterations. Wholesale rewrites—those that keep factual information the same, but substantially or completely altered wording—cannot readily be detected through purely automated means. For example, a January 1998 report about rice prices was initially released containing numerous monitor comments indicating unclear transcription. The 93-word transcript was rereleased nine days later as a 50-word paraphrased edition.³⁶ A 303-word transcript the same month concerning enactment of a tax law in Russia was rereleased six days later, cut nearly in half, again with heavy paraphrasing and rewriting.³⁷ In both cases the “Text of Report” header denoting a full-text transcript was removed from the subsequent report, suggesting an explicit decision on the part of the monitoring staff to switch from a literal translation to a paraphrased summary. A manual review of content during this period suggests that this activity may be restricted to broadcast content, which presents the greatest challenges for accurate transcription.




Figure 12: SWB and FBIS Source Locations, 1994–2004.

SWB and FBIS Coverage Compared

FBIS and SWB had a long history of sharing content. The maps on this and the next page (figures 12 and 13) show the similarity of the two services's geographic emphases. (Their Pearson correlation is $r=0.84$ [N=191], suggesting very strong overlap.)

Unfortunately, source references are constructed very differently in the two collections, so it is only possible to compare source listings geographically. Figure 12 locates all SWB and FBIS sources during this period. To simplify the map rendering, if SWB and FBIS both have a source at a given location, the FBIS map point may be obscured by the SWB point.

The data show that FBIS draws from a larger selection of sources in a broader geographic range than does SWB.

Unlike FBIS, SWB draws some content from sources based in the United States (primarily US sources aimed at foreign audiences), but those account for only a small fraction of its content and are not shown here. FBIS is a much-higher-volume service, generating an average monthly volume of just over two and a half times that of SWB from 1993–2004, which may also account for the larger number of sources.

Shifting Coverage Trends

Because SWB content is available in digital format back to 1 January 1979, it is possible to analyze a 30-year span to trace

the evolution of geographic coverage of monitored material.

As shown in figure 13, which illustrates the total change in coverage density from 1979 to 2009, relatively large increases have taken place in coverage of Iran and Pakistan; little change can be seen in other Middle Eastern nations, notwithstanding increased Western military presences in Iraq and Afghanistan; and declines have occurred in coverage of Russia and China, where the decline has been the most pronounced. If SWB coverage can, indeed, be used to infer levels of US coverage of open sources today, these data support the argument that open source resources are not, by and large, retasked to military conflict zones and provide instead a strategic resource.




Figure 13: SWB Coverage Density Change, 1979–2008.

Figures 14A and 14B show coverage shifts in five-year increments during this period. (Western Hemisphere countries are not shown because there was relatively little change in the period.) These graphs further highlight the

evenness of SWB coverage throughout the world and the sustained emphasis on Russia and China, mirroring FBIS’s focus on these two countries. The impact on analysis of such stable sourcing cannot be overstated. While countless studies

examine the geographic biases in Western reporting of international events, SWB appears to be largely immune to such selection biases, with African and Latin American countries receiving nearly the same




Figure 14A: SWB Coverage Trend, 1979–93

attention as their European counterparts.

The relatively intense coverage of Russia and China, however, is more troubling for those seeking to do broad-based research. All six maps use the same color scale, showing that Russian emphasis has remained nearly constant for three decades. Emphasis on China, on the other hand, has decreased nearly linearly over this period.

Increases in coverage of some areas evident in these maps—Greece, Poland, and India, for example—track with heightened security concerns during the periods.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding recent criticism of US neglect of open source intelligence, the record of US and British collection of such intelligence evident in publicly available collections reflects a longstanding US and British

US and British OSINT services' ability to penetrate into the non-Western world will make their products central to the next wave of social science research.


understanding of the importance of realtime, uniform monitoring of the media output of nations around the globe.

For the academic researcher, the two services in effect act as time machines, allowing social and political scientists, historians, and others to turn back the clock to revisit events in innovative ways. While the goals of intelligence analysts using OSINT are different from those of academic researchers, their needs and methodologies are similar. On the academic side, content analysts of international events have historically been limited by the constraints of commercial news databases dominated by Western media. With increasing globalization of so many social, economic, and political phenomena, scholars will have to abandon reliance on Western newspapers and look elsewhere.

The ability of US and British OSINT services to penetrate into the non-Western world will make their products central to the next wave of social science research. They operate as an almost ideal strategic monitoring resource, with nearly even coverage across the globe, and offer a unique view into the broadcast news media that dominate many regions of the world. Their political and economic focus and full-text English translations make them a powerful resource for international news studies. As the world grows smaller, OSINT offers academic scholars an unparalleled complement to existing commercial databases and provides a unique opportunity for academia and government to collaborate in furthering our understanding of the global news media and the insights it can provide into the functioning of societies.



Figure 14B: SWB Coverage Trend, 1994–2008



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Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence

Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman, eds. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, 263 pp., endnotes and index.

Mark Mansfield

In their introduction to *Spinning Intelligence*, coeditors Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman assert that the relationship between intelligence agencies and the media is “fluid,” “contradictory,” and “occasionally supportive.” The dozen essays they have compiled from experts in government, journalism, and academia bear this out. While some are far more informative and insightful than others, all of them reflect a complex, evolving, and often tense relationship.

Most of the contributors to this anthology are British and focus, to a large extent, on the British experience, but there is ample commentary on media – national security dynamics in the United States, both historically and currently. And the contemporary issues these essays explore—terrorism and the media; open-source information and nuclear safeguards; balancing the public’s right to know with keeping legitimate secrets in the information age; and the influence of movies and TV programs on public perceptions of CIA and the intelligence world—are every bit as relevant here as they are in the UK.

It is understandable why Dover and Goodman placed University of Warwick Professor Richard J. Aldrich’s “Regulation by Revelation?” as the first essay in the collection, because it is largely historical in nature and sets the scene for several other pieces in the anthology. But it is, from my perspective, the least compelling piece in the book. Having served in one public affairs capacity or another at CIA for two decades, I would take issue with Aldrich’s view that US intelligence agencies “arguably...have always enjoyed a remarkably close relationship with the press” and that there has been a “longstanding determination of elements within American intelligence to court the press.” Regarding the purported “remarkably close relationship,” Aldrich might have added that it hasn’t exactly translated into laudatory press coverage of CIA for the past 35 years or so. And as for a longstanding effort to court the press, if that were the case, why did CIA have no formal public affairs office until the late 1970s, decades after the Agency was founded? There are also a number of factual inaccuracies in Aldrich’s piece, not the least of which is his statement that the US government “indicted” *New York Times* reporter James Risen in 2008. Mr. Risen has not been indicted; he was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury to discuss confidential sources, according to a 2008 story in the *Times*.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Some media observers—mindful of well-publicized discussions between news organizations and the US government prior to publication of blockbuster stories on the Terrorist Surveillance Program, SWIFT, and CIA “secret prisons”—are under the impression that journalists’ dealings with government have always been adversarial and contentious. For them, *Spinning Intelligence* will offer evidence to the contrary. Illustrative of the “occasionally supportive” relationship cited by Dover and Goodman is an article by British journalist Chapman Pincher who, well into his nineties, reflects on a lifetime of reporting on intelligence and national security matters.

Pincher says his receipt and publication of such a steady stream of classified information over the years precipitated the “most cherished professional compliment” he ever received, made in Parliament—that he was a “public urinal where Ministers and officials queued up to leak.” But it was a two-way street, he recounts. Specifically, Pincher makes reference to a contrived front-page story he wrote, in collaboration with the UK government, concerning Britain’s first H-bomb tests off Malden Island in the Pacific Ocean in 1957. Pincher relates that Japanese, concerned about radioactive fall-out, were planning to make the tests impossible by sailing a thousand small ships into the area. If they forced the tests to be abandoned, Britain’s entire defense policy would be ruined, Pincher says he was told.

British officials solicited Pincher’s help in trying to fool the Japanese with a deception operation, and he complied. He reported that the tests, which were scheduled for May, had been delayed a month “due to technical problems with the bomb.” The *Daily Express* published Pincher’s front-page story and it was picked up by other media, but the tests went ahead in May 1957 as scheduled, with no protest fleet approaching Malden. In this instance, Pincher cooperated with the government, publishing something he knew was false. It clearly was a different era, and a different mind-set. Pincher’s article isn’t the only one that points to how government and the media have collaborated. In a piece subtitled, “A Snapshot of a Happy Marriage,” Goodman details the longstanding, mutually beneficial relationship between British intelligence and the BBC.

The most insightful essay in *Spinning Intelligence*—notwithstanding its references to former DNI Mike McConnell as “Director of Central Intelligence”—was written by Sir David Omand, former director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the UK’s first security and intelligence coordinator. In the piece, “Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights,” Omand points out that journalists and “spies” have more in common than they might care to admit—both seek to uncover what is hidden, both work under tight deadlines, and both have sources they protect assiduously.

Noting that the worlds of secret intelligence and journalism “have been forced to interact but never without strain,” he cites numerous reasons for the inevitable tension between the two professions. He correctly points out that “prurient curiosity” still sells newspapers and, as both intelligence professionals who deal with the media and reporters who cover intelligence issues can confirm, the word “secret” acts as an “accelerant” on a breaking news story. That’s as true in the United States as it is in Britain.

Omand, who has a very pragmatic view of the media and national security, makes an observation that is mirrored in several articles in the anthology. When considering public perceptions of intelligence and security, we are dealing with a “magical reality” and a “psychological construct,” as opposed to an accurate portrayal of the real world. This “magical reality,” he argues, is what sells newspapers and movie tickets. Thus even if journalists are serious and well informed—and there are more than a few out there who are not—it is awfully difficult to write about the subject and remain oblivious to that perception. Editors, he says, play on this, because the economics of journalism is “harsh,” competition is “fierce,” and “people have a living to make.”

While Omand’s view may seem a bit cynical, he happens to be right. With the 24-hour “news cycle” brought about by the information age—another theme echoed in several articles—there is too often a temptation to get something in print or on the air first, rather than get it right.

Moreover, the 24-hour news cycle hasn’t resulted in the media doing a better job of covering intelligence or national security. More airtime doesn’t equate to more substantive, more thoughtful, or more accurate reporting. News organizations continue to close foreign bureaus, slash budgets, let go of experienced staff, and devote less attention to coverage of intelligence and national security issues. Omand contends that intelligence agencies have to work for greater public understanding of their role, purpose, and ethics, and greater public confidence in oversight of their secret work “in return for greater understanding of why sources and methods must remain secret.” He also lays out a “golden rule” to which I can readily subscribe from my own experience in dealing with the media: Don’t wait until a crisis hits before trying to communicate.

Among the other fine essays in this anthology is coeditor Robert Dover’s “From Vauxhall Cross with Love,” in which he examines how the US television show *24*, the British drama *Spooks*, and other programs have a “real world impact” in terms of how they help to “condition the public” to think about intelligence, the use of state-sanctioned violence, and counterterrorism. Far from being a “value neutral portrayal of intelligence,” these programs “help create the reality they operate in,” Dover writes. One clear set of messages from these and other programs, he says, is a sense of all-encompassing threat that at any moment in time the United States or the UK could be “brought to its knees by terrorist atrocities.” He says it is no wonder that when polled, the vast majority of Western populations believe that terrorists seek to “end our way of life” and we are engaged in life or death struggle.

In “Bedmates or Sparring Partners,” Tony Campbell, the former head of Canadian intelligence analysis, observes that “broadly speaking” both intelligence and media are in the same business—collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information. But there are “crucial differences” between the institutions in terms of ownership (public vs. private), customer focus (policymakers vs. the public) and modus operandi (closed vs. open). These differences, he says, naturally establish a tension, one that has taken on “vastly greater importance and sensitivity” in recent years because of, among other reasons, the global information revolution and “increased temptation” in democratic governments to politicize intelligence.

In *Spinning Intelligence*, Dover and Goodman achieve what they set out to do; they demonstrate that what they refer to as the “ménage à trois of spooks, hacks, and the public” is worthy of serious attention. As for the question they pose in the afterword—namely, are spies and journalists really that different?—Dover and Goodman conclude by saying that both of them strive to seek knowledge, to increase understanding, and to better inform their consumers.

However, the editors identify a key difference—the implications of being wrong. A journalist can issue an apology (extremely rare) or a correction, but the spy, by contrast, “has far greater weight on their shoulders.” That was true before, and it continues to be the case in the “information age.”



U.S. Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare, and the CIA, 1945-53

Sarah-Jane Corke. (London: Routledge, 2008), 240 pp., notes, bibliography, and index.

Nicholas Dujmovic

Histories that get the big things right should be read for the insights and lessons to be derived from them, no matter if they get smaller things wrong. This is especially true for intelligence histories, because writing them is especially difficult, given the particular challenges posed by the subject—namely, activities, events, and decisions that were conducted in secret and were intended to remain that way.

Sarah-Jane Corke, a Canadian historian of the Cold War who teaches at Dalhousie University in Halifax, has produced such a history of the origins of CIA's covert operations mission. One hopes that readers will be distracted neither by the relatively nugatory errors in fact or interpretation, or by the publisher's hefty price—\$160, but Amazon has it for only \$137 as of this writing—because her book makes points that are important for today's intelligence officers to know.

Dr. Corke claims to be from the “revisionist” school of Cold War historiography, which generally blames the United States for that conflict out of a premeditated disposition to confront the USSR in pursuit of American global hegemony and secure markets. But her main thesis is refreshingly (and realistically) at odds with that school. The development of covert action capabilities during Harry Truman's presidency and of the structures carrying them out was not something that happened by plan or direction on the part of US leadership but arose out of a set of messy circumstances. Essentially, Corke says, the failure of the Truman administration to develop a coherent Cold War operations policy for CIA allowed the covert action “cowboys” (my word, not hers, but it captures her argument) to implement covert operations that in the end were largely failures or were otherwise contrary to US interests.¹

It is no surprise to anyone knowledgeable about early CIA covert operations that, in the first years of the Cold War, most of this activity met with failure. We may never know how failed covert actions ultimately influenced foreign adversaries to modify their behavior, but even so, Corke is persuasive and, in my view, absolutely correct in demonstrating that covert operations under Truman's CIA

¹ In this context I use the terms “covert action” (a term of the 1970s) and “covert operations” (a 1950s term) synonymously.

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

lacked coherence, a master plan, or even consistency. The primary cause of CIA's poor record in mounting operations during this period was, she says,

the persistent inability of the [Truman] administration as a whole to reconcile policy and operations successfully and to agree on a consistent course of action for waging the Cold War.... The United States simply did not have a coherent foreign policy during these years. Nor did it develop and maintain an integrated strategy on which covert operations could be based. (4)

I and other historians may disagree on whether the Truman administration had a recognizably coherent Cold War strategy. But that isn't really the point, which is that the hard thing was translating what the United States wanted—preventing any power from dominating Eurasia, supporting allies, and promoting international law and free trade—into what the United States should do about it in the shadowy zone between diplomacy and war. In other words, one doesn't need CIA's experience in Nicaragua during the 1980s to see that covert action, to be successful, needs a workable foreign policy context; it is evident from the first years of the Agency's existence. During the Truman years, the absence of a coherent plan to fit covert action seamlessly into overall US Cold War objectives meant that CIA was often left to its own devices and initiative with insufficient oversight by the executive branch. The Agency fell back on what Corke calls “the Donovan tradition,” which had survived the disestablishment of William Donovan's Office of Strategic Services in late 1945 and was carried forward into CIA's early covert action arm, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). As Corke describes this “Donovan tradition” (12–13), we can see features that arguably remain part of the organizational culture of the Agency's clandestine service to this day:

- Faith in individual initiative or “derring-do”
- Willingness to act unhesitatingly in ambiguous situations, to “do something” even if it goes beyond the original mandate
- Belief in the efficacy of unconventional methods
- Distrust or even disdain for the bureaucratic process and structure.²

Readers will also find useful her summary of the historiography of the Cold War, particularly regarding the origins of the term “rollback,” though, here again, for someone who describes herself as a “revisionist,” she argues against type that the United States was a most uncertain hegemon. She is excellent on the internal organizational and cultural divisions and feuds between the collectors of human intelligence, the Office of Special Operations (OSO) on the one hand, and the covert action operators, OPC, on the other.

A major point on which I and others will disagree with Corke is her repeated downplaying (pp. 8, 53, and elsewhere) of the external Soviet or international communist threat in the development of US Cold War policies, including CIA's covert activities. Corke apparently believes that the development of US covert

² CIA historian Thomas Ahern alludes to this legacy in his analysis of black entry operations into North Vietnam during the Indochina conflict. See *The Way We Do Things* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005) on http://www.foia.cia.gov/vietnam/5_THE_WAY_WE_DO_THINGS.pdf.

action was something that occurred with scant regard to the perceived Soviet threat. She asserts that “internal factors—ideology, partisan politics, personality and bureaucratic politics—took precedence over geopolitical considerations,” which is certainly at least a false choice, as these are hardly discrete factors. Much of the personality clashes and partisan debates of the Cold War from the very beginning, for example, were precisely about the nature and extent of the Soviet threat.

Another point of debate concerns whether it was clear in the summer of 1947, with the National Security Act already signed and the Central Intelligence Group on its way to being transformed into CIA, that the new agency would be conducting covert operations. Corke says it isn't clear (45–47), but I and other intelligence historians would say it certainly was. CIG was involved in clandestine operations, mostly HUMINT but also including what we would call covert action, and the National Security Act's primary act with regard to intelligence was to re-create CIG with all its activities as CIA. Moreover, the contemporary correspondence of DCIs Souers and Vandenberg, taken together with Truman's intent in creating CIG, make the case that CIA was intended from the get-go to conduct covert action. I also disagree that OPC—the covert action organization supposedly managed jointly by State and CIA but which also took tasking from the Joint Chiefs of Staff—was ever as independent as she claims, but reasonable people can disagree on these matters.

In any case, there is no dispute that covert activities were firmly underway by late 1947 and early 1948, and Corke recounts the disputes among CIA, State, Defense, and the National Security Council over the kind and scope of operations to be conducted, as well as their initiation, coordination, and organization—a situation she accurately describes as a “bureaucratic fiasco.” Corke paints a picture of an astonishingly diverse landscape of positions in the US government at the time, from those who advocated what later would be termed “coexistence” to adherents of containment to those wanting a more aggressive policy (later “roll-back”). In that chaotic give-and-take, CIA could, and did, heed the calls to action that underpinned its early covert action programs. Corke quite boldly, and I believe persuasively, puts the lion's share of the blame for this strategic policy incoherence on George Kennan at the State Department. Truman's establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board in April 1951 was intended to rationalize US Cold War policy aims and CIA operations, but as Corke ably shows, the PSB could not overcome the bureaucratic rivalry among CIA, State, and Defense and instead reflected “the complete lack of unanimity that existed within the [Truman] administration over the meaning and interpretation of American Cold War policy” (134).

The resulting covert action failures included ethnic agent paramilitary penetrations by sea and by airdrop into communist countries. These operations led to the capture and probably the deaths of, on average, some three-quarters of the teams sent in—a total over many years and in many countries that numbered in the hundreds, not the “countless lives” of Corke's hyperbole. She does give a usefully detailed description of a series of operations against a particular country that I may not name here because the Agency, despite plenty of accurate scholarship on the matter, has not acknowledged the activity because of liaison con-

cerns, but her chapter 5 persuasively presents what cannot be described as anything but a disaster. More valuably, Corke shows that the lessons from this failure were not learned, with the result that this kind of failure was repeated over and over again in similar operations against different countries over the course of the next decade.

History is not a science in the sense that one can run the experiment again, and Corke therefore cannot prove where the logic of her argument leads—namely, to the conclusion that better coordination and strategy would have made for more successful covert operations. The fact is that there was significant policy input from both State and the Pentagon for CIA operations in the Far East in the early 1950s, most of which—particularly those directed against mainland China—were unsuccessful. All this suggests that CIA shares the blame for these failures with other parts of the government and that better coordination doesn't necessarily lead to better or more successful covert action.

There are some factual mistakes. CIA did in fact warn the State Department about the likelihood of riots in Bogota in 1948. OSO did not prepare intelligence estimates but conducted espionage and other operations; here Corke has confused "foreign intelligence" (HUMINT) with finished intelligence. It was news to me that after his stint as the country's first DCI (1946) Sidney Souers went to the Bureau of the Budget: in 1947 he became the executive secretary of the National Security Council, returning to private business after serving three more years in the Truman administration.

There are the careless mistakes. It's one thing to misspell the name of a War Department intelligence official that only intelligence historians will recognize ("Gromback" for Grombach), but it's another thing entirely to occasionally refer to "Allan" (instead of Allen) Dulles or Walter "Beddle" (instead of Bedell) Smith. Commas are strewn randomly throughout the book. The footnotes too could have benefited from a disciplined copy editor.

Still, this is a valuable contribution to the history of CIA's covert action mission, and it is hoped that Dr. Corke will follow up with another book on how the Eisenhower administration inherited, used, and arguably improved the capability for waging Cold War in the shadows, a subject she just introduces in the concluding chapters of her present work.



Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5

Christopher Andrew. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. 1032 pp., including notes, bibliography, and index.

John Ehrman

I opened my copy of *Defend the Realm* with a sense of dread. With 865 pages of dense text, some 170 pages of notes and bibliography, and weighing in at more than three pounds, Christopher Andrew's authorized centennial history of the British Security Service promised to be the type of long, hard read one might expect of the usual official history.

But then something unexpected happened. After about 30 pages, I began to suspect that the book might not be as dull as I had feared. On page 62, as the first German spy was executed (shot at the Tower of London, but not before he had a chance to thank his British captors for their kind treatment of him), I realized that Andrew knows how to tell a good story. Another 20 pages and a few more executions and I was hooked. *Defend the Realm* turned out to be a terrific book, filled with fascinating spy stories, wonderfully eccentric characters, bureaucratic infighting, as well as shrewd insights into the development of one of the world's premier domestic security services. I could hardly put it down.

In addition to being a good read, *Defend the Realm* is an unprecedented intelligence history. For the 100th anniversary of its founding in 1909, the Security Service (or MI5 as it was long known) commissioned Andrew—one of the world's leading intelligence historians—to write a history of the service and gave him complete access to its archives. This included access to files on recent cases which, although Andrew could not use all of their contents in the book, still helped inform his overall judgments. To my knowledge, no other service ever has given an outsider such access, not to mention a promise not to censor the author's conclusions and opinions. For his part, Andrew supplemented his archival sources with previously published materials, documents from other archives, memoirs, and interviews with Security Service officers. As a result, *Defend the Realm* is an extraordinarily detailed book and, in all likelihood, will stand for many years, both as the authoritative account of the service as well as a unique example of intelligence service openness.

With an enormous amount of material and many threads in his story, the author easily could have drowned in the details. Andrew, however, avoided this trap, largely because of the way he organized *Defend the Realm*. He divides the service's history into six distinct periods—founding of the service, World War I, the interwar era, and so on, to the present—and marches through them. The sec-

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

tion on each period begins with an overview of about 20 pages that presents the main themes and events—the growth and changing organization of the service, the evolution of its missions, relations with its political masters, and major intelligence cases and affairs—and then gives the details in the ensuing chapters. As a result, he reduces a massive history to bite-size, easily digestible pieces, while still following his themes and presenting all the information the reader needs.

American readers, it needs to be said, face some disadvantages in reading *Defend the Realm*. Andrew clearly wrote for a British audience and so assumes, for example, that his readers know why Ramsay MacDonald would naturally have been suspicious of the service or what the role of a permanent undersecretary is in the British bureaucracy. Similarly, Americans might tire of seeing characters introduced as “Major (later Major General Sir) William Thwaites,” wonder what is a lord president, or be unable to remember the differences between a QC, GCB, WPC, the TUC, and any number of other British acronyms that populate the pages. But those who remember Britain’s economic and political difficulties in the 1960s and 1970s will appreciate the contempt that drips from Andrew’s descriptions of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, the two hapless Labour prime ministers of the period. Wilson, in particular, was prone to conspiracy theories and became increasingly paranoid with age. “One of his colleagues recalls standing next to [Wilson] in the lavatory at Number 10, and watching in some astonishment as the Prime Minister pointed to the electric light fitting and gestured to indicate that, because it might well be bugged, it was unsafe to mention anything confidential. During his last few months in office, Wilson appears rarely to have said anything in the lavatory without first turning on all the taps and gesturing at imaginary bugs in the ceiling.” I wonder if an official American intelligence history will ever contain such intimate anecdotes about a president.

Overall, Andrew portrays the Security Service as an extremely successful organization, one that has generally improved its performance and kept up with new threats as they have developed during its 100 years. Its greatest long-term achievement has been in countersubversion. Starting after World War I, the service began to monitor the activities of the Communist Party, gradually accumulating enormous files on its members, and then began watching fascists in the 1930s and, later, various leftwing sects and militant labor activists who were threatening the stability of the British state. The service managed to do this even though it did not have a formal definition of subversion until the Maxwell Fyfe Directive of 1952 and, moreover, was able to continue this mission until the 1990s with little political interference from the governments of the day. That it was able to do this even as it kept tabs on Labour MPs who might have been drifting too far to the left—“lost sheep,” as those too close to the communists were called—is a tribute to the professionalism of the service and the trust its leaders built with politicians. Among the service’s other successes, Andrew counts its extraordinary performance against German intelligence in both world wars, culminating with the control of Nazi espionage in Britain through the double-cross system; helping with the transition of British colonies to independence and then building intelligence relationships with the new governments; gradually restricting Soviet intelligence activity in Britain; and, after the end of the Cold War, transitioning into one of the world’s best counterterrorism services. It also has maintained good relations with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), which is a remarkable accomplishment for both.

Andrew does not give us an entirely triumphalist history, however, and he freely acknowledges the service's shortcomings and the overly long time it often has taken to recognize and address them. Among these were the service's many errors in the investigation of Kim Philby and the other Cambridge spies; allowing Peter Wright's long, groundless investigation of Sir Roger Hollis, MI5's director general from 1956 to 1965, as a suspected Soviet spy; and a complete lack of readiness to operate effectively in Northern Ireland at the start of the "Troubles" in 1969. "Though many MI5 staff had experience working in Africa, Asia and/or the West Indies, Ulster still seemed more alien territory than outposts of empire thousands of miles away," he observes. (Andrew notes further that the service was slow to understand the growth of international terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s.) The service's internal management, too, was haphazard for most of its first 100 years, and it was slow to institute formal training and professionalization of its officers.

Andrew also offers good accounts of external factors that affected the service's performance. Some, like the deep cuts that followed each world war and the end of the Cold War, are familiar stories for intelligence services in other countries, including the United States. Others, such as the perennial uncertainty about what constitutes subversion and a legitimate target for the service—a thorny problem in Britain, where industrial strikes, which were not normally considered a national security issue, began to threaten the stability of the state—are peculiar to its mission and political situation. Successive British governments also took decades to work out the roles and coordination of police forces, the Security Service, and SIS for dealing with Irish terrorism, a problem that seriously hampered Britain's overall effort and whose lessons should be studied carefully.

Another important point that Andrew makes is that the Security Service has accomplished much with only limited resources. It grew from a few hundred officers and staff in the late 1930s to fewer than 1,500 during the war, and then fell back to about 500; it did not return to its wartime staffing level until the mid-1960s and, even as it fought Irish terrorists, tracked Soviet intelligence, and monitored domestic subversives, still was under 2,500 in 1989. For much of its history, moreover, the service worked in shabby buildings scattered around London. Its officers and staff tended to stay for long careers, however, and developed a great deal of experience and cohesion—Andrew quotes a personnel officer as telling a new recruit that "one of the best things about working here is that the percentage of bastards is extremely low." There also appears to have been little bureaucratic empire building, perhaps because the limited resources discouraged spending on nonessential items. Even after 9/11 led to a rapid growth of the service, its chiefs still were careful to spread the expansion over a decade, to avoid driving down the overall experience level too much.

American readers will inevitably ask if the Security Service model of a small, watchful, and efficient domestic security service can be copied by the United States. The answer, I believe, is that it cannot. Until 1989, MI5 operated in a legal and political grey area, without statutory authority. Not only would such a situation not be tolerated in the United States but, in light of the unhappy history of sedition statutes in the United States, it is difficult to imagine civil liberties groups and Congress agreeing to set up a domestic intelligence agency with

the power to monitor internal threats and, by extension, to define when dissent crosses the line to become a threat. Similarly, the service gained many of its powers, including the authority to open mail and wiretap, through informal arrangements, and it largely operated with the trust of senior British politicians—themselves a small group, in which everyone knew everyone else. American politics, in contrast, is much more open and fluid, making such intimate arrangements virtually impossible. Moreover, the conditions of political trust under which the service has prospered simply do not exist in the United States today. Finally, MI5 was a London-based operation. A domestic service in the United States likely would open offices in almost every state and, certainly, in every major city; it soon would become much larger and bureaucratic than the British model.

Even if we cannot adopt the Security Service model, we still can learn much from its history. A review of this length cannot possibly do justice to *Defend the Realm*, but I guarantee that anyone who reads it will find it a fascinating and richly rewarding book.



Japanese Intelligence in World War II

Kotani Ken. Oxford: Osprey, 2009, 224 pages, endnotes and index. Foreword by Williamson Murray. Translated by Kotani Chiharu.

***Nihongun no Interijensu: Naze Joho ga Ikasarenai no ka* [Japanese Military Intelligence: Why Is Intelligence Not Used?]**

Kotani Ken. Tokyo: Kodansha, 2007, 248 pages, endnotes and index.

Stephen C. Mercado

The old Italian complaint concerning the near impossibility of faithfully translating form and content from one language to another, *traduttore, traditore* (translator, traitor), comes to mind in reading *Japanese Intelligence in World War II*. Kotani Ken, an intelligence expert¹ at the Japanese Ministry of Defense's National Institute for Defense Studies, misidentifies his new book as the "translation" of his impressive *Nihongun no Interijensu*, winner of the 2007 Yamamoto Shichihei Prize for Japanese nonfiction. Rather, his new work is an adaptation of the original. In his original work, Dr. Kotani draws lessons for Tokyo's contemporary intelligence community from the successes and failures of Imperial Japanese Army and Navy intelligence activities before and during the Second World War. Stripped of references to Japanese intelligence today, his "translation" is only an intelligence history.

In *Japanese Intelligence in World War II*, Dr. Kotani commits to paper a great many names of intelligence officers and organizations of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). He divides his IJA chapter into signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) activities against the Soviet Union, China, the United States, and Great Britain, as well as the counterintelligence (CI) operations of the IJA police (Kempeitai) and the War Ministry's Investigation Department. He also touches on the extensive collection of open sources and the valuable support given by such auxiliary organizations as the South Manchurian Railway Company and Domei News Agency. Readers will come away with a better appreciation for Japanese military intelligence, in particular for SIGINT, whose successes are almost completely unknown outside Japan.²

¹ Japanese names are in traditional order, given name following family name. Kotani is also the author of *Mosado: Anyaku to Koso no Rokujunenshi* (2009) [Mossad: A Sixty-Year History of Covert Maneuvering and Struggle] and *Igirisu no Joho Gaiko: Interijensu to wa nani ka* (1999) [British Intelligence Diplomacy: What Is Intelligence?], as well as co-author of *Interijensu no 20 Seki: Johoshi kara mita Kokusai Seiji* (2007) [20th Century of Intelligence: International Relations Seen from Intelligence History] and *Sekai no Interijensu: 21 Seki no Joho Senso wo Yomu* (2007) [World Intelligence: Reading Intelligence Warfare of the 21st Century].

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

The author also covers a great deal of territory in his chapter on the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). As in the preceding chapter, he divides his presentation into SIGINT, HUMINT, and CI activities. Readers of such books as Ladislav Farago's *Broken Seal* or John Toland's *Rising Sun* will be somewhat familiar with parts of this section, recognizing such names as Yoshikawa Hideo and Otto Kuehn.³ He is scathing in his criticism of the IJN for its laxity, with naval officers resistant to the notion that the enemy had broken their codes even after the defeat at Midway, the ambush of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku by US aircraft during an unannounced visit to the front, and the temporary loss of a naval codebook in the possession of Vice Admiral Fukudome Shigeru when his aircraft plunged into the ocean near the Philippine island of Cebu.

Particularly interesting are the author's conclusions regarding Imperial Japan's successes and failures. He is impatient with British and American authors who dismiss Japanese military intelligence as ineffectual or emphasize their own side's errors rather than credit Japanese capabilities. Dr. Kotani argues that capable Japanese intelligence officers suffered from insufficient resources and an inferior position relative to operations officers, who cared little for intelligence and barred them from strategic decisions. Intelligence officers contributed to such tactical successes as the naval attack against Pearl Harbor and the army airborne assault on the Dutch oilfields in Palembang but played little or no part in strategic decisions. Drawing from the memoir of Maj. Gen. Tsuchihashi Yuichi, chief of the Army General Staff's Second Bureau (Intelligence), the author cites as an example the planning for the 1940 invasion of French Indochina. Tsuchihashi, a French expert who had served as military attaché in Paris, wrote that officers in the First Bureau (Operations) ignored his opposition to the invasion and kept him in the dark about planning for the operation. Washington's consequent cut-off of vital oil exports to Japan sent Tokyo on a course of war and defeat.

Dr. Kotani's "translation" generally follows the structure of his original book but ends as a simple history of the Second World War, depriving readers outside Japan of the lessons he offers in Japanese to enhance his nation's current intelligence efforts. In his original concluding chapter, he argues for more resources, better development of intelligence officers, and more cooperation within Tokyo's intelligence community. He notes that, never mind the resources available to Washington, Tokyo's intelligence budget is only a third of London's. He suggests better training and more time on target as part of a general enhancement of intelligence as a career. He favors a British "collegial" approach to develop horizontal linkages and eliminate intelligence stovepipes over a central intelligence organization in the American way. He worries that Tokyo still slights the strategic for the tactical. Warning that Japan lost the intelligence war in the Second World War not because of general intelligence failure but because of an operational failure to make use of intelligence, he suggests that Japan today develop a

² Almost all documents of the IJA's Central Special Intelligence Division and subordinate SIGINT units were destroyed in advance of the occupation. Fearing punishment, nearly all veterans kept their successes to themselves and highlighted failures in postwar interviews with US officials. The resulting treatment of IJA SIGINT in Anglo-American intelligence literature has been scant and skewed.

³ Yoshikawa was a naval intelligence officer operating in the guise of a clerk at the Japanese Consulate General in Honolulu on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack. Kuehn was a German national and IJN agent in Hawaii.

system to meet the challenges of an age in which the postwar US “intelligence umbrella” is in doubt.

Japanese Intelligence in World War II, apart from missing the last chapter and numerous references elsewhere in the original to contemporary Japanese intelligence issues, suffers as a “translation” from mistranslations of standard military intelligence terms and awkward English.⁴ Even so, Western readers should find value in this lesser version of the original *Nihongun no Interijensu*. It is the first general history in English of IJA and IJN intelligence activities during the Second World War.⁵ The endnotes alone, many pointing to materials found in the British National Archives at Kew, warrant a close reading.



⁴ Among the mistranslations are the rendering of the Army General Staff’s Second Bureau (Intelligence) as “2nd Department” and the description of the Soviet Union, a hypothetical enemy, as an “imaginary” one.

⁵ The reviewer’s own *Shadow Warriors of Nakano* (2002) only concerns IJA intelligence and neglects SIGINT. Tony Matthews wrote of Japanese diplomatic intelligence activities in *Shadows Dancing* (1993). The reviewer is unaware of any other book-length treatments of Japanese intelligence in the Second World War.

The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

Current Topics

- Beyond Repair: The Decline and Fall of the CIA***, Charles S. Faddis
- Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives***, James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian, (eds.)
- Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy***, Mark M. Lowenthal
- Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad***, Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, and David N. Edger
- The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation***, Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman
- Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction***, Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith A. Hansen

Historical

- Delusion: The True Story of Victorian Superspy Henri Le Caron***, Peter Edwards
- Hide and Seek: The Search For Truth in Iraq***, Charles Duelfer
- The Official C.I.A. Manual of Trickery and Deception***, H. Keith Melton and Robert Wallace
- A Terrible Mistake: The Murder of Frank Olson and the CIA's Secret Cold War Experiments***, H. P. Albarelli, Jr.
- The Shooting Star: Denis Rake, MC, A Clandestine Hero of the Second World War***, Geoffrey Elliott
- Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb***, Michael S. Goodman
- TRIPLEX: Secrets from the Cambridge Spies***, Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev (eds.)

Intelligence Abroad

- East German Foreign Intelligence: Myth, Reality and Controversy***, Thomas Wegener Frills et al. (eds.)
- Historical Dictionary of German Intelligence***, Jefferson Adams
- The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism***, Ami Pedahzur
- Secrecy and the Media: The Official History of the United Kingdom's D-Notice System***, Nicholas Wilkinson

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Current Topics

Charles S. Faddis, *Beyond Repair: The Decline and Fall of the CIA* (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2010), 183 pp., endnotes, glossary, index.

This book is an argument that the existing Central Intelligence Agency is no longer capable of performing the task for which it was designed and must, rapidly, be replaced. (1)

“The failure of the CIA is structural,” he continues.⁽⁷⁾ But replaced with what? Eight of the nine chapters in *Beyond Repair* deal with supposed existing inadequacies. Faddis offers the OSS, MI6, and other contemporary examples to illustrate what must be done to correct the problems. Chapter 9, “A New OSS,” discusses specific issues that need to be taken up. These include demanding individual initiative as a given, coupled with embracing less risk-averse policies; removing constraints imposed by privacy laws; providing adequate training and language skills; addressing leadership deficiencies; and using nonofficial cover officers. Of equal importance, he suggests, are excessive limits on command authority, the operational damage done by managers without field experience, too much authority allowed to in-country ambassadors, conflicts with the Defense Department, and the difficulties created by a Congress that often confuses oversight with management.

The OSS examples of the right way to run operations—permitting maximum initiative—that Faddis offers include the case of Virginia Hall operating in France behind German lines and Max Corvo operating in Africa and Italy. To illustrate the problem of “calcified” regulations and the value of nonofficial cover, Faddis discusses the case of British agent Sidney Reilly, “Ace of Spies,” who obtained essential details of German naval weapons after getting a job with the German manufacturer and stealing the plans—killing a man in the process. The story may make its point, but the choice of Reilly was a poor one as the operation was complete fantasy.¹

Many of the problems that Faddis identifies will be familiar to current and former officers, and he recognizes they are not likely to be solved with a name change. In the final chapter Faddis offers 14 points as guidance for a “new OSS.” Although he begins his book by asserting that CIA’s problems are structural, his descriptions and guidance suggest they are fundamentally people related. If he has got that right, current CIA management could implement solutions. This is an option *Beyond Repair* does not explore.

¹ For details on the realities of Reilly’s exploits, see: Andrew Cook, *On His Majesty’s Secret Service: The True Story of Sidney Reilly Ace of Spies* (Charleston, SC: Tempus Publishing, 2002), 238–39. This well-documented account shows that the story of Reilly in the shipyard could not have happened.

James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian, eds. *Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 296 pp., end of chapter notes, index.

In the age of GOOGLE, those interested in learning how intelligence and policy influenced the decision to go to war in Iraq have more than 2 million choices from which to obtain data. Their difficulty then is one of determining which ones are correct. George Mason University professor James Pfiffner and University of Leicester professor Mark Phythian have solved that problem with their uncommonly fine selection of 13 articles and supporting documents dealing with the key issues and personalities involved.

The 13 authors are a mix of intelligence professionals, academics, and independent scholars. Four of the articles have appeared elsewhere but this does not lessen their value. The topics covered include intelligence decision making and the rationale for war in the United States, Great Britain, and Australia; collection and analysis failures; the politics and psychology of intelligence and intelligence reform; parliamentary and congressional oversight; and the management of public opinion. Four of the five appendices are excerpts from key documents. The fifth is an open letter to then-DCI George Tenet from former intelligence officers.

The tone of the book is positive, which is not to say that one will agree with every assertion. For example, University of Georgia professor Loch Johnson's comment that most observers agree "that lawmakers are performing below their potential when it comes to intelligence accountability ... [and that] oversight remains the neglected stepchild of life on Capitol Hill" is open to challenge.

While most of the material has been discussed in bits and pieces elsewhere, the articles provide a concise and articulate summary. The subtitle of the book is slightly misleading, however, as it excludes mention of the Australian experience that is nicely formulated in a chapter by Professor Rodney Tiffen of the University of Sydney. But overall, this is an excellent book that analyzes, objectively and dispassionately, some of the worst experiences of intelligence professionals and decision makers. There are valuable lessons to be learned by all those who advocate speaking truth to power.

Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 4th edition, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 364 pp., indices (author & subject), appendices, further readings.

Since the first edition of this book appeared in 1984, former senior CIA analyst Mark Lowenthal has periodically revised the work to reflect changing conditions in the US Intelligence Community. While retaining the basic format, which provides a primer on IC personnel, functions, and organizations, this edition, adds some 30 pages covering the implementation of the reforms following the creation of the office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2004, the ethical issues raised by the war on terrorism, intelligence priorities, and the importance of transnational issues such as WMD and terrorism.

There is new material on congressional oversight and a tendency toward politicization, which Lowenthal sees in the declassification of national intelligence estimates to sway opinion. Each chapter concludes with a list of readings, and these too have been updated. Appendix I adds still more readings and Web sites. While chapter 15, “Foreign Intelligence Services,” has been updated, the services included—British, Chinese, French, Israeli, and Russian—are the same as in previous editions. The addition of services from Middle East countries and how al-Qaeda handles the problem would be welcome in future editions.

Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy is now firmly established as the basic introductory text on the intelligence profession. Well written and well documented, it should be kept close to hand by students and the interested general reader alike.

Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, and David N. Edger, ***Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad*** (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 320 pp., endnotes, bibliography, glossary, index.

During the Cold War, those concerned with understanding what made a communist tick had to study the writings of Marx, Engels, Trotsky, and Lenin along with Stalin’s speeches and party publications. To grasp Soviet realities it was necessary to study transcripts of purge trials, the memoirs of émigrés and defector, and books by former gulag inmates and former believers. Today, an analogous but far more difficult situation confronts those who seek to comprehend terrorists motivated by a radical Islamic fervor. *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad* provides an indispensable foundation for understanding the Islamic threat.

The authors are professors at the University of Oklahoma. Springer is an Arabic linguist and an expert on how the jihadist movement uses the Internet. Regens is an expert in biosecurity and nuclear countermeasures. Former senior CIA officer David Edger brings 35 years of Middle East expertise to the mix. Their approach explains how the “resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism has fostered among some Muslims the belief that a religious war (jihad) is required to fight the infidels” who seek to destroy Islam. The authors do this by clarifying “the nexus between global jihad and Islamic radicalism, including the use of terrorism, as a basis for restoring the caliphate.” (1)

After discussing the philosophical foundations of jihad—the authors address the major elements of jihadist ideology, doctrine, strategy, and tactics as expressed in jihadist writings, Web sites and al-Qaeda. There follow chapters on strategic vision, organizational dynamics, recruitment and training, operations and tactics, and the challenge to intelligence, which, they conclude, is “serious but not insurmountable...with respect to generating credible information.” (226) The final chapter is the authors’ perspective on a strategy to successfully counter global jihad, assuming no alteration in US policy—especially with respect to Israel—a continuing rise in political Islam, and a lengthy battle. They stress the importance of understanding vulnerabilities on both sides and the effective use of our national resources.

Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad is not light reading. The rationale expressed in the writings that motivate the radicals, while clearly expressed, will not be familiar to those accustomed to Western thinking. But the benefit is worth the effort, because it is essential to know one's enemy.

Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman, *The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009), 392 pp, footnotes, appendices, index.

The nuclear train wreck metaphor hinted at in the title and made explicit in the prologue of this somewhat alarmist book is illustrated by describing the damage that would have been done had Ramzi Yousef used a 5-kiloton nuclear weapon instead of fertilizer in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing—millions dead in devastation reaching Central Park. The authors drive home the point adding a quote from Harvard professor Graham Allison: “The detonation of a terrorist nuclear device in an American city is inevitable if the U.S. continues on the present course.” (4)

The authors, both experienced nuclear weapons specialists, go on to review the history of nuclear weapons development in all countries that have them or have sought to acquire them since the end of WW II. They also look closely at the political motivations of nations that seek to circumvent international agreements and complicate efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In discussing the Soviet Union's program, they digress and speculate about a supposed Soviet agent at the nuclear weapons laboratory in Los Alamos in the 1940s and 50s, whom the authors came to suspect after the VENONA material was released in the mid-1990s. They call him “Arthur Fielding” but decline to mention his true name, which they say they know, or to describe his espionage activities. They claim Morris Cohen, a well-known KGB agent, recruited him and gave him the code name PERSEUS. They go on to acknowledge and then dismiss the positions of some historians who consider PERSEUS a KGB myth. Unfortunately, the authors provide no sourcing for their digression. Readers will get different perspectives on the subject by consulting other treatments.²

The authors recommend stiff policies to control nuclear weapons and prevent their acquisition by Islamic radicals. Their primary concern is a potential linkup of North Korea, Iran, and China. The solution: a more realistic energy policy, strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency, taking China more seriously, and fixing the broken Intelligence Community, which is “disconnected at the top, arrogant at the bottom...and needs to refocus its efforts from the Cold War instruments...to human intelligence on the scene.” (326–7). The *Nuclear Express* lays out the problems but invokes less confidence in the solutions it outlines.

² See for example: John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassilliev, *SPIES: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).

Thomas Graham, Jr. and Keith A. Hansen. *Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 300 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendices, index.

The end of the Cold War reduced the threat of superpower nuclear catastrophe but the potential for clandestine proliferation of WMD by nation states persisted. The problem was compounded after 9/11, when al-Qaeda's intention to obtain and use WMD became a priority concern. In *Preventing Catastrophe*, two skilled analysts provide the background necessary to understand the new circumstances and the steps required to improve the intelligence-policy aspects of counterproliferation in the future.

The first four chapters discuss the types of WMD, the problems of detecting and monitoring secret programs, the US record of accomplishment in this area (mixed), and the role that intelligence is supposed to play. Chapter 5 gives a real-world example of how the intelligence-policy community stumbled badly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, identifies principal causes (failure to validate sources and politicization, the authors argue), and suggests lessons for the future. Chapter 6 considers the tools available "to limit and, if possible, reverse" proliferation in the future (5). Then follow two unnumbered chapters. The first addresses whether or not it is possible to prevent proliferation; the second looks at what might happen if the attempts fail. The 15 appendices discuss specific proliferation issues in greater detail. Topics include technical details of various types of WMD, the estimative process (with examples of estimates themselves), presidential influence, the role of the UN, and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Preventing Catastrophe stresses the need for a healthy intelligence-policy relationship when addressing the complexities of WMD proliferation. But it is particularly important for students of the issue—the analysts of the future—who lack the historical knowledge needed to deal with a problem whose parameters change frequently and is of critical importance in the international arena.

Historical

Peter Edwards, *Delusion: The True Story of Victorian Superspy Henri Le Caron* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2008), 344 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The life of Henri Le Caron, according to author Peter Edwards, is best characterized by the term delusion: fooling oneself or others with false impressions or deception. Born in London in 1841 and christened Thomas Beach, Le Caron, as he is known to history, compensated for a lack of formal education with a grand sense of adventure. Leaving home for Paris as a teenager, he did odd jobs until beckoned to America by the Civil War. In the United States he adopted the name Le Caron and enlisted in the Union army, joining the Irish Brigade. He survived Antietam but was captured by the Confeder-

ates, only to escape with the help of a young lady who would become his life-long wife. After the war he became an agent for the Fenian movement, which was promoting revolution in Ireland. He went to medical school, was arrested for grave robbing, and escaped again. Le Caron continued to spy for the Irish cause in Canada, the United States, Ireland, and England until 1889, when in a London open court trial of Irish “terrorists” he testified that he had been an agent for Scotland Yard all along.

In his telling, Edwards adds much history of the Fenian movement and its struggles. In addition, he corrects the many embellishments found in Le Caron’s 1892 memoir, *Twenty-Five Years in the Secret Service: The Recollections of a Spy*, and draws parallels with modern terrorist organizations. *Delusion* is a well-documented corrective to an intriguing spy story.

Charles Duelfer, *Hide and Seek: The Search For Truth in Iraq* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009), 523 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

After nearly six years in the Office of Management and Budget and 10 years in the State Department, Charles Duelfer became deputy executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), whose mission was to determine the state of Iraq’s WMD program after Iraq was forced out of Kuwait in 1991. As UNSCOM conducted inspections toward that end for the next nine years, Duelfer became the American with the most experience in Iraq. After US entry into Iraq in 2003, George Tenet tapped Duelfer to head the CIA’s Iraq Survey Group (ISG), charged with locating Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction. *Hide and Seek* is an account of both missions, which he defined as seeking the truth.

Duelfer writes that his UNSCOM experience was marked by bureaucratic frustration by the UN, persistent obstruction by the Saddam regime, and difficulties created by “extraordinarily ignorant” leaders in the White House and the Department of Defense. (xiii). It is also the story of data collection and analysis based on the results of surprise on-site inspections, defector interviews, contacts with friendly Iraqis, and input from friendly intelligence services—Great Britain and Israel, among others. The Iraqis resisted disclosing WMD data unless given no alternative. The case of Saddam’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, who defected to Jordan in 1995, is an example. Faced with the reality of what he would disclose, Saddam revealed a million and a half pages of WMD documents stored at Kamel’s chicken farm, which the Iraqis claimed they had only just learned about from one of Kamal’s girlfriends. Duelfer concluded the documents were part of a formal government attempt to keep them secret until the defection forced Baghdad to reveal them. (112) Kamel’s sudden redefection and execution was a surprise to all and raised further doubts about the data he provided. Duelfer reports that his behavior may have been due in part to a brain tumor operation he had undergone. (115)

Duelfer explains that his time with UNSCOM had been too controversial to expect he would be part of the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission UNMOVIC—UNSCOM’s successor between 1998 and the US invasion—or the State Department for that matter. His new assignment was as

a scholar in residence at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. But he remained in contact with the Iraq Operations Group at CIA and eventually deployed to Iraq with a CIA team after Baghdad had been secured in 2003. The chapters he devotes to this period are harshly critical of the Defense Department, especially its reliance on Ahmed Chalabi, who promised so much after the fall of Iraq and produced nothing but problems. The decisions to dismiss the Iraqi army and the Baath Party come in for equally severe criticism.

By July 2003, Duelfer realized his CIA work in Iraq was complete and he once again took an academic sabbatical, this time to Princeton. In January 2005, he was back at CIA as the new head of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). His mission from George Tenet was to find the truth in Iraq. Were WMD being hidden? Had there ever been any? By December 2005 he had answered the questions. In between, his team had discovered indications of experiments with ricin—left over from before the first Iraq war—dealt with an IED containing a nerve gas, reported to Congress that Iraq had not restarted its WMD programs, and survived a suicide bomber's attempt on his life that killed two of his military escorts. The final chapter is a tribute to their memory.

Hide and Seek is much more than a record of Duelfer's dogged, frustrating, and ultimately successful WMD efforts. His insights about intelligence analysis, interrogation techniques, the value of experience in the field, the penalties for inadequate planning, the need to pursue all diplomatic avenues, and the limits of the UN Security Council are worthy of serious thought. Similar conditions may be encountered in the future.

H. Keith Melton and Robert Wallace, ***The Official C.I.A. Manual of Trickery and Deception*** (New York: William Morrow, 2009), 248 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, no index.

In his foreword to this volume, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin, an amateur magician himself, writes that “magic and espionage are really kindred arts.” (xi) The CIA had recognized this fact in the 1950s when, as part of the MKULTRA project, they hired magician John Mulholland to help teach young officers tricks of deception for use in the field. As part of his contract, Mulholland prepared two training manuals, *Some Operational Applications of the Art of Deception* and *Recognition Signals*. In 1973 when then-DCI Richard Helms ordered the destruction of all documents associated with the MKULTRA program, the manuals were thought to be gone forever. Then, in 2007, as he was going through some unrelated documents, Robert Wallace, a former director of the CIA's Office of Technical Services, discovered references to the manuals and tracked down poor-quality copies of each that had somehow escaped the weeding. Since portions of the manuals had been referred to in a published work, Wallace thought publication of the complete versions was warranted. With his coauthor, intelligence historian and collector Keith Melton, Wallace wrote an introduction to the manuals and commissioned illustrations. The *Official C.I.A. Manual of Trickery and Deception* was the result.

The introduction reviews the MKULTRA program and the clandestine operational concepts and devices that resulted. They include illustrations of stage deception—for example, Houdini’s walk through a wall—and details on Mulholland’s use of real coins “to create espionage magic.” (57) They also provide biographical information on Mulholland and other key personnel.

The first manual discusses deception and the handling of liquids and tablets, surreptitious removal of objects, deception for women, teamwork, and the importance of rehearsals. The second manual considers clever recognition signals—lacing shoes in a special way, placing pens in pockets, using special wrapping for packages, and the like. While some techniques, flowers in the buttonholes, for example, might not be practical today, the principles are clear.

In addition to satisfying inherent interest in the topic, *The Official C.I.A. Manual of Trickery and Deception* fills a historical gap. It is an unexpected and valuable contribution.

H. P. Albarelli, Jr., ***A Terrible Mistake: The Murder of Frank Olson and the CIA’s Secret Cold War Experiments*** (Walterville, OR: Trine Day LLC, 2009), 826 pp., endnotes, appendices, photos, index.

In the early morning of 28 November 1953, Frank Olson, an army scientist working at Ft. Detrick, Maryland, plunged to the street below his hotel room window on the 13th floor of the Statler Hotel in New York City. When the night manager reached him, Olson tried to speak, but he expired without saying a word. (18) His death was ruled a suicide, but the circumstances surrounding the death have been disputed ever since. The conventional wisdom is that Olson was the victim of a CIA LSD experiment gone awry.³ Olson’s son, Eric, eventually came to suspect a more sinister explanation and had his father’s body exhumed 40 years later for a new forensic study. Journalist Hank Albarelli began his own investigation in 1994 after reading about the exhumation in the *Washington Post*.⁴ *A Terrible Mistake* presents his conclusion: Frank Olson was murdered by two CIA employees to keep him from revealing secrets.

Eric Olson had reached the same conclusion based on extensive tests performed on his father’s body. After contacting Eric and interviewing others involved with case, Albarelli reached a tipping point in his investigation in 1995 when he had a serendipitous encounter with two fishermen in Key West, Florida. During their conversation, Albarelli mentioned he was investigating the Olson case. The fishermen then revealed that they were former CIA employees and had known Olson. Promised confidentiality, they gave Albarelli the names of others involved, and he interviewed them all.

³ See, for example, Peter Grose, *Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 394.

⁴ Brian Moar, “Digging for new evidence: Scientist’s death linked to CIA tests of LSD,” *Washington Post*, 3 June 1994.

By 1999, Olson's son had persuaded New York City District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau to reopen the investigation into his father's death. According to Albarelli, detectives on the case reached him the next year and were told of the two "fishermen." (2) The two claimed through a letter sent to Albarelli (688) that Olson, unwittingly to him, had indeed been given LSD, mixed with the stimulant pipradol (meretran) to facilitate an interrogation of him, but he showed "no lasting reaction." (693) Further inquiries revealed that Olson was upset because he had talked to "the wrong people" concerning allegations that the Army and CIA had conducted an experiment in France and subjected an entire town to LSD, supposedly sickening many people and killing several. (690)

On the night in question, Olson was to stay in the hotel before flying to Maryland the next day for treatment. When his roommate and minder concluded he was "becoming unhinged," it was decided to drive him to Maryland that night and two "CIA employees" were called to collect him. When he resisted, "things went drastically wrong...and in the ensuing struggle he was pitched through the closed window." (692–93) The "sources" said only that the minder "was awake and out of the way." When Albarelli refused to identify his "CIA sources," the district attorney dropped the case.

That, in short, is the Albarelli account. Has he got it right? The author's endnotes suggest the answer: There aren't any worthy of the name, and some chapters have none at all. With a very few exceptions, the book's many quotes, pages of dialogue, and the documents described cannot be associated with references listed in the notes. Moreover, some notes cover topics not even mentioned in the chapter they are tied to.⁵ With such notes, readers will be left wondering how to know what Albarelli writes is accurate.

Potential readers should also know that less than a third of this book is about the Olson case. The balance is a rehash of CIA mind-control experiments that have been in the public domain for years. Albarelli struggles mightily to link the program and Olson's death with North Korean brainwashing; the Kennedy assassination; attempts on Castro's life; the Mafia; Watergate; the suicides of James Forrestal, James Kronthal (a CIA officer), and Bill Hayward (an associate producer of *Easy Rider*); and the death of William Colby. (705) But it is all speculation, and the sourcing of this part of the book is as bad as the rest. Conspiracy theorists will no doubt overlook these weaknesses. Those who demand documentation for such serious charges will discover that investing time to look for it in Albarelli's narrative would be a terrible mistake.

⁵ For example, a reference in chapter 6 of the fifth part of the book cites a CIA/CSI review of a book by Gordon Thomas, *Secrets and Lies*, but neither Thomas nor the book is mentioned in the chapter.

Geoffrey Elliott, *The Shooting Star: Denis Rake, MC, A Clandestine Hero of the Second World War* (London: Methuen, 2009), 251 pp., footnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In 1950 Denis Rake was the butler in the household of actor Douglas Fairbanks, Jr. When Fairbanks saw a letter addressed to “Major Denis Rake, MC,” he was astonished, as nothing his butler had ever said suggested he had served in WW II, let alone received a military cross for gallantry. When queried, Rake gradually revealed his exploits while in the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Fairbanks encouraged him to write a memoir, and it was published in 1968.⁶ Geoffrey Elliott became interested in the story after discovering variations in Rake’s account and the versions included in books written by those with whom he served. When the British National Archives released the SOE files he was able to sort out the discrepancies. *The Shooting Star* is the result.

When war broke out, Rake enlisted in the army. He barely survived the evacuation of British troops from France in 1940. Separated from his unit, he got aboard the overloaded HMT *Lancastria*, which Luftwaffe dive bombers promptly sank. He was among the few survivors of the attack, which killed thousands. Undaunted, he volunteered for SOE and was accepted.

Most SOE officers were college educated and many had substantial prior military service. Denis met neither criterion; in fact, he was a most unlikely candidate. He was middle aged, of uncertain parentage, had spent years in the circus and London theater, and was openly homosexual at a time when that was not accepted behavior. But he had three things in his favor: He was fluent in French, had been trained in Morse code, and he had volunteered as an interpreter at the start of the war, when the need was great. After training, he was landed in France in May 1942 and served as a clandestine radio operator for Virginia Hall, an American then working with SOE resistance networks. After the Allied invasion of North Africa and the Nazi occupation of southern France, Rake escaped over the Pyrenees. After a period in a Spanish jail, he returned to London. The demand for radio operators had not diminished, and Rake—by this time a major—returned to France in 1944, where he served with the FREELANCE network as radio operator for Nancy Wake. It was at this time that he was involved in heavy fighting. Wake described Rake’s gallant service in her own memoir.⁷

Elliott used the archival records to correct the discrepancies and embellishments found in Rake’s own memoir and other stories about him.⁸ He also documents the operations and frequent close calls that were a part of Rake’s daily life with the resistance. After the war, Rake served briefly with the Secret Intelligence Service in Paris before returning to civilian life in Britain. He had earned the admiration of all who served with him. He faded from public

⁶ Denis Rake, *A Rake’s Progress*

⁷ Nancy Wake,

⁸ Marcus Binney,

view until the publication of his memoirs and a French movie based on them in which he made a cameo appearance. Denis Rake died in obscurity in 1976. *The Shooting Star* sets the record straight for this war hero.

Michael S. Goodman, *Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 295 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In his 1996 book, *Stalin and the Bomb*, David Holloway asked, “What role did espionage play in the Soviet nuclear project?”⁹ His answer, in the era before release of the VENONA decrypts, was understandably incomplete. *Spying on the Nuclear Bear* attempts to flesh out Holloway’s answer by examining detection, monitoring, and estimative efforts as they influenced the often bumpy Anglo-American nuclear relationship from 1945 to 1958.

In the first two chapters, author Michael Goodman, a lecturer at Kings College London, looks at the origins and development of the Soviet nuclear program, the British-American efforts to learn about it, and the consequences of the surprise Soviet explosion of their first atomic bomb—Joe-1—in 1949. In his introductory comments about chapter 3, “Atomic Spies and Defectors,” Goodman asserts that “a characteristic of the 1950–54 period was the success of Soviet espionage in penetrating British and American political, scientific, and intelligence circles.” (2) In the chapter itself, he discusses specific agents, Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Donald Maclean, John Cairncross and Ted Hall.

But historians of espionage may take issue with aspects of this assessment. For example, the characteristic of Soviet atomic espionage in the 1950–54 period was failure, not success.¹⁰ By that time, each of those mentioned had been identified and dealt with. Moreover, Goodman does not refer to the impact of GRU defector Igor Gouzenko or the Rosenbergs that, together with VENONA, brought Soviet atomic espionage to a halt by the end of the 1940s. Finally, his assertion that “it was not until Kim Philby had been identified as a Soviet spy that British intelligence realized just how extensive Soviet espionage was,” is just not supported by the facts.⁽⁸⁴⁾ The Soviet atom spies had all been neutralized by then.¹¹

Spying on the Nuclear Bear goes on to give a fair and interesting account of the impact of the Soviet nuclear program on British-American relations and atomic intelligence in the early missile age. In the process it discusses the personalities involved, the various collection programs, and their influence on the estimates produced. Of equal value are the analyses of Anglo-American relations concerning the strategic value of the atom bomb, the comparison of US and UK estimative methodology, and the technical and political issues in-

⁹ David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 3.

¹⁰ For details see: John Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Nigel West, *VENONA: The Greatest Secret of the Cold War* (London: HarperCollins, 1999).

¹¹ *Ibid.*

volved. As to the role of intelligence with regard to the atomic threat, the impact of the espionage cases should be assessed with caution, though the contributions of the technical sources of intelligence are on point.

Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, eds., *TRIPLEX: Secrets from the Cambridge Spies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 363 pp., index.

In their 1999 book, *Crown Jewels*, Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev discussed a variety of KGB operations based on material from the KGB archives, some provided originally by the Cambridge Five.¹² The appendix reproduced some documents furnished by Blunt and Philby. The present volume reproduces still more material they provided.

TRIPLEX was the code name given to a secret MI5 operation during WWII that illegally acquired material from diplomatic bags of neutral missions. (To this day the code name has never been mentioned in any official or unofficial history of British intelligence, not even in Chris Andrew's *Defense of the Realm*.) The operation itself was supervised by Anthony Blunt, who forwarded selected copies to Moscow. Some of the documents are reproduced in part I of the present volume. They include Swedish naval attaché reports, a report of Japanese networks in the United Kingdom, comments on neutral attachés in London, notes on the invasion plans, a list of agents being run by MI5 in various London missions, and the first draft of the then secret MI5 history. A much expanded version of the latter document was released and published in 1999 with some redactions that Blunt did not excise from his copy.¹³

But *TRIPLEX*, the book, includes more than the Blunt material. Part II, about half the book, is devoted to materials Philby supplied to his Soviet masters. Included here are reports on attempts to break Soviet codes, comments on SIS personnel and operations, a memo discussing efforts to penetrate Russia, and SIS codes and plans for anti-Soviet operations. Part III of the book reproduces four documents supplied by John Cairncross, one of them about Philby, who Cairncross did not know at the time was also a Soviet agent. Part IV of *TRIPLEX* departs from the "what the British agents provided" theme and reproduces six documents prepared by NKVD analysts that assess some of the material the Cambridge spies furnished.

TRIPLEX is a unique and valuable addition to the intelligence literature, perhaps the last from this source. It leaves no doubt about the damage moles can do when placed at the heart of an intelligence service.

¹² Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, *The Crown Jewels: British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999)

¹³ Jack Curry, *The Security Service 1908-1945: The Official History*, with an Introduction by Christopher Andrew, (London: PRO, 1999), 442 pp.

Intelligence Abroad

Thomas Wegener Frills, Kristie Macrakis and Helmut Müller-Enbergs, eds., *East German Foreign Intelligence: Myth, Reality and Controversy* (London: Routledge, 2010), 272 pp., end of chapter notes, indices (people, places, cover and operation names)

Western historians studying the intelligence services of the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact surrogates have in most cases been dependent on data provided by defectors; the cases of former agents that became public; released SIGINT material, for example, VENONA; and the memoirs of intelligence officers. *East German Foreign Intelligence* is a refreshing exception. Using the files of the East German Ministry of State Security (Stasi) that became available after the collapse of the German Democratic Republic, the authors address two questions: How did the domestic security and foreign intelligence services of Stasi operate and how effective were they? To add perspective, the book also discusses the roles of the West German intelligence service (BND) and Soviet military intelligence service (GRU). Its 13 chapters are divided in three parts: intelligence and counterintelligence, political intelligence, and scientific-technical and military intelligence. Its authors come from seven countries: the United States, Britain, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Russia. The group is a mix of intelligence research scholars, academics, and former intelligence officers.

Part I starts with an overview of the KGB's recovery from agent losses as a result of postwar defections and the VENONA material, showing how it recovered its operational effectiveness and how it imposed its influence over the East European nations under its control. Several authors document pre-Berlin Wall successes of the Western services, the CIA among them. Former CIA historian Ben Fischer looks at the other side of that story, demonstrating how the CIA became "deaf, dumb and blind" in East Germany as the Stasi improved its operational skills. Robert Livingston, senior fellow at the German Historical Institute in Washington DC discusses the principal source material in his article "Rosenholz" (Rosewood) and explains why the documents created a controversy between the CIA and the BND.

In part II, University of Leiden professor Beatrice de Graaf takes an unusual view of East German intelligence activities in an article that examines them in each phase of the intelligence cycle. Professor Thomas Friis, from the University of Southern Denmark, explains the importance of East German espionage operations in Denmark. In part III, Georgia Tech professor Kristie Macrakis looks at the importance of scientific intelligence, while Matthias Uhl, a researcher at the German Historical Institute in Moscow, examines the GRU and its influence on the Berlin Crisis. The book concludes with a look at the BND and its struggles from 1946 to 1994.

East German Foreign Intelligence solidly documents what a dedicated and determined intelligence service, free of the constraints of democratic society, can accomplish. As a work of research and analysis, the book is a benchmark for historians and intelligence professionals.

Jefferson Adams, *Historical Dictionary of German Intelligence* (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009), 543 pp., bibliography, appendices, chronology, no index.

The Historical Dictionary series on intelligence services is intended to provide a single reference that covers the missions, personnel, operations, organizations, and technical terms that define the services of various countries. In this volume Jefferson Adams, professor of history and international relations at Sarah Lawrence College, has done just that in exemplary fashion. His chronology, which begins in 1782, lists major events in German intelligence history from then until the present. The introduction adds descriptive detail about the formative figures and principal organizations in the evolution of the German services. The dictionary portion has more than 1,000 entries that focus on Germany—East and West—but also includes some Austrian organizations and operations. In many instances new details are added to familiar cases. One example is the fact that Wolfgang zu Putlitz, a British agent who penetrated Nazi embassies in London and The Hague, also worked briefly for the OSS. Likewise, Adams identifies the man behind the Zimmermann telegram. There are also entries about lesser known spies, for example, James Sattler, an American recruited by the Stasi. The appendices list the heads of the various services beginning with the Austro-Hungarian Evidence Büro. There is an excellent bibliographic essay, followed by entries that concentrate on the Cold War period and the modern services.

Some may wish that terrorist operations and technical equipment developed by the services had received greater emphasis, but there is no doubt that Professor Adams has produced a major contribution to the literature of intelligence.

Ami Pedahzur, *The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 215 pp., endnotes, bibliography, glossary, index.

“The literature of counterterrorism makes an analytical distinction between the war model, the criminal-justice and the reconciliatory model.” After defining each one, University of Texas professor, Ami Pedahzur, adds a fourth: the defensive model. (1) From these facts alone, it is safe to conclude he is a practicing political scientist—this is confirmed on the fly leaf. And carrying on in that tradition, he has produced an excellent study of the Israeli intelligence services and their battle against terrorism. At the outset, Professor Pedahzur makes three important assertions. First, Israel applies the war model to combat terrorism—kill the enemy until peace is achieved—but it hasn’t worked. Second, Israel has never developed a coherent doctrine for dealing with terrorism. And third, “terrorism, in most cases, should not be considered a major threat to national security of a country.” (10)

After a brief review of the origins of Israel and its intelligence services, Professor Pedahzur describes typical acts of terror that began when Israel became a nation and to which Israel often responded in kind—the war model. A sea change in tactics occurred after the Munich Olympics in 1972, when Israe-

li athletes were massacred and Mossad responded with Operation Wrath of God—an operation that targeted for assassination all the terrorists involved. It was only partially successful, and that makes the author's point: the war model doesn't bring peace, more likely it brings more terrorism. Several other operations, including four well-known rescue operations, are described in detail to emphasize this point. In the development of these stories, Pedahzur provides insightful attention to the organizational battles of the intelligence services—their struggle for power and position is a universal phenomenon.

Citing contemporary events, Professor Pedahzur, goes on to show how Israel has gradually adopted elements of the defensive model—the building of a wall, seeking negotiations, establishing diplomatic relations with recognizing Egypt and Jordan—though this has not defeated the terrorists either. What to do? In the end the author recommends applying a mix of the four models as circumstances demand and allow, but he does not promise success.

The *Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism* is a well-documented exposition of the problem and what has and has not worked in efforts to resolve it. Whatever the ultimate solution, he is convinced that use of the war model alone will only prolong the conflict.

Nicholas Wilkinson, ***Secrecy and the Media: The Official History of the United Kingdom's D-Notice System*** (London: Routledge, 2009), 613 pp., end-notes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

The British, it is said, taught the Americans everything the Americans know about intelligence, but not everything the British knew. Whether this applied to controlling what intelligence officers could publish is unknown, but the practice the OSS adopted during WWII did follow the British precedent—publish nothing. The only known exception to this policy occurred in October 1944, when an article attacking the Soviet conspiracy in America, by former Red Army general and then OSS officer, Alexander Barmine, appeared in the *Reader's Digest*. Barmine was dismissed the next day.

During the war both countries imposed strict censorship to prevent damage. In the postwar world some form of prepublication review was implemented. In the British case, dealing with the media to prevent publication of information potentially damaging to national security was accomplished through the D-Notice System. The Americans found this precedent “impossible to implement.” (382) *Secrecy and the Media* presents the official history of the so-called D-Notice System and, in the process, confirms the American judgment.

From 1999 to 2004, author Nicholas Wilkinson served as secretary to the Defence Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee (DPBAC), the body that oversees what is informally called the D-Notice System. In practice the system represents a “compact between the British Government and the British media to prevent inadvertent damage to national security through public disclosure of highly sensitive information.” (xi) Participation is strictly voluntary. The committee is composed of media members and government representa-

tives. When an issue arises, it is discussed among the members and if possible a solution agreed to. But where judgments differ, the editor involved has the final decision. After publication, if circumstances warrant, the government can resort to legal action under the Official Secrets Act.

Secrecy and the Media reviews the historical origins of the system, which follows closely the growth of the press beginning in the 18th century. In those days there was no formal way to prevent publication of information useful to the enemy, and a reporter's judgment was not always in the military's interest. In 1810, the Duke of Wellington could only complain to the War Office when newspapers reported fortification details. Later, a frustrated Sir Herbert Kitchener vented his anger with reporters by addressing them as "you drunken swabs." (4) In 1912, with WW I looming, the first "D-Notice" committee to prevent damaging disclosures was established. Wilkinson traces the committee's evolution in great detail from then until 1997.

Some examples of the D-Notice System in action will illustrate how it differs from the US approach. The first book considered for clearance by the Committee in 1945, *They Came to Spy*, was submitted voluntarily by its author, Stanley Firmin. It was published in 1947. This practice continues to this day. Historian Nigel West has submitted each of his books. Journalist Chapman Pincher, on the other hand, has submitted none. In preparation for the trial of KGB agent and MI6 officer George Blake, a D-Notice was issued asking the media not to mention his MI6 and Foreign Office connections. It was uniformly honored. But a D-Notice prohibiting mention of serving intelligence officers was ignored in the case of a book, *The Espionage Establishment*, by Americans David Wise and Thomas Ross that included the names of the heads of MI5 and MI6, then not permitted in the UK. Section 7 of *Secrecy and the Media* deals with the "Lohan Affair," a complex case involving author Chapman Pincher, Prime Minister Harold Wilson, editors, and politicians and illustrates the sometimes bitter battles the system allows. Examples of D-Notices are given in appendix 3.

In the final chapter, Wilkinson notes that while the history ends in 1997, the D-Notice System continues to operate and evolve in the internet-terrorism era—it now has its own Web page: <http://www.dnotice.org.uk>. *Secrecy and the Media* is documented by official sources that are cited. It should be of great interest to all those concerned with national security, intelligence, and freedom of the press.

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