



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R. I.

U.S. STRATEGIC MANEUVER:

A New World Order Requires Some New Thinking,

Not Reorganization

by

Douglas E. Humston

LtCol. USMC

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: 4

21 June 1991

Paper directed by CAPT C.G. Mendenhall III, USN LTC P.J. St. Laurent, USA

DIC F.J. SC. Ladrent, USA

CDR J.E. Keyes, USF

OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

Approved by:

i

Faculty Research Advisors

This document has been approved for public release and sale; its distribution is unlimited.

01 9 19 010

91-10387

Date

FCURITY CL	ASSIFICATION	OF THIS PA	65
ACOMIT CC		0	

BEDORT DOCUMENTATION BACE

.

ν			REPORT DOCU	MENTATION	PAGE		
	SECURITY CLAS	SIFICATION		16 RESTRICTIVE	MARKINGS	1	
2a. SECURITY	CLASSIFICATIO	N AUTHORITY		3 DISTRIBUTION	AVAILABILITY (OF REPORT	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		public rele	ON STATEMEN ease; distr	TA: Ap ibution	proved for is unlimited		
4. PERFORMI	NG ORGANIZA	TION REPORT NUMBE	R(S)	5 MONITORING	ORGANIZATION	REPORT NUN	ABER(S)
6. NAME OF	PERFORMING	ORGANIZATION	6b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a NAME OF M	ONITORING ORG	ANIZATION	
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT							
6C. ADDRESS NAVAI NEWPC	(City, State, and J WAR COLL DRT, RI	rd ZIP Code) EGE 02841		7b. ADDRESS (Cr	ty, State, and ZIP	Code)	
8a. NAME OF ORGANIZI	FUNDING / SPC	DNSORING	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMEN	T INSTRUMENT IC	DENTIFICATIO	DN NUMBER
Sc. ADDRESS	(City, State, and	d ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF	FUNDING NUMBE	RS	
				PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Inc U.S. ST Not Rec 12. PERSONAL	Inde Security C TRATEGIC M organizati	Dessification) ANEUVER: A N on (v)	ew World Order	Requires Som	ne New Thin	king,	
LT. COL	L. COUGLAS	E. HUMSTON,	USMC		RT (Vear Month	Dav) 115 1	
FINAL		FROM	TO	91-05-20			35
16. SUPPLEME satisfa paper r College	ENTARY NOTAL Iction of reflect my or the D	NON A paper s the requireme own personal epartment of	ubmitted to the nts of the Depa views and are the Navy.	Faculty of rtment of Op not necessar	the Naval perations.	War Colle The con ed by the	ege in partial tents of this e Naval War
17. 5(5) D	COSATI		18 SUBJECT TERMS (Strategic Mane	Continue on reven	e if necessary an ized forces	d identify by ; speed	versus
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	efficiency; ne forte, composi	w world orde	er; synergi	sm; join	t; service
19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if mecessary and identify by bloct number) The current changes in the kinds of world threats we face and the requirement to downsize U.S. forces pose as significant challenge to the military as significant as those confronted at the end of World War II. The concept of Strategic Maneuver within the military, accompanied by a focusing process of (areas-to-threats-to-interests-to-resources-to-requirements) using the current organization, will allow a smaller force to operate effectively. The Persian Gulf War proved that the concept of Strategic Maneuver, formed by prioritizing and combining the indivi'ual and unique capabilities of each military services, is the best method to meet the future defense needs. The alternative plan of service reorganization and downsizing within compels the planners to unlearn all of the post-Viet Nam lessons. New mobility concepts such as the C-17's, for more efficient air lifting, and SL-7's for faster shipping cannot by themselves form the mindset needed to maintain efficiency. This paper argues that the wheel does not have to be reinvented in order for a smaller one work as well.							
20 DISTRIBUT	ION / AVAILABI SIFIED/UNLIMIT	LITY OF ABSTRACT	PT. DTIC USERS	21 ABSTRACT SE UNCLASS	CURITY CLASSIFIC	ATION	
228 NAME O	F RESPONSIBLE	INDIVIDUAL ONS DEPARTMEN	Τ	226 TELEPHONE (841-3434	Include Area Code	22c. OFFI	CE SYMBOL C
DD FORM 14	473, 84 MAR	83 API	Redition may be used un	til exhausted	SECURITY	CLASSIFICAT	ION OF THIS PAGE
				00	≜ u	.S. Government	Printing Office: 1985-639-612
			0102-01-014-00	UZ			

Abstract of

U.S. STRATEGIC MANEUVER:

A New World Order Requires Some New Thinking, Not Reorganization

The current changes in the kinds of world threats we face, and the requirement to downsize U.S. forces, pose challenges to the military as significant as those confronted at the end of World War II. The concept of Strategic Maneuver within the military, accompanied by a focusing process of: [areas--> threats--> interests--> resources--> requirements], using the current organizatior, will allow a smaller force to operate effectively. The Persian Gulf War proved that the concept of Strategic Maneuver, formed by prioritizing and combining the individual and unique capabilities of each military service, is the best method to meet future defense needs. The alternative plan of service reorganization and downsizing within compels the planners to unlearn all of the post-Viet Nam lessons. Now mobility concepts, such as the C-17's for more efficient air lifting, and SL-7's for faster shipping, cannot by themselves form the mindset needed to maintain efficiency. This paper argues that the wheel does not have to be reinvented in order for a smaller one to work as well.

i i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTE	R
--------	---

4.

Availationly Colle

BSTR	ACT	i i	
IST	OF TABLES	iv	
IST	OF ILLUSTRATIONS.	v	
I	INTRODUCTION	1	
_	THE CHALLENGE	ī	
		•	
II	WHERE WE WERE	3	
	BIPOLAR WORLD	3	
	WHAT CHANGED	3	
	NEXT MOST LIKELY THREAT	4	
ттт		e	
111	WERE S THE NEW OVERALL REQUIREMENT(0	
	METHODS OF DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS	D ~	
	THREAT-BASED	7	
	INTEREST-BASED	7	
	MIX OF THREAT AND INTEREST	8	
	THREAT AND INTEREST SIMULTANEOUS	9	
	INTEREST PRIOP TO THREAT	9	
	THREAT PRIOR TO INTEREST	10	
	MOST LIKELY LOCATION	10	
	ALREADY IN PLACE	11	
	FORCIBLE ENTRY	12	
	NON-FORCIBLE ENTRY	12	4. 7.
	MOBILITY OPTIONS	13	
	AIR	13	
	SEA	13	
	AIR/SEA MIX	14	
IV	THE USMC AS A COMPOSITE MODEL?	15	Accesion For
	WHAT IS IN PLACE AND PAID FOR	15	NTIS CRASH
	INTEGRATED LOGISTICS	16	DTIC TAR
	COMPOSITE VALUE	19	Unamotineed
	COMPOSITING MODEL	19	Justification
v	A NEW DIRECTION?	21	
	THE CONCEPT TURNED REAL	21	Ву
	WOULD A LARGER FORCE WORK?	$\frac{-}{21}$	Distribution/
	PERSIAN GULF INTERACTION	22	
	SHOULD THE ARMY AND ATR FORCE CHANGE?	24	Availationly Ce
	LESSONS NOT TO LEARN	24 I 0 17	I Avan . e
	LESSONS NOT TO LEARN	21	Dist Special
VI	CONCLUSION	29	
			12-11
NOT	ES	32	
BIB	LIOGRAPHY	30	

LIST OF TABLES

t t

TABLI	E	PAGE
I.	USMC MAGTE SIZING/MOBILITY OPTIONS	16
II.	MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (MEF) EQUIPMENT	18
III.	NOTIONAL AIR FORCE COMPOSITE WING	25

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1 1

FIGUI	RE									I	PAGE
1.	USMC	COMPOSI	TE BUILI	OUP CO	ONCEPT	•••		• • • • • • •			20
2.	U.S.	FORCES	PERSIAN	GULF	BUILDUP,	2	AUG	9017	JAN	91.	23

v

U.S. STRATEGIC MANEUVER:

A New World Order Requires Some New Thinking, Not Reorganization CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE CHALLENGE.

The Strategic Maneuver issues today lie not in how fast can you get there, but in how can a smaller U.S. force remain effective. To answer that question, a top-down approach that redefines the threat, the national interest, and military capabilities is in order. If downsizing of the military were to be driven by only the requirements that we have seen in the Grenada, Panama, and Persian Gulf operations, then all of the services would emulate the operations and activities of the U.S. Marine Corps--the smallest service. The equipment dispersion, integrated logistics, and use of strategic mobility assets that work well on a relatively small scale, and in a limited mission, however, should not be considered as the working model for all services. If all the services were reorganized to function identically, then the strength derived from one service's flexibility, and personified by the other services, would become a weakness.

Strategic Maneuver in this paper is defined as the combination of capability (personnel and equipment) and mobility

(in place, air and sea), with the plans and training to make it work efficiently. For this type of maneuver to operate effectively and efficiently, the organization for movement and organization for combat must be uniform, or the process will be lengthened.

The new world (Soviet & Eastern Europe) and internal (less resources) changes are causing the U.S. to reassess its requirements. The alternatives under consideration must be viewed with the new national interest, goals, and objectives in mind, and within the imposed budget constraints. If a smaller military is to remain formidable enough to deter aggressive military behavior and provide a creditable defense through the projection of power, then a complete top-down rethinking is in order. The threat from the conventional ten-foot-tall Soviet military has diminished,¹ and it is now recognized that a reduction in military forces is required if other national priorities are to be met. How the process should begin, and what the final product should be, is now the challenge.

This challenge lies not in how fast you can get there, but in how fast you can become effective. In the new world or 'er strategic maneuver thinking on the part of the military will be essential if support is to continue for the 'thousand points of light.'

CHAPTER II

WHERE WE WERE

BIPOLAR WORLD.

The bipolar military world which was formed by the U.S. and Soviet forces has been around for 40+ years. During that period it has been relatively easy to keep a numbers count on the threat and a policy that had containment as its goal. Toward that end, the US forces were generally focused on the Fulda Gap in Europe. It was relatively easy to think only in terms of when the next conflict would begin. Even though the US recognized Low-Intensity-Conflict (LIC) and Mid-Intensity-Conflict (MIC) as the most likely, it concentrated on the High-Intensity-Conflict (HIC), which is the most demanding. This was done as an end in itself as well as for the reasoning that if the capability to do a HIC was assured, then any lessor conflict could also be contended with. Policy, strategy, tactics, procurement and training were focused to this end. Goals were simple --contrinment; force sizing was relatively easy --- big; and mobility was defined --- toward Europe.²

WHAT CHANGED.

The biggest change has occurred in the intentions and capabilities of the conventional Soviet threat. The Cold War is considered to be over. The Russians have lost and, primarily for

economic reasons, are downsizing their forces. Their emerging third world (or worse) status is not expected to threaten Europe, and their capability to project communism will be greatly reduced. Without a Soviet arms race to justify our present military size, and because of the current budget deficits, the U.S. military has been directed to make significant cuts.

The containment strategy that won the Cold War against the Soviets does not work at lower levels of conflict by simply scaling back in capability. While we had forces based in Europe during the Cold War, the use of a number of other bases that would have afforded us influence and power projection was being reduced significantly. Since World War II, we have reduced our worldwide presence from 400 foreign bases to 130. It is still easier to relinquish basing rights than to pay the cost (political and monetary) to maintain them. Compounding the situation are the disputes over flight/refueling rights, even for military aircraft transiting to and from bases we currently occupy.³ The change from a containment policy has been wrongly interpreted by the services as a mandate towards a smaller more flexible expeditionary total force for future operations, which concentrates on speed as its measure of effectiveness rather than efficiency.

NEXT MOST LIKELY THREAT.

There were certain benefits to the bipolar Cold War. The Soviets controlled the money and politics in many countries that

will now be "cut loose" to fend for themselves. Some may use their newfound freedom to become "loose cannons," adding to those already out there. With a reduced military, can the U.S. be the world's big brother? Americans may learn to envy the years when there were two big brothers overlooking the emerging countries.

If the likelihood for employing HIC forces against the Soviets is now lessened, then the chances for MIC and LIC are increased and must be planned for. Numerous old possible adversaries come to mind a d many new ones will arise. Emerging technologies/trends will also play a key role.

It can be expected that the mobility to be used by adversaries in future military operations will improve. If they were walking--in the future they will ride; if they were riding-in the future they will fly. In addition, the market for hightechnology arms will continue. Anything that can be purchased, will be. Quantum improvements in the lethality, accuracy, and range of weapons, from small arms to missiles, will be purchased with greater ease. Low-ccst, efficient communications and intelligence capability will close the gap between the have and have-not countries, even if it is simply the purchase of off-theshelf radios, lap-top computers, and watching CNN on T.V. Te capabilities in the Third World countries can improve dramatically at a relatively low cost to them, but the cost for us to operate against, even low volume, sophisticated technology will come at a very high cost.⁴

Before we consider a change in our mobility requirements, we

must lay down new rules for examining our requirements picture in general.

CHAPTER III

WHAT'S THE NEW OVERALL REQUIREMENT?

METHODS OF CETERMINING REQUIREMENTS

Determining how the military will assist in realizing the national goals can be analyzed by several methods. Each method provides a different perspective and a different answer. Each is a process to drive the Strategic Maneuver requirements.

Using either a threat-based and/or an interest-based possibility for modeling the requirements can be illustrated by any one of five different flow diagrams. The methods of evaluation are:

> Threat Only Ir erest Only Threat and Interest Simultaneous Interest Prior to Threat Threat Prior to Interest

Of the two inputs, the threat is more quantifiable than the interest. For the threat, a numbers analysis can be derived from intelligent estimates that allow for a direct capabilities

assessment. Whatever method chosen, it should provide the best in terms of focus for reducing unnecessary cost and should allow for the least amount of uncertainty, thus diminishing the opportunity for surprise.

The conventional threat that is considered should incorporate air, land, and sea components, evaluated both in the perspective of intent as well as capability, in a country-bycountry evaluation. The interest considered should consist of the political, economic, military, social, and psychological not only by country, but also by region.

THREAT-BASED

A pure threat-based requirement model would have the advantage of providing the broadest base of threat capabilities, thereby reducing the chance of an area not being evaluated. It would, however, by itself, prove to be the most difficult to evaluate and focus the resources on.

AREAS

RESOURCES

THREATS

REQUIREMENTS

INTEREST-BASED

A pure interest-based requirements model would be less quantifiable and wore nebulous than threat only. It could, however, focus on the U.S. priorities of interest, in a region or country, that are primarily in the areas of political, military and economic. If used exclusively, however, this method could tend to overlook a threat should there be a low interest level at the time of assessment. As an example, the U.S. interest in Iraq (prior to the invasion of Kuwait) did not dictate the need for a threat assessment on the area that could have disclosed Iraq's diverse capabilities and which would have brought about a watchfulness of those capabilities (which were well known) because the Iraqi intentions (interest) were assumed to be peaceful.



MIX OF THREAT AND INTEREST

It would be easy to conclude that for a determination of requirements, neither a pure threat by itself, nor an interestbased methodology alone would be adequate. Clearly a mixture is in order, but what that combination might be requires study, because different formats produce different answers.

THREAT AND INTEREST SIMULTANEOUSLY

.

A simultaneous assessment of requirements--by threat and interest--would develop two parallel tracts of thought processes, requiring too broad a divergence base from which to re-focus.

REQUIREMENTS

AREAS RESOURCES

INTEREST PRIOR TO THREAT

Using interest to direct a focus for the threat assessment process would reverse the process back to the category of an interest-only limitations format. Interest is not subject to consideration in an evaluation; capabilities or an intent of threat are initially screened out.

	< <u>,</u>			
			<u></u>	
AREAS	INTERESTS	THREATS	RESOURCES	REQUIREMENTS
<u> </u>	!</td <td>Missed Threa</td> <td>ts</td> <td></td>	Missed Threa	ts	

THREAT PRIOR TO INTEREST

Allowing the threat assessment to proceed, the interest provides a method for top-down, graduated focusing. All countries remain in the constant threat assessment loop and are evaluated only when a changed circumstance warrants a full reevaluation. The interest focus can evaluate from a broad base and is more likely not to miss an area of concern in the political, economic, military, social, and psychological screening. This method would allow U.S. economic interest and focus a better opportunity to counter a foreign military change in capabilities. It may not only provide the military with a heads up on the capability which is developing, but may also provide a better, more advanced warning than the other methods. This earlier focus would provide the planners and operators of strategic mobility with a longer lead time for positioning the assets that may be required.

AREAS THREATS INTERESTS RESOURCES REQUIREMENTS

MOST LIKELY LOCATIONS.

There are three general types of location to be monitored, and each requires distinctive maneuver considerations. First, Europe, Central America, the Middle East and Korea are locations

where preposition equipment could be stored for local use or for easy access should rapid movement to another area be necessary. Equipment could be easily moved from one area to another, and airfields and seaports are sufficient and numerous enough to minimize departure bottlenecks.

Second, inland Africa, Russia/China, and inland South America are areas where a host country is required, but no port is available. Airlift would the best method for entering a host nation, or sealift, followed by an overland track.

Third, the coastal countries and island nations. Only a handful of nations in the world do not have their capitals (center of gravity) more than a few hundred miles from a port/coastline. This would lend toward shipping as the primary means of entry, both for ease of off-load presence/massing/strategic surprise, as well as for the most likely location.

ALREADY IN PLACE

Currently, in some areas of the world there are U.S. forces in place that could either stand alone to complete the mission assigned or become the base upon which to augment with additional forces. In the cases of Panama and the Persian Gulf operations, a prime situation for incoming units to use the equipment and infrastructure was already in place. This may or may not be the case in a future conflict, but in-place forces cannot afford to plan and train as if they will be expected to operate in only the

area where they are currently employed.

As an example, the Army personnel and equipment in Korea/Europe or the Marine equipment in Norway must not only stand as a forward deployed presence, but must be capable and ready for easy deployment from that location. To fully optimize all assets, all forward-based personnel and equipment must be deployable for either reinforcing or to stand alone in other areas. The methods of movement and entry then, are the concern.

FORCIBLE ENTRY

If plans require a forcible entry you have the flexibility to change to non-forcible entry should the threat change. The method of movement and entry are dependant on who owns what. At the onset of the conflict, it must be determined, which of the two categories of entry (forcible or non-forcible) is required. The reverse, however, is not true. The two forcible entry methods are amphibious assault and/or parachute assault.

NON-FORCIBLE ENTRY

The mobility options to meet this level of emphasis should be confined to those that offer flexibility, survivability and cost-effectiveness as well as speed. Three types of mobility into a benign environment (non-forcible) off-load area will focus the issues.

MOBILITY OPTIONS

AIR

The first to be considered is primary air option. This option emphasizes delivering most of the personnel and equipment into the Area of Operation (AOA) by aircraft. It's advantages are that only one set of equipment is required and it holds the versatility to move to almost any airfield. Currently, the C-130, C-141, and C-5 are designed to meet this requirement. The current discussion over the Air Forces's C-17 cargo aircraft procurement issues examine how this mobility can be better unitized and optimized. The C-17 is capable of carrying oversize loads (tanks, artillery, APCs) for long distances and into short runways. The disadvantages are the costs for the number of A/C required and the number of airfields that are needed in close proximity. Units being moved should avoid the loss of unit integrity resulting from landing at different airfields, which causes other delays from moving to re-group/re-organize within the AOA to become effective.⁵

SEA

The second option is primary sea mobility. This issue hubs on the rapid availability of shipping during the time of need. Cruise ships would be used to transport personnel, and container vehicle roll-on/roll-off ships for equipment. This would require using an international-size port for off-load. The advantage here

is in needing only one set of equipment--one primary mobility means which can load and launch, and unlike A/C, could delay, hold as presence, or select another port for strategic advantage. The low cost of sealift is another advantage over airlift. The disadvantage lies in the uncertainty of being able to count on commercial contracts with ships for this primary means of military mobility.

In a comparison study by the Army's Military Management and Terminal Services, the 101st Air Mobile Division was lifted 6,000 miles by sea and by air. The sealift required 16 days, while the airlift required 19 days. This is a maximum effort and is played as the only war in town.⁶

During the Desert Shield buildup, over 88% of the gear and equipment arrived via shipping.

AIR/SEA MIX

4

The third option uses dedicated ships with preloaded equipment sailing into port, and troops arriving by commercial air to a nearby airfield. (For perspective, the load carrying value of (12) C-17 A/C are approximately equal to one commercial type RO/RO preloaded and prestaged for the same equipment, over the same time period, delivered over the same distance.) The advantage to using air/sea mix is that the flexibility and efficiency of sealift for heavy items are combined with the responsiveness of airlift for personnel. The disadvantages are the costs for dedicated ships and the two sets of equipment (one training - one prepositioned) that are needed.⁷

CHAPTER IV

THE USMC AS A COMPOSITE MODEL?

Currently the United States Marine Corps (the smallest of the services) uses the integrated logistics and compositing doctrine in the conduct of prepositioning, primary air, primary sea, and air/sea mix to fulfill its expeditionary mobility requirements. The methods of movement to accomplish their mission rely on expending a tremendous amount of energy to ensure maximized flexibility. The question is, would the Army and Air Force better serve the nation if they reorganized and changed their logistic/organizational doctrine and their mobility requirements to that of expeditionary en masse?

WHAT IS ALREADY IN PLACE AND PAID FOR.

Since 1947 the Marine Corps has carried the torch for development of the planning, tactics, training, and procurement type of expeditionary operations where mobility and compositing are required.⁸

The Marines divide expeditionary operations into three categories: contingency, amphibious, and non-amphibious forces. Contingency forces are usually light and quick; strategic air mobility is provided into a secure field by Air Force assets. Amphibious forces, for purposes of forcible entry, include Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC), Marine

Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).

The third operation is non-amphibious. The Maritime Preposition Force (MPF) consists of Maritime Preposition Ships (MPS), which are preloaded/prepositioned ships with personnel, and combat aircraft which arrive by air. The time needed for personnel to fly into (secure field) and marry up with equipment off-loaded in secure port is greatly reduced.⁹

INTEGRATED LOGISTICS

.

The TABLE I shows current Marine mobility, logistics capabilities and size currently provided to the CINCs.

	MEU(SC	DC) MPF	MEB	MEF
Personnel	1-4000	17000	4-17000	20-60000
Days to Deploy	1	10	15	20
Mobility	sea	air&sea	sea	sea
Days of Supply	15	30	30	60

TABLE I

USMC MAGTE SIZING/MOBILITY OPTIONS

Each of these units is a Marine Air Ground Task Force MAGTF consisting of a Command Element (CE), Ground Combat Element (GCE), Air Command Element (ACE) and Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). The internal single service synergism of air ground and support is an effective and strong, flexible component for the maritime strategy. Planning and execution by these units allows for doctrinal compositing at sea, utilizing mixes of these units with strategic shipping and air, toward a highly effective sizing to meet each mission.¹⁰ Table II provides the equipment in a notional MEF that can be composited to meet a specific mission.

AII	RCRAFT/LAUNCHERS	MAJO	DR WEAPONS	MAJ	OR EQUIPMENT
60	AV-8B	70	TANK	9	MED GIR. BRIDGE
48	F/A-18	208	AAV	12	30-TON CRANE
20	A-6E	110	LAV	17	7.5-TON CRANE
6	EA-6B	90	155mm HOW(T)	16	600kGAL FUELSYS
32	CH-53A/D	18	155mm HOW(SP)	392	3-100kW GEN
16	CH-53E	12	8 HOW(SP)	254	5-TON TRUCK
24	AH-1T/W	12	180mm MORTAR	72	5-TON DUMPTRUCK
60	CH-46E	81	60mm MORTAR	19	5-TON WRECKER
24	UH-1N	194	TOW LAUNCHER	89	WATER PURIFY
8	RF - 4B	600	MK 19 40mm	230	FORK LIFT
12	KC-130		GRENADE	39	BULLDOZER
12	OV-10A/D		LAUNCHER	29	ROAD GRADER
16	HAWK LAUNCHER			29	TANKER TRUCK
				53	2.5-TON TRUCK
				28	CONTAINER
					HANDLER(LACH)

,

•

.

- 230 DRAGON WAGON
- 477 LIGHT TRUCK
- 855 ASS. TRAILERS

TABLE II

MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (MEF) EQUIPMENT

COMPOSITE VALUE.

Compositing provides the flexibility to join units of various sizes from the same service, on a rapid basis, to accomplish an assigned mission. The mindset that compositing creates is as valuable and necessary to the execution of an operation as is the physical conduct in that effort. The process is difficult because the doctrine that folds units into one, also causes seniority problems as well as personnel and equipment headaches. Planning and practice are essential if the process is to proceed smoothly and quickly.

COMPOSITING MODEL.

The real flexibility (Figure 1) lies in the capability to composite forces even during different stage of an operation, for the execution of specific missions. Using the strength and efficiency which is derived from being able to tailor a unit to a mission, overcomes the weakness normally associated with small, flexible units. Prior to the Persian Gulf War the Marine Corps did train in this process, but cost constraints prohibited a large-scale practical apolication that would have proven its worth. On paper, a deployed MEU(SOC) can do pre-assault operations while the MEB or MEF are in transit to the AOA. The MPS can follow to either augment or provide supplies to a unit already in place.







CHAPTER V

A NEW DIRECTION?

THE CONCEPT TURNED REAL

On the 2nd of August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The U.S. responded to that event with an operation the size and speed of which would never have been funded had it been an exercise to validate the compositing concept. Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield not only proved the value of some units being able to best serve by compositing (Marine MAGTF and Navy Carrier Air Wing [CAW]), but also the value of mass and concentration (Army and Air Force) to the success of a conflict.

The Marine Corps put into operation MAGTFs and mobility that validated compositing. The largest movement, 60,000+ personnel, including equipment using all modes of tactical, operational, and strategic mobility was transported to one of the farthest locations ever planned and into the harshest environment imaginable, proving that the theory worked.¹¹

What operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm validated was the concept of rapid mobility aimed toward efficiency, and a new capability for Strategic Maneuver was born; a joint and combined operation that confirmed the concepts that surprised all of the neasayers who believed the U.S. not only didn't need the capability, but that it couldn't be made to work.

WOULD A LARGE FORCE WORK? .

Prior to the Persian Gulf War buildup, many arguments could

have been posed against the possibility that even a large Marine MAGTF could be effectively formed, or that the concept could be used in a joint or combined operation. With the lessons learned from the Gulf buildup, and using that operation as a yard-stick, not only can the doctrine of compositing and integrated logistics be validated, but also the integration of the Army and Air Force on a large scale. Strategic maneuver was planned and executed in a rapid and controlled manner that required the use of the composite, joint and combined process.

PERSIAN GULF INTERACTION

During the Persian Gulf War each service used its forte to form the integrated force necessary. Army Airborne Forces, true to their mission and capability, were the first on the ground in the region. This not only demonstrated the U.S. resolve, it also began the buildup that would quickly become an offensive force of over 540,000 personel and 35,000,000 SQ. FT. of equipment.

The airborne forces were quickly followed by the Marines, with both amphibious capability and MPS equipment and by personnel who were flown into the area. The full weight of the Army and Air Force were put in place to form the bedrock of a complete and integrated force.

Figure 2 depicts how the different service capabilities were prioritized, summed and integrated into the area of operation in a procedure that used the individual service strengths to meet the mission requirements.¹²



.

SHOULD THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE CHANGE?

If the expeditionary concept of logistics and compositing worked so well for the MAGTF during Desert Shield-Desert Storm, and if the mobility assets can be mixed to meet a varying scenario, then why shouldn't all of the services adapt to the change?

The Army believes that there is a need to change the balance of armor, light and special forces to underscore rapid deployability and force projection. The reorganization of individual Army units into a structure toward that resembling the present day Marine units, as well as an increase in the percentage of light divisions in the active force is viewed as the improvements needed to improve flexibility.¹³

Likewise, the Air Force is considering plans to make air wings more divergent and non-specialized, with the intent of becoming more flexible and responsive. The composite wing concept, as described by the Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. McPeak, would be a mix of aircraft types providing a variance of missions (Table III). The primary advantage that the Air Force expects to derive from the composite wing is elimination of the one-wing training exercise planning problems that result from their Sand Eagle, Red Flag, and Cope Thunder exercises.¹⁴

Capability		Aircraft
Multi-Role	24	F-16C
Night/Under Weather Attack	12	F-16C Lantern
Long Range/Precision Guided Munitions	12	F-15E
Air Superiority	24	F-15C
Air Refueling	6	KC-135R
Surveillance/Control	3	E-3

Table III

NOTIONAL AIR FORCE COMPOSITE WING

The flaw in the Army and Air Force compositing plans is in their disregard for the fundamental difference between how a unit exercises and how it fights. The Marine Corps MAGTF and the Navy CAW must be able to operate as an autonomous unit and go in harms way as one MAGTF or CVG with the same ease that it integrates into a Joint or Combined operation. The Army and Air Force may exercise as one division or one wing, but will fight as part of a multi-division/wing operation. The compositing of the Army Division or Air Force Wing, in order to exercise problems, will in combat, require more of a day-by-day reorganization in order to re-mass the assets from the composite to complete the normal size mission. As an example, a normal size mission or operation that requires two or more squadrons to be complete, would now be required to draw upon the assets from more than one wing in order to have enough assets (a re-composite).

To be effective, the size of the operation normally envisioned when the Army and Air Force are included requires a compositing of assets from divisions and wings with enough similar capabilities.

The current non-composite organization does seem to counter the adage that 'you must train the way that you fight'; but the answer for the Army and the Air Force must be to train in larger size if they are to overcome the requirement to composite which obliges having a little of everything for the exercise. The Marine Air Wing that supports a Marine Division or a Navy Carrier Air Wing must train, move, and fight as a composite organization which is task-organized to meet the mission during either an exercise or operation.

The integration worked in the Persian Gulf because each service gave what it did best to the effort. The Marine Corps' flexible integration arrived early in the AOA, while the Army and the Air Force supplied backbone support for rounding out the capability in the depth required.

The concept of mobility and integration worked well because each service concentrated on its particular forte. Supergism works when a variety of capabilities work together for the overall mission. If all the services conclude that the most effective way to operate is by reconstructing themselves into multipurpose flexible units, then flexibility, once persorified, becomes a weakness.

The term "purple force" is military jargon used to indicate

a mixture of services that complement each to complete a mission. A single service that is "entirely" purple (attempts to be all things to all people) risks not being able to do anything well.

The Marine Corps MAGTF niche for flexibility can be accomplished only when combined with the bedrock quality of the Navy and Air Force for massed strategic mobility, and with the Army for massed or long operations.

If the characteristics of the services were more closely aligned, despite (Army and Air Force) improvements in speed and flexibility, the overall effectiveness would be inherently flawed.

LESSONS NOT TO LEARN

The lesson common to the last three conflicts (Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War) appears to be that rapid flexible forces, even if efficiency is lost, work best. The operations were successful, but each contained some very advantageous conditions that did not require the efficiency of the operation to be fully tested. In Grenada the forcible entry and subsequent operation was conducted against a very small and undetermined force that had neither the capability nor the intent for sustained combat.

The Panama operation permitted U.S. forces to fall in on units and infrastructure which were already in place and did not have a strong will to resist.

The Desert Shield/Storm operation was a non-forcible entry

into an area that contained some of the best port, airfield, trafficability, and fuel-independent locations in the world.

To consider these operations as the stereotypes for all future operations would allow the tooth-to-tail sustainability issues and organizational flexibilities to be out of sync. Many very different "lessons learned" would have come to light if a forcible entry followed by sustained combat on a long-term basis had occurred.

There is little doubt that quick, decisive maneuver warfare has the opportunity for great success. But if it stalls or is put to the test, bedrock strengths derived from deep capabilities are what that will allow the operation to regroup and regain the initiative.

Flexibility can be accomplished only when it is formed around a steady backbone. The 100-hour offensive ground operation of Desert Storm was founded on the strength derived from the differences in strategic and operational capability--not from sameness.

The Persian Gulf success should not prescribe another military reorganization toward service sameness in the name of jointness.

A reduction in size--as all of the services have been told to accomplish--and a self-imposed reorganization to improve the tooth-to-logistics tail, is an unnecessary and short-sighted approach to cost savings. This requirement is driven solely by the need to save money, not from what the services have learned

and applied since Viet Nam has been found to be flawed.

The proposed cutbacks and reorganization to meet future commitments lends itself toward moving backward rather than forward.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The down-sizing of the U.S. military is inevitable. The proper operational-tactical, and strategic mobility method, combined with jointness, is the best way to accomplish the expeditionary capability needed to form Strategic Maneuver. Determining which methods work best in varying situations, and practice, will allow the remaining forces to offer the most that they can give, with the least they are allowed. The terms of joint and combined can most effectively be used if the individual services know their job, do their job, and don't try to do someone else's job.

The new world order can be best supported by a downsized military if Strategic Maneuver becomes the new way of thinking.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

′.

- Avella, J.R., Capt. USNR, "It's the "M" Word---MOBILIZATION." <u>U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings</u>. January 1991, PP. 41-44. Bush, George. "Remarks by the President at the Address to the Aspen Institute Symposium." Aspen, Co: The Aspen Institute, 2 August 1990.
- Butler, George L. "Speech to the Center for Defense Journalism." Washington D.C.: The National Press Club, 27 September 1990. Cheney, Dick. "Remarks to the International Institute for Strategic Studies". Hot Springs, Va: The Homestead, 6 September 1990.
- Evans, David, LtCol. USMC (Ret.). "From the Gulf." U.S Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1991, pp. 77-80.
- Garrett, Lawrence H., Secretary of the Navy, and Kelso II, Frank B., Adm. USN, Chief of Naval Operations, and Gray, A.M., Gen. USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, "The Way Ahead." U.S. Naval Institute <u>Proceedings</u>, April 1991, pp. 36-47.
- McPeak, Merrill A. Gen. USAF. Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. "For the Composite Wing." <u>Air Power Journal</u>, Fall 1990, pp.4-11.
- Nash, Nathaniel. 'In Budget Move, Pentagon Plans Closing and Cuts for 150 Sites.' <u>The New York Times</u>, 19 September 1990, p. A26.
- Johnson, H. T. Gen. USAF. USCINCTRANS. "An Address." Lecture U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 29 April 1991.
- Parker, Maynard. 'Baghads' Bully.' <u>Newsweek</u>, 13 August 1990, pp. 16-21.
- Powell, Colin L. "Remarks at National Convention of VFW." Baltimore, Md: 23 August 1990.
- Sullivan, John J. Col. USMC. 'How Military Reform Helped Win the War,' <u>The Providence Journal-Bulletin</u>, 26 March 1991, p. A-11.
- U.S. Congressional Budget Office. <u>Improving Strategic Mobility:</u> <u>The C-17 Program and Alternatives</u>. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., September 1990.
- U.S. Department of the Air Force. <u>The United States Air Force</u> <u>Report to the 101st Congress of the United States of</u> <u>America</u>. Washington: Govt.print. Off., 1991.

U.S. Department of the Army. <u>The United States Army Posture</u> Statement FY91. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1991.

1. 9

- U.S. Department of the Navy. <u>Report to the Congress Fy 1991</u>. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1991.
- U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration. <u>Maritime Administration Emergency Operations, Operations</u> <u>Plan 001A</u>. Washington: Govt.Print. Off., September 1990.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. <u>1990 Joint Military Net Assessment</u>. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 20 January 1990.
- U.S. Marine Corps. <u>Annual Report to Congress, Gen. A.M. Gray,</u> <u>Commandant of the Marine Corps 1990</u>. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1990.
- U.S. Marine Corps. <u>Concepts and Issues 1990</u>. Washington: Govt. Print.Off., 1990.
- U.S. President. <u>National Security Strategy of the United States</u>. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., March 1990.
- Vuono, Carl E. Gen. USA, Chief of Staff, USA. "The U.S. Army in the 1990's." <u>Army 1990-91 Green Book</u>, October 1990, pp. 18-28.

END NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. •

1. U.S. President, <u>National Security Strategy of the United</u> <u>States</u>, March 1990, White House, pp. 3-14.

CHAPTER II

2. Ibid., p. 25.

3. Nathaniel Nash, 'In Budget Move, Pentagon Plans Closing and Cuts for 150 Sites,' <u>The NewYork Times</u>, 19 September 1990, p. A26

4. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>1990 Joint Military Net</u> <u>Assessment</u>, 20 January 1990, pp. VI-1--VI-28.

CHAPTER III

5. Congressional Budget Office, <u>Improving Strategic Mobility: The</u> <u>C-17 Program and Alternatives</u>, September 1986, pp. IV-XVII.

6. US Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, <u>Maritime Administration EmergencyOperations</u>, <u>Operations Plan001A</u>, September 1990, pp. 501-640.

7. United States Marine Corps, <u>Concepts and Issues 1990</u>, pp. 5-2, 5-3.

CHAPTER IV

8. USMarine Corps, <u>Annual Report to theCongress, Gen. A.M.</u> <u>Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps 1990</u>, p. 5.

9. Ibid., pp.5-8.

10. U.S. Marine Corps, <u>Concepts and Issues 1990</u>, 1990. pp. 1-7--1-9.

CHAPTER V

11. Maynard Parker, ed., 'Baghdads' Bully,' <u>Newsweek</u>, 13 August 1990, pp. 16-21.

12. H.T. Johnston, Gen. USAF, USCINCTRANS, "AnAddress," U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI: 29 April 1991.

13. Carl E. Vuono, The U.S. Army in the 1990's. <u>Army 1990-</u> <u>91 Green Book</u>, October 1990, pp. 18-28. 14. McPeak, M.A. 'For the Composite Wing,' <u>Air Power</u> Journal, Fall 90, pp. 4-9.

. •