MILITARY DIPLOMACY
IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

BY

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by
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MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

"Diplomacy without arms is music without instruments."
--Frederick the Great

I. Introduction

History Rewritten: July 1990

Continuing a war of words between Baghdad and Kuwait, Saddam Hussein issued a stinging speech on 17 July 1990 in which he reiterated demands that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates cease exceeding oil production quotas. Saddam's televised address was full of threats to bring the "nineteenth province" back in line.

At MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, the J-2, Intelligence Directorate of the U.S. Central Command alerted on the Iraqi leader's words. They had established an "Iraqi Warning Problem" in mid-March when certain Iraqi actions gave cause for added monitoring. Over the months following, indications and warnings increasingly pointed to the use of military force against Kuwait. At issue for the United States were continued access to Arabian Peninsula oil at market prices and regional stability. Saddam's verbal threats toward Kuwait and his military capabilities to invade that country and seize Saudi Arabian oil facilities held a knife at the throat of the world's oil dependent economies.

In communications between U.S. Central Command and the Pentagon, the Iraqi situation was described as grave. Though indications were not crystal clear, the common consensus was that Iraq would take military action against Kuwait and probably Saudi Arabia. It was not known exactly when; however, estimates were
that, unless Kuwait capitulated to Iraqi demands, military forces could be mobilized for action in one to two weeks. The Chairman, JCS, General Colin Powell, and the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, were in agreement that the Iraqi situation had reached a critical stage. A special session of the National Security Council, chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle, would meet the following morning.

From a wide spectrum of options exercising all elements of U.S. national power, the NSC recommended a broad diplomatic front to dissuade an Iraqi military invasion of the Arabian Peninsula. The key to this effort would be strong signals sent to Baghdad—clear signals. Using the current rapprochement between the U.S. and USSR, an informational and diplomatic effort would be developed between Washington, Moscow, and Baghdad.

Washington would press for access to basing rights for major deployments to Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Once basing and overflight rights were secured, three tactical fighter squadrons would deploy for "exercises" to Turkey, another three to Saudi Arabia, and two more to Cairo. Accompanying the TFSs would be supporting KC-130 refuelers, and a total of six E-3 (AWACS) aircraft. Another exercise involving Army airborne and Navy/Marine amphibious forces would be scheduled and conducted in Kuwait within two weeks. In addition to the U.S. Navy ships conducting escort duties of re-flagged Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, the *USS Eisenhower, CVN-69*, currently deployed in the Indian Ocean, would be ordered to the Gulf. The *Eisenhower*
with its complement of over 90 aircraft would arrive on station in five days. An Amphibious Ready Group with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) embarked, would sail from the Philippine Islands to be in the Gulf in two weeks. A second ARG/MEU(SOC) would be ordered to the eastern Mediterranean Sea as would the Independence, CV-62, battle group. Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2, home ported in Diego Garcia, would sail for the Persian Gulf—estimated arrival in eight days. This series of deployments would be made public by Department of Defense personnel.

Secretary of State Baker would also send a cable to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, for passing to President Hussein. The message: the U.S. would view any attack against the sovereignty of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia as an attack on its vital interests for which the U.S. is prepared to respond by all reasonable means to include military force; further, the U.S. is prepared to use its offices, either openly or through quiet diplomacy, to assist in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute on oil production and marketing policies.

One week later, the President will consult with Congressional leaders and address the nation. His purpose will be to comment on the growing danger of renewed conflict in Southwest Asia, reaffirm the Carter Doctrine regarding U.S. vital interests in the region, and announce the show-of-force military deployments in support of U.S.-USSR diplomatic efforts.
With the above actions taken, it is now near the end of July. Saddam Hussein is perplexed by the developments facing him. He views the array of diplomatic efforts and military forces as formidable. He believes the U.S. is serious. He faces diplomatic arm-twisting by Moscow as well. As a result, Hussein would attend the Jeddah oil minister's conference on 26 July where he would blast Kuwaiti practices—and demand they talk.

In the ensuing months, negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait continued. Agreements were made, payments made to Iraq in the form of domestic assistance, and U.S. forces in the region began to redeploy. There was no battle.

Thesis

In the above scenario of re-written history, military and naval forces were used, short of war, to reinforce diplomatic and political efforts. Such actions do not always end in ultimate success. They may merely buy time to allow a necessary political solution to a crisis. They may fail totally and result in violent conflict. They are, however, part of our past, present and future.

The thesis of this paper is that in the New World Order as articulated in President Bush's Aspen Institute speech of August 2, 1990, coercive and cooperative military influence—especially that which will be defined as military diplomacy—has a continuing place in the exercise of United States global leadership. Military diplomacy will be defined in terms of
historical data. The altered security environment of the post-
Cold War will be examined as it impacts dramatically on the
potential for use of U.S. military diplomacy. How this tool of
diplomacy can be used in the current "adaptive planning"
construct as established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff will also be examined. The merits and strengths of each
service in the military diplomacy arena will be reviewed.
Finally, the future utility of military diplomacy in the New
World Order will be forecast.

The general conclusion is that traditional use of military
diplomacy—either in a cooperative or coercive form—will
continue to have great utility in the New World Order. However,
a reduced military force structure beyond the proposed base force
will impact negatively on the ability to employ this foreign
policy instrument in a consistent, global manner.

II. Concepts and Definitions

There are several partly overlapping terms and concepts
relating to this discussion. This section seeks to define and
distinguish them. A prudent point of departure is to determine
what limited military diplomacy is and what it is not. This is
not a futile exercise, for various terms and phrases have been
and are in current use. For example, coercive diplomacy relates
to an antagonist and involves two forms: deterrence and
compellence. In deterrence, the goal is to deter the target from
an undesired action or from stopping a desired action. In
compellence, the goal is to compel the target to do or to stop doing something. A second aspect of military use which relates to supporting a non-antagonist is that of cooperative employment. Two modes under cooperative diplomacy supporting a non-antagonist are: (1) to assure a second target so that it will continue to do or not to do something; or (2) to induce a second target to or to stop doing something. One additional form of military use is categorized as latent or catalytic wherein forces are not directly nor indirectly used—they are poised for contemplated use only.

The following is a review of candidate definitions for coercive, military, and naval diplomacy from several noted sources. The list of sources is by no means exhaustive.

Blechman and Kaplan, in their oft-cited study, Force Without War, address the question of the application of discreet U.S. political use of the armed forces. They offer the following:

A political use of armed force occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.

Naval diplomacy—often referred to as gunboat diplomacy—has been used as an effective tool by maritime powers, large and small. It principally focuses on deterrence and coercion. The subject is treated extensively in James Cable’s seminal work, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979. Noting that gunboat diplomacy is the application of "limited naval force as one of the instruments
of foreign policy," Cable rejects the broader connotation of gunboat diplomacy as the use of any form of military power short of war by one state to influence the behavior of another. Rather, he offers a purer form of the definition which deals uniquely with naval power. However, the principles apply across the spectrum of military power—though each service has its own strengths. Cable characterized coercive diplomacy as a bounded instrument and excludes the condition of war. It may be as limited as the mere show of force only reminding the victim that the other party owns a navy. Such an articulation may imply the threat of force, however discreet. The upper boundary is something short of an act of war. Instead, it is "an alternative to war" that, if it leads to war, has failed. Further, it may be doubted that such a failed move was deserving of the term coercive diplomacy. Cable, extrapolating coercive diplomacy to limited naval force, offered this definition of gunboat diplomacy:

Gunboat diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or jurisdiction of their own state [italics added].

Continuing the focus on the naval component of the armed forces, Dismukes and McConnell applied the concept of Blechman and Kaplan as follows:

Naval diplomacy is the employment of naval power directly in the service of foreign policy. Like all forms of diplomacy it is intended to influence the thoughts and actions of foreign decision-makers. It can be practiced in cooperative ways—by employing
naval forces to make goodwill port visits or to furnish humanitarian or technical assistance. But it has been of far greater consequence (though less frequently encountered) in its coercive forms, when naval forces are used to threaten, or impose, violent sanctions.

Another source, FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, defines the same concept in what it refers to as political reinforcement operations:

...those military actions undertaken under Executive authority, wherein military support and/or military operations are combined with diplomatic action to protect U.S. lives, property, or interests in foreign countries. Political reinforcement may vary from military assistance (training, equipment transfer) to simple demonstrative operations to military intervention in the fullest sense, short of war [italics added].

These definitions and concepts share the following stated or implied themes: (1) the activity of military forces is intended to influence behavior; (2) there is a broad spectrum of activity that qualifies as military diplomacy; (3) the lower limit of that spectrum of activity is benign in nature; and (4) the upper limit of that spectrum falls short of war but can include violence.

All of this points to a delicate balance between force and violence. The best balance would create a fait accompli, and the reasonable victim would not be forced or be able to respond with tit-for-tat escalation. Further, the force applied should be limited in nature. Cable, noting that the victim may well view the force quite differently in scope than the wielder of the force, suggests four conditions to determine if a force is limited. In summary, they are:
- The act or threat of force has a purpose apparent to both parties;
- The purpose of the party applying or threatening to apply force must be recognized as both limited and tolerable;
- The force employed must be recognized as capable of achieving its specific purpose; and
- Following an application of force resulting in some damages and/or victims, it should be clearly established that the force employed is actually limited with respect to that available to the applying party.9

Thomas Schelling provides a well developed thesis on the variances between coercive force, deterrence and compellence. He states that coercive force has an aspect of "hurting" the enemy—either by the application of limited force backed by yet more force potential or by threatening the use of force by actions and words. Deterrence is a contingent threat. If deterrence fails and conflict ensues, the diplomatic control of the military efforts may include the threat to use or the actual application of violence, i.e., compellence. Compellence requires a threatened use of force after a set time limit or period of warning. It is the business of making somebody perform. Schelling asserts that "compellence...usually involves initiating an action...that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds. The overt act, the first step, is up to the side that takes the compellent threat [Schelling's italics]."16 Thus, to be credible, "the compellent threat has to be put in motion...and then the victim must yield [Schelliing's italics]."17 Nonetheless, Schelling concludes that "[d]eterrence will go on
being our main business, compellence the exception." Shultz and Pfaltzgraff, noting the work of Schelling, summarize that "[t]he purpose of compellence is to employ military power to affect an adversary's behavior in the following ways: (1) halt an activity that is under way, (2) undo a deed already accomplished, or (3) initiate an action that is undesirable."3

Based on the above discussion and for the purposes of this study, the following composite definition of military diplomacy is chosen:

Military diplomacy is the employment of military power actively in the service of national interest with the intent to influence the thoughts and actions of foreign decisionmakers. It can be practiced in the benign cooperative form and in coercive forms short of war, when military forces are used to threaten, or impose violent sanctions, without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.14

Thus, military diplomacy has as its overarching goal the purpose of assisting political ends while deterring escalation of a situation beyond the brink of war. To restate Cable, should the exercise of military diplomacy fail and a crisis escalate to war, then the military diplomacy failed.15

III. ALTERED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Almost without exception, articles in current literature dealing with the global security environment begin with the notion of change. Clearly, there has been change. America and its allies have won three major events this century--two world wars and a hard fought Cold War. That the United States today
remains the only "full service" superpower is an established fact. That is, the U.S. is the only power which can claim superpower status in the areas of economic, diplomatic/political, and military influence. The demise of the Warsaw Pact and collapse of the Soviet Union ended forty plus years of bipolarism between the East and West. In place of the Cold War era is a yet undefined period. The evolving era does have character. It is multipolar. It is uncertain.

While the tectonic plates of the security environment are shifting and point to fundamental change, it remains that "the efficacy of military power remains the final arbiter when states disagree." Or, as noted by Clausewitz, the resort to military power will remain an instrument of statecraft.

The New World Order is full of mixed signals. The demise of communism is not necessarily a global victory for democracy or even democratic principles. Instead, there is a movement to cash in on the so called "peace dividend," implying an inward focused U.S. foreign policy. Regional leaders of the world, however, seek continued U.S. involvement as a "grand facilitator" or "honest broker." Amid this uncertainty, the world remains a dangerous place. For example, on the very day President George Bush articulated his vision of a New World Order spelling out security challenges and hopes, the first major post Cold War conflict began when Iraq invaded its southern neighbor, Kuwait, and threatened to dominate Arabian Peninsula oil resources. Iraq’s actions probably resulted from misreading U.S. intentions.
In turn, the U.S. response in Desert Shield and Desert Storm may have resulted partly from misreading Iraq’s goals and intentions. A year later, the Soviet Union ceased to exist and ended its 70-year experiment in communism. A new experiment in government began with the first real election of a national leader in Russian history, but the outcome remains unclear. Current prospects for Russian democracy seem less than bright.

This does not make the security landscape clear of dangers. Indeed, the global glue of the bipolar Cold War which generally held in check historic ethnic, religious and nationalistic enmities is gone. As President Bush put it, "Although the forces of integration are stronger than ever, new and in some cases dormant forces of fragmentation have also been unleashed." Couple this with forecast trends which impact on the national security environment, and the future takes on an additional coat of gloom. By 2025, for example, the world’s population will reach ten billion people—almost double the current population. Unless great international efforts cause change, 90 percent of the population will live in lesser-developed countries. This represents an increase from the current figure of 84 percent. Up to 25 percent of the world’s population will go hungry each day. The obvious result will be intense strain on fragile Third World economies, infrastructures, and political systems. Adding to the burden will be increased competition for scarce natural resources including oil and fresh water.
The net result may be what Seyom Brown has called a drift toward "polyarchy." He defines polyarchy as "a many-communitied globe host to 'multiple spheres of influence; hegemonic imperiums; interdependencies; nationalisms; and transstate religious, ethnic, and ideological affinities,' some overlapping, some concentric, and some in conflict with each other."\(^1\)

The polyarchic strategic environment is inherently ambiguous, historically projecting two directions—one benign and one dangerous. The benign model is a world in which:

multiple bargaining activities...would characterize relations between so many power centers [and] would tend to reinforce the incentives upon each center to moderate its exertion of coercive influence—most importantly, of violence—upon others so as to avoid losing chips that will be needed in other, simultaneous bargaining situations where the object of the influence may be needed as an ally.\(^2\)

The other, more dangerous variant of polyarchy can be termed the "warlord phenomenon." There, "independent capacity for physical coercion becomes the sole measure of power center efficacy. [As a result,]... incentives to acquire advanced arms and engage in lawless behavior (e.g., state terrorism) become irresistible."\(^27\)

This ambiguous, ambivalent world defines three plausible policy options for the U.S., according to Brown. One is passive, pragmatic adaptation as polyarchy pulls apart postwar alliances and institutions. A second attempts to restore the Cold War consensus. A third, "creative adaptation," is preferred and involves shaping a "New World Order" to replace the postwar version. Creative adaptation requires an overt strategy to reduce the degree of militarism and to maintain free access to
compete on a global economic scale. It tries to adapt postwar institutions and national roles to the new geopolitical realities, based on the premise that many of our traditional definitions and reflexes are obsolete. The combination of a polyarchic world and U.S. superpower status poses a significant challenge for U.S. national leaders.

The New World Order--the Good, the Bad and the Ugly

The Bush administration accepted the above view with refinement. In his parting document on security strategy, President Bush observed that "the future is uncertain, and...that the world needs the leadership that only America can provide." Even more significant than his words was his commitment of U.S. forces under United Nations charter to humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. At the same time, he pushed for European solutions to European problems, especially at the lower end of the conflict spectrum as in the Bosnia-Herzegovia crisis. This combination of actions represented a strong effort to create a New World Order agenda based on what Andrew Goldberg called "selective engagement."

Noting that the "world is...depressingly messy and hard to lead," Goldberg believes the U.S. leadership role falls between a "good" world, in which the U.S. is the global scout troop leader, and an "ugly" world. The draft 1992 Defense Planning Guidance reflected a presumption of this "ugly" world in which emerging centers of power in Europe and Asia may challenge the
U.S. and, in fact, wish to harm the United States. In this realistic, albeit worst case scenario, U.S. leadership must maintain a robust U.S. military establishment and presence that can totally dominate those emergent power centers. The problem with working from this posture is that it requires sustained economic growth and sense of purpose currently absent in the United States.

Thus, in a likely "bad" world--between the "good" and the "ugly"--selective engagement offers a middle path between collective engagement and unilateral actions. The proposed policy has three key elements. First, the U.S. must adopt a foreign policy that nurtures "a relative equilibrium of power among the major states in Europe and in Asia." This gives the U.S. a role reminiscent of eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain--that of an honest broker of interests in a political system where "there are no longer significant ideological divisions nor clearly apparent friends or foes." Second, the U.S. should avail itself of international organizations and coalitions, whenever possible, to solve security problems while avoiding most permanent military commitments and taking "a more flexible, case-by-case approach to situations where there is no immediate threat to its safety." Finally, the U.S. should limit its own expectations. The U.S. should not hope to persuade others to rely solely on its military power. Rather, others should expand their own military capabilities creating new military powers. Under this policy and in its own interests,
the U.S. must maximize efficiency of forces and innovative
technologies to keep a comparative security advantage.

America as the Grand Facilitator--The Military Strategy

Another author, Alberto Coll, notes that "U.S. efforts to
forge a 'new world order' will be challenged by powerful forces
pulling the international system toward greater decentralization
and anarchy." Specifically, Coll calls for the U.S. to lead as
the "grand facilitator" and notes that the challenge:

is to face those myriad instabilities with balance,
creativity, and clear-headedness, mediating where
Americans can play a constructive role, containing or
easing threat where appropriate, and prudently ignoring
those that can do them no harm. In this pursuit, U.S.
political and economic diplomacy must be preeminent,
with American military power playing a supporting but
nonetheless important role. In concert with other
states, the United States can provide settlements that
would otherwise be impossible. It can help selected
friendly governments ameliorate some sources of
instability by providing humanitarian, infrastructure,
and military assistance. And, when instability
generates a sufficiently serious threat to American
interests, U.S. military power can be used to deter and
contain it [italics added].

This observation is consistent with the current national
military strategy forged from setting aside the Cold War, Soviet
based strategy. The military strategy is a well-developed,
reasoned approach and is centered on President Bush's "peacetime
engagement" role for the U.S. as fleshed out by Secretary of
Defense Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Powell. It has four key elements: strategic deterrence and
defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution."
With regard to strategic deterrence and defense, the new strategy expands the traditional focus on deterring nuclear war to include slowing the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction while developing defenses against them. The rapid spread of ballistic missile technology will give rise to the design and deployment of limited anti-ballistic missile defenses. This development will take into account the likelihood that some ballistic missiles will be launched accidentally or intentionally, or used to blackmail America and its allies.

The last key element of the strategy, reconstitution, focuses on maintenance of America’s capability to rearm in the face of a emergent global threat. The current strategy has put aside the global base case family of contingency plans. Reconstruction is a hedge against the unlikely event of a future threatening military superpower—providing that selected existing industrial and military capabilities should be nurtured and new ones developed. Additionally, the U.S. will invest in areas of technology to maintain leads in fields such as space, military research and development, intelligence, quality of military personnel, and special operations forces.3

The second and third key elements of the military strategy—forward presence and crisis response—are integral to military diplomacy. In these foundational areas, military diplomacy serves the nation to protect its interests, deter threats,
maintain international order, and prepare the footings to apply decisive force, if necessary.

Forward presence recognizes that, as a "island nation" dependent on global economics and military ties, the U.S. must maintain a degree of military presence in areas important to national interests. This requirement as not diminished in the aftermath of the Cold War. Despite large cuts planned in U.S. forces and the closure of numerous overseas bases, forward presence will continue to play an integral part in the emerging security environment. It will include smaller deployments of forces in Europe and East Asia, training exercises with foreign forces, military exchanges, security assistance, access agreements, and the prepositioning of equipment. The National Security Strategy envisions forward presence as:

redefining our presence abroad with combined exercises, new access and storage agreements, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, military-to-military contacts, and periodic and rotational deployments. Our forward presence forces and operations lend credibility to our alliances and ensure the perception that a collective response awaits any threat to our interests or to those of our allies.39

In the New World Order, emphasis must be placed on the ability to respond to selected areas of special interest to the United States. The key to executing will be putting the proper combination of forces where and when required to influence diplomatic efforts. In this regard, President Clinton’s continued emphasis of the Bush administration’s efforts to enhance strategic lift and intelligence architecture appears fundamentally sound.40
Better intelligence capabilities will allow decisionmakers to apply appropriate and timely orchestration of national power in crisis response, the third key strategic element. Forward deployed and presence forces are, obviously, useful in crisis response if they are properly located. Backing up these forces will be those stationed in the U.S. or other foreign regions. The time-distance factor involving the movement these reinforcing and augmenting forces—or, power projection and strategic agility—is critical. If the U.S. is to respond effectively where its global interests are threatened, a significantly more robust strategic lift structure is required. How military planners tailor contingency plans within the realities of such issues as the time-distance factor and to support diplomatic efforts short of war will be discussed in the following section.

IV. THE MILITARY ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

The utility of military power is an historic fact. It is also reality that, unless a major global threat emerges, the future force structure of the U.S. will be reduced at least 25 percent of its peak levels of the Reagan-Bush era. Utility of this smaller, fiscally constrained force into the coming century will be based essentially on the constructs established by the end of the Cold War. Amid this change will be a re-definition of service roles and missions based on the Unified Command Plan and warfighting commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands (CINCs). While uncertainty remains, so does the
absolute requirement to execute the National Security and National Military Strategies. Those fundamental foundations--previously described as strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution--have not been either rebuffed or endorsed by the new Clinton administration. Though a formal defense policy has not been articulated by President Clinton, there are enough statements available from the 1992 Presidential campaign and in the early period of the new presidency to conclude basic continuity with the path initiated under the Bush administration. For example, in a pre-election comment, Les Aspin claimed "Clinton’s program starts with the cold-eyed, correct premise that 'power is the basis for successful diplomacy, and military power has always been fundamental to international relationships.'" The critical difference between the two administrations may be related to how much forward presence the restructured and reshaped U.S. military can muster.

**Regional Focus and Adaptive Planning**

Military planning in the aftermath of the Cold War recognizes the basic shift from global to regional concerns, the reality of force requirements and capabilities, as well as the requirement to plan for uncertainty. Military planners continue to emphasize the collective strength of national power elements in a process described as adaptive planning.
The Case for Adaptive Planning

As historical fact, a state has many means at its disposal to obtain objects abroad. These include personal diplomacy, alliances, trade, aid, cultural and scientific exchanges, emigration and migration policies, other domestic policies, covert activities, and use of the military. Adaptive planning recognizes continued U.S. involvement on a global scale but with fewer total forces. As such, greater emphasis is placed on planning flexibility, training and employment. Especially important will be continued enhancement of technological superiority and quality people.

In the diverse, "rapidly changing international environment, the precise time, location, and nature of the threat will always be uncertain." Adaptive planning specifically points to a concern about warning time, or available response time, for future contingencies. The uncertain nature of regional crises will require the U.S. to respond early and under possible ambiguous circumstances. The "means" available to decisionmakers include a wide range of options across elements of the national power spectrum--military, economic, political, and diplomatic. Under adaptive planning, commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands (CINCs) develop flexible, adaptive plans which can be altered to address a range of crises. Small, discriminate response packages are prepared for likely contingencies. Known as flexible deterrent options (FDOs), these packages offer decisionmakers a menu of options. The assumption is that key
decisionmakers will be more likely to use the available crisis response time if they are provided such a menu as opposed to an all or nothing option. The historic example of the Schlieffen Plan provides rationale for adaptive planning. Flexible deterrent options are designed to project a clear demonstration of U.S. resolve, to deter potential adversaries, and, if necessary, "to deploy and employ force to fight and win, quickly and decisively." Note that, in writing contingency plans, CINCs recommend FDOs which include all elements of national power—not just military options.

The Case for Concern

There are at least two points of concern in the current adaptive planning construct. They are, first, the assumption that decisionmakers will make obligatory decisions under ambiguous circumstances and, second, that many of the crises the U.S. will face may not be deterrable.

The concern that national leaders may hesitate to involve U.S. power in developing crises is always present. It involves the high diplomatic art form of knowing where, when and how to exercise a nation’s assets. Further, the reluctance or non-reluctance of a leader to use, for example, military force is related to the security environment and the style of the leader. Presidents have not been consistent in their exercise of military or naval diplomacy. For example, a military diplomacy study of the period between 1975 and 1984 showed that 63 percent of all
incidents for the period occurred during President Reagan’s first
term. His predecessor, President Carter, was less inclined to
use conventional military power as a diplomatic means.49

There is an obvious problem of overusing U.S. power and
influence--especially in an unilateral mode. If every crisis on
the horizon causes the U.S. to shift a carrier battle group,
amphibious ready group, or tactical fighter squadron to the area,
then the response becomes routine. Should a crisis later develop
which threatens genuine vital U.S. interests, the response may be
perceived as impotent--the boy crying wolf once too often.
Likewise,

the arrogant exercise of U.S. power will produce
counterreactions, as balance of power theory predicts.
...[The U.S.] must walk the fine line: use its
considerable power to assume the leadership role where
its vital interests and those of its key allies are at
stake, but in doing so, avoid running roughshod over
them, thereby provoking them to build up their own
power or to construct a coalition against the United
States.50

Not only must the U.S. "walk the fine line," but it must avoid
embarrassing itself or becoming a wounded giant as a result of
strategy-policy mismatches. The 1983 terrorist bombing of the
Marine headquarters in Beirut illustrates the negative results of
such a mistake--both in blood and national pride.51

The second concern with the adaptive planning construct
deals with the view expressed by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
that today's threats are "non-deterrable."52 This argument has
some merit especially considering that many post-Cold War
potential conflicts are driven by nationalistic, religious, or
ethnic differences. Such strife may be beyond the rational-actor and nation-state models. Or, stated differently, the actors generating such activity may not have established ties to the nation-state so as to be influenced by U.S. presence or retaliation operations. Further, their views may result in irrational actions and responses to any attempts of military diplomacy.

Where possible, adaptive planning seeks to deter a crisis and avoid escalation to conflict—what Schelling calls "brinkmanship." Again, the target of the deterrent action or military diplomacy must possess something "targetable." Schelling amplifies:

...it is so important to know who is in charge on the other side, what he treasures, what he can do for us and how long it will take him, and why we have the hard choice between being clear so that he knows what we want or vague so that he does not seem too submissive when he complies."

If the target is not targetable, the effectiveness of adaptive planning FDOs and military diplomacy is perplexed. In fact, threats such as non-state sponsored terrorism or those from transnational actors may be "non-deterrable." On balance, however, international order will prevail, thus presenting a combination of traditional deterrable actors with a generous sprinkling of non-deterrables.

In sum, adaptive planning well addresses the range of options for prudent application of U.S. national elements of power. It retains necessary flexibility and utility to address the conflict spectrum in the New World Order. Further, this
planning construct recognizes the utility of military diplomacy especially as it relates to deterrence.

V. MILITARY DIPLOMACY

Indeed, the current world situation offers no indication of lessening requirements for the use of military support in pursuit of diplomatic aims. The past provides ample instances for analysis with a view toward future employment.

The previously cited study by Blechman and Kaplan provides a detailed analysis of political uses of U.S. armed forces. Their study cataloged 215 incidents in which the U.S. employed its armed forces for political purposes in a 30-year period between 1946 and 1975.55 Others have used their scholarly effort as a basis to expand and update data. Zelikow, for example, analyzed the nine and one-half year post-Vietnam conflict period between 1975 and 1984 while using Blechman and Kaplan as a basis for data comparison.56 These two sources provide indicators of past and present courses of U.S. employment of military diplomacy. Their perspective—as well as that of new directions for the use of United Nation’s forces in the wake of the Persian Gulf War—signals continued employment of military forces in the role of political reinforcement. Of interest in the present study are the locations of such military activities, the type of U.S. armed forces likely to be used, the relative levels of force, and,
finally, the mode or methodology of force used. Each aspect will be briefly reviewed below.

**Regions of Employment**

The location of U.S. employment of forces for political use has changed according to foreign policy interests. The most recent shift has been toward the Middle East and North Africa, although the Western Hemisphere continues to receive a good deal of attention. See Figure 1. The conclusion is that static or routine deployments should broadly reflect U.S. security interests. The propensity to politically use the military should, likewise, reflect such focus.

Though not reflected in Figure 1, the recent Gulf War demonstrates a shift of focus. Prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, for example, the U.S. developed a series of moves to stress its interest in the area. In early 1980, President Carter deemed U.S. and allied access to Arabian Peninsula natural resources (oil) as vital. On the heels of this announcement, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was formed and maritime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Western Hemisphere</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
<th>South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Southeast and East Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-1975</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1984</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1. Percentage Distribution of Incidents*
prepositioned ship squadrons created. In 1983, the U.S. further focused regional interests by establishing U.S. Central Command as a geographic unified command. Commencing in 1987, Kuwaiti oil tankers were re-flagged and escorted in the Gulf by U.S. warships. This successful effort continued until abruptly terminated by the aforementioned invasion of Kuwait. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, U.S. forces remain on station in the form of a composite air wing, surface action groups, amphibious forces, a carrier battle group, and limited ashore prepositioning of Army and Air Force materiel. Post war activities such as enforcement of no-fly zones in Iraq and support to United Nations inspection teams characterize current regional military diplomacy.

Type of Forces Utilized

Another trend is the type of military forces used to support diplomatic efforts. Under the direction of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act, there is an increased effort to tailor the strengths of each service to each specific requirement—the joint military response. A brief survey of actual responses reveals that many uses of military diplomacy are, in fact, joint responses. This is particularly true in more recent years when, by definition, the use of Navy and Marine forces acting in continement comprise a joint operation. Previously, such Navy-Marine actions were not considered joint. What follows is an
summary of the utility of each service or type of force in response to military diplomacy operations. See Figure 2.

**Naval Forces**

A constant over the period studied is the utility of naval forces. The U.S. frequently employs naval units as instruments of crisis management and political influence. In the 30 year period studied by Blechman and Kaplan, naval units participated in 177 of the 215 incidents, or more than four out of every five. Land-based air units participated in 103 incidents, while ground combat units responded to 45 incidents (excludes Marine units when deployed by ship). Naval units were the sole participants in 100 incidents. Land-based air units acted alone in only 22 incidents; ground combat forces were the sole participants in only 3 incidents. The combined use of land-based air and ground combat units without naval participation was used 12 times. Figure 3 summarizes these data.59

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Naval</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Marine</th>
<th>Land-based Air forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-1975</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1984</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2. Percentage Use of Armed Forces in Incidents**

The reasons naval forces dominate military participation short of war in the political arena are varied but also somewhat obvious. First, ships are easy to move about compared to Army or land-based air units. Further, ships and the squadrons they
Figure 3. Number of Incidents in Which Naval, Ground Combat, and Land-Based Air Units Participated (1946-75)′

compose are complete combat units for which communications and logistics support can be established with little difficulty. Second, a warship can be unobtrusively posed on a crisis scene. They can be less disruptive psychologically than land-based forces and are, therefore, less offensive diplomatically. Naval forces can be employed subtly to support foreign policy incentives "without tying the President's hand." Finally, frequent recourse to the Navy is part of tradition or habit. This follows from earlier times when it was far more difficult to
transport land-based forces great distances. Even with the advent of aircraft, naval forces continued their traditional use. Only in more recent years have aircraft had the range and lift capacity to allow them the capability of influencing diplomacy. As a result of historic usage, the Navy took on its employment for political objectives as one of its principle missions--show the flag, presence, and crisis diplomacy.

Carriers and amphibious forces were used in many of the naval responses. In the post World War II era, nearly half--106 incidents--involved carrier battle groups. Again, naval tradition continues as noted by former Secretary of Defense Cheney. He observed that when he sat down with then President Bush in order to deal with a crisis, literally the first question was, "How are we fixed for carriers?" Amphibious forces were used in 71 incidents between 1946 and 1975. This equates to 40 percent of the naval involvements and 33 percent of all incidents. They were used in conjunction with aircraft carriers in 56 incidents or one quarter of the total; amphibious forces participated alone in only 15 incidents. The capabilities of the "Navy/Marine Team" is traditionally recognized. General Colin Powell commented:

[The] amphibious capability of the Marines in tandem with the Navy gives us a capability to have a potential ground-force presence whenever we have Navy presence. And that is a great deterrent. Lying offshore, ready to act, the presence of ships and Marines sometimes means much more than just having air power or ship’s fire, when it comes to deterring a crisis. And the ships and Marines do not have to do anything but lie offshore. It is hard to lie offshore with a C-141 or C-130 full of airborne troops."
The utility of various forces is certainly a matter of circumstance. "There are certainly times when the speed of airborne delivery is all that matters, but there are other times when what is prized most is both arrival and an ability to loiter without impinging on any nation's sovereignty."^63

Ground Combat Forces

The Army was used least of all services in the earlier period--39 incidents or 18 percent of the total. In the post-Vietnam era, the percentage increased markedly to 32 percent. This may be due to the development of light infantry divisions. It should be noted that when Army forces are used, they are employed in force. In incidents where Army forces were used, over one-fourth involved more than a full division. Also, the Army remained forward deployed in strength in both Korea and Europe. In both of these locations, forward presence has well served political objectives.

Marine Corps

Forward deployed in amphibious ships, Marine Corps units are often the force of choice when ground forces were injected or threatened to be injected into a crisis. Marine ground combat forces took part in 76 incidents in the earlier period--twice the Army total. Much of their use is based on the tradition of employment, force structure, and availability of the force.
Land-Based Air Forces

Land-based air forces lend inherent speed and power to military diplomacy. In the earlier period reviewed (1946-1975), a total of 103 incidents employed land-based air units. Three general categories used were transport aircraft, combat aircraft, and patrol or reconnaissance aircraft. Transports were used to move U.S. or friendly troops and/or equipment a total of 66 times—52 occasions utilizing fixed wing assets and 14 times using helicopters.

Land-based combat aircraft were used less frequently. Air Force units were used 34 times, and Marine Corps assets an additional 12 times. Aircraft from both services were employed in five of these incidents.

In 27 incidents, the U.S. used land-based patrol or reconnaissance aircraft for political objectives. The most frequent use was of Navy maritime patrol craft primarily searching for suspected Cuban-supported guerrillas in the Caribbean. Over half of all incidents took place in the 1956-65 period.

In more recent times, land-based aircraft have become more responsive as a diplomatic means. Donald Rice, the Secretary of the Air Force under President Bush, strongly advocated the "unique capabilities" of his service. He argued how "with one refueling and a large conventional payload, land-based bombers can cover the entire globe from as few as three secure bases."
If proper basing is available, the full spectrum of Air Force or other land-based air capabilities—e.g., surveillance, transport, electronic warfare, fighter, or ground attack—can rapidly arrive to influence diplomacy. A modern day component of military diplomacy is the AWACS aircraft. Rice referred to "AWACS diplomacy...[as] shooting electrons rather than bullets, AWACS can quell potential trouble by its mere presence."  

The fact is, land-based air can often provide "global reach" more quickly than any other component because of the speed at which they can bring considerable power to bear over long distances. Commenting on the Air Force's ability to respond worldwide within hours, Secretary Rice added "that a response does not necessarily have to be lethal. A helping hand or a clenched fist--airpower can...deliver both." Limiting factors include overflight rights and forward basing. Forward basing essentially requires a benign environment for insertion. If this is not available, a secure base must be forcibly taken before land-based air forces can be inserted. Also, substantial lift may be required for ordnance and base operations support especially in a "bare base" situation. And, while Air Force bombers can carry substantial power to a target, they provide only minutes of presence.

VI. THE FUTURE UTILITY OF MILITARY DIPLOMACY

If the past is worth studying for other than history's sake, it is to learn lessons for the future. As established in the
previous section, the past is rich with diplomatic situations where coercive diplomacy was employed. The future New World Order promises to offer similar opportunities and challenges. As always, the utility will be situational. Employment of military diplomacy will be linked to important U.S. interests and will be dependent on several factors including U.S. propensity to use the military arm as an instrument of diplomacy, availability of forces, and preoccupation with other events. These factors have historic trends which provide indicators for the altered future security environment. That this is evident is demonstrated by the no-fly zones established at the end of the Gulf War or more recently by NATO's no-fly zone in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Propensity to Use Force

The United States has consistently resorted to the use of force—or the exhibition of power—as an extension of diplomacy in regions throughout the world. This is especially true of the period since the mid-1950s when the world was distinctly bipolar. Within the Cold War era, the post-Vietnam period deserves a specific review because it may have some relevancy as we enter the post-Cold War period. The conventional wisdom following the Vietnam conflict was that the U.S. would turn toward isolationism and, therefore, would be less involved militarily—the so-called "Vietnam syndrome." The facts do not support this prediction. Following Vietnam, the U.S. continued to employ the use of force short of war at a consistent rate, indicating a willingness on
the part of U.S. leadership to use military leverage. This is perhaps indicative of the post-Cold War era. The engagement of U.S. military forces under United Nations auspices in the Gulf conflict or humanitarian efforts in Somalia or Bosnia indicate that the propensity to use military diplomacy in the post-Vietnam period will continue in the current New World Order.

There are, however, important qualitative changes in the use of U.S. military force since Vietnam. They are the region used, the level of force used, and, importantly, the objectives served by the use of force. As summarized in Figure 1 above, the locus has been increasingly concentrated in the Middle East, reflecting recognition of U.S. vital concerns in that region. There has been a shift away from use of substantial force. Instead, lower force levels have been targeted toward efforts to assure allies and reinforce behavior. This is a significant shift in the use of military force, and represents a change from efforts to compel or constrain behavior to a theme of friendly reassurance. See Figure 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Compel</th>
<th>Deter</th>
<th>Induce</th>
<th>Assure</th>
<th>Latent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-1975</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1984</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4. Modes of Using Armed Force
It is also noteworthy that the force levels used in the two periods under review changed. To aid in their analysis, Blechman and Kaplan adopted the following scale from which to evaluate those force levels. The scale was similarly used by Zelikow. See Figure 5 for definitions used within the various levels.

**Level 1.** Use of strategic or theater nuclear unit plus at least one major force component (naval, ground or air).

**Level 2.** Two or three major force components used but not strategic nuclear units.

**Level 3.** Either one major force component or strategic nuclear unit used.

**Level 4.** At least one standard component used, no major components and no strategic nuclear units.

**Level 5.** Minor components of force used only. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Force</th>
<th>Naval</th>
<th>Ground</th>
<th>Land-based Air</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Two or more aircraft carrier task groups</td>
<td>Over a battalion</td>
<td>One or more combat wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>One carrier task group</td>
<td>Up to a battalion, over one company</td>
<td>One or more combat squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>No carriers included</td>
<td>Not over one company</td>
<td>Less than a squadron</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5. Levels of Force**

Using the above scale and level of force criteria in Figure 5, the use of military elements for political purposes reveals general consistency in the two periods under review. See Figure 6.

The apparent rationale for changes in the mode, level of force, and location is a concern to buttress the credibility of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Effort</th>
<th>Percentage of Incidents, 1946-1975</th>
<th>Percentage of Incidents, 1975-1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. Levels of Effort, in Descending Order of Magnitude

U.S. commitments. As a result of these changed methods of employment, the United States has been more successful in its use of military diplomacy since the end of the Vietnam conflict.

**Force Availability and Force Mix**

The future force availability in the New World Order is not clear. The issue is clouded with current force structure resizing, budget reductions within the Department of Defense, service roles and missions debates, shifting U.S. foreign policy in a polyarchic world, and the position of leadership the U.S. elects to take in the emerging world. While each of these points will not be fully explored, they collectively indicate the shape of future J.S. military diplomacy.

It is clear that all military services are being reduced. Figure 7 shows the Fiscal Year 91 force structure compared to the General Powell's first "base force" proposal. There are, of course, civilian and military personnel reductions equating to an overall 25 percent across the board cut. Further reductions in
the personnel and force structure are forecast as the Clinton administration reviews its national military strategy. For example, whether the U.S. Navy's force structure for the next century shrinks to 12, 10 or 8 "center piece" aircraft carriers and somewhere between 350 to 400 vessels overall is relevant only in degrees. The fact is, reduced DOD budgets and the resulting smaller force will dramatically impact on the available density of forward presence of naval units worldwide. The U.S. will be

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIC</th>
<th>FY 91</th>
<th>BASE FORCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bombers</td>
<td>B-52 + B-1</td>
<td>B-52H + B-1 + B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSBNs</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>16 Divisions</td>
<td>12 Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>10 Divisions</td>
<td>6 Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadre</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>530 (15 CVBGs)</td>
<td>450 (12 CVBGs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>13 Air Wings</td>
<td>11 Air Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>2 Air Wings</td>
<td>2 Air Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>3 MEFs</td>
<td>3 MEFs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>1 Div/Wing</td>
<td>1 Div/Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>22 FWE</td>
<td>15 FWE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>12 FWE</td>
<td>11 FWE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"FWE = Fighter Wing Equivalents

Figure 7. Force Structure Comparison"

only able to selectively provide presence and, by extension, influence. This lack of influence will be exacerbated by the scheduled reduction in the numbers of U.S. bases on foreign soil. The thought that naval deployments will make up the difference for these forward deployment losses is a prescription for a hollow presence strategy. In all probability, naval forces--
especially carrier battle groups and amphibious task forces—will be deployed to maintain U.S. forward presence in the most important areas. Deployments to other areas of lesser import will be non-existent or intermittent. Only the mobility and range of naval units will ensure their continued viability to the naval diplomacy process. Similar reductions in the Army and Air Force structures will likewise shape their capabilities to influence.

There is an obvious capabilities cost to a reduced force structure and the resulting sporadic presence in the unstable New World Order. The capabilities cost also has an associated risk factor. The size of U.S. military deployments in the future may be smaller. Additionally, there may be fewer deployments worldwide. Forces may be employed in a less intrusive way as they were in the 10 years following the Vietnam conflict. The more desirable but less likely use would be for a more proactive deployment schedule to assist and stabilize fragile democracies throughout the world. In a theme related to major force deployments and strategic agility, President-elect Clinton stated, "We need to invest more in airlift and sealift. We need to increase the facility and speed and competence with which we can move our people, because we never know where we might be needed." The importance of strategic lift is certainly underscored: any hope for success in military diplomacy must be supported with sufficient military power potential to lend credibility to coercion or reinforcement efforts in the New World
Order. Anything less marks a hollow implication of military diplomacy.

The U.S. must, therefore, optimize what it views as necessary responses when using naval or other military forces in support of diplomacy. Its arsenal should be balanced and mutually reinforcing. Crisis management may include a single arrow or several from the archer's quiver. That is to say, situation dependent, the proper response may be naval only in character. Or, the situation may involve only units from the Air Force or the Army. Likewise, the response may include joint forces. It should not, however, be joint or combined simply for the sake of military politics. The U.S. unilateral military force package should be the most efficient and effective available for crisis response.

United States Preoccupied?

If the United States is preoccupied with a major regional contingency--or several lesser contingencies--the availability of resources to influence diplomacy outside the theater or theaters of conflict will be limited. The U.S. may find itself impotent with regards to military diplomacy. The prediction based in history is that forces will be committed to the protection of U.S. interests and citizens abroad. The recent operations in Liberia (Operation Sharp Edge) and Somalia (Operation Eastern Exit) at the front and back of Operations Desert Shield/Storm provide examples of U.S. flexibility and strength. Yet, a second
major effort on the scale of the desert deployments would have been extremely taxing, even at 1990 force levels. The future force structure will be more limiting.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The use of military diplomacy, or military action short of war, in support of diplomatic efforts, is founded in history. It continues to have great relevance in the emerging New World Order. Future United States foreign policy will impact on the degree and form of military diplomacy employed.

Several other factors will determine the pattern of "selective engagement" by the U.S. Key among these are the general world political situation, the national security and military strategies adopted, and the means available to conduct military diplomacy. First, the New World Order, as envisioned by President Bush, may only be a hope or unattainable goal. If current situations in several African and European countries are indicative of future world uncertainty and instability, then the global situation may be better described as the New World Disorder. Political, economic and military indicators point to the middle path of a good, bad or ugly world--a polyarchic world. World disorder will be fueled by traditional ethnic, religious and nationalistic contests. A strong international system will be necessary to maintain even minimum cooperation and regional order.
U.S. foreign policy and world leadership roles will do much to shape national security and military strategies. Certainly nothing is ever predictable or easy regarding world affairs. Within this context, the U.S. will probably lead in important regions but under the collectivism of the United Nations. Foreign policy will be well served if the U.S. adopts the role of grand facilitator—one which allows for selective engagement while supporting and encouraging other allies and friends to provide regional leadership where appropriate. The role of military diplomacy—especially in a cooperative context—will be integral to supporting these efforts. This is particularly true as the military element of national power becomes secondary and the primacy of economics evolves. The grand facilitator policy may offset more limited U.S. presence capabilities which, under a reduced force structure, are destined to become more random and intermittent.

Finally, U.S. military forces provide the means of future military diplomacy—a simple yet important observation. Purposed force structure cuts beyond the base force—as a function of the defense budget, domestic affairs, and the total force policy—will impact both the availability of and propensity to use military forces in a diplomatic reinforcement role. The current military adaptive planning construct focuses on conflict deterrence while posturing for the application of decisive forces. This deterrent application as well as that of coercive, cooperative or latent employment of military diplomacy will
continue to have responsible utility in the New World Order. Military diplomacy will continue to be an effective tool to offset, or at least mitigate, the consequences of unexpected events in a yet dangerous world.
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7Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, eds. Soviet Naval 

8Department of the Navy, The Role of the Marine Corps in 
the National Defense, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-2 (Washington: 

9Cable, 45-47

10Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence. (New Haven and 

11Ibid.

12Ibid., 176.

ed., The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, July 1992), 
179.

14Brent Alan Ditzler, "Naval Diplomacy Beneath the Waves: 
A Study of the Coercive Use of Submarines Short of War" (M.A. 
in this section is credited to this reference.

15Cable, 38.

16Edward K. Hamilton, ed. America’s Global Interests, A 
was the first to use the now popular terminology of "great

45
tectonic plates of geopolitics and economics upon which post-
World War II American foreign policy has been based are
shifting."

17Shultz and Pfaltzgraff, 173.

18Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1976), 87.

19Albert R. Coll, "America as the Grand Facilitator,"
Foreign Policy 87 (Summer 1992): 47.

20Bush, 1190.

Russian independence from the former USSR was declared by the
Supreme Council on 24 August 1991; on 1 December 1991, a
referendum on independence passed. President Boris Yeltsin has
been in office since 12 June 1991.

22Laurie Hays and Elisabeth Rubinfien, "Yeltsin Hints He
Might Dissolve Congress After His Latest Setback," Wall Street

23George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United

24David E. Jeremiah, "Beyond the Cold War." US Naval


26Ibid.

27Ibid.

28Bush, National Security Strategy, i.

29Andrew C. Goldberg, "Selective Engagement for the U.S.,"

30Robert J. Art, Security and Management in the Post-Cold
War Pentagon (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,

31Goldberg, 16.

32Ibid.

Some analysts feel there is significant difference between the Bush and Clinton administrations. See, for example, Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, The Future of U.S. Sea Power, Paper presented as part of the symposium "Strategy in Period of Transition" at the U.S. Army War College Fourth Annual Conference on Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 22-23 February 1993, 9; and Tony Capaccio, "Democrats Flex New Muscles in Post-Cold War Defense Plank," Defense Week, 13 July 1992, Dialog file 636, PTS Newsletter database.


Blechman and Kaplan, 4.

Powell, 12.

Carl E. Vuono, "The United States Army: A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond" (Washington: Department of the Army, January 1990), 10.

The Schlieffen Plan gave decisionmakers an all or nothing option. Once placed in motion, it was nearly impossible to stop and quickly escalated to war.

Art, 13.

The terrorist bombing cost the lives of over 240 Marines and Navy personnel. Shortly after the terrorist attack, President Reagan ordered the ground forces withdrawn.


Schelling, 91. Adaptive planning does call for the use of decisive force should deterrence fail.

Schelling, 175.

Blechman and Kaplan, 23. Their study actually chronicled 218 incidents. See Zelikow, 42.

Zelikow.

Ibid., 37.

Ibid., 38.

Blechman and Kaplan, 40.

Ibid., 41.

Daniel and Hayes, 33.


Daniel and Hayes, 32.

Blechman and Kaplan, 46.


Ibid., 8. The three bases are Barksdale, Louisiana, Diego Garcia, and Guam. Mr. Rice also suggests that one squadron of F-15Es or eight B-52s can match the daily ordnance capability
of a carrier—a "tons on target" argument. Such arguments ignore the comparative advantages of different aircraft basing schemes. See Daniel and Hayes, 23.


68 Donald B. Rice, "Reshaping for the Future," a summary of testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on February 20, 1992, p. 6.

Recent trends in forward basing has been negative. For example, in the past few years, the U.S. has either left or agreed to leave Torrejón Air Base outside of Madrid, Hellenikon Air Base outside of Athens, and Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Further, use of foreign basing for U.S. operations continues to have associated political "baggage." Cable, for example, suggests that British Prime Minister Thatcher may have paid an "electoral price" for allowing U.S. F-111s to take off from British bases to support the April 1986 raid on Libya. See Sir James Cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112: August 1986), 40.


71 Zelikow, 46.

72 Ibid., 44.

73 Blechman and Kaplan, 50; and Zelikow, 39.

74 Ibid.

75 Zelikow, 40.

76 Ibid., 46.

77 Rothmann, 7.

78 For example, reflecting on the loss of Clark Air Base, a Philippine spokesman downplayed the situation by stating "it is the U.S. Navy carriers that will make the difference." See "U.S. Fighter Planes to Leave Philippine Base in '91," New York Times, 8 November 1990, p. A6, quoted in Daniel and Hayes, 28.

79 Ibid., 45.
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