BUILDING ORDER IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

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"The responsibility of the great states is to serve, not to
dominate the world"

President Harry S. Truman

"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy
present...As our case is new, so must we think anew. We must
disenthrall ourselves."

President Abraham Lincoln

BUILDING ORDER IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

With the end of the Cold War and the shattering of the Soviet
Empire to pieces smaller even than that ruled by Peter the Great,
a recurring theme of the defense debate is that the world is too
uncertain, that invisible dangers lurk behind every bush, and that
we must retain a huge military presence to protect against
instability and potential threats. Our grand strategy, once
easily articulated by the single word, containment, has been
superseded and the lack of an unambiguous threat has prompted a
fractious debate. Whether the size of our military forces are be
based on what is necessary to protect our interests, or on what our
politicians deem is affordable depends on our ability to look ahead
to see a clear path for our nation, and define the role the
military will play.

The demise of the Soviet Union need not leave us rudderless in
the sea of uncertainty. Fear that we will be surprised by new and
different enemies certainly disregards the huge number of skilled
members of intelligence agencies, and the Departments of State and
Defense whose job it is to assess our interests and those that may
oppose them. We are wrong to be fearful that the yawning chasm of
the unknown and unknowable is before us and that some invisible
entity is ready to push us in.

It is time to conduct a careful analysis of the domestic and
world condition, cutting through the dogmas of the defense debate
of the last 45 years, and define the realistic responses our nation
should have to the changing world political and economic landscape.

While much has changed, much remains the same. That which is
the same is predictable and that which has changed deserves our
study so that it can be better understood and prepared for. Our
preoccupation with the "Great Game" of the 20th century has
prevented us from taking a good look at the world, undistorted by
the Cold War prism through which we have peered for nearly a half
century. Without this view, assumptions will be drawn and
historical analogies will be narrowly or inaccurately applied,
which will influence the way we prepare for the next half century.

As the 1993 budget debate heats up the proposed Base Force,
the remnants of a 25% total reduction in force, will likely be the
casualty of national fiscal realities. Having a smaller force will
certainly change our capabilities, but if we control the reduction
and adapt the remaining forces to a coherent strategy of protecting
our interests and security needs, then we will be able to achieve
our national security objectives. If, however, we permit the force
structure to be shaped by budget planners who will reduce our forces based on some programmatic algorithm in their search for the bottom line, we will face an uncertain future.

I. THE THREE ARENAS

The debate underway now seems to be stuck on a hamster-wheel of repetitious articulations of Cold War rhetoric which is not easily understood by Congress, is completely lost on the American people, and does not effectively demonstrate our military needs for the next century. The only effective way to design a military force is to cast aside this dogmatic approach and take a good look at the domestic, international, and military organizations that were designed for a threat and a strategy that no longer has any meaning.

DOMESTICALLY— There is greater interest in internal concerns and a decreasing interest in our military involvement overseas. There is no doubt that forward presence and military interaction is important to maintaining our global engagement, but as yet, this has not been articulated in a way that many Americans understand.

INTERNATIONALLY— We have built a network of alliances, alignments and interests, many of which were created solely to respond to the threat of the Soviet Union. Foreign entanglements that no longer serve our interests should be modified or discarded, and new bilateral or multilateral alliances and agreements that do should
be created. As an example, does NATO, even in its proposed form respond to a realistic security interest, or is there perhaps a better, European solution?

MILITARILY - We should control the shape of our reduced forces. The shape of our military, now still structured to defend against a Soviet-like threat, should change to respond to the realities we now face. As our forces return from overseas, they will need greater mobility and self contained sustainability. Those forces which will be needed should be made robust, those that have a lesser role should be reduced or eliminated. While sweeping historical analogies do not adequately address the world of today, much can still be learned. The instabilities of the recent past provide us with a reasonably clear vision of the types of conflicts we may well be involved in in the proximate future.

In the context that will be outlined below, the United States must now reassess its role in the global arena and the military must be shaped to support this role. Nebulious references to "threat" or "instabilities" are not meaningful in defining force size or mix, but it is relatively simple to define our interests and estimate what types of forces will be necessary to ensure that our interests are protected.

II. NO MORE SUPERPOWERS
The revolution of 1991 eliminated the Soviet Union as one of two superpowers and caused the dissolution of one of two global balance of power alliances. This left a world that has been variously referred to as unipolar or multipolar, no longer bipolar. Those that subscribe to unipolarity assert that the United States is the last superpower due to its remaining overwhelming conventional and nuclear military capability. Adherents to the multipolarity thesis reflect the growing importance of economic security on national interests and the growing strength of the Japanese and European Community as compared to the U.S. Realization that economic power has gained importance in the power equation is not a new phenomenon; however, the Cold War so completely dominated the foreign policy debate that the emphasis on military capability obscured its significance. Without a realistic military threat to our security, the economic strengths of our competitors has also assumed a more ominous perspective.

Despite the remaining military strength of the United States, the collapse of the Soviet Union has left the world with no military superpower in the traditional sense. Let me explain. The Soviet Union, without destroying a single rank, missile, or submarine, has quickly been relegated to second rate status. In the United States, the decline of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has had a similarly dramatic, if as yet unnoted, impact. The absence of an ideological foe has had the effect of diminishing the effective size of our military in the global power
equation and has eliminated the actual usefulness of our strategic and heavy armor forces. Yes, we have the largest nuclear arsenal, but could we realistically employ it?

Economic strength has re-emerged as the primary measure of national power. Although we remain the only nation capable of projecting force anywhere on the globe, through our maritime and air strength, we are profoundly constrained in how we can use these forces. There is no historical precedent to a powerful nation requesting financing to support the waging of a war that they desire to conduct. During the Napoleonic wars Great Britain paid for the raising of Germanic armies to wage war against France. The extraordinary cost of sustaining a campaign in the post-industrial world severely limits any nation's ability to pay for a conflict.

Public and world opinion, in the absence of a clearly dangerous adversary, has changed the security environment. Greater public attention to events half a world away and the daily democratic debate of the issues involved in interventions instills a reluctance to employ force unless a consensus is gained. All sides of the argument, even extreme minority views, are played out on television.

Finally, the huge military might of the United States was designed for different missions than it is now likely to face. Much of what we point to as definitive proof of our military superpower status simply does not have a credible role outside of
the Cold War context.

The limits placed on our use of force come from a variety of international and domestic pressures:

FEAR OF THE WORLD POLICEMAN—There is international wariness over the United States acting as the world's policeman, enforcing our rules through force of arms. Note the worldwide concern voiced when we announced our intention to stop a North Korean freighter enroute to Iran, in the absence of an international agreement to support such an action.

The presence of a powerful nation that lacks a counterbalance is unique in modern history. For the past 200 years, as the balance shifted, alliances formed to restore equilibrium. The fact that there has been no significant move to counterbalance the de facto hegemon is both the result of the speed with which the Soviet collapse took place and a testament to our credibility in the world arena as a nation without imperial ambitions. Ill conceived use of our military would cause a great deal of concern among the less powerful nations.

For example, without international agreement in the area of nuclear proliferation or ethnic/nationalist strife, it will continue to be exceedingly difficult for the U.S. to use military force to address these problems, even though our National Military Strategy clearly asserts that it is in our national interest to do so. The Gulf War, a clear example of an assault on global economic security, was only grudgingly supported by nations that had the...
LACK OF A THREAT—There is waning domestic consensus on a threat to national interest that would require a committing military force to war. The traditional employments of our military in evacuation, or humanitarian efforts will continue to receive approval, and limited use of military forces in the drug war, against terrorism, or to enforce U.N. sanctions in Iraq, for example, would not create a significant backlash, but few Americans can identify a reasonable threat that would be worth the risk of large numbers of casualties.

GROWING ISOLATIONISM—There is an increased sense of isolationism in America that is being inflated by the election year political process. The feeling seems to be that, with the Cold War won, our continued military presence overseas is no longer essential to keeping the peace. As other nations gain in economic power, maintenance of large numbers of U.S. forces overseas becomes harder to justify. Forward deployed forces, once serving the dual purpose of deterring potential aggressors and reassuring our allies, now are now the subject of intense debate.

Military intervention in such exotic locations as Grenada or Quemoy and Matsu are only rational when viewed through the looking glass of the Communist threat. Our interests in many parts of the world change dramatically when our fear of Soviet expansion is allayed.
The trends described above are a reflection, in large part, of a realization that the end of the Cold War has dramatically changed the world we live in and our role in it. The revolution of 1991 in the Soviet Union precipitated a similar revolution in the United States security debate and has fundamentally changed the vocabulary. Old paradigms must be discarded. Alliances and treaties drawn up in the Cold War environment should be reviewed in this new context. What are our interests? How much are we willing to spend in national wealth and manpower to defend them? What is a reasonable force to protect our interests and contribute to continued peace and stability in the world? Are we solely responsible for righting every wrong and correcting every injustice?

III. WHAT HAS NOT CHANGED

The geopolitical landscape is now being seen more clearly through the receding tide of the cold war. Many of the conditions and security concerns being voiced as new, or as the result of the end of the Cold War, are only new in that they have now become more visible as our traditional fears have receded.

INSTABILITY AND TURBULENCE- Instabilities and regional strife outside of Europe continued unabated during the Cold War. Indeed, the Cold War was not forty-five years of peace. Far from it. During this period the United States was involved in two major conflicts and employed forces in some form, ranging from moving an
aircraft carrier to landing Marines, over two hundred times. And, we did not get involved in most of what was going on. In the past year, in addition to the Gulf War, U.S. forces participated in two major evacuation operations and three major humanitarian efforts.

Many of the regional instabilities in the last forty years were given inordinate significance as they were viewed in a Cold War context. Our interests in such places as Zaire, Ethiopia, and Viet-Nam for example, no longer have the security significance that the Cold War bestowed upon them. In the future, these regions will be evaluated on their actual relationship to our national interest. In many cases, our ideological desire to foster democracy, assist in developing economies, and protect human rights, will be balanced by public apathy and the pressures of fiscal realities at home.

THE DRUG WAR- This unpleasant business continues. Although a very small part of our military is involved in this effort, as long as our National Drug Strategy is focused on stopping the flow of drugs at the source, it will remain a task for our armed forces in concert with affected nations and other governmental agencies.

MIDDLE EAST INSTABILITY: The still unresolved crisis in the Persian Gulf shows no sign of abatement. Iraq remains arrogantly aloof from the United Nations effort to remove its nuclear and chemical weapons capability. Iran is rearming and is in active search of missile and weapons technology. The remaining Gulf States are so weak, relatively, that no collective security
arrangement they can create among themselves could effectively counter aggression by either Iran or Iraq. Meanwhile, the bulk of the world's oil reserves and a large percent of the production must travel through the Straits of Hormuz. Interruption of that flow would have global repercussions.

The U.S., with its allies, will need to remain in the region for some time to ensure that no one nation has control of the vast oil reserves there. However, as was demonstrated in the Iran-Iraq war, there are instabilities and conflict, even in this region, that do not require our military involvement.

AMERICAN EUROCENTRISM—The primary battlefield of the Cold War was Europe, and NATO was the major weapon with which it was fought. For many years, however, Europe has been eclipsed by the Pacific Rim nations as trading partners and sources for essential resources. An objective look at our national interests will reveal that the Pacific region is increasingly important. With the growth of the European Community, both economically and militarily, we should adopt a more balanced view of security issues.

Familiarity with European problems, compared to the myriad complexities of the Asian-Pacific nations only increases the danger of ignoring a growing problem while attending to the familiar.

There are powerful ethnic, cultural, and traditional ties to Europe that are difficult to ignore, and it was the center of our foreign policy attention for over 200 years. When we did look outward it was usually towards Europe but it is no longer our major
trading partner and should not be the focal point of our military
planning.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION— Nuclear technology, which has slowly spread
through the nations of the Third World, may see a rapid increase as
the potential for the sale of nuclear technology and materials from
the former Soviet Union increases. There is not yet international
agreement on a military option to this problem.

The instabilities that could be introduced in areas of vital
interest to the U.S. are a very real concern. That a renegade
nation will gain possession of one or more nuclear weapons within
the next ten years is almost a certainty. At that point the world
community will be faced with a very serious dilemma that it has
gthus far failed to address.

IV. WHAT HAS CHANGED

There have been some major changes to the global security
environment that, as already mentioned, have achieved greater
significance. These trends are important in that they may provide
a key to analyzing the direction that the world has moved during
this period. Historical analogies are frequent tools in our
assessment of security issues, but we often make a simplistic
assessment without understanding the full import of the differences
as well as the similarities between the events we are analyzing.

EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN NATIONS: The Cold War was largely
Eurocentric, with our largest military commitments being to NATO and our European allies with whom we share ethnic, cultural, and economic ties. As a result, the new security environment will necessarily have a greater impact on our European alignments.

For over forty years, the NATO allies have been undergoing a metamorphosis in their economic relationship that has not been fully appreciated in our new strategy. The economic ties that exist between the members of the European Community are stronger now than in any collection of nations before in history. The depth of the European Community commitment has required each of the participants to sublimate nationalist tendencies to an unprecedented degree.

GROWTH OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: Even a fairly strict definition of democracy would support the assertion that democratic process, accompanied by the rule of law and the demise of tyranny, have nearly achieved global acceptance. It seems to be only a matter of time before North Korea and Cuba will join the ranks of democratic nations. Similarly, democracies are now present in much of the Asian-Pacific and most of Latin America. The growth of democracy has been attended in most cases with a reorganization of economies that has resulted in greater stability and an increased interdependence with the world economic community.

The proliferation of democratic nations has been widely received as very good news due to the oft repeated adage that "democracies do not make war on each other." Many of these new
democracies, however, have only a tentative grip on the democratic process. The forces of ancient rivalries, economic pressures, and racial, religious and ethnic differences in Eastern Europe and South and Eastern Asia, will all be destabilizing and a potential source of conflict regardless of the political process that has been followed.

FORMER SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITY: The republics of Russia, Ukraine, and others, continue to maintain a very large conventional and nuclear capability. To disregard this military reality when creating a security strategy would be foolhardy. However, the vast difference between the huge Soviet forces that existed for the last forty-five years and the fragmented forces that remain must be taken into consideration.

While much hardware remains it is exceedingly unlikely that it could easily be reformed into a functioning military machine. There is no question that the forces remaining could be formidable, but the necessary question is whether they constitute a threat to the United States. Instability in the region will continue for some time, but in the event of a regional conflict, between Russia and Georgia or Ukraine, for example, the United States or our European allies are unlikely to become the target of an unprovoked attack. The immediate problems these nations face are too great and they are becoming increasingly dependent on the aid and assistance that they are receiving from the West.
EXPLOSION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: Our ability to look inside another nation is now better than ever before. It is difficult to envision an event like Germany’s Kristall Nacht or Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch not being covered in detail by CNN. Likewise, the image of the U.S. is spread worldwide every day. Mass media allows nations of the world to see first hand the unfolding of events that may impact them. While television is certainly not the key to peace in our time, it provides a new access to the workings of society, and allows decision makers to see more clearly the actions of governments. The FAX machine and the XEROX are the new tools of dissidents, and permit the spread of information worldwide that was easily suppressed before.

In some applications this technology assists those that would destabilize a regime, but that effort too is visible to the alert observer. Timely decisions can be made and the clear intent of the U.S. can be transmitted instantly through a news conference where before the ambiguity of diplomatic notes had to suffice.

RESURGENCE OF NATIONALISM: Just as the western European nations have begun to adopt a less nationalist and more European perspective, the removal of the restraint of the Soviet government has begun a resurgence of intense nationalism in the newly liberated nations of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. This potentially dangerous development presents a series of dilemmas for the western allies. How much instability and conflict can be tolerated? What can be done to limit or end violence? At what
point will it be necessary to use force to impose peace? At what point are U.S. interests at risk?

V. A NEW DEFENSE VOCABULARY

The threats of the last four decades have given way to the interests of the next four. A one word foreign policy that consisted of "containment" is inadequate for the next millennium when there is no longer anyone to contain. The use of the word "threat" is even now much reduced in the foreign policy debate and has increasingly been replaced by the word "interest."

The phrase "threats to interests" merely as a synonym for "threats to security" does not adequately recognize the changes that have occurred. We need to protect our interests. Frequently this is done diplomatically, sometimes through force of arms. Developing and protecting these interests should not take place after a threat is discovered, rather military forces should be employed through the traditional channels of diplomacy, alliances, in support of our interests and allies before a crisis occurs.

As the military strategy is developed and discussed, only the United States has the capability to project force globally. Although it is much harder to do this unilaterally. International organizations that were created to provide global collective security have not yet gained the stature necessary to influence events militarily. Although the recent deployment of U.N. peace keeping forces to Cambodia and Yugoslavia is encouraging, the U.N.
Regardless of misgivings about the U.S. acting as the world's policeman, most of the nations of the world see us as a stabilizing influence. Presence, ranging from forces forward based in Germany, Japan or Korea, to port visits by naval vessels, is widely accepted as a positive force in those regions that are still searching for regional order. We are the only nation capable of worldwide employment of forces that can be used in support of our friends. Increasingly, we must take advantage of this superiority and actively engage in bilateral and multilateral exercises, mobile training team deployments, and military-to-military schooling and joint training.

VI. NATIONAL STRATEGY

The National Strategy must be the result of a far reaching vision of the future, coupled with a realistic balance of our economic capability and prioritized assessment of strategic goals. If we are to continue in our role of world leadership, we must continue to promote and support peace and development of democratic ideals. In order to maintain leadership role the United States must provide a far reaching vision, and economic and military strength.

The National Security Objectives promulgated in the "National
Security Strategy of the United States provide the President's guidance upon which the National Military Strategy is based. They are:

-The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure;

-A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad;

-Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations;

-A stable and secure world where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.

These four basic principles have not changed significantly as a result of recent world events. How they are translated into policy and when it is appropriate to use military force in their execution remains to be defined. As we move from the starker contrasts of the Cold War, where issues were much clearer, to the hazy gray of the current environment, expressing the above strategy within a military context provides some insight into how and where we may employ our military.

SURVIVAL OF THE NATION: There is no question that the security of the United States and the protection of her citizens is ultimately dependent on military strength. Continued strategic deterrence and effective employment of forces short of combat are essential
elements of a military strategy. Establishing and maintaining stability is the best method of protecting our citizens overseas.

Judicious use of alliances, alignments, and influence, under the umbrella of U.S. military capability, allows newly emerging nations to concentrate on economic development without the fear of the adventurism of a neighbor. Regional arms races, such as those now underway in Iran and Syria, are inherently destabilizing. The presence of U.S. forces, either through forward basing, periodic exercises, or deployments provides a more secure atmosphere.

SUPPORT A HEALTHY ECONOMY: Our economy is reliant on access to foreign markets and resources. The global economy is heavily dependent on access to our markets and the interruption of that access would have had severely detrimental effects. There is no other power that is able to ensure the continued freedom of the seas globally and as a result, we have largely assumed responsibility for defense of the world’s oceans. It falls largely on the Naval forces to ensure freedom of commerce globally.

Bilateral alliances with nations having capable navies and the encouragement of development of effective forces in stable, democratic nations would ease much of this burden.

MAINTAIN HEALTHY ALLIANCES: This is the cornerstone of a realistic strategy for the future. Bilateral and, wherever possible, multilateral relationships with those nations that share our democratic principles will assist us in providing the global
security that the world needs in order to prosper. Equally important is the continued support of multinational institutions, like the United Nations, which provide a forum for the discussion of regional or global problems.

Those alliances and friendships that were established in response to the danger of Communist imperialism should be reevaluated in this new context. Modifying or even discarding old alliances that do not support our current interests should be given priority. Establishment of new friendships or expansion of existing alliances to accept nations that are moving closer to our democratic ideals are of equal importance. Just as after World War II we established closer relations with the defeated Japanese and Germans, it only makes sense to allow increasing security cooperation with our former foes. Progress in this direction has begun with the growth of the Western European Union and the former Warsaw Pact nations applying for membership in NATO.

A reevaluation of many of those regimes that were perceived as strategically important in the Cold War era should also be done. It detracts from our credibility when we support corrupt regimes which do not embrace our democratic values or our concern for human rights such as Syria, or Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. It is especially damaging when we support those nations that are known to be supporters of international terrorism for the expediency of limited political goals.

The U.S. stand on the Palestinian problem with continued opposition to the construction of settlements on the West Bank
demonstrates that there are some issues that are important to the American people. Business as usual, even between historical allies, is correctly stopped when that reality is being ignored.

MAINTAIN A STABLE AND SECURE WORLD: It is here that the image and perception of the United States is so important. There is no other nation that so vividly demonstrates the ideals of democracy and personal freedom. The collapse of Soviet tyranny, it could be argued, was in large part due to the widespread embrace of the moral leadership that we embodied. Our wealth, pride and respect for the individual were heightened by the contrasts that were a part of their everyday life.

Continued economic vitality of the United States is essential to ensure our role in maintaining stability. The elimination of a unifying military threat has replaced military with economic strength as the measure of importance. A history of being the world's strongest nation is not sufficient in the competitive world of today as our strength will be measured and evaluated daily. When we are found lacking our authority and influence will quickly erode.

The four major components of the National Strategy provide the basis by which our force capability should be developed. Use of military force in a regional contingency is one end of the spectrum by which this force should be calculated, but equally important are those roles that are important for regional stability and security.
Establishment and reaffirmation of alliances and coalitions must be the result of a judicious review of our new interests and aspirations.

VII. ADJUSTING OUR THOUGHT PROCESS

The post-Cold War period is profoundly different from previous eras. The commitments and employments of our forces should reflect a sound assessment of the new environment, and should not be the residual inertia from Cold War thinking. The National Military Strategy, as based on our National Security Strategy gives us a good framework upon which we can build an effective force that is capable of protecting our interests and maintaining our leadership position in world security issues.

In the National Military Strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established four pillars upon which the strategy must be based: strategic deterrence and defense; forward presence; crisis response; and reconstitution. They provide a framework upon which the military strategy can be established. Within this framework there are four areas which should be highlighted as being significantly altered by the new security environment.

USE OF HISTORY- The use of historical analogies to extrapolate the events of tomorrow is an exceedingly dangerous exercise and must be undertaken with great care. Our rapid disarming in 1992 while disconcerting, does not easily compare with similar events in 1919
and 1945.

Those that would try to draw a cause and effect relationship between disarming after the World Wars, and the subsequent outbreak of new wars, ignore a host of other factors that may have had a greater impact on the events that followed. Was it faulty foreign policy or perceived U.S. weakness that precipitated the ill-fated adventures of Kim Il Sung and Saddam Hussien?

The aftermath of the Cold War left a shattered government and economy in Eurasia, but an intact military force. More importantly, the traditional battlefield, Germany and France, remain strong vital nations. Only one economy survived World War II intact and for the next decade much of that power was dedicated to rebuilding the war damaged economies of Europe and Japan and fighting a war in Korea.

Today, the world is a global marketplace with no single tyrant bent on world hegemony. Most of the world's nations have adapted democracy in some form, and the economic ties of all nations are intertwined.

DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL SECURITY INITIATIVES: The military does more than fight, it keeps the peace. The military only provides the foundation upon which diplomacy and economic incentives are based. One cannot rely on effective strategic deterrence, forward presence or crisis response unless sound relations have been established with the other nations of the world. In the next century, we can expect conflict and turmoil, but we will also see
other nations try to resolve their own security issues and an attempt at limiting conflict by regional agreements and accords.

We must prioritize our national interests. Only with a clear understanding of those interests which we will not compromise can we begin to identify those interests which may require military force. Clearly, the security of our nation is our number one priority. In the absence of a military challenge to our national sovereignty, it is sensible to maintain a deterrent force, but focus greater resources on the non-military challenges to our economic and political stature. Economic strength will be the key to maintaining our role in the future.

Peace is everyone's ideal, but in many cases there is little we can do but work to limit the extent of the conflict. Pakistan-India, India-Sri Lanka, Iran-Iraq, insurgencies in Peru, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, and Palestine are all examples of instabilities where our influence is limited regardless of the size of our military. Our diplomatic efforts may also be limited to providing an unbiased mediator during discussion of differences.

In this vein, the word "deterrence" takes on a fresh nuance. Previously defined as a force to prevent a preemptive nuclear assault on the United States or a conventional assault against Europe, deterrence now loses its apocalyptic overtone as it shifts from a global focus to a regional war. Deterrence strategy must now be based on the willingness of the United States to use force to prevent an act that is contrary to our interest. Credibility is essential. Similarly, deterrence is weakened if our interests are
not clearly articulated and communicated with the potential aggressor.

Through inaction, we have already relinquished our leadership role in supporting the emergence of stable economies in the new republics. This hinders our participation in discussions about security issues with these new nations and the Western European allies. More importantly, we have not demonstrated a clear resolve that the outcome of their search for a free society is as important to us as was the military confrontation.

DETERRENCE— Conventional deterrence has failed about half the time. We should delay the use of US power and prestige in deterrence until it can be determined what the motivations of the belligerent parties are. And, when we deploy our forces as a deterrent, we should be ready to employ them when the deterrent fails. Sometimes the tide of hostility is not open to rational intervention.

We must take the lead in the areas of reducing nuclear proliferation and conventional arms build ups. We have not yet forged a meaningful policy for the world to debate and agree to. Worse, we are leading the rush to support the regional arms races by acting as the world’s largest arms merchant.

While the world consensus is against the spread of nuclear weapons, we have no provision for a lawful aggression against an aspiring nuclear power. We lack the credibility to act unilaterally, as we have carefully ignored the growth of Israeli
nuclear capability and have made only feeble gestures towards
unknotting the nuclear problem in the former Soviet Union.
Politically hazardous, this area, if not addressed, will result in
regional crises that will be exceedingly dangerous for the
participants.

CRISIS RESPONSE- There is one generality that applies to the next
decade. It will continue to be unstable. Instabilities were with
us throughout the Cold War and we seldom involved ourselves,
outside of this hemisphere, when they were not seen as part of the
East-West conflict. Notwithstanding, if instabilities and regional
conflicts occur around the globe with the same frequency that they
occurred the past forty-five years, it will be exceedingly,
turbulent.

Instabilities are not necessarily dangerous for America. As
regional conflicts occur, our involvement should be carefully
gauged against our interests, international and domestic opinion,
and the ability to actually make a difference in the situation with
military means. Frequently it will be in our interest to simply
contain the conflict by preventing regional balance of power
alliances that escalates the conflict by supporting opposing
parties. It is most often in our interest to work to avoid
conflict through diplomatic and economic efforts.

VIII. ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF THE SMALLER FORCE

There are a number of reasons to restrain ourselves from
reducing our forces; domestic politics, economic stability, and the adverse impact on the men and women of the services. However, barring a resurgent Russia or some other disaster, fiscal reality will drive us below the Base Force by the end of this decade. Even if much reduced a military structure that would support our global interests and world leadership is not so hard to envision.

The key elements of this future force will be mobility, interoperability, flexibility, and sustainability. We will find our forces working with alliances and ad hoc coalitions, in joint task organizations and as single service efforts, and in activities running the full spectrum of response, from peacetime presence to large scale conventional war.

With fewer men and women in our forces our investment in those traditional force multipliers must not be ignored. Command and control, mobility, appropriate technology, and better training are essential components of a force that may encounter a numerically superior force that lacks our equipment and training.

The key characteristics of these forces can be identified.

INTEROPERABILITY- Joint operations will remain a key element in our ability to project forces in the future. Tremendous strides have been made in this area since the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but much remains to be done. As forces get smaller,
redundancy between the services will be reduced and the efforts of one service will usually require additional assistance. Even now the naval forces in the Gulf are embarking Army helicopters to provide a gunship capability. Future embarkation of unique Army forces in ships, or the use of air forces in support of traditional naval mission will be the reality.

More importantly, as a mission is identified, the forces must have common doctrine, communications and tactics so that the appropriate component can be used to support a task organized effort.

MOBILITY- The force for the 21st century must have an increased ability to deploy quickly with its integral mobile logistics support. As our forces withdraw from our overseas bases, we must increasingly look to moving our men and equipment from the United States into regions where indigenous support is not available.

Long range sea lift, amphibious assault capability, and logistic aircraft both for strategic and tactical lift will be essential elements of any force capability. No amount of tanks will be effective if they are not at the battlefield with the logistics train to support them.

The Marine Corps has always provided unique capabilities in responding to crises. Unlike analogous Army units, the marines arrive ready to stay with a built-in logistics train right offshore. This capability will be called on more frequently in the future.
Expeditionary forces should not only be made more robust, but the equipment that is used to support them should be improved. Longer range logistics aircraft, like the V-22 Osprey would give these forces the ability to reach further, stay longer, and withdraw when necessary.

SUSTAINABILITY- Logistics has always been a poor stepchild. As we reduce our overseas presence our reliance on ships and aircraft for logistics support becomes a key element to our capability. The Gulf War demonstrated the efficacy of the Maritime Pre-positioning ship concept. This fleet must be expanded to provide the same sort of support for any of the forces we intend to deploy overseas.

Heavy lift aircraft, such as the C-17, will have an even greater role in the future. Medium lift capability must be designed with the recognition that support from airfields may not be available. Deployment of the C-17 and the V-22 Osprey (tilt-rotor aircraft) increases the ability to support and move forces far from traditional logistics bases.

CHANGED ROLE OF NUCLEAR FORCES- As the likelihood of use of nuclear forces decreases, our strategic nuclear requirements are also diminished. It is difficult to predict, even if threatened by a nuclear weapon by a third world nation, that we would respond by use of nuclear arms.

A shift to emphasis on halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons permits the change of our strategic triad to some other,
less costly form. A secure nuclear capability will be a requirement as long as any other nation has a ballistic nuclear capability, but the structure this capability maintains should conform to the real threat.

FORWARD PRESENCE- Visible presence of capable forces will replace the forward based forces of the cold war in indicating resolve. Where our policy is not clear, or where the policy changes in response to an invasion (Korea and Kuwait), early movement of forward deployed units, both maritime and air, can either deter an aggressor, reassure an ally, or defend our interests.

We should change our deployment cycle to reflect the reality of fewer aircraft carriers. An amphibious carrier with Harriers and marines embarked provides a significant presence with unique capabilities and could prove even effective as a conventional deterrent in many crises. Similarly, Tomahawk equipped cruisers send a signal of resolve that cannot easily be misunderstood.

MARITIME FORCES- The cornerstone to our ability to respond to crises will remain the naval forces. Navy ships and Marines provide the unique ability to arrive at a crisis and employ all levels of escalatory capability, from deterrence through presence, to putting bombs on target and soldiers on the beach. There is no other force that allows the U.S. to provide sustained presence with minimal commitment, yet allows the flexibility of controlled military efforts.
Carriers will always have a role in our deterrent and defensive structure, but the traditional requirement of continuous deployments can change to permit a reduction of carriers and escorts. The battleship of old has been replaced by the long range strike capability of the Tomahawk equipped cruisers and destroyers. These ships provide a potent capability to conduct strikes, of the magnitude of the 1986 raid against Tripoli, without endangering manned aircraft. As a deterrent in the low end of the threat spectrum, they can provide a cheaper, but effective tool.

TECHNOLOGY— We must maintain our lead in weapons technology but we must resist the temptation to sell it to potential adversaries. With fewer men and women under arms, the requisite force multiplier associated with better weapons technology is absolutely essential.

Space is a relatively new battlefield and it lends itself to our technological edge. Command and control, space borne weapons systems, navigation and communications are all areas where our increased reliance on and mastery of the skies leaves us an advantage.

The resulting force is largely maritime in character. The vast majority of the conflicts and military activities will be performed by small Army units, living in the host country, or by naval forces which will represent U. S. interests through most of the conflict spectrum. When we become involved in regional
contingencies, the fast sea lift and maritime pre-position ships will provide the logistics support for all of the ground forces. Most importantly, the U.S. forces will fall in on bases and airfields of allies or coalition partners who share our concern and agree with our actions.

X. CONCLUSIONS

The end of the Cold War has provided the opportunity to regain control of our foreign policy which was hostage to the Kremlin decision makers for the past 45 years. Our military was designed to respond to the Soviet threat and our interest in much of the world was largely as a score card of influence.

We now have control of where our future foreign policy will take us and the trip will be quicker if we take a more direct route. Clinging to the vestiges of a Cold War foreign policy, alliances, or military force structure will delay the process and may prove dangerous, as we attempt to protect our interests with tools ill-designed or the task. Maintaining the full range of capabilities and forces that were created for one type of threat, because the future is unknown, or the world is a dangerous place is the height of timidity. Fear of the unknown is certainly rational. Irrational fear of the knowable is perpetuating ignorance.

Let us now move forward. Establishing those interests that are truly in support of the United States. Selecting foreign
policy objectives of our choosing, defending them from adversaries of our selection, in theaters that we have determined are important to our security.