Approved For Release 2004RI DP~ REPLY TO: DT-S 04!0010-1 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT memorandum SUBJECT: SUN STREAK Interim Report - 90104-A (U) DT-5 TO: DT 1. (S/NF/SK) Two remote viewing sessions were conducted on 22 October 1990, to provide Indication and Warning (I&W) information related to a possible preemptive strike by Iraqi forces against US and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. 2. (S/NF/SK) At this time, there are no indications of any plans and intentions by Iraqi forces to launch a preemptive attack against US and coalition forces located in Saudi Arabia. 3. (S/NF/SK) In reply to a request to surface political indicators to substantiate the reported lack of military aggression by Iraqi forces, Remote Viewer 079 perceived Saddam Hussein as intent on seeking a negotiated settlement to the crisis. Viewer 079 indicated that Egypt will play a significant role in the future in support of such a negotiated peace. According 079, Kuwait will not recapture its complete political identity; it will experience economical reversals as a result of the current crisis. More hostages are expected to be released in November (this data recently reported by the press). The United HANDLE VIA SKEET CHANNELS ONLY OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 (REV. 1-80) GSA FPMR (4t CFR)10t-11.6 5010-114 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP6-00789R000800110010-1 NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN 1 TIt,WI' Approved For Release m I 14_0181dood00110010-1 Nations (UN) will play an extensive and key role in the negotiated settlement of the crisis. The name "camaru/kamaru" surfaced phonetically; its significance, if any, is not further identified. A copy of 079's effort is at TAB A. 4. (S/NF/SK) Remote Viewer 049 also indicated there would be no preemptive strike launched by Iraqi forces against US and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia. When pressed to provide military indicators, his initial findings notwithstanding, 049 furnished a series of conceptual indicators that defied clear definition and identification. Tube-like structures (missiles?) appeared to dominate his reporting and sketching. The results of 049's session is at TAB B. 5. (S.NF/SK) OPS COMMENTS: Viewers 049 and 079 remain available to pursue and refine the raw data submitted in their respective summaries. SG1J Approved For Release 2004/0 L*P96~07,1j9RC08/ 0 SG1A Ilk Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000800110010-1 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000800110010-1 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000800110010-1 90104-A 901022 V: 079 S: 01 At this time, there is no imminent threat to US and coalition forces in the Middle East. Hussein will try to alleviate his problems thru negotiations. Hussein currently feels and thinks that he will be able to get what he wants thru negotiations. Even though Hussein will be thinking and feeling this way for the next three to five weeks, conditions and circumstances will still be intense for US and coalition forces. More hostages will be coming out of Kuwait in the November time frame. Kuwait will lose politically and economically when this crises is over. The old regime of Kuwait will not return. Egypt is a prime negotiating force in this crises and there are some factions within the Egyptian government that want more democracy in the region. Most of the current thrust of the situation is now at the United Nations Judicial system. The name "camaru/kamaru" phonetically surfaced. Approved For ReleaE TT RDP 6-0b /7P8 /9R000800110010-1 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000800110010-1 (tk6 (Al 0 -1 6a 12 /o37- ;: - q/2 LJ C, ~Lv 019, c W & 0 r4~ 77 ( / ( 14"? 6) u7 ld -Z40 )Ir6) CJ J-2-, 1417 IS C-6 /IA Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000800110010-1 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000800110010-1 V7(1c) if1 -"-Alp ved For elease 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000800110010-1 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000800110010-1 (~3 14 16 "i s 110 G X-A SSrc1vJ~ Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000800110010-1