SGFOIA3 it kk A forthcoming book on the secret military operations undertaken during the Reagan era provides an unmatched account of the nation's most classified intelligence and counterterrorist units. The result of a yearlong investigation into these Pentagon operations shows how, after the failure of the Iran rescue mission in 1980, covert operations shifted from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Pentagon, which, in effect, established a "mini-CIA" in its basement V F7"77-1- or the soldiers and officers on the C-141 BY tiamsport planc flying, westward across tile occan t o Virginia, there was probably STEVEN' no sadder moment. During the 14-hour EMERSON trip from Egypt back to the U.S., the U. Ne men. all members of an elite antiterrorist 11" Sit inned silerice. To be surc. 111C.N \~Clc _141r\ivois. but what was that wonh' On April 24~ 1980, they had conducted a i hi,,toric raid to free American hostages held in Iran. The mission failed, men were killed. And now, instead of a triumphal ride home alongside the liberated hostages, the soldiers were flying ba _i I ck risi ejiqe,_ALscp ._ ^b a Mbult ul 1,11C 1411111C V1 1,111Z 111111 llubtar'u- Adapted from his book, rescue mission at Dvsert One in 1980, the most Secret Warriors., Inside the fundamental. assumptions, about American. ef- Covert Military Opera'(ions forts to comb r sm. abroad came into of the Reagan Era, to. W. at on.. Ot q~esti ~-pu'bl1shedj)yG. Putnam's,--,, aged m6ir~ diffl'.., why Sons in April c., 24 couldn't the United Slates get its act together? It was a gnawing question. And a small group in the Pentagon quickly began wrestling with an answer. The Desert One operation threw U11114ru kipci kLtlull - alluw Jail U. t&Alu IL wuuiu be a model for the elite quick-strike units that would evolve., within the Pentagon in the ad- iministration j)f -Ronald 'I the ~pagark. jpdeed, U.S.NEWS &WORLD REPORT, March 21,1988 Approved For Release 2000/08/11 CIA-RDP96-00 92RO-0,0.5-00620M d e ease 20 0/08/11 CIA-RDP96-00792ROOD500620003-2 scandal. lio%k, for instanc ad,=~r~to.HL- 5, 44. 7, r "I'll1cl- pc: t 10: t,: 7 h W' dl_L,i!l1Cd Of b). tile late diiC~:10) Of W111A (M IiILTI (1) i,~f fi)1'4 C. llldjllo~~Ilcc, Williall) caseN. Intelhac=( ant! Securi- k suarclit of hostagn 1 ty Conirrinncf: I 1,e Ill ],]Tg(' 11MISUIC, thc ans%vers to these and I biaiich w"ili( Aom OtfiCr C]LICStiOll, can be found in an examination I tradiiionalli, rc. poii.~i- 1 of' the -wiliterror units developed in tile illrlff- b1c.1or it.~ b'1tc11~qc11c( I)CIII, al;d c1 it. -woll ill 111c 'Ificm-ILIfli (11-Ch of' tile Iran iescue mission. With the Central Intelligence Agency constrained on many Intelligence Support Ac- A- fronts, the Pentagon units seemed especially ap- tivity: The Pentagon's pealing. And each new success fed the appetite most classified intelli- for more. But herein lies the central paradox of gence-gathering and covert military operations. On the one hand, counterterrorism unit. they are valuable and necessary instruments for the United States in gathering intelligence and Joint Special fighting terrorism. On the other, covert actions Operations Command: have demonstrated a historical propensity for The umbrella military abuse, and there are decided limits facing those command in charge of inclined to action. Based on hundreds of inter- all military counterter- views and thousands of pages of documents ob- roristforces. tained under the Freedom of Information Act and from government sources, a yearlong inves- Seaspray. The classi- tigation of the still classified Pentagon units fied CIA -Army a via- provides the most detailed portrait to date of the tion unit. Seasproy has successes and failures of the U.S. military's se- participated in opera- cret warriors. Among the principal findings: tions in the Middle In 1985, while Colonel North and others in East, Grenada, Cen- thie administration were attempting to secure tral America and the release of the hostages in Beirut, U.S. intelli- SoutheastAsia. gence had located the house in which five of the six Americans were being held. A detailed mili- Snow Bird: The classi- tary rescue mission was planned in 1986, but it fied second 1980 Iran was scrapped when the Iran-Contra affair began rescue-mission effort to unfold (page 26). led by Air Force Maj. i~~s far back as 1981, intelligence agents from Gen. Richard Secord. the Pentagon relied on psychics, first to help determine the whereabouts of a kidnapped U.S. Special Operations III* -nn, st f general in Italy (page 28) and later to locate the sion: The A i af Beirut headqueatrters of the lnui-baclcd llczbol- oigam--a"loll 7'eSPo!,*Si- hil, organization, believed to be tile keepers of ble)-or coordinating special opera A nhy Following the terrorist bombing of the U.S. tions and countertei ~Iarinc b"Irracks in Beirut, ill which 241 Amer- rorist units. i(%1-'- died. ill,,, Pelitap'm !I, ul;lc I G ' 'I( I.I j \ e~llc )2~11 1~ ii",tJl I-'10h- QJIUi U-0tilh A lclw, and nrl-ange logistics for q possibIc smu/,[ Come ll~jltionilhv infaillow., ill 111L \\wJ1l_;,, days tor\ mission (page 31). Tile five-person tearl], Counterintelligence lie \vw, nti Air ForC-e ]Ill 01 including a fcnia~e agent named "Becky," spent unit. nam~ed Richard Secord. And lie wound up at more than a month combing the back alleys of the very heart of the Iran-Contra arms-for-bos- Beirut, devising several methods of infiltrating Yellow Fruit: The tages affair, the worst scandal of the Reagan commandos should a decision be made to go Army's classified oper- atiohal-secur:10&0~ after the terronsts.4 resid ency Vi 6ide_ gh s e a' i6iii ih MKn-&111&hc& ~.i6j&Vjt, al decision~bn ~,CW= 80WW 11he ntrary-.126xploited ikhe 1 o sup Wwait-_a,&r d -cnmi4a1 Jqoid' clo" di 3 t merits (ivfilkV ' d come as early as iliis'~vee the s ret Pentagon units to carry out covert Pentagon covert opera- coul it is clear now-despite more than a year of operations in Central America to further the tions. It became, how- Mquiries by congressional panels, a presidential cause of the Contra rebels fighting the Sandinis- ever, part ofan unau- review board and a special pr6secutor=4hat in Nicaragua. One such unit, thorized CIA cell in ta government te _,%',tTel16w'- -6itj A M ab 6"M the rmy. luch still is unknown out the origins of tt - V1 " was ultimately closed U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, M .arch 21, 1988 25 --- -- - A'0ji'eoVed_F6e'Re[eaSd 2000/08/11" CIA-RDP96--00792ROO0500620603-2 by Seaspray carrying commando units on an exercise of all the signal intelligence collected by the United States between 1982 and 1984-there were problems. And keeping the operation from becoming exposed was getting increasingly diffi- cult. So Longbofer and his aides decided to create a top-secret program that would provide additional operational security and counterintel- ligence for the Central American mission, as well as for other Army classified counterterror- ism and special-intelligence operations. The new program was code named Yellow Fruit. Yellow Fruit was unlike anything the Army had, done before. It would operate under com- mercial cover outside the Pentagon. Eventually, it would grow to a staff of nine, including coun- terintelligence agents, high-tech surveillance 1w ON t -;C, Ij',C IlOi I". 111 11 li! 1! T'l I 1 v. ill I It'll\ bli, f~ J opci ;'I I I I L' ~!N ~! L 0!, 111 Wl.Ci~l I C411 14 1 b (.11 ill JUI BIld! 01)('11,~! ill S Ll C 0 C 11 C o I c I u1c drivc from thc Peuta-on. Yello\N 1-rui( L, members projected the appearance of a very .successful business, but the money was flowing perhaps too easily. Indeed, maintaining cover became a license to spend money extravagantly. Too close for comfort There were other complications as well. From th.- low point it had reached during the Iran rescue mission, the trust between the CIA and the Defense Department had gradually been re- stored, Through the successful covert operations run by the Special Operations Division, the Army demonstrated to the CIA its seemingly unlimited amounts of money, skilled manpower, modern equipment and ability to work under deep cover. But with increasing pressure from the CIA to get the secret units more deeply involved in Central America, Secretary of the Army John Marsh thought the relationship was becoming too close. On March 9, 1983, Marsh sent an unusual build it by the next morning-before workers arrived. Arriving in West Germany through other countries to avoid being fol- lowed, the QRT agents met their mili- tary-intelligence colleagues who had arranged for them to enter the Opel ot niCht by bribinF security A U'~ell workillp at tflz- plant for some t~ tj it. i-osin'- e. , 2R,,Tkish worker, l3v "Z-1, rl t r 1;;,.,~ J jll IhC was by destroying the car. By morn- ing, the QRT had finished its job. Soon thereafter, the Soviets took de- livery. U.S. intelligence operatives trailed it to monitor sensitive conver- sations, and followed the Soviets as flicy comacted local ngents. Thc nni~- SiOll XVil 1.~(l SLICCC.,Sful (ha*. a nuillbc,, several Ru~ ian codes were brol~el','. Ultin-latch sinorc tlmil a dn;~en So\ ict I,-1_, CL 1'~ V, ~:l S11 j ell o7LI" 1 1 01.'~F, . c C11 (11, - lo firl"` t,ht clevjce~, had to bc i;i the structure. Methodically, the agents took the car apart'and inserted the transmitter into the chassis. in the microthin U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 21, 1988 I lJoille of C, C! I)-. Oj-o fun-ibled b,ld.!~, Tv,(~ unprnn(ci lp-nt, I. gan making their way across the y4rd of a lux- urious Noriega residence near Panama City when suddenly a chorus of fierce barks from ing a bug in a, lavish I apartment. But na. failed.to vield cutl:- oil:~!) to ally w$_. U., [-,I!:: I'll, t1v T(, ltn, r VL~)' rinu,~Iy, all(l withk:1 days tion. At night, a 500-man battalion was dis- patched to the area, and soldiers quietly took up positions around the house. At dawn, the ca- rabinlerl launched an as- sault on the home. They found an Innocent Italian family living there. Dozier finally was res- cued after U.S. Army counterintelliconce aaonts, w1l'o, hat! hSor; sions of Rural bripads nletnhcrs, locatc, 2-~: apartutwit that was U~. Ing far mait; electricity than it had over the past few months. At around noon on January 28. 10 Italian antiterrorlsl: corn- mandoe raided the place. thoritles enthusiastically thanked the Italians. Publicly, they main- talned, no U.S. assis- tance had been given. 29 Approved For Release 2000/08/11 CIA-RDP96-00792ROO0500620003-2 General Dozier J lt:L b~~IIE th" rank1:,,r- U.S. L's Swtji fik~r~- N Vco,l,,, llu;!y. At 5:311 1%;_ El_ standing outside the door Identified them- selves as plumbers and said that a leak from Uo- zler's bathroom was causing water to seep Into the apartment be- low. Just after the gen- eral lot them in, two oth- er "plumbers" appeared carrying a trunk. Dozier was put In It. Several hours later, the Red Brigades terror- Ist organization claimed credit for Dozier's abduc- Von. Dozier was the first American and first U.S. military officer kid- napped by terrorists. And the Pentagon under- took a massive opera- Von, code named Winter Harvest, to find the gen- eral. it wouldn't be easy. A detachment from the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) was able to lock onto the radio transmissions between thu terrorists. And. wit!i h.- " 1ru.;. V!, 11:2ti-'..-' Securit. Agency, ISA ha~ y holl.or! the Italians to lu ca' e 0 scricc of 11101 r-i -200R111q11 1,: CIA-RDPH ,.9P Ing ugure eigT,907~9 cw Mz) ;0 as I n I-T 'acl' r W I CV V _61~171 s,-T~W 7o 77' T vill-fo- It 0 nicj;l kid the pl;mc becii shol doNN n. or ha~.11 it 1 lls ~Noul~ 11,111I)CII lo ii flip,111 collirolicd I,; T u cord iii ()1 1. 19,~10-- 11w [ ]:Il miJ (1(.I1\ 'IT.N Coll I IQ",l iolt. ll~:ppik Ili,- Ilev, divisiol), lhelk: werc no Such filul vp~,. And 0101.1211 Ilic ofticcrs iuvolvcd dial MIT 1 1: - ih~, it ~! III,-. lime. thc~-. sllccc~,, I]! 111),11 1""; lh~_ bc~;illlilllg o1 Ific Rczl~,'.W1 i1cIllIkIl"Ifil- tion's covert operation to destabilize the Sandi- nista regime and aid the Contras. It was an impressive beginning. The CIA had turned first to the supersecret National Security Agency, which, coordinates and conducts elec- tronic intelligence around the world. But the NSA could not do the job, because any ground stations it could set up would be ineffective in monitoring constantly moving transmitters. Enter the Special Operations Division. It leased a Beechcraft King Air 100, a versatile airplane with a range of 1,200 nautical miles, and flew it to Nashua, N.H., where the division paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to an electronics firm to install state-of-the-art com- munications, electronic eavesdropping and aeri- al-reconnaissance equipment so sensitive that it could piak up ground radio communications even when flying at altitudes above 25,000 feet. Seaspray then transported the plane to San Pe- II, 11s, 011011'. to 11!1~', bme-. the pcntauor~ even turned to psychics. Many were interviewed at the Pentagon, and a half dozen were sent to Raly. one P w sr chic siffivred in Vincenza 'ind desc6ed'& rmittair'y officials his vision of where Dozier was being held captive- 1 see a small house. made of 28 Quick Response: The custom Star Wars choppers dro Sula, and the mission began. According t( NSA sources, the intelligence "take" was phe- nomenal. Electronic recordings showing rebel locations and their planned attacks were for- warded to NSA for dispatch to the Salvadoran government. Under the code name "Queens Hunter," the mission lasted three years, moni- toring suspected cross-border intrusions and weapons-supply routes in addition to communi- cations between Sandinista forces in Nicaragua and leftist rebels in El Salvador and Honduras. Yellow Fruit blossoms Despite the spectacular success-the Army's electronic-eavesdropping operation, according to NSA sources, would account for 70 percent Bugging Soviet cars and Panamanian abodes ne of the most impressive of the Penta- gon's secret units was the Quick Reaction Team. A small and elite team, QRT spe- ci~flized in electronic surveillance. It scored -Y)Ille stulill.ing successes. Onc of the biggesi I- \o1ved the Soviet military aitach6s stationed ill NVesiGerniany. Looking for new Nva~s to spy l_III0btrLISiVC1V' oil the SOvicts ill 1981, Arnl~' I'll to ~11 0i". orl'lci~!l of the sovict li~li,,on teilm llicl or- dcred Ili American Chevrolei. Arniv a elits ill- tcrcepted the car and outfitted it with ea),es- dropping transmitters built into the interior. To wire other cars, Army intelligence de- T Y a so-. U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 21, 1988