Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788ROO1200410008-7
            . TAB .I
            Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788ROO1200410008-7

            

    Approved For Release n1A ODP96-00788ROO1200410008-7
    81@MET
                                             20 Dec 79
    SUBJECT: Establishment of INSCOM GRILL FLAME Task Force (U)
    1. (S) In response to DCG-I comments concerning the size of the recommended
    task force for project GRILL FLAMEt the following information is submitted
    to provide additional data upon which to make a decision.
         a. I want to re-emphasize that the recommended action calls for the
    establishment of a taslk for e not a TDA unit. If the project develops and
    proves worthwhile, Then the'FY82 POM submission that we have made should
    take care of establishing a TDA unit at the appropriate time.
         b. Project Manager (PM) - Operations Officer: It is essential that one
    individual be available and responsible for mana ing the day-to-day activities.
    The PM, on an average, is unavailable 40% of the time. Working group meetings,
    both DA and DOD, and liaison with other elements working in this field keep the
    PM fully occupied. The project needs someone to interface with the various
    intelligence elements they are working with. The Operations Officer, among
    other responsibilities, must maintain the unit's scheduling activities and
    insure that any given requirement is being "attacked" with the proper resources.
         c. Analyst Positions: We have carefully selected the individuals involved
    to insure that we would have representation from each of the disciplines. Each
    of the analysts will have several roles within the task force: all are
    individuals who will be doing remote viewing; all are individuals who are being
    trained as interviewers thereby giving us the capability of doing multiple
    sessions at the same time. We realize that there is an element of danger in
    having analysts also doing remote viewing. However, internally we have taken
    the necessary steps to insure that proper compartmentation is maintained and
    by doubling up on functions we are able to keep down man-power requirements.
    d. Secretary Position: Plain and simple - one secretary cannot keep up
    with the work-load. We have training reports over I month old still waiting
    to be typed (current secretary has worked paid overtime and has given consider-
    able free time in an effort to reduce this back-log). The current operational
    task (Iran) has generated enough work to keep two secretaries busy without
    even considering other aspects of the program. In fact, when a second
    secretary has not been available it has me-ant that reports that might contain
    meaningful information have been delayed'up to a week from reaching the customer.
    As a reminder, each session is completely taped and all reports typed verbatim;
    which adds up to a lot of required typing support.
         e. Training Officer/NCO Positions: TAG training officer is essential to
    the development of the program and he also serves as one of the primary
    interviewers. The NCO doubles as a remote viewer. He also helps in collating
    the data obtained from the sessions and is responsible for maintaining the
    training chartst briefing aids and our weekly status summaries. Basically,
    he serves as the senior administrative chief and assists in developing training
    procedures. Also, he is responsible for maintaining all equipment that belongs
    to the element.
    SECRET
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     Approved For Release 2c&E/GRETP96-00788RO01 200410008-7
     2. Summary: I have carefully scrubbed and re-scrubbed this proposed
     task force and feel that the request is justified in keeping with current
     man-power constraints and yet providing INSCOM with the necessary assets to
     fully explore and develop this potentially tremendous intelligence collection
     program. According to various officials (Dr. Laberge, Dr. Verona among them)
     it's our @ro@ram which is leadinq the way for the Intelligence Community.
     Wi e high visibility it-has, INSCOM can not afford to "fail" for want
     of proper support. Request that our rather modest task force requirements
     be approved as originally given.
     CHAD B. WHITE
     Colonel, GS
     ADCSOPS-HUMINT
     SECRET
     Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788ROO1200410008-7