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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/29/2006

To: Washington Field

Attn: [redacted]

SSA [redacted]
Counterterrorism/WMD/DOU SSA
[redacted]

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From: Washington Field

AMX 3

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) - 1603

Title: AMERITHRAX
Major Case 184

Synopsis: To provide a periodic update regarding the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft. Detrick, MD. Building [redacted] Suites [redacted]. These suites are known locations for work with and storage of *Bacillus anthracis* Ames.

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[redacted]

(1834)

[redacted]

Details: For a comprehensive overview of Suite [redacted] activity, co-worker observations, unidentified individual identification, fermentors usage, Ames sample issues, Genealogy, and [redacted] Lyophilized *Ba*, the following individuals have been interviewed in this effort: [redacted]

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[redacted]

Currently pending interviews include: [redacted]

Suites [redacted]

Individuals were interviewed to determine unusual suite activity in the laboratory. [redacted] provided the following information regarding [redacted] actions [redacted] [sic] had legitimate access to [redacted] but would [redacted] to avoid the hassle of having to shower out of [redacted] and then shower into [redacted]. No one recalled any unknown individuals or unusual

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 09/26/2006

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activity in Suites [redacted] No dry powder work was observed in Suites [redacted] or in other locations at USAMRIID. It was believed that this type of work would not go unnoticed. It was mentioned, however, that there was a benchtop SpeedVac in several locations used to dry small quantities of material for analysis.²

Fermentor

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Identification and tracking of fermentors in place at USAMRIID positively identified one fermentor as having been in place in Building [redacted] Room [redacted] around the time of the anthrax mailings. Additional fermentors of interest have been identified for location, materials used, and operator with an undetermined final disposition date. The fermentors ranged in volume from 150-Liters to 5-Liters. The two largest fermentors were manufactured by New Brunswick Inc. and were not portable. These could not likely have been used in a discreet manner. The 5-L fermentor also manufactured by New Brunswick was lent to [redacted] by Bruce Ivins. [redacted] indicated the New Brunswick fermentors were likely to predate 2001.³ Further analysis would be required to determine which fermentors were up and running between 09/11/01 and 10/9/2001.

Ames Samples

Interviews were conducted to determine Ames distribution, disposal, and storage as performed by personnel. Within the [redacted] Division it was general knowledge that *Ba* Ames was stored in Suites [redacted] [redacted] recalled [redacted] being cluttered with flasks and plates containing prepared media; [redacted] believed spore solutions of anthrax were stored there as well. Two -70°C freezers were located in the hallways of Suites [redacted] Any researcher with access to the suites had access to the freezers and their contents.

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There were no sign-in/sign-out procedures and it was at the discretion of the individual investigator to control the dissemination of their materials. In [redacted] interview [redacted] stated that [redacted] did not remember signing any paper work in order to receive Ames samples from Ivins.⁴ [redacted] believed [redacted] worked with *Ba* Ames received from [redacted] [redacted] worked with *Ba* Ames from [redacted] and believed it originated from Ivins, [redacted] [redacted] was uncertain as to whether or not [redacted] received virulent Ames from Ivins or [redacted] but mentioned it was possible.

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There was no consistent method for the disposal of materials, as many researchers would autoclave their own waste, while others would leave items in or around the autoclave until it reached capacity.

Genealogy

Interviews were conducted to discriminate between Ba Ames samples by tracking dissemination of spore stocks and dilutions, specifically RMR 1029 "Dugway Spores" because of its commonalities with the Ames strain used in the anthrax mailings of 2001. The flask labeled "RMR 1029 GLP Ames Spores Oct 97" could not be definitively identified, although several individuals did recognize the handwriting to be similar to that of Ivins. Due to the volume of glassware in and around Building 1425 and Building 1412, no one could place this flask at a particular location or time frame. [redacted] maintained a copy of the Reference Material Receipt (RMR) 1029 after receipt of a couple of milliliters of Ba Ames from Ivins and because [redacted] had earlier observed [redacted] maintain a similar document in [redacted] notebook. [redacted] indicated that Ivins did not record the Ba Ames transferred to him. Ivins also provided a tube containing approximately one milliliter of a purified 10⁹ concentrated sample of Ba Ames for a 2001 challenge in which [redacted] assisted [redacted]

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[redacted] Lyophilized Ba

In the Building [redacted] Suite [redacted] walk-in refrigerator, two Nunc boxes containing lyophilization vials were found. The depicted handwriting on the boxes stated, [redacted] [redacted] This location was utilized by [redacted] for sample storage. [redacted] stated that [redacted] were assigned a project to [redacted] but did not recognize the vials. [redacted] recognized the box of vials and acknowledged the writing on the box was [redacted] own. [redacted] indicated the vials must have been there before [redacted] arrived [redacted] came across the vials during an inventory of Suite [redacted] It has not been determined where the material in the vials was lyophilized.

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Observation of Coworkers

Observations provided by the interviewees were to include the name of persons they had direct contact with in the

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suites, with additional observations including information about [redacted] Ivins and [redacted]

There were no unusual activities or statements made by co-workers that would lead interviewees to suspect someone's involvement in the anthrax mailings of 2001.

Interviewees that knew [redacted] did not mention any unusual behaviors performed by [redacted]

It was known to many researchers that [redacted]

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[redacted] No one witnessed [redacted] allowing unfettered access to [redacted] lab or other [redacted] Suites to individuals not permitted to be there. It is believed all of [redacted] work was done with attenuated strains of anthrax and was in accordance with [redacted] duties. In an interview [redacted] stated that [redacted] did not have a good relationship with Ivins.⁹

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[redacted] was mostly described as a competent worker who was supportive of individuals. No one made mention of [redacted] involvement with any unusual activity. [redacted] was described as [redacted] about Ivins regarding his desire to be in control of his work life because [redacted] was in control of his home life.¹⁰

Ivins was described as odd by many individuals. It was further explained that he may be socially inept, but that he was in general a "good" guy. No one believed that his personality translated to his work in a negative way. Ivins was described as professionally competent, intelligent, and someone who liked to joke around. No one mentioned witnessing any unusual activities performed by him.

Investigative Goals

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Ongoing initiatives include: interviewing the remaining individuals, detailing the activities of individuals who accessed the containment areas of Suites [redacted] from approximately 9/1/2001 to 10/15/2001 using detailed analysis of time and attendance schedules and keycard access records, and lab notebook reviews to conduct a comparative study of the timeline versus statements made in interviews for significant persons. Information will be plotted in chart format by the general analysts. The [redacted] individuals identified as having accessed the [redacted] [redacted] between 9/1/2001 and 10/15/2001 are: [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

As more information is developed during this initiative, goals will be reevaluated as needed.

The investigation is continuing.

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- 1.(U) FD-302 of [REDACTED] (01-23-06) - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1463
- 2.(U) FD-302 of [REDACTED] (02-13-06) - Sub POI Serial 1487
- 3.(U) EC to WFO from WFO (09-07-06) - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1598.
- 4.(U) FD-302 of [REDACTED] (01-23-06) - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1463
- 5.(U) FD-302 of [REDACTED] (02-13-06) - Sub POI Serial 1487
- 6.(U) FD-302 of [REDACTED] (01-23-06) - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1463
- 7.(U) FD-302 of [REDACTED] (02-13-06) - Sub 302 Serial 4561
- 8.(U) FD-302 of [REDACTED] (03-15-06) - Sub USAMRIID Serial 1520
- 9.(U) FD-302 of [REDACTED] (02-13-06) - Sub POI Serial 1487
- 10.(U) FD-302 of [REDACTED] (03-29-06) - Sub 302 Serial 4678

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/02/2006

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To: Washington Field

Attn: Amerithrax

From: Washington Field
Amerithrax-2

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936 Sub Sci18 (Pending) -4
279A-WF-222936 Sub USAMRIID (Pending) -1605 ✓

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Reference: 279A-WF-222936-Sci18 Serial 3
279A-WF-222936-Sci18 Serial 2

Synopsis: To compile all information regarding the distribution of Ames strain stock RMR-1029 which tested positive for genotypes A1, A3, and D.

Enclosure: A one (1) page spreadsheet of quantities, dates, researchers, and reference serials/notebooks of *Bacillus anthracis* spore production transfers of RMR-1029 spore material.

Details: By way of background, in July, 2006 an investigative initiative was established to compile all information regarding the genealogy of Ames strain samples testing positive for genotypes A1, A3, and D. It was subsequently determined that all samples testing positive for the A1, A3, and D genotypes were identified as being sub-samples of RMR-1029.

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On 09/21/2006 and 09/22/2006 SAs [REDACTED] conducted a detailed review of inventory for RMR-1029, provided by Bruce Ivins, FD-302s, electronic communications, and subpoenaed material such as scientific notebooks and 11r

[REDACTED] 27506a.ec

To: Laboratory From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 10/02/2006

material transfer paperwork in order to substantiate all transfers of RMR-1029 spore material from the time of its inception on 10/22/1997 through the window of opportunity for the second anthrax mailing in October of 2001.

Noted transfers of material were substantiated using laboratory notebooks 3745, 3945, 4000, 4010, 4237, and 4251. A final AMERITHRAX-2 developed inventory control sheet was generated taking into account transfers of material as well as material used for quality assurance testing and within lab (Ivins' scientific group) animal challenges which were not originally identified on the maintained inventory for RMR-1029.

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Log Date	Quantity (mL)	Recieipient	Comment	References
03/17/98	unknown	Bruce Ivins	Microscopic examinations/encapsulation study	See pages 73-78, notebook 4010
03/20/98	3		Spores irradiated for endotoxin/phenol analysis	See page [redacted] notebook [redacted]
05/13/98	unknown		Protocol D98-03 under [redacted]	FD-302 sub-USAMRIID #1472 dated 1/24/06 and EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006
09/17/98			Aerisolization study	See page [redacted] notebook [redacted]
03/16/99	1	Bruce Ivins	On 3/16/1999 Bruce determined the CFU of RMR-1029. Determined to be 2.3×10^{10} /ml.	See page 91, notebook 4010
03/23/99	1	Ivins [redacted]	B97-05, sub-cutaneous injection	See [redacted] Notebook [redacted] page [redacted]
03/24/99	unknown		Washed spores-- 2.3×10^{10} /ml--> 2×10^8 /ml	See FD-302 sub-USAMRIID #1489
04/27/99	unknown	Ivins [redacted]	Sub-cutaneous injection	See [redacted] Notebook [redacted] page [redacted]
05/05/99	2		Projected aerisolization study--postponed	See page [redacted] notebook [redacted]
05/11/99	1	Ivins [redacted]	Sub-cutaneous injection	See [redacted] Notebook [redacted] page [redacted]
05/19/99	unknown	Ivins [redacted]	Sub-cutaneous injection	See [redacted] notebook [redacted] page [redacted]
08/19/99	unknown	Bruce Ivins	B97-03, sub-cutaneous injection	See Ivins notebook #3745 page 68
10/15/99	unknown		Aerisolization study	FD-302 sub-USAMRIID #1472 dated 1/24/06 and EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006
02/22/00	6		[redacted] (Irradiated)	See [redacted] Notebook [redacted] page [redacted]
03/22/00	8		[redacted]	See [redacted] Notebook [redacted] mentioned page on [redacted]
04/03/00	75		B00-003 Part 1	See Page [redacted] notebook [redacted] and EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006
06/29/00	1		<i>anthracis</i> death using fixative/Gm killing	See page [redacted] notebook [redacted]
07/07/00	40		B00-003 Part 2	See EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006
07/10/00	unknown		Repeat EM experiment	See page [redacted] notebook [redacted]
08/28/00	40		For DARPA mass spec project with JHU-APL	See FD-302 sub-302, #3605 dated 4/15/2003
12/04/00	100		F00-11 Bioport	See EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006
03/07/01	0.5		University of New Mexico. Samples submitted to the repository were negative for A1, A3, and D! Note: UNM's Biosafety level (BSL) 3 suite was not ready for laboratory work at the time this sample was shipped. The <i>Ba</i> was placed in storage until after the 2001 anthrax attacks, when the BSL-3 suite was completed.	See Sub 302 Serial 4309, MAIN Serial 6492, Sub Lab Serial 1266. USAMRIID Form 11r indicates that the sample was 1029, shipped on 3/7/01 but the conc. listed was 3×10^9 /ml, and tested at 7×10^8 /ml by [redacted] Ivins added this on 4/9/04, going over the 11r forms he realized the omission from the log and added it. The concs., omission from the log, and neg. genetic assays indicate that the sample was not actually RMR-1029. See Notebook #4000 Page 42.
04/06/01	60		B00-003 Part 3	See EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006
05/01/01	90		Battelle	Form 11r indicates 50 ml of spores (3.9×10^{10} /ml) were sent!
06/15/01	50		Battelle	Form 11r indicates 30 ml of spores (3.9×10^{10} /ml) were sent!
07/09/01	50	Ivins	B00-003 Part 4	See EC sub-USAMRIID #1456, dated 01/11/2006
08/27/01	5			See EC sub-USAMRIID #785, dated 05/11/2004
10/04/01	10		Aerisolization study	See EC sub-USAMRIID #795 and sub-MAIN 6263

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/04/2006

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On October 2, 2006, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), office number [redacted] was interviewed at Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] confirmed the existence of a unit called the Elite Rover Observer Force (EROF) at USAMRIID which falls under the supervision of the Biosurety Officer. [redacted]

[redacted] advised, to the best of [redacted] recollection, the EROF was initially created shortly after September 11, 2001, as a response by USAMRIID management to increase the level of security in the labs. [redacted] X23

The EROF was originally [redacted] back in 2001 and [redacted] recalled that approximately [redacted]

[redacted] The EROF is staffed totally by soldiers who are tasked with conducting random and unannounced observations of research activity within the Biosafety Level-2 (BSL) and BSL-3 suites in Buildings 1412 and 1425. The observations are conducted on all shifts and the times of observation are kept a secret from non-EROF personnel. Due to safety concerns, EROF personnel are not permitted into BSL-4 areas to conduct spot observations. Observations are accomplished by merely peering into the various labs from hallway or door windows, making note of any work place activity that appears suspicious or unusual. [redacted] reiterated EROF personnel do not enter laboratories within the containment suites rather they merely peer into the labs from the hallway. Also, not all EROF personnel were vaccinated and as such wore respirators while walking down the hallways in the BSL-3 containment suites.

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Investigation on 10/02/2006 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1608 Date dictated n/a

by SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/04/2006, Page 2

_____ advised that since its inception back in 2001, the EROF's role at USAMRIID has somewhat diminished due to the installation of video cameras throughout the various labs in Building 1425. However, Building 1412 still has a significant number of labs which have not been equipped with video cameras and therefore continues to receive a lot of attention from the EROF.

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_____ was specifically asked if _____ had any recollection of former USAMRIID _____ named _____. _____ confirmed knowing _____ and offered that _____ appeared to _____. _____ advised that _____ however, _____ did not appear to have any malicious intentions. As far as work is concerned, _____ frequently worked _____ in the labs and _____ was not sure why.

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_____ an _____ and was primarily worn when conducting research in _____ lab suites. _____ advised that these suits are not required to be worn when conducting research with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba). _____ explained that Ba is categorized as a BSL-2 level biological agent; however, USAMRIID for safety reasons, classifies Ba as a BSL-3 organism. _____ advised that the Safety Office at USAMRIID maintains records as to the assignment of these suits.

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_____ recalled working on a project with _____. _____ has not seen _____ in a while and believes _____ is currently residing in _____. _____ indicated that _____ may be able to locate a phone number for _____ but that USAMRIID employee _____ would also be able to provide a current number for _____ because _____

_____ was asked to explain the process at USAMRIID pertaining to environmental swabbing of the various labs. _____ advised that environmental swabbing is conducted in the various

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 10/04/2006, Page 3

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labs on a weekly basis and is done by the suite supervisors or their designee. There are no outside validation studies conducted on the environmental swabbing efforts. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The weekly swabbing is an in-house quality assurance safety program which was developed back in 2002 as a result of a *Ba* exposure incident involving BRUCE IVINS and the FBI's anthrax laced letter evidence. [redacted] advised that since the 2002 incident, all floors have to be mopped weekly with bleach and all of the linens have to be autoclaved prior to leaving USAMRIID for the off site laundry. Contract custodians are prohibited from entering any [redacted] and [redacted] suites.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 10/24/2006

The following investigation was conducted by SA [redacted] in rooms [redacted] at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland on October 5, 2006:


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BRUCE EDWARD IVINS, born April 22, 1946, advised that every female FBI Special Agent (SA) that he has encountered is very attractive. This includes SAs [redacted] and [redacted]. IVINS believes that the FBI intentionally hires attractive female SAs so that they will be more effective interviewers of male suspects. IVINS indicated that [redacted] thought that SA [redacted] is attractive.

IVINS asked SA [redacted] what the standard issue weapons of FBI SAs were upon their completion of the FBI academy. IVINS indicated that he had just returned from North Carolina where he was visiting his brother.

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IVINS is happy that his laboratory, room [redacted] Building [redacted] USAMRIID, now has a keypad on the door controlling access to the lab. IVINS believes that both the keypad and the cameras installed in his lab are a good thing, particularly given the fact that there are so many anthrax spores currently stored there.



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[redacted].302
~~.302~~

Investigation on 10/05/2006 at Fort Detrick, Maryland


File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1614 Date dictated NA

by SA [redacted]

SA



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SA

BACK

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6 Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 10/12/2006
b7C

To: Washington Field Attn: [redacted]
SSA [redacted]
SSA [redacted]

b6 From: Washington Field
b7C AMX-3
Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) - 1615

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To report results of investigation.

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Details: Special Agent (SA) [redacted]
[redacted] examined available telephonic records in an attempt to identify particular telephone extensions to exact locations at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland. Investigation was hampered by the following technical considerations:

- Historical USAMRIID telephone records were maintained in a batch format by year encompassing the period of time between 1997 and 2005
- The location of a particular extension in many instances changed over time.
- Some records are accurate and reflect the USAMRIID building number, as well as a particular location (i.e. Room B413); however, in many instances the room location field is blank or was otherwise not recorded.

Although available records were in many instances incomplete, a substantial volume of intelligence value was gleaned pertaining to USAMRIID building 1425. A query of available electronic records for "1425" and "USAMRIID" met with 921 results. A thorough examination of the same has definitively identified the twenty-one (21) unique telephone numbers to locations within USAMRIID 1425 germane to the above captioned investigation:

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[redacted]
2-3

[redacted] 2852. EC
[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/12/2006

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[redacted] Division Numbers:

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>LOCATIONS</u>	<u>YEAR</u>
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

A query of the above mentioned numbers in [redacted] met with negative results; whereas, a query in [redacted] database for the same met with positive results for [redacted]

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[redacted] is definitively associated as an alternate work number for Dr. BRUCE E. IVINS (279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1345).

Writer recognizes it is likely other extensions are/were associated with particular rooms within the [redacted] hot suites; however, available records do not permit one to definitively associate a particular extension to a particular location other than the above mentioned six (6) numbers.

[redacted] Numbers:

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>LOCATIONS</u>	<u>YEAR</u>
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/12/2006

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[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

A query of [redacted] met with negative results; whereas, a query in [redacted] database for the same met with positive results for [redacted] as well as [redacted]

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[redacted] was the listed work telephone of [redacted] [redacted] (279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 114). It should be noted [redacted] access investigation was concluded on 12/15/2003; no derogatory information was discovered.

[redacted] was the listed work telephone of [redacted] [redacted] (279A-WF-222936-[redacted] Serial 984). [redacted] [redacted]

was not employed at USAMRIID until after the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001; however, as it relates to the [redacted] access to room [redacted] and the rest of the [redacted] not suite may warrant further investigation. Writer will contact the Pittsburgh Division Case Agent and inform the same.

[redacted] Area Numbers:

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NUMBER	LOCATIONS	YEAR
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

A query in [redacted] met with negative results; whereas, a query in [redacted] database for the same met with positive results for [redacted] (279A-WF-222936-LAB, Serial 1076, 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, Serial 1271, as well as a [redacted] document dated [redacted]

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As it relates to the AMERITHRAX investigation, [redacted] has been linked to the [redacted] at USAMRIID, and specifically [redacted] circa [redacted] Previous AMERITHRAX reporting identifies [redacted] work number as the same. It should be noted the same reporting identified [redacted] has a USAMRIID point of contact for foreign visiting scientist (FVS); investigation

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/12/2006

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produced no derogatory information pertaining to [] or [] FVS; furthermore, investigation determined [] did not access or attempt to access locations at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* while stationed at USAMRIID.

A printout of the above mentioned '921 electronic records pertaining to USAMRIID building 1425 (242 pages) will be sent to FBIHQ for uploading into the AMERITHRAX Major Case Database. Intelligence value gleaned from examination of available electronic records pertaining to USAMRIID building 1412 will be address under a separate communication.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/10/2006

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

AMX-2

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) - 1619

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To report results of investigation.

Details: Special Agent (SA) [redacted] completed an investigation pertaining to former United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) employee, [redacted] [Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted]]. The investigation was predicated upon [redacted] access to location(s) at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*.

Knowledge and Experience:

[redacted] graduated with a [redacted] degree in [redacted] from [redacted]. Concurrent to [redacted] undergraduate education, [redacted] was also [redacted]. Upon graduation from [redacted] University in [redacted] [redacted] attended [redacted] College for [redacted] before transferring to [redacted] graduated from the University of [redacted] with a [redacted] degree in [redacted]. Upon graduation [redacted] Upon completion of [redacted] reported to [redacted] USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] was assigned to the [redacted] from [redacted] through [redacted] where [redacted] was a [redacted]

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[redacted] 2421.EC

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/10/2006

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This is the only time period [redacted] had access to the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* prior to the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001.

Access:

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[redacted] laboratory was located in USAMRIID building [redacted] room [redacted] research did not pertain to *Bacillus anthracis*; rather, [redacted]

[redacted] has never worked with the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* or any of its components. [redacted] laboratory was "cold," and contained no Select Agents. [redacted] advised [redacted] was in the [redacted] and [redacted] hot suites on a handful of occasions.

[redacted] account of [redacted] suite activity was verified via available USAMRIID keycard access records. A thorough review of [redacted] USAMRIID keycard access records indicated [redacted] entered the [redacted] hot suite via the [redacted] keypad once on [redacted] and [redacted] during normal business hours. USAMRIID keycard access records for [redacted] indicated no unusual "after hour" activity nor any attempts to access other location(s) at USAMRIID known to contain the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*.

[redacted] indicated [redacted] entered the [redacted] suites in an effort to obtain [redacted] conducted no "bench work" pursuant to this effort; rather watched an individual he referred to as a [redacted] then later, [redacted] watched the same [redacted] [redacted] recalled [redacted] also entered the [redacted] suite to conduct equipment inventory; however, available keycard access records do not support [redacted] contention [redacted] conducted equipment inventories within the [redacted] hot suite.

[redacted] keycard access records indicated occasional "piggybacking": specifically, during normal business hours, into the [redacted] change room on [redacted] as well as out of the [redacted] change room [redacted] On 06/30/1999 [redacted] keycard access records indicated [redacted] did not have sufficient time to enter either the [redacted] hot suite and abscond with the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* before [redacted] next recorded keycard activity.

[redacted] advised [redacted] never left the [redacted] hot suite with the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* or any other Select Agent, nor did any one ask [redacted] to do so. No evidence or allegation(s) were discovered to refute [redacted] statement.

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Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/10/2006

B3/B4 Specific Intelligence:

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Although USAMRIID keycard access records did not support [] contention of additional [] hot suite access pursuant to equipment inventories, [] was knowledgeable of the following:

To the best of [] knowledge access to the [] hot suites was electronically controlled via a unique Personal Identification Number (PIN). [] was unaware as to the existence of a "generic" code one would use to covertly enter the B3/B4 hot suites.

Although "piggybacking" occurred at USAMRIID, [] never observed anyone ever piggybacking into the [] hot suite.

[] never observed anyone from another Division, specifically the Virology Division, within the [] hot suite.

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[] indicated [] could not recall observing any additional fermentors located within the [] hot suites aside from the "big one" in the [] suite. [] never observed a lyophilizer within the [] hot suite. The only lyophilizer [] recalled was in the [] suites. This lyophilizer was not a large port-style lyophilizer; rather, a small bench top type.

The [] Division's Select Agents were stored in freezers located within the hallways of the [] hot suites. To [] recollection these freezers were locked via a combination padlock, similar to what one would observe on a gym locker. [] had no knowledge as to which freezer(s) contained the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*.

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[] Specific Co-workers:

[] noted since leaving USAMRIID [] has been a regular attendee of [] Per [] [] had told [] that [] believed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was listening to [] home and work telephonic conversations.

Per [] prior to 2001 Bruce Ivins was a jovial guy with a good sense of humor and personality. [] noted that since 2001 and specifically the FBI investigation of the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001, Ivins's personality has change. [] opined the FBI investigation has taken an emotional toll on

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/10/2006

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Ivins. Per [redacted] Ivins also stated he believed the FBI was listening to his telephonic home and work conversations.

[redacted] interacted with [redacted] on three occasions.

Knowledge of [redacted]

[redacted] recalled one instance when [redacted] was walking by [redacted] division office. [redacted] introduced [redacted] to [redacted] and spoke about [redacted] book which was on [redacted] desktop, [redacted].
[redacted] Pertaining to the other two occasions, [redacted] had no derogatory information to report; however, noted on [redacted] observed [redacted].
[redacted]
[redacted] saw [redacted] exiting USAMRIID [redacted].
[redacted]

[redacted] advised [redacted] had no knowledge of [redacted] interacting at USAMRIID or socially.

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A thorough review of available 2001 residential telephone records pertaining to [redacted] was unremarkable. Furthermore, a query of [redacted] met with negative results.

Connectivity to New Jersey:

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[redacted] stated [redacted] did not travel to New Jersey in 2001. A thorough review of residential telephone records, as well as credit card statements pertaining to [redacted] indicate no connectivity to New Jersey, specifically there was no evidence [redacted] called anyone or anything in New Jersey in 2001, nor was there any evidence of interstate travel to New Jersey in 2001.

Time line

Investigation and interview determined [redacted] had no interstate travel in 2001, specifically [redacted] worked and resided in [redacted] in 2001. Inasmuch as investigation produced no derogatory information pertaining to [redacted] as well as no evidence or allegation(s) were discovered to suggest [redacted] had interstate travel, no further investigation

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 10/10/2006

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pertaining establishing a more detailed time line for [] is warranted.

Miscellaneous:

[]
[]
[]

Nonproductive Investigation:

[] has no current wants or warrants nor any identifiable criminal history.

A review of available electronic records pertaining to [] produced no derogatory information.

An ACS database query for [] residential address met with negative results.

An ACS database query for [] met with positive results; however, no derogatory information was discovered and no reporting was noted aside from what was reported in the above captioned investigation.

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As previously noted, a query for [] met with negative results.

No motive was identified through investigation nor interview.

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Summary:

A thorough investigation (4 inserts and 6 FD-302s) indicated although [] has a pertinent educational and scientific background, as well as [] had access to the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* while at USAMRIID, no evidence or allegation(s) were discovered to suggest [] was involved in, or otherwise had additional knowledge pertinent to, the investigation of the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. Unless or until such evidence or allegation(s) are discovered, no further investigation of [] is warranted.

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1624

[REDACTED]

1

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [REDACTED] on 10/25/2006:

Off-line NCIC checks were performed on all vehicles owned by BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS for the time frame of 1/1/2000 through 12/31/2002. The searches were performed using the Vehicle Identification Numbers (VIN) and license plate tag information for each vehicle. The following tags and VINs were searched:

<u>Tag</u>	<u>VIN</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Make</u>
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	SATURN
			HONDA
			HONDA
			DODGE
			HONDA

On 3/31/2001 at 11:01 p.m., a vehicle bearing tags [REDACTED] was entered into the NCIC computer by the Frederick, Maryland Police Department.

On 2/9/2001 at 10:34 a.m., a vehicle bearing [REDACTED] was entered into the NCIC computer by the Maryland State Police, Westminster Station.

According to [REDACTED] CJIS, in order for a nation wide license plate search to be conducted, a state identifier is not used. For example, if plates in both Maryland and Texas are 123-ABC, the off-line search does not differentiate between the two states and all "hits" of the tag 123-ABC will be returned. This being said, three "hits" were returned from tags consistent with the five tags listed above. This results are as follows:

On 7/12/2002 at 10:03 p.m., a vehicle bearing tags [REDACTED] was entered into the NCIC computer by the Lamar County Enhanced 911 Center, telephone number (601) 794-8610.


On 7/10/2002 at 7:29 p.m., a vehicle bearing tags [REDACTED] was entered into the NCIC computer by the Louisiana State Police, telephone number (504) 925-6325.

On 6/29/2002 at 10:56 p.m., a vehicle bearing tags [REDACTED] was entered into the NCIC computer by the Lamar County Enhanced 911 Center, telephone number (601) 794-8610.



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BACK



An www.atxp.com search revealed that there are vehicles registered in Mississippi (where Lamar County is located) and in Louisiana bearing the identical license plates listed above. Based on this fact and information gathered during the investigation to date, it does not appear that these "hits" were generated by vehicles owned by Ivins.

The abovementioned off-line searched are attached to and made part of this document.

[redacted] txt

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1N01XXTOM
DCFBIWAK2

TITLE: 2006000000

ROUTE TO: [redacted]

ADDRESS: [redacted]

EXTENSION: [redacted]

COMMENTS: [redacted]

TYPE: HYP NEED: . UNI FILE:

LST BEGIN DATE: 20000101 END DATE: 20011231 LIST TYPE:

LIST: FILE SIZE: 000000000 COUNT: 000000 RANDOM NUMBER

IMAGE INDICATOR:
FIELDS SEARCHED:

[redacted]

[redacted]

ORI IS FREDERICK PD

301 694-2100

[redacted]

ORI IS MD STATE POLICE WESTMINSTER

410 386-3000

THE DATA PROVIDED IS FROM THE BDAT THROUGH THE FOLLOWING DATE: 12-31-2001
END OF REPORT REPORT DATE: 10-25-2006

1N01XXTOM
DCFBIWAK2

[redacted] txt

TITLE: 2006000000

ROUTE TO: [redacted]

ADDRESS: [redacted]

EXTENSION: [redacted]

COMMENTS: [redacted]

TYPE: HYP NEED: UNI FILE:

LST BEGIN DATE: 20020101 END DATE: 20021231 LIST TYPE:

LIST: FILE SIZE: 000000000 COUNT: 000000 RANDOM NUMBER

IMAGE INDICATOR:
FIELDS SEARCHED:

[redacted]

[redacted]

ORI IS LAMAR COUNTY ENHANCED 911 CENTER

601 794-8610

[redacted]

ORI IS LOUISIANA STATE POLICE

504 925-6325

[redacted]

ORI IS LAMAR COUNTY ENHANCED 911 CENTER

601 794-8610

THE DATA PROVIDED IS FROM THE BDAT THROUGH THE FOLLOWING DATE: 12-31-2002
END OF REPORT REPORT DATE: 10-25-2006

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1625

[Redacted]

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The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [Redacted] on October 20, 2006 and November 1, 2006:

On October 20, 2006, writer requested that the Maryland Motor Vehicles Administration (MVA) conduct a records search on any and all vehicles owned by BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, [Redacted]

On November 1, 2006, the results of the abovementioned search were received by writer. According to the search results, the following vehicles were owned by the Ivins family during 2001:

Year	Make	Model	VIN	Date Purchased
[Redacted]	Honda	Civic	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	Dodge	Van	[Redacted]	[Redacted]


Ivins purchased the following vehicles subsequent to 2001:

Year	Make	Model	VIN	Date Purchased
[Redacted]	Saturn	SL1	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	Honda	Sedan	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	Honda	Sedan	[Redacted]	[Redacted]

The original search results received from MVA are attached to and made part of this document.

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U.S. Department of Justice



Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 222936


601 4th Street, NW

[Redacted]
October 20, 2006

To Whom it May Concern:

In relation to a criminal investigation, I am respectfully requesting any and all MVA records associated with the following individuals, including any and all vehicles registered to any of these individuals during 2001. If you could also search their home address of [Redacted] that would be appreciated.

Name	SSN	DOB
Bruce Ivins	280-44-5449	04/22/1946 - I-152-098-188-310



Any questions can be directed to Special Agent [Redacted]
[Redacted] Any results can be faxed to me at
[Redacted] Thank you in advance for your help.

32455168
29019556

Sincerely,



Special Agent

6950856

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6601 Ritchie Highway, N.E.
Glen Burnie, Maryland 21062

Motor Vehicle Administration

AS MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND AND BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME UNDER THE TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE, MARYLAND VEHICLE LAW, I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, THAT THE FOLLOWING IS A TRUE COPY TAKEN FROM THE ORIGINAL NOW ON FILE AND PART OF THE RECORDS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION.

06950856 PAGE 1

I-152-098-188-310 SUS.REV: NO PRIVACY: YES
BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS 5-10 150 2 M 04/22/46

-END OF RECORD-



OCT 23 2006

DR-080 (10-05)

MARYLAND AND FEDERAL LAW PROHIBITS UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION FROM MVA RECORDS. VIOLATION OF THESE PROVISIONS IS A MISDEMEANOR PUNISHABLE BY A FINE UP TO \$1000 DOLLARS. AS WITNESS, MY HAND AND THE SEAL OF THIS ADMINISTRATION THE DAY AND YEAR SET OPPOSITE.

DRIVER RECORD ABBREVIATION CODES

A License Class
 A/A Administrative Adjudication
 A/C Air Conditioning
 ACC Accident
 ACCUM Accumulate(d)
 ABEY Abeyance
 ACT Action/Acted
 ADM Administration/Administrative
 AEP Alcohol Education Program
 AFF Affirmed
 AGREE Agreement
 ALCH Alcohol
 ALT Altered
 AOM Age of Majority
 APP Application
 APPR Approved/Approval
 A/R Alcohol Related
 ATT Attend
 AUM Accident - Uninsured Motorist Case
 B License Class
 BAC Blood Alcohol Level
 BLDG Building
 B/S Blackout/Seizure
 C License Class
 C Corrected License
 C/FS Complaint/False Statement
 CANC Cancelled
 CCU Central Collections Unit
 CDL Commercial Driver's License
 CDS Controlled Dangerous Substance
 CERT Certificate
 CHEM Chemical
 CIR Circuit
 CLF Central License File
 CLR Clearance
 CMV Commercial Motor Vehicle
 CO Company
 COMB Combination
 COMM Committed
 COMP Complete(d)
 CONC Concurrent
 CONF Conference
 CONS Consecutive
 CONT Continued
 CONTR Control
 CONV Conviction
 COR Corrected
 CR Credit
 CSE Child Support Enforcement
 CT Court
 D License Class or Days (30D)
 D-1 Duplicate License
 DEC Decision
 DEF Default
 DEPT Department
 DEV Device
 DIP Driver Improvement Program
 DIS Displaying
 DIST District
 DIV Division
 DL Driver License
 DMV Motor Vehicle Administration
 DOC Document
 DR Drive/Driving/Driver
 D/R Driver Records
 DRC Driver Rehabilitation Clinic
 DT Date
 DTO Dealer Tags Only
 DUP Duplicate
 E License Class
 EC Express Content
 EDUC Education
 EFF Effective
 ELEC Electric
 EMP Employee, Employment
 ENT Entry
 EQUIP Equipment
 EX Expired, Expiration
 EXC Exceeding
 EXD Excluded Driver Case
 EXP Explosives
 FA Fatal Accident
 FAIL Failing/Failure/Failed
 FC Full Credit
 FI Fictitious
 FIN RESP Financial Responsibility
 FPF Fail to pay fine
 F/R Financial Responsibility
 FR#() Financial Responsibility Case (Acc. Date)
 FRAUD Fraudulent
 FREQ Frequency
 FT Feet/Failed Test
 FTA Failure to Appear
 FTY Failure to Yield
 H Hearing (Hearing Officer's Initials)
 HAZ Hazard

HEAR Hearing
 HFA Hearing - Failed to Appear
 HGT Height
 HME Hazmat Endorsement
 HW Hearing Waived
 HWY Highway
 IC Implied Consent
 ICD Insurance Compliance Division
 ID Identification
 IMP Improper/Improvement
 INC Increase
 IND Indefinite
 INF Influence
 INFO Information
 INJ Injury/Injuring/Injurious
 INS Insurance
 INSPECT Inspection
 INSTALL Installment
 INSTR Instructions
 INTER Interest
 INTERLOCK Ignition Interlock Device
 INTOX Intoxicated/Intoxicating
 INVEST Investigation
 ISS Issued
 IVP Insurance Verification Program Case
 J MVA Judgement Case
 JUDGE Judgement
 K Moped Permit
 LET Letter
 LIC License
 LIQ Liquor
 LO Violation of Local Ordinance
 M License Class or Months
 MAB Medical Advisory Board
 MAG Magistrate
 MAIF Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund
 M/C Motorcycle
 MAX Maximum
 MD Maryland
 MFG Manufacturer
 MISREP Misrepresentation
 MO Motorcycle/Motorscooter
 MODI Modified
 MPH Miles Per Hour
 MSP Maryland State Police
 MTR Motor
 MUT Mutilated
 MV Motor Vehicle
 (MV) Moving Violation
 MVA Motor Vehicle Administration
 NC Nolo Contendere
 NEGL Negligent
 NRS Non-Resident Student
 OBT Obtain
 O/C Out-of-Country
 OP Operating
 OPR Operator
 ORG Original
 O/S Out-of-State
 PSYS Point System
 PAR Parent
 PASS Passenger
 PAY Payment
 PBJ Probation Before Judgement
 PED Pedestrian
 PEND Pending
 PER Permit
 PERS Person
 PD Property Damage
 PI Personal Injury
 POS Possession, Possess
 PRIV Privilege
 PROB Probated or Probation
 PROH Prohibited
 PROP Property
 PT Passed Test
 PUR Purpose
 PWV Probation Without (or before) Verdict
 R Refused or Renewal License
 RA Reinstatement Application
 RE Reissued
 REC Record
 RECD Received
 RECIP Reciprocity
 REF Refused or Refusal
 RE-EXAM Re-Examination
 REG Registration, Register, or Regulations
 REIN Reinstatement
 REHEAR Rehearing
 REL Relative, Related
 REM Remand, Remanded
 REQ Requirement, Require
 RES Resident

RESC Rescinded
 RESCH Rescheduled
 RESP Responsibility
 RESTR Restricted or Restrictions
 RET Return
 RETRO Retroactive
 REV Revoked or Revocation
 RI Reinstated
 ROW Right of Way
 RP Reprimand
 RPA Refused or Revoked Pending Appearance
 RR Railroad or Restriction Removed
 R/R Review & Reinstatement
 RS Random Selection
 RTT Brake Reaction Time Test
 S Substitute License
 SAT Satisfied
 SCH Scheduled
 SER Serial
 SIGN Signed
 SNL Signed Statement - No License in Possession
 SPA Suspended Pending Appearance
 SPEC Special
 SS Sentence Suspended
 ST Student
 STAT Statement
 SUB Substitute
 SUBST Substance
 SUR Surrender
 SUS Suspended or Suspension
 SW Suspension Withdrawn
 SYS System
 T License Type
 TEMP Temporary
 TP Test Place
 TRAF Traffic
 TRANS Transportation or Transporting
 TRK Truck
 TUN Tunnel
 TV Television
 TY Regular or Photo License
 UL Unable to Locate (Investigation)
 UMC Uninsured Motorist Complaint Case
 UN Under
 UNATT Unattended
 UNAUTH Unauthorized
 UNINS Uninsured
 UNLIC Unlicensed
 US United States
 VEH Vehicle
 VER Verdict
 VERIF Verification
 VIN Vehicle Identification Number
 VIO Violation, Violate
 WARN Warning
 WARR Warrant
 WDN Withdrawn
 WGT Weight
 WL Warning Letter
 W/O Without
 X Involved in an Accident
 YDIP Youth Driver Improvement Program
 YLCP Youth License Control Program
 YR Year
 & And
 * Points Expired
 / Or

Driver License Restriction Codes (as they appear on back of driver licenses)

1. Glasses or contact lenses
2. Outside rear view mirror
3. Valid in the State of Maryland only
4. Automatic Transmission
5. Directional signals
6. Daylight driving only
7. Limited to certain vehicles only
8. Other - See special restriction card
9. Alcohol

CDL Endorsement Codes	X - N and H combined
T - Double/triples	S - School Bus Authorized
P - Passenger Transport	TPXS - All CDL Endorsements
N - Tank vehicle	
H - Hazardous materials	

Restriction Codes	I - Limited (See restriction card)
B - Corrective lenses	J - Other (See restriction card)
C - Special brakes, hand controls/other (see restriction card)	K - CDL Intrastate only
D - Prosthetic aid	L - Vehicles without airbrakes
E - Automatic transmission	M - Except class A bus
F - Outside mirror	N - Except class A & B bus
G - Limited to daylight only	O - Except tractor trailer
H - Limited (see restriction card)	Z - Organ Donor, Hearing/Speech Impaired

BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS

Maryland
M.V.A.
Title/Reg Receipt

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TR DATE: 09/13/02
TR NUMBER:
TR TYPE: T1
TITLE:
CTL NO:
CL/TAG:
STKR:
MULTI: 00
1ST LIEN:

VIN:

Total Tax
1.2 % Allowed
Net Tax
Title Fee

Transfer
Admin
Misc
Registration
Surcharge

Total Fees
MVA Amount

32455168

568

OCT 02 2002

Saturn of Frederick
Member of the King Automotive Group

5903 Urbana Pike
P. O. Box 618
Frederick,
MD 21701-0618
(301) 663-1300
FAX: (301) 663-4065



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Motor Vehicle Administration
Vehicle Registrations Department
6601 Ritchie Highway
Glen Burnie, Maryland 21062

VIN:

[Redacted VIN box]

The following items have been altered:

- _____ Certificate of Origin
- _____ Title Application (VR5)
- _____ Odometer Statement
- _____ Dealer Reassignment
- Other *Title*

Comments:


SIGNATURES ON BACK ARE FOR SELLER & CO-SELLERS.
Co-Sellers Signature was accidently signed on the
Buyers Name.

Sincerely,

[Redacted signature box]

6950857

10/20/2006 09:47



AMERITHRAX

PAGE 02/02

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324UCBAW/DK/CMW



U.S. Department of Justice



Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 222936

601 4th Street, NW




October 20, 2006

To Whom it May Concern:

In relation to a criminal investigation, I am respectfully
requesting any and all MVA records associated with the
following individuals, including any and all vehicles
registered to any of these individuals during 2001. If you
could also search their home address of [redacted]
[redacted] that would be appreciated.

<u>Name</u>	<u>SSN</u>	<u>DOB</u>
Bruce Ivins	280-44-5449	04/22/1946 - I-152-098-188-310




Any questions can be directed to Special Agent [redacted]

[redacted] at [redacted] Any results can be faxed to me at
[redacted] Thank you in advance for your help.

#

32455168
29019556

Sincerely,



Special Agent

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MVA

Motor Vehicle Administration

6601 Ritchie Highway, N.E.
Glen Burnie, Maryland 21062

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324UCBAW/DK/CMW

AS MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND AND BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME UNDER THE TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE, MARYLAND VEHICLE LAW, I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, THAT THE FOLLOWING IS A TRUE COPY TAKEN FROM THE ORIGINAL NOW ON FILE AND PART OF THE RECORDS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION.

[Redacted]

06950857

PAGE 1

[Redacted]

I-152-098-188-310 SUS.REV: NO PRIVACY: YES
BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS 5-10 150 2 M 04/22/46

[Redacted]

-END OF RECORD-



OCT 23 2006


DR-060 (10-05)

[Signature]

MARYLAND AND FEDERAL LAW PROHIBITS UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION FROM MVA RECORDS. VIOLATION OF THESE PROVISIONS IS A MISDEMEANOR PUNISHABLE BY A FINE UP TO \$1000 DOLLARS. AS WITNESS, MY HAND AND THE SEAL OF THIS ADMINISTRATION THE DAY AND YEAR SET OPPOSITE.



U.S. Department of Justice



Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 222936

601 4th Street, NW

[Redacted]
October 20, 2006

To Whom it May Concern:

In relation to a criminal investigation, I am respectfully requesting any and all MVA records associated with the following individuals, including any and all vehicles registered to any of these individuals during 2001. If you could also search their home address of [Redacted]


[Redacted] that would be appreciated.

Name	SSN	DOB
Bruce Ivins	280-44-5449	04/22/1946 - I-152-098-188-310



Any questions can be directed to Special Agent [Redacted] at [Redacted]. Any results can be faxed to me at [Redacted]. Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely,



Special Agent

6950858



6601 Ritchie Highway, N.E.
Glen Burnie, Maryland 21062

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..... 06950858

AS MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND AND BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME UNDER THE TRANSPORTATION ARTICLE, MARYLAND VEHICLE LAW, I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY, THAT THE FOLLOWING IS A TRUE COPY TAKEN FROM THE ORIGINAL NOW ON FILE AND A PART OF THE RECORDS OF THIS ADMINSTRATION.

- () APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL DRIVERS LICENSE
- () APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL DRIVERS LICENSE
- () APPLICATION FOR CORRECTED DRIVERS LICENSE
- () APPLICATION FOR DUPLICATE DRIVERS LICENSE
- () APPLICATION FOR MOPED LICENSE
- () APPLICATION FOR IDENTIFICATION CARD
- () VEHICLE TITLE NUMBER
- () VEHICLE REGISTRATION TAG NUMBER
- () VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
- () CORRESPONDENCE
- (X) OUR RECORDS FAIL TO REFLECT ANY INFORMATION FOR:

DATED:

(X) OTHER:

NO RECORD OF TITLE OR REGISTRATION INFORMATION



OCT 23 2006

DR-060 (10-05)

MARYLAND AND FEDERAL LAW PROHIBITS UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION FROM MVA RECORDS VIOLATION OF THESE PROVISIONS IS A MISDEMEANOR PUNISHABLE BY A FINE UP TO \$1000 DOLLARS. AS WITNESS, MY HAND AND THE SEAL OF THIS ADMINISTRATION THE DAY AND YEAR SET OPPOSITE.



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

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In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 222936

601 4th Street, NW

[Redacted]
October 20, 2006

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Name	SSN	DOB
Bruce Ivins	280-44-5449	04/22/1946 - T-152-098-188-310

[Redacted]

Any questions can be directed to Special Agent [Redacted] at [Redacted]. Any results can be faxed to me at [Redacted]. Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Special Agent

6950859



6601 Ritchie Highway, N.E.
Glen Burnie, Maryland 21062

Motor Vehicle Administration

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..... 06950859

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- () VEHICLE TITLE NUMBER
- () VEHICLE REGISTRATION TAG NUMBER
- () VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
- () CORRESPONDENCE
- (X) OUR RECORDS FAIL TO REFLECT ANY INFORMATION FOR:

DATED:

(X) OTHER:

NO RECORD OF TITLE OR REGISTRATION INFORMATION




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U.S. Department of Justice



Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 222936

601 4th Street, NW

[Redacted]
October 20, 2006

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Name	SSN	DOB
Bruce Ivins	280-44-5449	04/22/1946 - I-152-098-188-310



Any questions can be directed to Special Agent [Redacted]
[Redacted] at [Redacted] Any results can be faxed to me at
[Redacted] Thank you in advance for your help.

33806825 ✓
24315323
3450 0028

Sincerely,
[Redacted]
Special Agent

6950860



MVA

Motor Vehicle Administration


6601 Ritchie Highway, N.E.
Glen Burnie, Maryland 21062

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06950860

PAGE 1



-END OF RECORD-



OCT 23 2006

DR-060 (10-05)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "John D. ...".

MARYLAND AND FEDERAL LAW PROHIBITS UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION FROM MVA RECORDS. VIOLATION OF THESE PROVISIONS IS A MISDEMEANOR PUNISHABLE BY A FINE UP TO \$1000 DOLLARS. AS WITNESS, MY HAND AND THE SEAL OF THIS ADMINISTRATION THE DAY AND YEAR SET OPPOSITE.



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 222936

601 4th Street, NW



October 20, 2006

To Whom it May Concern:


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Bruce Ivins	280-44-5449	04/22/1946 - I-152-098-188-310



Any questions can be directed to Special Agent [redacted]
[redacted] Any results can be faxed to me at
[redacted] Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely,



Special Agent

33806825
24315323 ✓
3450 0828

6950861



6601 Ritchie Highway, N.E.
Glen Burnie, Maryland 21062

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b7c

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06950861

PAGE 1

-END OF RECORD-




OCT 23 2006

DR-060 (10-05)

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
U.S. Department of Justice



Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 222936

601 4th Street, NW




October 20, 2006

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
Name	SSN	DOB
Bruce Ivins	280-44-5449	04/22/1946 - I-152-098-188-310



Any questions can be directed to Special Agent [redacted]

[redacted] at [redacted] Any results can be faxed to me at
[redacted] Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely [Signature]



Special Agent

33806825
24315323
34500828

6950862



MVA

Motor Vehicle Administration


6601 Ritchie Highway, N.E.
Glen Burnie, Maryland 21062

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GRATIS

06950862

PAGE 1



-END OF RECORD-



OCT 23 2006

DR-060 (10-05)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "D. [unclear]".

MARYLAND AND FEDERAL LAW PROHIBITS UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION FROM MVA RECORDS. VIOLATION OF THESE PROVISIONS IS A MISDEMEANOR PUNISHABLE BY A FINE UP TO \$1000 DOLLARS. AS WITNESS, MY HAND AND THE SEAL OF THIS ADMINISTRATION THE DAY AND YEAR SET OPPOSITE.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/06/2006

To: WMD Directorate
Laboratory

Attn: SSA [redacted]
Attn: A/UC [redacted]
SSA [redacted]
A/UC [redacted]
Attn: ADIC Joseph Persichini, Jr.
A/SAC [redacted]
CDC [redacted]
SSA [redacted]
SSA [redacted]
SSA [redacted]
SPI [redacted]
SSA [redacted]
SSA [redacted]

Washington Field

From: Washington Field
Amerithrax-2
Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

[redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) ✓-1626
279A-WF-222936-SCI34 (Pending) -5

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184;
OO:WF

Synopsis: Law Enforcement Operations Order concerning search of U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, commencing on 11/10/2006.

Reference: 1) 09/19/2006 meeting between Amerithrax, CBSU, WFO ERT, WFO HMRT, and HMRU personnel at the FBI Laboratory, Quantico, VA. 2) 11/02/2006 meeting between Amerithrax and HMRU personnel at the FBI Laboratory, Quantico, VA.

Enclosure(s): 1) One page diagram of the [redacted] containment suites within Building [redacted] USAMRIID, 2) One page list of items required for search titled, "HMRU Item List."

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To: WMD Directorate From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 11/06/2006

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Details: On 11/10/2006, the Washington Field Office (WFO) AMERITHRAX Task Force, with the assistance from the Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) and the WFO Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT), will conduct a search of Bio-Safety Level 3 [redacted] laboratory suites at USAMRIID. The [redacted] suites are located in building [redacted] and are designated suites [redacted]. The purpose of the search is to collect 1) non-anthraxis species of *Bacillus* isolates currently located in [redacted] 2) aliquots from samples of Renocal/Hypaque located in room [redacted] of the [redacted] suite, and 3) general evidence to include notes, envelopes, paper envelope bands, tape, items with pieces of tape, and documents that may be evidence of involvement in the anthrax mailings.

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It is anticipated that this search will be conducted pursuant to consent. Consent to search will be requested from [redacted] USAMRIID [redacted] on Thursday November 9, 2006. In the event that consent is denied, the search will proceed under the authority of a previously obtained search warrant issued in the District of Columbia. Application for the warrant will be presented to the U.S. District Court, Washington D.C. on November 7, 2006. All search personnel will be advised of the authority (consent or warrant) by which the search is to proceed.

Background

Bacillus subtilis

The anthrax spore powder recovered from the anthrax envelopes addressed to the *New York Post* and Tom Brokaw contains low levels of a bacterial contaminant identified as a strain of *Bacillus subtilis*. The *Bacillus subtilis* contaminant has not been detected in the anthrax spore powder recovered from the envelopes mailed to either Senators Leahy or Daschle. *Bacillus subtilis* is a non-pathogenic bacterium found ubiquitously in the environment. However, genomic DNA sequencing of the specific isolate of *Bacillus subtilis* discovered within the *New York Post* and Tom Brokaw anthrax powders reveals that it is genetically distinct from over seventy (70) isolates of *Bacillus subtilis* tested to date. Analysis of the *Bacillus subtilis* from the *New York Post* and Tom Brokaw envelopes revealed that these two isolates are identical.

RMR-1029

USAMRIID is a military research institute located on the base of Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland. Prior to the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, USAMRIID was one of sixteen (16) U.S. laboratories which possessed the Ames strain of *Ba* which was used in the attacks. Genetic analyses conducted by the AMERITHRAX investigation, with the assistance of several contract

To: WMD Directorate From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 11/06/2006

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laboratories as well as the FBI Laboratory, has led investigators to conclude that the *Bacillus anthracis* used in the anthrax letter attacks is directly related to Reference Material Receipt-1029 (RMR-1029). RMR-1029 was a large *Bacillus anthracis* Ames strain spore batch produced to conduct numerous anthrax aerosol challenges. RMR-1029 was produced in 1997 by scientists in the Bacteriology Division at USAMRIID and was stored in the [] containment suite within Building [] of USAMRIID.

Investigation has determined that research strains of *Bacillus subtilis*, that have not yet been compared to the *Bacillus subtilis* isolated from the *New York Post* and Tom Brokaw anthrax powders, are located in the [] containment suites within Building [] USAMRIID. In April of 2005, a notebook labeled "Cultures Frozen in [] Bruce Ivins" was provided to the FBI. The book is an inventory of the organisms in the storage boxes within a -70°C freezer located in the hallway of the [] suite. Many *Bacillus* species, to include *Bacillus subtilis*, are listed within the book. All of the samples of non-*anthracis Bacillus* located within these storage boxes will be seized. These samples will then be packaged and transported to the National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC) where they will be analyzed.

Operation Execution

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[]

To: WMD Directorate From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 11/06/2006

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Search Assignments

1) Outside [redacted] Containment Suites:

WFO On-Scene Commander:
[redacted]

WFO Deputy On-Scene Commander:

SSA [redacted]

WFO [redacted] Team Member:

SA [redacted]

WFO [redacted] Team Member:

SA [redacted]

HMRU Team Leader:

SSA [redacted]

HMRU Scientist:
[redacted]

2) [redacted] Containment Suite Search Team:

[redacted] Search Team Leader:

WFO SA [redacted]

- search of -70°C freezer

- search of remaining lab rooms within [redacted]

[redacted] Search Team Members:

WFO SA [redacted]

- assist with search of -70°C freezer, photograph
log(s)

CBSU SSA [redacted]

- assist with search of -70°C freezer, evidence log(s)

WFO SA [redacted]

- mirror hard drive of computer within [redacted]

- search of [redacted]

WFO SA [redacted]

- assist with mirror hard drive of computer within [redacted]

- assist with search of [redacted]

3) Surveillance Team:

Surveillance Team Leader:

WFO SA [redacted]

- WFO SOG Point of Contact

Surveillance Team Members:

WFO SA [redacted]

WFO SA [redacted]
[redacted]

To: WMD Directorate From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 11/06/2006

Communications

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Radio Communications: Radio channels [] have been reserved for the purpose of this search.

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Stationary phone lines: A hardline phone exists in the hallway of the [] containment suite. Once inside [] Search Team Member, Special Agent [] will provide the phone extension to the On Scene Commander and the Surveillance Team Leader who will distribute the number to the appropriate personnel.

Medical Resources

The nearest medical facility is Frederick Memorial Hospital, 400 West 7th Street, Frederick, MD, 21701, phone (240) 566-3300.

Directions to Frederick Memorial Hospital: From USAMRIID's front gate, go straight out the main USAMRIID gate, drive away (southeast) on 7th Street. Go under Route 15 Overpass. Frederick Memorial Hospital is on the right.

In the event of an emergency in the [] suite, to include exposures, USAMRIID's Special Immunizations Program duty nurse should be contacted at [] [] is a medical contact for extreme medical emergencies inside the containment areas []

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FBI Deadly Force Policy (eff. 7/1/2004 as stated in an EC written by [] dated on 7/7/2004):

Law enforcement officers of the Department of Justice may use deadly force only when necessary, that is, when the officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to another person.

To: WMD Directorate From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 11/06/2006

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

WMD DIRECTORATE

AT WASHINGTON D.C.

For information.

Set Lead 2: (Action)

LABORATORY

AT HMRU, QUANTICO, VA

AMERITHRAX requests that HMRU provide personnel and materials necessary to conduct a hazardous material search at USAMRIID.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

LABORATORY

AT CBSU, QUANTICO, VA

AMERITHRAX requests that CBSU provide personnel and materials necessary to conduct a hazardous material search at USAMRIID.

Set Lead 4: (Action)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT HMRT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

AMERITHRAX requests that WFO, HMRT provide personnel and materials necessary to conduct a hazardous material search at USAMRIID.

Set Lead 5: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

To: WMD Directorate From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 11/06/2006

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

For information.

◆◆

HMRU Item List

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Orange Suitcase
Large Cooler
Digital Cameras (preferably the ones that like AA batteries)
Underwater Camera Housings
Memory Sticks
Purple Nitriles (3 each M, L, and XL)
Ziploc-type bags (for cryovials to cryoboxes)
Biohazard bags for trash
ICHEM jars
Disposable pipets
Sample Kit
Duct tape
Hype wipes
Decon Buckets
Bleach
Pre-mixing Bleach spray bottles
Lab Mat
Paper Towels

Multi-Rae
Ludlum

WFO Supplies and Paperwork:

Non-disclosures
FD-597s
Admin paperwork

HazMat Camera, housing, memory sticks, batteries, etc...
HazMat Computer
Rite -n- Rain DuraLabels
Rite -n- Rain Graph paper (for extra notes)
Rite -n- Rain Evidence Logs
Rite -n- Rain Photo Logs ()
Clip boards
Evidence Photo Scales
Sharpies (Fine and Large tipped)
Evidence Tape
Stapler
Batteries (AAs)

Dry Ice (USAMRIID)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 12/04/2006

On 12/01/2006, [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted] the U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] has been employed in the [redacted] Division of USAMRIID since [redacted]. When [redacted] first started working at USAMRIID he worked with [redacted]. [redacted] currently works with [redacted]. [redacted] presently works in, [redacted].

[redacted] has used a lyophilizer on several occasions while employed at USAMRIID to dry purified [redacted]. The lyophilizer [redacted] uses has always been located in the [redacted] suite of building [redacted]. [redacted] is a suite of [redacted] laboratories used by [redacted] Division employees. There is no anthrax work in suite [redacted] however, [redacted] work is performed there.

Everyone entering suite [redacted] walks passed the lyophilizer. Prior to the events of 09/11/2001, there was a second entrance located at the opposite end of the [redacted] hallway (relative to the current entrance), that provided access into the [redacted] suite. Sometime after 09/11/2001, that entrance was locked for security purposes. A partial schematic of building [redacted] was provided to [redacted] who noted the location of the lyophilizer on the schematic. [redacted] denoted that the lyophilizer was located [redacted].

The [redacted] Division does not have any other lyophilizers. [redacted] has seen, what [redacted] believes to be a newer model of the [redacted] Division lyophilizer, in the [redacted] Division.

12/01/2006 Fort Detrick, Maryland
Investigation on _____ at _____
279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1634 12/04/2006
File # _____ Date dictated _____
by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]
[redacted] 3802.wpd

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 12/01/2006, Page 2

_____ believes BRUCE IVINS is responsible for the lyophilizer, since it is on IVINS's hand receipt, but does not believe IVINS showed _____ how to use it. There are instructions posted on the lyophilizer and _____ believes IVINS' referred _____ to the instructions.

_____ was shown printouts of e-mails dated _____ in which _____ is requesting IVINS to show _____ how to use the lyophilizer. _____ was familiar with the e-mails, but was not sure that IVINS showed _____ how to use the lyophilizer, stating that the lyophilizer was easy to use (user friendly) and the instructions posted on the lyophilizer were good.

The first time _____ used the lyophilizer _____ had difficulties after the defrost cycle. _____ opened the door to the cold trap and the water inside (condensate from the lyophilized samples) spilled out. _____ stated that the vacuum pump oil for the lyophilizer had not been changed since _____

According to _____ the lyophilizer is rarely used (maybe once every two months). _____ the lyophilizer is _____ (writer believes to be _____, who uses it to _____ and _____ never prescheduled the use of the lyophilizer, although, _____ would occasionally put a note on the lyophilizer prior to use. IVINS sometimes made comments about _____ use of the lyophilizer, so, _____ oftentimes would tell IVINS before _____ used the lyophilizer. _____ preparations took the lyophilizer _____ to complete, but _____ wanted to be sure the preparations were completely dry so _____ would add _____ to assure complete dryness.

_____ The cloth was to keep out dust. _____ had no problems with cross-contamination since all of _____ samples were the same. _____ agreed that it was theoretically possible to cross-contaminate samples when drying them together. When the lyophilization was complete the _____ that had sublimated from the samples, would have condensed as ice in the cold trap. Once the ice in the cold trap thawed, the water would be removed.

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b7C 279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 12/01/2006, Page 3

_____ did not know the original reasoning behind purchasing the lyophilizer, but it is set up for stoppering, using vials with rubber caps. The main chamber is refrigerated in order to keep samples cold. According to _____ drying spores is a, "no-no". _____ never saw the front of the lyophilizer obscured in any way.

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The lyophilizer is somewhat noisy, such that you would notice if it were running from _____ but not from the hallway. Once the lyophilizer is started, it takes approximately 1 hour for the sample chamber to achieve -40 degrees Celsius. The lyophilizer would be ready in about 5 minutes if you were not interested in cooling down the sample chamber. Once the lyophilization is complete, it takes only minutes to get the samples out, however, it could take hours to thaw the cold trap depending on the volume of ice present.

Neither _____ nor _____ work in _____

_____ Room _____ in suite _____ belongs to IVINS.

_____ escorted the interviewing agents to suite _____ and started up the lyophilizer. The lyophilizer is further described as a _____

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_____ provided the interviewing agents with an article _____ describing the lyophilization _____ a 2 page document provided by _____ which describes _____ a copy of the "Operational Instructions for Lyophilizer" (1 page), and the manufacturer's "Operation Summary" (1 page). These items are included in the 1A along with the original notes of the interview, the two e-mails as shown to _____ and one partial schematic with _____ indication of the lyophilizer location.

_____ was glad to help, and was agreeable to re-contact by the interviewing agents.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1639

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[redacted]

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [redacted]

During the course of the Amerithrax investigation, numerous pieces of digital evidence have been obtained either by search warrant or via a consent search. Writer reviewed five digital images associated with BRUCE E. IVINS, including his home computer, his United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) office workstation, his B4/B5 USAMRIID workstation, his USAMRIID user directory and various pieces of loose media. During the review of these items, follow up work was deemed necessary on certain items in order to determine their investigative merit. This investigative document is meant to memorialize the investigative work performed on the digital evidence collected from IVINS' home computer. A summary of the work performed is as follows:

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A user of IVINS' home computer searched for [redacted]. The search was performed at US Search. ACS and UNI checks of [redacted] were met with negative results. A google.com search revealed a [redacted] at [redacted] telephone number [redacted].

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A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] with negative results. Searches of [redacted] google.com were negative.

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A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] with negative results. Searches of [redacted] google.com were negative. Verizon of Maryland was subpoenaed to determine the subscriber. The subpoena returned [redacted] as the subscriber to this number. ACS and UNI checks were negative on [redacted].

A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted]. Searches of [redacted] google.com were negative. [redacted]

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A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] with negative results. The date the reverse lookup was performed is unknown. Searches of [redacted] google.com were negative. Verizon Wireless subpoena results indicated that the number was subscribed to by [redacted] not further identified, from January 19, 2000 through January 8, 2004 and effective February 27, 2004 [redacted] was subscribed to by [redacted] ACS and UNI checks on both [redacted] were negative.

A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] with negative results. [redacted] was negative [redacted] but google.com reported that the number was subscribed to by [redacted]

[redacted] Verizon of Maryland confirmed that the phone number belonged to [redacted] ACS check of [redacted] was negative. Due to commonality of [redacted] name, a UNI check offered multiple unfocused results. Additionally, a user of IVINS' computer performed a search at PeopleData for [redacted] [redacted] The search was met with negative results because the website required a \$25.00 for the search and it does not appear as if the fee was paid to receive the results.

A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] [redacted] was negative [redacted] but google.com reported that the number was subscribed to by Nissan Pavilion. Verizon Virginia also reported that the number is subscribed to by Nissan Pavilion, 7800 Cellar Door Drive, Bristow, Virginia 20136 [Agent note: Nissan Pavilion is an outdoor concert venue near Manassas, Virginia].

A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] [redacted] search revealed that [redacted]

A user of IVINS' home computer searched for [redacted] [redacted] The search was performed at US Search. An ACS search was met with negative results. A UNI search revealed numerous results on [redacted] but that could be attributed to a [redacted] in Maryland or Virginia.

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A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] [redacted] was

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[redacted] but google.com reported that the number was subscribed to by Blockbuster Video, 6089 Springridge Parkway, Frederick, Maryland. Verizon Maryland also reported that the number is subscribed to by Blockbuster at the abovementioned address.

A user of IVINS' home computer performed a reverse telephone lookup on phone number [redacted] with negative results. Searches of [redacted] google.com were negative. Subpoena results from Cingular Wireless identified the subscriber as [redacted]

[redacted] ACS check of [redacted] was negative. Due to commonality of [redacted] name, a UNI check offered multiple unfocused results.

A user of IVINS' computer performed a reverse telephone lookup of phone number [redacted] with negative results. [redacted] google.com searches of the number were met with negative results. A subpoena return from Nextel is pending to determine the subscriber.

A user of IVINS' computer performed a reverse telephone lookup of phone number [redacted] with negative results. [redacted] google.com searches of the number were met with negative results. A subpoena return from Verizon Maryland is pending to determine the subscriber.

A Yahoo! People Search was conducted on the last name [redacted] and Ithaca, New York on IVINS' home computer. The search returned the names [redacted] address [redacted]

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[redacted] phone number [redacted] SA [redacted] has performed additional work on [redacted] This work is documented under separate cover.

A user of IVINS' computer used Mapquest.com to obtain directions from an unidentified address on [redacted] [redacted] to Washington Dulles International Airport. Investigation revealed that there are only [redacted] on [redacted] [redacted] reside at [redacted] [redacted] reside at [redacted] [redacted] resides at [redacted] and [redacted] reside at [redacted] [redacted] ACS and UNI checks for all of the abovementioned names and addresses were met with negative results.

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A search was performed on IVINS's computer for hotel rooms in Fort Lauderdale, Florida from April 1 to April 5, 2002 on Lodging.com. Investigation to date has not revealed if anybody from IVINS' family traveled to Fort Lauderdale, and if so, why they traveled.

A United States Postal Service track and confirm notice was found on IVINS' computer. SA [redacted] forwarded the tracking number, EU41 2171 516U S to United States Postal Inspection Service [redacted] [redacted] opined that [redacted] would be able to obtain the shipping information associated with the abovementioned tracking number.

Two hotmail.com inbox web pages were found on IVINS' computer. The pages were the email inbox for hotmail.com user skymasterson77@hotmail.com. The inbox included three emails, from three different accounts, from [redacted] a known associate of IVINS. One [redacted] address was not present in the "From" line, but [redacted] full name appeared. Another address was [redacted]. This appears to be [redacted] email as well because of the use of [redacted] initials and [redacted] presumably a reference to [redacted]

[redacted] The last [redacted] associated email address was [redacted] (the rest is cut off), but presumably the email address ended [redacted]. Another email in the inbox was from [redacted], [redacted]

[redacted] An email was also in the mailbox from MSN Communities (the host provider of hotmail.com) with the subject line of "You are now a member of blindfolded." This appears to be a chat group that IVINS has joined associated with blindfolding. Investigation to date has revealed that IVINS was interested in blindfolding and kidnapping websites and chat rooms. The last email in the inbox appears to be junk mail asking IVINS to signup for credit of some sort.

As mentioned above, HANK NUWER is an author specializing in hazing issues. Using amazon.com, IVINS pulled up information on two of NUWER's books, "The Hazing Reader" and "Wrongs of Passage: Fraternities, Sororities, Hazing, and Binge Drinking." It is unclear whether IVINS purchased these books. [redacted]

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A truncated email was found that appears to be between IVINS and [redacted]. The email discusses a [redacted]

IVINS asked if "there are genetic/biological factors to sexual preferences and appetites. I remember that my 'interest' was present way before I reached 10 years of age." IVINS' "interest" is not known to investigators. If appropriate, during the next interview of IVINS it should be asked what his "interest" is.

In another email between IVINS and [redacted] IVINS states that, "The only reason I've stayed [redacted]

[redacted] The FBI wondered why I spent so much time at work, but I didn't tell them it was, in large part, to get away from home." If appropriate, during the next interview of IVINS it should be asked why he did not tell us this information and if there is any additional information he is not telling us.

On February 15, 2002, IVINS purchased a [redacted] [redacted] for [redacted] from Major League Baseball's website. The total purchase was for \$44.8 [truncated] and was shipped to [redacted]

[redacted] United States. It should be noted that [redacted] was living in [redacted] IVINS Cusomter number on mlb.com is 915039634 and the order number was DR917546095. This order number will be subpoenaed to determine what credit card IVINS used to make the purchase.

IVINS reviewed the Yahoo! member profile of [redacted]. The profile listed the following particulars for [redacted]

Real Name:
Nickname:
Location:
Age:
Gender:

[redacted]

A subpoena will be sent to Yahoo! in order to gain additional information about [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 11/29/2006

[redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN):
[redacted] Date of Birth (DOB): [redacted] was
interviewed, as pre-arranged, at [redacted] place of employment, address:
the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, on
the morning of November 28, 2006. After being advised of the
identity of the interviewing Special Agents (SAs) and the nature of
the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

(WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 associated with
communication is a non-disclosure agreement form [redacted] voluntarily
signed.)

[redacted] was [redacted] at
USAMRIID. [redacted] began employment at USAMRIID circa [redacted] as a
[redacted] however, [redacted] worked for [redacted] from
[redacted] until [redacted]
During this period, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] perfunctory duties included
[redacted]

[redacted] advised to the best of [redacted] recollection [redacted]
did not possess the knowledge or experience necessary to propagate
Bacillus anthracis while at USAMRIID; however, [redacted] noted minimal
knowledge or experience was needed to propagated *Bacillus*
anthracis. [redacted] opined if [redacted] indeed grew *Bacillus anthracis*
at USAMRIID, it was pursuant to toxin production and was grown on
non-sporulation media; however, [redacted] reiterated, to the best of
[redacted] recollection, [redacted] did not grow *Bacillus anthracis* at
USAMRIID.

[redacted]
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[redacted] advised to the best of recollection [redacted] did
not produce *Bacillus anthracis* spores at USAMRIID. [redacted] opined

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Investigation on 11/29/2006 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1642 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 11/29/2006, Page 2

if _____ assisted _____ by _____ for _____ once when the weather (snow) precluded _____ from reaching USAMRIID, then _____ probably _____ *Bacillus anthracis* spores as it was not generally necessary to wash the vegetative cells for further experimentation. _____ advised _____ had no recollection of _____ assisting _____ in such a manner. _____ noted _____ would be surprised if _____ actually did that for _____

_____ advised _____ had access to the hot side of USAMRIID building _____ Throughout the period of time between _____ may have been peripherally involved in aerosol challenges pursuant to _____ advised the _____ Division routinely requested the laboratory technicians from the _____ Division to assist in the aerosol challenge. _____ Division laboratory technicians supported the anthrax-aerosol challenges by transporting animals to and from the animal room and the aerosol challenge room, as well as possibly plating. _____ reiterated _____ had no specific recollection of _____ assisting in the transport of animals used in the anthrax challenges; however, the practice of using _____ Division laboratory technicians in this manner was common. In addition _____ recalled there was an extended period of time, months to a year, that _____ and during this extended period _____

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(WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 associated with this communication are USAMRIID floor plans _____ was provided for review.)

_____ indicated _____ had _____ hot suites in USAMRIID building _____ and indicated the same on the provided floor plans. _____ further explained, the hallway was divided off and the posterior aspect of the hallway contained various freezers. The other half of the hallway, nearest the change rooms, was otherwise cordoned off to create offices. _____ reiterated, _____ was not in the _____ hot suite, rather _____ the _____ hot suite and the _____ hot suite.

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 11/29/2006, Page 3

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[REDACTED] advised sera derived from animals previously exposed to *Bacillus anthracis* was considered "hot," and as such any immunological work needing to be conducted on the same would have to occur within a hot suite. [REDACTED] opined perhaps this would account for [REDACTED] keypad activity at the [REDACTED] hot suite; however, [REDACTED] noted [REDACTED] had not been in a hot suite since [REDACTED] [REDACTED] noted an ELISA or TNA was a regimented protocol with extended incubation periods whereby one could exit the hot suite and re-enter at a later time if one didn't mind taking multiple showers during the day. [REDACTED] advised it would likely take longer than ten minutes for an individual conducting an ELISA to enter the hot suite, conduct the required step(s), and exit the hot suite.

[REDACTED] noted the rabbits utilized in the rPA study were purchased from Covance. Due to space limitations at USAMRIID in [REDACTED] the rabbits were immunized at Covance at later shipped to USAMRIID for the anthrax-challenges and subsequent experimentations. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] USAMRIID personnel, such as BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] went to Covance. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was certain only the vaccine was taken to Covance, as the Covance facility was not equipped to handle infectious agents.

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was knowledgeable of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] further advised [REDACTED] went to [REDACTED] house on several occasions. [REDACTED] indicated it was likely [REDACTED] had told [REDACTED] and possibly others at USAMRIID [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was from [REDACTED] however [REDACTED] had no specific recollection of such a conversation. [REDACTED] opined it was unlikely [REDACTED] was the mailer. [REDACTED] continued if [REDACTED] was upset with USAMRIID then it would make sense for [REDACTED] to mail the anthrax to person(s) directly affiliated with USAMRIID or to the institution itself. [REDACTED] opined the perpetrator(s) of the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001 have a nefarious intelligence nexus, as the mailings were, in [REDACTED] opinion, designed to increase public awareness to a perceived weakness or inadequacy in U.S. biodefense preparedness.

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] outside interests involved [REDACTED]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 11/29/2006, Page 4

advised [redacted] had no knowledge of whether or not [redacted] maintained a security clearance while at USAMRIID. [redacted] noted aside from [redacted] to the best of [redacted] recollection [redacted] did not host or otherwise sponsor any foreign visiting scientist to USAMRIID.

[redacted] advised [redacted] was overheard telling other [redacted] Division personnel [redacted] following [redacted] FBI administered polygraph pursuant to the investigation pertaining to the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. [redacted] advised other [redacted] Division personnel, such as [redacted] had expressed similar comments. [redacted] advised [redacted] [redacted] due to [redacted] vehement opposition of the use of a polygraph as an investigative tool as it was not admissible in court and also based upon the negative comments and experiences of [redacted] fellow USAMRIID employees.

[redacted] advised [redacted] was in occasional email or telephonic contact with [redacted]

Through interview and observation [redacted] is further described as:

<u>LAST NAME:</u>	[redacted]
<u>FIRST NAME:</u>	[redacted]
<u>MIDDLE INITIAL:</u>	[redacted]
<u>RACE:</u>	[redacted]
<u>SEX:</u>	[redacted]
<u>DOB:</u>	[redacted]
<u>SSAN:</u>	[redacted]
<u>WORK TELEPHONE:</u>	[redacted]
<u>EMPLOYER:</u>	USAMRIID
<u>EMPLOYER ADDRESS:</u>	[redacted] Porter Street Fort Detrick, Maryland
<u>MISCELLANEOUS:</u>	[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 01/08/2007

[redacted] Social Security Account Number
(SSAN): [redacted] Date of Birth (DOB): [redacted] place
of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), work address: [redacted] Porter Street,
Fort Detrick, Maryland, work telephone: [redacted] was
telephonically interviewed, as pre-arranged, on the morning of
January 08, 2007. After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing Special Agent (SA) and the nature of the interview,
[redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] advised [redacted] spoke to [redacted]
[redacted] concerning the five (5) liter (L) fermentor.
Per [redacted] [redacted] had previously told an interviewing Postal
Inspector that USAMRIID employee BRUCE IVINS lent the 5 L fermentor
to [redacted] [WFO NOTE: see 279A-WF-222936-POI, Serial 1487]].
[redacted] clarified, [redacted] at the time IVINS lent the fermentor
was [redacted] and not [redacted] [redacted]
did not work for [redacted] until after [redacted] left USAMRIID circa
[redacted] [redacted] reiterated IVINS never lent [redacted] the 5 L
fermentor, [redacted] has never seen it at USAMRIID, nor does [redacted]
maintain any paperwork associated with the same.

[redacted] recalled during [redacted] last interview with writer,
circa December 2006, [redacted] had mentioned a current USAMRIID employee
had told [redacted] about activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that purportedly occurred in the [redacted]
Division hot suites in November 2006. [redacted] advised [redacted]
was the source of this information; however, [redacted] further advised
[redacted] had heard this information secondhand, and not directly from
[redacted]

[redacted] agreed to contact writer should [redacted] recall any
additional pertinent information.

[redacted] (1)

07 [redacted] 008a.wpd


Investigation on 01/08/2007 at Frederick, Maryland (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1652 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

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BACK



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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 12/21/2006

[redacted] was interviewed, as pre-arranged, on the morning of December 20, 2006, at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), work address: office number (#): [redacted] Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, work telephone #: [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agent (SA) and Postal Inspector and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] advised USAMRIID IT services maintained no documentation which coherently placed a particular computer, at a particular location, at a particular date. [redacted] further advised a computer in a hot suite that is scheduled for replacement is decontaminated by the hot suite personnel and brought to IT services. Once at IT services, files from the old computer are transferred to the replacement computer. [redacted] further advised these transferred files typically contain files which were saved to the root C-drive on the old computer. [redacted] advised to the best of [redacted] knowledge, temporary internet files and cookies were not transferred. [redacted] clarified, typically only documents saved onto the C-drive of the old computer were transferred to the new computer.

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[redacted] advised [redacted] could [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

1. IT services received a ticket from USAMRIID employee, BRUCE IVINS, on July 19, 2001, with a request for IT services to set up a Macintosh computer, [redacted] for [redacted] and [redacted] for use in the [redacted] hot suite. [redacted] the IP address from IVINS's office computer, located in Room [redacted] of USAMRIID building 1425 was [redacted] and the MMCN on the same was [redacted]. [redacted] had no knowledge if [redacted] was ever connected to the internet while in the [redacted] hot suite.

2. Computer [redacted] although currently in the [redacted] hot suite in room [redacted] was not always in the hot suite. On September [redacted]


Investigation on 12/20/2006 at Fort Detrick, Maryland [redacted] *sl. 307*

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1653 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
[redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 12/20/2006, Page 2

11, 2002, and on November 21, 2002, _____ was not in the _____ hot suite, rather it was located in the _____ suite, room _____. At some point it was moved from the _____ suite, and on January 02, 2003, _____ was located in the _____. However, additional records dated March 14, 2003, place _____ in the _____ suite. Finally on July 02, 2003, records indicated _____ would be taken into the _____ suite _____ to replaced a leased unit.

3. On September 02, 2003, _____ was scheduled to be placed in the hot suite, room _____, _____ replaced a leased unit identified as _____ and may be more knowledgeable.

_____ indicated that prior to September 02, 2003, there was leased computer, _____ in the _____ hot suite, room _____ and _____ which was previously not in any hot suite, replaced the leased unit. _____ that indicated if _____ was even located in the _____ hot suite or connected to the internet during the September 11, 2001, time frame. _____ had no direct knowledge as to what data, if any, was transferred from _____ nor whether _____ were internet connected computers. _____ reiterated, to the best of _____ recollection, a computer from a hot suite is decontaminated and brought to IT services and the files are transferred from the old computer to the new computer.

Attached hereto and considered part of this document are the _____ _____ agreed to contact the interviewing SA should _____ recall any additional pertinent information.

SA

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User ID	002073	Login ID	IvinsBE	MMCN	F0599	IP 1	140.139.166.20
First Name	BRUCE	Last Name	IVINS	MMCN 2	F1326	IP 2	140.139.165.179
e-mail ID	Ivins, Bruce E Dr USAMRIID	ORG	USAMRIID	MMCN 3		IP 3	...
Phone	<input type="text"/>	Ext	<input type="text"/>	MMCN 4		IP 4	...
Bldg	1425	Room	<input type="text"/>	USAMRIID Help Desk			

Status	Closed	Close Information Only	
		Please use Journal for status updates	
Call Description	Bruce would like MMCN E7380 Macintosh to be setup with USAMRIID applications and E-Mail profiles for <input type="text"/> Bruce will have all passwords in an envelope.	Solution	setup mac. added the persons who gave me a password. tests fine
Origin	USAMRIID	RIIDProject	
System	Hardware	APC	
Call Type	Macintosh	Tracker	<input type="text"/>
Item	PowerMac	Source	Phone
Module	Setup/Inst/Conf	Activity	
Problem Type	Workstation Related	Cause	New Requirement
Priority	2	Chronology	
	User's sense of urgency	Received by	<input type="text"/> 07/19/2001 09:32:24am
	Standard	Last Update	12/02/2002 02:19:52pm
	First Closed (HD use only) <input type="checkbox"/>	AutoEsc	
	Check to Send Survey <input type="checkbox"/>	Closed By	<input type="text"/> 07/19/2001 11:33:09am
		Tier2_hrs.	0.00

USAMRIID View

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 52

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