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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 12/29/2003

[redacted] born [redacted] social
security number [redacted] address [redacted]
[redacted] phone number [redacted] was interviewed at
[redacted] place of employment, UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH
INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick,
Frederick, Maryland, phone number 301-619-2445. After being
advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature
of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] is currently employed at USAMRIID as [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted] does not have the training or access to enter any
[redacted]

[redacted]
P12
[redacted]

Most of the time [redacted] is able to perform routine

[redacted]

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[redacted] has not had any unusual request for maintenance to
any equipment that [redacted] can recall. [redacted] did not notice any
suspicious activity by any particular individuals and never saw any
[redacted]

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Investigation on 12/10/2003 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 1328

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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unauthorized or unusual activity surrounding any laboratory equipment. [REDACTED] did not recall any instances of seeing unauthorized or unusual personnel in any area of USAMRIID.

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[REDACTED] did recall individuals who violated USAMRIID security protocol by improper use of their access badges or "piggy backing" into laboratory areas of USAMRIID. [REDACTED] stated that it was a common practice [REDACTED] had allowed people to access laboratory areas of USAMRIID without using their badge. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] always knew the individuals [REDACTED] allowed or observed "piggy backing" into laboratory areas. [REDACTED] recalled only one time [REDACTED] allowed an individual to "piggy back" into a [REDACTED] area of USAMRIID. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] allowed [REDACTED] to enter without [REDACTED] badge. [REDACTED] was disciplined for [REDACTED] actions and has not allowed anyone else to "piggy back" since. [REDACTED] has not observed any unauthorized access to any hot suite of USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] has occasionally worked late while at USAMRIID. ~~DR~~ BRUCE IVINS is the only person that [REDACTED] could identify who frequently works at USAMRIID during late evening hours. [REDACTED] remembers IVINS was in Suite [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] sometime after September 11, 2001, working with an envelope that [REDACTED] heard was used in the anthrax mailings. IVINS was accompanied by a group of individuals with whom [REDACTED] is unfamiliar.

[REDACTED] does not associate with any scientists at USAMRIID and has no knowledge of any activities surrounding any laboratory areas. [REDACTED] does not know what select agents are used at USAMRIID or where they are stored.

[REDACTED] has no knowledge of any research of *Bacillus anthracis* being conducted at USAMRIID and does not know where any stocks of any strain of anthrax are stored. [REDACTED] has never worked with and has never had any contact with the letters containing anthrax which were mailed to the NEW YORK POST, TOM BROKAW and UNITED STATES SENATORS TOM DASCHLE and PATRICK LEAHY, and does not know anyone who has.

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[REDACTED] does not know anyone who has expressed anti-American views or hostile attitudes toward any individual or organization. [REDACTED] does not know of anyone who expressed interest in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents without a specific need or responsibility to do so.

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[REDACTED]

, On 12/10/2003

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[REDACTED] has no knowledge of anyone who would be capable of being involved in the anthrax attacks.

[REDACTED] was working at USAMRIID during the time of both anthrax mailings in September and October of 2001 and did not visit New Jersey during that time-frame.

[REDACTED] has not used pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the anthrax mailings and has no knowledge of anyone who does.

[REDACTED] has not used plastic sterilite boxes for storage purposes at USAMRIID

[REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] and does not have any useful information regarding [REDACTED] relevant to this investigation.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/24/2003

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[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] was interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft Detrick, Maryland, (301) 619-4887. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

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[redacted]

[redacted] received [redacted] of [redacted] degree in [redacted] located in [redacted] and [redacted] degree [redacted] at the [redacted] began [redacted] career at USAMRIID on [redacted]. [redacted] responsibilities at USAMRIID has increased since that time, but [redacted] duties have not changed. [redacted] conducts [redacted] Bacillus anthracis (B.a.), tularemia, and the plague. [redacted] studies with B.a. involve approximately 30 different strains. [redacted] provided SAs [redacted] and [redacted] with a computer printout listing the different strains (the list has been sent to the corresponding 1A file).

[redacted] receives all of [redacted] B.a. from BRUCE IVINS and/or [redacted]. All [redacted] B.a. are stored in eppendorf screwcap tubes in a refrigerator located in Laboratory Room [redacted] of Building [redacted]. [redacted] always archives a sample of the original B.a. in case [redacted] to go back to it for [redacted] studies. [redacted] uses live B.a. spores for aerosol challenges in monkeys. Afterwards, the monkeys are treated [redacted]

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Any extra B.a. spores left from the studies are destroyed using an autoclave. [redacted] grows B.a. [redacted] and to do plate dilutions to get spore counts. If an animal dies during a study, a necropsy is conducted and the B.a. is re-isolated from the deceased animal to check for any changes from the original strain. Parts of the animals used for re-isolation are lungs, spleen, and the mediastinal lymph node. The tissue samples are stored in a refrigerator under a bench in laboratory room [redacted]. Everybody who has access to the suite has access to the refrigerators. [redacted] uses Mueller-Hinton plates or Blood Agar plates to grow B.a. [redacted] uses multiple colony techniques to culture B.a. [redacted] does not use New Sporulation Media (NSM) or Modified G media. [redacted] believes that IVINS uses a modified growth media to

Investigation on 12/18/2003 at Frederick, Maryland
File # 279A-WF-222936 / USAMRIID; 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A
SA [redacted] ak
by SA [redacted]

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SSA

SSA



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obtain a higher yield of spores. This modified growth media is nutrient deficient, causing vegetative cells to produce spores sooner. [REDACTED] thinks that this modified growth media may possibly be Modified G.

[REDACTED] has sent 1 to 2 samples of [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] as part of a collaborative study. [REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] B.a. [REDACTED] in small tubes a couple of months ago. It took approximately 1 year to transfer the samples because of the paperwork involved. Other than the agar stabs to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has not sent any B.a. samples to anyone outside or within USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] stores all of [REDACTED] B.a. and other biological agents in [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] only uses the walk-in cooler in [REDACTED] has a large amount of plates to be stored, which does not happen often. [REDACTED] knows that [REDACTED] frequently uses the [REDACTED] cooler for storage. Technicians in [REDACTED] group also have access to the cooler. [REDACTED] did recall a technician who was not part of [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] group with unsupervised access to the Room [REDACTED] cooler. [REDACTED] does not recall the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has never noticed anybody in Room [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] that did not belong.

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[REDACTED] is the [REDACTED] for all the suites in Building [REDACTED]. People with access to one suite will have access to other suites within the building. Some laboratory equipment, such as a centrifuge, are limited and kept in one room, so people must have access to all the suites to gain access to certain equipment. On occasion, the freezers will malfunction and everything inside will be moved to another freezer. When this happens, people find it difficult to locate their equipment. However, [REDACTED] does not recall any incidences when equipment or a biological agent could not be found. [REDACTED] is very strict about not allowing the practice of "piggy-backing" others into BSL suites to occur. If [REDACTED] is present, [REDACTED] will tell people to badge themselves in. However, [REDACTED] is not always in the laboratory and cannot say that "piggy-backing" never occurs.

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There are 2 laboratory technicians that work for [REDACTED]: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] prior to working for [REDACTED] started in [REDACTED] laboratory shortly before the anthrax mailings in 2001. [REDACTED] was working in

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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the [REDACTED] of USAMRIID prior to working for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has been in [REDACTED] laboratory for approximately [REDACTED] years.

Notebooks for the research conducted by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] technicians are kept inside the hot suites and faxed to the cold side. Much of the information and data [REDACTED] has are kept in [REDACTED] computer.

Bacterial contaminations in Building [REDACTED] have occurred twice to [REDACTED] knowledge. A few months ago, routine surveys of the door handles in the [REDACTED] floor of Building [REDACTED] were found to be contaminated with *B.a.*, although the strain was not identified. The cause of the contamination was traced back to poor decontamination procedures by some employees who work on aerosol challenges. This issue was resolved this past November. The other contamination issue was discovered 6 to 9 months ago when a [REDACTED] laboratory technician had a routine test conducted by [REDACTED] come up positive for contamination. What was first thought to be the result of poor laboratory practices by the technician later turned out to be a contaminated container that caused the cross-contamination. It is believed that this contamination occurred about 1 year ago.

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The Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for decontamination calls for the use of bleach. Everything in the laboratory is wiped down with bleach, which can cause damage over time because of the corrosiveness of the substance. Items such as plates, flasks, and other smaller equipment are autoclaved after it is cleaned with bleach. People who work in the animal rooms wear hoods, tyvec suits, and 2 pairs of gloves. The protective gear is removed upon exiting the animal rooms and all employees step onto a small puddle of bleach to decontaminate their shoes. Animals who die in the laboratory are placed in a bag, sprayed with bleach, brought into the cold side, autoclaved, and then disposed.

Building [REDACTED] does not have access to the Virology suites in Building [REDACTED]

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When USAMRIID received the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] anthrax letters, [REDACTED] was responsible for [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. It took approximately [REDACTED] to make that determination and [REDACTED] was in USAMRIID for the entire duration of the testing. [REDACTED] received a subculture of the [REDACTED] material from [REDACTED] to analyze. The [REDACTED] material was brought to [REDACTED] in powder form in a plastic bag from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] took a

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 12/24/2003

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loop of the powder and inoculated it into a flask to grow in broth media. [Redacted] then cultured the B.a. in a plate to [Redacted]

[Redacted] As with all the other agents [Redacted] works with, [Redacted] kept a small sample of the original [Redacted] and [Redacted] materials and stored it in Room [Redacted] of Building [Redacted].

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[Redacted] was present when [Redacted] material and observed that it consisted of 2 colony phenotypes. [Redacted] noticed that this was very similar to the B.a. that IVINS received from Dugway Proving Ground. This B.a. was eventually used in aerosol challenge studies by [Redacted]. [Redacted] told [Redacted] not divulge that information to others in USAMRIID because it dealt with FBI evidence.

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[Redacted] uses small to medium sized plastic sterilite containers, but does not use any large ones. [Redacted] believes that [Redacted] might use the bigger sized containers. [Redacted] has never purchased pre-stamped or pre-franked envelopes, nor are there any stocked in the office.

During September 11, 2001, [Redacted] was [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] During Columbus Day weekend in October 2001, [Redacted] could not recall exactly where [Redacted] was not working at USAMRIID. [Redacted] probably at [Redacted]

[Redacted] does not recall ever meeting [Redacted]. [Redacted] started at USAMRIID approximately the same time [Redacted] was leaving. It is possible that the two crossed paths at USAMRIID, but [Redacted] does not remember it, if it ever happened.

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[Redacted] is not a member of the Aeromedical Isolation Team. A former technician of [Redacted] was a member of the Team. [Redacted] was transferred to [Redacted] in August 2001. [Redacted] and [Redacted] exchange emails once in awhile, but [Redacted] has never mentioned [Redacted].

[Redacted] has never hosted a foreign visiting scientist nor has [Redacted] seen one in the hot suites of Building [Redacted].

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, On 12/24/2003, Page 5

There is an annual conference for Antibiotics Resistance held in February in Princeton, New Jersey which [REDACTED] attended in [REDACTED]. During one of those years, the conference was held at a Hilton Hotel. [REDACTED] attended this conference in [REDACTED] does not know of anybody else from USAMRIID who has been to this conference.

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[REDACTED] believes that the anthrax used in the 2001 mailings could not have been produced at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] saw the fine powder from the Daschle letter when [REDACTED] and believes that when the powder was produced, it created a large amount of contamination that would be impossible to clean up properly. If it had been produced at USAMRIID, the contamination would have been detected. [REDACTED] also theorized that the woman who died of inhalation anthrax in New Jersey could have been the actual mailer. She was most likely approached to mail the letters without her knowing what was in them. This may explain how she was exposed to anthrax even though a connection could not be found between her and the anthrax-laced letters.

[REDACTED] was asked whether he would agree to take a polygraph administered by the FBI on questions related to the anthrax mailings of 2001. [REDACTED] voluntarily agreed to take the polygraph.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/09/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] home address [redacted] home/telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] was a United States Army laboratory technician who first reported to USAMRIID in [redacted] worked in the Clinical Laboratory in the [redacted] until [redacted] During this time, [redacted] was assigned to assist on many different studies that needed clinical research support. [redacted] worked with both human and animal samples and was the [redacted]

In [redacted] [redacted] After completing this course, [redacted] returned to USAMRIID where [redacted] assigned to the [redacted] worked in the [redacted] performing tissue cultures and toxicity assays. From 1986 until 1990, [redacted] became the [redacted]

[redacted] nature and kept [redacted] out of the labs. As [redacted]

[redacted] From 1990 until 1992, [redacted] was the [redacted] continued with [redacted] managerial responsibilities. Between 1992 [redacted] retirement in [redacted] served as the [redacted] In [redacted] became a contract employee at USAMRIID in the Office of [redacted] works with cell cultures on the cold side and is involved with [redacted] currently has access to [redacted] laboratories and assists [redacted].

Between 1992 and 1994, [redacted] assisted in an anthrax aerobiology study run by [redacted] stated [redacted]

Investigation on 1/9/04 at Frederick, Maryland
File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID [redacted] Date dictated 1/9/04
by SA [redacted] SA [redacted] 1/23/2004

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[redacted]

, On 1/9/04

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[redacted] was not involved with the preparation or growth of any of the material used in the study and was not involved with infecting the animals. [redacted] does not know where the anthrax used in the study came from but advised that [redacted] might know.

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[redacted] ordered a glove box for [redacted] and provided copies of information on the product purchased for [redacted]. The glove box was purchased through [redacted] and the purchase had to be approved by various entities inside of USAMRIID. The glove box carries product number [redacted] and a quote for the box was listed as [redacted].

[redacted] was shown an envelope consistent with the ones used in the anthrax mailings in 2001. [redacted] advised [redacted] has never seen or used an envelope like [redacted] shown.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/06/2003

To: Washington Field

Attn: IIC [redacted]
SSA [redacted] AMX 1
SSA [redacted] AMX 2
SA [redacted] AMX 2

From: Washington Field
AMX 3

Contact: [redacted] [redacted]

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Approved By: [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936 [redacted] (Pending) - 963
279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) 433

Title: AMERITHRAX
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: Report results of elimination investigation regarding
[redacted] No evidence has been discovered to
date which suggests that [redacted] may have been involved in the
anthrax-laced letter mailings. Unless such evidence is
identified, no further investigation of [redacted] is intended in
this case.

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Details: [redacted] has been investigated in the
captioned investigation based upon [redacted] access to the Ames Strain
of Bacillus anthracis (B.a.), and [redacted] knowledge and expertise
related to Ames B.a. In addition, [redacted] former coworker,
Bruce Ivins, described [redacted] as someone obsessed with
bioterrorism, who had the knowledge and character to mail the
anthrax letters.

[redacted] worked at the United States Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort
Detrick, Maryland, from [redacted] to [redacted]
worked as a [redacted] in the [redacted] Division.
After leaving USAMRIID in [redacted] worked at the [redacted]
[redacted] in
[redacted] began working at the [redacted]
[redacted] is currently
employed as a [redacted]
[redacted] resides with [redacted]
[redacted] and [redacted] in [redacted]

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 01/06/2003

[redacted] holds a doctorate [redacted] While at
USAMRIID, [redacted] worked on developing a vaccine against B.a. [redacted]
studied the [redacted] and [redacted] of B.a. by establishing
a type culture collection of B.a. strains. [redacted]
[redacted] obtained a sample of a B.a. strain from [redacted]

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[redacted]

Review of [redacted] financial records from 2000 through
2002 was unremarkable. A review of [redacted] telephone records
and financial records revealed no connection to New Jersey.

A time-line of [redacted] activities for the
likely time periods of the two mailings of the anthrax letters
from Princeton, New Jersey was compiled using [redacted] telephone
and credit card records. In addition, [redacted] time and attendance
and e-mail records from the [redacted]
[redacted] were collected (Note: [redacted] did not maintain
electronic access records dating back to September and October
2001). [redacted] was also interviewed and accounted for [redacted]
whereabouts during the two windows of opportunity for the
September and October mailings. The time-line is focused upon
any six-hour period for which [redacted] would be unaccounted. This
time period is premised upon the round trip travel time between
[redacted] residence and Princeton, New
Jersey and between [redacted] office and
Princeton, New Jersey.

**Time-line First Mailing (4:30 p.m., 09/17/2001 through 11:30
a.m., 09/18/2001):**

A review of [redacted] time and attendance records
revealed a fifteen-hour time period for which [redacted] cannot be
accounted for after [redacted] left work at 5:00 p.m. on 09/17/2001 until
[redacted] returned to work at 8:00 a.m. on 09/18/2001. There are no
credit card or telephone records which indicate [redacted] whereabouts
during this fifteen-hour time frame. [redacted] time and
attendance records were signed by [redacted] but
there is no electronic record of [redacted] entered or left work.
However, [redacted] provided copies of work e-mails [redacted] sent at 9:23
a.m., 9:54 a.m. and 3:22 p.m. on 09/17/2001, suggesting [redacted]
present [redacted] during his work shift from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. [redacted] also provided copies of eleven work e-mails [redacted] sent
on 09/18/2001 that range from 1:08 p.m. to 2:53 p.m.

[redacted] advised that during the first mailing period
[redacted] was not at work, [redacted] were in [redacted]
company and can corroborate [redacted] whereabouts.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 01/06/2003

Time-line Second Mailing (4:30 p.m., 10/06/2001 through 11:30 a.m., 10/09/2001):

A review of [redacted] time and attendance records and credit card records revealed a twenty-two hour period for which [redacted] cannot be accounted. [redacted] left work at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, 10/05/2001. Travel time to [redacted] from [redacted] is approximately thirty to forty-five minutes. On 10/05/2001, [redacted] left [redacted] after 6:48 p.m. [redacted] arrival time in [redacted] would have been some time between 7:18 p.m. and 7:33 p.m. [redacted]

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[redacted]

On Saturday, 10/06/2001, [redacted] sent an e-mail from work at 7:32 p.m. The next independent corroboration of [redacted] whereabouts occurred nineteen hours and twenty-seven minutes later on 10/07/2001 when [redacted]

The next independent record of [redacted] whereabouts occurred at 12:50 p.m. on Monday, 10/08/2001, when [redacted] sent another e-mail at work, leaving a span of nineteen hours and 50 minutes. The last independent record of [redacted] whereabouts on 10/08/2001, occurred at 3:30 p.m. when [redacted] sent another e-mail at work. On Tuesday, 10/09/2001, [redacted] returned to work at 8:00 a.m., a span of sixteen hours and thirty minutes from the last independent record of [redacted] whereabouts. [redacted] sent an e-mail from work on 10/09/2001 at 2:20 p.m.

[redacted] advised that during the second mailing period [redacted] was not at work, [redacted] can corroborate [redacted] whereabouts.

[redacted] was asked to submit to a polygraph examination; however, [redacted] refused to do so. [redacted] explained that in February 2003, [redacted] had passed the [redacted] polygraph examination in advance of [redacted] employment as a [redacted]

[redacted] did not want to risk a false positive result in the FBI's requested polygraph examination which would jeopardize [redacted] security clearance. [redacted] also explained that the

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-POI, 01/06/2003

[redacted] polygraph examination questioned [redacted] on any involvement in criminal activity which covered the period of the mailings. As a result of [redacted] refusal, [redacted] attended an interview in the office of [redacted] Assistant United States Attorney, on 11/20/2003. [redacted] was cooperative and answered the questions posed to [redacted] during the interview.

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In addition to the findings presented above and the fact that [redacted] has cooperated with this investigation, no evidence has been discovered to date which suggests that [redacted] may have been involved in the preparation or mailing of the anthrax letters. Unless such evidence is identified, no further investigation of [redacted] is intended in this case.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/06/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] was interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [redacted] at the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Frederick, Maryland Taskforce Office. [redacted] already acquainted with SA [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

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During a previous interview conducted on December 18, 2003, [redacted] stated that there had been 2 incidences of bacterial contamination in Building [redacted]. One of those incidences was discovered a few months ago when a routine survey of a door handle came up positive for *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.). [redacted] clarified that the door handle was located on the inside of the hot suite on the [redacted] floor of Building [redacted]. The source of the contamination was traced back to carelessness by someone in the [redacted] section. It could have happened when someone forgot to change gloves after decontaminating the suite. [redacted] was the one who cultured the swab and determined the contamination to be B.a. She did not, however, determine the B.a. strain. [redacted] would be the person to talk to regarding whether any of the culture or the swab still remains.

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There are no B.a. samples in [redacted] laboratory that are left-overs from previous researchers. [redacted] stated that an old inventory of registered agents listed B.a. belonging to BRUCE IVINS was located in the first floor cold room. This inventory is relatively dated, and the sample, if it were ever in the cold room, has since been removed. [redacted] does not know any further details regarding this inventory or sample. [redacted] stated that IVINS would be the person to talk to for further details.

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During the previous interview, [redacted] was asked [redacted] was ever approached by the FBI to submit samples [redacted] B.a. collection into the FBI repository. [redacted] stated that [redacted] never been approached with this request, nor has any [redacted] laboratory technicians. [redacted] did state [redacted] is willing to submit [redacted] archived B.a. samples to the FBI if requested. During the last interview, [redacted] was given an instruction sheet for submitting [redacted] B.a. samples to the FBI repository in the future. [redacted] stated that there is a major error in the instructions. The instructions call for the frozen samples to be thawed. [redacted] believes that frozen B.a. samples should never be thawed completely because it

Investigation on 1/6/2004 at Frederick, Maryland b6
File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID; [redacted] ⁴⁴⁰ b7C
by SA [redacted] Date dictated N/A

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID; 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of , On 1/6/2004, Page 2

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will cause a 99% loss in viability. stated that the proper way to collect a sample would be to scrape the surface of the frozen B.a.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 01/13/2004

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[redacted] born [redacted]
social security account number [redacted] residing at [redacted]
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]

[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] residence. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] has been working for [redacted] since February 2001. Prior to being employed by [redacted] [redacted] worked at the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) with the [redacted]

During [redacted] last several months at USAMRIID [redacted] was asked to be the [redacted]

[redacted] received [redacted] PhD in [redacted] from the [redacted] medical school. [redacted] has a Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree in [redacted] and [redacted] in [redacted] did [redacted] on [redacted]

[redacted] worked initially at USAMRIID from approximately [redacted] until [redacted]. From [redacted] was employed by the [redacted]. From [redacted] until [redacted] worked at the [redacted]. From [redacted] until [redacted] worked at [redacted]. From [redacted] until [redacted] worked again at USAMRIID.

While employed at USAMRIID, [redacted] supported the Bacillus Anthracis (Ba) program and worked on Plague vaccines. [redacted] is a [redacted] by trade and training however, [redacted] was well versed and did assist with bacteria studies to include conducting assays (testing) [redacted]

[redacted] never personally worked with the live Anthrax agent, [redacted] work utilized the [redacted]. All of the employees working in the [redacted] department had access to Anthrax. [redacted] recalled that [redacted] was in charge [redacted]

[redacted] 12/4/5

Investigation on 01/12/2004 at [redacted]
279A-WF-222936-LEAD; -414

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -441

Date dictated 01/13/2004

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 01/12/2004, Page 2

of a group that worked on Ba. [REDACTED] worked with live agents on Vaccine strains. [REDACTED] also remembers a man named [REDACTED] Last Name Unknown (LNU) working on Anthrax and being highly regarded in the field. [REDACTED] was the manufacturer of the Anthrax vaccination.

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[REDACTED] never was involved in the drying of Ba and never witnessed this process being accomplished. [REDACTED] advised that although [REDACTED] never used a lyophilizer its use would have been common. The strains were fully characterized and their origin should be documented somewhere at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] was unable to recall specifically where the documentation paperwork regarding the origins of the strains of bacteria were kept. [REDACTED] worked with BRUCE IVINS and the Ames strain of Ba, but does not believe the strain originated with IVINS. [REDACTED] does not know [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] is not aware of anyone with the expertise in weaponization techniques, and could not come up with a name for the FBI to contact concerning the weaponization of Anthrax.

[REDACTED] was not aware of any bacteria contamination concerns in the virology suites.

[REDACTED], by virtue of [REDACTED] status and vaccinations had access to every room at USAMRIID, but only worked out of [REDACTED] labs, on the [REDACTED] floor of facility [REDACTED] (rooms within the hot zone, denoted with the markings [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] enclosed in boxes), on the blueprint. [REDACTED] also had an office in building [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] could not recall the cooler specifically within the hot zone of building [REDACTED] but advised that [REDACTED] laboratory staff and others working there would definitely use and have access to the cooler in the course of their work.

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[REDACTED] never allowed anyone to "piggy-back" in and out of the hot areas of building [REDACTED]. To the best of [REDACTED] knowledge the measures and vaccinations required to be in the hot zones made access fairly restricted. Unvaccinated visitors would have to wear "Rakal", (phonetic) suits with a dedicated air supply to gain access to the hot zones. This access would always be escorted.

[REDACTED] believes that Select Agents could be removed from building [REDACTED] but that the key was to gain access to building [REDACTED]. Once you have access, removing a Select agent would be relatively easy. Only a small sample would be needed to be removed

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 01/12/2004 , Page 3

as it could be grown on the outside very easily. The sample would need to be protected while the person went through the showering procedures, but [REDACTED] believed that it would not be terribly difficult to achieve. [REDACTED] is not aware of anyone who attempted to or talked about removing a Select agent out of the hot zone.

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[REDACTED] never heard any one make the statement that they might make a Select agent for use in an improper fashion. [REDACTED] is not aware of anyone expressing hostile intentions or attitudes toward any political organization, the media, or anyone else.

[REDACTED] does not suspect anyone that [REDACTED] knows at USAMRIID or anywhere else for being responsible for the Anthrax letter mailings. [REDACTED] would be very surprised if someone from USAMRIID was involved.

[REDACTED] never worked with anyone that was lax in handling dangerous items or was inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents. [REDACTED] does not know of anyone nor has [REDACTED] heard any rumors regarding anyone interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without specific need or authority.

[REDACTED] does not know how to go about preparing dried Ba and sending it through the mail, but if [REDACTED] had to [REDACTED] could accomplish it by consulting the mailing literature. [REDACTED] does not know of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

[REDACTED] does not have a Personal or professional association with, nor does [REDACTED] know of anyone with an association with Trenton, New Jersey. In September and October 2001, [REDACTED] was already working for [REDACTED] and did not travel to New Jersey.

[REDACTED] recalls that specific decontamination procedures of class II and Class III biosafety cabinets in [REDACTED] work area existed, but [REDACTED] could not recall them verbatim. [REDACTED] believed that they involved a combination of bleaching and rinsing. Paraformaldehyde has been used in both the virology and bacteriology areas of USAMRIID, but [REDACTED] does not recall the use of glutaraldehyde as a fumigation agent at USAMRIID.

Since Paraformaldehyde is used for decontamination of both the virology suites and bacteriology suites, [REDACTED] has smelled it in both places.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 01/12/2004, Page 4

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[REDACTED] could not recall specifically, but [REDACTED] is sure that [REDACTED] has used plastic storage containers in [REDACTED] labs. [REDACTED] does not know who manufactures these containers or from where they were purchased. [REDACTED] does not recall a time when any storage boxes were missing. [REDACTED] advised that it was common for other lab workers to come into a lab and take unused equipment.

[REDACTED] does not know of any unrecorded or unofficial work being done with Ba or its simulants. All of [REDACTED] laboratory work fell under the auspices of GLP (Good Laboratory Practices) compliance and as such was meticulously documented and archived. [REDACTED] could not recall which room was used for archiving the lab records.

[REDACTED] has never purchased or used pre-stamped envelopes from any store or vending machine.

Because [REDACTED] left USAMRIID prior to the Anthrax letter mailings, [REDACTED] never handled nor did any of the analytical work on the Anthrax letters and envelopes.

[REDACTED] was slightly familiar with the name [REDACTED] prior to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED] have seen [REDACTED] in the halls of building [REDACTED] in the past. [REDACTED] could not be more specific on when [REDACTED] may have seen [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] did recognize the face [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is confident that [REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] in building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] does not know what employment status [REDACTED] held when [REDACTED] last saw him, nor what badge [REDACTED] may have been wearing. [REDACTED] never allowed [REDACTED] to piggy-back into any area with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] taking equipment out of USAMRIID or bringing equipment to a place where [REDACTED] could use it unobserved.

[REDACTED] does not know what [REDACTED] worked on at USAMRIID, nor does [REDACTED] know if [REDACTED] showed any interest in Anthrax. [REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] working on bacterial cultures or lyophilizers. [REDACTED] does not know if [REDACTED] ever removed or borrowed equipment from the lab and [REDACTED] is not aware of [REDACTED] ever trying to obtain discarded lab equipment.

[REDACTED] did not do any work with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] does not know, nor has [REDACTED] heard about any samples of any kind that [REDACTED] may have brought to USAMRIID. [REDACTED] never discussed experiments with [REDACTED] to include any involving [REDACTED].

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[REDACTED]

, On 01/12/2004 , Page 5

[REDACTED] is familiar with [REDACTED] and is aware of who [REDACTED] is, but never had any discussions with [REDACTED] regarding these people. [REDACTED] never heard anyone, to include [REDACTED] discuss killing people or Senators or media personnel. [REDACTED] never heard anyone complaining about political views or other issues.

[REDACTED] is unaware of any connection [REDACTED] may have to New Jersey or Princeton.

To the best of [REDACTED] recollection, [REDACTED] never hosted a foreign visiting scientist during [REDACTED] tenure at USAMRIID.

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[REDACTED] does not know anything about milling or weaponizing Anthrax. [REDACTED] is not aware of anyone that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would be interested in talking to based upon [REDACTED] experiences at USAMRIID. At this time, [REDACTED] is not aware of any other information that could be of assistance to the FBI's Anthrax investigation.

[REDACTED] was unable to provide further details, but is willing to be re-contacted at any time.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/12/2003

[redacted] Ph.D. [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted], social security number [redacted] U.S. ARMY MEDICAL
RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Ft. Detrick,
MD, telephone [redacted], was interviewed at [redacted] place of
employment, USAMRIID, by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

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[redacted] was hired by USAMRIID in [redacted]
[redacted] assigned the Bacillus anthracis (Ba) [redacted] to
[redacted]. [redacted] was previously working with guinea pigs
on the Ba [redacted] before [redacted] left employment at USAMRIID.
[redacted] was no longer employed by USAMRIID when [redacted] began [redacted]
employment at USAMRIID. [redacted] provided [redacted] with the
background information and paperwork pertaining to the Ba [redacted]
[redacted]. BRUCE IVINS provided [redacted] with most of the protocols
needed for the Ba [redacted]. The Ba collection used by
[redacted] was also passed on to [redacted] for the [redacted]
As far as [redacted] knows there is no other Ba Ames strain in
[redacted] collection, except [redacted]. [redacted] knew that the sample
labeled [redacted] was Ba Ames strain only because FBI agents told [redacted]
it was the Ames strain. [redacted] knows very little about [redacted]
[redacted] knows that [redacted] has the Ames strain. [redacted] is
stored either in BRUCE IVINS' Room [redacted] or in the cold room in the
hallway of suite [redacted]

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[redacted] picked the 10 hottest strains from [redacted] guinea
pig studies and will use these strains to challenge rabbits.
[redacted] wrote an addition to the already approved protocol to use
to challenge the rabbits. The rabbits are vaccinated at [redacted]
[redacted] USAMRIID receives the rabbits
at 9 weeks post vaccination. The rabbits are challenged at 10
weeks post vaccination.

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
[redacted] produces [redacted] own spores for the rabbit challenges
from [redacted] spore preps. The spores are stored in 1% phenol at 4
degrees Celsius. [redacted] takes a loop from the spore prep, streaks
a plate for isolation, picks a single colony to produce spores

Investigation on 12/12/03 at Fort Detrick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -450 Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted] SA [redacted]

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using Leighton and Doi medium, spins it down into a pellet, and finally resuspends the spores. The concentration is approximately 3×10^9 CFU/volume. He then uses these spores for the rabbit challenges.

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recommended that the Agents obtain a copy of the 15-6 Commander's Inquiry Report which summarized the results of the Ba contamination issue.

works with on a Ba
 believes that may have been given Ba from Iraq. The Ba has an unusual orange color.

The following is a list of the documents provided to the Agents that will be submitted to the 1A section of the file:

- 1) Protocol for Ba Vaccine Resistance Study
- 2) Strain list of Ba for Vaccine Resistance Study
- 3) Agenda for International Biomedical Conference in 2003, titled "Crossing Boundaries"
- 4) PowerPoint slides showing results of Ba vaccine resistance study

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/28/2004

[redacted] (U. S. Citizen), born [redacted]
Social Security Number [redacted] residing at [redacted]
[redacted] Telephone Number [redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted]
After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents
and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the
following information:

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[redacted] received [redacted]
[redacted] degree from the [redacted] in [redacted] and [redacted] PHD in
[redacted] from the [redacted]
[redacted] was employed at USAMRIID from [redacted]
through [redacted]. [redacted] worked in the [redacted] department
at USAMRIID. From [redacted] through [redacted] worked primarily with
animal models (rodents) of viral infections of the [redacted]
[redacted]. From [redacted] worked with [redacted]

[redacted] From [redacted]
[redacted] worked with the [redacted]
In [redacted] was promoted to [redacted]
[redacted] then [redacted] and finally to [redacted]
In [redacted] was transferred to [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] is currently employed by the [redacted]
[redacted] as a [redacted]
[redacted] has been detailed to the [redacted]

[redacted] has never worked with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba),
but worked extensively with the [redacted]

[redacted] indicated that [redacted]
BRUCE IVINS, [redacted]
and [redacted] were the individuals [redacted] that worked
with Ba. [redacted] was the [redacted]
and [redacted] subordinates would have worked with Ba. [redacted] worked
with animal models to research the effects of aerosol exposure of

[redacted]
Investigation on 1-22-2004 at [redacted]
File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 469 Date dictated _____
by USPIS [redacted] USPIS [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 1-22-2004, Page 2

animals to Ba. [redacted] is the one individual that would have had the expertise to have produced the Ba found in the letters.

[redacted] was not aware of any problems of contamination while [redacted] worked at USAMRIID.

[redacted] worked primarily in the [redacted] and [redacted] laboratories of building [redacted] from [redacted]. [redacted] indicated [redacted] access to the building and received the vaccinations, but does not recall being in building [redacted] in the [redacted]. [redacted] stated [redacted] probably in the Room [redacted] cooler, but did not recall any reasons exactly. [redacted] thought the [redacted] cooler was a storage place where the animal care takers kept the fruit for the non human primate study on [redacted] and possibly a storage place for media, but did not recall seeing anyone enter or leave the room.

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[redacted] never allowed anyone to piggyback into any suite and was not aware of anyone who did so.

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In 1986-1987 [redacted] knew of visiting scientists from the [redacted] that were conducting experiments with the Alpha Virus, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis (VEE) to develop vectors for vaccines. The procedures that were necessary for these scientists to enter the lab would be handled by the Safety Office. The scientists were required to either have the vaccinations or they had to use respirators in order to access the laboratories.

[redacted] indicated it would have been possible to remove agents from the hot suites, but it would not have been easy because some security measures were in place. One had to remove all clothes for decontamination when leaving the lab, and had to pass through the airlock which had Ultra Violet light. It could be possible to place an agent into an orifice or hold a small vial in one's hand to remove it from the lab. [redacted] was not aware of anyone who tried to remove an agent in this manner nor anyone who would use an agent in an inappropriate way.

[redacted] was the only individual [redacted] could have suspected because [redacted] worked in the [redacted] lab and was different, but [redacted] did not expect [redacted] to have done the mailings. According to [redacted] all scientists are different, but it just made sense that people were looking at [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 1-22-2004, Page 3

[redacted] never worked with and does not know how to work with Ba; only [redacted] would have the ability and expertise to be able to lyophilize and/or weaponize Ba.

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[redacted] has no family or friends in New Jersey, nor has [redacted] traveled there.

[redacted] was in [redacted] on 9/11/2001 and was forced to drive back to [redacted]

Standard Operating Procedures for decontamination were in place and consisted of sealing off an area and fumigating it with paraformaldehyde. Paraformaldehyde was also used in the virology labs when any equipment was in need of repair or replacing. The Safety Office handled this and paraformaldehyde was used in the air locks for the decontamination.

[redacted] never used any plastic storage containers nor saw any of them in the laboratories.

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[redacted] always recorded [redacted] work in green hard bound laboratory notebooks which are possibly stored in the suites now. After [redacted] left USAMRIID, the labs began using the numbered lab notebooks.

[redacted] never utilized pre stamped envelopes nor ever purchased any envelopes from vending machines.

[redacted] did not handle any of the Anthrax letters nor did [redacted] perform any of the analytical work on the evidence.

[redacted] knew of [redacted] prior to the media exposure of [redacted] worked in the [redacted] Division. [redacted] was either the [redacted] or [redacted] when [redacted] was working at USAMRIID. [redacted] began working at USAMRIID in approximately [redacted] as a [redacted] Post Doctoral Fellow. According to [redacted] all [redacted] must go through a selection process [redacted] then a USAMRIID selection committee reviews each application and decides who to select. [redacted] was selected [redacted] on [redacted]

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[redacted] saw [redacted] usually in the hallways of building [redacted] near [redacted] Office, and possibly in the [redacted] and [redacted] labs in a space suit, possibly working with [redacted] infected animals

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 1-22-2004, Page 4

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or tissues [redacted] left USAMRIID while [redacted] was still working there. [redacted] used a USAMRIID badge for access as we all had the same type of badge.

[redacted] never saw [redacted] remove any equipment from any laboratories.

[redacted] did not recall ever seeing [redacted] in the hot suites of building [redacted] or in the room [redacted] cooler, but did see [redacted] in the cold side of building [redacted] [redacted] was believed to have stored things in the [redacted] but [redacted] did not know if [redacted] ever brought any agents to USAMRIID.

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[redacted] never talked about [redacted] to [redacted] nor about creating any bio weapons. [redacted] did not socialize with [redacted] but named [redacted] and possibly some of the technicians as possible sources of information.

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As [redacted] was familiar with the Foreign Scientists that visited USAMRIID. In 1998 there was a [redacted] that was given a tour and slide show, but they were always escorted by officials and were not given access to any labs. The visitors were not taken by the microbiology labs. There were also NRC Fellows [redacted] was aware of. [redacted] was responsible for two fellows from [redacted] that worked in the non-bio annex section and [redacted] supervised [redacted] who now works at [redacted] in [redacted]. [redacted] worked in the [redacted] and [redacted] labs and had access to the virology lab, but did not have access to the hot suites. Each Fellow had their own access badge and could have possibly removed samples, but [redacted] did not suspect anyone of doing so.

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[redacted] was not a member of the [redacted] but [redacted] was a member who did a lot to build up the team. [redacted] did not recall if [redacted] was a member.

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[redacted] indicated [redacted] would be willing to take a polygraph regarding [redacted] knowledge of the mailings and the information presented in this report.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/03/2003

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On 10/31/2003, [redacted] date of birth: [redacted], social security number [redacted] home address: [redacted] home phone number: [redacted] work phone: [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] is a [redacted] is [redacted] at USAMRIID in the [redacted] division. [redacted] has a PhD in [redacted] from the [redacted]

[redacted] worked as a [redacted] at USAMRIID with [redacted] from [redacted] to [redacted].

[redacted] was assigned to [redacted] in [redacted] Fort Detrick, Maryland in [redacted] where [redacted] worked in the [redacted] division at USAMRIID.

[redacted] was [redacted] division at USAMRIID from [redacted] through [redacted] During [redacted] service period [redacted] was the [redacted] for bacteria vaccine product development studies.

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[redacted] has worked with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) in [redacted] career. [redacted] last worked with Ba in [redacted] work at USAMRIID was all conducted in building [redacted]

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[redacted] does not know how to weaponize Ba.

[redacted] believes that [redacted] and [redacted] BRUCE IVINS might know something about how one would weaponize Ba. but [redacted] is not sure.

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Investigation on 10/31/03 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID ⁴⁸³ [redacted] Date dictated 11/3/03

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 10/31/03, Page 2 b6 b7C

[redacted] worked in building [redacted] suites [redacted] while in the lab and [redacted] and [redacted] did not work in building [redacted] prior to 2001.

[redacted] does not think the Ba used in the mailings was lyophilized as "the spore would get everywhere."

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[redacted] does not know of anyone to ever lyophilize Ba. [redacted] knows of one lyophilizer located in [redacted] purchased it.

[redacted] believes a foreign national with help from someone in the United States is responsible for mailing the anthrax-laced letters but he does not have any idea who it might be.

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[redacted] does not know of any contamination problems at USAMRIID.

[redacted] believes anyone could shower out of the hot suites with any select agent.

[redacted] does not know anyone to have hostile attitudes toward the government, political organizations, or the media.

[redacted] knows of only one person to be disciplined for not following proper safety procedures at work. [redacted] was found to be careless in [redacted] handling procedures. [redacted] eventually came down with [redacted] because [redacted] was not using [redacted] gloves around [redacted] work.

[redacted] is aware that approximately 200 organisms of Ba were detected near the pass box in [redacted] during the examination of the anthrax-laced letters. [redacted] believes BRUCE IVINS caused the contamination.

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[redacted] was called by [redacted] to accompany [redacted] out front of building [redacted] about one month after the anthrax-laced letters were mailed. [redacted] was outside on the front walk. BRUCE IVINS and [redacted] soon joined the group. [redacted] wanted to "show them something". [redacted] opened a brown briefcase containing several jars with what [redacted] stated was simulant. Each jar had different types of white particles and [redacted] was inquiring as to which simulant was most like the actual evidence

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/31/03, Page 3

found in the letters. IVINS stated that the one that looked like "smoke in a glass" looked like the actual evidence.

[REDACTED] believes that to prepare Ba for mailing one would have a wet preparation first and then lyophilize it, mill it down perhaps in a milling machine but [REDACTED] is not sure that would work for bacteria. Preventing self contamination would be difficult and one would need a glove box but the box would become highly contaminated. The particles would have to become statically neutralized in some way, however [REDACTED] does not know how that is done.

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[REDACTED] understands that the normal decontamination procedures for surface areas in bacteriology is a 10 percent bleach solution. [REDACTED] has never known there to be a bacterial contamination problem in the virology suites.

[REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID, and had only heard about [REDACTED] after [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was responsible for hosting several foreign visiting scientists. USAMRIID provided a list of foreign visitors either hosted directly by or approved by [REDACTED] during [REDACTED] time at USAMRIID. Attached hereto and considered part of this document is the list of names. [REDACTED] reviewed the list of names with investigators and commented on each name as follows:

[REDACTED] from [REDACTED] visited USAMRIID on [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID for a day and was accompanied by a translator (NU) and a representative from the State Department (NU). [REDACTED] again visited USAMRIID on [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] (nationality unknown) visited on [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] does not recall who this individual was.

[REDACTED] from [REDACTED] visited USAMRIID from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] for an interview. USAMRIID could not hire [REDACTED] due to [REDACTED] nationality.

[REDACTED] does not know [REDACTED] (nationality unknown) at all.

[REDACTED] from [REDACTED] visited USAMRIID on [REDACTED] for a meeting to discuss experimental projects related to the [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 10/31/03, Page 4

_____ from _____ visited USAMRIID on _____ for one day from the _____ to discuss plans for the development of immunogenicity testing of mice.

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b7D

_____ sponsored _____ a visiting Biology student from _____. _____ was a _____, was at USAMRIID to perform a student research internship in the Bacteriology Division. _____ was allowed in the cold areas of building _____ unescorted, but did not have access to the _____ suites, or building _____.

_____ from _____ is unknown to _____. _____ from _____ visited USAMRIID on _____ as part of a working group to discuss potential collaboration between _____ and USAMRIID.

_____ from _____ visited USAMRIID on _____ to discuss anthrax vaccine work and therapeutics.

_____ from _____ is unknown to _____. _____ is listed as _____ on the USAMRIID list of foreign visitors.

_____ from the _____ visited USAMRIID on _____ to discuss experimental projects.

_____ from _____ visited USAMRIID on _____. _____ does not recall the specific reason.

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b7C

_____ from _____ is unknown to _____. _____ also recalled that _____ sponsored a National Research Center (NRC) fellow _____ from _____. _____ could not recall the specific time periods. _____ had authorization to be in the hot suites.

_____ and _____ are the only visiting scientists that knew about and had access to the lyophilizer in room _____ of building _____ during their time at USAMRIID as far as _____ knows.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 10/31/03, Page 5

[redacted] was never a member nor was [redacted] ever involved with the Aeromedical Isolation Team.

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[redacted] had nothing to do with the mailing of the anthrax-laced letters and has never given any strain of *Bacillus anthracis* to anyone.

[redacted] is willing to submit to a polygraph examination on November 18, 2003 at 10:00 a.m.

atta

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/18/2003

On [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]
place of employment, [redacted]
[redacted] work telephone [redacted] where [redacted] works as a
[redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the
agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the
following information:

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[redacted] provided the agents with a copy of [redacted] curriculum
vitae (c.v.) which listed [redacted] home address as [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone [redacted]
[redacted] c.v. is maintained in an FD-340 1A envelope.

[redacted] educational history is as follows:

[redacted]

[redacted] employment history with [redacted]


[redacted] with additional details from [redacted] c.v., is as follows:
[redacted]

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Investigation on 12/17/2003 at [redacted]
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File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID/279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A
by SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, [redacted] 279A-WF-222936 [redacted]

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/17/2003, Page 2 b6
b7C



During the time that [redacted] worked in the [redacted] Division at USAMRIID, both [redacted] and [redacted] served as [redacted]. [redacted] worked under the supervision of [redacted] with whom [redacted] worked again at [redacted]

While at USAMRIID, [redacted] worked on [redacted] Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) vaccines were [redacted] and [redacted] worked with BRUCE IVINS and [redacted] to develop an anthrax DNA vaccine. [redacted] has never worked with live *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.).

[redacted] performed an anthrax DNA vaccination on the experimental animals and then returned them to IVINS and [redacted] to be challenged with anthrax. The DNA vaccine consisted of a portion of the anthrax gene which was inserted into a plasmid. A gene gun was used to blast the vaccine into the skin of the animals.

[redacted] thought that this project was [redacted] only collaboration with anyone from the [redacted] Division. At most, [redacted] may have had casual conversations with some other individuals from [redacted] regarding DNA vaccines.

[redacted] viral work was done in Building [redacted] at USAMRIID, and [redacted] laboratory bench work was done in Building [redacted] a [redacted] [redacted] building at Fort Detrick.

Other individuals who worked in [redacted] included: [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/17/2003, Page 3

[redacted]

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[redacted] work was conducted in a [redacted] Division Biosafety Level (BL) [redacted] and [redacted] work was done in the [redacted] BI [redacted] was shown a floor plan of Buildings [redacted] and [redacted] however [redacted] could not recall specifically in which suites [redacted] had worked.

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[redacted] did not work directly with [redacted] in the [redacted] Division at USAMRIID, however they did work on some similar projects and each knew of the others work. [redacted] thought that [redacted] had too big of an ego to talk to someone of [redacted] which at the time which was either [redacted] [redacted] did work with [redacted] who may have been in [redacted] lab group at that time.

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[redacted] advised that [redacted] "plays by the rules", and gave the following reasons for why [redacted] eventually left the [redacted] Division. A chloroform spill occurred in a lab [redacted] [redacted] followed the hazardous material spill protocol [redacted], an action which upset [redacted]

[redacted] Radiation Safety office after a radioisotope spill. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] arrived at USAMRIID close to the time when [redacted] left [redacted] position there in early [redacted]. Although they both worked in the same division for approximately three to four months, [redacted] spent most of [redacted] in [redacted]

Shortly after [redacted] left USAMRIID, [redacted] met [redacted] at the [redacted] in [redacted], [redacted] and introduced [redacted] to IVINS and [redacted]. [redacted] was working on general immune stimulatory work wherein a DNA vaccine with a particular genetic sequence is used to stimulate the immune system as a whole in order to boost it. [redacted] had no knowledge of how involved [redacted] became with the project.

[redacted] never worked with [redacted] but spoke with [redacted] regarding professional issues approximately six to ten times. [redacted] recalled stopping by [redacted] cubicle, where [redacted] sat back-to-back with [redacted] to discuss [redacted]. [redacted] never saw [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/17/2003, Page 4 b6
b7C

[redacted] outside of USAMRIID, never traveled with [redacted] and never dated or had drinks with [redacted]

[redacted] recalled that there was an item on or near [redacted] desk that was something [redacted] would not expect to see in the office of someone at [redacted] professional level. Although [redacted] could not recall what the specific item was, it was related to [redacted]. This item started a conversation regarding collaborative work [redacted] had done with people in the bio-defense community. [redacted] seemed to have familiarity with people at higher levels in that community than [redacted] would have expected. [redacted] recalled that [redacted] was either writing a proposal or drafting a document that was unrelated to [redacted] work at USAMRIID. [redacted] made mention of a [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] thought [redacted] may have mentioned that [redacted] had worked with the [redacted]. [redacted] said that [redacted] had worked with the military, however [redacted] did not recall that [redacted] claimed to have been with the [redacted]. [redacted] told [redacted] something about [redacted] time [redacted] however [redacted] could not recall what [redacted] claimed to be doing there. [redacted] advised that what [redacted] has [redacted] about [redacted] has become indistinguishable from what [redacted] told [redacted] about it. [redacted] never discussed New Jersey or Princeton University with [redacted]

[redacted] could not recall any instances of bacterial contamination in [redacted] Division laboratory space, and never saw evidence of anything peculiar in the division. [redacted] spoke with [redacted] regarding pooling of efforts and collaboration on some projects. [redacted] never met [redacted] nor did [redacted] ever attend a [redacted] conference. [redacted] had no involvement with the [redacted] at USAMRIID, and [redacted] never used a lyophilizer or a speed vac while working in the [redacted] Division. [redacted] never worked with [redacted]

[redacted] reviewed [redacted] travel since 1997 for the agents. [redacted] attended the American Society for Virology meeting in Toronto, Canada, and advised that [redacted] likely traveled to several of these meetings, as well as meetings of the American Society for Microbiology, with co-workers from USAMRIID. [redacted] recalled attending an American Veterinary Association meeting where either [redacted] or [redacted] as well as [redacted] and First Name Unknown

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936- [REDACTED]

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 12/17/2003, Page 5

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[REDACTED] were in attendance, however [REDACTED] did not actually travel to the meeting with these co-workers. In [REDACTED] [REDACTED] spent three weeks in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has not re-encountered any of the individuals that [REDACTED] met during [REDACTED] at Fort Detrick. [REDACTED] also traveled to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] conference that occurs bi-yearly. Although no one from USAMRIID traveled to the meeting with [REDACTED] recalled being surprised to see someone from USAMRIID at the conference. [REDACTED] could not recall who this individual was.

[REDACTED] did not sponsor any foreign visiting scientists while at USAMRIID. While [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] requested [REDACTED] assistance with a State Department sponsored scientist who [REDACTED] thought may have been from South Korea. [REDACTED] could not recall the scientist's name, but remembered that [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID for approximately four to six weeks. [REDACTED] would not have had access to the hot suites, as it takes longer than six weeks to receive the vaccinations necessary for entry. [REDACTED] thought that this scientist was photocopying too much information, and called [REDACTED] about the situation.

After the mailings, [REDACTED] looked at the bio-defense field and [REDACTED] colleagues in a questioning manner. Although [REDACTED] was "weird and not average", there was no indication that [REDACTED] would have committed such an act. No one strikes [REDACTED] as being capable of such a thing, particularly because those in the bio-defense community all know what can happen with anthrax. No one who was familiar with the bio-defense field would have done this, as the amount of anthrax in the letters could have done even more damage than it actually did. The only motivation for the mailings that [REDACTED] could think of was money.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/14/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] b6
[redacted], social security number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] b7C
place of employment, United States Army Medical Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) on [redacted]. After being
advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of
the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] does not know of any other foreign national visitors
besides what has been documented by USAMRIID building security on
August 4, 2003. [redacted] recalled that the Russian group that visited
the facility had been given a tour through the hot side of building
[redacted] but were escorted during the entire tour.

Neither [redacted] nor any of [redacted] associates traveled to New
Jersey during September or October of 2001.

[redacted] is unaware of ever working with any uncharacterized
strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.)

The stock of B.a. that was being used by [redacted]
and [redacted] was returned back to BRUCE IVINS stock.

[redacted] will be willing to participate in a polygraph
regarding the anthrax mailings.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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b7C

Investigation on 1/13/2004 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 190

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 02/02/2004

[redacted], date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] home address [redacted] home telephone number [redacted] employer [redacted] work telephone number [redacted]

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[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] earned [redacted] and then earned a Master's Degree in [redacted] from the [redacted]

[redacted] began working at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) part time in [redacted] as a [redacted]. In [redacted] [redacted] to USAMRIID. [redacted] was the [redacted] and [redacted] worked in the [redacted] until [redacted].

[redacted] worked in building [redacted] and building [redacted] had access to Biosafety [redacted] and Biosafety [redacted] Laboratories. [redacted] specifically worked in [redacted] and [redacted] Laboratories that supported the [redacted] division. [redacted] was responsible for animal [redacted] in the various laboratories and would provide animal [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] worked on Ebola injection challenges and injection vaccine studies with [redacted]. This study involved nonhuman primates (NHP). [redacted] would [redacted] to the NHP, [redacted] the challenge locations, evaluate each [redacted] and bleed the animals if necessary. [redacted] was never responsible for preparing any of the agents used in the study. In addition, [redacted] did not perform necropsies or transport carcasses.

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b6
b7C

Sometime during [redacted] [redacted] assisted [redacted] with a monkey pox study that was conducted in building [redacted] in room [redacted]. [redacted] administered anesthesia to the animals and [redacted]

Investigation on 1/30/04 at Washington, D.C.

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID ^{AQA} [redacted] Date dictated 2/2/04

by SA [redacted] SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 1/30/04, Page 2

_____ would intubate the animals. At the direction of the investigators, _____ would administer treatments which were mixed with applesauce to the animals. During this study, _____ spent most of _____ time in Room _____ which was the _____. _____ was also involved in this study. _____ believes that this study started before _____ reported to USAMRIID.

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_____ met _____ sometime in 1997 or 1998. _____ advised that _____ had _____ from _____ in the _____ Division. _____ believes that _____ was _____ as accommodating and easy to work with. _____ advised that _____ always seemed to be in a hurry, and _____ described _____ felt that _____ was less safety conscious, and because of this, _____ was more careful around _____. Someone told _____ that _____ was _____. _____ stated that _____ had a reputation for being cocky.

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_____ was always aware of the color of scrubs that people were wearing and paid attention to whether or not people showered out of the hot suites. _____ considers _____ to be safety conscious and pays attention to others that may put _____ at risk. For example, after leaving room _____ which was _____ in room _____, _____ and _____ co-workers would spray each other off immediately. _____ remembers working in room _____ at the same time as _____. _____ advised that _____ would frequently walk between _____ and the laboratory which was designated _____ without spraying off.

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b7C

_____ never discussed _____ human anthrax outbreaks or pieces of laboratory equipment that _____ had or wanted to obtain from USAMRIID. In addition, _____ did not discuss _____ personal life, _____ or any connections to New Jersey with _____. _____ stated that _____ may have had a discussion about monkey pox with _____ but _____ is not sure.

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_____ thought that _____ was a contractor. _____ remembers seeing _____ with _____ and _____ but _____ does not recall seeing _____ spend a lot of time with anyone else.

_____ may have seen a picture in _____ office of _____ in military fatigues holding a weapon. _____ said that

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 1/30/04

, Page 3

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b7C

the fatigues did not appear to be U.S. military issue because the pattern on the fatigues was not like the patterns used by the U.S. military.

[REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED] saw [REDACTED] on the first floor hot side of building [REDACTED] and in room [REDACTED] on the second floor of building [REDACTED]. In addition, [REDACTED] also saw [REDACTED] in building [REDACTED].

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[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had the reputation of being a [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] remembers [REDACTED] staying away from [REDACTED] and being very standoffish to [REDACTED].

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[REDACTED] worked on a [REDACTED] study with [REDACTED]. This study was carried out on the [REDACTED] floor hot side of building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] also assisted with a [REDACTED] with [REDACTED]. This study involved nonhuman primates (NHP) and took place on the hot side of building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised that the NHP's were eventually x-rayed, euthanized and the carcasses were double bagged.

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[REDACTED] is familiar with the walk-in-cooler located on the [REDACTED] floor hot side of building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] thinks that animal carcasses may have been stored in that room.

[REDACTED] participated in a [REDACTED] study at [REDACTED] that involved rabbits.

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[REDACTED] does not recall seeing a lyophilizer at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] believes that BRUCE IVINS was involved with an anthrax study using rabbits.

[REDACTED] has never grown, cultured or dried *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba).

[REDACTED] is not aware of any area inside of USAMRIID that had problems with bacterial contamination. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] worked next to the [REDACTED] and does not remember hearing any "chatter" about a contamination problem.

When [REDACTED] reported to USAMRIID, it was made clear to [REDACTED] that the badges were important for tracking employees, especially in case of an emergency. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] took

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/30/04, Page 4 b6 b7C

piggybacking very seriously and cannot recall ever seeing anyone piggyback into a hot suite.

Animal Caretakers were responsible for disinfecting the animal rooms and they followed a routine maintenance schedule. [REDACTED] was aware that items were autoclaved or decontaminated in an airlock, but is not aware of all of the specific procedures that were used.

While inside of a hot suite, [REDACTED] would take [REDACTED] notes on acetate paper and then pass them through a "dip box". After transcribing [REDACTED] notes, [REDACTED] would discard the acetate paper.

[REDACTED] has never seen or utilized a sterilite box at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] was shown an envelope consistent with the one used in the anthrax mailings of 2001. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] has never seen or used an envelope like the [REDACTED] was shown.

[REDACTED] one foreign visitor while at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] was a visiting veterinary resident. [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID to take the [REDACTED]. In addition, [REDACTED] reviewed training slides to help prepare for [REDACTED] board exam. [REDACTED] did not have access to any of the hot suites.

One of [REDACTED] colleagues, named [REDACTED] used to live in New Jersey. [REDACTED] worked and lived in [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] believes that [REDACTED] visited [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is no longer living in New Jersey.

[REDACTED] does not recall taking leave in September or October 2001. During that time, [REDACTED] was working at [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] was aware of anyone who might have been involved with the anthrax mailings or if anyone at USAMRIID had expressed hostile attitudes toward USAMRIID or others. [REDACTED] does not know anyone who fit either description.

[REDACTED] stated that there were a few people who were fired or moved because of their work habits while [REDACTED] at USAMRIID.

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 1/30/04, Page 5

does not recall who had the NHP contract but believes that the manager of that contract was

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b7c

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/14/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
social security number [redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted]
work telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place
of employment the United States Army Medical Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the
identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] received an undergraduate degree from
[redacted] a [redacted]
[redacted] in [redacted]
[redacted]

As part of [redacted]
USAMRIID in [redacted] During [redacted] first [redacted] years at
USAMRIID, [redacted] was [redacted] the [redacted] which
was run by [redacted] had
both administrative and research support duties. [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] and [redacted] assisted with necropsies in buildings
[redacted] and [redacted] While in this position, [redacted] and [redacted]
subordinates, worked at [redacted]

In [redacted] transferred to the [redacted]
Division and assumed the title of [redacted]. [redacted]
remained at this position for [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted]

In [redacted] began working at USAMRIID as
a [redacted]

[redacted]
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Investigation on 1/14/04 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

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b7C

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID [redacted] Date dictated 1/14/04
by SA [redacted] SA [redacted]

[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 1/14/04, Page 2 b6 b7C

was employed by _____ While employed by _____ worked in the _____ Division and was responsible for research support. On occasion, _____ worked as a Principal Investigator and was involved with performing necropsies, particle sizing, histology, aerosol studies and a study involving the effects of toxins on mice.

_____ was hired as a Microbiologist and advised that this position _____ held that position until _____ when _____ became a _____.

_____ has been involved with various aerosol studies involving *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba). _____ has worked with the following scientists/principal investigators during Ba aerosol studies: _____, BRUCE IVINS, _____ and _____. During the aerosol studies, _____ mainly dealt with _____ the animals, and seeing to the animals' well being. _____ was not involved with the preparation, culturing or growth of any of the Ba used in the above-mentioned studies. _____ advised that it would have been rare for _____ to handle the wet spore preparations and advised that the principal investigator usually handled the Ba.

_____ has been involved with the culturing and growth of _____. During this study, _____ was assisting an Army Major FNU LNU. After _____ was deployed overseas, _____ was instructed to continue the study until _____ return. _____ conducted blood cultures, isolated bacteria, conducted necropsies, grew bacteria and extracted DNA and RNA. _____ advised that _____ made streaks on blood agar plates and used a tan colored agar as well as some other type of selective media. After _____ returned _____ completed the study. _____ believes that _____ may currently be working at _____.

IVINS told _____ that the Ba at USAMRIID came from Dugway.

_____ stated that _____ has had a few laboratory notebooks signed out to _____. The first time was while _____ was a _____ working for _____. _____ stated that _____ signed for the notebook and advised that the notebook is in the _____.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 1/14/04

, Page 3

library. Additionally, [REDACTED] thinks that there may have been a few notebooks signed out to [REDACTED] while [REDACTED] was [REDACTED].

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[REDACTED] currently has access to [REDACTED] Biosafety [REDACTED] and Biosafety [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised that this is due to [REDACTED] position as [REDACTED] and it is [REDACTED] responsibility to perform safety inspections.

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[REDACTED] advised that the submarine went "hot" shortly before Christmas.

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b7C

[REDACTED] stated that animal carcasses are typically stored in a freezer in the basement of building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that a Primary Investigator might put a carcass in room [REDACTED] the walk-in cooler on the [REDACTED] floor hot side of building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has been inside of room [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has mopped the floor, and [REDACTED] has turned on the light to make sure it was neat. [REDACTED] thinks that reagents are stored in room [REDACTED] but is not sure. [REDACTED] has never seen anyone else inside of room [REDACTED].

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[REDACTED] recalls that there was bacterial contamination found in one of the passboxes in building [REDACTED]. After this incident, weekly testing has been conducted within the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] laboratories. [REDACTED] advised that inside the suites, on a weekly basis, the floors are vacuumed with a Hepa filter, the floors are mopped with bleach and all of the equipment, door handles and light switches are sprayed down. [REDACTED] stated that occasionally spores are found in one of the safety cabinets or centrifuges and then the equipment is decontaminated with bleach and retested.

Approximately every ten-days [REDACTED] the various suites. [REDACTED] and on occasion picks up trash and drags laundry into the suites for autoclaving. [REDACTED] stated that after the passbox incident all of the used scrubs, socks and towels are returned to the hot suites and sterilized with steam before they are taken away to be laundered. This change took place after the laundry companies expressed concern with possible bacterial contamination of the laundry and potential threat to their employees.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 1/14/04

, Page 4

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[REDACTED] has access to the various places where FBI evidence is stored, but stated that all freezers, rooms etc. are outfitted with special locks, and [REDACTED] does not have access to them. [REDACTED] was not involved with the processing of any FBI evidence.

[REDACTED] was shown an envelope consistent with the ones used in the anthrax mailings in 2001. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] has seen photographs of the anthrax letters, but has never personally seen or used envelopes like the one [REDACTED] was shown.

[REDACTED] has never seen or used a clear sterilite box at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] advised that large colored Rubbermaid tubs are used to transport monkeys and to hold toys used by the monkeys. [REDACTED] stated that some of the monkeys are too large for the traditional "hat boxes" used to transport monkeys and the Rubbermaid totes were purchased to alleviate that problem.

[REDACTED] never met or saw [REDACTED] while working at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] thought [REDACTED] " Additionally, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] leaving a suite without showering.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was in [REDACTED] the first few weeks following September 11, 2001. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] was involved with [REDACTED] and stated that [REDACTED] was busy conducting necropsies during this time period.

When asked about October 6-9 2001, [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] did not travel or take leave during this time. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was supposed to take a [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] some time during October, but it was cancelled because of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] worked with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] provided technical reports and [REDACTED] for some of [REDACTED] research, but none of it has been published because of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was involved with [REDACTED] studies, and [REDACTED] worked in [REDACTED] suites. To [REDACTED] knowledge, [REDACTED] never had access to BSL-3 or BSL-4 suites.

b6
b7c

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Additionally, _____ is not aware of any vaccinations that _____ may have had.

_____ was _____ between November _____ and April _____. Also in _____ chain of command were _____ and _____. _____ advised that _____ has _____ surrounding _____. Additionally, _____ advised that _____ stated that _____

_____ had professional problems with the following individuals in the _____ Division: _____ and a _____ Army Officer (ENLT LMI). _____ stated that _____ but _____ did not know who put it there.

There was an _____ investigation revolving around _____. _____ believes that the investigation was run by _____ an _____ who was assigned to the _____.

_____ socialized with _____ a few times and _____ remembers having dinner with _____ family. Additionally, _____ and _____

_____ stated that _____ and advised that _____ talked about _____ family quite a lot. _____ would travel frequently and told _____ that _____ had family all over the world, if _____ is unaware of _____ having a _____ stated that _____ did not display the fact that _____ and felt that someone would have had to work with _____ closely before _____ would tell them. _____ advised that on one occasion _____ traveled to _____

_____ and _____ both attended school at _____. In _____, _____ was starting a program and _____ was finishing one. _____ remembered having difficulty with a computer and advised that _____ helped _____ log on.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] worked on a study where [REDACTED] was the Principal Investigator. Also assisting with this study was [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. This study involved nonhuman primates and [REDACTED] collected tissue samples from [REDACTED] work.

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] expected the people that worked for [REDACTED] work very hard and stated that [REDACTED] work generated a lot of data. However, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has not talked to [REDACTED] recently and has only seen [REDACTED] during [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also butted heads with [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] used to oversee the [REDACTED] at USAMRIID.

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