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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/01/2004

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[redacted], born [redacted], Social Security Account Number [redacted] driver's license number [redacted] currently residing at [redacted] home phone [redacted] currently employed at [redacted] phone number [redacted] Extension [redacted] employed as a [redacted]

[redacted] voluntarily agreed to be interviewed at the [redacted] Field Office. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

1. [redacted] graduated from [redacted] University in [redacted] in [redacted] with a [redacted] Degree in [redacted] worked at USAMRIID from [redacted] of [redacted] to [redacted] of [redacted] as a [redacted] worked on [redacted] [redacted] left in [redacted] because [redacted] From [redacted] to [redacted] worked for [redacted] as a [redacted] In [redacted] began working for [redacted] in the [redacted] Section as an [redacted] In [redacted] began working for [redacted] as a [redacted] specialization is [redacted] At USAMRIID, [redacted] worked with Bacillus anthracis (Ba) cultures for [redacted]

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2. At USAMRIID, [redacted] worked with [redacted]

3. [redacted] worked with [redacted] employee on [redacted] named [redacted] who is still employed at USAMRIID. [redacted] worked with live cultures of Ba stored at -70 degrees and grew Ba on blood auger plates. [redacted] did no spore work and worked with the Ames strain of Ba. [redacted] had both a freezer and an incubator in [redacted] suite, so [redacted] never distributed Ba to any other sources, and no one else used their cultures.



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Investigation on 2/26/04 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-6001-USAMRIID-703 Date dictated 2/26/04  
by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]



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06 [redacted] 302



279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 2/26/04, Page 2

4. [REDACTED] has never used modified G sporulation media.

5. [REDACTED] worked mostly with multi-colony cultures.

6. [REDACTED] did not work with the drying of Ba.

7. [REDACTED] does not know if the strains were characterized, where they originated, or where they were disseminated. [REDACTED] is not familiar with Bruce Ivins or [REDACTED].

8. [REDACTED] is not familiar with anyone who has expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production, or lyophilizing. [REDACTED] stated that when [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] was told that no one was working on weaponization techniques.

9. [REDACTED] is unaware of any areas at USAMRIID that have problems with bacterial contamination and was never in a virology suite.

10. After studying the provided floor plans, Building [REDACTED] determined that [REDACTED] worked in Building [REDACTED].

11. N/A

12. [REDACTED] was not aware of any piggybacking in and out of the hot areas in 1412. [REDACTED] never saw it, nor did [REDACTED] know anyone who did it. [REDACTED] was not aware of visiting scientists being taken into any hot areas.

13. [REDACTED] said it would be easy to remove select agents from the hot areas by either putting them in the pockets or waistband of your scrubs. Neither individuals nor their bags were searched upon exiting the area.

14. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] was unaware of anyone who said they might make a select agent for use in some improper fashion.

15. [REDACTED] was not aware of any persons with the access and the ability to create dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organizations, the media, or others.

16. [REDACTED] is not aware of anyone [REDACTED] believes to be a suspect or associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters.

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279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 2/26/04, Page 3

17. \_\_\_\_\_ did not work with anyone whom \_\_\_\_\_ considered lax in handling dangerous items.

18. \_\_\_\_\_ was not aware of anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or other biological or chemical agents.

19. \_\_\_\_\_ said \_\_\_\_\_ would sporulate and liafolize or mill a Ba sample than mail it.

20. \_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

21. \_\_\_\_\_ has no personal or professional association with New Jersey.

22. Neither \_\_\_\_\_ nor \_\_\_\_\_ associates traveled to New Jersey in September or October of 2001. \_\_\_\_\_ was in \_\_\_\_\_ during that time period.

23. \_\_\_\_\_ did not see any SOPs for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets while at USAMRIID.

24. \_\_\_\_\_ was not aware of any fumigation in the verology areas.

25. N/A

26. \_\_\_\_\_ said that \_\_\_\_\_ had frequently used plastic storage containers, but that \_\_\_\_\_ did not purchase them, nor does \_\_\_\_\_ know who did. \_\_\_\_\_ never noticed any of \_\_\_\_\_ storage boxes missing.

27. \_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of any work that was conducted with Ba unofficially.

28. \_\_\_\_\_ work was recorded in three-ring binders, not lab books. \_\_\_\_\_ assumes those binders are still somewhere at USAMRIID.

29. \_\_\_\_\_ never purchased pre-stamped envelopes.

30. \_\_\_\_\_ did not use the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes.

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 2/26/04, Page 4

31. [redacted] did not personally handle any of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes.

32. [redacted] did not do any analytical work on the evidence in this case.

[redacted]  
1. [redacted] did not know [redacted] prior to the media coverage about [redacted]

2-24 N/A

25. [redacted] is not aware of anyone who has made comments about [redacted] or about having given [redacted] access to certain areas with Ba.

26. [redacted] had no additional information regarding the anthrax letter mailings.

FOREIGN VISITING SCIENTISTS

1. [redacted] never had any dealings with any foreign visiting scientists.

2-13 N/A

[redacted]  
1. [redacted] was not an [redacted] member.

2-11 N/A

When asked if [redacted] had any additional information to provide regarding this investigation, [redacted] stated no.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/20/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
social security number [redacted] telephone number [redacted]  
was interviewed on February 20, 2004 at [redacted] place of employment at [redacted]

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[redacted] After being advised of the  
identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the  
interview [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] is [redacted]  
[redacted] received his [redacted] in [redacted] at [redacted] University. [redacted]  
dissertation was on [redacted]

[redacted]

working on [redacted] work included [redacted]

[redacted] and aerosol challenges administered in  
Building [redacted] at the United States Army Medical Research Institute  
of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. The  
tests that [redacted] conducted at USAMRIID were [redacted]  
[redacted] and were approved by [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] worked with [redacted]  
[redacted] and [redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted] and [redacted]  
performed the aerosol challenges in building [redacted] and, both worked  
for [redacted] believes that [redacted] left [redacted] when

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[redacted]. The veterinary caretakers were [redacted]  
[redacted] who now works at [redacted] and [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted], was the other primary investigator working with  
[redacted] would assist [redacted] with [redacted]

Investigation on 02/20/04 at [redacted]

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File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated [redacted]

by [redacted]  
[redacted] 040511.wpd

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of

[redacted]

, On 02/18/04

, Page 2

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[redacted]  
[redacted] recalled that aerosol challenges were run on a random schedule, but usually every two (2) to three (3) weeks.

[redacted]

Most of [redacted] work at USAMRIID was conducted in Room [redacted] in Building [redacted] [redacted] had no office space in Building [redacted] or Building [redacted] [redacted] with members of BRUCE IVINS' group working on *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.). [redacted] Tyvex suits were required for entry into Room [redacted] [redacted] IVINS' group would come in after he had left. He knew that they were there from the mess of blood, papers, samples, and bottles left around the lab. [redacted] recalled that the bottles used by IVINS' group were poorly labeled.

[redacted]

[redacted] did not recall whether Ames was one of the strains.

[redacted] grew and stored live bacteria in room [redacted] of Building [redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The only refrigerator and freezer that [redacted] used were in room [redacted] Blood counts were done in room [redacted] with [redacted] from [redacted] [redacted] would perform serum chemistry and microscope work.

When [redacted] finished working at USAMRIID in [redacted] took everything he had in room [redacted] except [redacted] [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/18/04

, Page 3

b6  
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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is unaware of what else was in the freezer during that period.

[REDACTED] was immunized in [REDACTED] at USAMRIID. In [REDACTED] was contacted to have [REDACTED] boosters updated, however, [REDACTED] never had them done.

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[REDACTED] did not know who [REDACTED] was prior to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have never interacted.

[REDACTED] stated that it was common knowledge that the [REDACTED] code on the suite doors would grant access in Building [REDACTED] at USAMRIID. It was noted that doors that should have been closed and locked were often propped open. Rooms [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were coded with the same access numbers. Room [REDACTED] was used for storage while [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID.

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[REDACTED] never used the cooler in room [REDACTED] of Building 1412 at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] did use the walk-in cooler on the first floor of Building [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] plates and consumable material were stored.

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[REDACTED] did not work with anyone from the [REDACTED] department at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] is not aware of any weaponization procedures for pathogenic material.

[REDACTED] never saw a lyophilizer or freeze dryer in Building 1412 at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who attempted to gain access to pathogenic material without reason or need.

[REDACTED] has dried clinical isolates from patients in the past. [REDACTED] noted that it is a routine and common activity.

[REDACTED] has used a lyophilizer in the past to freeze bacterial isolates for storage.

[REDACTED] has used a fermentor to grow vaccine candidates in glycerol and glucose.



279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 02/18/04, Page 4

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[redacted] is aware that there is B. a. at [redacted] and [redacted] has the [redacted] strain of B.a., however, [redacted] is not aware if there are any other strains at the facility.

[redacted] does not know any member of the [redacted] at USAMRIID.

[redacted] had no foreign visitors while working at USAMRIID. [redacted] never saw any foreign visitors in Building [redacted] at USAMRIID.

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[redacted] is unaware of anyone who could have done the anthrax mailings of 2001.

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[redacted] read the Canadian study regarding *Bacillus globigii* dispersal via the mail system prior to the Anthrax mailings of 2001. [redacted] could not recall if [redacted] had read the study on the internet or through [redacted] had read the study as part of [redacted]

[redacted] recalled going into USAMRIID's [redacted]

[redacted] noted that [redacted] has never done any work that was classified as Secret.

[redacted] does not believe the assumption that the anthrax used in the mailings of 2001 came from USAMRIID. [redacted] noted that since [redacted] never saw a lyophilizer and no one had any weaponization knowledge at USAMRIID, that USAMRIID was not the source of the material. [redacted] believes that Anthrax is not a practical pathogen to use for an attack since too much material is needed for an effective attack, however, it is a good choice for long term storage. Anthrax is a good choice of material to use if distribution is going to be via powder. [redacted] believes that the people who perpetrated the anthrax mailings died in the September 11, 2001 attacks. [redacted] recalled the report of a cutaneous exposure to anthrax and MOHAMMAD ATTA's access to crop dusters. [redacted] would not have thought that sending anthrax through the

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 02/18/04 , Page 5

mail would be so effective since it is such a low tech use for the pathogen. [redacted] believes that there would have been subsequent incidents of anthrax if the people responsible had not either died or ran out of material to use. [redacted] recalled the 1996 or 1997 incident at the Israeli Embassy where a petri dish was found. [redacted] noted that a possible motivation for the attacks could have been for increased research funding.

[redacted] noted that [redacted] would use Bounce fabric softener to remove the static charge from the powder.

[redacted] does not believe that the material was from an American isolate.

[redacted] indicated on a USAMRIID floor plan of Building [redacted] where the refrigerators that [redacted] utilized were on the [redacted] floor and where the refrigerator in room [redacted]

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[redacted] A copy of the floor plan with [redacted] markings will be maintained in the 1A section of the file along with the notes of this interview.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/29/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] home address [redacted] home telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, Building [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft. Detrick, MD, work telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] is currently the [redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted] has a [redacted] from [redacted] University. [redacted] worked at USAMRIID from [redacted]

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[redacted] has done no personal work with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba); however [redacted] in the [redacted] Division at USAMRIID who work with Ba.

[redacted] has not had any projects that dealt with Ba and has never used the modified G sporulation media. [redacted] stated that no drying of Ba work is conducted at USAMRIID.

[redacted] identified Dr. BRUCE IVINS, [redacted] and [redacted] as persons who have some expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production and lyophilizing of Ba.

[redacted] recalled one incident after 09/11/2001, where bacterial contamination occurred in the hallway of USAMRIID which was the only incident that [redacted] could recall outside of the containment suites. Other incidents occur within the containment suites on occasion, which are understandable because the containment suites are assumed to be contaminated.

[redacted] identified buildings [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] containment suites as areas routinely used by [redacted] has used the hot areas of building [redacted] however, [redacted] has not used room [redacted]

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Investigation on 01/22/2004 at Ft. Detrick, MD

File # 279-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 01/29/2004

by [redacted] Postal Inspector; [redacted] Postal Inspector

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279-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/22/2004, Page 2

[REDACTED] doesn't know anyone who uses room [REDACTED] and doesn't know what is stored there.

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[REDACTED] stated people did "piggy-back" in and out of the hot areas of USAMRIID and stated visiting scientists were taken into the hot areas of USAMRIID by researchers.

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[REDACTED] stated there are many, many ways someone could remove Select Agents from the hot areas of USAMRIID covertly.

[REDACTED] said it would not be a difficult task. [REDACTED] said hypothetically, someone could procure culture plates through the pass box or shower room, could take impure cultures, or a person could auto-innoculate themselves and place a culture under their fingernails, in their nose and etc. [REDACTED] did not know anyone who said they would use or make Select Agents improperly.

[REDACTED] knew of no one whom [REDACTED] believed to be associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters.

[REDACTED] advised that there were [REDACTED] who [REDACTED] worked with on occasion who were lax in handling dangerous items (no names recalled) but they were dealt with in-house by retraining. [REDACTED] knew of no one who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other dangerous agents.

[REDACTED] advised if [REDACTED] was to prepare Ba to send through the mail it definitely wouldn't be done in the institute.

[REDACTED] said the drying of the Ba would be the hardest part of the process. First, one would need to build themselves a lab, grow the cultures, get a lyophilizer or drying equipment such as a spray dryer to make it aerosolize and add compounds to refine the powder.

[REDACTED] advised the person would have to have a fairly reasonable biological background and experience. In the lab, one would have to drape everything in plastic and use a HEPA filter as well as internal pressure of the lab so that the neighbors wouldn't get sick. [REDACTED] doesn't know anyone who would construct such a lab.

[REDACTED] is not aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in having the ability to get around forensic techniques.

[REDACTED] stated the only dealings [REDACTED] has had with the state of New Jersey was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] believes USAMRIID [REDACTED] however, [REDACTED] does not know its

279-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 01/22/2004, Page 3

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location. \_\_\_\_\_ sated neither \_\_\_\_\_ nor any of \_\_\_\_\_ associates traveled to New Jersey in September or October of 2001.

\_\_\_\_\_ advised there are SOP's for decontamination of \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ biosafety cabinets; \_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_ couldn't recall them, but stated they can be can be retrieved online. \_\_\_\_\_ said \_\_\_\_\_ has smelled bacterial decontamination chemicals in the virology suites. \_\_\_\_\_ stated air-locked suites are deconned monthly with either paraformaldehyde or glutaraldehyde. Suite \_\_\_\_\_ was deconned in 2001 for renovation purposes; \_\_\_\_\_ advised facilities engineering would have the exact dates.

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\_\_\_\_\_ stated \_\_\_\_\_ has never used plastic storage containers such as sterilite boxes for storage of \_\_\_\_\_ materials. \_\_\_\_\_ said small plastic boxes are used by some researchers for the storing of samples in freezers but none the size of a sterilite box. \_\_\_\_\_ has never noticed any missing containers and has no knowledge of purchase dates.

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\_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of any unofficial or unrecorded work with Ba in \_\_\_\_\_ division. \_\_\_\_\_ said not all of \_\_\_\_\_ work is located in notebooks; some of \_\_\_\_\_ data is captured electronically and was not recorded in lab notebooks. \_\_\_\_\_ said researchers keep official notes but not always in official notebooks. \_\_\_\_\_ advised some \_\_\_\_\_ research is located in the library at USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_ has never purchased pre-stamped envelopes like those in the anthrax mailings for \_\_\_\_\_ or anyone else.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ stated \_\_\_\_\_ Dr. Bruce Ivins and two technicians (names unknown) were present when \_\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_ has no knowledge of \_\_\_\_\_ other than what \_\_\_\_\_ said \_\_\_\_\_ never ran into \_\_\_\_\_ at USAMRIID and has no personal knowledge of \_\_\_\_\_

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279-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 01/22/2004, Page 4

\_\_\_\_\_ stated \_\_\_\_\_ has never hosted foreign visiting scientists and has never been a member of the \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ said \_\_\_\_\_ has a small problem with submitting to a polygraph examination. \_\_\_\_\_ stated the polygraph is being used opposite of what it is intended. \_\_\_\_\_ advised asking questions relating to what a person did when they were 15 years old has no significance to the case at hand. \_\_\_\_\_ stated \_\_\_\_\_ wouldn't mind taking the polygraph but has problems on how it is being administered at this time.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 04/08/2004

[redacted], date of birth [redacted],  
[redacted] social security number [redacted] employed at the United States  
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), was  
interviewed on [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of  
the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided  
the following information:

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[redacted] antifoam was used when aerosol challenges

[Large redacted block]

[Redacted block]

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Investigation on 04/07/2004 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-713

Date dictated

by SSA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]  
[redacted].wpd

[Redacted box]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/07/2004, Page 2

[redacted] said that the same AGIs have been used for at least the past ten (10) years. Recently the AGIs have been modified to use a screw top instead of a push on top.

The material that was collected in the AGI would be maintained for several days or longer following a challenge.

Small amounts of the antifoam were aliquoted into tubes. In previous years, larger tubes were used which caused excess waste.

[redacted]

[redacted] noted that Anthrax spores are very resilient.

[redacted] is unaware of any antifoam stock ever reported missing.

[redacted] said that [redacted] would assume that [redacted] knew the process of using antifoam as part of the aerosol challenges. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] in the past olive oil was used for aerosol challenges. The olive oil was used for challenges involving toxin proteins. Olive oil has not been used during challenges for ten (10) years. [redacted]

[redacted] has not seen a bottle of olive oil at USAMRIID since the early 1990's.

[redacted]

[redacted] stated that there is no difference in the post challenge assays if olive oil or antifoam are used during the aerosol challenge.



279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/07/2004, Page 3

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The concentration of anthrax used in the aerosol challenge depended on the desired post-challenge concentration. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

For a long period, only the material provided by Dugway was utilized in the aerosol challenges at USAMRIID. [redacted] stated that BRUCE IVINS wanted to do the plating of the material of his challenges personally. [redacted] said that IVINS would plate 0.1 or 0.2 ml of material, and that the amount plated differed for each PI. IVINS and [redacted] grew material used in the challenges.

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[redacted] IVINS and [redacted] were always present for [redacted] studies involving aerosol challenges. [redacted] if any logs indicated that [redacted] was the PI, it was IVINS that was handling the aerosol challenge for [redacted] also

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 04/07/2004, Page 4

\_\_\_\_\_ said that \_\_\_\_\_ was not around for any of the aerosol challenges related to \_\_\_\_\_ studies.

\_\_\_\_\_ never saw the post challenge plates after they had been placed into the autoclave bags for disposal.

\_\_\_\_\_ there are unofficial and also possibly official procedures for anthrax aerosol challenges. \_\_\_\_\_ IVINS would have a copy of the procedure, as well as a protocol for anthrax aerosol preparation. \_\_\_\_\_ there are general Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for equipment usage and maintenance.

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that the systems used in the aerosol challenge process have been updated with newer, automated, computer based systems. As an example \_\_\_\_\_ the flow meters are now electronic instead of manual. Some of the modifications to the units over the past several years have been based on system maintenance, however, other modifications have involved complete component replacements. Upgrades made to the equipment were not noted in a log. \_\_\_\_\_ maintenance logs were maintained for filters, tubing, and glove replacements. The maintenance logs were not kept with the intention of historical documentation. The hood lines present in the laboratory now are the same ones present since the early 1990's.

On the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) website, interviewing agents should be able to locate a presentation given at an aerosol workshop. The presentation was given in December of 2003. The presentation should have photographs of the equipment used in the aerosol challenges.

\_\_\_\_\_ *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) Ames challenges are still conducted at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ one non-human primate is going to be exposed to Ba Ames around May 1, 2004. The PI for the study is \_\_\_\_\_ IVINS will provide the Ba Ames for the challenge. \_\_\_\_\_ there will be an aerosol challenge of Ba Ames involving mice at the end of April 2004. The PI for the study is \_\_\_\_\_ Both of the upcoming challenges will take place in room \_\_\_\_\_ of Building \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ the aerosol technicians listed on the Aerosol Challenge Log sheets were the people actually running the challenge. \_\_\_\_\_ if rabbits were utilized in the challenge, another individual would need to be involved to hold the animal. \_\_\_\_\_ there were always people around observing the challenges,


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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 04/07/2004, Page 5

however, not many people were hands-on with administering the challenges.

\_\_\_\_\_ identified \_\_\_\_\_ as a former aerosol technician.



\_\_\_\_\_ was asked by the interviewing agents to provide any protocols or other documentation for Ba Ames challenges run in \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ would require the protocol number of the study in order to provide the information. \_\_\_\_\_ the material from in the \_\_\_\_\_ period would have been aerosolized using the old nebulizers and that none of the remaining material in the nebulizers would have been re-mixed back into any anthrax stock. The material that was collected in the AGI would have been poured into a sterile tube. \_\_\_\_\_ the Anthrax used in the challenge would have been provided by IVINS.

\_\_\_\_\_ provided the interviewing agents with two (2) green Aerosol Log Books. One of books is labeled \_\_\_\_\_ and the other is labeled as \_\_\_\_\_ room \_\_\_\_\_ Aerosol Log Book". \_\_\_\_\_ a print out of the model and price of Antifoam A Emulsion that is purchased for the aerosol challenges. \_\_\_\_\_ provided a copy of an unregistered and unapproved SOP titled \_\_\_\_\_ the SOP is based on an older unofficial procedure developed with IVINS. IVINS should be able to provide a copy of the older procedure.

The two (2) log books, the SOP provided \_\_\_\_\_ the FD-597 for the books collected, the antifoam product information, and the interview notes will be maintained in a 1A envelope.

During this interview, \_\_\_\_\_ advised by SSA \_\_\_\_\_ that the agents may want to obtain Ames samples from various stages of a future Ames aerosol challenge and may want to secure them in the

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 04/07/2004, Page 6

aerosol challenge laboratory at room temperature. \_\_\_\_\_ willing to assist when needed. \_\_\_\_\_ told that \_\_\_\_\_ may be asked in the future to produce spore preparations and use the challenge equipment as it was setup in the late 1990's for some challenge runs without animal exposures. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ SSA \_\_\_\_\_ told \_\_\_\_\_ such plans would be cleared with \_\_\_\_\_ is asked to assist.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 04/01/2004

On March 1, 2004, [redacted]  
 [redacted] date of birth [redacted] place of birth [redacted]  
 [redacted] social security number [redacted] employed as [redacted]  
 [redacted]  
 [redacted] telephone [redacted] mailing address of [redacted]  
 [redacted] Attn: [redacted] e-mail [redacted]  
 [redacted] was interviewed at the offices of  
 the [redacted]  
 [redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and  
 the nature of the interview. [redacted] voluntarily provided the  
 following information:

[redacted] arrived at [redacted] in [redacted]  
 [redacted]

In [redacted] received [redacted] degree in  
 [redacted] from the University of [redacted] In [redacted] received  
 [redacted] from the University of [redacted]  
 In [redacted] received [redacted] in [redacted] from the University of  
 [redacted] In [redacted] received a [redacted] degree in  
 [redacted] College in [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] work specialty is [redacted], or the study of  
 [redacted]

[redacted]  
 [redacted] at the United States Army Medical Research Institute  
 of Infectious Diseases (AMRIID) from [redacted] to [redacted]  
 [redacted] does not have first hand experience working with bacillus  
 anthracis (BA), however the division in [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 03/01/04 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-723 Date dictated Not dictated

by Legat [redacted]

279A-WF-222936.

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 03/01/04, Page 2

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AMRIID contracted with \_\_\_\_\_ who made an anthrax vaccine. \_\_\_\_\_ ended up going private and is now called \_\_\_\_\_ is a partnership between \_\_\_\_\_ and the British firm of \_\_\_\_\_ and other companies.

\_\_\_\_\_, at AMRIID there were also the Bacteriology Division, Virology Division, and Diagnostic Systems Division. \_\_\_\_\_ the Toxicology section worked with by-products of bacterial agents. The Aerobiology section worked on aerosol delivery systems for all agents, including BA. This section worked with both BA spores and vegetative cells.

BA was never made at \_\_\_\_\_. Any BA received had to be logged. \_\_\_\_\_ never personally handled any BA. The \_\_\_\_\_ received BA from the \_\_\_\_\_ Division.

There were contractors who worked at the laboratory representing several companies. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled the following companies as having contractors at \_\_\_\_\_. The first two letters of \_\_\_\_\_ stand for \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ could not recall the full name of the company. There may have been other companies represented as well at AMRIID but \_\_\_\_\_ could not recall their names. \_\_\_\_\_ had a contract to produce BA for the Bacteriology Division.

\_\_\_\_\_ was the \_\_\_\_\_. There were over \_\_\_\_\_ people in \_\_\_\_\_ division. \_\_\_\_\_ worked on BA related projects. \_\_\_\_\_ also worked in this division, but worked on other toxins and not BA. There were several \_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_\_ department and there was personnel movement between projects.

Regarding BA, \_\_\_\_\_ is an \_\_\_\_\_ who worked on \_\_\_\_\_ for BA. \_\_\_\_\_ may still be at AMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ worked for \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_ worked on developing a vaccine for BA. \_\_\_\_\_ was a \_\_\_\_\_ at AMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ did not grow any BA at AMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ did not work with BA itself. \_\_\_\_\_ worked on the \_\_\_\_\_ for BA, but the Bacteriology Division would be responsible for actually exposing animals in experiments.

279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 03/01/04 , Page 3

[REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] at AMRIID prior to becoming [REDACTED] worked as a [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] did not work with BA during those times. [REDACTED] worked with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not know where the BA samples were stored at AMRIID. [REDACTED] did not have access to the areas where BA was stored. If [REDACTED] needed, [REDACTED] could have obtained access, but [REDACTED] did not. [REDACTED] would occasionally [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was shown the floor diagrams for AMRIID. [REDACTED] could not recall where the BA was stored. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] The Bacteriology Division would have been responsible for inventory of the BA samples.

For an individual to access a storage freezer it would require security card access and a key.

If a person had a small sample of BA and if he knew what he was doing he could grow more BA from the sample.

[REDACTED] does not recall [REDACTED] division ever receiving any powdered anthrax. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was aware that powdered anthrax was made at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] division did not maintain any stocks of BA, but [REDACTED] A lot of people at AMRIID had potential access to BA, primarily individuals in [REDACTED] In addition [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] staff in [REDACTED] would potentially have access to BA.

[REDACTED] had no direct workings with colony culture techniques. [REDACTED] division did no work on the drying of BA. Individuals in [REDACTED] division would have had the capability of drying small amounts of BA. [REDACTED] in the past had worked on drying toxins. [REDACTED] is not aware of anyone in [REDACTED] drying BA. The Bacteriology Division may have dried BA but [REDACTED] has no information regarding this. [REDACTED] division never did any experiments with dry powder.

Bruce Ivins (Ivins) worked in Bacteriology. [REDACTED] never worked directly with Ivins or socialized with him. [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/01/04, Page 4

[REDACTED] knew Ivins as a professional acquaintance who worked [REDACTED].  
[REDACTED] Ivins was a nice person. Ivins was [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED].

During [REDACTED] tenure at AMRIID [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] worked on producing material for delivery in weapons  
systems. [REDACTED] is now a [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] at AMRIID who  
worked on weapons hardware. [REDACTED] only met [REDACTED] recently  
in [REDACTED] may now work at [REDACTED].

Regarding spore production, Ivins knows how to grow BA  
spores. [REDACTED] may also know how to grow  
BA. [REDACTED] worked in [REDACTED] is a [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] at AMRIID.

Lyophilizing is a common technique for small quantity  
samples. [REDACTED] does not know anyone who would be capable of  
handling a large quantity. [REDACTED] has [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Many lab technicians would have the  
knowledge to lyophilize.

In [REDACTED] traveled to [REDACTED] with [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] does not know of any individuals who would be  
capable of creating anthrax powder and mailing it. [REDACTED] does  
not think it would be possible to create the powder in a garage or  
basement because it would be too dangerous. The person who created  
anthrax powder would most likely be immunized against anthrax.  
[REDACTED] advised that the companies Dugway and Battell may be  
capable of producing powdered anthrax. It is possible that someone  
could create the source of the anthrax if they had access to bulk  
quantities of the reagent, but it would be very difficult.  
[REDACTED] does not believe that the individual who manufactured the  
powdered anthrax acted on their own.



279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 03/01/04, Page 5

In approximately [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] after the anthrax mailings, samples were taken at AMRIID looking for anthrax. "Hotspots" were found in building [REDACTED] on the [REDACTED] floor in the [REDACTED] suites which were controlled access areas. [REDACTED] could not recall specifically which areas were hotspots. [REDACTED] was shown the map titled "1st Floor Plan Facility No. [REDACTED]" and circled the areas which [REDACTED] believed were identified as hotspots. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] best guess was that the hotspots were in an area of the freezer, however [REDACTED] information is second hand.

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Shortly before [REDACTED] arrived at AMRIID in [REDACTED] anthrax spores were found in the HEPA filtration in hoods where they performed aerosol exposure. These hoods were located in building [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] could not recall specifically where. The spores were found during a routine safety test. It is possible that cultures of anthrax could be developed from spores found in this manner.

[REDACTED] was in charge of the [REDACTED] at AMRIID, however any samples taken would have been handled by people from the Bacteriology Division. [REDACTED] would not have the capability to test for BA spores.

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[REDACTED] office was on [REDACTED] of building [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not have access to most areas in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] had access to the hotspot areas and had access for some agents, including BA. [REDACTED] had access to room [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] never went in the room. [REDACTED] had no access to the areas where [REDACTED] were stored, nor did [REDACTED] have access to the [REDACTED] containment areas. [REDACTED] card did not allow [REDACTED] access to [REDACTED] but it would have been possible for [REDACTED] to access the areas in the company of someone who did have access, i.e. for inventory purposes.

Room [REDACTED] was used by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to store exposure material. [REDACTED] never observed anyone go in this room. [REDACTED] did not know specifically what was stored in this room.

[REDACTED] does not know of specific instances but is fairly certain that "piggybacking" into restricted access areas

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279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 03/01/04 , Page 6

occurred on occasion. The issue would come up at staff meetings and the staff would have to be reminded that "piggybacking" was not allowed.

Visiting scientists were allowed into some areas of AMRIID with escort. [REDACTED] does not believe that these scientists were allowed access to [REDACTED] areas. Access was further limited depending on the individual's level of vaccination. [REDACTED] does not have any specific recollection of a particular visiting scientist and their access. Most of the visiting scientists would have been coordinated by [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]

If someone had access to an area which housed select agents, it would not be difficult to remove these agents. At that time there were no controls in place of what physically went in and out of these areas. There was a rumor that someone had removed a toxin agent, but [REDACTED] did not have any details regarding the rumor.

[REDACTED] is not aware of anyone who said they might make a select agent for use in some improper fashion.

[REDACTED] is not aware of any individual who had the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media, or others. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not suspect any person [REDACTED] knows of committing or being associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters.

[REDACTED] is not aware of anyone at AMRIID who was lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents.

[REDACTED] is not aware of anyone who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so.

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/01/04, Page 7

[REDACTED] advised that in order to prepare dried BA a person would need to grow a large quantity of spores, isolate them, freeze dry them, then mill the spores in a tumbler with BBs. The difficult part would be to maintain viable spores and milling them into a powder. The milling process would be very dangerous for reasons of exposure. The powdered anthrax would have to be placed in an envelope in a contained area. There is no guarantee that an anthrax vaccine would protect a person from this kind of potentially heavy exposure.

[REDACTED] is not aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

Neither [REDACTED] or to the best of [REDACTED] knowledge any of [REDACTED] associates have a personal or professional association with Trenton, New Jersey, Princeton or other areas of New Jersey.

[REDACTED] remembered that there may have been some contract work associated with AMRIID at Princeton, New Jersey, but [REDACTED] could not recall any specifics.

[REDACTED] did not travel to New Jersey during September or October 2001. [REDACTED] was at AMRIID during that time except for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not recall taking any other trips. [REDACTED] does not recall any of [REDACTED] associates traveling to New Jersey in September or October 2001.

[REDACTED] is aware of the existence of SOPs for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets. Most of the SOPs center around the use of an approximate five percent bleach solution to clean after the use of any agent. In addition there are ultraviolet lights which should be turned on to kill potential agents. The SOPs are in a written document and are fairly simple in nature.

Paraformaldehyde was usually used for fumigation if there had been a study conducted using replicating agents like anthrax. To the best of [REDACTED] knowledge, glutaraldehyde was used for tissue sample preservation and not decontamination. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has smelled bacterial decontamination agents many times in the virology suites. If a decontamination was performed the chemicals could be smelled.

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 03/01/04, Page 8

\_\_\_\_\_ is not sure what a sterilite plastic box is and does not believe they were used for storage at AMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of any work conducted with BA or its simulants which was unofficial or not recorded.

When \_\_\_\_\_ worked in the lab \_\_\_\_\_ work was recorded in notebooks. During \_\_\_\_\_ tenure as \_\_\_\_\_ did not perform any lab work and therefore did not use lab notebooks.

\_\_\_\_\_ never purchased pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings for \_\_\_\_\_ own use or for anyone else. \_\_\_\_\_ was not aware of the storage of any such envelopes.

\_\_\_\_\_ never used any of the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes.

\_\_\_\_\_ never personally handled any of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes.

No analytical work was performed on the anthrax letters in \_\_\_\_\_ division. Some of the letters were contained however in \_\_\_\_\_ division.

\_\_\_\_\_ did not know about \_\_\_\_\_ did not personally know \_\_\_\_\_ and did not know what \_\_\_\_\_ looked like. \_\_\_\_\_ had previously heard of \_\_\_\_\_ name because \_\_\_\_\_ also worked at AMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ personally knew \_\_\_\_\_ although not well.

All visiting scientists were logged at the security office of AMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ would have been listed as \_\_\_\_\_ in \_\_\_\_\_ position as \_\_\_\_\_. Sometimes \_\_\_\_\_ was \_\_\_\_\_ with the visit and other times \_\_\_\_\_ was not.

\_\_\_\_\_ was asked about the visitors where \_\_\_\_\_ as well as any other visitors \_\_\_\_\_ could recall. \_\_\_\_\_ recalled the following visitors:

\_\_\_\_\_ could not recall anything about the name \_\_\_\_\_

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/01/04, Page 9

In approximately November 2001, seven [REDACTED] scientists visited AMRIID, but [REDACTED] could not recall their names.

From approximately 1991 to 1993, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was stationed at AMRIID. [REDACTED] was a scientist. [REDACTED] has visited the lab several times since then.

[REDACTED] recalled talking to a [REDACTED] but does not believe [REDACTED] ever visited AMRIID.

[REDACTED] visited AMRIID for a meeting on biological warfare agents. [REDACTED] does not know whether [REDACTED] toured the AMRIID lab.

[REDACTED] does not recall if [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ever visited AMRIID.

[REDACTED] was a contractor at AMRIID. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] toured the lab and was accompanied by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was brought into the lab by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was a contractor for AMRIID. [REDACTED] recalled meeting [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has no recollection regarding [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] worked at AMRIID for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] name not recalled, also visited AMRIID. There were a few other visiting scientists but [REDACTED] could not recall their names.

[REDACTED] were not allowed access to the AMRIID lab.

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] calender may have notes regarding foreign visitors, but it would take [REDACTED] some time to look through them. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] would review [REDACTED] calenders and contact reporting Agent. There would be very little if any visitors who were at AMRIID in regards to BA.

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/01/04, Page 10

No visiting scientist would have been given access to any hot suites or any location where live, virulent BA was stored or utilized, unless they were a contractor hired for such work.

To the best of [REDACTED] knowledge no visitor was ever left alone in a lab.

Most of the principal investigators at AMRIID, approximately 37, assisted with foreign visitors. A log was maintained of visitors as well as their escort at the security office.

Outside scientists would request samples from AMRIID. [REDACTED] is not aware of any BA being provided, but advised that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] may have received sample strains of botulism. Any samples provided would have been recorded in the security office.

[REDACTED] is not aware of any instances where a visitor had the opportunity to remove a sample from AMRIID without being detected.

[REDACTED] is not aware of any visitors having a particular interest in BA. Many visitors had an interest in weaponization techniques as this was a common topic. Protective measures against toxins were also discussed.

Visiting scientists who were assigned to AMRIID as well as post doctoral students at AMRIID would have had access to lypholizers as they were common equipment. Any visiting scientist who worked at AMRIID would have had to receive clearances. The security office should have a comprehensive list of visiting scientists who worked at AMRIID.

Most visiting foreign scientists would not have had access to BA. [REDACTED] division would know which foreign scientists had access.

[REDACTED] never observed any foreign visitors in possession of pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in the mailings.

[REDACTED] is not aware of any of the visitors asking about locations in Frederick where they could purchase stamped envelopes for personal use.

279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 03/01/04, Page 11

[redacted] is not aware of any visitor showing anti-American sentiment during their visit.

[redacted] was not a member of the [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] advised that individuals at [redacted] would have a better opportunity to manufacture powdered BA. Individuals at AMRIID did not have access to the materials required which would make it very difficult to manufacture.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/25/2004

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[redacted] On March 18, 2004, [redacted] date of birth [redacted], social security account number [redacted] home address [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] has heard of modified G sporulation media, but [redacted] has never made it or worked with it. [redacted] uses a single colony culture technique for culturing *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.).

[redacted] was not aware of anything in [redacted] work area belonging to others that was known to be the Ames strain of B.a. and was not sent to the FBI Repository (FBIR).

[redacted] used the walk-in cooler Room [redacted] Building [redacted] for media storage just prior to an aerosol challenge. BRUCE IVINS' lab group never stored any B.a. spores in Room [redacted] recalled seeing media and laboratory supplies stored there, and advised that [redacted] used Room [redacted] and that [redacted] would have had access to the room as well.

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[redacted] did not have any concerns about [redacted] co-workers with regard to their involvement in the anthrax mailings of 2001. [redacted] was not aware of anyone who may have removed a select agent for improper use, nor of anyone with hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media, or others.

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[redacted] and [redacted] blamed the anthrax contamination found by IVINS outside of the containment areas in 2002 on the [redacted] Division. [redacted] has heard people say that because IVINS conducted an independent swabbing project, perhaps he could have participated in other unapproved activities. [redacted] does not think that these accusations are serious.

[redacted] has never been to New Jersey, and [redacted] does not have any family there. [redacted] has never seen any pre-stamped envelopes at USAMRIID, and [redacted] has never purchased any from a postal vending machine.

Investigation on 03/18/2004 at Fort Detrick, Maryland  
USF-279A-WF-222936-POI 731 1488  
File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID/ 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A  
by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]



279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392, 279A-WF-222936-POI

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 03/18/2004, Page 2

Flip-top Sterilite brand containers were used in the Special Pathogens Sample Test Laboratory (SPSTL) to store samples. These were purchased in December 2001 at Staples.

[redacted] only knowledge of the [redacted] [redacted] at USAMRIID was that [redacted] [redacted] who is currently working in the [redacted] Division, is a member of the [redacted]

[redacted] traveled to [redacted] on [redacted] moved from the [redacted] Division to the [redacted] on [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] is held every year on Columbus Day weekend in [redacted] [redacted] usually attends [redacted] but recalled that [redacted] could not attend in 2001 because [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/25/2004

On March 24, 2004, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] obtained [redacted] degree in [redacted] from the [redacted] College of [redacted], and [redacted] is currently working toward a [redacted] degree at [redacted]

[redacted] has been a full time employee of USAMRIID since [redacted] [redacted] has also been a [redacted] since [redacted]. From [redacted] to [redacted]

[redacted] primary [redacted] work space was Room [redacted] Building [redacted] also used part of Room [redacted] Building [redacted] as [redacted] primary [redacted] work area. In addition, [redacted] also worked in Suite [redacted] Building [redacted]

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[redacted] works for [redacted] [redacted] will eventually be working with [redacted]

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[redacted] has never used modified G sporulation media. Whether [redacted] uses a single or multiple colony culture technique depends on what procedure [redacted] is doing. The Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (*B.a.*) that is used by [redacted] laboratory group was initially obtained from BRUCE IVINS. [redacted] had no knowledge of any material in [redacted] work area that was known to be *B.a.* Ames, and that had not been submitted to the FBI repository (FBIR).

[redacted] had no knowledge of any bacterial contamination of any virology laboratories. During the summer of 2003, a freezer in Room [redacted] was found to have some *B.a.* contamination during a routine swabbing. [redacted] recalled that it was contaminated with more than one strain of *B.a.*, and that one of these strains may have been Ames.

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Investigation on 03/24/2004 at Fort Detrick, Maryland  
1160-279A-WF-222936-POI 233 1489  
File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID/279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A  
by SA [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 03/24/2004, Page 2

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\_\_\_\_\_ has been in Room \_\_\_\_\_ Building \_\_\_\_\_ although \_\_\_\_\_ did not use the room or store any materials there. \_\_\_\_\_ never saw \_\_\_\_\_ in the vicinity of Room \_\_\_\_\_ had no knowledge of any piggybacking into containment suites at USAMRIID.

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\_\_\_\_\_ did not know of anyone with expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production, or lyophilizing. \_\_\_\_\_ advised that select agents could easily be removed from a containment area and gave the example of a person showering out with an easily concealed tube. \_\_\_\_\_ had no knowledge that anyone had removed any select agents at USAMRIID, or of anyone who said that they might use a select agent in an improper fashion.

\_\_\_\_\_ did not know of anyone with access to dangerous biological agents who expressed hostility toward any political organization, the media, or others. \_\_\_\_\_ did not suspect anyone of possibly being associated with the 2001 anthrax mailings, and had no knowledge of anyone at USAMRIID who was interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other select agents without a specific need to do so.

At one point, there were one or two plastic containers with white plastic lids used for storage and transport in the \_\_\_\_\_. These containers were in the \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ did not know the current location of the boxes nor whether they were Sterilite brand.

\_\_\_\_\_ has no association with New Jersey or Princeton University, and \_\_\_\_\_ did not travel to New Jersey during 2001. \_\_\_\_\_ never used or seen any pre-stamped envelopes at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ has never purchased any such envelopes from a postal vending machine.

\_\_\_\_\_ never met, knew, or saw \_\_\_\_\_ around USAMRIID. The only knowledge that \_\_\_\_\_ has of \_\_\_\_\_ is from what \_\_\_\_\_ or in rumors around USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ only knowledge regarding the \_\_\_\_\_ was that \_\_\_\_\_ was a member.

With regard to \_\_\_\_\_ whereabouts during September 17-18, 2001 and October 5-9, 2001, \_\_\_\_\_ advised the following. \_\_\_\_\_ was working very long hours during September 2001 and approximated those hours as \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ daily. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 03/24/2004

, Page

3

worked at least one day during the October 5-9, 2001 time frame. [Redacted]  
was not able to locate a personal or electronic calendar, or any other  
documents relating to those time periods.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 02/13/2004

On February 13, 2004, [redacted],  
 [redacted], date of birth [redacted], social security account number [redacted],  
 [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United  
 States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases  
 (USAMRIID) located at [redacted] Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland  
 21702, telephone [redacted] where [redacted] currently [redacted].  
 After being advised of the identities of the agents and  
 the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following  
 information:

[redacted] provided a copy of [redacted]  
 which is maintained in an FD-340 1A envelope. [redacted] outlined  
 [redacted] educational history as follows: [redacted] obtained a [redacted]  
 [redacted] degree in [redacted] from the University of [redacted] at  
 [redacted] in [redacted]; and a [redacted] degree in [redacted]  
 [redacted] from [redacted] University in [redacted]  
 [redacted] in [redacted]

[redacted] employment history with [redacted]  
 as outlined in [redacted] c.v. is as follows:  
 from [redacted] to [redacted] worked as a [redacted]  
 [redacted] in the [redacted]  
 [redacted] located in [redacted]  
 from [redacted] to [redacted] was the [redacted] in the

[redacted]

from [redacted] to [redacted] worked as a [redacted] in the [redacted]

[redacted]

from [redacted] to [redacted] was the [redacted]

[redacted]

from [redacted] to [redacted] was [redacted]

[redacted]

from [redacted] to [redacted] was the [redacted]

the [redacted] in the [redacted] Division of  
 USAMRIID;

Investigation on 02/13/2004 at Fort Detrick, Maryland  
 737-279A-WF-222936- [redacted] 302-1081 1493  
 File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID/279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A  
 by SA [redacted]  
 SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 02/13/2004, Page 2

from [redacted] to [redacted] was [redacted] of the [redacted]  
[redacted] at USAMRIID;  
from [redacted] to [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] and from [redacted] to [redacted] has served as [redacted]  
of USAMRIID.

Since the completion of [redacted] all of [redacted]  
research has been with [redacted]  
[redacted] worked exclusively with the [redacted] while [redacted]  
was employed in the [redacted] Division of USAMRIID. [redacted] primary  
work spaces at that time were Suites [redacted] and [redacted] in USAMRIID  
Building [redacted]

b6  
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[redacted] has not directly conducted any research since [redacted]  
[redacted] at USAMRIID in [redacted]. While in [redacted]  
[redacted]

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As part of [redacted] duties as [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] had access to [redacted] USAMRIID Building [redacted] and the following areas  
in Building [redacted] Suite [redacted] Room [redacted]; the [redacted]  
[redacted] laboratories; and Suite [redacted] which was the  
[redacted]

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In Building [redacted] stored media in [redacted] lab space  
and perhaps in Room [redacted] as well. [redacted] had no knowledge of what  
was stored in the walk-in freezer in Building [redacted] but advised  
that it was shared space. [redacted]  
[redacted] which caused many things to be moved around.

[redacted] has never worked with *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.)  
and had no experience with anthrax until material relating to the  
fall 2001 anthrax mailings was received at USAMRIID. Because of  
[redacted] training as a [redacted]  
[redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of

[redacted]

, On 02/13/2004

, Page 3

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was at USAMRIID on the day the Daschle letter was delivered there by the United States Capitol Police (USCP). Upon receipt, the condition of the package was recorded, the package was photographed, and a chain of custody was created. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the Daschle letter, it was being photographed by personnel from the FBI and the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS). [redacted] never worked with any of the B.a. material from the fall 2001 anthrax mailings.

[redacted]

With regard to piggybacking through doorways at USAMRIID, [redacted] advised the following: There have been no incidents of people entering [redacted] laboratories prior to being fully trained. [redacted] felt ownership over the [redacted] areas, and therefore kept them under tight control. Further, those working in [redacted] areas did not want untrained personnel in the lab with them because it posed a danger.

With regard to contamination issues at USAMRIID, [redacted] advised the following:

In approximately 2002, the combination to an orthopox virology lab in Building [redacted] was commonly known to those working on that floor, as it housed equipment that was being shared by various researchers. A potential exposure was recorded when [redacted] entered an area where there was viral contamination.

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[redacted] was noted for taking an unapproved virus into Suite [redacted] [redacted] was also aware of an exposure incident involving [redacted] [redacted] however [redacted] had no specific knowledge of the incident.

From [redacted] to [redacted] was building a reference repository for which [redacted] obtained some strains from the Bacteriology Division. Many of the plates that [redacted] received were

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

b6  
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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/13/2004, Page 4

contaminated with other organisms, and this contamination was traced to a common media preparation area. This media preparation group had a history of numerous military personnel turnovers of individuals with different backgrounds. [REDACTED] began using commercially made media after this contamination problem was found.

The foreign visiting scientist program is part of the [REDACTED] sponsored by the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to encourage interaction among scientists for project development. Visiting scientists are not given access to laboratory space, but instead spend their time in conference rooms discussing their mutual interests.

Foreign scientists have to request visits through their embassies, which forward the request to the Department of Defense (DOD). The scientist undergoes the DOD clearance process, and perhaps a State Department clearance as well. USAMRIID is notified of the completion of this process, and in turn [REDACTED] who is the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is notified.

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of any Russian scientists having access to laboratory space at USAMRIID. In approximately [REDACTED] there was an official visit by two Russian scientists, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to USAMRIID as part of the [REDACTED]. In addition to Russia and the United States, the United Kingdom was part of this commission as well. [REDACTED] has never been to Russia to tour or view any of their laboratories.

As part of the new research campus being planned for Fort Detrick, USAMRIID is slated to move to a new building and Buildings 1412 and 1425 will be demolished. USAMRIID is currently pursuing funding for this mission and reporting to Congress. If this effort is unsuccessful and USAMRIID does not move to a new building, the current building will fall apart as it is too expensive to maintain in its current state. USAMRIID'S budget has remained flat and has recently decreased.

USAMRIID was originally built to accommodate 325 employees, and it now houses 750 employees with a planned expansion to 1000 employees. More laboratory space is needed to accommodate all of the additional testing that is being conducted. Animal studies have increased threefold and aerosol challenges have increased fivefold. In addition, medical product and evaluation





279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

b6  
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/13/2004, Page 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] talked a lot and [REDACTED] was way out of bounds to promote [REDACTED] as a biodefense expert. [REDACTED] did not strike [REDACTED] as much of a scientist, and [REDACTED] did not recall that [REDACTED] research project had been very successful. [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] rather than a [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not have much [REDACTED] ability.

[REDACTED] had less experience at working through threats than those in [REDACTED] did, particularly in the case of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. USAMRIID has been working with the FBI since 1995, and [REDACTED] did not recall [REDACTED] ever being involved with any of that work. [REDACTED] had no involvement with the [REDACTED] exercise and had never heard of it, nor did [REDACTED] know of anyone at USAMRIID who may have had any involvement with the exercise. [REDACTED] advised that tabletop exercises are different from the real responses such as those that [REDACTED] have participated in.

[REDACTED] feels sorry for [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] does not think that [REDACTED] had either the technical skills or the capacity to send the anthrax letters, and also because [REDACTED] was accidentally noticed by [REDACTED] is not a skilled [REDACTED] and does not have the ability to make purified spores like the ones contained in the letters. [REDACTED] has not seen any publications indicating that [REDACTED] knew the relevant protocols. Only a few individuals have the knowledge to create such purified spores, one of whom is [REDACTED] however [REDACTED] is above suspicion [REDACTED] and BRUCE IVINS have often had to interact with personnel at [REDACTED]

There are 29 to 30 scientists on the FBI'S investigation list who are far more skilled than [REDACTED]. There are probably 5 or less individuals at USAMRIID who could make such pure spore preparations. If [REDACTED] is the FBI'S primary suspect, [REDACTED] "feels sorry for us because we have nothing".

In the late 1980s, USAMRIID lost its mission. At that time, no one thought that biological warfare was important and USAMRIID'S mission drifted into different areas including a Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) program. No one was concerned with what was going on scientifically.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

b6  
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/13/2004, Page 7

In 1990 and 1991, the Gulf War sharpened the effort at USAMRIID and helped to increase the understanding of the importance of their research programs. There was a transformation that resulted from working toward a mission and toward building products. Twenty three medical products have been developed at USAMRIID, and over half of those were developed within the last ten years.

There were personnel problems at USAMRIID during the late 1980s and early 1990s that were destructive and resulted in some hard feelings, as well as bitter and disappointed people. Despite this, it was beyond the realm of imagination that anyone would have sent anthrax through the mail. Since [REDACTED] time in [REDACTED] has only known people who were dedicated to the mission of USAMRIID and who were patriots.

These personnel problems were not resolved until [REDACTED] [REDACTED] however [REDACTED] started the process. Some of the efforts to resolve these problems included letting some people go from USAMRIID. [REDACTED] had to do a Reduction in Force (RIF), and as a result some of the military officers were encouraged to leave. [REDACTED] advised that an investigation was conducted regarding this in the early 1990s, and that the FBI has had access to these records.

[REDACTED] does not think that the B.a. contained in the letters was made at USAMRIID because they do not have the equipment necessary to produce spores of that quantity. [REDACTED] intuition is that the material was spray dried, which is a common way to dry pharmaceuticals, and USAMRIID does not have a spray dryer. The media could still be smelled in the B.a., and that would not have been the case if the material had been lyophilized as the aromatics are lost when an agent is vacuum dried. The B.a. in the letters would have had to be prepared at DPG or at a state sponsored laboratory from which it was stolen or passed on intentionally. [REDACTED] has told [REDACTED] that Russia, Korea, Iraq, Syria, and Iran all have spray drying capabilities.

The recipes for weaponizing anthrax and smallpox are still at USAMRIID, however [REDACTED] has never viewed them. The recipes may have been accidentally de-classified in the 1990s, but were then re-classified. No one without the proper clearance has been given access to these. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

b6  
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/13/2004, Page 8

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] There are elements of spore preparation that are necessary for weaponization. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There are newer purification methods, such as Renograffin, that are used on the Dugway material. [REDACTED] advised that it would be interesting to see how the higher quality B.a. was made in the old days without the newer protocols and technology.

[REDACTED] has no relatives in New Jersey, and [REDACTED] did not travel there during 2001 or prior to 2001. [REDACTED] recently returned from [REDACTED]

With regard to [REDACTED] whereabouts from September 17-18, 2001, [REDACTED] advised the following:

Immediately after September 11, 2001, USAMRIID began supporting the USCP in executive site surveillance through assay validation and sample processing. They were completely "maxed out" by the project, and the number of people working on the project grew from 6 to 85, including [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were all stuck at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) from September 11, 2001 until September 17 or 18, 2001.

With regard to [REDACTED] whereabouts from October 5-9, 2001, [REDACTED] advised the following:

During the weekend of October 6, 2001, there was a transformation process to put systems in place where they were needed. At that time USAMRIID was processing 200 to 250 samples per day, and that number grew exponentially after October 15, 2001. USAMRIID was mandated to survey for eleven different agents and toxins at the executive sites, which created a large volume of work.

[REDACTED] advised that there were reports generated daily at that time, and all records relating to sample testing were saved. If necessary, the agents could be provided access to these records.

[REDACTED] agreed to allow SA [REDACTED] to photograph a piece of equipment in [REDACTED] office as long as [REDACTED] gave consent

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of , On 02/13/2004, Page 9

as well.  showed this  to SA  during a previous interview.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6  
b7c

Date of transcription 04/01/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social  
Security Account Number [redacted] home address [redacted]  
[redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted]

[redacted] was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of  
Investigation, Washington Field Office. After being advised of the  
nature of the interview and the identity of the interviewing  
agents, [redacted] provided the following information.

[redacted] graduated from [redacted] College of [redacted] with a  
[redacted] also graduated  
with a [redacted] from this institution.  
Thereafter [redacted] continued [redacted] education at the University of  
[redacted] and earned a [redacted]  
[redacted] earned a [redacted] from [redacted] University with a  
concentration in [redacted]

[redacted]

From [redacted] to [redacted] was [redacted]  
[redacted], United  
States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases  
(USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. Here, [redacted] was  
responsible for [redacted]  
[redacted] was  
responsible for [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

In [redacted] was a [redacted] at  
[redacted] College located in [redacted]  
[redacted] From [redacted] to approximately [redacted] was

[redacted]

From [redacted] to [redacted] was employed by  
[redacted]. Here, [redacted] was responsible for [redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 03/29/2004 at Washington Field Office

File # 279A-WF-222936 USAMRIID <sup>744</sup> 279A-BA-C101392 <sup>1497</sup> Date dictated 03/31/2004

by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936 USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

b6  
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 03/29/2004, Page 2

\_\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

During \_\_\_\_\_ tenure at USAMRIID, \_\_\_\_\_ office and research activities were conducted in Building \_\_\_\_\_ did not conduct any research with *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba).

\_\_\_\_\_ stated needle challenges were conducted with the Ames strain of Ba. \_\_\_\_\_ also participated in the following research programs: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

While at USAMRIID, \_\_\_\_\_ did not conduct any projects involving B.a., however, \_\_\_\_\_ stated that BRUCE IVINS and \_\_\_\_\_ were testing isolates from the Vollum strain. \_\_\_\_\_ never worked with or cultured the B.a. Ames strain, although \_\_\_\_\_ thinks the strain may have been present at USAMRIID while \_\_\_\_\_ worked there.

279A-WF-222936 USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 03/29/2004, Page 3

\_\_\_\_\_ met \_\_\_\_\_ at a conference in \_\_\_\_\_ could not remember the date of the conference, but advised that \_\_\_\_\_ was at the conference with \_\_\_\_\_ recalled having dinner with \_\_\_\_\_ and possibly \_\_\_\_\_ recalled \_\_\_\_\_ being somewhat of a "blow hard".



\_\_\_\_\_ has discussed the characteristics of the spores found in the anthrax-laced letters with \_\_\_\_\_ spoke to \_\_\_\_\_ about spore size, how they were grown, and the spore coats. \_\_\_\_\_ never discussed these issues with \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that \_\_\_\_\_ could not have mailed the anthrax-laced letters. \_\_\_\_\_ believes \_\_\_\_\_ does not have the ability to have pulled off the mailings. \_\_\_\_\_ based this statement on \_\_\_\_\_ impression of \_\_\_\_\_ during their brief meeting and discussion in \_\_\_\_\_ has also seen \_\_\_\_\_ and believes that \_\_\_\_\_ did not have access to anthrax as \_\_\_\_\_ was an \_\_\_\_\_ also does not believe that \_\_\_\_\_ had access to the appropriate equipment to make the anthrax mailed in the letters. This opinion is also based upon \_\_\_\_\_ short meeting with \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ knowledge of USAMRIID in the early 1980's.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/18/2004

b6  
b7c

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] social security account number [redacted]  
[redacted] driver's license number [redacted] was interviewed  
at [redacted] residence, [redacted]  
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted] cell phone  
number [redacted] After being advised of the identity of  
the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted]  
provided the following information:

[redacted] is currently employed as a [redacted] at [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] stated that [redacted] has a [redacted] degree in  
[redacted] and a [redacted] degree in [redacted]  
obtained these degrees while [redacted]

[redacted]

While assigned to USAMRIID, [redacted] worked for the  
[redacted] Division [redacted] branch. [redacted]  
job consisted of [redacted] and  
[redacted]

Investigation on 05/17/2004 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 279A-WF-222936-USAM Date dictated 05/18/2004

by SA [redacted]

752

279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 279A-WF-222936-USAM

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/17/2004, Page 2

\_\_\_\_\_ did not work with the live organism Bacillus anthracis (hereafter Ba) except for \_\_\_\_\_.  
\_\_\_\_\_ worked with the Ba \_\_\_\_\_.  
\_\_\_\_\_ Prior to receipt of the anthrax letters \_\_\_\_\_ worked on Ba as \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ did not work on any contracts with Ba to \_\_\_\_\_ knowledge. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ was assigned to \_\_\_\_\_. The Ba was stored at \_\_\_\_\_ in freezer storage at \_\_\_\_\_. Ba was also stored at \_\_\_\_\_ freezer \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ These \_\_\_\_\_ storage locations were the \_\_\_\_\_ locations \_\_\_\_\_ had access to. \_\_\_\_\_ does not know if the Ba was distributed to other researchers. \_\_\_\_\_ was only given \_\_\_\_\_ assignments and shown where fresh controls were located. If spores were used they were grown with the \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ worked with many employees at USAMRIID, both civilian and military. \_\_\_\_\_ remembered the names of the following employees (some spellings are phonetic): \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ is not sure if \_\_\_\_\_ ever worked with the modified G sporulation media. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

The type of culture technique used was blood auger plate. \_\_\_\_\_ would do four quadrant streaks and always got multiple colonies. \_\_\_\_\_ would streak for purity and test the organism. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 279A-WF-222936-USAM

b6  
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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/17/2004, Page 3

\_\_\_\_\_ used \_\_\_\_\_ to dry down the reagent for reconstitution. \_\_\_\_\_ micro liters were placed in a tube and put in a lyophilization chamber which dries the fluid out and leaves a residue in crystal or powder form.

\_\_\_\_\_ does not know if samples were maintained of the dried Ba. The dried Ba tubes were placed into kits for deployment. Some were used as controls or reagents. One tube would be tested to ensure it was at the right concentration.

USAMRIID supplied all the strains used and \_\_\_\_\_ does not know where they came from. \_\_\_\_\_ worked on the Ames strain also, which also was supplied by USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ does not know, nor has ever heard, the names Bruce Ivins and \_\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_ does not know anyone having expertise in weaponization techniques. Almost everyone \_\_\_\_\_ worked with performed lyophilization. \_\_\_\_\_ also does not know of anyone else who should be questioned regarding the above issues.

\_\_\_\_\_ does not know of any areas of USAMRIID which had problems with bacterial contamination while \_\_\_\_\_ was there.

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that \_\_\_\_\_ did not ever work at building \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ knowledge, and the floor plan of the building did not look familiar to \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ identified the following areas of building \_\_\_\_\_ which \_\_\_\_\_ routinely used and are marked on the floor plans enclosed in an FD-340: A suite consisting of rooms \_\_\_\_\_ through \_\_\_\_\_, a suite at room \_\_\_\_\_ room \_\_\_\_\_ room \_\_\_\_\_, room \_\_\_\_\_, room \_\_\_\_\_ and the \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ added that \_\_\_\_\_ could not locate \_\_\_\_\_ on the floor plan. \_\_\_\_\_ further stated that \_\_\_\_\_ main work locations were \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ also worked in \_\_\_\_\_ offices located on the \_\_\_\_\_ floor of the facility, however \_\_\_\_\_ could not locate the offices on the floor plan provided.

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\_\_\_\_\_ stated that to \_\_\_\_\_ knowledge people did not "piggy back" in and out of the hot areas at USAMRIID. Everyone had their own suite code, and if someone did "piggy back" then the safety officer would find out. \_\_\_\_\_ did not let anyone into the suites. \_\_\_\_\_ added that if you were to follow

b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 279A-WF-222936-USAM

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/17/2004, Page 4

someone in and then swiped your way out the safety officer would know you had "piggy backed". To [redacted] knowledge visiting scientists were not taken into the hot areas, they were only taken into the level two areas [redacted] and [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] advised that although someone could covertly remove agents from the hot areas by carrying them out in their pocket [redacted] does not know anyone who attempted it. [redacted] added that [redacted] would not understand why anyone would even want to take an agent home and risk exposing their family to the organism.

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[redacted] is not aware of anyone who said they might make an agent for use in some improper fashion. [redacted] and [redacted] coworkers had discussions and received training concerning the dissemination of anthrax by a crop duster or similar method of mass distribution, but had never heard or talked about using anthrax in powdered form.

The only individual of concern to [redacted] who had access to the biological agents was [redacted] (first and last names unknown). [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] does not know anyone [redacted] believes or suspects of possibly being associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters. [redacted] added that everyone [redacted] worked with got along and seemed like outstanding people.

[redacted] does not know anyone with whom [redacted] worked that was inappropriately interested in agents. However, [redacted]

[redacted] was lax concerning safety. [redacted] noted that [redacted]

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 279A-WF-222936-USAM

b6  
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/17/2004, Page 5

\_\_\_\_\_ advised that there was not anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so.

When asked how \_\_\_\_\_ would go about preparing dried Ba and sending it through the mail, \_\_\_\_\_ stated that he would lyophilize it and then culture it in baby formula.

\_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that \_\_\_\_\_ did not have any personal or professional association with Trenton, NJ, Princeton or any other areas of New Jersey. To \_\_\_\_\_ knowledge, none of \_\_\_\_\_ coworkers did either.

\_\_\_\_\_ advised that \_\_\_\_\_ did not travel to New Jersey in September or October 2001, and that \_\_\_\_\_ has only possibly driven through New Jersey on \_\_\_\_\_ way to New York. \_\_\_\_\_ added that on September 12, 2001, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that there are SOPs for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets. The SOP for a spill was to use a 10-15% bleach solution, DNA away.

\_\_\_\_\_ does not know if paraformaldehyde or glutaraldehyde fumigation had been employed in the virology areas because \_\_\_\_\_ did not work virology.

\_\_\_\_\_ had never smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the virology suites and had never even been in the virology suites.

\_\_\_\_\_ stated that cardboard boxes were preferred over plastic containers for storage of materials because the cardboard would deform to allow more samples to fit in the box.

\_\_\_\_\_ may have used sterilite boxes because they are more reusable than the cardboard but \_\_\_\_\_ could not remember specifically. USAMRIID had a supply of sterilite boxes that were probably obtained from \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ did all the purchasing for equipment. \_\_\_\_\_ does not know if any boxes were missing as

279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 279A-WF-222936-USAM

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/17/2004, Page 6

sometimes a lot were available and sometimes only a few because they were taken to different sites.

[redacted] is not aware of any work being conducted with Ba or its simulants which was unofficial or not recorded. [redacted] added that everything that was done was documented and SOPs were used.

[redacted] work was not recorded in [redacted] it was recorded on [redacted] [redacted] would be turned in to the Division Chief who had assigned the project and then would probably be filed by [redacted]

[redacted] had purchased pre-stamped envelopes. However, they were [redacted]

[redacted] did not ever use any of the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes. [redacted]

[redacted] The suite was located on the first floor, [redacted] building [redacted] at rooms [redacted] through [redacted] Approximately [redacted] people were present at that time, including [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] can not remember the other people present.

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b2  
b7F

[redacted] did not perform any analytical work on the evidence in this case, [redacted] work was strictly [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] did not know who [redacted] was and does not know who [redacted] is to this day. [redacted] did not host any visiting foreign scientists and was not an [redacted] member. [redacted] was part of the [redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6  
b7c

Date of transcription 05/07/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] resides at [redacted]

[redacted] cellular telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted]

[redacted] work telephone number [redacted] After being advised of the nature of the interview and the identity of the interviewing agents, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] provided a [redacted] page Curriculum Vitae which details [redacted] academic achievements and professional experience. A copy of this Curriculum Vitae is attached hereto and made a part of this document.

In [redacted] graduated from [redacted] High School, [redacted] From [redacted] to [redacted] attended [redacted]

[redacted] College and subsequently transferred to [redacted] College, [redacted] In [redacted] graduated from [redacted]

College with a [redacted] Degree in [redacted]

From [redacted] attended and graduated from [redacted] University, [redacted] with a [redacted] Degree in [redacted]. During this time [redacted] applied and received a [redacted]

(2)

From [redacted] to [redacted] worked on [redacted] as a [redacted] at [redacted]

[redacted] work telephone number [redacted]

At [redacted] worked for [redacted]

[redacted] telephone number [redacted] During this time, [redacted]

Investigation on 05/06/2004 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936, USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 05/07/2004

by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

[redacted] 04132a

279A-WF-222936, USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/06/2004, Page 2

From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ worked at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) as a \_\_\_\_\_ worked in the \_\_\_\_\_ Division, and \_\_\_\_\_ immediate supervisor was \_\_\_\_\_ telephone \_\_\_\_\_

Here, \_\_\_\_\_ primary goal and mission was: (1)

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ worked on the living organism of the Ames strain, but \_\_\_\_\_ does not recall where the stock came from. \_\_\_\_\_ office and laboratory were located in Building \_\_\_\_\_ on the first floor. \_\_\_\_\_ conducted \_\_\_\_\_ research in a \_\_\_\_\_ laboratory \_\_\_\_\_ does not recall the laboratory room number) which contained one unlocked freezer. This freezer contained various select agents including \_\_\_\_\_ Ames strain stock. There was another freezer in the corridor of the \_\_\_\_\_ which was locked and had a video camera pointed at it. However, \_\_\_\_\_ did not use this particular freezer.

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\_\_\_\_\_ was taught to grow Ba by \_\_\_\_\_ or \_\_\_\_\_ staff, also USAMRIID employees. \_\_\_\_\_ grew the Ames strain for use in \_\_\_\_\_ laboratory research. This research included \_\_\_\_\_ of Ba so \_\_\_\_\_ could \_\_\_\_\_

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\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ also participated in the \_\_\_\_\_ while at USAMRIID. In the summer of \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ worked with the following \_\_\_\_\_ employees while employed at USAMRIID: \_\_\_\_\_ All of these individuals performed the same or similar tasks as \_\_\_\_\_ and all of these individuals worked with Ba, the living organism. \_\_\_\_\_ will make an attempt to discover the last names of these individuals.



279A-WF-222936, USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/06/2004, Page 3

[redacted] also spent time with [redacted] testing. Here, [redacted] was involved with [redacted]

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b7E

[redacted]

[redacted] does not know what a modified G sporulation media is and never used one.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] used blood agar culture technique and LB broth.

[redacted] never participated in the drying of Ba and [redacted] does not have any knowledge or information regarding anyone that may have pursued this act.

[redacted] does not know if the Ba strains were fully characterized and [redacted] does not know if the Ames strain came from BRUCE IVINS or [redacted]

[redacted] is not aware of anyone that may have the knowledge or expertise in weaponizing anthrax and [redacted] does not have anyone in mind that the Federal Bureau of Investigation should investigate.

[redacted] is not aware of any areas of USAMRIID which had problems with bacterial contamination, particularly the [redacted]

[redacted] spent much of [redacted] time on the [redacted] of Building [redacted] and the [redacted] suites. [redacted] did not perform any research in Building [redacted] and [redacted] did not use any of the hot areas in Building [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that individuals did piggy-back throughout USAMRIID [redacted] also stated that it would be easy for one to remove select agents from the hot suites because there was a lack of security and the agents are easy to conceal.

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[redacted] is not aware of anyone who had an interest in removing select agents from the hot areas or any other areas in UNSAMRRID, nor was [redacted] aware of any individuals who had an interest in making a select agent for an improper fashion.

279A-WF-222936, USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/06/2004, Page 4

\_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of anyone with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media or others. \_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of any individuals that \_\_\_\_\_ believes to be a suspect or possibly associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters.

\_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of anyone \_\_\_\_\_ worked with that was lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents. Nor was \_\_\_\_\_ aware of anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so.

\_\_\_\_\_ does not know how to go about preparing dried Ba. \_\_\_\_\_ is not aware of anyone that is or was interested in getting around forensic techniques. \_\_\_\_\_ does not have any personal or professional ties to New Jersey and \_\_\_\_\_ does not know if \_\_\_\_\_ colleagues have ties to New Jersey.

\_\_\_\_\_ has not used Sterilite storage containers at work or at home. \_\_\_\_\_ does not recall if \_\_\_\_\_ ever observed anyone else at USAMRIID using a Sterilite container.

\_\_\_\_\_ never saw a pre-stamped envelope (similar to the type used in the anthrax mailings) and never used one. Nor was \_\_\_\_\_ aware of any work being conducted with Ba which was unofficial or not recorded. \_\_\_\_\_ stored \_\_\_\_\_ USAMRIID research in laboratory books which are maintained at USAMRIID. The laboratory books were returned to \_\_\_\_\_ upon \_\_\_\_\_ resignation. \_\_\_\_\_ does not know where the laboratory notebooks are currently maintained.

\_\_\_\_\_ did not personally handle any of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes nor did \_\_\_\_\_ perform any analytical work on the evidence in this case.

From \_\_\_\_\_ to January \_\_\_\_\_ worked as a

\_\_\_\_\_ for \_\_\_\_\_ Supervisor,

\_\_\_\_\_ telephone number \_\_\_\_\_

From August \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ worked as a  
\_\_\_\_\_ worked

279A-WF-222936, USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/06/2004, Page 5

[redacted] and [redacted] supervisor was [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]

From [redacted] to [redacted] has worked as a  
[redacted] immediate supervisor is [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]. Here, [redacted] is working on.

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/09/2004

On 01/27/2004, [redacted], date of birth: [redacted]  
[redacted] social security number [redacted] home address [redacted]  
[redacted] home phone: [redacted]

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Work: [redacted] Cell: [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]  
place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]  
provided the following information.

[redacted] is employed as a [redacted] in the [redacted]  
Division of USAMRIID specializing in [redacted]  
has a [redacted] degree in [redacted] from [redacted]  
[redacted] University, and a [redacted] from [redacted]  
[redacted] has worked at USAMRIID since [redacted]  
in the [redacted] Division. [redacted] did [redacted] at  
University of [redacted]

[redacted] currently works with [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
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b7F

[redacted] has done work with B. anthracis while [redacted]  
[redacted]

The objective of [redacted] search is to [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] received the spores from [redacted]  
[redacted] The strain used was the Ames  
strain, and it was stored in building [redacted] room [redacted]  
has never distributed any of the cultures outside of the  
[redacted] Division.


- [redacted] has never used the modified G sporulation media.
- [redacted] has never used any culture techniques.
- [redacted] has never dried B. anthracis or used a lyophilizer.

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Investigation on 02/27/2004 at USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 02/03/2004

by [redacted] Postal Inspector [redacted]  
[redacted] Postal Inspector [redacted] 046209.302



279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/27/2004 , Page 2

b6  
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[REDACTED] received the cultures from BRUCE IVINS in a liquid form which was used with macrophages. The samples were then autoclaved and irradiated to destroy them.

[REDACTED] does not know of any persons who had expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production or lyophilizing.

[REDACTED] is unaware of any areas of USAMRIID which had problems with bacterial contamination.

[REDACTED] has worked in the following areas at USAMRIID; Rooms [REDACTED] in building [REDACTED] and in the [REDACTED] areas.

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[REDACTED] has used the hot areas of building [REDACTED] and room [REDACTED] has observed others using the cooler for storage of unused plates, kit reagents and had used it to store plates due to not having a separate refrigerator.

[REDACTED] is unaware of any "piggy-backing".

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b7C

[REDACTED] does not know how someone could remove Select Agents from hot areas due to the fact that they would have to pass things out to irradiate them. There is a procedure to follow which, in theory, would be dangerous.

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who wanted access or the knowledge to make bioweapons or of anyone with the access or the ability to create them.

[REDACTED] does not know of anybody who [REDACTED] believes to be associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters.

[REDACTED] is unaware of any persons with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents, or who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization or the media.

[REDACTED] only knew of one incident in which someone was lax in handling select agents and [REDACTED] The person was [REDACTED] who was working with the organism during a research project.

[REDACTED] has never heard of any rumors of anyone interested in obtaining anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 02/27/2004, Page 3

[REDACTED] thought the process of drying B. anthracis would be done by first making the spores, lyophilizing them, and grinding them. The preparation would have to be mixed with something in order to make it anti-static.

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

[REDACTED] does not have any relatives or professional association with Trenton, New Jersey, Princeton or any other area of New Jersey.

[REDACTED] did not travel to New Jersey in September or October 2001 and was at work during the time of the mailings.

[REDACTED] advised that there are SOP's for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets and suites. Class II use alcohol and detergent and Class III use bleach and then autoclave materials.

[REDACTED] is unaware if paraformaldehyde or glutaraldehyde fumigation have been used in the [REDACTED] areas [REDACTED] did know that is what they are supposed to use in order to decontaminate the suites.

[REDACTED] has never smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the [REDACTED] suites.

[REDACTED] has never used any plastic storage containers, such as sterilite boxes for storage of research materials, only cardboard boxes.

[REDACTED] is unaware of any work being conducted with Ba or its stimulants which was unofficial or not recorded.

[REDACTED] records all [REDACTED] work in lab notebooks and in the computer located in the hot suite and then emails [REDACTED] the notes to [REDACTED] computer at [REDACTED] desk at USAMRIID. The lab notebooks are still in the hot suite due to contamination.

[REDACTED] has never purchased pre-stamped envelopes like the ones used in mailings for [REDACTED] or for anyone else. [REDACTED] has also never used the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/27/2004 , Page 4

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[REDACTED] did not handle any of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes.

[REDACTED] has not done any of the analytical work on the evidence in this case.

[REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] prior to the media coverage about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] after seeing [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] did remember that [REDACTED] did observe [REDACTED] in building [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] at USAMRIID after [REDACTED] left employment with them.

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[REDACTED] never let [REDACTED] piggy-back into areas within USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] did not know of [REDACTED] removing any equipment from USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] while working at USAMRIID, but did know that [REDACTED] worked in the [REDACTED] department.

[REDACTED] had never seen [REDACTED] using a lyophilizer.

[REDACTED] did not recall ever seeing [REDACTED] in the walk-in cooler in room [REDACTED] building [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] never talked to [REDACTED] while [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] is unaware of where [REDACTED] stored samples or materials.

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[REDACTED] did not know of any research samples that [REDACTED] may have brought with him to USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] never talked with [REDACTED] in reference to bioweapons, [REDACTED] connections to New Jersey, or political issues.

[REDACTED] has never attended any classes given by [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 02/27/2004, Page 5

[redacted] could not provide investigators with any other information in regards to [redacted] or in reference to the anthrax mailings.

[redacted] did not host any foreign visitors.

[redacted] was not a member of the [redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/20/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed  
at [redacted] residence, [redacted]  
home telephone number [redacted] After being advised of the  
identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the  
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] possesses a [redacted] degree in  
[redacted] and began a [redacted] degree at [redacted] College,  
[redacted]  
[redacted] began taking classes at the UNIVERSITY  
OF [redacted] working toward a [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] began working as an [redacted] at the United States Army  
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at  
Fort Detrick, Maryland in [redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted] job consisted of [redacted]

[redacted] also worked in the  
[redacted] section at USAMRIID. Although [redacted] never worked  
directly with Ba [redacted] did have access to Building [redacted] where the  
anthrax-infected animals were housed and Building [redacted]  
worked, in [redacted] words, "all over", [redacted]

[redacted] Two of  
coworkers included [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] could "talk all day" about how lax the security  
was at USAMRIID. [redacted] a story about someone,  
perhaps a member of the military, building a bomb made possibly of  
botulism with materials from the USAMRIID lab. [redacted] was not  
sure if that story was true. [redacted] left USAMRIID in [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] to begin work at [redacted]  
[redacted] The reason [redacted] left USAMRIID is because [redacted]  
[redacted]

Investigation on 02/20/2004 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID/782

Date dictated 02/20/2004

Inspector [redacted]  
by SA [redacted]

302 022004

279A-WF-222936

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 02/20/2004, Page 2

[REDACTED] was not familiar with the procedures for drying anthrax, nor did [REDACTED] know what a lyophilizer was. [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] BRUCE IVINS, had some expertise with Ba, and worked on studies with rabbits. An incident at USAMRIID involving bacterial contamination took place in 2000 in Building [REDACTED]. A pipe broke and exposed several individuals to plague bacteria and to Ba. The individual responsible for handling the plates containing various types of organisms had not labeled them properly, so all who were potentially exposed had to take multiple medications for safety reasons. Radioactive contamination was also a problem, in [REDACTED] opinion, as people did not clean their work areas sufficiently. [REDACTED] was "shocked" when [REDACTED] began working at USAMRIID at how "unhealthy" it appeared and because of the "filthy setting".

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[REDACTED] also worked in the [REDACTED] suite with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] worked with the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] did not feel comfortable with the way the safety procedures were conducted.

[REDACTED] was unsure whether [REDACTED] was familiar with the walk-in coolers in Building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was familiar with the dead animal holding area, but did not know whether the two areas were the same.

[REDACTED] knew that a lot of "piggybacking" took place in the areas of USAMRIID where [REDACTED] worked. There was no pin code required for [REDACTED] labs. Anyone could have access to the unlocked coolers in [REDACTED] if they wanted to remove select agents. However, [REDACTED] was unaware of anyone harboring hostile attitudes toward the United States government or of any threats made by [REDACTED] former coworkers at USAMRIID against the United States. [REDACTED] could not think of anyone who could have mailed the anthrax letters. [REDACTED] felt that some military "kids" who worked with Ba were lax in its handling and did not know what they were doing. [REDACTED] also cited a [REDACTED] whose name she could not immediately recall, who followed unsafe handling procedures.

[REDACTED] did not believe that there was anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so. [REDACTED] did not personally possess the technical skill or knowledge needed to dry Ba and send it through the mail. [REDACTED] was unaware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

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279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/20/2004 , Page 3

b6  
b7C[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not know anyone at USAMRIID with New Jersey connections, neither personal nor professional.

[REDACTED] knew that safety procedures existed for decontamination of Class II and Class III biosafety cabinets, although [REDACTED] was not sure if these procedures were followed. When [REDACTED] left USAMRIID, "anyone" could get clearance into the [REDACTED] suites, although it is [REDACTED] understanding that USAMRIID has subsequently implemented a "buddy system" in those suites.

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[REDACTED] had employed glutaraldehyde fumigation in the [REDACTED] areas, and had never smelled bacterial decontamination agents in the [REDACTED] suites. [REDACTED] had never used plastic storage containers, such as sterilite boxes, for storage of materials at USAMRIID.

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[REDACTED] was not aware of any unofficial or unrecorded Ba work; [REDACTED] felt that IVINS was very thorough and that records were well-kept in their section.

[REDACTED] had used pre-stamped envelopes and had visited the 7th Street post office in Frederick, Maryland. However, [REDACTED] had never used the vending machines there to purchase pre-stamped envelopes and had never personally handled USAMRIID envelopes.

[REDACTED] was acquainted with [REDACTED] met [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] took [REDACTED] picture in a [REDACTED] suite. [REDACTED] was better acquainted with [REDACTED], since [REDACTED] spent more time in the [REDACTED] suite. [REDACTED] also saw [REDACTED] in Building [REDACTED] and interacted with [REDACTED] mostly through electronic mail, about [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] after [REDACTED] left USAMRIID, and never let [REDACTED] "piggyback" into a room after [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] never brought [REDACTED] anything and never noticed anything odd regarding [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] taking any equipment out of USAMRIID. [REDACTED] was under the impression that [REDACTED] only worked on the [REDACTED] with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] near the walk-in cooler, room [REDACTED] in the hot side of Building [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did not know where [REDACTED] stored samples and materials, and was not aware of any samples [REDACTED] may have brought with [REDACTED].

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279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 02/20/2004, Page 4

from prior research or employment. \_\_\_\_\_ had no knowledge of any connections \_\_\_\_\_ may have had to New Jersey, nor did \_\_\_\_\_ know whether \_\_\_\_\_ ever visited the Gambrill Park Road area. \_\_\_\_\_ never socialized with \_\_\_\_\_, and did not know who \_\_\_\_\_ friends were. \_\_\_\_\_ was "shocked" when \_\_\_\_\_ name was \_\_\_\_\_ in regards to the anthrax case, since \_\_\_\_\_ was a "nice man". Although a \_\_\_\_\_ was "fun". \_\_\_\_\_ never mentioned \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ had no knowledge of \_\_\_\_\_ activities after \_\_\_\_\_ left USAMRIID, and did not ever attend any presentations given by \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ no one has made any comments to \_\_\_\_\_ about \_\_\_\_\_ or about having given \_\_\_\_\_ access to certain areas or to Ba.

\_\_\_\_\_ had never hosted foreign visiting scientists. \_\_\_\_\_ had been interested in the \_\_\_\_\_ and would have applied for a position \_\_\_\_\_ learned about \_\_\_\_\_ through \_\_\_\_\_ knew a \_\_\_\_\_ could not immediately recall \_\_\_\_\_ (first name), who was once a part of \_\_\_\_\_ although \_\_\_\_\_ believed that a \_\_\_\_\_ at the time, had applied for a position on \_\_\_\_\_ believed \_\_\_\_\_ had recently left \_\_\_\_\_ job with the \_\_\_\_\_

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7C

Date of transcription 05/10/2004

On May 10, 2004, [redacted], date of birth [redacted], [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed telephonically at [redacted] place of employment, the UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, that being to determine [redacted] role regarding the usage of the *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) samples sent to USAMRIID from Dugway Proving Grounds, Dugway, Utah [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] received samples of Ba from Dugway Proving Grounds, via BRUCE IVINS, in order to conduct aerosol challenge studies. [redacted]

[redacted] However, prior to the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001, [redacted] did not keep a record of these samples and so could not provide any documentation regarding their exact amount or location.

5 [redacted] 302

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Investigation on 05/10/2004 at Frederick, Maryland (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/11/2004

b6  
b7C

[redacted] born [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed telephonically at [redacted] place of employment, the UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone number [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, that being to determine [redacted] role regarding the usage of the *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) samples sent to USAMRIID from Dugway Proving Grounds, Dugway, Utah, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

13

[redacted] has never directly received any samples of Ba from Dugway Proving Grounds. [redacted] did receive a sample of Dugway Ba from BRUCE IVINS on August 27, 2001. The Ba was probably transferred to [redacted] in a [redacted] conical centrifuge tube. [redacted] stored this sample in the [redacted] walk-in refrigerator, and used the Ba in experiments over a period of several months. [redacted] did not keep a written record of this sample and so could not provide any exact documentation regarding this matter.

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511-[redacted] 302

Investigation on 05/11/2004 at Frederick, Maryland (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/22/2004

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[redacted] (U. S. Citizen), born [redacted],  
[redacted], Social Security Number [redacted] residing at [redacted]  
[redacted] Telephone Number [redacted]  
[redacted] Office Telephone Number [redacted] Cellular  
Telephone Number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of  
employment, [redacted]

12

[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview,  
[redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] received [redacted]  
Degree in [redacted] from the [redacted] University in  
[redacted] and [redacted] Degree in [redacted] from [redacted]  
University in [redacted] in [redacted] Although [redacted]  
[redacted] was from [redacted] University, [redacted] completed [redacted]  
in [redacted] at [redacted] University. [redacted] was  
employed at USAMRIID as a [redacted] in  
[redacted] and worked under the supervision of [redacted]  
[redacted]. In [redacted] left USAMRIID to work  
for [redacted] in [redacted] present position as a [redacted]

While at USAMRIID, [redacted] worked under [redacted]  
[redacted] with studies involving the [redacted]  
[redacted] and Anthrax. [redacted] worked  
with only components of Bacillus anthracis (Ba) and never worked in  
the cultivation of Ba. Live rabbit challenge work involving Ba was  
done by [redacted] which utilized the Ames Strain that was  
most likely from Bruce Ivins' stock.

[redacted] worked in the [redacted] laboratories only,  
and [redacted] did not perform any work in the [redacted] suites. In building  
[redacted] worked in the [redacted] and [redacted]  
[redacted] suites, the [redacted] lab and the conference room; in building  
[redacted] worked in the [redacted] room under [redacted] possibly six  
times. [redacted] never used room [redacted] of building [redacted] All  
of the laboratory work performed by [redacted] was recorded in  
laboratory notebooks that were stored in building [redacted]

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[redacted] 041481302

Investigation on 4/13/2004 at Bethesda, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-792

Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_

by PI [redacted]  
PI [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 4/13/2004, Page 2

According to \_\_\_\_\_ "piggy-backing" was a regular occurrence at USAMRIID, and \_\_\_\_\_ was alarmed at how easy it was. Training was not adequate for the V1 and V2 suites.

\_\_\_\_\_ never hosted any Foreign Scientists and did not believe they ever had access to any "hot suites".

\_\_\_\_\_ indicated the removal of any agents from a suite could be easily accomplished by taking the agent through the decontamination showers. \_\_\_\_\_ did not know of anyone who had done this.

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Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for decontamination existed, but \_\_\_\_\_ doubted they were normally followed and indicated a decontamination manual could probably not be located.

\_\_\_\_\_ never used any Sterilite boxes, never purchased any pre-stamped envelopes, and never made any purchases from the stamp vending machines.

\_\_\_\_\_ never handled any of the evidence in this case nor performed any analytical work of the evidence.

\_\_\_\_\_ did not know \_\_\_\_\_ prior to the \_\_\_\_\_ and never saw \_\_\_\_\_ at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ believed \_\_\_\_\_ worked with \_\_\_\_\_ and indicated \_\_\_\_\_ trained \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ became aware of the training through a conversation with \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_ was referred to as \_\_\_\_\_ by some of the older Scientists at USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ was not a member of the \_\_\_\_\_ and never hosted any Foreign Scientists.

\_\_\_\_\_ indicated \_\_\_\_\_ would be willing to take a polygraph examination regarding the facts of this report.



# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/15/2004

To: Washington Field

Attn: IIC  
SSA  
SSA  
SA  
USPI

[Redacted]

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From: Washington Field

AMX 3

Contact: SSA

[Redacted]

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Approved By:

[Redacted]

Drafted By:

[Redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID ✓ (Pending) - 795

Title: AMERITHRAX  
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To summarize information obtained from 15 laboratory notebooks and related interviews regarding production of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) Ames spores (to include, but not be limited to, Reference Material 1029 and 1030) from Bruce Ivins' research group in the Bacteriology Division at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland.

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[Redacted]

Details: During April and May, 2004, 15 laboratory notebooks from researchers in Bruce Ivins' group at USAMRIID were reviewed. Entries in these notebooks were made by Ivins (USAMRIID)

[Redacted]

and Oliver Perry Mikesell (formerly USAMRIID, then Battelle Memorial Institute, died 10/2002). The information contained herein was obtained from the notebooks and from multiple interviews of Ivins, [Redacted] and [Redacted]. Summarized interview information is presented in brackets [ ] to distinguish it from notebook documentation. Additional information can be found in FD-302s of these individuals.

Numbers are assigned by the USAMRIID Library to all laboratory notebooks issued to Principal Investigators. The notebooks can be turned in to the Library for archival when completed. Notebooks may also be retained by individual researchers in offices or in biological containment suites within

T: [Redacted] ECF / 2EC sports

[Redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

USAMRIID. Because several notebooks were used concurrently, the information is not presented in absolute chronological order.

Non-Ames research is presented only if protocols might prove pertinent or if Ames was probably used as a control.

This EC will be supplemented by a summary of the aerosol challenge process and uses of various Ames preparations in challenges. For this reason, aerosol challenge terminology is not thoroughly defined in this communication.

REFERENCE MATERIAL 1030 (RMR 1030)

Notebook [redacted] page 70, identifies the source of material for study [redacted] a rabbit challenge, as RMR 1030 Ames spores.

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As of 10/27/97 (date of notebook [redacted] entry), RMR 1030 was a mixed batch of Ames spore preparations produced

[redacted]

The production dates of the batches which were combined to make RMR 1030 were 11/20/95, 12/4/95, 1/8/96, 1/22/96, 2/8/96, 2/12/96, 2/16/96, 2/19/96, 3/18/96, 3/25/96, 4/1/96, 4/15/96, 11/18/96. [redacted]

[redacted]

On 11/28/97, Ivins used tryptic soy agar (TSA) plates to determine the concentration of heat-shocked spores and found it to be between  $2.54 \times 10^{10}$  colony forming units (cfu)/ml and  $2.9 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml.

The Notebook [redacted] description of the combined RMR 1030 preparation refers back to previous notebooks for the descriptions of each batch preparation. The review of these batch preparations provided the following production information without any documented deviations:

From Notebook [redacted] on 3/8/96, [redacted] and Ivins purified eight batches of spores on Renografin gradients and resuspended to 250 ml in 1% phenol. The final count of heat-shocked spores was  $3.18 \times 10^{12}$  cfu total and  $1.27 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml. The dates of the eight purified batches were 11/20/95, 12/4/95, 1/8/96, 1/22/96, 2/8/96, 2/12/96, 2/19/96, 2/16/96.

b6  
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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

From Notebook [redacted] on 4/19/96, Ivins purified 4 batches of Ames spores (produced on 3/18/96, 3/25/96, 4/1/96, and 4/15/96). These spores were resuspended in [redacted]. On 4/22/96, two days later, Ivins combined these four batches with the eight batches purified on 3/8/96. Ivins heat-shocked the spores at [redacted] and [redacted] and obtained counts. The average spore counts for the combined lot were  $1.22 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml to  $2.2 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml from the TSA plates and  $1.54 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml from the sheep's blood agar (SBA) plates (his dilution schemes and individual counts were documented).

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From Notebook [redacted] page 86, on 12/3/96, Ivins added more batches of Ames spores to the above combined batch. He documented that the production and purification methods were the same. The production date of this batch was 11/18/96. At this point in time, Ivins documented that there were "about 300 ml of these spores", and that this mixed batch would be called "GLP Ames spores". On 12/2/96, he determined concentration after heat shocking. The total spores from TSA plates (7 plates of  $10^{-9}$  dilution incubated overnight) was  $4.5 \times 10^{12}$  for the 300 ml, or  $1.5 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml. On page 88, 12/13/96, Ivins wrote that he would have to add more Ames spores to the GLP batch and that he would have to make more [redacted].

From Notebook [redacted] in 1/97, Ivins sent an e-mail to co-workers with calculations of how long it would take to make enough Ames spores for an upcoming aerosol challenge using 1000 rabbits and 200 monkeys. They would make 8.5 ml of aerosol per animal, so they could put 8 ml in each tube. The current batch of Ames spores (RMR 1030) took 13 production runs, and they needed 10 times the amount in the current batch. Ivins noted that 260 liters of culture would be needed, 130 weeks at one run per week or 65 weeks at two runs per week. He noted that 13 runs had yielded  $3 \times 10^{12}$  spores. They had 2000 ml per run, so they got  $1.13 \times 10^8$  spores/ml of original culture after purification.

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[The amount of material needed for the upcoming challenge was too great for USAMRIID to produce. They contracted [redacted] at Dugway Proving Ground (Dugway) to produce large quantities of Ames spores for this USAMRIID aerosol study. The spores were produced from Ames sent to Dugway by Ivins in 1997

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

for this project (origin unknown to date). Ames had also previously been sent to Dugway by Ivins in 1992. Numerous shipments of Ames spores were sent to USAMRIID from Dugway in 1997. Dugway spores were combined with spores grown by Ivins' research group in order to create RMR 1029 for use in the numerous scheduled aerosol challenges. The laboratory notebooks document the shipments and the combination of Ames preparations.]

REFERENCE MATERIAL 1029 (RMR 1029):

b6  
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RMR 1029 was created on 10/22/97. Ivins combined four separate lots of mixed batches of spores to make RMR 1029. Each lot contained multiple batches of spores. On page 68 of Notebook [redacted] Ivins documented the combination of the four lots. The combined lots were brought to [redacted]

Each of the four lots was broken down as follows:

Lot 1 - A combination of Dugway spore shipments 5 and 6 (see below) with purified USAMRIID spores from pages 10, 34, and 52 of notebook #4010 as follows: Page 10, Notebook #4010: On 6/5/1997, Ivins combined the Dugway spores with spores he had grown (described in notebook #3655, page 102) to make RMR 1029. The ultimate goal was a total of  $3 \times 10^{13}$  spores. From Notebook [redacted] page 102, the batches of Ames spores produced by Ivins and ultimately combined with the Dugway material to form RMR 1029 were originally produced on [redacted] and purified on [redacted]. These batches were produced on 1/17/97, 1/24/97, 1/27/97, 2/3/97, 2/24/97, 3/3/97, 3/10/97, 3/17/97, and 3/24/97. The batches were purified on 4/3/97: [redacted]

[redacted] The spores were stored in a [redacted]. On 5/14/97, Ivins determined the concentration to be  $2.28 \times 10^{12}$  total spores (60 ml at  $3.8 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml).

The page 34 entry on 9/29/97 for purification is identical to that found on page 104 of Notebook [redacted]. On 9/3/97 Ivins purified on [redacted] the following batches of Ames spores from [redacted] cultures: 4/14/97, 4/21/97, 4/28/97, 5/13/97, 5/23/97, 6/2/97, 6/13/97, 6/30/97, 7/28/97. The [redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

[redacted] The spores were stored  
in a [redacted] The concentration  
[redacted] was 2.38 x  
10<sup>10</sup> cfu/ml.

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Notebook [redacted] Page 52: On 9/19/97, Ivins  
purified more spores on [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] The  
batches were produced on 8/11/97, 8/12/97, 8/25/97, and  
9/8/97, and were stored in a [redacted]  
[redacted]

b6  
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On 8/7/97, the 5th shipment was received from  
Dugway. It consisted of batches from 7/21/97 (52 ml, 3  
x 10<sup>12</sup>) and 8/2/97 (51 ml, 3 x 10<sup>12</sup>). [redacted]

b7F

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

b7F

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The 9/4/97 viability counts on TSA yielded a concentration of  $2.78 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml or  $3.89 \times 10^{12}$  total spores.

The 6th Dugway shipment was from 8/4/97 ( $5 \times 10^{12}$  total spores) and was received at USAMRIID on 9/4/97. Processing was as described for the 5th shipment with a few exceptions: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Viability counts on TSA for the 100 ml preparation showed a concentration of  $3.8 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml or  $3.8 \times 10^{12}$  total spores.

Combination to form Lot 1

From page 62, Notebook [Redacted] the combined spores for Lot 1 were put into [Redacted]

b6  
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[Redacted]

[Redacted] the spore concentration for viability on TSA after overnight incubation at  $37^{\circ}\text{C}$  was between  $6.88$  to  $7.1 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml or about  $2.2 \times 10^{13}$  total spores.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

Lot 2 - Dugway spore shipments 1, 2, 3, and 4.

All of the Dugway Ames spores were sent to USAMRIID in the form of [redacted]. For the 4/21/97 shipment of the first two batches (4/12/97 and 4/14/97), [redacted] indicated [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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[redacted]

liquid with a total of approximately  $5-9 \times 10^{12}$  spores."

On receipt, Ivins and [redacted] scraped the spores from the containers and put them into [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b7F

On 4/28/97, Ivins made [redacted]

[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

b7E

[Redacted]

On 4/29/97, the spore suspension was layered

[Redacted]

On 4/30/97, Ivins took the bottles of spore suspension [Redacted] and combined them [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The 10<sup>-9</sup> dilution was documented as "contaminated, contaminated, contaminated, [Redacted]

[Redacted] The contaminant was not identified. He reported 115 ml at 3.4 x 10<sup>10</sup> cfu/ml or 3.9 x 10<sup>12</sup> total spores.

On 6/26/97, Dugway lots made on 4/22/97, 4/25/97, and 5/19/97 were received. The spores were scraped from the containers and put into [Redacted]

[Redacted]



To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

b7E

[Redacted]

On 7/14/97, Ivins made [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

polycarbonate flask and stored at 2-8°C. Viability counts were made from two dilutions [Redacted]. The concentration of the 250 ml was  $2.6 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml or  $6.5 \times 10^{12}$  total spores.

On 7/10/97, Dugway lots made on 5/22/97 and 6/28/97 were received at USAMRIID. They were processed by Ivins in the same manner with the following exceptions: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The preparations were handled the same as described

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

b7F

[Redacted]

Ivins made [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Viability

counts for a dilution of the 170 ml on TSA was  $5.02 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml or  $8.53 \times 10^{12}$  total spores.

Dugway batches made on 7/11/97 (60 ml,  $5 \times 10^{12}$ ) and 7/17/97 (80 ml,  $3.25 \times 10^{12}$ ) were received at USAMRIID on 7/24/97. They were processed like the batches from 5/22/97 and 6/28/97, put in a refrigerator, and allowed to settle until 8/28/97. After settling, about [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Viability counts on TSA yielded a concentration of  $3.06 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml or  $7.34 \times 10^{12}$  total spores.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

Combination to form Lot 2 of 4

Page 64 documented the combination of the spores from shipments 1,2,3, and 4. These batches were

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[REDACTED]

The spore concentration [REDACTED] incubated overnight at 37°C was 5.26 to 5.4 x 10<sup>10</sup> cfu/ml or 7.89 to 8.1 x 10<sup>12</sup> total spores for combined Lot 2.

Lot 3 - Consists of "Combined spores from the previous (shipments 1-6) Dugway shipments and from Ames spores described in this notebook" (from page 65). The third lot was processed as described in the final stage of Lot 2 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Counts of heat-shocked diluted spores gave a concentration of 2.5 x 10<sup>10</sup> cfu/ml or 2.5 x 10<sup>12</sup> total spores. This was the only information provided for Lot 3.

Lot 4 - "Combined from Dugway lots and "our" lots" (page 65 and 67, dated 10/10/97). "This is the last lot of spores combined from the Dugway lots and our lots. It was processed similarly to the other 3 lots [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Counts of heat-shocked diluted spores gave a concentration of 2.8 to 2.98 x 10<sup>10</sup> cfu/ml or 0.34 to 0.36 x 10<sup>13</sup> total spores." This was the only information provided for Lot 4.

Additional information regarding RMR 1029:

The phenol used to make RMR 1029 was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

There was no manufacturer expiration date, so Ivins gave this phenol a laboratory expiration date of 1/1/03.

Ivins conducted several studies using RMR 1029 with RMR 1030 used as a control. He examined RMR 1029 spores microscopically [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

[redacted] Based on the observations, there were >99% refractile spores, <1% vegetative cells, <1% non-refractile spores, and <1% debris in RMR 1029 as of 3/17/98.

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On 3/19/98, Ivins documented results of growth of RMR 1029 on SBA and capsule agar (10 plates each). RMR 1030 was used

[redacted]  
On 3/20/98, Ivins sent 2 freezer tubes, each containing 1.5 ml of gamma-irradiated RMR 1029 spores to the QC laboratory. The QC laboratory reported [redacted]

[redacted]  
On 3/16/99, Ivins checked the viability counts for RMR 1029. [redacted]

[redacted] and incubated overnight. The viability was determined to be  $2.3-2.4 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml. This viability was in comparison to that obtained on 10/22/97 which was  $3.6 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml.

Potentially pertinent information about RMR 1029 and 1030 from miscellaneous interviews:

[The flasks of Ames spore preparations created by Ivins and his coworkers were usually stored in the cold room (walk-in cooler) in Suite [redacted] of USAMRIID building [redacted]. If there was a problem in, or renovation of, the [redacted] cold room, the flasks were moved to and stored in the Suite [redacted] cold room. Suites [redacted] and [redacted] interconnected without a separate card reader, so researchers could easily move back and forth between the two suites. Access to one of the two suites gave access to the other.]

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[Because the quantities of RMR 1029 and 1030 were so large and dangerous, glass was never used for storage. The Reference Materials were always stored in polycarbonate flasks purchased from Corning®. These flasks were not cycled through the USAMRIID glassware room and were never re-used. The spore preparations were maintained in the same containers for the entire time after their creation and not routinely transferred to other similar containers.]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

[In addition to the large flasks storing the Reference Materials, [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] Flasks were sometimes labeled with the spore concentrations and strain.]

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[When RMR 1029 was being prepared for dissemination to another researcher, the flask was only swirled (if even that) to mix the contents. Vortexing or stirring would have been too dangerous.]

[redacted] never used RMR 1029 or RMR 1030 as a source or seed stock for growing spores. [redacted] stocks of vegetative material were used for that purpose when plates were streaked for production runs or experiments. [redacted]

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[RMR 1029 was widely used within USAMRIID for aerosol challenges. Ivins claims most challenges between 1997 and 2002 utilized RMR 1029. The material was produced for that purpose and was much cleaner and more pure than other spore preparations. A separate ongoing investigative project will identify all challenges which utilized RMR 1029 as well as sources of any other Ames used in challenges. Samples of RMR 1029 were also sent to other facilities as shown herein.]

[Neither Ivins nor [redacted] could recall or find documentation to identify the source of Ames material sent to the [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
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[redacted] handwriting is on the vials received at [redacted]

DISTRIBUTION OF RMR 1029

To other facilities:

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

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[redacted] 02/22/2000 - 1 ml; and 03/22/2000 - 6 ml.  
(understood to have been gamma-irradiated)

[redacted] 03/07/01  
0.5 ml in a cryotube at  $3 \times 10^9$  cfu/ml.

[redacted] Battelle Memorial Institute, 05/08/01  
50 ml in 125 ml polycarbonate flask at  
 $3.9 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml or  $2.73 \times 10^{12}$  total spores.  
There is a 60 ml discrepancy on this shipment  
(Ivins shows 90 ml sent on his balance book  
page, and the shipping request form shows 70  
ml marked shipped with 50 ml written over the  
amount shipped.

and  
06/18/01; 30 ml (10 ml in each of 3  
polypropylene tubes).

and  
07/22/02 - 20 ml shipped from Ivins to [redacted]

**Transfers and use of RMR 1029 inside USAMRIID:**

RMR 1029 was used in a multi-part aerosol challenge  
study with rabbits, study B00-03:

- Part 1 - 75 ml used on 4/3/00
- Part 2 - 40 ml used on 7/7/00
- Part 3 - 60 ml used on 4/6/01
- Part 4 - 50 ml used on 7/9/01
- Part 5 - 40 ml used on 12/10/01
- Part 6 - 21 ml used on 1/14/02
- Part 7 - 35 ml used on 9/17-19/02
- Part 8 - 26 ml used on 2/18/03

[redacted] 8/28/00, 40 ml

Bioport rabbit challenge - 12/04/00, 100 ml

[redacted] - 8/27/01, 5 ml

[redacted] 10/04/01, 10 ml  
11/15/01, 10 ml  
12/21/01, 8 ml  
04/02/02, 15 ml  
08/05/02, 50 ml  
11/29/02, 50 ml

[redacted] 11/02/01, 1.2 ml

[redacted] - 11/14/01, 1 ml

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

[redacted] - 11/01/02, 3 ml

b6  
b7C

[redacted] 05/05/03, 16 ml (two aliquots of 8 ml each) for study F02-09

11/18/03, 16 ml for study F02-09

[redacted] 08/18/03, 25 ml

OTHER AMES RESEARCH and SPORE PRODUCTION

Specific stocks or sample numbers are provided herein if listed in the notebooks.

[redacted] sent a 7th batch of Ames spores from Dugway (made on 9/9/97 and 9/15/97). The spores were processed like the other shipments through Renocal-76 gradients. They were still "so dirty" that they were not processed further or added to the GLP Ames spores. They were not added to the RMR 1029 Ames spores and were destroyed by autoclaving on 10/24/97.

From notebook [redacted]

A 6/13/95 Ames challenge on 30 rabbits used spores at  $1.4 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml. The post-challenge Day 1 colony counts from the all-glass impinger (AGI)  $10^{-4}$  dilution ranged from  $1.27 \times 10^6$  cfu/ml to  $6.5 \times 10^6$  cfu/ml.

In 7/94, under Experimental Protocol [redacted] Ivins, [redacted] [redacted], and [redacted] conducted an "encapsulated live vaccine trial with [redacted] strains".

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b7C  
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[redacted]

Experimental Protocol [redacted] was to use Ames spores,

[redacted]

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[redacted] This experiment examined the efficacy of different emulsions (vaccine) + protective antigen (PA) in guinea pigs. Lyophilized and unlyophilized emulsions were compared.

On 1/20/95, Ivins documented preparations for an Ames aerosol challenge with rabbits using the 10/94 spores at a

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

The same spore preparation was to be used in Experimental Protocol [Redacted] in 9/94. The animals were to be challenged 12/14-15/94. Post heat-shock counts showed the beginning challenge concentration was  $1.55 \times 10^9$  cfu/ml.

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On 2/9/95 Ivins made MPL and protective antigen (PA) + squalene/lecithin/Tween 80 emulsion according to protocol 129. He then lyophilized the material so that he had 3 ml per vial.

[Redacted]

b7F

On 4/12/95, Ivins noted that 5 batches of Ames spores from [Redacted]

[Redacted]  
purified. The resulting combination was highly pure spores, almost exclusively isolated, highly refractile spores, with less than 1% of the material in debris, vegetative cells, clumped spores, or non-refractile spores. He noted that this quantity may have been enough for several challenges.

On page 42, Ivins indicated that he had about [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Other spore dilutions were documented as well.

On 12/14/95, Ivins added [Redacted]

[Redacted]



To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

[Redacted]

b7F

[Redacted] Ivins repeated the viability determination (page 61) on the challenge spores 4 days after the rabbit challenge.

Experimental Protocol [Redacted] was for a challenge with Vollum 1B spores. Another study in Notebook [Redacted] is experimental Protocol [Redacted] to see how much PA can be adsorbed to alhydrogel.

b6  
b7C

From Mikesell's Notebook [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
.b7C  
b7F

[Redacted]

Mikesell's Notebook [Redacted]

This notebook covered research conducted in 1991 and 1992. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

b6  
b7C  
b7F

The first reference to Ames in Notebook [redacted] is on  
page 63. [redacted]

[redacted]

Notebook # [redacted]

[redacted] made a note on 10/16/97 that [redacted]  
asked [redacted] about sporulation. [redacted] worked in the fermentation  
lab [redacted] and had access to all Ames material  
produced by Ivins' group.] [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Notebook [redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

This notebook gave details on the production protocol used by [redacted] in 7/97. On 7/21/97, [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

On 7/31/97, Ames concentrations were determined from dilutions of  $10^{-6}$  and  $10^{-7}$ . Concentrations of  $1.85 \times 10^9$  cfu/ml and  $2.36 \times 10^9$  cfu/ml, respectively, were obtained.

On 9/15/97, [redacted] received [redacted] strains of Ba from [redacted] University. A list of the strains (identified by number) can be found on page 23 of notebook [redacted]. Ames was not identifiable on the list.

b6  
b7C

On 9/22/97, plasmid preparations were made of Ames. The protocol is on pages 25 and 26 of notebook [redacted]. On 11/4/97 [redacted] made dilutions of Ames to determine

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

concentration in order to prepare for an IM challenge the following week.

On 3/17/98, [redacted] streaked Ames onto SBA plates for antibiotic testing and incubated overnight. [redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[redacted]

On page 105, [redacted] documented that on 8/6/98 [redacted] and [redacted] made new stock solutions of [redacted]

[redacted]

In January 2000, [redacted] and [redacted] grew Ames on

[redacted]

On 2/7/00, [redacted] and [redacted] streaked Ames on SBA plates and incubated them overnight in a [redacted]. On 2/8/00, they prepared starter cultures by putting a loopful of Ames into a flask containing [redacted]. The flasks were

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

[Redacted]

b7F

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

Notebook [Redacted]

Notebook [Redacted] is a continuation of notebook [Redacted]  
Whenever [Redacted] referred to "harvest" in this notebook, [Redacted] used  
the following protocol: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Page 59 of notebook [Redacted] refers to research with

[Redacted]

On 6/8/00, [Redacted] noted that Ames showed lots of growth  
at the stab site [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The data supported the idea that Ba will show  
partial or minimal clearing after prolonged incubation.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[Redacted]

On 3/2/01, [Redacted] harvested Ames, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

On 3/9/01, [Redacted] harvested [Redacted]

[Redacted]

On 4/16/01, Ivins streaked Ames onto SBA and incubated overnight at [Redacted]

[Redacted]

4/20/01, [Redacted] harvested [Redacted]

4/30/01, [Redacted]

harvested them the next day.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

next page, but there were no subsequent entries in notebook

b6  
b7C

[redacted]  
Notebook [redacted]

This notebook included entries by [redacted] for an  
8/20/90 study on antimicrobial susceptibility testing of six  
strains of Ba using two methods. [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] The anthrax test strains were obtained from  
Ivins. [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[redacted]  
Notebook [redacted]

Notebook [redacted] included research by [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

On 1/8/97, meeting discussion suggestions regarding the

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[Redacted]

In 7/97, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

The 4/19/99 hamster challenge in this notebook used foreign strains of Ba, not Ames. An Ames challenge was conducted on hamsters on 5/11/99. Ivins prepared the Ames spores, and the source is identified as RMR 1029 in the dilution scheme. [Redacted]

b7F

[Redacted] Ames spores (RMR 1029). [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Ivins prepared the Ames spores from RMR 1029 on 5/19/99. [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

On 6/14/99, [Redacted] diluted Ames for a challenge the following day. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C

Another Ames hamster challenge was conducted on 7/14/99. Other



To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

b6  
b7C  
b7E

hamster challenges using other non-Ames Ba strains were conducted during 7/99.

NOTEBOOK [redacted]

This notebook was [redacted] notebook on various protocols including (but not limited to) [redacted]  
[redacted]

On 9/29/92, [redacted] reported that [redacted] purified [redacted] from Ivins' collection following the [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] used *B. subtilis* strain [redacted] to transform a clone into *B. subtilis* using a protocol given to [redacted] by [redacted]

On pages 140-141 of Notebook [redacted] [redacted] documented that [redacted] received a culture in [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] The contaminant was not further identified.

In 12/94, notebook entries indicate that [redacted] and [redacted] worked together on subcloning experiments with *B. subtilis*.

[redacted]

During the 1992 research covered in Notebook [redacted] [redacted] frequently used Ames as a control strain, primarily on [redacted]  
[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

[Redacted]

b7F

Notebook [Redacted]

Page 7 documents that [Redacted] began planning for the  
[Redacted] anthrax meeting in [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] had Ivins look at a slide for motility. He found some motile *Bacillus*. "So...is this really *B. anthracis*, or is our culture contaminated?"

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

On 6/18/96, page 51 of Notebook [Redacted] and [Redacted] conducted an experiment at [Redacted] request to

[Redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

control. [redacted] performed some of the DNA preps for these projects.

b6  
b7C

On 10/1/01, [redacted] began a preliminary growth study with Ames to determine [redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

Notebook [redacted]

On 3/10/98, [redacted] tested Ba strains including Ames on [redacted]

[redacted]

Page 42 of Notebook [redacted] shows a 5/11/98 production and purification of Ames spores for [redacted]

[redacted]

On 9/17/98, Ivins used [redacted] Ames spores ( $3 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml) for an aerosol challenge with [redacted] Dilutions were plated out on TSA plates. The AGI dilution plates had counts of between  $3.10$  and  $9.70 \times 10^6$  total spores. On 5/3/99, Ivins prepared for one of [redacted] Ames challenges. [redacted]

[redacted] "I'll use the GLP Ames spores which are approximately  $2.5 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml."

On 2/16/99, Ivins wanted to immunize rabbits with Ames spores, ungerminated (refractile) and germinated. [redacted] would immunize 10 rabbits with germinated spores in TriMix and 10 rabbits with ungerminated spores in TriMix. They planned to have the GLP Ames spores gamma irradiated [redacted]

b7F

[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

[Redacted]

b7F

[Redacted] (RMR  
1029-GLP Ames spores)

[Redacted]

On 4/7/00, Ivins planned a guinea pig IM challenge with 5,000 Ames spores in [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The dilution scheme showed RMR 1039 (this number was what was in the notebook and is not a typo) being used at a concentration of  $2.5 \times 10^{10}$  cfu/ml. The entry could have been in error in that RMR 1029 was routinely used for these types of challenges.

On 9/10/01, Ivins noted that they would take vaccine to [Redacted] on 9/18/01 and 10/16/01 for immunization of 100 rabbits. There were no subsequent entries in this notebook.

Page 85 documented a planned schedule for a guinea pig Ames challenge on 4/6/00. Much of Notebook [Redacted] was about a Vollum 1B challenge in mice. Work conducted with [Redacted] was also described.

b6  
b7C

Notebook [Redacted]

Notebook [Redacted] contained primarily competitive binding assays (protocols and results). Entries were made by [Redacted] regarding work [Redacted] conducted with [Redacted] and [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[Redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

b7F

[REDACTED]

Notebook [REDACTED]

This notebook covered a period of time including the second window of opportunity for the mailings of the anthrax letters. The first entry was on 10/5/01, and the second on 10/11/01. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[REDACTED]

On 1/7/02, [REDACTED] began testing some strains for temperature sensitivity to see if spores remained heat resistant at high temperature. Ivins had done a preliminary study "a while back" with Ames and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Notebook [REDACTED] also contained guinea pig challenge studies using Ames and other strains. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Notebook [REDACTED]

Notebook [REDACTED] included information on challenges of [REDACTED]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

[Redacted]

b7F

[Redacted]

[Redacted] GLP Ames spores (described in notebook [Redacted] were used to challenge the vaccines. [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Ivins gave [Redacted] tubes containing [Redacted] GLP spores at

[Redacted]

[Redacted] The GLP Ames spores were diluted [Redacted]

[Redacted]

On 12/11/96, Ivins took [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7F

[Redacted] were challenged with GLP Ames on 12/17/96.

[Redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

b7F

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]. A note scrawled at the bottom of the page in Ivins writing and dated 10/3/01 indicated that "this experiment has been postponed indefinitely". There were no subsequent entries.

**ADDITIONAL POTENTIALLY PERTINENT INFORMATION:**

On page 65 of Notebook [Redacted], Ivins pasted in an e-mail from him to [Redacted] with [Redacted] response regarding the origin of the Ames strain.

b6  
b7C

[From the early 1990's to present, Ivins and [Redacted] routinely used Ames from Ivins' 1985 subculture of the original slant. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

On 2/6/02 (page 98 of Notebook [redacted] Ivins took material from the original Ames slant [redacted] and inoculated SBA.

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[redacted]  
[redacted] but Ivins estimated the concentration [redacted]  
[redacted] "These spores are from a primary subculture of the original slant we received in 1981. They are still highly viable."

In Notebook [redacted] page 79, Ivins noted that he learned telephonically from [redacted] at [redacted] that

In Notebook [redacted] page 97, Ivins and [redacted] conducted a study to compare the differences in colony counts on plates using different pipetting techniques. Their counts did differ.

From Notebook [redacted] during the early 1990's, [redacted] had some problems with contaminated plates, but the contaminant was not identified. [redacted] also worked with *B. subtilus*.

b6  
b7C

In the early 1990's, Mikesell conducted research using some of [redacted] samples (various Ba and others). In his research, Mikesell used various types of media including [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

Notebook [redacted] contained [redacted]

b6  
b7C

From Notebook [redacted] Ivins combined and purified spore preparations of Vollum 1B in the same manner as Ames. Also in this notebook, page 100, he documented a 3/18/96 experiment to determine if there was any difference in [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[redacted] This experiment was conducted because



To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

[Redacted]

b7F

On page 44 of Notebook [Redacted] 6/19/98, Ivins documented that he weighed out [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[Redacted] "It appears as though the two have equivalent densities."

On 12/19/96, Ivins conducted a comparison of pipettes versus Pipetman tips for plating. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7F

[When materials were shipped from a researcher at USAMRIID to another facility, the researcher prepared the vial, tube, plate, or other container of material and overpacked it in a canister or other overpack container. The overpack was then passed out of the containment suite through decontamination and taken to the shipping handler who further packaged it for shipment. He arranged for pickup of the material and physically sent the material out of USAMRIID.]

Fermentation work in Suite [Redacted]  
Notebook [Redacted]

From page 12 (12/11/97), in research with Ba [Redacted] Ivins inoculated [Redacted] into a flask containing [Redacted] and another flask containing [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b2  
b7F

[Redacted] The spores were then purified through [Redacted]

[Redacted] Ivins then had 75 ml of RP4 spores at  $5 \times 10^9$  cfu/ml. On 2/10/98, Ivins described the following: To inoculate [Redacted] fermenters, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

[Redacted]

b7F

On page 21 of Notebook [Redacted]

[Redacted]

On 3/24/98, Ivins pasted [Redacted] version of R-  
medium into notebook [Redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[Redacted]

Ivins noted on 4/17/98 that [Redacted] and [Redacted] found  
that 1) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field  
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 05/15/2004

The following generalities were made from the notebooks:

Heat shocking of Ames spore preparations was consistently done at 60°C for 45 min from at least 1994 to present. Heat shocking was done prior to each aerosol challenge which used the Ames strain. [In a presentation by [redacted] [redacted] indicated that the purpose of heat shocking was to stimulate germination and get rid of vegetative debris.]

b6  
b7c

Colony counts to determine concentration of spore preps prior to injection or aerosolization were made sometimes only on TSA plates and sometimes on both TSA and SBA plates. The plates were routinely incubated overnight at 37°C and counted the following day. Spore concentrations were routinely documented as total concentrations for the whole preparation and as per-ml concentrations.

**Important note:**

The fifteen notebooks described herein were the laboratory notebooks obtained from Bruce Ivins in an interview in December 2003. Ivins was apparently asked for an assortment of notebooks used by researchers in his group, not for notebooks specific to Ames research. This collection of laboratory notebooks is only a small portion of the documentation of Ames research at USAMRIID. Additional pertinent notebooks will be obtained from USAMRIID and reviewed as the investigation progresses.

◆◆

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Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 12

Page 50 ~ b2, b7F

Page 51 ~ b2, b7F

Page 52 ~ b2, b7F

Page 53 ~ b2, b7F

Page 54 ~ b2, b7F

Page 55 ~ b2, b7F

Page 56 ~ b2, b7F

Page 115 ~ b6, b7C

Page 116 ~ b6, b7C

Page 117 ~ b6, b7C

Page 118 ~ b6, b7C

Page 119 ~ b6, b7C