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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/18/2004

On 10/12/2004, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] sent, via facsimile, a letter of request to [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), a letter of request. The letter, dated 10/12/2004, requested access to USAMRIID personnel files for BRUCE IVINS, [redacted]

[redacted]

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SA [redacted] subsequently hand delivered the original 10/12/2004 letter to [redacted] USAMRIID and a copy of the letter to [redacted] Fort Detrick, Judge Advocate General's Office.

The facsimile sent to [redacted] is attached.


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Investigation on 10/12/2004 at Frederick, MD


File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1002 Date dictated 10/18/2004

by [redacted]

[redacted] 04292B [redacted]



AMERITHRAX
TASK FORCE



FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES POSTAL
INSPECTION SERVICE

FREDERICK, MD OFFSITE OFFICE

FAX MESSAGE

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

No. of PAGES 3 (INCLUDING COVER PAGE)

FAX No: (301) 619 5138 DATE: 10/12/2004

TO:

FROM:

COMMENTS: Letter of request

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FAX No. (240) 379-6203

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

601 4th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20535
October 12, 2004

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

[REDACTED]
USAMRIID
1425 Porter Street
Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702


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Dear [REDACTED]

Pursuant to the ongoing criminal investigation into the 2001 mailings of letters laced with *Bacillus anthracis*, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) requests the items, documents, and/or access listed below. If a point of contact for an item or document has been identified by one of our investigators, that point of contact is listed with the item or document. Please contact Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [REDACTED] or Special Agent [REDACTED] when the items are available for pickup from USAMRIID. Please contact SSA [REDACTED] directly regarding any problems or issues with the items or documents requested. The requested items are as follows:

Access to Personnel records for the following individuals:

Bruce Ivins



As arranged previously, investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and The United States Postal Inspection Service will coordinate with [REDACTED] to review these files at USAMRIID.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

Inspector in Charge

[Redacted]

By:

[Redacted]

Supervisory Special Agent

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cc:

[Redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription 11/08/2004

On November 2, 2004, Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] interviewed [redacted] at [redacted] place of residence at [redacted]. [redacted] does not have [redacted] has a cellular telephone: [redacted] and a pager: [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

P, 3, 4, 7, 9

[redacted] received [redacted] degree in [redacted] attended [redacted] and received [redacted] degree in [redacted] is currently an [redacted] [redacted] is currently working at [redacted]

[redacted] worked at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) [redacted] worked at USAMRIID [redacted] obtained this position [redacted] IVINS' [redacted] did not have any access to hot suites during [redacted] employment and did not work with anything other than [redacted] USAMRIID as a full-time employee [redacted] after graduating from [redacted] Prior to starting [redacted] employment at USAMRIID, [redacted]

IVINS and [redacted] were the people [redacted] while at USAMRIID. IVINS was the Principal Investigator [redacted] role at USAMRIID was to [redacted] different strains of anthrax, including the Ames strain [redacted] referred to the paper published on the study to ascertain the correct number of strains tested). The goal of the study was to determine the [redacted]

Investigation on 11/2/2004 at [redacted]
File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1001 Date dictated N/A
by SA [redacted]

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Back Of Page

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SSA




279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 11/2/2004, Page 2

The process by which _____ produced *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) was taught to _____ by _____ would first

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The B.a. spores used for the aerosol challenges received _____ This additional step is utilized for aerosol challenge material to eliminate any impurities which can prevent spores from being fully aerosolized. The purification procedures _____ used _____ IVINS. _____ does not know if there are other people who also know how to purify spores. _____ did not have a written protocol to purify the spores, but every step is described in the published research paper on this study.

All the B.a. _____ used as inoculum were stored in cryoboxes containing mostly _____

_____ did not personally know the labeling system used on the tubes. _____ IVINS _____

_____ There was _____

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 11/2/2004, Page 3

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_____ knew which strain of B.a. _____ was using during the challenges.

_____ does not know of, nor has _____ ever used Modified G media. _____ has never used a lyophilizer and does not know if USAMRIID had one while _____ was employed.

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_____ never knew where the Ames strain that _____ worked with came from. _____ never shared any B.a. with people outside of USAMRIID, or with people not associated with _____ studies. _____ has no knowledge of anyone who knows how to weaponize biological agents. _____ also does not know of any bacterial contamination incidences at USAMRIID.

When _____ began employment at USAMRIID _____ IVINS, _____ believes _____ no longer works at USAMRIID). Later, _____ IVINS _____ worked in the _____ conducted experiments in _____ never worked in a BSL 4 suite.

_____ hours at USAMRIID were typically from _____

_____ This was mostly due to the work that needed to be done for challenges. _____ would go into USAMRIID at around _____

_____ The aerosol challenges were conducted in Building _____ does not recall the room numbers. _____ was shown a schematic map of Building _____ but _____ could not

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 11/2/2004, Page 4

specifically locate the exact rooms _____ work in. The aerosolization study, which began during _____ at USAMRIID, utilized _____

_____ is not sure if the Ames strain was among _____ strains selected for use in the aerosolization study.

_____ does not recall ever using the walk-in refrigerator in room _____. The only refrigerator _____ used in that building was the one _____

_____ does not remember specific instances of "piggybacking" at USAMRIID. _____ believes that _____ might have held a door open for someone right behind _____ a few times but could not remember specifics. _____ sure that "piggybacking" occurred while _____ was employed at USAMRIID.

_____ never used large plastic storage containers while _____ worked at USAMRIID. _____ never purchased pre-stamped envelopes and never bought envelopes from the vending machines at USAMRIID.

All of the work _____ did were recorded in a notebook. _____ would record the notes immediately after _____ was finished _____ or _____ would take notes while in the _____

_____ At first, _____ typed out all _____ notes but found that it was too time consuming, so _____ ended up writing out _____ notes. _____ estimates that _____ did not have more than _____ notebooks during _____ at USAMRIID. The notebooks were kept in _____ office and, up to the time _____ left, the notebooks only contained _____ notes and work. _____ is not aware if other people recorded their work in _____ notebook after _____ left. _____ does not know of any experiments that were conducted which were not official or not recorded in notebooks.

Only people with the proper vaccinations and training have access to the hot suites. Anyone with such access could easily steal a select agent. The vials storing the select agents are small enough to sneak out of the hot suite and out of USAMRIID without notice. The only way for security to detect such thefts would be to conduct a strip search. _____ does not know of, nor has _____ ever heard of anyone attempting to

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 11/2/2004, Page 5

steal a select agent from USAMRIID. _____ does not know of anyone who has attempted to use B.a. improperly, or who have attempted to gain access to select agents without a need to do so. _____ does not know of anyone who had access to B.a. who expressed hostile attitudes toward the government or the press. _____ could not think of anyone in USAMRIID who was lax in the handling of dangerous materials. _____ does not know of anyone who could have mailed or helped with the mailing of the anthrax letters.

When asked whether _____ would know how to accomplish the anthrax mailings, _____ stated that _____ would not know how to dry B.a. and then send it through the mail. _____

_____ been to Trenton, New Jersey. _____ knows of a few people who attended Princeton University, but _____ does not know of anyone who continues to have ties to that city. _____ does not know of anyone with ties to Trenton, New Jersey.

_____ did not conduct any travels on or shortly after September 11, 2001. The day of September 11, 2001,

_____ arrived home on September 11 after working _____ shift. _____ immediately fell asleep. _____ did not hear about the terrorist attacks until _____ called _____ later in the day. _____ was concerned because _____

_____ asked _____ asked if _____ knew people in New York City who were affected by the events.

_____ never knew _____ had never seen him at USAMRIID and _____ did not look familiar to _____ after _____ saw _____ in the media. _____ was never a member of the _____ and has never hosted any foreign visiting scientists.

The only people _____ are _____ IVINS. During the first two or three months after _____ left, _____ IVINS _____

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 11/2/2004, Page 6

has kept in steady contact with [REDACTED] over the years. They discuss mostly personal matters, though on occasion, [REDACTED] does update [REDACTED] on other USAMRIID employees and project matters.

After the anthrax mailings, [REDACTED] discussed with

[REDACTED] does not remember discussing with [REDACTED] where the anthrax could have come from. [REDACTED] surmises that they must have discussed it, but [REDACTED] could not remember specifically if they had.

[REDACTED] was asked to elaborate on [REDACTED] studies using B.a. [REDACTED] of B.a. used on the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not recall if [REDACTED] ever wrote down the concentration of the B.a. on the labels. [REDACTED] did not know how USAMRIID assigned the different nomenclatures to the different strains of B.a. [REDACTED] did not know if there were more than one naming system at USAMRIID.

IVINS [REDACTED] were the ones [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was not part of the decision-making. [REDACTED] believes that IVINS [REDACTED] wanted to get a representative sample of anthrax from all over the world. The stocks of B.a. were kept [REDACTED] although there might have been a larger tube of the Ames strain.

People whom [REDACTED] believed had access to [REDACTED] suite were IVINS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] B.a. samples were kept [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has never had any missing samples, and [REDACTED] has never had any incidences of the B.a. not do what it was suppose to do. [REDACTED] has never had any problems with [REDACTED] B.a. controls.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 11/2/2004, Page 7

_____ was the primary person who _____ on a few occasions, but it was _____
 _____ During the first month, _____
 _____ or IVINS _____
 After that period, _____

_____ does not recall conversations at USAMRIID regarding standardizing the anthrax used in research due to variations caused by various methods of growth or variations created by individual batches. _____ does not believe that there are differences in the virulence in different colonies of the same strain.

_____ never worked outside of _____ while at USAMRIID. _____ never worked with _____ but did work with _____ on occasion. _____ was _____ replacement, but their employments did not overlap by more than 2 weeks. _____ took over _____ project, but _____ did not train _____ does not know if _____ used _____ own notebooks for the studies, or if _____ used the remainder of _____ notebooks. _____ does not recall doing any lab work with _____ or discussing any of the projects. _____ has never worked with _____ has never worked with _____ but remembers that _____ was a "goofy guy". _____ knew _____ but did not work with _____ knew _____ as _____ for answers to technical questions. _____ never asked _____ questions relating to B.a. _____ believes that IVINS _____ might have talked about B.a. with _____ but _____ never discussed B.a. with either person.

_____ has never worked with foreign visiting scientists. _____ knew of two non-USAMRIID employees who worked in _____ but did not know if they were from another country or another lab within the United States.

_____ was not familiar with either "7738" or "7739". _____ was asked about "7800" and stated that it sounded familiar, but _____ could not remember much more. _____ was also asked

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 11/2/2004, Page 8

whether _____ had heard of "Reference Material Receipt (RMR)" and "Good Laboratory Practices (GLP)". _____ stated that _____ had heard of GLP work being done, but did not know specifics. As far as _____ knew, _____ never grew any RMR or GLP materials.

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anything from the challenges. IVINS, _____ or others _____ from _____ would plate out the B.a. to determine concentrations.

The aerosol challenges used only one strain of B.a. at a time. The different strains were tested several weeks apart. The B.a. used in the aerosol study was already available from the first phase of the study. _____ did not have to grow more B.a. for the aerosol study.

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_____ does not know of specific laboratories outside USAMRIID which possessed the Ames strain. _____ remembered that _____ had exchanged B.a. strains at one point, but could not remember the details.

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_____ does not recall specifics on a time when large batches of Ames spores were produced. _____ IVINS, when _____

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_____ was shown a series of photographs depicting individual vials, boxes of vials and tubes, and contents of refrigerators. _____ was shown a picture of a 2 mL vial with _____ written in green ink. _____

blue capped 15 mL falcon tube with _____ written in blue ink, or the _____ box or its contents. The handwriting on the 2 mL vial labeled _____ and a portion of the orange topped tube labeled _____

_____ The 2 mL vial labeled _____ did not look familiar. The blue topped tube labeled _____ and the _____

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 11/2/2004, Page 9

blue topped tube labeled [redacted]

[redacted] The flask labeled [redacted] did not look familiar to [redacted]

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[redacted] IVINS. [redacted] was shown a photograph of a vial with [redacted] written on the label. [redacted] did not recognize the nomenclature [redacted] (The photographs shown to [redacted] have been sent to the corresponding 1A file. All the photographs [redacted] have been marked accordingly.)

[redacted] does not recall ever going into [redacted] However, there were numerous boxes stored in the refrigerators and it might have been possible that at some point [redacted] went into another person's box to retrieve or store materials. [redacted] had a vague recollection of [redacted]

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[redacted] does not know the Protocol UIB BI3. The interviewing Agents showed [redacted] a copy of the Protocol (This Protocol has been sent to the corresponding 1A envelope). After looking through it, [redacted] stated that [redacted]

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[redacted] As a full-time employee, [redacted] never had written protocols in front of [redacted] while working. [redacted] relied on hands-on training.

[redacted] has not heard of any discussions of whether B.a. grown during a particular year was better than others. [redacted] has never received shipments of spores from other laboratories. [redacted] does not recall if [redacted] had a system of [redacted] own to [redacted] and does not know if others had their [redacted]

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[redacted] describes IVINS as diligent, meticulous, and not at all sloppy when it comes to scientific work. [redacted] IVINS [redacted]

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[redacted] describes [redacted] as also being detail oriented, safety conscious, and not sloppy.

[redacted] was asked whether [redacted] would agree to take a polygraph administered by the FBI on questions related to the

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of , On 11/2/2004, Page 10

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anthrax mailings of 2001. voluntarily agreed to take the polygraph.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/18/2004

To: Washington Field

Attn: SA [redacted]

AMX I

From: Washington Field

AMX 3

Contact: SA [redacted]

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Approved By: [redacted]

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending)-100

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: Report results of Amerithrax investigation regarding [redacted]

Details: An investigation of [redacted] commenced because [redacted] had access to locations where the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) was stored while employed at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).

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[redacted] Date of Birth: [redacted] Social Security Account Number: [redacted] Home Address: [redacted] [redacted] is currently employed at [redacted] business telephone number [redacted] home telephone number [redacted]

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[redacted] earned a [redacted] from the [redacted] does not have any specialized training, knowledge or skills with anthrax, biological agents or viruses. From [redacted] was employed at [redacted] During [redacted] tenure at [redacted] participated in projects concerning [redacted]

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From [redacted] through [redacted] was employed at USAMRIID in [redacted] Most of [redacted] time was consumed with projects involving [redacted] However, [redacted] B.a. aerosol challenges. The principal investigator was Bruce Ivins. [redacted]

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[redacted] was responsible for [redacted] [redacted] did not have and other responsibilities that involved B.a.. [redacted] never

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b7C

[redacted] 1327 [redacted] [redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 11/18/2004

maintained any of the B.a. or other select agents outside the scope of the animal challenges.

There is no evidence [redacted] has the knowledge, motivation or experience to conduct or participate in the September and October 2001 anthrax mailings. Numerous employees and contractors were interviewed from USAMRIID and none of these individuals alleged [redacted] possessed the knowledge, experience or motivation to conduct said acts. Also, there were no FBI tips or complaints indicating that [redacted] may have been directly or indirectly involved with the anthrax mailings.

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Based on the aforementioned information and the fact that [redacted] has cooperated with this investigation, no evidence has been discovered to date which suggests that [redacted] may have been involved in the anthrax-laced letter mailings. Unless or until such evidence is identified, no further investigation of [redacted] is intended in this case.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/30/2004

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To: Washington Field


Attn: IIC



From: Washington Field

AMX 3

Contact: SA



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DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Approved By:



Drafted By:



Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending)-1012

Title: AMERITHRAX;
Major Case 184

Synopsis: To document a September 20, 2004 meeting at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) regarding FBI access to USAMRIID computers.

Details: On September 20, 2004, SSA [redacted] SSA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] and Computer Specialist [redacted] met with [redacted] telephone [redacted] SERGEANT (SGT) [redacted] telephone [redacted] and BRUCE IVINS, telephone [redacted] at USAMRIID, 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland (MD) to establish a procedure by which the FBI could recover electronic mail (email) from USAMRIID computers.

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[redacted] and SGT [redacted] agreed to allow the FBI access to USAMRIID desktop computers, laptop computers, loose media such as zip drives and floppy disks, and the USAMRIID network so that data could be recovered. A temporary work area for the Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) agents will be created within IVINS' office.

[redacted] and SGT [redacted] were advised that the list of individuals from whom the FBI intends to recover emails is not yet complete, and that more names may follow.

IVINS advised that there is a laptop computer on his hand receipt, however he has never used it and cannot locate the computer.

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SGT [redacted] advised that [redacted] would be the point of contact (POC) on this matter in [redacted] absence.



To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 11/30/2004

A meeting with the Division of Information Management
(DOIM) on this matter was scheduled for 09/22/2004.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 8/5/2004

On April 2, 2004 and April 6, 2004, Special Agent [redacted] had telephonic contact with [redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] employed at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft. Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] During an interview on [redacted] had provided SA [redacted] SA [redacted] with page 1 of [redacted] which listed all Ba samples in [redacted] possession. The purpose of the phone calls with [redacted] was to discuss the submission of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) Ames strain samples in [redacted] possession to the FBI repository (FBIR).

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On April 2, 2004, and April 6, 2004, [redacted] provided the following information regarding each sample listed as Ba Ames strain:

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- REG# [redacted] BACILLUS ANTHRACIS - AMES DERIVATIVE
- REG# [redacted] BACILLUS ANTHRACIS - AMES DERIVATIVE
- REG# [redacted] BACILLUS ANTHRACIS - AMES DERIVATIVE
- REG# [redacted] BACILLUS ANTHRACIS - AMES DERIVATIVE
- REG# [redacted] BACILLUS ANTHRACIS - AMES DERIVATIVE
- REG# [redacted] BACILLUS ANTHRACIS - AMES DERIVATIVE

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[redacted] described the above listed samples Reg# [redacted] through Reg# [redacted] as Ba Ames derivatives, more specifically isolates from [redacted] was not asked to submit these samples to the FBIR.

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REG# [redacted] BACILLUS ANTHRACIS (AMES STRAIN), Investigator: [redacted] This sample [redacted] agreed to submit to the FBIR.

REG# [redacted] BACILLUS ANTHRACIS (Ames), Investigator: IVINS, [redacted] stated that this sample belonged to BRUCE IVINS and that [redacted] would need to ask for the permission of IVINS to submit the sample to the FBIR. [redacted] provided the following additional information that could not be seen on the original [redacted] print out that was previously provided to Agents. Reg# [redacted] was assigned facility registration number: [redacted] (found in the file maker pro database). The sample was listed as a liquid spore prep, [redacted] The location of the sample was listed as [redacted] in Building 1412. Reg# [redacted] was probably material that IVINS

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Investigation on 04/06/2004 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1013 Date dictated N/A

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by SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 04/06/04, Page 2

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sent to [redacted] for an aerosol challenge. [redacted] thought all of that material was consumed.

REG# [redacted] BACILLUS ANTHRACIS, AMES STRAIN, Investigator: Ivins [redacted] stated that there was not a sample associated with this registration number. The reg [redacted] represented the Ba room registration for Building [redacted] room [redacted] (aerobiology rooms). A Ba room registration allowed experiments with Ba to be conducted in the registered room.

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On April 6, 2004, [redacted] informed SA [redacted] that [redacted] was not able to locate sample designated as REG# [redacted] had contacted IVINS on April 2, 2004, to get IVINS' permission to send the sample to the FBIR. [redacted] knows that IVINS was at USAMRIID over the weekend searching for the sample in building [redacted] IVINS could not find the sample over the weekend. Sometime on April 5, 2004, or April 6, 2004, IVINS asked [redacted]

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[redacted]

Two slants of REG# [redacted] were subsequently prepared on April 6, 2004, and submitted to the FBIR on April 7, 2004. (Writer knows sample to be FBIR [redacted] and FBIR [redacted])

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04 [redacted] 2251.wpd

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 04/06/2004

On March 31, 2004, [redacted] date
of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] home
address [redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter
Street, Fort Detrick, MD, telephone [redacted] After being advised
of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview,
[redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] provided a copy of [redacted] curriculum vitae (cv) which
outlined [redacted] educational experience as follows: [redacted] received a [redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted] professional [redacted] experience, as outlined
in [redacted] cv is as follows: [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] worked as a [redacted]
[redacted] at USAMRIID; from [redacted]
[redacted] at USAMRIID; [redacted] has
[redacted] at USAMRIID since [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Although most of [redacted] work
was with [redacted]
[redacted]

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[redacted] 302.wpd

Investigation on 03/31/2004 at Fort Detrick, Maryland
1371 279A-WF-222936 [redacted] 302-1136
File # 279A-WF-222936-POI, 279A-WF-USAMRIID/1024 Date dictated N/A
by SA [redacted]



279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-WF-222936 [redacted] 279A-WF-222936-POI

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 03/31/2004, Page 2

[redacted] at USAMRIID on aerosol challenges using the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.). This was the only time that [redacted] ever conducted any studies with B.a., with the exception of [redacted] during which [redacted] has done some collaborations investigating [redacted] [redacted] but this work does not use the Ames strain. [redacted] but never handled or grew B.a. [redacted] did most of the laboratory work.

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[redacted] has never grown B.a., or any other organism, but [redacted] has worked with preparations of some organisms that have been grown by others. [redacted] has never had any direct access to B.a. [redacted] has never used modified G sporulation media, and [redacted] was not aware of any areas of USAMRIID that had problems with bacterial contamination.

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Most of [redacted] research has been conducted in [redacted] [redacted] in Building [redacted] and [redacted] advised that BRUCE IVINS used Room 109C for guinea pig anthrax studies. [redacted] has not had any research space assigned to [redacted]

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Rooms [redacted] in Building [redacted] were used by [redacted] [redacted] who conducted anthrax research with [redacted] [redacted] advised that [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] has never seen anyone piggyback through hot suites at USAMRIID. [redacted] had no knowledge of anyone at USAMRIID having an interest in forensic countermeasures. [redacted] never handled any of the FBI's evidence from the 2001 anthrax mailings at USAMRIID.

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[redacted] does not have any association with Trenton or Princeton, New Jersey [redacted]

[redacted] did not travel to New Jersey during September or October of 2001. [redacted] has never purchased any pre-stamped envelopes at a postal vending machine.

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-WF-222936- [redacted] 279A-WF-222936-POI

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 03/31/2004, Page 3

[redacted] First Name Unknown (FNU) [redacted]
[redacted] at USAMRIID [redacted]
[redacted] did not know what [redacted] looked like, and at the time [redacted] mistook [redacted]
[redacted] for [redacted] had an office near [redacted]

[redacted] office was Room [redacted] and was located [redacted]
[redacted] did not personally know [redacted]
[redacted] and never spoke with him directly. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b6
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[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-WF-222936- [redacted] 279A-WF-222936-POI

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 03/31/2004, Page 4

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[redacted]
[redacted] did not have any knowledge of [redacted]
working with anthrax or working on an anthrax project involving
rabbits.

[redacted]

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[redacted] never saw [redacted] Building [redacted]
and only saw [redacted] in Building [redacted]
saw [redacted] exit via [redacted] in Building [redacted] never saw [redacted]
[redacted] at USAMRIID [redacted] never
allowed [redacted] to piggyback into any areas with [redacted] and did not see
[redacted] remove any equipment from USAMRIID. [redacted] has seen a photo
of hoods laying around USAMRIID and has heard gossip that [redacted] had
taken one of the hoods.

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[redacted] overheard small bits of [redacted] conversations as
[redacted]

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[redacted] was asked by [redacted]
[redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-WF-222936- [redacted] 279A-WF-222936-POI

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 03/31/2004, Page 5

[redacted] had no knowledge of [redacted] relationship with the [redacted] found that

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[redacted]

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[redacted] had no knowledge of any connections that [redacted] may have had to New Jersey, nor of what [redacted] employment was after [redacted] left USAMRIID. [redacted] never attended any presentations given by [redacted] and had no other information about [redacted]

[redacted] was formerly [redacted] and took a job with [redacted] left USAMRIID. [redacted] did not know whether [redacted] was still at [redacted] and characterized [redacted] as a very straight up [redacted]

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[redacted] had no knowledge of a pulmonary anthrax sample that may have been received at USAMRIID in the early 1990s from a patient in South Africa. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] advised that [redacted] would look through [redacted] files for timeline information that would demonstrate [redacted] whereabouts during the fall of 2001, and advised that [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-WF-222936- [redacted] 279A-WF-222936-POI

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 03/31/2004, Page 6

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[redacted] agreed to submit to a polygraph examination targeting any knowledge of the fall 2001 anthrax mailings.

During late 2001, at the FBI's request, [redacted] reviewed [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] felt that the FBI would be negligent if [redacted] was not investigated [redacted] spoke with SA [redacted] about this and SA [redacted] told [redacted] that the FBI would send someone to interview [redacted] however [redacted] was never interviewed about this matter.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 12/08/2004

[redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted]
date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] was
telephonically contacted by Supervisory Special Agent [redacted]
[redacted] and Special Agent [redacted] regarding the scheduling
of a polygraph. During the course of the speakerphone
conversation, [redacted] provided the following information:

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Between [redacted] had attended a [redacted] While
there, [redacted] talked with employees from the United States Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID),
including [redacted] BRUCE IVINS, [redacted]
[redacted] advised [redacted] that an investigator had interviewed
[redacted] and had [redacted]
[redacted] SA [redacted] advised [redacted] that
[redacted] was aware of the situation [redacted] was referencing, but that there
are two sides to the story. [redacted] also advised that it is common for
investigators to [redacted]

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[redacted] also advised [redacted] of a situation that
had occurred after another USAMRIID employee had been interviewed by
the FBI. On a later date, this employee had [redacted]
[redacted] advised
[redacted] that [redacted] but
that the FBI [redacted]
[redacted] suggested that [redacted] tell the employee to contact
USAMRIID security.

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[redacted] was aware of the death of OLIVER PERRY MIKESELL,
although [redacted] IVINS that MIKESELL had [redacted]
[redacted] theorized that MIKESELL could have been
a contributor to the 2001 anthrax mailings, and thereafter drank
himself to death. [redacted] and MIKESELL [redacted] at
USAMRIID.

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Finally, [redacted] expressed some concerns about [redacted] upcoming
polygraph. [redacted] had read a National Academy of Sciences study that

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12/08/2004

Investigation on 12/08/2004 at Frederick, Maryland (telephonically)

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File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1027 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/08/2004, Page 2

found false positives and negatives were often the result of polygraphs and wondered what advantage the polygraph would serve for [redacted] told [redacted] that the polygraphers had conducted many polygraphs in this case and that there were no false positives. [redacted] reminded [redacted] that the polygraphs are not admissible in court and are being used as an investigative tool.

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[redacted] agreed to appear at the FBI offsite in Frederick, Maryland on [redacted] for a polygraph.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/20/2004

To: Washington Field

Attn: IIC [redacted]
SSA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

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
From: Washington Field

AMX-3

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH



Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) -1028

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To provide results of AMX-3 investigative project to determine potential windows of opportunity for access to post-challenge Ames from the Aerobiology Division of USAMRIID.

Enclosures: Microsoft Excel spreadsheet showing [redacted] key card access into the Building [redacted] during post-challenge windows of opportunity, [redacted] potentially pertinent post-challenge after-hours key card access records, and Building [redacted] after-hours [redacted] main entrance key card access records for individuals accessing those locations immediately before and after [redacted]

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Details: Data from aerosol challenges involving *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) for the time period August 1998 to September 1999 was analyzed to determine potential windows of opportunity for removal of post-challenge Ames during a ten-day period following each aerosol challenge. It was estimated based on spore concentrations of material used that any aerosol challenge involving greater than or equal to three animals would constitute enough available Ba to have assembled the anthrax-laced letters. All Ames challenges in the time period for which key card access records are available involved at least three animals.

In an interview of [redacted] on September 10, 2003, [redacted] indicated that, following Ba challenges, the agar plates were stored in refrigerators in Building [redacted] Room [redacted] and in a [redacted] from Building [redacted] Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] (Special Agent (SA) [redacted] believes [redacted]

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 05/20/2004

be Room [redacted]. [redacted] indicated that anyone with access to any of these areas could take a plate containing live Ba. In an interview of [redacted] on September 4, 2002, [redacted] indicated that [redacted] often observed [redacted] back in the spray area of the challenge labs when [redacted] should not have been there. [redacted] advised that [redacted] observed studies that [redacted]. The door was kept locked during aerosol challenges; however, [redacted]

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[redacted] was present [redacted] during anthrax aerosol challenges. [redacted] advised that [redacted] would often observe anthrax aerosol challenges and no one would bother [redacted] as it was a very hectic atmosphere during the experiment. It would be easy to gain access to the lab as the [redacted] in order to expedite the set-up procedure. [redacted] the aerosol challenges.

Bruce Ivins [redacted] prepared the Ba used in the aerosol experiments in Suite [redacted]. When Ivins left Room [redacted] in order to pick up the samples from Bacteriology, [redacted] Further, [redacted]

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[redacted] Ivins prepared the Ba for the nebulizer in Building 1425. He would then bring the Ba to Building 1412, Room [redacted] and transfer the samples to 50 milliliter conical tubes. The samples were then sent straight to the hood line in Room [redacted] for the aerosol challenge. After the aerosol challenges, the samples from the challenges went back to Ivins [redacted] to be diluted and streaked onto agar plates, which were left in an incubator overnight in Room [redacted]. [redacted] advised that [redacted] would not have noticed a missing sample, but perhaps Ivins would have. Any remaining labeled samples were kept [redacted] refrigerator in Room [redacted]. Other remaining tubes and plates were [redacted] incubator in Room [redacted]. On occasion, leftover Ames was stored in the [redacted]. These tubes and plates [redacted]. Once the growth on the plates in the incubator had been counted, the plates were placed in a garbage bag under one of the hoods to be autoclaved. [redacted] advised that the bags [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] advised that [redacted] most likely was aware of [redacted] was cleared to go into the hot suite, [redacted] could probably go anywhere [redacted] wanted.

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 05/20/2004

[redacted] also mentioned that if one could gain access to Room [redacted] one could then enter Room [redacted]

During [redacted] employment at USAMRIID, there were [redacted] 10-day windows of opportunity following aerosol challenges, beginning [redacted]. During the 10-day windows following each challenge in this time period, there [redacted] entered the hot suites. [redacted] (see enclosure), [redacted] aerosol challenges.

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[redacted]

[redacted] Interpretation of the lack of additional key card access records for [redacted] during these windows of opportunity must consider the use of "piggybacking" into the hot suites, which is known to have occurred routinely at USAMRIID. "Piggybacking" allows entry of more than one person into an area while only one individual's identifier is recorded.

Key card access records were also searched for any access into the hot side of Building [redacted] and [redacted] for the post-challenge windows of opportunity. [redacted] did not enter the hot suites in Building [redacted] during these times. [redacted] entered the hot suites in Building [redacted]

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[redacted]

A record of [redacted] main entrance key card access records was compiled, and individuals who entered or exited these locations shortly before or after [redacted] were noted. The elapsed time between [redacted] recorded entries or activity and other individuals' records ranges from 0 minutes to 81 minutes.

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It is important to note that key card records of access within USAMRIID were only available beginning August 1, 1998. This analysis does not include activity prior to that date.

◆◆

key card access into Bldg. 1412 hot suites during "windows of opportunity" after aerosol challenges				
[Redacted]	7:15 In	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	no out records)
	7:51 In			
	8:11 In			
	8:25 Out			
	8:29 Out			
	8:30 Out			
	8:36 In			
	8:38 Normal keypad			
	8:44 Out			
	8:52 In keypad			
	8:55 Normal keypad			
	8:56 In			
8:58 Normal keypad				
10:39 Out				
10:42 Out				

access records immediately before and after

individuals in the hot suites at the same time as

key card access records into the hot suites

[Redacted]	10:05 In	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	14:40 Out
	10:07 Normal keypad			8:27 In
	10:54 Out			8:30 Out
	8:04 In			8:30 In
	8:05 Out			8:33 Normal
	8:05 In			11:48 Out
	8:08 Normal keypad			12:52 In
	15:10 Out			12:56 Normal
	8:28 In			15:28 Out
	8:32 Normal keypad			
	14:01 Out			
	8:25 In			
	8:28 Normal keypad			
	13:40 Out			
11:53 In				
11:55 Normal keypad				

had no key card access records for this time frame at all.

potentially pertinent after-hours access records (subsequent to aerosol challenges)				
Start of Challenge	End of Challenge	Date of Access	Time of Access	Location Accessed
	10/11/1998	30-Sep	22:20-22:41	[Redacted]
			17:22-18:34	
			21:41-22:16	
			05:38-05:46	
			16:38-18:13	
			20:05-20:40	
		none		
		none		
			00:13-01:05	[Redacted]
			00:06-00:48	
			18:03-19:00	
			22:56-01:21	
			21:00	
			06:43-08:03	
			20:31-21:49	
			8:36-8:44	
		none		
suspicious access records (subsequent to aerosol challenges)				
		Date	Time	Location
			20:39-22:50	[Redacted]
			20:28	
Bldg. 1412 dock entries (before 9am/after 5pm)				
98-10 pm	Date	Time	Elapsed Time	
	was first record after 5 pm)			
[Redacted]		17:22		
		17:26	4 minutes	
		17:48		
		18:33	45 minutes	
(No one accessed this location again until 10/2/98)				
98-10 pm	Date	Time	Elapsed Time	
[Redacted]		18:11	0 min.	
		18:11		

		18:13					
		18:13	0 min.				
99-06 pm	Date	Time	Elapsed Time				
		22:56					
		23:08	14 min.				
		23:15	7 min.				
99-06 a.m.	Date	Time	Elapsed Time				
		6:38	5 min.				
		6:43					
		7:10	27 min.				
Bldg. 1412 Main Entrance (before 9am/after 5pm)							
98-09 p.m.	Date	Time	Elapsed Time	99-06 a.m.	Date	Time	Elapsed Time
		22:06				0:03	
		22:23	17 min.			0:48	45 min.
		22:39				2:03	15 min.
		22:53	14 min.				
				99-06 p.m.	Date	Time	Elapsed Time
98-10 p.m.	Date	Time	Elapsed Time			18:01	
		21:17				18:03	2 min.
		21:41	24 min.			18:07	4 min.
		22:07	26 min.			18:09	6 min.
						22:02	
		5:34				22:56	54 min.
		5:38	4 min.			22:59	
		5:46				23:11	12 min.
		6:09	23 min.				
				99-08 p.m.	Date	Time	Elapsed Time
		20:01				20:06	25 min.
		20:05	4 min.			20:28	3 min.
		20:40				20:31	
		22:01	81 min.			21:07	36 min.
	Date	Time	Elapsed Time				
		0:02					
		0:13	11 min.				

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	0:25	12 min.					
	1:05						
	2:03	58 min.					

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/14/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
social security account number [redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of
employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, MD,
telephone [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the
interviewing agents, and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided
the following information:

[redacted] earned a [redacted] degree in [redacted]
from [redacted] moved to Maryland
with [redacted] b6
[redacted] also worked at [redacted] at that time. [redacted] b7C
[redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted] current
[redacted] works with [redacted] in
[redacted]

[redacted] usually works with attenuated strains of *Bacillus anthracis (B.a.)*. [redacted] b6
[redacted] b7C
[redacted] has never b2
made any *B.a.* spore preparations [redacted] b7F
[redacted]

[redacted] did not know where [redacted] got [redacted] original sample of b6
B.a. Ames from, but advised that it was more likely from BRUCE IVINS b7C
rather than [redacted] advised that paperwork is now necessary
to transfer a select agent internally at USAMRIID. [redacted] has never
used modified G sporulation media.

[redacted] work areas include [redacted] Rooms [redacted] and [redacted] and
[redacted] Room [redacted] only has access to [redacted]
laboratories and cannot access [redacted] has never entered
[redacted] Building [redacted] as [redacted] does not have access to it.

[redacted] Piggybacking into hot suites does not take place. When
[redacted] was a new employee, [redacted] forgot [redacted] personal identification

Investigation on 06/10/2004 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

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File # 279A-WF-222936-POI, 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID Date dictated N/A

SA [redacted]
by SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-POI, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/10/2004 , Page 2

number (PIN) and [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had to obtain it from Security and would not allow [REDACTED] to piggyback into the suite.

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[REDACTED] has seen shoebox sized plastic storage containers in the hot suites, but has never seen any such containers in a larger size. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any areas of USAMRIID that had problems with bacterial contamination and advised that [REDACTED] has not spent any time in Virology Division laboratory space.

Neither [REDACTED] nor any of [REDACTED] associates have any personal or professional association with Trenton or Princeton, New Jersey (NJ) or any other area of NJ. [REDACTED] did not travel to New Jersey during September or October 2001. [REDACTED] has never purchased any pre-stamped envelopes, and [REDACTED] has never used a postal vending machine to purchase any such envelopes.

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[REDACTED] laboratory group [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] does not know [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] has never seen or met [REDACTED] has never had any involvement with the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and has never hosted any foreign visiting scientists.

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Everyone in the Bacteriology Division has expertise in spore production, and some people in the division have expertise in lyophilization. [REDACTED] has never seen anyone lyophilize material.

[REDACTED] was not aware of anyone who said they might make a select agent for use in an improper fashion. [REDACTED] did not know of anyone with access to dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media, or others. [REDACTED] did not suspect anyone of possibly being associated with the anthrax mailings of 2001.

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[REDACTED] has not worked with anyone who was lax in handling dangerous items or interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents. Individuals cannot access suites until they complete the necessary training. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] For

279A-WF-222936-POI, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 06/10/2004, Page 3

example, on one occasion [redacted] did not know of anyone at USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax without a specific need or responsibility to do so. [redacted] did not know of any work being done with B.a. that was unofficial or unrecorded.

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On 09/11/2001 [redacted] was [redacted] was at work at USAMRIID on [redacted] could not recall [redacted] activities for the period of [redacted] at that time and [redacted] may have gone to visit [redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/01/2004

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To: Washington Field


Attn: IIC



From: Washington Field

AMX 3

Contact: SA




Approved By:



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Drafted By:



Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) - 1033

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MC-184

Synopsis: To document the results and completion of the anthrax letter handling project to track each of the letters from the time of collection.

Enclosure(s): One spreadsheet for each of the four letters prepared by Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] reflecting information contained in the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) case file and the recollection of SA [redacted] who was present for much of the early activity with the letters. A floppy disk with an electronic copy of these four spreadsheets is contained in an FD-340 in the 1A section of the file.



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Details: The case files maintained at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) for each of the four anthrax letters were photocopied in their entirety, and a review of all relevant documents in Automated Case Support (ACS) was conducted in order to establish a timeline of the handling of the letters at USAMRIID. Numerous additional USAMRIID personnel who had contact with the letters were interviewed to document their work with the letters and to clarify any conflicting information. Some law enforcement personnel who were present for key events with the letters were also consulted.

The following representation is complete with respect to all information available and addresses the handling of the letters and envelopes only. The handling of the powdered material contained in each letter was not tracked as part of this project.

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 12/01/2004

DASCHLE LETTER:

10/15/2001

The letter was opened by Daschle employee [redacted]

The first overpacking was done at the Senate Hart Office Building (SHOB) by the Hazardous Devices Unit of the United States Capitol Police (USCP). The personnel present were Officers [redacted] and there may have been two other officers present. Several letters were overpacked together, as the source of the powder was initially unknown.

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FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT) personnel responded to the SHOB, and a second overpacking was done. The personnel present included SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] Investigative Specialist (IS) [redacted] and FBI JTTF member USCP Officer [redacted]

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The overpack was released to FBI JTTF member Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Officer [redacted] for transport to USAMRIID.

[redacted] released the overpack at USAMRIID to [redacted] at 2:01pm, and the samples were in-processed and photographed in Room [redacted]

[redacted] transported the letters into [redacted] Room [redacted] for photography and removal of material for analysis. FBI Microbiologist [redacted] also photographed the letter through the window in Room [redacted]

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b7F

10/16/2001

[redacted] transported the letters to Suite [redacted] to gather powder for additional analyses.

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b7F

10/18/2001

[redacted] gave a ziploc bag containing the Daschle letter and envelope to Bruce Ivins, who took the ziploc into Suite B3, Room [redacted] to perform a concentration count. [redacted] returned the ziploc bag containing the letter and envelope to [redacted]

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The letter and envelope were irradiated by [redacted] in Room [redacted]. The overpack was provided to United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) photographers by [redacted] and FBI Microbiologist [redacted] and was photographed in [redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 12/01/2004

10/26/2001

Scent was extracted from the letter and envelope by FBI Physical Science Technician (PST) [redacted] (now a Special Agent) in Room [redacted] Building [redacted] photography and preliminary questioned document analysis were done by FBI personnel in Building [redacted] Room [redacted] and preliminary DNA, fingerprint, and ink examinations were performed by FBI personnel in Building [redacted] Room [redacted]. The people present for this event were Captain [redacted] of USAMRIID, and FBI personnel [redacted]

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b7C

12/05/2001

FBI Special Projects Unit personnel [redacted] [redacted] photographed the letter and envelope through a ziploc bag.

b6
b7C

12/09/2001

The letter and envelope were heat sealed in a clear plastic bag, and released at 6:30am by [redacted] to SA [redacted] along with the Brokaw, Post, and Leahy letters. The transfer was witnessed by Captain [redacted]

b6
b7C

SA [redacted] transported the letters to FBI Headquarters and released them at 8:05am to SSA [redacted] Trace Evidence Unit.

BROKAW LETTER:

10/12/2001

The letter was picked up from the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) mail room in New York (NY) at 1:05pm and released at 5:30pm to [redacted] at the New York City Department of Health (NYCDOH) Lab by SA [redacted] and JTF members New York Police Department (NYPD) Detective [redacted] and NYPD Sergeant [redacted]

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b7C

Date Unknown

The letter was removed from the NYCDOH lab by [redacted] [redacted] of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and flown to the CDC facility in Atlanta, Georgia (GA).

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 12/01/2004

10/14/2001

At 11:35am the letter was picked up from [redacted] at the CDC in Atlanta, GA by SA [redacted] and JTTF member Detective [redacted]. The letter was transferred at 1:00pm to FBI Hazardous Material Specialist [redacted] who transported it to USAMRIID where it was held in storage in Room [redacted].

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10/24/2001

Analysis of powder material began at USAMRIID.

10/25/2001

Irradiation of the letter and envelope was done by [redacted] in Room [redacted].

10/26/2001

Scent was extracted from the letter and envelope by PST [redacted] in Room [redacted] Building 1412; photography and preliminary questioned document analysis were done by FBI personnel in Building 1412, Room [redacted] and preliminary DNA, fingerprint, and ink examinations were performed by FBI personnel in Building [redacted] Room [redacted]. The people present for this event were Captain [redacted] USAMRIID, and FBI personnel [redacted].

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12/09/2001

The letter and envelope were heat sealed in a clear plastic bag, and released at 6:30am by [redacted] to SA [redacted] with the Daschle, Post, and Leahy letters. The transfer was witnessed by [redacted].

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b7C

SA [redacted] transported the letters to FBI Headquarters and released them at 8:05am to SSA [redacted] Trace Evidence Unit.

NEW YORK POST LETTER:

10/19/2001

At 11:45pm, SA [redacted] picked up the letter at the New York Post Building and handed it to SA [redacted]. The letter was removed from the envelope and repackaged in double sealed bags. The anthrax powder was removed and placed in [redacted].

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b7F

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 12/01/2004

10/20/2001

SA [redacted] delivered the triple-bagged letter to Major [redacted] at USAMRIID at 2:00am. According to [redacted] [redacted] processed the letter in Suite [redacted] Room [redacted] Photographs of the bagged envelope and letter were taken in Room [redacted] Both the letter and envelope were then stored in Suite [redacted]

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10/23/2001

Both the NY Post envelope and letter were irradiated in Room [redacted] by [redacted] Either [redacted] arrived at Room [redacted] and handed [redacted] the letter which was double-bagged. [redacted] immediately walked it to [redacted] without making any stops. When the irradiation was completed, [redacted] took the letter out and walked it back to [redacted] without making any stops. Once in [redacted] handed the letter back to either [redacted] and did not have any further contact with the letter again. The bags in which the letter was kept were never opened at any time while under [redacted] control.

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A sterility check on both the letter and envelope was performed after irradiation exposure.

10/26/2001

Scent was extracted from the letter and envelope by PST [redacted] in Room [redacted] Building [redacted] photography and preliminary questioned document analysis were done by FBI personnel in Building [redacted] Room [redacted] and preliminary DNA, fingerprint, and ink examinations were performed by FBI personnel in Building [redacted] Room [redacted] The people present for this event were [redacted] of USAMRIID, and FBI personnel [redacted]

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Date Unknown

The New York Post letter and envelope were stored in Room [redacted]

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b7F

12/09/2001

The letter and envelope were heat sealed in a clear plastic bag, and released at 6:30am by [redacted] to SA [redacted] along with the Daschle, Brokaw, and Leahy letters. The transfer was witnessed by Captain [redacted]

b6
b7C

SA [redacted] transported the letters to FBI Headquarters and released them at 8:05am to SSA [redacted] Trace Evidence Unit.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 12/01/2004

LEAHY LETTER:

11/16/2001 or 11/17/2001 (conflicting information)

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b7C

At 4:40pm, SA [redacted] found the Leahy letter in Drum #33 at the Government Services Administration (GSA) Warehouse in Springfield, Virginia. After it was sealed in a plastic bag and photographed, the letter was placed in a metal container which was then placed inside a large plastic container and sealed.

SA [redacted] transported the container with the Leahy letter to USAMRIID, where [redacted] received it at 8:37pm. [redacted] walked the container to Room [redacted] and photographs were taken. The container was stored unopened in the top right shelf of the refrigerator in [redacted]

b6
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12/05/2001

The container with the Leahy letter was taken from [redacted] to the Suite [redacted] and then into [redacted] where it was scheduled to be opened. [redacted] opened the letter inside a glovebox in room [redacted] and transferred the powder from the letter/envelope to a vial. [redacted] was present in the room with [redacted] for technical support. [redacted] and FBI/USPIS personnel were in Room [redacted] while [redacted] worked on the Leahy letter. Photographs of the event were taken through a window in [redacted]. [redacted] left the letter and envelope inside the glovebox while he handed the vial of powder to [redacted]. [redacted] weighed the vial of powder in [redacted] triple bagged both the letter and envelope and handed it to [redacted] who gave it to [redacted] for decontamination with bleach. [redacted] placed the letter and envelope through the [redacted] passbox for [redacted] who took it to Room [redacted] for irradiation at 3:05 pm. Once irradiation was completed at 7:20 pm, [redacted] removed the letter and envelope from the irradiator and handed both to [redacted]

b6
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While still in ziploc bags, the Leahy letter and envelope were photographed by FBI Special Projects Unit [redacted]

[redacted] in room [redacted]

At 8:52 pm, [redacted] hand carried the letter and envelope from [redacted] to [redacted] for secure storage in a locked drawer.

12/06/2001

b6
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At 1:45 am, [redacted] took the Leahy letter and envelope from [redacted] to Room [redacted] for a sterility check. [redacted] swabbed the letter and envelope and then plated out the swabs. [redacted] returned the letter and envelope back to the secure drawer in [redacted] at 5:10 am.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 12/01/2004

Date Unknown

The Leahy letter and envelope were moved from [redacted] to [redacted] for storage.

b2
b7F

12/09/2001

The letter and envelope were heat sealed in a clear plastic bag, and released at 6:30am by [redacted] to SA [redacted] along with the Daschle, Post, and Brokaw letters. The transfer was witnessed by Captain [redacted]

b6
b7C

SA [redacted] transported the letters to FBI Headquarters and released them at 8:05am to SSA [redacted] Trace Evidence Unit.

At 11:00 am, FBI employee [redacted] (now a Special Agent) extracted scent from the Leahy letter and envelope at FBI Headquarters.

All four letters and envelopes were received from the FBI Laboratory on 01/16/2003 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] and have been stored in a locked safe since their receipt. The safe is currently located at the Northern Virginia Resident Agency (NVRA) in the Amerithrax squad area in the office of SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/04/2004

[redacted] was interviewed on [redacted] by Postal Inspectors [redacted] [redacted] was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview. [redacted] then provided the following information:

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[redacted] resides at [redacted] home telephone number is [redacted] Social Security number is [redacted] Date of Birth is [redacted]

[redacted] is currently [redacted] work telephone number is [redacted] coordinates [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] graduated with a [redacted] degree in [redacted]

[redacted] he received a [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).

At USAMRIID, [redacted] started as [redacted] worked on [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

Investigation on 11/03/04 at [redacted]

b6
b7C

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID -1035 Date dictated [redacted]

by PI [redacted]
PI [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 11/03/04, Page 2 b6 b7C

[redacted]

While [redacted] worked at all Bio-safety levels, including Bio-safety level 3 and 4 laboratories. In Building [redacted] worked in [redacted] and possibly [redacted] or both. In Building [redacted] worked in [redacted] had access to *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) seed stocks. [redacted] said the seed stocks were kept under lock and key in low temperature freezers in Bio-safety level 3 laboratories. [redacted] named room [redacted] as a specific location where [redacted] obtained Ba. [redacted] also had access to the walk in cooler in Room [redacted] said [redacted] took what [redacted] needed. [redacted] stated that everyone with Bio-safety level 3 access also had access to the walk in coolers. [redacted] stated [redacted] believed there was another walk in cooler in [redacted] but [redacted] never accessed it. [redacted] explained that Ba [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] did not recall the exact strains of Ba [redacted] worked with, but because [redacted] worked with many strains, it's possible they included Ames and Stern.

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b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b2
b7F

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 11/03/04, Page 3

[redacted] BRUCE IVINS [redacted] never worked with [redacted] on Ba. [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C

When asked about Anthrax weaponization, [redacted] stated [redacted] was the recognized expert, [redacted] named [redacted] as others who may have knowledge of weaponization, but perhaps no actual experience. [redacted] stated there was a difference between people with knowledge of weaponization, and those with actual experience.

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[redacted] said that theoretically, [redacted] knows something about weaponization though [redacted] has no experience in it. [redacted] said Ba seed stock of sufficient lethality could be grown in quantity with a growth media, such as sheep's blood agar or broth. The Ba could be purified [redacted] then mixed with [redacted] in [redacted] and dried with [redacted] leaving the dried Ba. [redacted] described [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
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b7F

[redacted] stated [redacted] has never worked with dried Ba. [redacted] stated [redacted] never saw [redacted] a Spray Dryer at USAMRIID. [redacted] added that if Ba was mixed with a mixing agent [redacted] might be present in the Ba.

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[redacted] stated [redacted] had no knowledge of any specific incidents of bacterial contamination at USAMRIID, including the Virology Suites.

With reference to piggy-backing, [redacted] believes the employees at USAMRIID are cognizant of the importance of security and do not engage in piggy-backing into Hot Suites. When [redacted]
[redacted]

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When asked if anyone could have removed a dangerous organism from USAMRIID, [redacted] stated it could have been done by transferring it through an Ultra-violet Cabinet, from the hot side to the cold side. [redacted] knew of one incident where an organism was taken out of USAMRIID. In 1999, an employee [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 11/03/04, Page 4

_____ removed a Bio-safety level 2 organism from USAMRIID and took it to _____ offsite where there was no equipment to incinerate or autoclave those materials. _____ was not sure who removed the organism. _____ only recollection was an employee _____ named _____ had knowledge of the incident, but wasn't sure if _____ was the employee who took the organism. _____ wasn't sure which organism was taken, but said it was either E coli or some equivalent organism, that while not lethal, would cause sickness. _____ aware of this incident and said _____ also was aware of it. _____ was not sure of the outcome of the incident.

b6
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When asked if _____ knew _____ stated _____ remembers seeing _____ in the hallway of Building _____ in the _____ at USAMRIID. _____ saw _____ in a common area; a corridor, not a laboratory. _____ USAMRIID _____ never worked or conversed with _____ knew nothing about _____ social habits, never saw _____ conversing with others, never saw _____ access any dangerous materials and didn't know exactly where _____ worked. _____ recalled that _____ may have information about _____

b6
b7c

When questioned whether _____ made any visits or had contacts in New Jersey, _____ has never been to New Jersey.

_____ was shown a photocopy of a 34-cent Federal Eagle Stamped Envelope. _____ stated _____ has never purchased or used any, and never saw them used at USAMRIID. With reference to Sterilite boxes, _____ said _____ seen small ones used at USAMRIID, but no large ones.

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When asked _____ handled any of the September or October 2001 Anthrax letters, _____ said no. _____


_____ stated this happened in Rooms _____ Following the Anthrax letter attacks, _____ tested other "suspicious powder" letters and packages received by USAMRIID. These were all determined to be hoaxes.

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_____ never hosted any Foreign Visiting Scientists at USAMRIID. _____ not a member of the Aero-medical isolation team (AIT), _____ At

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 11/03/04, Page 5



b6
b7C

_____ was asked _____ had any involvement in the preparation or the mailing of the September and October 2001 Anthrax letters. _____ said _____ had no involvement. When asked to take a voluntary polygraph examination relative to the preparation and the mailing of the Anthrax letters, _____ agreed to do so.

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b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/12/2004

On November 4, 2004, [redacted] born [redacted] with Social Security Account Number [redacted] was interviewed at the Radisson Hotel in [redacted] by Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs) [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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(11/24/07)

[redacted] advised that [redacted] did not participate in any aerosol vaccine challenges with Ames strain *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) in building [redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted] conducted some monkey challenges that [redacted] was aware of, and [redacted] did help [redacted] in building [redacted]. [redacted] did not work in [redacted] very much and did not know much about [redacted] activity in the building either. [redacted] did accompany [redacted] on one occasion in [redacted] when [redacted] but [redacted] could not recall the specific room even when looking at a schematic of the building.

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b7C

[redacted] knew of no other means to get into the hot side of building [redacted] other than through the usual change room entrances. [redacted] advised that it [redacted] normal habit to work [redacted] often saw [redacted] car parked near the main entrance of the building during similar times. [redacted] did not recall seeing [redacted] building [redacted].

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[redacted] was the first person to take [redacted] into a [redacted]. They went into suite [redacted] sometime between [redacted]. Most of [redacted] work while at USAMRIID occurred in [redacted] laboratory in [redacted]. [redacted] could not recall seeing [redacted] in suites [redacted] or in [redacted]. [redacted] also could not recall whether [redacted] inter-connected to one another during that time frame. On one occasion in [redacted] was escorted into [redacted] of [redacted].

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b7C

For a short period of time after the research in [redacted] began, [redacted] had to be escorted into [redacted] because [redacted] unescorted access into [redacted] had not yet been granted. [redacted] was working on [redacted] with the other researchers in [redacted]. [redacted] did not think [redacted] ever went in the walk-in cooler of this lab. [redacted] could not recall any Ba work that was occurring

Investigation on 11/04/2004 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1039
by SSA [redacted]
SSA [redacted]

Date dictated
b6
b7C

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 11/04/2004, Page 2

there at the time and was not aware of any specific samples of Ba. _____ did participate in _____ research in _____ but _____ concentrated more on _____ since this was _____

b6
b7C

During _____ time at USAMRIID, _____ does not recall ever using a lyophilizer and does not know whether _____ ever used one. _____ could not recall a lyophilizer that may have been left in the hallway of _____ did not work with _____ but was aware that _____

_____ advised that _____ had an unusual disposition regarding the Amerithrax case. While considering _____ a good friend, _____ felt _____ statements about the case generated suspicion. _____ was adamant about stating that _____ was not involved in the case and routinely speculated about why the mailings were done. _____ stated that someone may have _____ statements struck _____ as odd. _____ did not have any access to Ba at USAMRIID to _____ knowledge. _____ specialty was _____ is now at _____ was not familiar with _____ Bruce Ivins.

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b7C

_____ could provide no recollection as to why _____ ever signed into _____ of USAMRIID. _____ had no knowledge of USAMRIID receiving classified samples, of _____ receiving samples or of a pulmonary anthrax sample from South Africa. _____ also had no knowledge of _____ receiving laboratory equipment from Aberdeen. _____ did not

b6
b7C

_____ did not have any contacts in the Northeast United States to include New Jersey on or around the time of the anthrax-laced letter mailings. _____

b6
b7C

_____ advised that _____ while working at USAMRIID. While using an _____

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 11/04/2004, Page 3

[redacted]

b6
b7C

The period of September and October of 2001 [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] met [redacted] in USAMRIID

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

b6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 11/04/2004, Page 6

[redacted]

In previous interviews, [redacted] commented that [redacted] would have mailed the anthrax-laced letters in 2001 to make a point. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 11/04/2004, Page 7

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] does not know what other USAMRIID employees used suite [redacted] at the time [redacted] showed [redacted] the suite.

[redacted] conducted some research which involved [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] does not really know the "ins and outs" of Building 1412 of USAMRIID. [redacted] impression was that there were areas of the building which were not used on a regular basis and which could have been used without drawing attention. [redacted]

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 11/04/2004, Page 8

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

_____ also worked in the clinical laboratory _____

_____ conducted _____

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b7C

_____ never saw _____

_____ agreed to take a polygraph relating to _____ potential in the mailings of anthrax-laced letters from 2001.

_____ also agreed to send agents original cancelled checks and bank records _____ had located to help establish _____ whereabouts and activities around the time of the mailings. _____ was very cooperative and agreed to help in any way _____ could.

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/02/2004

[redacted] DOB [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] After [redacted] was advised of the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information.

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[redacted] worked in [redacted] at the USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, Maryland, between [redacted] [redacted] supervisor was [redacted] who was in charge of [redacted] The primary function of [redacted] and a secondary function was to conduct [redacted] including [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] worked primarily with [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] never heard of modified G sporulation media. [redacted] dealt with [redacted] [redacted] never used culture techniques since [redacted] lab never grew the cultures.

b6
b7C

As a general rule, [redacted] believes all strains are fully characterized. Whenever [redacted] needed to work on any particular strain, [redacted] would have acquired the strain from another department which was headed by Bruce Ivins. [redacted] does not recall a person named [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] knows no one who had expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production, or lyophilizing. [redacted] can only assume that personnel in Bruce Ivins' department may have been more familiar with these methods.

b6
b7C

[redacted] recalls reading about a possible bacterial contamination at the USAMRIID in the newspapers. [redacted] believes the newspaper may have been USA News.

Investigation on 12/01/2004 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936 - 6618 Date dictated 12/01/2004

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b7C

by [redacted] \USAMRIID 1044

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/01/2004, Page 2

[redacted] identified the areas of the USAMRIID in which [redacted] had access. Rooms [redacted] were routinely used by [redacted] On certain occasions and for specific projects, [redacted] were accessed. In October 2001, shortly after the mailing of anthrax letters [redacted] the USAMRIID. [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] never used Facility No. 1412 at any time; therefore, [redacted] had no occasion to use the walk-in cooler, Room [redacted] did not know what may have been inside the cooler. While employed at USAMRIID, [redacted] had heard rumors that only a select few people in the entire institution had access to the cooler and that there was a camera installed near the cooler to monitor all activities.

b6
b7C

There was much "piggy-backing" going on in entering and exiting the facility. When an employee opened the door, others entered the facility without entering their individually assigned personal codes. [redacted] was unaware of any visiting scientists being taken into the hot areas by USAMRIID researchers; however, employees used the piggy-backing method to enter and exit the "hot" areas. [redacted] understood hot areas to be any area which was actively being utilized for research purposes and not areas which were already decontaminated and "dark."

b6
b7C

When asked how someone might covertly remove select agents from the facility, [redacted] replied there were several ways. The first was to use the "dunk-tank," which was filled with bleached water. An employee could properly seal up an item and dunk the item into the water for decontamination. The same employee can then exit the facility and retrieve the item from the other side of the tank, especially during after-hours when no others were present. The second method was to use the "pass box," a compartment built into the wall with UV lights. An employee can easily turn off the UV lights by turning off a switch from the inner walls of the facility. An employee can pass an item through the box from the inner walls and retrieve the item from the outer walls. The third method was for an employee to simply take a vial or a small container and hold it his or her hands while taking a shower. If there were no others in the facility, this method can be used easily. The last method was to simply walk out of the

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/01/2004, Page 3

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b7C

[redacted] facility. [redacted] agreed that employees were rarely challenged. The only time someone was challenged was if people with no reason or access wandered around. Many employees probably disregarded some of the safety procedures in place at the facility.

[redacted] was unaware of anyone who may have taken any select agents for use for improper fashion.

b6
b7C

[redacted] knew of no one with the access and the ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitude toward any political organization, the media, or others.

[redacted] could think of no one who would possibly mail anthrax letters.

[redacted] could think of no one who was lax in handling dangerous items.

b6
b7C

[redacted] was unaware of anyone in the USAMRIID who was rumored to be interested in gaining access or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so.

[redacted] has no idea how someone would prepare dried BA and send it through the mail without placing himself/herself through grave danger. Unless someone is an expert in growing, separating, and properly handling the BA, [redacted] could not imagine someone risking his/her life to mail such dangerous material.

b6
b7C

[redacted] knows of no one who may have been interested in being able to get around forensic techniques.

[redacted]

[redacted] did not travel to NJ in September or October 2001 timeframe. [redacted] did not recall specifically where [redacted] may have been in September; however, [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/01/2004, Page 4

[redacted]

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[redacted] does not recall any smell of bacterial decontamination agents in [redacted]

[redacted] did not use any plastic storage containers, such as sterilite boxes, for storage of materials at USAMRIID.

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[redacted] was not aware of any work being conducted with BA or its simulants which was unofficial or not recorded.

All of [redacted] work was recorded in a notebook which was maintained in [redacted] office, [redacted]

[redacted] never used a pre-stamped envelope (as supplied by FBI-WFO) to mail anything.

[redacted] never used any of the vending machines at USAMRIID to purchase pre-stamped envelopes.

[redacted] never personally handled any of the anthrax-laced letters or envelopes. [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/10/2004

[redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted]
social security number [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
work address [redacted]

[redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was interviewed
at the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) offsite location in
Frederick, Maryland. The purpose of the interview was to clarify
information from previous interviews and to obtain new information.
After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and
the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

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[redacted] clarified [redacted] previous employment by advising
that [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] had never visited the Swedish
Institute for Infectious Disease Control, nor had [redacted] ever attended
the Chemical and Biological Defense Conference in Stockholm,
Sweden. [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] acknowledged that [redacted] was well acquainted with
[redacted]. However, [redacted] never visited [redacted]
[redacted] where [redacted] resides. [redacted] contact with
[redacted] was limited to meetings.

[redacted] was familiar with the name [redacted]
but had never met this individual.

[redacted] advised that [redacted]
[redacted]

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Investigation on 12/10/2004 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 104p

Date dictated N/A

by SSA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 12/10/2004, Page 2

United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)

[Redacted]

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Referencing [Redacted] statements in [Redacted] discussion with the interviewing agents, [Redacted] further stated that [Redacted] BRUCE IVINS, a USAMRIID researcher, had discussed the possible identity of the mailer of the 2001 anthrax-laced letters. IVINS wondered how someone could live with himself or herself after this act. That statement prompted [Redacted] to recall OLIVER PERRY MIKESELL, who had died of alcoholism after the mailings. Moreover, MIKESELL had worked with a powdered agent at Battelle. [Redacted] did not recall MIKESELL's state of mind upon leaving USAMRIID, [Redacted]

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[Redacted] advised that inserting plasmids into DNA to cause virulence was not too difficult. [Redacted] believed any Principal Investigator in USAMRIID's Bacteriology section could accomplish this. However, it was more likely that someone would take material in which the correct plasmids already existed instead of taking material which required extra work.

[Redacted] did not think the powdered material inside small glass tubes labeled as Ba from South Africa, found during a July 2004 inventory at USAMRIID by the FBI, had been produced at USAMRIID. [Redacted] had never lyophilized *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba). [Redacted] was not sure who else may have used a lyophilizer at USAMRIID.

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[Redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/10/2004, Page 3

[redacted]

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[redacted] there were several old Ba samples which had been produced by "old-timers" who no longer worked at USAMRIID and therefore could not provide any further information on them. [redacted] and others tried to identify these samples through various forms of literature. [redacted] was not aware of any strain typing of this powdered material, although back then the sequencing technology that allows researchers to discern these differences was not available.

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[redacted]

[redacted] never sent a hoax letter to anyone in an attempt to raise biodefense program funding awareness, nor did [redacted] know anyone who did. [redacted] stated that this would be a crime.

Since [redacted] last interview, [redacted] has not recalled any potential pertinent information [redacted] has not already provided to investigators.

[redacted] provided [redacted] business card to each of the interviewing agents. [redacted] also allowed the interviewing agents to make copy of a typed two-sided sheet from [redacted] wallet. One side listed various important dates in [redacted] life, including [redacted] education and family information, as well as employment information. The other side listed identifying and contact information regarding [redacted] immediate family, as well as [redacted] parents and siblings. The business card and photocopy of the page from [redacted] wallet are maintained in the 1A section of the file.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 12/14/2004

On December 13, 2004, United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) [redacted]
telephone number [redacted] provided Special Agent [redacted]
[redacted] with an updated printout listing any and all laboratory
notebooks assigned to the following researchers at USAMRIID:

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[redacted]
[redacted] BRUCE IVINS,
[redacted] OLIVER MIKESSELL,
[redacted]

In addition,
the document displayed the notebook number, the location of the
notebook, and miscellaneous comments, if applicable.

Attached hereto and considered a part of this document is
a copy of the above-mentioned document.

Investigation on [redacted] at Frederick, Maryland

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File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1019 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

	A	B	C	D	E
1	CODE				
2					
3	** = laboratory technician; not always assigned individual notebook				
4	NA = no record of notebook assigned to researcher				
5					
6	active = notebook held by researcher				
7	destroyed = notebook sent to Records Mgt office and destroyed ca 1988				
8	inactive = notebook held in library				
9	inactive/storage = notebook held by library, stored in warehouse				
10	transferred = notebook ownership transferred to another researcher				
11	unused = notebook returned unused; reissued under same number to another researcher				
12					
13					
14	NAME	NTBK #	STATUS	COMMENTS	
15					
16		NA			
17					
18			active		
19	starts 2002		active		
20			active		
21			active		
22				transferred to	
23				transferred to	
24				transferred to	
25			inactive		
26			unused	reissued to	
27			active		
28					
29			inactive/storage		
30			inactive/storage		
31			inactive/storage		
32			inactive/storage		
33			inactive/storage		
34			inactive/storage		
35			inactive/storage		
36			inactive/storage		
37			inactive/storage		
38			inactive/storage		
39			inactive/storage		
40			inactive/storage		
41			inactive/storage		
42			inactive/storage		
43			inactive/storage		
44			active		
45			active		
46			active		
47			active		
48			active		
49			active		
50			inactive		
51			active		

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	A	B	C	D	E
52			active		
53			active		
54			active		
55			active		
56			inactive		
57			active		
58			active		
59			active		
60			active		
61			active		
62			active		
63			inactive		
64			active		
65					
66			inactive/storage		
67			inactive/storage		
68			inactive/storage		
69			inactive		
70				transferred to	
71			inactive		
72			inactive		
73				transferred to	
74			inactive		
75				transferred to	
76		✓	inactive		
77		✓	inactive		
78		✓	inactive		
79				transferred to	
80		✓	inactive		
81				transferred to	
82		✓	inactive		
83				transferred to	
84		✓	inactive	<i>transferred to</i>	
85			inactive		
86				transferred to	
87				transferred to	
88				transferred to	
89				transferred to	
90				transferred to	
91			inactive		
92			inactive		
93			unused	reissued to	
94				transferred to	et al.
95				transferred to	et al.
96					
97		✓	active	assigned to Ivins	
98					
99			active		
100			active		
101		✓	inactive		
102		✓	inactive		

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	A	B	C	D	E
103		✓	inactive		
104		✓	inactive		
105			active		
106		✓	inactive		
107		✓	inactive		
108			active		
109			active		
110			active		
111			active		
112			active		
113			active		
114			active		
115			active		
116			active		
117			active		
118			active		
119			active		
120			active		
121			active		
122			active		
123			active		
124			active		
125			active		
126			active		
127			active		
128			active		
129					
130		NA			
131					
132		NA			
133					
134		NA			
135					
136		NA			
137					
138	Ivins, B.	n/a	destroyed		
139		n/a	destroyed		
140		n/a	destroyed		
141		✓	inactive/storage		
142		✓	active		
143		✓	inactive/storage		
144		✓	inactive/storage		
145		✓	active		
146		✓	active		
147		✓	inactive/storage		
148		✓	active		
149		✓	inactive/storage		
150		✓	active		
151		✓	active		
152		✓	active		
153		✓	active		

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	A	B	C	D	E
154		✓	active		
155			active		
156		✓	active		
157		✓	active		
158		✓	unused	reissued to	
159		✓	active		
160		✓	active		
161		✓	active		
162		✓	active		
163		✓	active		
164		✓	active		
165		✓	active		
166		✓	active		
167		✓	active		
168		✓	active		
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172		✓	active		
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177		✓	active		
178		✓	active		
179		✓	active		
180		✓ 4010	active		
181		✓	active		
182		✓	active		
183		✓	active		
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185		✓	active		
186		✓	active		
187		✓	active		
188		✓	active		
189		✓	active		
190		✓	active		
191		✓	active		
192					
193		✓	inactive		
194		✓	inactive		
195		✓	inactive		
196		✓	inactive		
197		✓	inactive		
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199		✓	inactive		
200		✓	inactive		
201		✓	inactive		
202		✓	inactive		
203		✓	inactive		
204		✓	inactive		

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	A	B	C	D	E
205		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
206		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
207		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
208		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
209		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
210		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
211		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
212		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
213		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
214		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
215		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
216		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
217			[redacted]		
218	[redacted]	✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
219		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
220		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
221		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
222		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
223		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
224		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
225		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
226		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
227			[redacted]		
228	[redacted]	✓	[redacted]		assigned to Ivins
229			[redacted]		
230	Mikesell, O.	n/a	[redacted]	destroyed	
231		n/a	[redacted]	destroyed	
232		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
233		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
234		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
235		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
236		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
237		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
238		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
239		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
240		✓	[redacted]	inactive/storage	
241		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
242		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
243		✓	[redacted]	inactive	
244		✓	[redacted]		transferred to Ivins
245		✓	[redacted]		transferred to Ivins
246		✓	[redacted]		transferred to Ivins
247		✓	[redacted]		transferred to Ivins
248			[redacted]		
249	[redacted]		[redacted]	inactive	
250			[redacted]	inactive	
251			[redacted]		
252	[redacted]		[redacted]	inactive	
253			[redacted]	inactive/storage	
254			[redacted]	inactive/storage	
255			[redacted]	inactive/storage	

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	A	B	C	D	E
256			inactive		
257			inactive		
258			inactive		
259			inactive		
260			inactive		
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262			inactive		
263			inactive		
264			inactive		
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267			inactive		
268			inactive		
269			inactive		
270			inactive		
271			inactive		
272			inactive		
273			inactive		
274			inactive		
275			inactive		
276			inactive		
277			inactive		
278			inactive		
279			active		
280			active		
281			active		
282			active		
283			active		
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289			active		
290			active		
291			active		
292			active		
293			active		
294			active		
295			active		
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297			active		
298			active		
299			active		
300			active		
301			active		
302			active		
303			active		
304			active		
305			active		
306			active		

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	A	B	C	D	E
307			active		
308			active		
309			active		
310			active		
311					
312			active		
313			active		
314			active		
315				transferred to Mikesell et al.	
316			active		
317			active		
318			active		
319			active		
320			active		
321			active		
322			active		
323			active		
324			active		
325			active		
326			active		
327			active		
328			active		
329			active		
330			active		
331			active		

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[Redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/16/2004

To: Washington Field

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

From: Washington Field

AMX 1

Contact: [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

(Rx) b6
b7C
[redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) - 1052

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To provide a summary of the investigative efforts into the water purification systems in USAMRIID and resulting water collection.

Details: In 2004, the Amerithrax investigation looked into the U.S. Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases' (USAMRIID's) water sources and the filtration systems used by both Buildings 1425 and 1412. Interviews of Principle Investigators, technicians, and Facilities Management personnel were conducted to determine the different purification methods in each building, and the types of water used for Bacillus anthracis (B.a.) studies.

On 2/25/2004, [redacted] stated that the water used to make media and reagents in the [redacted] suites of Building [redacted] came from a large filtration system in suite [redacted]. This system was later confirmed to be a Millipore filtration system. For washing and storage of B.a., [redacted] utilized bottles of sterile water for injection purchased from B. Braun (product number S9200-SS). SA [redacted] is in the process of obtaining the same bottles of sterile water through CBSU. Bruce Ivins learned from [redacted] that distilled deionized Milli-Q water is used for his Ames spore preparations.


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[redacted] stated in a 3/2/2004 interview that a deionized water filtration system is housed in the penthouse of Building [redacted]. This deionized water is further purified through a Millipore system prior to use. All the laboratories in Building [redacted] have access to this water

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Back Of Page

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 11/16/2004

system. The Cell Culture Group collects the penthouse water in large carboys (on an as needed basis), and utilizes the water for solid and liquid media preparations.

[redacted] stated that water purchased from Baxter International Incorporated was used for aerosol challenges and post-challenge plate dilutions during the 2001 timeframe. This water was pyrogen-free and contained no endotoxins. The aerosol challenge area gets deionized water from Building 1412's distribution system, with Millipore filtration units attached to several faucets for further purification.

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According to [redacted], the Cell Culture Group provided the sterilized water used in the aerosol challenges. Bruce Ivins would sometimes provide the sterile water, which was purchased from a commercial source and stored in Suite [redacted] in Building 1425. Purchased water was used, specifically, in the all glass impingers (AGI) in aerosol challenges.

[redacted], [redacted], [redacted] provided information on the source of water for USAMRIID. Fort Detrick operates its own water treatment plant which purifies raw water from the Monocacy River. The treatment plant which utilizes sand filtration, has not changed its method of treatment except for the discontinuation of adding fluoride starting in approximately 1996. [redacted] also provided annual reports of regulated contaminant monitoring results from 1996 to 2003.

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[redacted] of USAMRIID's [redacted] team stated that Building 1412 and 1425 have independent water purification systems. Building 1412 utilizes steam to distill water, and Building 1425 utilizes reverse osmosis (RO). Neither building has had upgrades to the systems since its inception. (Since the [redacted] interview, upgrades to the purification systems have been implemented in both Building 1412 and 1425.)

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Each laboratory has its own separate filtration units to provide an extra layer of purification. Many of these units are Millipore, Aqua Solutions, or Biocel brands. There are different models of each brand, but they all function similarly by running the water through several layers of filters. [redacted] provided a list of all the water filtrations units currently in the USAMRIID laboratories, and [redacted] provided the locations of each one.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 11/16/2004

In October 2004, Special Agents [redacted] collected water samples from various water filtration units in Building 1425. Below is a table highlighting the filter type and location of each sampling.

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Sample	Room Collected From	Filter Type
1	Tissue Culture Group	Tap Water
2	Tissue Culture Group	Penthouse Millipore System
3	Room [redacted]	Milli-Q Plus
4	Room [redacted]	Aqua Solutions
5	Room [redacted]	Solutions 2000
6	Room [redacted]	Biocel A10
7	Suite [redacted]	Milli-Pore
8	Suite [redacted]	Aqua Solutions

Building 1412 suffered a water system failure which required shutdown and replacement of the water filtration system in late October 2004. Because of this, water samples were not collected from most of Building 1412. However, in 2003, SA [redacted] acquired water samples from [redacted] laboratory. SA [redacted] took a water sample from the 2000 Solution Water Purification System in Room [redacted] of Building 1412 on May 1, 2003. The sample was later irradiated at USAMRIID. On August 7, 2003, SA [redacted] obtained three samples from the same source in Room [redacted]. Two of those samples were autoclaved at USAMRIID and the other was irradiated.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 12/07/2004

To: Washington Field

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

From: Washington Field

DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

AMX 1

Contact: [redacted]

[redacted]

(P)
[redacted]

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Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending)-1062

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To summarize information collected for media recipes project.

Details: On December 7, 2004, SA [redacted] completed the compilation of media recipes from the U.S. Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). The recipes were collected from various researchers' notebooks as well as from the Cell Culture Group.

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The notebooks reviewed were from the following former and current USAMRIID researchers:

Bruce Ivins

[redacted]

Perry Mikesell

[redacted]

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[redacted] was interviewed on several occasions to provide information on the types of media which [redacted] group prepare for USAMRIID researchers. [redacted] provided Agents with media recipe cards, as well as the actual [redacted] growth media bottles to obtain the ingredients.

[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 12/07/2004

The media recipes have been compiled in a three-ring binder along with FD302s of interviews.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 01/13/2005

[redacted] Date of Birth: [redacted] Social
Security Number: [redacted]

[redacted] home
telephone number [redacted] cell phone [redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted]

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After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided
the following information:

[redacted] received [redacted] and [redacted] Degrees
from [redacted] was awarded [redacted]

[redacted] from [redacted] spent [redacted]
[redacted] at United States Army Medical Research Institute
of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) conducting [redacted] research.

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While working at USAMRIID, [redacted] also worked on [redacted]
[redacted] worked [redacted] at USAMRIID
[redacted] began to
work for [redacted] as part of [redacted]

During [redacted] career at USAMRIID, [redacted] was [redacted]
[redacted] work was at [redacted]
and [redacted] worked specifically anthrax. [redacted] worked with [redacted]

[redacted] also worked with the Ames
strain on one of [redacted] projects.

During, [redacted] entire career at USAMRIID, [redacted] using
[redacted] Towards the end of [redacted] career, [redacted]
began to [redacted] project was [redacted]
different strains. While working with the Ames strain in [redacted]

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[redacted] does not recall growing the Ames strain, but
does recall that during one study Dr. BRUCE IVINS grew the strain
into spores and gave them to [redacted] cannot
recall which strains Dr. IVINS provided [redacted] for [redacted] other research
projects. During the Gulf War, [redacted]
challenges that IVINS [redacted] were conducting. [redacted]

[redacted] USAMRIID, [redacted] gave [redacted] laboratory notebooks to [redacted]

INTERVIEW W/D [redacted]

Investigation on 1/13/2005 at Frederick, Maryland

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File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1065 Date dictated 1/13/2005

by [redacted] U.S. Postal Inspector [redacted]
[redacted] U.S. Postal Inspector

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 1/13/2005, Page 2

[redacted] has worked with [redacted] IVINS, [redacted] USAMRIID. In addition, [redacted]

[redacted]

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Prior to [redacted] USAMRIID, [redacted] was part of a group that [redacted] was not in building [redacted] in the last two years [redacted] however [redacted] still had full access to [redacted] In addition, [redacted] had access to building [redacted] but never worked in the building. The last time [redacted] worked in a lab was in 1992. During [redacted] years at USAMRIID, the anthrax strains were kept in a freezer in [redacted] [redacted] without any internal controls. Everyone who had access to [redacted] also had access to the freezer. While [redacted] was there [redacted] did not observe any "piggy-backing", furthermore [redacted] did not see a lot of traffic in [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] has never met [redacted] Furthermore, [redacted] has not heard anything about [redacted] trying to [redacted]

[redacted] knows and has spoken to [redacted] in the past. During their conversations, [redacted] In 1996, [redacted] believes that [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] does not have the expertise like [redacted] does to weaponize anthrax, but has read some material. Drying anthrax can be done at home, but is very dangerous. Someone would have to [redacted]

First you would have to determine the purity of the culture by selecting an organism and then testing it. Drying the organism you can use dryers or lyophilizers. [redacted] is not familiar with the Modified G Spore medium.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 1/13/2005, Page 3

[redacted] has never used a lyophilizer while working at USAMRIID. The only time that [redacted] used a lyophilizer was during his college years. A virologist would use a lyophilizer to protect the proteins of the virus.

b6
b7c

[redacted] did not travel to New Jersey during the mailings. [redacted] On September 11, 2001, [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/06/2005

To: Washington Field

Amerithrax Task Force

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Attn: IIC [redacted]
SSA
SSA
SSA

Laboratory

Chemical Biological Sciences Unit

Attn: [redacted]

From: Washington Field

Amerithrax-2

Contact: SA [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID (Pending) - 1067

Title: AMERITHRAX
Major Case 184

Synopsis: To communicate receipt of information from [redacted]
[redacted] reporting [redacted]

[redacted]

Enclosure(s): [redacted] document is attached and made a part of
this record.

Details: [redacted]

[redacted]

In the report, [redacted]

[redacted]

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173
[redacted]

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b7C

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

file: [redacted] 00602.wpd
[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 01/06/2005

[Redacted]

b7E

[Redacted]

RMR 1029 is a spore preparation acquired from Dr. Bruce E. Ivins, Bacteriology Division, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. The spore preparation has been reported on numerous occasions by Dr. Ivins as having [Redacted]

[Redacted] of suspension. Fourteen (14) days after removing RMR 1029 from USAMRIID to the Naval Medical Research Center (NMRC), [Redacted] taken from [Redacted] solution of RMR 1029 were returned to Dr. Ivins. Within this time, a spore viability count of the RMR 1029 material by [Redacted] at NMRC determined the viability to be [Redacted]. Subsequent to receiving the RMR 1029 material, Dr. Ivins, independent and unaware of NMRC's results, performed a viability count and found it to be [Redacted]

b6
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b7F

A direct count was performed by [Redacted] and Special Agent [Redacted] on the serial dilutions used to determine the spore viability. [Redacted] and [Redacted] found there to be [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7F

What is not known, is the typical range of viabilities for *Bacillus anthracis* Ames strain spore preparations. This can be addressed in part using spores prepared by [Redacted] of the [Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted] has prepared at least [Redacted] spore preparations of the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*, using different media. Some insight can be gained into the range of viabilities across different media upon comparing the spore viability against total spore counts for each of these preparations.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID,01/06/2005

In addition, *Bacillus anthracis* Ames spores prepared by

b6
b7C

[redacted]
[redacted] can be used to determine percent spore viabilities of spore paste, slurries, and dried materials; thereby, determining if there are changes in viability numbers throughout the manipulation of the spore material.

Spore preparations acquired during AMERITHRAX searches may also prove useful in determining ranges in viabilities for spores prepared by different investigators, protocols and media.

[redacted]
b6
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Since the percent viability for a spore preparation can not be altered simply by dilution, sub-samples removed from a preparation and maintained under similar conditions as the master stock, should not vary in their percent viability. If the percent viability of sub-samples, derived from [redacted] that have been maintained under similar conditions [redacted] [redacted], are found to have viabilities comparable to [redacted] it is safe to assume that the percent viability was always low.

Assuming the percent viability was always low, in conjunction with the concentration dropping from [redacted] to [redacted], [redacted]
[redacted]

b7F

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 01/06/2005

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

LABORATORY

AT QUANTICO, VA

Obtain and peer review the protocol for determining the percent spore viability as used for RMR 1029 by [REDACTED]

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b7C

Set Lead 2: (Action)

LABORATORY

AT QUANTICO, VA

[REDACTED]
determine the percent spore viability for each preparation of *Bacillus anthracis* Ames spores prepared for the FBI by [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Set Lead 3: (Action)

LABORATORY

AT QUANTICO, VA

Using the protocol acquired from **Lead 1** above, determine the percent spore viability for each sub-sample of RMR 1029 obtained during AMERITHRAX searches.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/28/2005

[redacted] Social Security Account Number (SSAN):
[redacted] work office #: [redacted] work address: 1425 Porter Street,
United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID), work telephone #: [redacted] was
interviewed on the morning of [redacted] as pre-arranged at
[redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of
the Special Agents (SAs) and the nature of the interview [redacted]
provided the following information:

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised [redacted] has consistently maintained a Secret
security clearance at USAMRIID since circa [redacted]
further advised, prior to [redacted] did not have a
security clearance at USAMRIID.

[redacted] advised [redacted] address: [redacted]
[redacted] employee, [redacted]
visited USAMRIID [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised [redacted] not have access to *Bacillus anthracis*
(Ba) at USAMRIID on [redacted] further advised [redacted]
not have access to any other Select Agent at USAMRIID on [redacted]

(1-2)

[redacted] resided in [redacted]
[redacted] further advised circa [redacted]
stated [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised [redacted] old laboratory worked with [redacted] circa
[redacted] time frame, however, [redacted] was not stored in
[redacted] old laboratory (room [redacted] USAMRIID Building [redacted] where
[redacted] access to. [redacted] further advised [redacted] laboratory work on
[redacted]

[redacted] advised prior to [redacted]
[redacted] had various [redacted] and other
government contracts. [redacted] advised circa [redacted] time frame,

0 [redacted] 281.302

Investigation on 01/28/2005 at Frederick, Maryland

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b7C

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1083

Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 01/28/2005, Page 2

[redacted] sought employment elsewhere.

b6
b7C

[redacted] advised as [redacted] USAMRIID [redacted] felt it was understood that any scientific discoveries made at USAMRIID became the intellectual property of USAMRIID or the U.S. Government. [redacted] further advised [redacted] does not specifically recall if [redacted] ever signed an Intellectual Property Agreement Form.

[redacted] advised [redacted] spoke with BRUCE IVINS circa [redacted] [redacted] further advised [redacted] IVINS [redacted] advised IVINS stated [redacted] anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001. [redacted] advised, per IVINS, [redacted]

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
[redacted] opined the person who mailed the anthrax-laced letters would have to have been knowledgeable and would not want to accidentally endanger their family by bringing any Ba home.

[redacted] agreed to contact the interviewing SAs should [redacted] be able to locate the business card [redacted] recall any additional pertinent information.

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
Through interview and observation [redacted] is described as:

- ~~LAST-NAME:~~
- ~~FIRST-NAME:~~
- ~~MIDDLE-INITIAL:~~
- ~~SEX:~~
- ~~RACE:~~
- ~~SSAN:~~
- ~~HOME ADDRESS:~~
- ~~HOME TELEPHONE #:~~
- ~~PREVIOUS HOME TELEPHONE:~~
- ~~OCCUPATION:~~
- ~~EMPLOYER:~~
- ~~WORK ADDRESS:~~
- ~~WORK TELEPHONE:~~



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USAMRIID
Office #: [redacted]
1425 Porter Street
Fort Detrick, Maryland



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/02/2005

To: Washington Field

Attn: IIC [redacted]
SSA [redacted] AMX 1

From: Washington Field

AMX-3

Contact: SA [redacted]

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Approved By: [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID ✓ (Pending) - 1090

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: Comprehensive description of phone calls placed from Fort Detrick, Maryland, to New Jersey between April 1997 and December 1999.

Reference: 279A-WF-222936-Lead Serial 341

Details: In an effort to identify any association between Fort Detrick personnel and New Jersey, telephone records were obtained from Fort Detrick for the period of April 1997 to December 1999. A lead was sent to the Trenton New Jersey Residence Agency of the Newark Division requesting interviews of all of the New Jersey telephone number subscribers. Although the interviews identified a reasonable explanation for a significant number of the telephone calls, some of the calls to New Jersey telephone numbers require additional investigation.

The following paragraphs separate the telephone calls into various categories including: Knows/May Have Known [redacted] [redacted] Business/Equipment Contact, Personal Contact, Employee/Former Employee, Previously interviewed, Trunk Line/Customer Service Line/Fax Line, No Explanation Business, No Explanation Residence, Current Subscriber/Not Subscriber During Period of Interest, Deceased, Previously Interviewed Pursuant to Another Lead, No Forwarding Address/Needs to be Located and Interviewed, Needs to be re-subpoenaed & Unable to be Determined.

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Back Of Page



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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

Knows/May Have Known [redacted]

Number: Subscriber/Interviewee Interview Results:
or Business & Subpoena
return address:

[redacted]

[redacted]

(609)665-8727 SPEX Industries
3880 Park Avenue
Edison, New Jersey

[redacted] advised that
[redacted] received an inquiry
from [redacted] regarding a

b6
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] Has also
had contact with others
from Fort Detrick.

[redacted]

[redacted] friend [redacted]
[redacted] introduced [redacted]
to [redacted] or
[redacted] from [redacted]

Follow-up interview
ascertained the individual
was [redacted]

Business/Equipment Contact:

Number: Subscriber/Interviewee Interview Results:
or Business & Subpoena
return address:

(609)243-9300 I-STAT Corporation
303 College Road
Princeton, New Jersey

Makes hand held blood
analyzers & has a business
relationship with
USAMRIID.

(609)259-7051 Allentown Caging
Equipment

Manufactures animal cages.
Conducts routine business
with USAMRIID.

[redacted]

Worked for [redacted] and sold
equipment to [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] USAMRIID

contacts: [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

[Redacted]

(609) 439-9100 Denton Vacuum
1259 North Church
Morristown, New Jersey

Manufactures vacuum systems used in chemical testing. Has conducted business with Fort Detrick.

(609) 443-9300 I-STAT Corporation
303 College Road
Princeton, New Jersey

Makes hand held blood analyzers & has a business relationship with USAMRIID.

b6
b7C

(609) 452-8550 Covance Inc.
210 Carnegie Center
Princeton, New Jersey

Contact with [Redacted] through a trade show.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] worked for [Redacted]

[Redacted]

sold equipment to numerous scientists at USAMRIID.

(609) 467-2000 Arthur H. Thomas
Company
Box 99
Swedeboro, New Jersey

Conducts business with USAMRIID

(609) 467-2600 VWR International
P.O. Box 369
Bridgeport, New Jersey

Conducts business with USAMRIID.

(609) 467-4200 Omega Engineering
1 Omega Circle
Bridgeport, New Jersey

Company has done business with USAMRIID in the past.

(609) 514-2200 BRACCO Diagnostics
P.O. Box 5225
Princeton, New Jersey

Sells media for MRI's. USAMRIID made a purchase in 1999.

(609) 584-9575 Diedre Moire Corp.
510 Horizon Center
Robbinsville, New Jersey

Headhunter. They had contact with [Redacted] [Redacted] sent correspondence to this company that they characterized as

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

threatening. Letter was
forwarded to SA [redacted]
[redacted]

(609) 589-2560 TECHNE Inc.
743 Alexander Road
Princeton, New Jersey

Sells and distributes
life science and lab
equipment. Contact was
[redacted] from
USAMRIID.

(609) 587-9797 Princeton Instrument
Incorporated
3660 Quaker Bridge Rd.
Trenton, New Jersey

Sells cameras/photo
equipment for use in labs.
Has had contact with
USAMRIID. Not sure who was
contacted during this time
frame.

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b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]
Attempted to obtain a
speaker from Fort Detrick
but does not know anyone
from USAMRIID.

(609) 667-7727 Universal Technical
950 N Kings Highway
Cherry Hill, New Jersey

Federal Laboratory
Consortium for Technology
Transfer has dealt with
USAMRIID and uses the
switchboard at Universal
Technical.

(609) 686-1600 Henry Troemner
Incorporated
P.O. Box 87
Thorofare, New Jersey

Manufactures scales.
USAMRIID contact [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]

Conducts business with
USAMRIID. Responded to a
Grand Jury subpoena re:
[redacted]

b3
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b7C

(609) 695-8355 Habitat Management
210 W State Street
Trenton, New Jersey

Company studied effects of
human activity on bald
eagles for Fort Detrick.

(609) 734-2068 Sarnoff Corporation
P.O. Box CN5300
Princeton, New Jersey

Bug to Drug Program.
Contacts [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

(609)985-8700 Automatic Switch
Company
2 Eves Drive
Marlton, New Jersey

USAMRIID has purchased
equipment from this
company.

Personal Contact:

Number: Subscriber/Interviewee
or Business & Subpoena
return address:

Interview Results:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
biomedical research
projects at USAMRIID.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

At the time, [Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

See above.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] (see below)

[Redacted]

Former [Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
worked at USAMRIID
[Redacted] was the [Redacted]
[Redacted] at
USAMRIID.)

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted] worked at
USAMRIID.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

[Redacted]

USAMRIID.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

USAMRIID.

[Redacted]

Friends with [Redacted]
They discussed [Redacted]
[Redacted] described [Redacted]
as difficult to be around [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

are friends with USAMRIID
employees [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] worked with [Redacted]
[Redacted] at Fort Detrick
regarding developing a [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Been in contact with [Redacted]
[Redacted] at Fort
Detrick.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted] USAMRIID.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

USAMRIID.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted] works at Fort
Detrick.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] at Ft.
Detrick.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Ft.
Detrick.

[Redacted]

Friend [Redacted]
[Redacted] at USAMRIID.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted] at
USAMRIID.

Employee/Former Employee:

Number: Subscriber/Interviewee
or Business & Subpoena
return address:

Interview Results:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] at
USAMRIID from [Redacted]
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted] Worked at
[Redacted] USAMRIID.

b6
b7C

[Redacted]

Both worked at USAMRIID.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] worked at
[Redacted]

Previously Interviewed:

Number: Subscriber/Interviewee
or Business & Subpoena
return address:

Interview Results:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] advised
[Redacted]
[Redacted] at USAMRIID.

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

Previously interviewed by
SA [redacted]

(609)848-2116 Aikers Bio Sciences [redacted] advised
210 Grove Road that [redacted] previously
Thorofare, New Jersey interviewed by the FBI.

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b7c

Trunk Line/Customer Service Line/Fax Line:

Number:	Subscriber/Interviewee or Business & Subpoena return address:	Interview Results:
(609)340-4000	ADAMAR of NJ Inc. (Tropicana Casino) Iowa & Boardwalk Atlantic City, New Jersey	Trunk line.
(609)344-6101	Days Inn 112 S. Morris Avenue Atlantic City, New Jersey	Trunk line.
(609)344-8800	I Trocki Sheraton 6821 Black Horse Pike W. Atlantic City, New Jersey	Trunk line.
(609)344-8800	Atlantic Place Development dba Royal Suites Hotel 4252 Harbour Beach Boulevard Brigantine, New Jersey	Trunk line.
(609)347-5211	City of Atlantic City Tennessee & Bachrach Atlantic City, New Jersey	Fax line for Emergency Management & Beach Patrol.
(609)348-2200	Holiday Inn Boardwalk 111 S. Chelsea Avenue Atlantic City, New Jersey	Trunk line.
(609)348-7000	Atlantic City Convention Center 1 Ocean Way	Trunk line.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

Atlantic City, New
Jersey

(609)368-6101 Stone Harbor Chamber of Commerce Trunk line.
P.O. Box 422
Stone Harbor, New Jersey

(609)387-7800 Burlington Coat Factory Customer service number.
1830 US Highway 130 Many employees have
Burlington, New Jersey family members in the
military.

(609)392-1888 Cadet Motors, Inc. Main number. No record of
1960 Spruce vehicle sale to Maryland
Trenton, New Jersey resident. Employees do
not have a family member
in the military.

(609)441-4444 Greater Bay Hotel & Trunk line.
Casino (Sands)
S Indiana Avenue &
Brighton
Atlantic City, New
Jersey

(609)463-2000 Burdette Tomlin Trunk line.
Hospital
2 Stone Harbor Blvd.
Cape May, New Jersey

(609)497-4000 Princeton Medical Main number. Hospital has
253 Witherspoon Street no formal business with
Princeton, New Jersey USAMRIID, but [redacted]
may have talked to [redacted]
USAMRIID about [redacted]
[redacted]

A follow-up interview was conducted with [redacted]
[redacted] advised that [redacted]
[redacted] at Fort Detrick
[redacted] does not know [redacted]
[redacted] recalls [redacted] giving a lecture about the
[redacted] Fort Detrick. [redacted] gave interviewing agents a list
of the instructors and students who attended the course. [redacted]
does not recall receiving a call from USAMRIID.

b6
b7c

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

(609) 522-0521	Cavalier Hotel 410 E. Toledo Avenue Wildwood Crest, New Jersey	Trunk line.
(609) 522-1439	Concador Hotel 507 E. Stanton Road Wildwood Crest, New Jersey	Trunk line.
(609) 522-3343	Bar Harbor Inn Stanton Road & Beach Wildwood Crest, New Jersey	Trunk line.
(609) 522-6961	Singapore Motel 515 E Orchid Road Wildwood Crest, New Jersey	Trunk line. Number is disconnected. Manager cannot explain call.
(609) 692-3333	Ace Glass Inc. 1430 NW Boulevard Vineland, New Jersey	General purpose number. No formal business relationship with USAMRIID, but has conducted business with many U.S. Departments. No direct contact with <div data-bbox="906 1102 1120 1144" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 130px; height: 20px; margin: 5px 0;"></div>
(609) 835-3030	Lourdes Medical Center 218A Sunset Road Willingboro, New Jersey	Direct Line to the ER and numerous individuals had access to the phone.
(609) 342-2000	Cooper Medical Center 1 Cooper Plaza Camden, New Jersey	General number, cannot trace calls.
(609) 921-9000	Educational Testing Services (ETS) Rosedale Road Stop 35D Princeton, New Jersey	Transfers calls to various ETS sites. They have 23,000 employees in New Jersey.
(609) 984-1100	Thomas Edison College 777 Parkway Avenue Trenton, New Jersey	Main number. Call(s) could have been transferred to any extension.
(609) 989-7888	New Jersey Chamber of Commerce	Main number. Call(s) could have been

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b7c

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

216 W State
Trenton, New Jersey

transferred to any
extension. Two National
Guard members worked at
the office.

No Explanation Business:

Number:	Subscriber/Interviewee or Business & Subpoena return address:	Interview Results:
(609)234-1600	Cortaulds Aerospace 823 E Gate Drive Mount Laurel, New Jersey	Now called PPG Aerospace. Records of incoming calls were not maintained. No knowledge of business with USAMRIID.
(609)252-9060	KDC Group 114 Main Kingston, New Jersey	Recruiting firm for pharmaceutical companies. No business relationship with USAMRIID.
(609)259-7591	Upper Freehold Regional School District 27 High Allentown, New Jersey	Fax machine utilized by over twenty employees.
(609)265-5537	Burlington County Office of Communicable Diseases 49 Rancocas Road Mount Holly, New Jersey	All employees can access this number. Does not know of any contact with USAMRIID.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

who worked at a military
base in Maryland.

(609)423-3010 East Greenwich
Municipal Court
Cohawken Road
Clarksboro, New Jersey

Involves traffic tickets
issued on the NJ Turnpike.
A computer search was
made for the name [Redacted]
[Redacted] with negative
results. They advised
that there is no way to
search tickets for someone
stationed at Fort Detrick.

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b7c

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

(609)423-6300	EM Diagnostic Systems 480 Democrat Road Gibbstown, New Jersey	Lab supply company. No record of business with USAMRIID. Advised that most customers use a toll free number.
(609)423-7222	Talley Management Group 19 Mantua Road Mount Royal, New Jersey	Handles administrative functions for various clients including American College of Veterinary Pathology.
(609)424-5875	Hit Doctor 2 Inc./ American Showcase 6 Bicentennial Court Erial, New Jersey	Company provides scholarships and promotes baseball camps.
(609)426-7887	McGraw Hill Credit Department 148 Princeton Highstown Road Highstown, New Jersey	No information on 8 second phone call.
(609)427-4000	State National Training 510 S Burnt Mill Road Kirkwood, New Jersey	Prepares candidates to take various tests. Records did not reveal any business with [redacted]
(609)443-4000	East Windsor Township 16 Lanning Boulevard Highstown, New Jersey	They employ thirty people. No reason why they might have received a call from USAMRIID.
(609)448-3001	Lavipharm Labs Inc. 69 Princeton-Hightstown Road Hightstown, New Jersey	Lavipharm moved into a building previously occupied by Mettler Instrument in 1998. Lavipharm can not think of a reason why they might receive a call from USAMRIID.
(609)452-2400	Radisson Hotel Holiday Inn P.O. Box 2700 Caldwell, New Jersey	Information not available concerning phone call. At one time this property was a Holiday Inn.
(609)522-6281	Sea Kist Motel 288 Tall Pines Drive	Manager [redacted] does not recall speaking to anyone

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b7c

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

	Sewell, New Jersey	from Fort Detrick.
(609) 584-7677	Weber Scientific 2732 Kuser Road Robbinsville, New Jersey	Sells equipment to the dairy industry. Records do not show business with USAMRIID.
(609) 646-5220	Ramada Hotel P.O. Box 1373 Pleasantville, New Jersey	General number and address for the hotel. Manager is not familiar with the name [redacted]
(609) 646-9111	TA Brand Company 111 E Parkway Drive Pleasantville, New Jersey	Dedicated Fax number. Has not conducted business with USAMRIID.
(609) 652-2200	Days Inn 224 W White Horse Pike Absecon, New Jersey	Guest records are only maintained for three years. Manager was not familiar with the subscriber name [redacted] [redacted]
(609) 655-4848	Orthopedic Associates 9 Centre Drive Monroe, New Jersey	Has not conducted business with USAMRIID.
(609) 655-6000	Med Pointe Healthcare Half Acre Road Cranbury, New Jersey	Carter-Wallace Inc. (CWI)/ Med Pointe Healthcare was acquired by ARMKEL. Business counsel unable to determine if CWI had a relationship with USAMRIID or [redacted]
(609) 655-6047	Carter-Wallace, Inc. Half Acre Road Cranbury, New Jersey	See above.
(609) 655-9600	Boy Scouts of America P.O. Box 268 Jamesburg, New Jersey	No involvement with USAMRIID or Fort Detrick.
(609) 662-2070	Faulkner Technical Reports Incorporated 7905 Browing Road Pennsauken, New Jersey	Publishing company with several government contracts. Not aware of a contract with USAMRIID.

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

(609) 667-7164	Seamans Furniture 300 Crossways Park Dr. Woodbury, New Jersey	No idea about who might have received the call. Large employee turnover.
(609) 683-9678	Fleet Bank	Number not in service. Fleet purchased Summit Bank. Manager was not familiar with USAMRIID or [redacted] and could not recall if this used to be the bank's number.
(609) 758-7781	Alpharma Inc.	Company restructured and closed several offices. No information available.
(609) 771-7100	Educational Testing Services One Meadowsland Plaza E Rutherford, New Jersey	Several hundred employees. No information available.
(609) 802-0245	Radisson Hotel 915 State Highway 73N Mount Laurel, New Jersey	No record of incoming calls, but they conduct [redacted]
(609) 848-1000	Slack Inc. 6900 Grove Road Thorofare, New Jersey	Publishes medical journals and books. Do not have records of [redacted] making a purchase.
(609) 848-7200	Oil Test Inc. P.O. Box 519 Thorofare, New Jersey	Test marine fuel for the Navy. No association with USAMRIID.
(609) 860-0096	Bureau of Dangerous Goods 322 Applegarth Cranbury, New Jersey	Sells software program dealing with shipping infectious materials. [redacted]
(609) 860-4000	Rhone-Poulenc Prospect Plains Road Cranbury, NJ	Rhone-Poulenc was acquired by Rhodia, Inc. Neither company appears to have had a relationship with Fort Detrick.

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

(609) 871-5922 Rancocas Orthopedic
2103 Burlington-
MT Holly Road
Burlington, New Jersey

No routine business
conducted with USAMRIID.
May have had a case
involving a military
member.

(609) 924-8131 Orthopedic Associates
325 Princeton Avenue
Princeton, New Jersey

Has not conducted
business with USAMRIID.

(609) 927-2942 ATX Communications
50 Monument Road
Balla Cynwyd, PA

No information available.

[Redacted]

Dedicated fax line. Does
not know anyone at
USAMRIID.

(609) 966-1305 Quality Bio-Tech

Now known as Enviro Tech.
Phone records are not
maintained, and they can't
explain call.

No Explanation Residence/Individual:

Number: Subscriber/Interviewee
or Business & Subpoena
return address:

Interview Results:

[Redacted]

Neither [Redacted]
could explain a call to
what they believe was

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

do not know of anyone from
Fort Detrick who might
have called them during
that time period.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] no reason
to call USAMRIID.

[Redacted]

No association with
USAMRIID.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

[Redacted]

Neither [Redacted]
[Redacted] could provide
explanation.

[Redacted]

Not familiar with
USAMRIID. Does not know
anyone at Fort Detrick.

(609) 499-2523 Margaret McGrath
901 Broad
Florence, New Jersey

This number was assigned
to McGrath's (deceased)
room at a nursing home.

[Redacted]
was not aware of any
connection to Ft. Detrick.

[Redacted]

Was assigned this number
for a short while, no
connection to USAMRIID.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was assigned this
number in [Redacted]
does not know anyone from
USAMRIID, or Fort Detrick.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] who has
no idea why someone from
USAMRIID would call her.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
Fort Detrick &
occasionally is in contact
with others [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
No explanation for call.
No longer uses this number
because of too many wrong
number calls.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
They claim no association
with USAMRIID.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Does not recall doing business with anyone from USAMRIID.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] has no information on anthrax or [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Does not recall having contact with USAMRIID.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

but does not recall dealing with anyone from Fort Detrick.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] does not know why they would have received a call from Maryland. They moved to that address before

[Redacted]

[Redacted] nor recall having a call with someone from USAMRIID.

Current Subscriber/Not Subscriber During Period of Interest:

Number: Subscriber/Interviewee or Business & Subpoena return address: Interview Results:

[Redacted]

Moved to [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(609) 520-0300 Incoda Corporation
100 Overlook Center
Princeton, New Jersey

Telephone subscriber in 2000.

[Redacted]

Fax line. Not familiar with USAMRIID of Fort Detrick. Number acquired in 1999.

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
To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005


Deceased:

Number:	Subscriber/Interviewee or Business & Subpoena return address:	Interview Results:
(609)423-0100	Bud Olsen 362 S. Swedesboro Avenue Mickelton, New Jersey	Deceased. Sold racing car parts.

Previously Interviewed Pursuant To Another Lead:

Number:	Subscriber/Interviewee or Business & Subpoena return address:	Interview Results:
(609)452-2500	Palmer Inn 3499 Brunswick Pike Princeton, New Jersey	Reference SUB-NK, serial 1914.



Reference SUB-
Serial 770.


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(609)890-8600	KNF Neuberger Inc. 2 Black Forest Road Trenton, New Jersey	Reference SUB-LEAD, Serial 326.
(609)921-7500	Nassau Inn Palmer Square Princeton, New Jersey	Reference SUB-NK, serial 1914.
(609)924-1707	Peacock Inn 20 Bayard Lane Princeton, New Jersey	Reference SUB-NK, serial 1914.

No Forwarding Address/Need to be Located and Interviewed:

Number:	Subscriber/Interviewee or Business & Subpoena return address:	Interview Results:
---------	---	--------------------



Number not in service.
Could not find 

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(609)241-1111	Ampcor Incorporated 603 Heron Drive	Moved in July 1999 with no forwarding address.
---------------	--	---

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

Bridgeport, New Jersey

[Redacted]

Filed change of address to
[Redacted]
[Redacted] under the name
[Redacted]

(609)365-5177 Genes Pharmacy
640 Pine Street
Camden, New Jersey

Out of business. Did not
leave a forwarding
address.

[Redacted]

Moved with no forwarding
address.

(609)423-0119 American College of
Veterinary Pathology
19 Mantua Road
Mount Royal, New Jersey

All records have been sent
to the Rees Group,
Middleton, Wisconsin,
(608)831-3611.

(609)424-5600 Marsam Pharmaceutical
P.O. Box 1022
Cherry Hill, New Jersey

Current subscriber is a
insurance company & stated
that they frequently
receive calls for Marsam.

[Redacted]

Correct address was [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] Mail Carrier
not familiar with the name
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Current homeowner advised
[Redacted] moved several years
ago.

[Redacted]

Unable to identify.

(609)448-3001 Mettler Instrument
P.O. Box 71
Hightstown, New Jersey

Lavipharm Labs advised
that this company moved
to Columbus, Ohio.

[Redacted]

Property manager could
not find records relating
to this tenant.

(609)520-0300 Chrysalis International
Corporation

This company went bankrupt
and was sold to Phoenix

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

DBA Chrysalis DNX
TRNSGNC
301B College Road
Princeton, New Jersey
Also:
5 Cedar Brook Drive
Cranbury, New Jersey

International (PI) in 1999.
PI was purchased by a
company named MDS.

(609) 541-2267 USARB NAVAL
State Highway 547
Lakehurst, New Jersey

Not in Service. Listed
subscriber has no record
of this number.

(609) 678-7550 USARB-MA-NAVAL ENG STA
Building 120, Floor 1
State Highway 547
Lakehurst, New Jersey

Not in Service. Listed
subscriber has no record
of this number.

[Redacted]

Moved with no forwarding
address.

[Redacted]

Moved with no forwarding
address.

[Redacted]

Moved with no forwarding
address.

[Redacted]

Moved with no forwarding
address.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
Current subscriber does
not know [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
Current subscriber does
not know [Redacted]

[Redacted]

May now reside at [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Address is vacant. No

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To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

forwarding address.

Moved with forwarding
address to [Redacted]
[Redacted]
[Redacted] telephone
numbers [Redacted]
[Redacted] Both
numbers are disconnected.

(609)804-1090 RJ Productions Inc.
822275
Egg Harbor, New Jersey
Also:
335 West Mossville Road
Galloway, New Jersey

Were unable to contact
[Redacted]
[Redacted] this company.

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

Moved with no forwarding
address.

Could not find.

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(609)964-0370 Garlock Inc. Plastics
602 N 10th Street
Camden, New Jersey

This company left Camden,
New Jersey in 2000 and
moved to Texas and
Newtown, Bucks County,
Pennsylvania. Lynsell
Technologies advised that
they may have some hard
copies of phone records
associated with Garlock,
and advised that they
believe the above-
mentioned number was a fax
line.

Needs to be Re-subpoenaed:

Number: Subscriber/Interviewee
or Business & Subpoena
return address:

[Redacted]

Interview Results:

Advised they never were
the subscriber of this

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

number.

[Redacted]
were assigned this number
in 2001.

[Redacted] advised that he was
never the subscriber of
this number.

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Per an office assistant,
they were assigned this
number recently (2003).

Was not assigned this
number until 2000. She
is no longer assigned this
number.

Unable to be determined:

Number: Subscriber/Interviewee
or Business & Subpoena
return address:

(609)426-7887 Merrill Lynch
P.O. Box 1406
New York, New York

Interview Results:

Documentation was not
provided as to what may
have been done to identify
connection of Merrill
Lynch to USAMRIID.
However, an interview of
someone from Mc Graw Hill,
who subscribed the same
number made mention of an
eight second call. It
is not clear when each
company was the subscriber
of this number.

(609)452-2400 Paetec Communications
290 Woodcliff Drive
Fairport, New York

Documentation was not
provided as to what may
have been done to identify
connection of Paetec to
USAMRIID.

It should be noted that the purpose of this document
was to collate all information gathered pursuant to a lead,
serial number 341, and to ascertain appropriate follow-up. For

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 02/02/2005

the purpose of this document, telephone numbers and addresses are duplicates of the ones sent to the Trenton RA in the original lead. It should be noted that some of the above-mentioned numbers may no longer be in service, have had an area code change, or belong to a new subscriber. Any such changes, unless follow-up is required, are irrelevant to this document and may or may not be noted. This document should not be considered an investigation of any of the above-mentioned individuals and/or companies. The information in this document, with the exception of information in parentheses, was gathered entirely from the FD-302's and inserts provided by the Trenton RA. There has been no additional investigation on the results provided by Trenton RA.

At this point in the investigation, the follow-up to this project should include an attempt to locate and interview those individuals named in the following sections: No Forwarding Address/Need to be Located and Interviewed, Need to be Re-subpoenaed, Unable to be Determined, and any other investigative follow-up deemed appropriate.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/24/2005

[redacted] Date of Birth (DOB): [redacted]
Social Security Account Number (SSAN) [redacted] work telephone
#: [redacted], place of employment, room [redacted] 1425 Porter
Street, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland provided
Special Agent (SA) [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) on the morning of February 18, 2005 the
following information via a seventeen page facsimile:

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Page 1: Cover sheet

Page 2: Email reply from [redacted] at
[redacted] dated [redacted] to [redacted]
[redacted] advised [redacted] via email,

[redacted]

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Page 3: Handwritten note maintained by BRUCE IVINS regarding
[redacted] IVINS noted [redacted] IVINS
noted [redacted]

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Page 4: Facsimile cover sheet from The University of Michigan
Medical Center to BRUCE IVINS date stamped "4-27-1998 9:37AM From
Allergy Division 7349362990" also, "Pages including this one: 5."

Page 5: Page 2 of facsimile from The University of Michigan
Medical Center to BRUCE IVINS. Page two is a copy of "University
of Michigan Hospitals Out-Patient Notes" for [redacted] (1-3)
Records indicate "2/6/98 Anthrax Vaccine Absorbed 0.5 cc," "2/20/98
Anthrax Vaccine 0.5 cc," "3/6/98 Anthrax sub q 0.5 cc," 3/9/98 3:05
P Plague Vaccine," and 4/10/98 11:35 A Plague Vaccine."

Page 6: Page 3 of facsimile from The University of Michigan
Medical Center to BRUCE IVINS. Page 3 is a type written note

551.302

Investigation on 02/24/2005 at Frederick, Maryland (via facsimile)

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File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 1095 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 02/24/2005, Page 2

entitled "Vaccination Summary: _____ (Social Security # _____) Records indicate the anthrax vaccine was from the "Michigan Dept. of Public Health, lot # FAV016" and the plague vaccine was from "Greer Laboratories Inc., lot # 0904Z1."

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Page 7: Page 4 of facsimile from The University of Michigan Medical Center to BRUCE IVINS. Page four is a copy of "University of Michigan Hospitals Out-Patient Notes" for _____ Records indicate _____ received the anthrax vaccine on "2/6/98," "2/20/98," and 3/6/98." In addition records indicate _____ received the plague vaccine on "3/9/98," and "4/10/98."

Page 8: Page 5 of facsimile from The University of Michigan Medical Center to BRUCE IVINS. Page 5 is a type written note entitled "Vaccination Summary: _____ (Social Security # _____) Records indicate the anthrax vaccine was from the "Michigan Dept. of Public Health, lot # FAV016" and the plague vaccine was from "Greer Laboratories Inc., lot # 0904Z1."

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Page 9: Copy of a Memorandum dated April 28, 1998. Records indicate _____ advised _____ has been immunized against "ANT" and "PLA."

Page 10: A type written letter from _____ The University of Michigan Medical Center, Division of Allergy, dated December 05, 1997, addressed to BRUCE IVINS. Records indicate "I much appreciate your willingness to work with us concerning our new anti-sporicidal material. We look forward to doing *in vitro*" Records further indicate "On December 19, commensurate with the filing of patents on this material, I will send you additional data on the formulations of our studies concerning the ability of these materials to inactive spores both *in vitro* and *in vivo*."

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Page 11: A type written letter from _____ to _____ dated "May 10, 1997." (WFO Note: after the date a handwritten comment follows "? should this be 1998.") Records indicate _____ thanks _____ and IVINS for their collaboration. In addition records indicate _____ provided excellent technical assistance.

PAGE 12-14: Forwarded email from _____ at _____ dated "10/18/98 2:37 PM" to IVINS containing an internet article entitled "Agent destroys anthrax, doesn't hurt

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of , On 02/24/2005, Page 3

animals or the environment." Article indicated MICHAEL HAYES and JAMES R. BAKER Jr., directed a research study in which "BCTP," presented experimental evidence that "BCTP" destroyed anthrax spores in a culture dish. Records further indicate "BCTP" was developed by at Novavax Inc., Columbia, Maryland. In addition "The [University of Michigan] and Novavax have filed a patent application" and plans to evaluate BCTP's effectiveness against inhaled anthrax spores, as well as other bacteria and enveloped viruses."

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Page 15: Data table entitled "Experiment from 5-5-98: Microemulsions (Sic) incorporated in TSA at 1:100 dilution. *B. anthracis* spores diluted 10-fold from 10^{-1} to 10^{-6} and 10 ul of dilutions streaked (Sic) on TSA (duplicate plates)."

Page 16: Bar graph entitled "Figure 1: Cidal Effect of Nanoemulsions on Anthrax Spores."

Page 17: Bar graph entitled "Figure 2: Cidal effect of Nanoemulsions on Anthrax spores."

(WFO Note: Attached to and considered part of this record is a 17 page facsimile received by writer circa 11:49 AM on February 18, 2005.)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-17-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases

FAX Phone Numbers:

DSN - 343-2152, Commercial - (301) 619-2152

Facsimile Transmittal Header Sheet

Bacteriology Division USAMRIID Fort Detrick Frederick, MD 21702-5011	Office Symbol MCMR-UIB	Phone DSN 343-7341 (301) 619-7341	Point of Contact <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div> Bacteriology Division USAMRIID 301-619-7341
TO	FBI, Washington, DC		
DATE: 18 Feb 05	Total #Pages: ¹⁶ plus cover = ¹⁷	FAX: <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 20px;"></div>	

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REMARKS:

*Enclosed FAX are records/ correspondence
on visit with University of Michigan
Scientists, - 6-9 May 1998.*

Request acknowledgement of receipt - Yes Phone (301) 619-7341
No

Call AV 343-7341, Commercial (301) 619-7341, if you experience difficulty

in message transmissior **"Research for the Soldier"**


RegOpenKey failed.

will be kept
about
April 27 - May 8


May 4

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Cl. of Mich.
Dept. of Internal Medicine
MSRB (Bldg #3)



QED



Ann Arbor MI 48109


- ① length of time after Vacc.
- ② STD BL-3 safety procedures
- ③ (email if possible)
mmh@msia.umich.edu
- ④

3 after 3d ant
3 after 2nd pligere

- sendⁿ copy of shot documents
bring
- can get in right away

Send 385-69

Talk to four by



when you come

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The University of Michigan Medical Center

Division of Allergy

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

DATE: 4/27/98

TO: Bruce Ivins

FROM:

1150 W. Medical Center Drive, 9220 MSRB III
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-0648
(734) 647-2777; Fax (734) 936-2990

PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 5

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HOSPITALS
OUT-PATIENT NOTES

BIRTHDATE

9
0802

[Redacted]

28 VISIT

SEX: M. F

VISIT No

020698

#1 1205 2/6/98 Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed 0.5cc

(L) sub Q

per

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Reviewed with patient

#2 2/20/98 Anthrax Vaccine 0.5cc

(R) upper arm - SQ.

[Redacted]

b6
b7c

#3 - two 3/6/98 917A (R) Anthrax 0.5cc

(L) sub Q

3/9/98 305P Plague Vaccine (R) IM 1cc

Reviewed insert with patient

OK to give per

4/10/98 1135A Plague Vaccine (L) IM 0.2cc

Vaccination Summary:

(Social Security #)

b6
b7c

Anthrax:

Michigan Dept. of Public Health

lot # FAV016

expiration date 28 JUL 98

06 FEB 98: 0.5 cc subcutaneous injection

20 FEB 98: 0.5 cc subcutaneous injection

06 MAR 98: 0.5 cc subcutaneous injection

Plague:

Greer Laboratories Inc.

lot # 0904Z1

expiration date 07 NOV 98

09 MAR 98: 1.0 cc intramuscular injection

10 APR 98: 1.0 cc intramuscular injection

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HOSPITALS
OUT-PATIENT NOTES

BIRTHDATE

NAME

CHI No.

SEX: M F

VIST No.

02772-713-1

#1 2/6/98 ¹²⁰⁵ Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed 0.5cc
LT Sub Q per Dr Engleberg

#2 2/20/98 ^{3:00pm} Anthrax Vaccine 0.5cc ^{Plaque arm. 20}

b6
b7c

#3 - 4wks 3/4/98 9:15A ^{Anthrax} (LT) subq 0.5cc

3/9/98 3:05P Plague Vaccine (LT) IM 1cc
Reviewed insert with patient
OK to give per

4/10/98 2:08P Plague vaccine (LT) IM 0.2cc

Vaccination Summary:

[Redacted]

(Social Security #

[Redacted]

b6
b7c

Anthrax:

Michigan Dept. of Public Health

lot # FAV016

expiration date 28 JUL 98

06 FEB 98: 0.5 cc subcutaneous injection

20 FEB 98: 0.5 cc subcutaneous injection

06 MAR 98: 0.5 cc subcutaneous injection

Plague:

Greer Laboratories Inc.

lot # 0904Z1

expiration date 07 NOV 98

09 MAR 98: 1.0 cc intramuscular injection

10 APR 98: 1.0 cc intramuscular injection

SGRD-UIM-S (40-5e)

Date 5/8/04

MEMORANDUM FOR [redacted]

SUBJECT: Special Immunizations for [redacted]

Special immunizations for the above-named individual have been completed as per the enclosed request. He/She has been immunized against circled agent(s).

~~ANT BOP EEE RB JE JON PLA QF~~

~~RAP RUF OPH TBE TUL VEE WEE WE~~

[redacted]

[redacted] Special Immunizations Branch

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The University of Michigan
Medical Center

Division of Allergy



3918 Taubman Center
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-0380
[Redacted] Fax (313) 936-2990

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b7C

December 5, 1997

Bruce Ivins, Ph.D.
U.S. Army Research Institute for Infectious Disease
Bacteriology Division
1425 Porter Street
Fort Detrick, MD 21702-5077

Dear Dr. Ivins:

It was a pleasure speaking with you the other day. I much appreciate your willingness to work with us concerning our new anti-sporicidal material. We are looking forward to doing *in vitro* evaluating whether or not this material is effective against anthrax spores given its efficacy against other species of bacillus spores. These studies would involve mixing the material with the spores for varying lengths of time and then either separating the spores or culturing them directly to determine the viability. We might also do fixation of the spore preparations to determine if there are any ultrastructure changes in the spores that can be observed with electron microscopy.

My technicians are fully trained in the contagious pathogen handling and have experience with level 3 biosafety requirements. They, as I, are willing to undergo both the anthrax and plague immunizations, although I was hoping that we might be able to administer the vaccines at the University of Michigan. This might allow us to only make one trip to USAMRID before we begin the studies. If we could either purchase the vaccine from you or from a commercial distributor, we would be happy to then administer it and document titers in any way you feel appropriate.

I look forward to the initiation of this work. I believe it could be a very interesting collaboration that could eventually lead to animal studies. On December 19, commensurate with the filing of patents on this material, I will send you additional data on the formulations and our studies concerning the ability of these materials to inactivate spores both *in vitro* and *in vivo*.

Sincerely,



[Redacted] Division of Allergy



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The University of Michigan
Medical Center

Division of Allergy and Immunology




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May 10, 1997

? should be 1998



Bacterial Diseases Division
USAMRIID
1425 Porter St.
Ft. Detrick, MD 21702-5011

Dear

My colleagues and I would like to extend our thanks and appreciation to both you and Dr. Ivins for the opportunity to work at USAMRIID. Dr. Ivins, were very helpful and cooperative in facilitating our studies as well as providing excellent technical assistance. Their efforts made our stay at USAMRIID both pleasant and highly productive. In particular, our discussions with Dr. Ivins provided valuable insights which will enable us to better define and develop our technology.

The data generated in these studies serves to clarify and validate the results which we have seen in our model systems (see attachments). We were able to block growth of both strains of *B. anthracis* with emulsion incorporated media (Table 1). We also were successful in reducing both Vollum and Ames spore counts by 95% (as assessed by CFU of viable organisms). These reductions were observed at spore concentrations up to 1 X 10⁶/ml (Figure 1), and were seen even in conditions which limited germination (room temperature incubation). Decreased numbers of spores also were identified microscopically in the media after treatment. In contrast, no reduction in counts was noted with an initial spore inoculum of 1 X 10⁸/ml (Figure 2). These conditions probably overwhelm the emulsion given that the concentration of spores is approaching the concentration of lipid vesicles. However, extremely high spore concentrations may alter the effect of the lipid in other ways and we are designing experiments with inhibitors of germination used at lower spore densities to clarify this result.

We were pleased with this outcome and the personal interaction that produced them. Given the non-toxic nature of these emulsions, we feel that they may have a role in the decontamination and treatment of agents such as anthrax and alphavirus. We look forward to future collaborative efforts with Dr. Ivins and his laboratory staff. With the diverse nature of our respective programs, we believe that a cooperative approach will serve to accelerate the development of these compounds.

Sincerely,



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Division of Allergy

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TABLE 1: Experiment from 5-5-98: Microemulsions incorporated in TSA at 1:100 dilution. *B. anthracis* spores

[Redacted]

Microemulsion

Ames strain

Vollum 1B

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/22/2005

[redacted] Date of Birth (DOB): [redacted]
Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted] work telephone
#: [redacted] place of employment, room [redacted] 1425 Porter
Street, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland contacted
Special Agent (SA) [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) on the morning of February 18, 2005 and
provided the following information:

[redacted] [redacted] advised [redacted] had some additional information for SA
[redacted]

[redacted] advised BRUCE IVINS had provided [redacted] with
approximately twenty pages worth of email printouts and facsimiles
that document the collaboration between IVINS and [redacted]
[redacted] advised [redacted] would send the
information via facsimile to SA [redacted]

[redacted] agreed to contact the FBI should [redacted] recall any
additional pertinent information.

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[redacted]

0 [redacted] 33.302

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Investigation on 02/18/2005 at Frederick, Maryland (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1099 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
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