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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

Date of transcription 09/13/2004

On September 8, 2004, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] b6
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed b7C
at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted]
[redacted] telephone [redacted] After being advised of the
identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

[redacted] was not familiar with the sample name [redacted] as it b6
was a name given to the sample after [redacted] had made it [redacted] b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] The only ongoing study during that time frame was the
[redacted] could not provide much assistance with [redacted]

[redacted] and therefore could not enter Building [redacted]

[redacted] frequently grew *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) Ames spores b6
during the time [redacted] kept [redacted] laboratory notes in lab notebooks that were organized b7C
according to study. All of [redacted] laboratory notes would be located
in [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] did not photocopy [redacted] notes from the laboratory notebooks, nor
did [redacted] keep [redacted] own side notes.

[redacted] used to grow [redacted]
[redacted] would have used IVINS' spore stock as [redacted] seed stock
for each batch, and would have initially streaked it on a plate, and
isolated one colony to grow the batch. IVINS' spore stock was kept in
a tube in the walk-in refrigerator and was not frozen. [redacted] would
have gone back to the same stock to start each batch, rather than to
the plate from the previous batch. Although [redacted] was not certain what
the sample name was for the seed stock that [redacted] used, [redacted] knew that it
would have been the same as what IVINS used for his seed stock.
Specific batch information could be found in IVINS' laboratory
notebooks. Approximately 100 milliliters (mL) of spores were being
produced per week at a concentration of 8.5×10^8 or 10^9 and up to
approximately 10^{11} spores per mL.

[redacted] 8302.wpd

Investigation on 09/08/2004 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 934

Date dictated N/A

SA [redacted]
by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 09/08/2004, Page 2 b6 b7C

After [redacted] was working in the laboratory growing spores for [redacted] who started growing spores in approximately [redacted]

In the [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] office with the agents and reviewed the laboratory notebooks containing [redacted] notes. Upon review, [redacted] advised that [redacted] did not note what [redacted] used as [redacted] seed stock.

In Notebook [redacted] page 26, dated [redacted] and signed by [redacted] it was noted that the initial concentration of [redacted] seed stock was [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/10/2004

BRUCE E. IVINS, Principal Investigator, date of birth
04/24/1946, telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at
his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street
Fort Detrick, Maryland. After being advised of the identities
of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview,
IVINS provided the following information:

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In 1985, IVINS was concerned about the possibility of genetic variants of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) making their way into cultures which were grown by sweeping batches of spores off of a seed stock and plating these spores. IVINS noticed that when he took a full sweep of many spores to inoculate a plate (sweep technique), he would get a more heterogeneous culture. In addition, when he passed a culture that was plated as described above, each generation of passage would include more aberrant colony morphologies. When IVINS used just one colony to inoculate a plate (single colony technique), the result was a more homogeneous culture with just a few aberrant colony morphologies. Although he was advised by the "old timers" like [redacted] that he should inoculate plates by taking a sweep of spores from the seed stock, IVINS believed that growing spores in this way was contrary to pure microbiology culture technique. As a result, in 1985, IVINS dipped into the original 1981 Ames slant to begin a new seed stock which he refers to as the "1985" sample. IVINS intended to use this sample as a seed stock so that he would not have to continually dip back into the "1981" original slant. He did not recall the sample name, number, or what was written on the tube containing the "1985" sample. He does not think that any of the "1985" sample remains, however, if it does, the FBI has it in their repository. IVINS cannot recall if he used just one spore from the "1981" sample to create his "1985" seed stock or if he used just a few "normal" spores. IVINS noted that there were originally two "1981" original slants; however, there is now only one "1981" slant. IVINS does not know what happened to the second slant.

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The "1985" sample was being used as seed stock for intramuscular (IM) challenges, therefore USAMRIID was not growing large batches of spores. Large batches of spores are [redacted]

302.wpd

Investigation on 09/08/2004 at Frederick, Maryland
File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 935 Date dictated 09/10/2004
by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce E. Ivins, On 09/08/2004, Page 2

needed primarily for aerosol challenges, which is what everyone is currently moving towards. The "1985" stock was used for guinea pig IM challenges around 1990 during the Gulf War, but it was not used for any rabbit challenges at that time. The "1985" stock was also used for some non-human primate (NHP) challenges. In 1993, this stock was used for aerosol challenges. Notebook # [] has information on those NHP studies.

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IVINS does not recall if he was making large batches of spores in the late 1980s. Vollum 1B was the strain originally used for batch growth, and later the Ames strain was used. He [] made spores for a guinea pig aerosol challenge study in the late 1980s, and this study has been published. In the early 1990s, IVINS [] made additional spores for a guinea pig aerosol challenge. The large batches of spores are only required for aerosol challenges. In 1995 or 1996, [] [] IVINS does not know what [] In addition, IVINS knew that Perry Mikesell maintained the Ames strain, but he did not know where Mikesell obtained his original stock. IVINS explained that the following persons have grown spores in his lab: prior to 1988, only IVINS was growing spores; from 1988 to 1997, IVINS [] were growing spores; from 1997 to 1999, [] were growing spores; from 1999 to 2001, [] were growing spores; from 2001 to 2002, [] were growing spores; and since 2002, IVINS [] have been growing spores.

In 1989, IVINS created a second seed stock from the "1981" original slant, referred to as the "1989" sample. IVINS reviewed page 17 of Notebook [] which is dated December 20, 1990. This page discusses the creation of the "1989" sample using the "1981" original slant. IVINS made 100 milliliters (mL) of the "1989" sample at a concentration of 2×10^9 spores per mL. These spores were not run through a density gradient. IVINS wanted to use a density gradient, but the "old timers" at USAMRIID were against it. IVINS cannot recall if he made this second seed stock because the "1985" sample was depleted. He was also unsure if there was any "1989" sample currently remaining at USAMRIID. In 1989, IVINS was working with [] [] They were looking at the quality of spores grown in Leighton and Doi media versus the quality of spores grown on agar. They found that spores grown on Leighton and Doi media were "hotter", cleaner, nicer, smaller, less

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce E. Ivins, On 09/08/2004, Page 3

likely to clump, and aerosolize better. [redacted] (phonetic) told IVINS that he had difficulty aerosolizing spores grown on agar and that broth grown spores aerosolize better. IVINS indicated that there would be additional information about the "1989" sample in his notebooks. He stated that the "1989" sample was not currently in use at USAMRIID.

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IVINS created at third seed stock in "2002" by plating a spore from the "1981" original slant onto blood agar and

[redacted]
[redacted] It is this "2002" seed stock that is currently in use. IVINS noted that he is making nearly 1 trillion spores a week for USAMRIID, the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), etc. As an example, IVINS explained that [redacted] currently conducts aerosol challenges using spores at [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] the following persons were making spores at USAMRIID: [redacted]
[redacted] IVINS did not know if these persons inoculated plates using a sweep technique or using a single spore technique. Prior to knowledge of the two plasmids, USAMRIID was mostly interested in Ba toxin production. IVINS noticed that newer cultures (those created more recently) produced more toxin than older cultures. He did not recall if anyone was investigating Ba spore virulence as affected by multiple passages of that organism at that time. IVINS did notice that Ba samples which were grown using the single spore technique produced more toxins than those grown using the sweep technique.

IVINS described RMR 1030 as a "bunch of spores" grown by IVINS [redacted] in 1995 and 1996. Nearly all of RMR 1030 has been used. The only remaining RMR 1030 has been provided to the FBI. IVINS reviewed notebook # 3655, page 72, dated 3/8/96. This notebook described the creation of RMR 1030 and noted that Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) "UIB-BI-3" was used to grow RMR 1030. This material was used for aerosol challenges of rabbits, guinea pigs, and possibly NHPs. IVINS was working with [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] IVINS then printed a copy of "UIB-BI-3" and noted that the "1989" sample was the seed stock for any material made under SOP UIB-BI-3, to include RMR 1030. UIB-BI-3 was initially a challenge protocol for which he

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce E. Ivins, On 09/08/2004, Page 4

grew the 1994/1995 batches of spores. These batches were so good that this challenge protocol was formalized as SOP UIB-BI-3. IVINS provided the interviewing agents with a copy of SOP UIB-BI-3, which is maintained in an FD-340, in the 1A section of the file.

After creating RMR 1030, IVINS [redacted] calculated the number of spores needed for upcoming vaccine study work and determined that it would take approximately two years to grow enough spores for this work. As a result, IVINS contracted with Dugway to grow a large number of Ames spores (approximately 10^{13} total spores). IVINS explained that the "Dugway spores" were made in 1997, combined with spores made at USAMRIID by IVINS [redacted] and given the name "RMR 1029". IVINS believes that the portion of RMR 1029 grown at USAMRIID was grown using SOP UIB-BI-3. IVINS was unsure of the seed stock for the RMR 1029 spores grown at USAMRIID, but believed that he [redacted] would have used the same material as what was sent to Dugway. USAMRIID shipped spores to Dugway in 1997 as seed stock for RMR 1029 spores. IVINS shipped [redacted] of Ames strain spores, in [redacted] that was [redacted]. He was unsure of the seed stock for this shipment, but thought it may be in his notes. IVINS stated that for RMR 1029, he was more concerned with getting a large batch of spores than with ensuring uniformity in growth conditions. He was also not concerned with genetic variability in the Dugway batches that were prepared for RMR 1029. The entire RMR 1029 sample was considered one lot and IVINS was only concerned that the entire lot, once combined into RMR 1029, was consistent. The final RMR 1029 sample was 1000 mL at a concentration of approximately 3×10^{10} cfu/mL.

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IVINS noted that Dugway made 8 batches (IVINS later reviewed his notes and determined that only 7 batches were made by Dugway) and shipped them periodically during 1997. The eighth batch (later determined by IVINS to be the seventh) was dirty and could not be purified by density gradient. IVINS described this "dirty" sample as dark brown in color, clumpy, non-refractile with a lot of debris and vegetative matter. IVINS does not recall seeing a non-Ba contaminant and noted that the sample was just bad Ba. IVINS did not know why this shipment was bad and did not know why Dugway did not notice the quality of these spores prior to shipment. IVINS reviewed his notes and determined that this sample was autoclaved, although he does not recall if he was present when it was autoclaved.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce E. Ivins, On 09/08/2004, Page 5

Typically, IVINS would place a sample in a bag and place it in the autoclave. The last person leaving for the day would usually turn on the autoclave.

IVINS reviewed the Reference Material Receipt Record for RMR 1029. He stated that this was not a legal document and was only meant to keep track of the inventory to know when more spores would be needed. IVINS explained that since RMR 1029 were Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) spores, they were not accessible to many people. IVINS reviewed some of the specific entries on the Reference Material Receipt Record for RMR 1029 and explained the following: (1) Spores used in [redacted] were for an IM challenge where only thousands of spores were needed. Spores for this work were only [redacted] of RMR 1029 that was then diluted for the study. (2) Spores used for Covance irradiated prior to shipment to Covance's Denver, Pennsylvania facility for use in spore antiserum production. (3) [redacted] was [redacted] project, which involved aerosol challenges of approximately 1000 rabbits. [redacted] was trying to determine what dose of vaccine would provide protection for 50% of the rabbits challenged. IVINS would take material from RMR 1029 in Suite B3, dilute it, and provide this to [redacted] for this study. [redacted] was not able to enter Suite B3 because of [redacted] [redacted] (4) Spores used for [redacted] were provided to [redacted] as undiluted spores. (5) Spores used for the Bioport Rabbit Challenge included [redacted] that were used to challenge approximately 100 rabbits. (6) Spores for [redacted] at Battelle were sent for aerosol challenges at Battelle. IVINS explained that the discrepancies between the volume removed from RMR 1029 for the May and June 2001 shipments to Battelle [redacted] and [redacted] respectively) and the volume actually shipped in May and June 2001 [redacted] and [redacted] respectively) were due to the fact the IVINS centrifuged the samples and reduced their overall volume prior to shipment to Battelle. (7) Spores provided to [redacted] on 8/27/01 were undiluted spores. (8) Spores provided to [redacted] on 10/4/01 were undiluted spores.

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IVINS explained that RMR 1029 was maintained in two 500 mL flasks in suite B3. When material was needed for a challenge, IVINS would remove the volume of spores needed in the challenge and place this volume in a Gibco serum bottle. This Gibco serum bottle was then transported to building 1412 at USAMRIID, where it was aliquoted for use in the challenge. IVINS stated that the two 500 mL flasks that contained RMR 1029

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce E. Ivins, On 09/08/2004, Page 6

were never taken over to building [redacted]. Only the amount needed for a challenge was taken to [redacted] in a Gibco serum bottle. The volume of RMR 1029 that was recorded on the Reference Material Receipt Record was not based on visual observation but instead was based on back calculating the amount taken from the original volume. When asked about a [redacted] discrepancy in this record, IVINS explained that evaporation over the years as well as math error would account for this missing volume. IVINS stated that RMR 1029 could have lost up to [redacted] a year and this would not be unusual because it is not stored in an air tight container. He noted that when they aliquoted [redacted] tubes in the past, they would see an approximate [redacted] drop in volume over time that they believe is from evaporation. IVINS also stated that he is not sure how much his record is off from the actual volume because SA [redacted] took the container and noted there was approximately [redacted] left, but [redacted] did not actually measure the container. Therefore, IVINS is unsure how much of RMR 1029 may be missing.

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IVINS noted that he shipped some of RMR 1029 to the University of New Mexico in 2001. IVINS stated that this shipment was not recorded on the Receipt Record and he was not sure why it wasn't recorded. IVINS stated that the information on this shipment would be located on USAMRIID form 11R in the Safety Office.

USAMRIID had previously shipped the Ames strain to Dugway in 1992. IVINS does not know what the 1992 shipment was used for at Dugway. IVINS believes that the 1992 shipment to Dugway was spores from either the "1985" or "1989" sample. There is only a small amount of RMR 1029 remaining that is needed for non-human primate (NHP) studies this year. When USAMRIID was getting low on RMR 1029 spores, they contracted Dugway in 2001 to produce additional spores. Dugway put off the production of these spores and just recently sent USAMRIID the last batch of spores they were contracted to produce. The FBI is in possession of the first batch of these spores, called the "2003 Dugway" spores. IVINS is in the process of purifying the last batch of these spores, called the "2004 Dugway" spores. IVINS noted that the 1997 Dugway spores were much nicer than the 2003 Dugway spores. Approximately 1/2 of the 2003 shipment could not be used because they were so bad. The only Dugway spores at USAMRIID are the 1997 spores, the 2003 spores, and the 2004 spores. IVINS noted that he called the 1997 Dugway spores the "Dugway Spores". The other two sets of spores were called the

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce E. Ivins, On 09/08/2004, Page 7

"Dugway 2003 spores" and the "Dugway 2004 spores". IVINS copied the USAMRIID Form 11 that documented the shipment of Ba to Dugway in 1992. This document is maintained in an FD-340 in the 1A section of the file. At this point in the interview, IVINS escorted the interviewing agents to the USAMRIID Safety Office to obtain a copy of the USAMRIID form 11R for the shipment of Ba to Dugway in 1997. A copy of this document is maintained in an FD-340 in the 1A section of the file.

IVINS explained that some samples of Ba have multiple numbers used to identify the samples. For example, RMR 1029 is also identified as "7737". He explained that [redacted] who worked in Office of Product Development and Regulatory Affairs (OPDRA) at USAMRIID, assigned numbers for samples at the entire institute. IVINS noted that [redacted] is no longer at USAMRIID and is currently working in the Research Triangle Park area in North Carolina. When a sample was moved between buildings 1412 and 1425, it was assigned a different tracking number. As a result, a sample could have as many as three identification numbers. IVINS noted that the only number that was consistent in identification of a sample was the Agent Inventory Number.

With regard to RMR 1030 and RMR 1029, IVINS stated that all of the batches made at USAMRIID which were incorporated in 1030 or 1029 were made by IVINS [redacted] RMR 1030 was prepped for an aerosol challenge in the same way as RMR 1029 (described above). IVINS is not aware of any deviations from protocol when growing RMR 1030 or RMR 1029. As with RMR 1029, the main flask storing RMR 1030 was never taken from 1425 to 1412. Only the amount required for an aerosol challenge was decanted and sent to 1412. IVINS then explained some changes in the growth protocols that were used to prepare RMR 1030 and RMR 1029 and the growth protocols used today. These differences included the following: (1) using an orbital shaker (now) versus using a side-to-side shaker (then); (2) growing the Ba at [redacted] (now) versus growing Ba at [redacted] (then). He noted that a new SOP is being drafted with the current changes incorporated. Outside of these noted changes, IVINS stated there have only been minor modifications to the protocols over time; for example, centrifuging for 20 minutes instead of 10 minutes. [redacted] would be good sources of information on this topic.

IVINS noted that there are several individuals at USAMRIID that grow spores. Most of the persons who grow Ba also grow spores, although he was not sure of the amounts grown by each person. IVINS listed the following persons as those at USAMRIID outside of his

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce E. Ivins, On 09/08/2004, Page 8

laboratory who have grown spores: [REDACTED] b6
[REDACTED] IVINS explained a previous statement where he b7C
had said that the Ames strain was determined to be "hot" in 1996. He
explained that USAMRIID used the Vollum 1B strain until [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] showed some vaccine resistant strains in guinea pigs,
one of which was the Ames strain. Therefore, researchers decided to
use the Ames strain instead of Vollum 1B. This occurred in the early
to mid-1990s.

IVINS was shown a series of photographs of samples collected
by SA [REDACTED] from IVINS on June 6, 2004. He was shown a photo
of a tube labeled "Ames Stock, [REDACTED] written in
blue ink. IVINS did not recognize the handwriting on the tube. IVINS
was asked why he called the sample a [REDACTED] sample when the date on
the tube was 1999 and [REDACTED] IVINS stated
that the tube was just in a box labeled [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED]
may know more about this sample. IVINS was then shown a photograph of
a tube labeled "Ames Spores, 2433, CDC 7738", written in black ink.
IVINS explained that this was a sample that [REDACTED] got from IVINS
and IVINS believes that the FBI already has this sample in the FBI
repository. The sample is either RMR 1029 or material that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] made. IVINS suggested the interviewing agents contact [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to determine what seed stock was used to make this sample,
if in fact [REDACTED] did make this sample for [REDACTED] IVINS was
then shown two photos of a sample labeled "Ames Spores, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] written in green ink. IVINS did not recognize these tubes. IVINS
was also shown a photo of a tube labeled "Ames Spores, Renograffin
Purified, 3/28/01, 7739C", written in blue ink. IVINS noted that this
was a sample of Ba prepared by [REDACTED] in March of 2001. He did not
know the seed stock used to make this sample.

The interview was then paused for lunch. After conducting
some research during the lunch break, IVINS provided agents with copies
of page 70 from notebook # 4010 and page 86 from notebook # 3655. In
addition, IVINS provided agents with a one page document titled
"Information on *B. anthracis* Ames spore lots", and a one-page document
titled "Spore Preparation Form". These documents are maintained in an
FD-340 in the 1A section of the file. From these documents, IVINS
noted that the Ames spores sent to Dugway in 1997 were sent in
suspension, in four 1mL polypropylene tubes, at a concentration of 1 x
10¹⁰ spores per mL. This shipment is consistent with IVINS sending RMR
1030 to Dugway in 1997. Although IVINS isn't sure that it was RMR 1030
that he sent to Dugway, the concentration of the 1997 shipment, the
storage container, and the method of shipment are all consistent with
RMR 1030 being sent to Dugway in 1997. IVINS noted that all of RMR

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce E. Ivins, On 09/08/2004, Page 9

1030 was produced in Leighton and Doi broth, in accordance with UIB-BI-3. IVINS advised that he would need to review his notebooks to determine what seed stock was sent from USAMRIID to Dugway in 1992.

IVINS explained that Capsule Agar detects capsule formation in Ba. He noted that Ba would not show capsule formation when grown in carbon dioxide at less than 5% unless both plasmids were present. IVINS advised that the material sent from Southern Research Institute (SRI) to California by [redacted] recently was grown on capsule agar. He then provided a USAMRIID Study Specific Procedure titled [redacted]

[redacted] prepared by [redacted] date originated 3/23/97 and effective date 4/7/97. This document is maintained in an FD-340 in the 1A section of the file.

IVINS has worked with Covance in Denver, Pennsylvania. USAMRIID wanted Covance to produce antiserum for some spore antibody studies. These studies were performed by [redacted] In support of some Ba vaccine studies at USAMRIID, USAMRIID has provided the Ba vaccine to Covance. Covance immunizes the rabbits, and the rabbits are then brought down to USAMRIID for challenge. IVINS is not aware of any live Ba used by Covance. All Ba provided by USAMRIID to Covance is gamma-irradiated. [redacted] is doing some work with Covance and IVINS works with [redacted] The only Covance facility visited by IVINS is the one in Denver, Pennsylvania.

Regarding the sample sent to the Defense Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) in Canada, IVINS believes it was vegetative cells sent by [redacted] He believes this shipment was not spores and was probably sent in a frozen state. IVINS noted that this information could be found on the form 11R. He does not know the origin of the sample sent to DRES. IVINS noted that [redacted] was very good at making spores. He also added that [redacted]

[redacted] IVINS provided a one-page e-mail from [redacted] at DRES, dated 4/8/04, regarding this Ames Ba spore shipment to DRES. This document is maintained in an FD-340 in the 1A section of the file.

Regarding sample 7739A, grown by [redacted] in 1997, IVINS did not what [redacted] used to make this sample and stated he would have to check his notebooks and ask around to determine what may have been used.

IVINS described heat shocking of spores. He explained that it was an activating mechanism used to synchronize spores prior to

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce E. Ivins, On 09/08/2004, Page 10

germination. IVINS first became aware of heat shocking back in the Gulf War. The Division Chief called IVINS in his office to discuss a large NHP study. The Division Chief did not want the spores Renograffin purified because that was not done in the old days. Spores used to be heat shocked at [REDACTED]. This temperature was chosen because counts do not decrease at this temperature and refractile spores are not killed. Spores that are used for intramuscular (IM) or aerosol challenges are heat shocked. All spores are heat shocked in building 1412. IVINS does not know if anyone has studied virulence with respect to heat shock. However, [REDACTED] did some studies on heat shocked material versus non-heat shocked material.

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IVINS noted that he told SSA [REDACTED] that USAMRIID used Tween to break up a thick spore suspensions. [REDACTED] who works for [REDACTED] has added anti-foam to spore suspensions. IVINS then discussed the spore harvest procedure. Ames strain Ba, from a primary subculture, is streaked onto a sheep's blood agar (SBA) plate. Three "typical" colonies are selected and placed in phosphate buffer solution, then into Leighton and Doi broth for three days. Spores are harvested and run through a Hypaque density gradient. Hypaque is what is used now, where as Renocal or Renograffin is what was used in the past. IVINS learned this density gradient purification procedure from [REDACTED]

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IVINS advised that he recently received an e-mail from USAMRIID command that stated the FBI was requesting all files, e-mails, etc. that related to the Ames strain of Ba. IVINS opined that this was a large undertaking and demonstrated this by showing the interviewing agents that just by searching the term "Ames" on his archived e-mails, he retrieved over 1200 e-mails. IVINS advised that he will be glad to provide whatever the FBI requested, but this request would require a large amount of time.

Fifteen laboratory notebooks that were provided by IVINS were returned to him. An FD-597 was executed and detailed the numbers of the notebooks returned. IVINS was provided with a copy of the FD-597, and the remaining two copies are maintained in an FD-340, in the 1A section of the file.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/04/2004

To: Counterterrorism
Washington Field

Attn: SSA [redacted]
Attn: IIC [redacted]
Amerithrax 3,
SA [redacted]

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From: [redacted]
Squad 7/[redacted] Resident Agency
Contact: SA [redacted]

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Approved By: [redacted]

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DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH
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Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD (Pending) -676
~~279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID~~ (Pending) -937

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To report information obtained during interview of
[redacted]

Reference: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD Serial 627
279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID Serial 891

Enclosure(s): Enclosed for Washington Field, Amerithrax 3, is a
1-A envelope containing notes taken during the interview of
[redacted]

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Details: Referenced serials set forth a lead for [redacted]
Division at [redacted] to conduct an interview of
[redacted]
[redacted] at the United States Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in relation
to captioned investigation. Pursuant to that lead, the following
information is provided:

On 9/29/2004, [redacted]
[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Account Number:
[redacted] place of birth [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]
place of residence at [redacted] in
[redacted] telephone [redacted] (home) and [redacted]
[redacted] (cellular). Present during the interview was [redacted]
[redacted] a task force agent assigned to the [redacted]
[redacted] Regional Domestic
Security Task Force. After being advised of the identity of the

[redacted] b6
b7C

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 10/04/2004

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interviewing agent as well as the nature of the interview,
[redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] had obtained the equivalent of a [redacted]
[redacted] degree in [redacted]
[redacted] was awarded [redacted] degree in [redacted]
College [redacted] graduated
from [redacted] College [redacted] originally

[redacted]

In [redacted] enrolled in the [redacted]
College [redacted] where [redacted] majored in [redacted]

[redacted]

While attending [redacted] University.

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 10/04/2004

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] did not work with Anthrax during the time [redacted] was employed at [redacted]. [redacted] did note that while [redacted] [redacted] did some culturing of Anthrax spores. [redacted] The Anthrax cultured was a toxic form. [redacted] tasked [redacted] with culturing Anthrax, separating the components of the spores and doing DNA analysis on them.

[redacted]

According to [redacted] The research involved working with infectious diseases to develop means of diagnosing and treating infectious diseases [redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 10/04/2004

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[redacted]
[redacted] did not work with Anthrax during the time [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] had an interest in working with infectious diseases and decided to [redacted] at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] also elected to work at USAMRIID because he knew that the skills he would acquire there would be highly sought after in the private sector [redacted]

[redacted] advised that when the FBI was reestablishing its laboratory at Quantico, Virginia, USAMRIID began to collaborate with them on various research projects. [redacted] thought that by working at USAMRIID, [redacted] chances of obtaining employment [redacted] would be enhanced .

[redacted]

[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 10/04/2004

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[redacted]

The Anthrax spores were cultured using selective media or enriched media. Only that amount of Anthrax that was needed to conduct testing was cultured. Some to the Anthrax was dead through irradiation; however, some live Anthrax spores were also used. Live Anthrax would be stored in refrigerated compartments until it was needed. [redacted] explained it, [redacted] would obtain the Anthrax they used from [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] used the modified G sporulation media on almost a daily basis. Initially, [redacted] advised that [redacted] could not recall the specific strains of Anthrax that were used by [redacted] however, [redacted] searched for and retrieved some personal notes [redacted] had taken regarding experiments [redacted] had performed while at USAMRIID. These notes indicated that the Anthrax strains that had been used in his research testing were [redacted] speculated but could not state for a fact that some of the Anthrax samples that were used had been obtained during [redacted] [redacted] indicated once again that [redacted] was responsible for storing the Anthrax. Typically, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] would then take whatever amounts of Anthrax they needed to complete that particular day's testing assignments.

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that neither [redacted] nor anyone else in [redacted] section ever did any work which involved the drying of Anthrax.

According to [redacted] all strains of Anthrax that [redacted] worked with were fully characterized. The specific strains used were [redacted] [redacted] All of the Anthrax that [redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 10/04/2004

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[redacted] worked with [redacted] was given to them by [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] has no idea how [redacted] could be contacted at the present time but assumes that [redacted] would be able to provide identifying data for [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] had no idea how [redacted] could be contacted but assumes that [redacted] would be able to fully identify [redacted]

[redacted] did know of any problems that were experienced with bacterial contamination at the lab. [redacted] was not aware of any problems with bacterial contamination in the virology suites.

According to [redacted] the two areas that [redacted] routinely used to conduct [redacted] experiments were [redacted] research areas [redacted] was unable to identify any of the areas [redacted] worked in based upon the floor plans [redacted] was provided by the interviewing agent.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] and other personnel in [redacted] section had, on varying occasions, used the hot areas of building [redacted] and [redacted]. The laboratory [redacted] worked at in building [redacted] [redacted] could not identify the locations [redacted] had worked in using the diagrams that had been provided. [redacted] could not specifically recall anything relating to a cooler located in room [redacted] could not identify where room [redacted] was located on the diagrams [redacted] was provided by the interviewing agent.

According to [redacted] no one was ever allowed to piggy back in and out of the hot areas with any members [redacted] believes that [redacted] and may have allowed people to piggy back into the hot areas with them.

To: Counterterrorism From: [REDACTED]
Re: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 10/04/2004

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believed that if someone wanted to, they could remove select agents from the hot areas by placing them in vials and then putting the vials in their pockets. [REDACTED] never witnessed anyone removing any select agents from the hot areas but in [REDACTED] opinion, such removal could be easily accomplished. [REDACTED] explained that the military technicians were strictly accountable for all the materials that they used in their experiments. The military personnel had to sign for all of the materials they used and account for them at the end of each day. All of the materials were turned in or documentation had to be provided that showed that they were destroyed. [REDACTED] the civilian lab technicians were not held to such high standards of accountability for the materials they worked with. [REDACTED] never heard anyone talking about removing any select agent from the lab. [REDACTED] never heard anyone make any statement indicating that they were going to try to obtain a select agent to use it for some improper purpose. [REDACTED] was not aware of any persons with access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological weapons to express hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media or others.

[REDACTED] stated that none of the people that [REDACTED] worked with were lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents. [REDACTED] again stated that [REDACTED] many of the civilian technicians were more lax in their following of procedures than the military personnel who worked at the lab. [REDACTED] could not identify any specific individuals who were lax in handling dangerous items.

During the time that [REDACTED] worked at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] never heard any rumors indicating that there was an individual or individuals who were interested in gaining access to Anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents. [REDACTED] did not know of or hear any rumors indicating that anyone was trying to obtain the means to produce Anthrax or other biological or chemical agents who did not have a specific need or responsibility for doing so.

[REDACTED] stated that in order to mail dried Anthrax, someone would have to be able to know how to weaponize it. In [REDACTED] opinion, whoever prepared the Anthrax that was mailed in October of 2001, had to have access to a great deal of laboratory machinery in order to make it.

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
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[redacted] was not aware of anyone who expressed a special interest in being able to get around forensic techniques. [redacted] has never been to the State of New Jersey in [redacted] life. [redacted] does not have any associates or any personal or professional acquaintances who are associated with the Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey areas. [redacted] believed that some of the civilian technicians who worked at USAMRIID were from New York but [redacted] did not know anyone from the New Jersey area. [redacted] advised that [redacted] does not know anyone who traveled to New Jersey in September or October of 2001. [redacted]

According to [redacted] there were standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the decontamination of class two and class three bio safety cabinets in [redacted] work areas. [redacted] could not recall specifically what the SOPs contained. In general, the SOPs gave instructions on how disinfectant were to be used. During the time that [redacted] worked at USAMRIID, [redacted] At times, [redacted] could smell bacterial decontamination agents in the [redacted] suites.

[redacted] advised that during the time [redacted] worked at USAMRIID, [redacted] routinely used plastic storage containers such as sterlite boxes for the storage of [redacted] research materials. [redacted] did not know how, where or when these containers were purchased. [redacted] explained that a civilian supply technician ordered all of those types of supplies and issued them out as they were needed. [redacted] never knew of any storage boxes to be missing.

According to [redacted] at various times when [redacted] worked at USAMRIID, some researchers would conduct experiments with Anthrax which were not recorded. [redacted] stated that this was not done for a sinister purpose. [redacted] explained that scientists are curious by nature and some experimentation that was conducted was impromptu and went unrecorded. [redacted] advised that this was not a practice of the military personnel but was a routine practice of certain civilian lab technicians. [redacted] could not identify any individuals who did such unrecorded experiments.

[redacted] advised that all of [redacted] work was recorded in lab notebooks. Those notebooks should be in the custody of [redacted] stated that [redacted] did keep some personal notes regarding experiments [redacted] conducted. These notes are unclassified and [redacted] knows of no prohibition against [redacted] possessing them.

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 10/04/2004

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[redacted] stated that when [redacted] worked at USAMRIID, [redacted] would use a post office in Frederick, Maryland to transact [redacted] personal business. At varying times, [redacted] did purchase pre-stamped envelopes. All of the envelopes [redacted] purchased were for [redacted] own personal use and [redacted] does not recall giving any to anyone. [redacted] always purchased [redacted] envelopes over-the-counter from a postal service employee. [redacted] claimed that [redacted] never purchased any envelopes from a vending machine.

[redacted] did not know [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] knew who [redacted] was but never interacted with [redacted] or worked with [redacted] on any projects at USAMRIID.

[redacted] advised that [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]

To: Counterterrorism From: [redacted]
Re: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 10/04/2004

[redacted]

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At the conclusion of the interview, [redacted] advised that [redacted] would be more than happy to answer any additional questions regarding [redacted] experiences while working at the USAMRIID laboratories. [redacted] also stated that [redacted] would be willing to take a polygraph examination in order to prove the truthfulness of the information [redacted] provided above.

To: Counterterrorism From:
Re: 279A-WF-222936-LEAD, 10/04/2004

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LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Read and clear.

◆◆

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/12/2004

Pursuant to a letter of request dated 08/24/2004, on 10/12/2004, [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), telephone [redacted] provided Special Agent (SA) [redacted] with the following items:

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A list of laboratory notebooks maintained at USAMRIID for the following individuals, [redacted] BRUCE IVINS, [redacted] No notebooks were located for [redacted]

Leave records for the year 2001 for [redacted]


Time and Attendance records for [redacted]

A list derived from Electron Microscopy (EM) logs of all EM which meets the description "Ames spore preparations" as requested in the letter of request. Included are samples for which there was not enough information to make a determination, but could be "Ames spore preparations";

Sample [redacted] an [redacted] a special project conducted for [redacted]

42 electron microscopy photographs.

The list of laboratory notebooks is attached. All of the other items are maintained in 1A envelopes.



Investigation on 10/12/2004 at Frederick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 948 Date dictated 10/12/2004

by [redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted] [redacted] 4286 C [redacted]

	A	B	C	D	E
1	CODE				
2					
3	** = laboratory technician; not always assigned individual notebook				
4	NA = no record of notebook assigned to researcher				
5					
6	active = notebook held by researcher				
7	destroyed = notebook sent to Records Mgt office and destroyed ca 1988				
8	inactive = notebook held in library				
9	inactive/storage = notebook held by library, stored in warehouse				
10	transferred = notebook ownership transferred to another researcher				
11	unused = notebook returned unused; reissued under same number to another researcher				
12					
13					
14	NAME	NTBK #	STATUS	COMMENTS	
15					
16		NA			
17					
18			active	assigned to Ivins	
19					
20			active	no subject	
21			active	no subject	
22			inactive	yersinia pestis recombinant	
23			inactive	yersinia pestis recombinant	
24			inactive	yersinia pestis	
25			inactive	ademylate cyclase cloning	
26			active	plague	
27			inactive	f1 protein purification	
28			inactive	f1 operon genetics	
29			active	plague	
30			active	plague	
31			active	plague	
32			active	plague	
33			active	plague	
34			active	plague	
35			active	plague	
36			active	plague	
37			active	live vaccine/yersinia pestis	
38			active	anthrax vaccines	
39			active	anthrax	
40			active	anthrax	
41			active	anthrax	
42			active	anthrax	
43			active	anthrax	
44			active	virulence genes	
45			active	gene regulation	
46			active	toxin expression	
47			active	anthrax	
48			active	anthrax	
49			active	anthrax	
50					
51		NA			

b6
 b7c

	A	B	C	D	E
52					
53		NA			
54					
55	Ivins, B.		destroyed	Legionnaire's disease	
56			destroyed	Legionnaire's disease	
57			destroyed	Legionnaire's disease	
58			inactive/storage	anthrax	
59			active	khf	
60			inactive/storage	Legionnaire's disease	
61			inactive/storage	Rapid detection of infect diseas	
62			active	Rapid detection of infect diseas	
63			active	Legionnaire's disease	
64			inactive/storage	anthrax	
65			active	Legionnaire's disease	
66			inactive/storage	anthrax	
67			active	anthrax toxin	
68			active	anthrax toxin	
69			active	871-ac/mgda bacillus anthracis	
70			active	91c-la/mcoc	
71			active	anthrax vaccine research	
72			active	anthrax toxin	
73			active	anthrax toxin	
74			active	anthrax toxin	
75			unused	reissued to	
76			active	anthrax toxin	
77			active	anthrax toxin	
78			active	anthrax	
79			active	anthrax	
80			active	anthrax	
81			active	anthrax	
82			active	anthrax vaccine studies	
83			active	anthrax vaccine studies	
84			active	anthrax and orgies	
85			active	anthrax vaccine studies	
86			active	anthrax toxin	
87			active	anthrax	
88			active	grp study mdph e	
89			active	bacillus anthracis	
90			active	anthrax	
91			active	anthrax and adjuvants	
92			active	anthrax studies 1	
93			active	anthrax studies 2	
94			active	anthrax studies 3	
95			active	anthrax surrogate markers	
96			active	anthrax vaccine studies	
97			active	anthrax spores	
98			active	Bacillus anthracis worlwide strain	
99			active	anthrax study b98-03	
100			active	atypical anthrax strains	
101			active	AVA experiments	
102			active	RPA experiments	

	A	B	C	D	E
103			active	anthrax	
104			active	anthrax	
105			active	anthrax	
106			active	vaccine efficiency	
107			active	anthrax spores	
108			active	spore inventory record	
109					
110			inactive	rapid diagnosis	
111			inactive	sequencing anthrax toxins	
112			inactive	sequencing anthrax toxins	
113			inactive	sequencing anthrax toxins	
114			inactive	rvfv dna proves	
115			inactive	anthrax toxins	
116			inactive	anthrax toxins	
117			inactive	anthrax toxins	
118			inactive	molecular genetics of bacillus ant	
119			inactive	molecular genetics of bacillus ant	
120			inactive	molecular genetics of bacillus ant	
121			inactive	871-ac	
122			inactive	871-ac	
123			inactive	anthrax toxins	
124			inactive	anthrax toxins	
125			inactive	anthrax toxins	
126			inactive	anthracis virulence factor	
127			inactive	anthracis virulence factor	
128			inactive	anthracis virulence factor	
129			inactive	no subject	
130			inactive	no subject	
131			inactive	no subject	
132			inactive	no subject	
133			inactive	no subject	
134					
135			inactive/storage	no subject	
136			inactive/storage	no subject	
137			inactive/storage	detection & charact plasmids	
138			inactive/storage	gene cloning	
139			inactive/storage	detection & charact plasmids	
140			inactive/storage	detection & charact plasmids	
141			inactive/storage	plasmids	
142			inactive	bacillus anthracis genetics	
143			inactive	bacillus anthracis	
144					
145				assigned to Ivins	
146					
147	Mikesell, O.		destroyed	plasmid char. & detection	
148			destroyed	plasmid char. & detection	
149			inactive/storage	anthrax	
150			inactive/storage	anthrax	
151			inactive/storage	anthrax	
152			inactive/storage	anthrax	
153			inactive/storage	s10-ao-170	

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	A	B	C	D	E
154			inactive/storage	s10-ao-170	
155			inactive/storage	anthrax	
156			inactive/storage	anthrax toxin	
157			inactive/storage	anthrax toxin	
158			inactive	anthrax toxin	
159			inactive	anthrax toxin	
160			inactive	anthrax toxin	
161				transferred to Ivins	
162				transferred to Ivins	
163				transferred to Ivins	
164				transferred to Ivins	
165					
166		NA			

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/29/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security number [redacted] employed at the United States
Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), was interviewed telephonically on October 29, 2004. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] stated that the material collected by the FBI in July 2004 belonging to [redacted] was part of an aerosol challenge on [redacted]. The material was taken from lot number [redacted]. The starting concentration of material placed into the nebulizer for the challenge was [redacted].

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[Large redacted block]

[redacted] stated that the lot is suspended by Phenol and is in possession of BRUCE IVINS. The material was heat-shocked prior to being used.

Investigation on 10/29/2004 at [redacted] (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 977

Date dictated [redacted]

by SA [redacted]
[redacted] 043035.wpd

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/17/2004

[redacted] dob [redacted] ssn [redacted]
address [redacted] cell phone
number [redacted] was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, [redacted] After
being advised of the nature of the interview and the identity of
the interviewing agent [redacted] provided the following
information:

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[redacted]

From [redacted] worked at
United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID). [redacted]
and currently works for [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]

While at USAMRIID [redacted]
[redacted] did not work with any biological organisms and did not know
where Bacillus anthracis (Ba) was stored and/or worked on. [redacted]
knew Bruce Ivins [redacted] but was not aware of
origination or dissemination of Ba. [redacted] did not know who had
expertise in weaponization techniques, spore production, or
lyophilizing. [redacted] was not aware of any areas that had problems
with bacterial contamination.

[redacted] was in building 1425 [redacted] rooms
[redacted]

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In building 1412 [redacted]
[redacted]

Investigation on 11/16/04 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 991

Date dictated 11/17/04

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by SA [redacted]

322 [redacted] 01.302

This document [redacted] neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;

[redacted]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 11/16/04, Page 2

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not use room [REDACTED] nor did [REDACTED] know who used it or what was stored there. [REDACTED] was unaware of people "piggy-backing" in and out of hot areas or if visiting scientists were taken into hot areas. [REDACTED] did not know how to get Select Agents from the hot area covertly, or know anyone who tried. [REDACTED] did not know anyone who said they might make a Select Agent for use in some improper fashion.

[REDACTED] did not know any person with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media or others. [REDACTED] did not know who mailed the anthrax letters. [REDACTED] did not know anyone who was lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents. [REDACTED] was not aware of anyone interested in gaining access to anthrax or any other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them without a specific need or responsibility to do so. [REDACTED] does not know how to prepare dried Ba and send it through the mail. [REDACTED] is not aware of anyone who expressed an interest in being able to get around forensic techniques.

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[REDACTED] and does not have any affiliation with Trenton or Princeton, New Jersey nor does [REDACTED] know anyone that does. [REDACTED] does not know about SOPs for decontamination of Class II or III biosafety cabinets and was not in virology areas. [REDACTED] did not work with any biological agents or make any records related to research, official or unofficial. [REDACTED] never purchased pre-stamped envelopes or used vending machines in Frederick. [REDACTED] did not handle any anthrax-laced letters or do any analytical work.

[REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] and saw [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] office and in the halls around [REDACTED] office. [REDACTED] did not know enough about [REDACTED] to comment on [REDACTED] activities at USAMRIID. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The only person [REDACTED] thought may have associated with [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 11/16/04, Page 3

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[redacted] did not host foreign visiting scientists.
[redacted] was not [redacted]

[redacted] tried to stay out of research areas, [redacted] did not
want to disrupt any work. [redacted]

[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/15/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Building [redacted] Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland 21702, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewers and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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Since [redacted]

[redacted]

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From [redacted]

[redacted]

From [redacted]

[redacted]

Technicians keep track of the inventory in stock and notify

[redacted]

Investigation on 10/15/2004 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 995

Date dictated n/a


by SA [redacted] Postal Inspector: [redacted]

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Back of Page

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b7c

04294.wpd



SSA

⋮

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 10/15/2004, Page 2 b6 b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] that must be kept frozen have been stored in Room [redacted] located on the hot side of Building [redacted]

[redacted]

b6 b7C

[redacted] was asked about [redacted] aerosol studies conducted on [redacted] stated that [redacted] received [redacted] *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) from BRUCE IVINS. [redacted] does not know the parent stock of the materials [redacted] received from IVINS, but [redacted] knows that it was material sent from Dugway Proving Ground. [redacted] could not remember exactly when [redacted] received this material, but [redacted] believes it may have been in [redacted], because [redacted] didn't leave it sitting around prior to the [redacted] experiment. The B.a. material was stored in a refrigerator in Room [redacted] could not remember the concentration of the original material received from IVINS, but [redacted] presumes that it was either 10×10^{10} , 10×10^{11} , or 10×10^{12} CFU/mL. [redacted] had to dilute the material alot because of the low concentrations needed for the experiments on [redacted]

b6 b7C b2 b7F

[redacted] has a working knowledge of lyophilizers. However, [redacted] did not use a lyophilizer at USAMRIID [redacted]

b6 b7C

[redacted]

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/DK/TH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/29/2004

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On September 17, 2004, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland (MD), telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identities of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] obtained [redacted] original *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) Ames samples from BRUCE IVINS, and has never obtained any B.a. Ames from [redacted]

[redacted]

Both samples are contained in 1.5 milliliter (mL) vials, and probably had an initial total volume of approximately [redacted]. The volume of [redacted] is now significantly less because of use. Both samples are currently in Room [redacted] but they may have previously been stored in [redacted] has been submitted to the FBI repository. [redacted] was not certain that [redacted] has ever used [redacted].

[redacted]

[redacted] B.a. Ames sample that [redacted] obtained from IVINS was taken [redacted] took some Ames spores from material [redacted]

[redacted]

Vollum 1B and Ames were used for monkey challenges as part of a study of vaccine proteins and antibodies and combinations of the two. At least thirty to forty monkeys were used in the antibody vaccine study. [redacted] thought that one batch of spores was used for the

[redacted] 3302.wpd

Investigation on 09/17/2004 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-985

Date dictated N/A

b6
b7C

SA [redacted]
by SA [redacted]

[redacted]

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b6
b7c

entire study, but did not know anything about that batch, and advised that IVINS would know more about it.

Bioport was having difficulty with the challenge strain used for their vaccine work. USAMRIID at the time, and they were trying to sort different Vollum 1Bs. There is more than one Vollum 1B at USAMRIID,

which is maintained in an FD-340 in the 1A section of the file.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

There are over seven thousand numbers assigned to samples within File Maker Pro, which is an inventory database of select agents at USAMRIID. The numbers are assigned by File Maker Pro regardless of the PI or any other factor. The system was developed prior to the new Centers for Disease Control (CDC) regulations. [redacted] [redacted] USAMRIID is changing the program to be more user-friendly and to better track samples.

Implementation of File Maker Pro started around the time when the FBI served the first subpoena to USAMRIID in the spring of 2002. Researchers were instructed to inventory all samples in January 2002, but [redacted] could not recall who gave this directive. They were supposed to register every strain they were in possession of, and each strain was assigned one number, with the quantity of vials of that strain noted. A copy of this sample list was provided to the FBI

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] File Maker Pro does not assign alpha characters, however an alpha character after a sample number may designate an aliquot.

Prior to the File Maker Pro inventory system, the Ames strain used in Suites B3 and B4 was registered with the Safety Office at USAMRIID and given a number there. This Safety Office sample number covered all B.a. Ames and Ames variants within the suite. Delta Ames, Delta ANR, and ANR all have different parental lines and therefore were likely registered differently.

[redacted]

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b6
b7C

[Redacted]

The only nomenclature outside of File Maker Pro and PI preference is the B.a. list, although [Redacted] did not think that anyone [Redacted] uses the B.a. list. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

No one at USAMRIID ferments spores. Until recently, there was a fermentor in Suite B4 used for protective antigen (PA) and lethal factor studies. The fermentor was in a laboratory considered to be Biosafety Level-2 (BL-2) space within Suite B4, as no hot strains could be present in the room. Attenuated strains such as Stearne were grown in the fermentor. In accordance with the Biological Weapons (BW) convention, the size of the B4 fermentor would have made it illegal to use for fermentation of hot strains. [Redacted] advised that she could probably count the number of times the fermentor was used. The space has been renovated, and now they have a smaller 5 liter (L) to 10L fermentor. [Redacted] thought that USAMRIID may have donated the fermentor previously in Suite B4 to a university.

SA [Redacted] showed [Redacted] a series of photographs: [Redacted] did not recognize a photo of a tube labeled [Redacted]

[Redacted] did not recognize a photo of a cryovial with a white top and labeled [Redacted] in green marker, however [Redacted] advised that most people would not use a green marker to label samples. [Redacted] advised that "CDC" was written in front of sample number [Redacted] pictured horizontally in a tube with an orange top because people are getting confused among the CDC, File Maker Pro, and Safety Office numbers.

The handwriting on the Falcon tube with a blue top pictured horizontally and labeled [Redacted] was familiar to [Redacted] could not identify it.

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