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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

JUN - 6 2018

Mr. John Greenwald, Jr.
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

RE: Freedom of Information Act Case No. F2017-13192

Dear Mr. Greenwald:

Reference is made to your September 12, 2012, Freedom of Information Act request to the Secret Service for documents pertaining to a May 10, 2005, assassination attempt on President George W. Bush in Tbilisi, Georgia. The Department of Homeland Security referred one document to the Department of State for review and direct response to you.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has withheld portions from this document pursuant to 5 USC 552 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), and (b)(7)(E). Some information has been referred to another agency for consultation. We will inform you when that process is complete. An explanation of exemptions is enclosed.

You have the right to appeal the Department of State's denial of information by writing, within 60 days, to the Chairman, Appeals Review Panel, c/o Appeals Officer, A/GIS/IPS/PP/LA, U.S. Department of State, SA-2, Room 8100, Washington, DC 20522-8100. The appeal letter should refer to the Department of State case number shown above, clearly identify the decision being appealed, and provide supporting arguments when possible. For further information, see the Code of Federal Regulations, 22 CFR 171.52.

If you have questions regarding a particular aspect of this case, you should contact the Office of Information Programs and Services (A/GIS/IPS), Department of State, SA-2, Washington, DC 20522-8100. In any communication, please refer to the FOIA case number.

Sincerely,

William R. Terrini
Deputy Executive Director
Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Enclosures:
Explanation of Exemptions
Document

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552 (FOIA):

b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;

b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information, (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a (PA):

(b) No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains,

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding.

General Exemptions:

(j)(1) applies to CIA records and information provided by foreign governments;

(j)(2) maintained by an agency or component thereof which performs as its principal function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws, including police efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or to apprehend criminals, except records of arrest.

Specific Exemptions:

(k)(1) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal law, or which would identify a source under an express promise of confidentiality, or, prior to the effective date of this section, under an implied promise of confidentiality;

(k)(3) maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to section 3056 of Title 18;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;


(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suit ability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal contracts, or access to classified information, the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a source under an express promise of confidentiality, or, prior to the effective date of this section, under an implied promise of confidentiality;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used solely to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the Federal service the disclosure of which would compromise the testing or examination process; or

(k)(7) evaluation material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity of a source under an express promise of confidentiality, or, prior to the effective date of this section, under an implied promise of confidentiality.

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672-21527
671-35925

UNCLASSIFIED
TELEGRAM

June 13, 2005

To: SECSTATE WASHDC - IMMEDIATE

Action: DS

From: AMEMBASSY TBILISI (TBILISI 1452 - IMMEDIATE)

TAGS: ASEC, PTER, GG

Captions: DS CHANNEL, SENSITIVE

Subject: JUNE 10, 2005, INVESTIGATION UPDATE - THREAT AGAINST
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TBILISI, GEORGIA

Ref: (A) TBILISI 1213 (NOTAL), (B) PATE/DSCCER EMAIL, 16 MAY
2005, (C) TBILISI 1252; (D) PATE/DSCCER EMAIL, 10
JUNE

1. (U) The following information is Sensitive But
Unclassified - Handle accordingly. Please note that the
following information is for law enforcement use and
information only, and contains sensitive information
regarding Georgian law enforcement investigative procedures.

2. (SBU) BACKGROUND: As per REFS, U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and United States Secret Service (USSS)
investigative efforts into the threat against the President
of the United States during his Tbilisi visit are ongoing.
Their joint investigation in cooperation with the Georgian
Ministry of Internal Affairs has developed several
investigative avenues that are being pursued. Three
subjects of interest have been identified and proactive
investigative steps are being taken to further their
knowledge of the individuals and narrow the focus of the
investigative efforts. END BACKGROUND.



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
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4. (SBU) _____ (REF C) has been identified and a home address was obtained. DNA samples from _____ and _____ (formerly identified as _____) (REF C) have been _____ for DNA comparison.

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7. (SBU) The Armenian Nation Security Service (NSS) has replied to the official request for information regarding the origin and manufacture of the hand grenade. A translation of the reply indicates that the Armenians confirm that they have produced this type of hand grenade in the past, and that it is entirely possible that this is an Armenian model. They further advised that all factories manufacturing this particular munitions have closed and that they are no longer making this grenade. From a photographic analysis from evidence photos submitted by LEGAT Tbilisi, the Armenians believe that the hand grenade's useful life may have expired and concur that the spoon being inhibited by the handkerchief from deploying at a normal speed may have resulted in a light strike. They Armenians have qualified all of these statements however, by stating that a photographic analysis is not sufficient to give a definitive answer. They state that without a hands-on physical examination of the actual device, all of the foregoing is simply conjecture.

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a) [Redacted], a Georgian citizen of Azeri (Azerbaijan) heritage.

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[Redacted]

is unemployed and lives at home with his two brothers and parents. He is of the Muslim faith although he is not overly religious. He does not attend Mosque although he does associate with more devoutly religious individuals with ties to Iran [Redacted] and identifies himself with the Shia sect of Islam. He drinks alcohol on a regular basis and has a gambling habit.

[Redacted]

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It is apparent from conversations that [Redacted] harbors anti-American sentiment, has antipathy towards George W. Bush, and has stated that some unspecified Jihadist groups in Iraq, Jordan, or Algeria would pay for an assassination of the President.

b) [Redacted] is a member of a South Ossetian opposition group known as SAMARTLIANOBA. He has a criminal record for illegal firearms possession. He has also been active in the Labor Oppositionist Party that stands opposed to the current regime in Georgia.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] has previous experience in the Security

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Sector and has some paramilitary background. [redacted] maintains residences in Tbilisi and the autonomous region of South Ossetia. Shortly after the President's visit, [redacted] departed Tbilisi and was at his home in South Ossetia where Georgian authorities could not cover him until June 8, 2005.

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[redacted]

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c) UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL: June 4, [redacted] a Georgian citizen, came forward to the MOIA with information about a suspicious individual that she observed prior to and during the beginning of the President's speech. [redacted] related that she had been fearful of coming forward before but had been coaxed by a friend in the MOIA to relay what she knew. [redacted] advised that on the day of the speech at approximately 1030, she was standing directly in front of the northern end of VIP bleachers waiting for the speech to begin. She observed a Caucasian male, brown hair, 5'10" - 5'11" tall, wearing dark sunglasses, a black, heavy leather coat with a fur collar, and clutching something to his chest. He had a red bandana wrapped around his hand. The individual was standing 2-3 people away from her and [redacted] found it extremely odd that this individual was wearing a heavy coat on such a hot and sunny day. She feared the individual was a pickpocket and kept an eye on him to see if he was going to commit a crime. Occasionally, the wind would blow and the tarp being used as underpinning on the VIP stands would rustle and hit this individual. [redacted] advised that when this occurred she could hear him cursing in the Georgian language. [redacted] continued to observe this individual for approximately 3 hours until she felt like the UNSUB had noticed her watching him and she became fearful and moved away. She said that she moved approximately when President Bush's speech was beginning. [redacted] and her 13-year old son, who also noticed this individual, were initially interviewed [redacted] and Georgian authorities and both individuals related similar facts separate from one another. She is being re-interviewed today. [redacted] has been shown photographs and video of the area in question and has tentatively identified the individual. A Georgian sketch artist is also working with [redacted] to develop a composite of the subject. Given that this individual was located in the area where the

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grenade was thrown, was dressed suspiciously inappropriate

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
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Tbilisi 1542.txt

for the weather conditions for the day, and was clutching something to his chest for an extended period of time with a red handkerchief wrapped around his hand, an effort is being made to identify and locate this individual. Similarly, efforts are being made to identify people standing around that may also have observed this individual.

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As additional information become available, Post will advise the Department accordingly. Post advises Department to review attachments contained in REF B, C and D for additional investigative details. End Comment.

MILES