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UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

CCDC-COS

APR 22 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Classification Determination – Army Regulation 15-6 Report of Investigation into the Civilian Casualty Near Harim, Syria, 5 November 2014

1. Pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and the May 5, 2011 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, SUBJECT: *Delegation of Top Secret Original Classification Authority*, I am a TOP SECRET original classification authority for all documents that originate within or are classified by Headquarters USCENTCOM and/or our subordinate units.
2. [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6), submitted a report of investigation, with exhibits, of the civilian casualty (CIVCAS) investigation after execution of an air strike near Harim, Syria, on 5 November 2014. [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) report of investigation, as originally submitted, included a number of documents and photographs that bore various Information Security classification markings. In order to ensure that all markings are appropriate and correctly annotated, I directed that a team of subject matter experts from across this Headquarters review the full report of investigation for anticipated public release.
3. In my capacity as a TOP SECRET Original Classification Authority, I have now thoroughly reviewed the team's complete proposal and personally adopt their various classification and annotation recommendations in their entirety as well as approve a publicly releasable version of [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) report that fully redacts all classified material, in addition to other appropriate redactions of information, as authorized by the Freedom of Information Act.
4. A copy of this memorandum will be appended at or near the beginning of each version of the report that is kept on file within this Headquarters or that may be shared with others outside of this command. Points of contact for this matter are the Special Security Office (CCJ2-ADD-SSO) and the Staff Judge Advocate's Office.


MICHAEL X. GARRETT
Major General, U.S. Army

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TAB 4	Legal Review
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REFERENCES

- A. Army Regulation 15-6 (U)
- B. Army Regulation 600-20 (U)
- C. CJTF-OIR CIVCAS Credibility Assessment, dtd 31 DEC 14 (S//NF)
- D. USCENTCOM 212045Z SEP 14 EXORD (Kinetic Strike Operations in Syria) (S)
- E. USCENTCOM Positive Identification (PID) Policy 200053Z DEC 08 (S)
- F. CJSCI 3160.01A (U//FOUO)
- G. USCENTCOM Supplement to CJSCI 3160.01A, dtd 25 MAR 14 (U//FOUO)

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- Encl 10 Message from [redacted (b)(6)] to CENTCOM SJA
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Approved for Release

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE- OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE
APO AE 09306

13 February 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve,
Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, APO AE 09306

SUBJECT: Executive Summary of Allegations of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Resulting from
5-6 November 14 Airstrikes in the vicinity of (IVO) Harim, Syria

1. During the late night and early morning hours of November 5-6, 2014, coalition aircraft conducted airstrikes on targets in the vicinity of Harim City, Idlib Governate, Syria. The strikes were designed to destroy targets utilized by Khorasan Group-affiliated extremists to meet and manufacture explosives, including an explosives-making and storage facility used by known improvised explosive device (IED) manufacturers. Khorasan Group targets were assessed as destroyed as a result of those airstrikes. Despite the success of the airstrikes in destroying the targets, the strikes likely resulted in the deaths of two civilians, and caused minor injuries to two other civilians residing near one of the targeted locations.
2. During November, 2014, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) received reports of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) resulting from an airstrike in the vicinity of Harim City. The reports appeared to describe the November 5-6 airstrikes. The reports contained statements that confirmed the airstrikes targeted specific buildings that had been verified as enemy locations, and the airstrikes were accurate in striking those locations. The reports stated that the strikes destroyed buildings and ammunition depots used by enemy forces, and killed known fighters, but also caused deaths and injuries to civilians, including the daughter of a known enemy fighter.
3. As a result of the reports of CIVCAS, a credibility assessment of the allegations was conducted by the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) on December 22, 2014 and completed on December 31, 2014. The assessment found some of the CIVCAS allegations to be initially credible based on the information available. Therefore, the Commander, CJTF-OIR, initiated this formal investigation.
4. The November 5-6, 2014 airstrikes in the vicinity of Harim City, Syria, likely resulted in the destruction of Khorasan Group-affiliated targets that had been converted to military use. The primary weapons used against the targets functioned properly, accurately struck the intended targets, and caused secondary explosions.
5. A preponderance of the evidence available indicates the strikes likely resulted in the deaths of two civilian children at or near one of the targeted locations. The children had not been assessed as residing at any of the targets. The strikes also caused minor injuries to two civilian (b)(6)
(b)(6) local employees residing near one of the targets. Based on the

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SUBJECT: Executive Summary of Allegations of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Resulting from 5 November 14 Airstrikes in the vicinity of (IVO) Harim, Syria

information available, the exact locations of the civilians in relation to the targets, and whether the civilians were killed or injured by primary or secondary explosions could not be determined.

6. The targets engaged were valid military targets at the time of the strikes. The airstrikes in question were conducted in accordance with all military authorities, targeting guidance, and applicable rules of engagement. Additionally, reasonable measures were undertaken to avoid the death or injury of civilians during the strike by thoroughly reviewing the targets prior to engagement, relying on accurate assessments of the targets, and engaging the targets when the risk to non-combatants was minimized. Nonetheless, the death of any civilians is regrettable, and coalition targeting practices incorporating mitigation measures to prevent civilian casualties to the maximum extent possible based on operational requirements, the rules of engagement, and the Law of Armed Conflict will be continued.

7. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Investigating Officer

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

ointed by Brigadier General Thomas D. Weidley, Chief of Staff, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve
(Appointing authority)

on 8 January 2015 (Date) (Attach inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)

SECTION II - SESSIONS

The (investigation) (board) commenced at HQ, CJTF-OIR, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait at 0900
(Place) (Time)
on 8 January 2015 (Date) (If a formal board met for more than one session, check here . Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.) The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were present: (After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)

following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were absent: (Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 5-2 and 5-8a, AR 15-6.)

The (investigating officer) (board) finished gathering/hearing evidence at 1700 on 15 February 2015
(Time) (Date)
and completed findings and recommendations at 1700 on 16 February 2015
(Time) (Date)

SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES		YES	NO ^{1/}	NA ^{2/}
¹	Inclosures (para 3-15, AR 15-6)			
	Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: (Attached in order listed)			
	a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?	✓	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Copy of notice to respondent, if any? (See item 9, below)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	✓
	c. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	✓
	d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	✓
	e. Privacy Act Statements (Certificate, if statement provided orally)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	✓
	f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?	✓	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	g. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	✓
	h. Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?	✓	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

FOOTNOTES: ^{1/} Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.

^{2/} Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.

	YES	NO ^{1/}	NA ^{2/}
2 Exhibits (para 3-16, AR 15-6)			
a. Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (if substituted for real or documentary evidence) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board (para 3-6b, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g. If official notice of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official notice was taken attached as an exhibit (para 3-16d, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3 Was a quorum present when the board voted on findings and recommendations (paras 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
B. COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS (Chapter 5, AR 15-6)			
4 At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment (para 5-3b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5 Was a quorum present at every session of the board (para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6 Was each absence of any member properly excused (para 5-2a, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7 Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required (para 3-1, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8 If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the inclosure describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence (para 5-2d, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
C. COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED (Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6)			
9 Notice to respondents (para 5-5, AR 15-6):			
a. Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Does each letter of notification indicate –			
(1) the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(2) the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(3) the respondent's rights with regard to counsel?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(4) the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(5) the respondent's rights to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10 If any respondent was designated after the proceedings began (or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings):			
a. Was he properly notified (para 5-5, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel (para 5-4c, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11 Counsel (para 5-6, AR 15-6):			
a. Was each respondent represented by counsel?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Name and business address of counsel:			
(If counsel is a lawyer, check here <input type="checkbox"/>)			
b. Was respondent's counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy (or, if oral, a summary) of the request and the action taken on it included in the report (para 5-6b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12 If the respondent challenged the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality (para 5-7, AR 15-6):			
a. Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Did each member successfully challenged cease to participate in the proceedings?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13 Was the respondent given an opportunity to (para 5-8a, AR 15-6):			
a. Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including written statements?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Testify as a witness?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Make or have his counsel make a final statement or argument (para 5-9, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14 If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses (para 5-8b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
re all of the respondent's requests and objections which were denied indicated in the report of proceedings or in an inclosure or exhibit to it (para 5-11, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FOOTNOTES: 1/ Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet. 2/ Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.			

SECTION IV - FINDINGS (para 3-10, AR 15-6)

The (investigating officer) (board) , having carefully considered the evidence, finds:

See Attached Memorandum dated 13 February 2015.

SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS (para 3-11, AR 15-6)

In view of the above findings, the (investigating officer) (board) recommends:

See Attached Memorandum dated 13 February 2015.

SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-17, AR 15-6)

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. (If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear)

_____	(Recorder)	_____	(Investigating Officer, if necessary)
_____	(Member)	_____	(Member)
_____	(Member)	_____	(Member)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT (para 3-13, AR 15-6)

To the extent indicated in Inclosure _____, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board. (In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

_____	(Member)	_____	(Member)
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
SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY (para 2-3, AR 15-6)

Findings and recommendations of the (investigating officer) (board) are (approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/substitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)

From THE INVESTIGATION IT CAN BE DETERMINED THAT ~~THE~~ BOARD PROCEDURES WERE FOLLOWED AND MUST BE FOLLOWED IN THE FUTURE.

Approved for Release


 JAMES L. TERRY
 Lieutenant General, USA
 Commanding



05 APR 2015



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE- OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE
APO AE 09306

CJTF-OIR-J2

13 February 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, APO AE 09306

SUBJECT: Army Regulation (AR)15-6 Investigation into Allegations of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Resulting from 5-6 November 14 Airstrikes in the vicinity of (IVO) Harim, Syria

1. (~~U//FOUO~~) On 9 January 2015 I, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] was appointed as an Investigating Officer (IO) to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding a series of coalition airstrikes that led to potential CIVCAS at 052229Z (060229L) NOV 14 IVO Harim City, Idlib Governate, Syria.

2. (~~S//NF~~) **Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF)**. During the late evening and early morning hours of 5-6 NOV 14, U.S. aircraft conducted multiple airstrikes on Khorasan Group (KG)-affiliated targets and personnel IVO Harim City, Syria, to destroy KG's ability to create explosives that could potentially be used against targets in the Area of Operation. The targets had been [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] and approved by USCENTCOM for strike. Two series of buildings targeted, identified as compounds 001 and 002, were assessed as valid military targets being used as meeting places for senior KG extremists [redacted (b)(6)], and as explosives-making and storage facilities. Multiple aircraft engaged the targets. The aircraft observed weapons accurately striking their intended targets on Compound 001 and Compound 002. Post-strike battle damage assessment (BDA) of the two targets determined the airstrikes struck their intended targets, with 6 (six) buildings destroyed, and 2 (two) buildings damaged. By a preponderance of the evidence, the airstrikes likely caused the deaths of two civilian children who were likely residing at or near one of the targets. The airstrikes also likely injured 2 (two) [redacted (b)(6)] local employees, who were residing near one of the targets. The targets were valid military targets and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) principles of military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and unnecessary suffering were adhered to during the targeting and engagement process. Furthermore, the strikes were conducted IAW military authorities and the rules of engagement (ROE) current at the time of the strikes. All targeting procedures were followed in order to mitigate possible civilian casualties during these strikes.

3. (~~U//FOUO~~) **Methodology**.

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SUBJECT: Army Regulation (AR)15-6 Investigation into Allegations of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Resulting from 5-6 November 14 Airstrikes in the vicinity of (IVO) Harim, Syria

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) I reviewed the following information to inform these findings and recommendations: maps of the area showing the approximate location of the strikes; a Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) report entitled "The International Alliance Airstrikes Kill More Civilians and Target Ahrar Al-Sham Movement for the First Time;" attributed local national photographs and video footage purportedly from the location of the airstrikes; statements provided by Syrian civil society contacts to the US Department of State; a statement from a staff member of [redacted (b)(6)] to a USAID employee; video from the strike; map overlays of the strike site; strike storyboards; and USCENTCOM targeting documents prepared prior to the 5-6 NOV 14 airstrikes. That information is incorporated as enclosures and attached to this report.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) I also consulted the following documents for reference only: AR 15-6 (Reference A); AR 600-20 (Reference B); CJTF-OIR CIVCAS Credibility Assessment, dtd 31 DEC 14 (S//NF) (Reference C); USCENTCOM 212045Z SEP 14 EXORD (Kinetic Strike Operations in Syria) (S) (Reference D); USCENTCOM Positive Identification (PID) Policy 200053Z DEC 08 (S) (Reference E); CJSCI 3160.01A, dtd 12 OCT 12 (No Strike and the Collateral Damage Methodology) (U//~~FOUO~~) (Reference F); USCENTCOM Supplement to CJSCI 3160.01A, dtd 25 MAR 14 (U//~~FOUO~~) (Reference G).

4. ~~(S//NF)~~ Facts.

a. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) During the late evening and early morning hours of 5-6 NOV 14, U.S. aircraft conducted multiple airstrikes on Khorasan Group (KG)-affiliated targets IVO Harim City, Syria. (Enclosures 1, 2, 3, 4).

b. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) The targets were [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] and approved by USCENTCOM for strike on 5-6 NOV 14 IAW reference E. (Enclosures 3, 4).

c. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) Two targets IVO Harim City, identified in targeting documents as compounds 001 and 002, were struck on 5-6 NOV 14. Both compounds 001 and 002 comprised multiple structures, and were formerly Category II No-Strike facilities that were assessed as being converted to military use by members of KG. IAW References F and G, the targets were removed from the No-Strike List (NSL) and

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approved for a single engagement due to a determination by USCENTCOM that the structures had been repurposed as military facilities by enemy forces. (Enclosures 3, 4).

d. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Intelligence assessed compound 001 as a KG-affiliated meeting place and storage location for [redacted (b)(6)], an Iraqi national IED expert, [redacted (b)(6)] a foreign fighter, [redacted (b)(6)], and [redacted (b)(6)] KG member. (Enclosure 4).

e. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Intelligence identified compound 002 as a KG-affiliated meeting place for KG extremists [redacted (b)(6)] bomb making expert, KG-affiliated bomb making expert [redacted (b)(6)] and KG-affiliated electronics and explosives expert [redacted (b)(6)]. (Enclosure 3).

f. (~~S//NF~~) Other residential and commercial structures were situated around both targets. (Enclosures 3, 4).

g. The targets were engaged by [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)] at approximately 2229Z 5 NOV 14. Compound 001 was engaged with [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]. Compound 002 was engaged by [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] millisecond (MS) delay, and [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] MS delay). (Enclosures 1, 2), [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)] observed that the second detonation was greater than expected, likely due to secondary explosions. (Enclosure 2).

h. (~~U//FOUO~~) USCENTCOM received open source reports of the deaths of civilians soon after the airstrikes. USCENTCOM also received still and video images purportedly showing damage from the strike and 2 dead civilians. (Enclosures 5, 6, 7, 8).

i. (~~U//FOUO~~) The images of the dead civilians showed 2 (two) bodies of female children that were dusty, and which appeared to have sustained injuries to their ear drums, consistent with having been in close proximity to blast overpressure injuries. (Enclosures 6, 7).

j. (~~S//NF~~) On 6 NOV 14, a [redacted (b)(6)] Contact reported to a US Department of State representative that airstrikes hit military targets IVO Harim, a residence of JAN [Jabat al Nusra] fighters with their families, and a warehouse of

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SUBJECT: Army Regulation (AR)15-6 Investigation into Allegations of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) Resulting from 5-6 November 14 Airstrikes in the vicinity of (IVO) Harim, Syria

ammunition in its basement, was struck. The contact reported that children were killed in the attack, but that the same building was used by ISIS in the past. (Enclosure 9).

k. (~~S//NF~~) A representative of the (b)(6) reported to a USAID representative that airstrikes IVO Harim City on 06 0200L NOV 14 injured 2 local (b)(6) (b)(6) members. The (b)(6) representative related that specific buildings that were struck were verified JAN locations, had hit their intended targets and resulted in multiple secondary explosions that damaged surrounding areas. The representative related the (b)(6) members were not in the targeted buildings, but one target engaged had been in close proximity to the residence of a local (b)(6) member. One (b)(6) member suffered (b)(6) and another suffered a (b)(6) injury from secondary explosions. (Enclosure 10).

5. (~~U//FOUO~~) **Findings.** In accordance with Reference A, AR 15-6, I make the following specific findings regarding the CIVCAS allegations initially deemed credible by the 31 DEC 14 CJTF-OIR CIVCAS assessment (Reference C):

a. (~~U//FOUO~~) The targets were valid military targets. The LOAC principles of military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and unnecessary suffering were adhered to. The strikes were conducted IAW current military authorities, ROE, and the LOAC. Targeting procedures were followed to mitigate possible CIVCAS for the 5-6 NOV 14 strikes IVO Harim City, Syria.

b. (~~U//FOUO~~) A preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that during the strike, 2 (two) civilian children were killed and 2 (two) local (b)(6) members received minor injuries during one of the coalition airstrikes on 5-6 NOV 14 targeting KG IVO Harim City, Syria, most likely on the strikes targeting compounds 001 and 002. It is impossible to determine with the information currently available which specific strike on 5-6 NOV 14 IVO Harim City caused the CIVCAS, and whether the CIVCAS occurred by primary or secondary explosions.

1. (~~U//FOUO~~) Reports of the deaths of the civilians were received by USCENTCOM soon after the strike. The number of civilians alleged to have been killed or wounded in the reports varied between three (Enclosure 9), four (Enclosure 5) and six (Enclosure 10). Additionally, images of two civilian children were also received. The timing of the reports and statements make it difficult for the individuals reporting the

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allegations to have colluded on their information, but the reports and statements were from non-eyewitnesses to the strikes.

2. (~~U//FOUO~~) Review of still and video images of 2 (two) children that accompanied the reports received by USCENTCOM indicate the individuals likely sustained injuries from a bomb blast.

3. (~~S//REL MESF~~) Review of other images accompanying the reports showing ground level perspective of damaged and destroyed buildings correspond with Coalition intelligence describing the targets. For example, one of the Coalition targets that evening was a former gas station. Several of the provided images show what appears to be a destroyed gas station, matching the imagery.

4. (~~S//REL MESF~~) The statement provided by the (b)(6) to the USAID representative describe a timeline of events that is consistent with the airstrikes. Additionally, the description of the strikes provided in the statement, such as a description of secondary explosions, was observed by the aircraft conducting the strikes.

6. (~~U//FOUO~~) **Additional Findings.** I was tasked to answer the following questions in the AR 15-6 appointment memorandum.

a. (~~U//FOUO~~) What were the factual circumstances that led to this engagement?

1. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Prior to the strike on compound 001, intelligence assessed it as a KG-affiliated meeting place and storage location for (b)(6), (b)(6) an Iraqi national IED expert, (b)(6) a foreign fighter; (b)(6) KG member. (Enclosure 4).

2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Prior to the strike on compound 002, intelligence identified it as a KG-affiliated meeting place for extremists (b)(6), (b)(6) bomb making expert, KG-affiliated bomb making expert (b)(6) KG-affiliated electronics and explosives expert (b)(6) (Enclosure 3).

3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) The targets were (b)(1)1.4a to USCENTCOM for strike. IAW Reference F (CJSCI 3160.01A), the compounds were formerly designated No-Strike entity (NSE) Category (CAT) II facilities. CAT II no strike facilities (NSFs) include nonmilitary billeting and accommodations such as private

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civilian housing. NSEs may lose their protected status and removed from the NSL if they are used for a military purpose. Before strikes can be approved and executed, the combatant command must remove the No-Strike CATCODE. The Combatant Commander or his designated representative is the only level of command authorized to change the status of an entity on the NSL.

4. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) For compounds 001 and 002, the CDR USCENTCOM removed the CATCODE restriction and approved the strike for a single engagement due to a determination that compounds 001 and 002 had been repurposed as military facilities by enemy forces. (Enclosures 3, 4).

5. (~~S//NF~~) Mission reports and video footage identified two specific targets engaged IVO Harim City by [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)] at approximately 2229Z 5 NOV 14. (Enclosures 1, 2). Based on satellite imagery, both targets were IVO other structures. (Enclosure 11, 12).

6. (~~U//FOUO~~) Secondary explosions were observed during and immediately following the coalition airstrikes. (Enclosures 13, 14). After the strikes, open source reports alleged that multiple civilians, including children, were killed during the strikes. (Enclosure 5). One of the civilians was identified in enclosure 5 as the daughter of [redacted (b)(6)], an ANF fighter. (Enclosure 5). The report identified [redacted (b)(6)] as an individual killed in one of the strikes on 5-6 NOV, but there is no further information corroborating the report of his death. (Enclosure 5). The other child was not identified.

7. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) The post-strike BDA assessed multiple buildings at compounds 002 and 001 were damaged or destroyed during the strikes. (Enclosure 1, 2). Based on the imagery provided in enclosures 5, 7, 12, and 15, and the description of the strikes in enclosure 1 and enclosure 2, numerous buildings may have sustained effects from the strikes or secondary explosions.

b. (~~U//FOUO~~) Who authorized the engagement and under what authority?

(~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) The engagement was authorized by the Commander, USCENTCOM.

c. (~~U//FOUO~~) Was the engagement conducted under authorities and ROE current at the time as outlined in the USCENTCOM Execute Order Kinetic Operations in Syria?

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1. (~~S//REL TO USA, IRKS~~) The engagement was conducted under the current authorities and ROE. The targets engaged were valid military targets and their geo-spatial locations were accurately identified. (Enclosures 3, 4).

2. (~~S//REL TO USA, IRKS~~) Coalition forces had positive identification (PID) of the targets and the targets were appropriately removed from the NSL IAW References F and G. The targets' predominant functions were military purposes-meeting places and bomb making and storage facilities for hostile forces. The weapons used on the targets functioned correctly and were accurate. (Enclosures 1, 2).

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) Was the basis of the authorization of the engagement reasonable given the circumstances at the time?

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Having considered all evidence gathered during this investigation, I find that the basis for the authorization of the engagement was reasonable, based on the intelligence and the information available at the time.

2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Prior to the strike on compound 001, intelligence assessed it as a KG-affiliated meeting place and storage location for (b)(6) (b)(6), an Iraqi national IED expert, (b)(6) a foreign fighter; (b)(6) KG member. (Enclosure 4).

3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) Prior to the strike on compound 002, intelligence identified it as a KG-affiliated meeting place for extremists (b)(6) (b)(6) bomb making expert, KG-affiliated bomb making expert (b)(6) and KG-affiliated electronics and explosives expert (b)(6). (Enclosure 3).

e. (~~S//REL USA, IRKS~~) What procedures are required to mitigate civilian casualties and collateral damage? Were those procedures followed for this engagement?

1. (~~S//REL USA, MESH~~) Commanders must consider the assigned mission, the current situation, higher commanders' intent and other available guidance in determining the level of force required for mission accomplishment. Commanders will ensure that military operations are conducted in accordance with the law of war principles of military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and unnecessary suffering. (Reference E).

2. (~~S//REL USA, IRKS~~) IAW LOAC and Reference E (Positive Identification Policy), targets must be positively identified as a legitimate military objective before being engaged. Single use civilian targets are protected and are not valid military

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targets. Dual use facilities are valid military targets characterized as serving both a military and civilian (i.e., noncombatant) purpose or function. Dual-use facilities may also consist of NSFs occupied by enemy combatants. NSFs occupied by enemy combatants for the purpose of advancing military objectives lose their LOAC protection and are not classified as dual-use. Similarly, if the function of an NSF is determined by proper authority to be supporting military operations and /or objectives exclusively, it is not classified as dual-use. A targeted facility formerly characterized as dual-use must have its protected status removed by proper authority before it may be engaged. Only someone with the proper authority may remove the protected status of a facility, after it is determined that the predominant function or purpose of the target is to advance military objectives.

3. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) In this case, the protected status of compounds 001 and 002 was lifted after determination that their predominant use was for hostile purposes - a meeting place and safe-house for foreign extremists. The facilities were visited and used by known KG-affiliated members. Multiple intelligence reports placed the individuals at these locations. The targets had been converted to military use by members of KG. (Enclosures 3, 4).

4. (~~S//NF~~) On 05 NOV 14, the targets were validated by the CENTCOM J3, at a target validation board, and added to the CENTCOM IRAQI instability plan Restricted Target List (RTL). The targets were deemed legitimate military targets based on information available at the time of the target validation board. (Enclosures 3, 4). The targets were engaged in the early morning hours, when the risk to civilians was minimized.

5. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) At 052331Z NOV14, forces engaged compounds 001 and 002 with (b)(1)1.4a. Assessment was (b)(1)1.4a KG buildings probably destroyed and (b)(1)1.4a KG buildings probably damaged at compound 001 and (b)(1)1.4a KG buildings probably destroyed at compound 002. (Enclosures 1, 2).

f. (~~U//FOUO~~) Were there civilian casualties as a result of this engagement? If so, describe the nature of the civilian casualties.

1. (~~U//FOUO~~) The preponderance of the evidence supports the finding that there was CIVCAS as a result of the engagement, including 2 (two) children killed and 2 (two) (b)(6) workers injured. The following support this finding:

2. (~~S//REL TO USA, FVEY~~) BDA: Post-strike BDA assessed multiple buildings

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destroyed. Based on the video footage from enclosures 8, 13, and 14, it appears that numerous buildings may have sustained effects from either the strikes, or secondary explosions at the targeted locations.

3. (~~S//NF~~) One (b)(6) contact reported to a DoS official that three children were killed in the airstrike; one of the buildings struck was a residence of JAN and their families with an ammunition warehouse in the basement, but that the (b)(6) contact did not know whether the children [allegedly killed in the strike] were from that residence or from a neighbor's house. (Enclosure 9). The same source said that ISIS had used the same building in the past, and that all airstrikes had "hit military targets." (Enclosure 9).

4. (~~S//NF~~) A staff member from (b)(6) reported to a USAID official that four children were killed in the strike, two of their staff members were injured in explosions, and one staff member's residence was so badly damaged he had to relocate. The staff member did not identify the source of this information. (Enclosure 10).

5. (U) The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) reported the deaths of two children in Harim City, including a map of the area showing the approximate location of the strikes on 5-6 November. (Enclosure 5, 7) The SNHR report identified one child as the daughter of (b)(6), an Al-Nusra fighter, also identified as an individual killed in the strike. The report did not identify the other child. (Enclosure 5). The report also reported injuries to the wife and son of (b)(6), but no images or other eye witness accounts corroborated that portion of the report. (Enclosure 5).

6. (U) Open source video footage purportedly from that location showed 2 (two) female children that appear to be deceased. (Enclosure 6). This video footage was posted by a YouTube user who states he is against the Assad regime (Enclosures 6, 7, and 12). The user posts mostly videos from the Idlib province area (Harem City is in Idlib province), documenting demonstrations and Assad regime airstrikes, as well as atrocities committed by the regime. (Enclosure 12) No intelligence indicates which building the children were in, and the (b)(6) members did not specify their location in proximity to the strike, beyond stating they were not in the targeted building. (Enclosure 10).

7. (U) Photos of the destroyed buildings in Harim City were posted on 6 November, leaving little time for them to be damaged after the purported coalition airstrikes.

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8. (~~S//NF~~) Reference C, the CJTF-OIR CIVCAS assessment, did not determine that other CIVCAS allegations beyond one child killed and two (b)(6) injured were credible. Upon my review, I determined by a preponderance of the evidence that one additional CIVCAS occurred and that the evidence did not support a finding that any further CIVCAS was caused by the airstrike. Reports provided several higher CIVCAS figures, but those reports were uncorroborated by photographs, video, or first-hand witness accounts. I therefore conclude that no further CIVCAS beyond 2 (two) killed and 2 (two) wounded occurred.

g. (~~U//FOUO~~) What are your recommendations, if any, to mitigate civilian casualties based on this incident?

I would recommend sustained ISR whenever practicable based on operational requirements, to ensure no civilians are entering or exiting a facility.

h. (~~U//FOUO~~) What are your recommendations, if any, for changes to targeting policies and procedures based on this incident?

I do not have any recommended changes to the targeting policies. Current targeting practices incorporate mitigation measures to prevent civilian casualties to the maximum extent possible based on operational requirements, the rules of engagement and the Law of Armed Conflict.

i. (~~U//FOUO~~) What are your other recommendations based on the outcome of this engagement?

I have no additional recommendations. Based on the facts and circumstances, all reasonable precautions were employed to mitigate civilian casualties.

7. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Investigating Officer




DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY CENTRAL
APO AE 09306

ACJA

17 February 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation
Inherent Resolve, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, APO AE 09306

SUBJECT: Legal Review of 15-6 Investigation CIVCAS Harim, Syria



(b)(5)

ACJA

SUBJECT: Legal Review of 15-6 Investigation CIVCAS Harim, Syria

(b)(5)

6. POC for this memorandum is (b)(3), (b)(6) at DSN: (b)(6) or
email: (b)(3), (b)(6)@mail.smil.mil.

FOR THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE:

Encl

(b)(3), (b)(6)



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE
APO, AE 09306

S: 22 January 2015

ACCS

8 January 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR (b)(3), (b)(6), Combined Joint Task Force – Operation
Inherent Resolve, APO AE 09306

SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer

1. Appointment You are hereby appointed as an Investigating Officer pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 into the facts and circumstances surrounding the strike that led to the potential engagement of civilians by coalition aircraft at 052229Z NOV 14 IVO Harim City, Syria.

2. Scope of the Investigation. You will make specific findings on the following:

- a. What were the factual circumstances that led to this engagement?
- b. Who authorized the engagement and under what authority?
- c. Was the engagement conducted under current authorities and the Rules of Engagement as outlined in CJTF-OIR OPORD 15-001 including the Annexes and Appendices?
- d. Was the basis of the authorization of the engagement reasonable given the circumstances at the time?
- e. What CJTF procedures are required to mitigate civilian casualties and collateral damage? Were those procedures followed for this engagement?
- f. Were there civilian casualties as a result of this engagement? If so, describe the nature of the civilian casualties.
- g. What are your recommendations, if any, to mitigate civilian casualties based on this incident?
- h. What are your recommendations, if any, for changes to targeting policies and procedures based on this incident?
- i. What are your other recommendations based on the outcome of this engagement?

3. Procedures. Follow the informal procedures of AR 15-6 for this investigation.

ACCS

SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer and Assistant Investigating Officer

4. Witnesses.

a. You will interview any person you believe has relevant information, including any individual who participated in the authorization, execution, or monitoring of the engagement. Possible witnesses may include members of TF (b)(1)1.4a and the TF (b)(1)1.4a. If you come to suspect misconduct by an individual senior to you, you will consult your legal advisor for further guidance.

b. Document all witness interviews on DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement) and place all witnesses under oath before they sign their statements. If a sworn statement is not possible, (1) prepare a memorandum for record (MFR) summarizing your interview of that witness, (2) explain why a sworn statement was not possible, (3) certify that the MFR is an accurate summary of the interview, and (4) sign the MFR in your own name. Inform all witnesses that they must not discuss their statements with persons who have no official interest in this investigation.

c. If you come to suspect that a witness may have committed misconduct, you will consult your legal advisor before starting or continuing your interview of that witness. Your legal advisor will help you determine if you need to advise the witness of his or her rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution. You will document all waivers of these rights on DA Form 3881 (Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate).

d. Determine if any witness should sign a Privacy Act Statement before your interview and provide this document as necessary.

5. Report of the Investigation. You will make findings of fact and recommendations on the DA Form 1574 based upon your investigation. The findings must be supported by the greater weight of the evidence than supports a contrary conclusion. You will recommend any remedial or corrective actions that should be taken. This may include actions to mitigate any activity you find inappropriate from occurring in the future and whether any type of disciplinary or administrative action should be taken against any responsible individual(s) involved in the present matter. Your final report will include a tabbed index of exhibits (to include this memorandum of appointment) and a chronology of events. If there is conflicting evidence, indicate whom you believe and your explanation. The completed investigation will include the following:

- a. This appointment memorandum
- b. DA Form 1574
- c. A memorandum for record with your findings and recommendations
- d. An executive summary

ACCS

SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer and Assistant Investigating Officer

e. Witness statements

f. Any other relevant exhibits

6. Legal advisor. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) CJTF-OIR [redacted] (b)(6) of Operational Law, has been appointed as your legal advisor. You will contact [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) for an in-brief before starting your investigation. His telephone number is SVOIP [redacted] (b)(6). He can also be reached by e-mail at [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) @mail.smil.mil.

7. Principal duty. The completion of this investigation is your primary duty and should take precedence over all other assigned duties during the suspense period. Submit your report to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate for legal review by the suspense date. If you are unable to complete the investigation during the time allowed, submit a request to me in writing, and annotate the reason for the requested extension on DD Form 261.



THOMAS D. WEIDLEY
BGen, USMC
Chief of Staff

Pages 1 through 5 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Approved for Release

Pages 1 through 4 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Approved for Release

Pages 1 through 5 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Approved for Release

Pages 1 through 7 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Approved for Release



The International Alliance Airstrikes Kill More Civilians and Target Ahrar Ash-Sham Movement for The First Time

This report includes

- First: Executive Summary*
- Second: Details*
- Third: Evidences and Attachments*

Executive Summary

On 6 November, 2014 the international alliance war-planes carried out a number of airstrikes targeting cities located near the Syrian-Turkish Borders. The airstrikes targeted the following:

1 - Four military centers for An-Nassra front in Idlib countryside – Harem city which killed two female children; one of whom was killed along with her father, who was an An-Nussra front fighter and lived in house next to the agricultural bank. Also, his wife and son were critically wounded.

2 - An ammunition car in Saramda city and burned her

3 - A center for Ahrar Ash-Sham movement in Idlib countryside – Babsqa village. The international alliance's missile destroyed and burned an ammunition depot. This was the first time that the international alliance targets Ahrar Ash-Sham movement.

4 - A center for An-Nussra front in Aleppo western countryside in Al-Muhandsien area. The shelling destroyed the whole building.

SNHR published on 25 October, 2014 a study on the death toll of the international alliance airstrikes which amounted to 24 victims including women and children at that time.





Details

The first attack: Idlib countryside – Harem

On Thursday 6 November, 2014 at 1:30 AM, the international alliance warplanes targeted four military point for An-Nusra front in Idlib northern countryside – Harem city near the Syrian-Turkish borders. The warplanes launched, at first, four missiles that hit three military points, which are located next to each other, in the northeast of the town:

- 1 - The Agricultural bank, which is used by An-Nusra front as a center.
- 2 - The central prison checkpoint, where An-Nusra fighters were stationed.
- 3 - An ammunition depot in the same area.

The shelling destroyed and burned the agricultural bank's building completely in addition to damaging a number of building nearby. Furthermore, a number of cars were burned while a series of explosions occurred after an explosion in the ammunition depot which why no one was able to get near the targeted area.

Afterwards, the warplanes targeted a fourth center with two missiles. The center, which was a building by an old deserted gas station located near the industrial school in the south of the town. The shelling destroyed the center completely as well as the gas station in addition to severely damaging the surrounding buildings. Harem residents were aided by the civil-defense teams to save people from underneath the rubbles.

SNHR documented the killing of two female children: one of whom were named (b)(6), five-year-old, who was killed along with her father (b)(6) (b)(6) while the other girl has not been identified.

(b)(6) father was born in Aleppo – Tal Ref't, he was one of An-Nusra fighters and was residing in a house near the agricultural bank.

(b)(6) mother and brother (b)(6) seven-year-old, were also wounded critically.

These attacks resulted in the death of a number of An-Nusra front. We weren't able to specify the number of fighters who were killed because of the inability to contact any of An-Nusra fighters. Additionally, An-Nusra doesn't publish any names or details about its fighters who get killed. Any numbers published are merely propaganda and completely inaccurate by the standards of the documentation methodology or approximate documentation.

The following [URI](#) shows the location of Harem on Google Maps

The following [URI](#) shows the location of the gas station in southern Harem on Google Maps



The second attack: Idlib countryside – Sarmada

On Thursday 6 November, 2014 at 1:00 AM, the international alliance warplanes targeted an ammunition car for a leader at An-Nusra Front, who was probably inside the car along with someone else, in front of the courthouse's building, which is located on the street that leads to the northern circle in northern Sarmada. The shelling burned the car according to eyewitnesses who told SN4HR.

The following URL shows the location of Sarmada town on Google Maps

The third attack: Idlib countryside – Babsqa

On Thursday 6 November, 2014 at 2:15 AM, the international alliance, for the first time, targeted a center for Ahrar Ash-Sham movement in Idlib countryside – Babsqa village, which is located near Bab Al-Hawa crossing with Turkey. The shelling targeted specifically a warehouse owned by one of the village residents who rented it to Ahrar Ash-Sham which used it as an ammunition depot. The shelling destroyed the warehouse completely and caused a fire that lasted for hours.

The following URL shows the location of Babsqa town on Google Maps

The fourth attack: Aleppo western countryside – Al-Muhandsien

On Thursday 6 November, 2014 at 4:00 AM, the international alliance warplanes targeted a two-floor building, located in – Al-Muhandsien western countryside - Jam`yat Al-Muhamien neighborhood, with two missiles. The building, which was used by An-Nusra front as a center, was destroyed completely. A number of residents told us that the victims of the shelling were civilians but we found out later they were An-Nusra fighters.

Mr. Yaman, lives in the area, told SN4HR:

“At dawn, we woke up to the sound of powerful warplanes which was different from the Syrian regime warplanes’. There were two incredibly fast warplanes at least soaring at a relatively low height. The sound was strong that it shook the windows. At 4:15 AM a huge explosion happened. We heard the sound coming from Al-Muhandsien southwestern countryside. After two hours, I headed to the place. There was a building that was demolished completely.”

“What I found was the rubbles of a two-floor building. The wall surrounding the building was also badly damaged. I also found two destroyed pickup cars in the front of the building. One of the vehicles had what seems to a local-made rocket launcher installed on it while the other vehicle had a metal base that is usually used to install medium-size machine guns.”



“I met a neighbor who told me that his building was for An-Nusra front and An-Nusra fighters pulled out five dead bodies at least from underneath the rubbles after the shelling. Also, there were two wounded; one of which was critically injured and had his both legs amputated.”

“The shelling didn’t destroy any nearby buildings because of the nature of the neighborhood planning as there are wide areas, used as fenced gardens, between the buildings which kept the nearby buildings, which are resided by civilians, safe.”

The Following URL shows the location of Jam’yat Al-Muhamien neighborhood in Aleppo western countryside – Al-Muhandisien countryside

Evidences and Attachments

1- Signs of destruction and shelling

Idlib countryside – Sarmda – 6 November, 2014

The following video footage shows the ammunition car on fire after it was targeted in the middle of a residential neighborhood by the international alliance warplanes

Idlib countryside – Harem – 6 November, 2014

Video footage showing huge signs of destruction in the middle of Harem city. Also, it shows the buildings that was wiped off by the international alliance forces at dawn





Idlib countryside – Harem – 6 November, 2014

The following video footage shows huge signs of the destruction of the agricultural bank's building and the surrounding buildings. The capacity of the missile used by the international alliance warplanes can be noticed as a large number of buildings were destroyed despite the size and the wide geographical space the buildings occupy.



Idlib countryside – Harem – 6 November, 2014

The following video footage shows signs of destruction and fire near a gas station in Harem. Also, destruction in the nearby residential buildings that was caused by the international alliance warplanes can be seen

Idlib countryside – Harem – 6 November, 2014

The following video footage shows wide and extensive destruction. Some of the buildings were demolished while another building was burning where the smoke kept rising for 10 hours after the shelling which was by the international alliance warplanes at dawn.

Pictures show the flames in Harem city after it was shelled by the international alliance at dawn

Pictures show the flames in Sarmada city after it was shelled by the international alliance at dawn

Signs of destruction near a gas station in Harem city that was shelled by the international alliance forces



Huge signs of destruction caused by the explosion at the ammunition depots that were targeted by the international alliance forces. Also, the smoke kept rising for hours after the shelling

Signs of destruction in buildings in the middle of Harem that was shelled by the international alliance forces



Idlib countryside – Harem 6 November, 2014

Video footages show civil-defense teams in Al-Atarem area trying to find any victims underneath the rubbles in Harem city

Huge signs of destruction caused by the international alliance's shelling against Harem

Idlib countryside – Harem 6 November, 2014

2- Victims


The following video footage shows the body of (b)(6) and another unidentified girl

Pictures of the 5-year-old (b)(6) (b)(6) who was killed by the shelling of the international alliance forces that targeted Harem on 6 November, 2014

(b)(6) he was an An-Nusra fighter, killed along with his daughter (b)(6) (b)(6) The pictures are for both of them after they were killed

The body of unidentified girl killed by the international alliance warplanes in Harem on 6 November, 2014

Picture of four dead An-Nusra fighters who were killed by the international alliance warplanes in Aleppo countryside – Jam'at Al-Muhandsien






Recommendations

The international alliance forces should respect the international humanitarian law and the customary international law. Furthermore, the alliance should bear the consequences of these violations and insure that it won't occur again.

The civilians, specifically in areas that are shelled frequently by the international alliance forces, must be properly aided. Also, more field-hospitals should be established. Additionally, IDPs camps on the Turkish-Syrian borders can be built on a larger scale.

We believe that a safe zone, where camps can be built, would significantly help the IDPs and the refugees that might leave Lebanon and Turkey and the other countries to live in the safe zone

Civilians must be protected from the brutality of the Syrian regime and its extremist militias. A no-fly zone should be imposed in order to put an end to the daily barrel bombs shelling as well as protecting the Syrian civilians from the brutality of ISIS



Syrian Network
For Human Rights

الشبكة السورية لحقوق الإنسان

Enclosure 6

You tube video of civilian casualties


Redacted for the following reason: (b)(6); unable to redact with readily available technology

Approved for Release

The following URL shows the location of Harem on Google Maps



The following URL shows the location of the gas station in southern Harem on Google Maps



The following URL shows the location of Sarmada town on Google Maps




The following URL shows the location of Babsqa town on Google Maps



The Following URL shows the location of Jam'yat Al-Muhamien neighborhood in Aleppo western countryside – Al-Muhandisien countryside



The following video footage shows wide and extensive destruction.



Pictures show the flames in Harem city after it was shelled by the international alliance at dawn



Release

Pictures show the flames in Sarmada city after it was shelled by the international alliance at dawn




Signs of destruction near a gas station in Harem city that was shelled by the international alliance forces



Signs of destruction in buildings in the middle of Harem that was shelled by the international alliance forces

(b)(6)



Video footages show civil-defense teams in Al-Atarem area trying to find any victims underneath the rubbles in Harem city



Huge signs of destruction caused by the international alliance's shelling against Harem

(same video as above)

The following video footage shows the body of [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) and another unidentified girl



[redacted] (b)(6) he was an An-Nusra fighter, killed along with his daughter [redacted] (b)(6)



Enclosure 8

Two videos of damage to buildings

Redacted for the following reason: (b)(6); unable to redact with readily available technology

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Page 1 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(5), (b)(6)

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From: [redacted] (b)(6)

To: [redacted] (b)(6)

Subject: Reports

Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2014 16:09:19 +0000

Hello,

I hope you are well. I am writing to see if you have heard of reports this morning about 8 civilians killed in coalition airstrikes? SNHR reported 4 children were killed in Harem and 4 civilians in Jame'yet al-Kahraba, Aleppo. Have you heard the same and do you have any videos, photos or other first hand accounts? I am trying to collect as much information as possible.

Thank you,

[redacted] (b)(6)

Pages 3 through 5 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(5), (b)(6)
(b)(5), (b)(6), DUPLICATE

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

Please see below statement (b)(6) in regards to the airstrikes in Harem on the night of 5 November.

My understanding is that the below will be one more data point for the system you outlined with our CIVIC colleagues earlier this month. Please review, and let me know if there are any next steps for me or my team, and what I can message back out as regards your process.

Thanks!

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Email: (b)(6) <mailto:(b)(6)>

Current Location: CENTCOM

Name (b)(6):

(b)(6) member (b)(6)

Location and time of event:

0200hrs 06.11.2014 Harem (Coordinates - 36°12'51.24"N , 36°31'20.24"E)

In your own words, what happened?

The airstrikes in Harem targeted specific buildings that have been verified as Jabat Al Nusra locations. A command and control centre and a Jabat Al Nusra ammunition storage facility.

The airstrikes were accurate in hitting their designated targets. The damage to the ammunition facility resulted in multiple secondary explosions that were reported to go on for some time. These

secondary explosions may have contributed to civilian casualties and fatalities. Damage to surrounding areas occurred, including a (b)(6) member's house and car. The location of one of the Jabat Al Nusra targets which had been identified was situated in close proximity to the house. The impact of the airstrike which destroyed the target caused significant damage to the individual's property.


What injuries did you sustain?

(b)(6)

Do you know anyone or see anyone else who sustained injuries or was killed?

(b)(6) injuries were reported by another (b)(6) member of staff who was treated locally. The airstrike itself contributed to an unconfirmed number of casualties and fatalities, at least four (4) children were reportedly killed in the bombing. It is believed that the fatalities came from a group of people who were living in one of the buildings that was struck.

(b)(6)



Page 2 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4c

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ATO YS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4c

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SQUIRTERS observed IVO southern target area by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

All weapons reported hits/good function on pre-planned deliberate targets

Harem

Video of destruction, all uploaded by (b)(6)

Self-described anti-regime user, joined Youtube on 15 Sept. 2011 and has 1,700 subscribers. Bulk of videos from the Idlib area, documenting demonstrations and regime air strikes, other atrocities

1. [Destruction in residential buildings in the Harem findings airline alliance bombing of the city](#)



Probable Syrian Civil Defense (CSO-supported first responders) members filmed on site.

2. Massive destruction in the town of Harem by the bombing of 06/11/2014



Buildings appear the same as those in the pre-strike images on the Harim Compound 002 slide:





3. [“The devastation caused by the bombing of Flight International Coalition on the city Harem 11/06/2014”](#)

Potential similarities to building, treeline and apartments in Harim Compound 001 slide





(possible second footage from other photographer in view)

Potential matches of structures in video to Harim Compound 001 Slide:



4. [Martyrs children in the town of Harem by the bombing of the city on the airline alliance 06/11/2014](#)

Same user but the bodies have no additional context for location beyond the video caption (zooms in and out on faces, not much additional information):



Photos provided to DRL are likely from same location, but not from this video. [Early posts to Twitter by this user](#). These plus two more posted several hours later by [different user](#). Origin unclear. Claims that there were four children killed here are likely untrue, or at least have not been seen. The two children shown in video and these photos are wearing the same clothes, but photographed from different positions and lighting

Sarmada – Vehicle Struck

Both videos uploaded by (b)(6) possibly a member of the Syrian Civil Defense based on his about page (“Civil Defense in Killi”), previous uploads and subscriptions. Videos are not listed:

5. [6/11/2014 \(b\)\(5\) Civil Defense Center Killi extinguished the fire in the city of Sarmada as a result of bombardment of Airline Alliance](#)



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



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(Possible Syrian Civil Defense)


6. Targeting a car in the town of Sarmada aviation military believed that the international airline alliance



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See Sarmada Target Area of Interest 001 slide

Ahrar al Sham building in Babisqa

Believe this is Babisqa (b)(5), a Byzantine-era site spread throughout a modern village on the northeastern edge of Jebel Barisha (b)(5). Approx coordinates are 36°12'53.17"N, 36°41'23.17"E

Note: this is very close to the Dar Kuwayata strike (see map)

Western Aleppo


Jame'Yet Al-Kahraba

The Syrian Network for Human Rights reported these coordinates as the location of the strike: 36.211792, 36.51997. These coordinates land very close to Harim (see map)

Rif Muhandisin

(b)(5) located in the western countryside of Aleppo

Photos posted to [Twitter](#) by (b)(6)





(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) - Nov 5
The Syrian Observatory posts the photos of the last night airstrikes on al-Nusra HQ in Rif al-Mohandseen #Aleppo pic.twitter.com/(b)(6)

13 4

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(b)(6)



(b)(6)

(b)(6)

- Nov 6

The Syrian Observatory posts the photos of the last night airstrikes on al-Nusra HQ in Rif al-Mohandseen #Aleppo pic.twitter.com/

(b)(6)



13



4



Enclosure 13

Video of Strike

Redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(c)

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Enclosure 14

Video of Strike

Redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4(c)

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