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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

24 August 2009

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Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.
[redacted]

Dear Mr. Greenewald,

This is in response for your request received 20 August 2009 (our inquiries reference number 65532) concerning IRIS Number 214602, United States Strategic Air Forces In Europe History, Chapter 2, Jan 1942 through January 1945. Since your request was made under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act it has been designated 2009-03269-F.

Please find enclosed a photocopy of the requested document.

Thank you for your request.

Sincerely,

BARRY L. SPINK
Archivist

Attachment:
USSAFE HI, Jan 42-Jan 45, Chap 2, IRIS # 97935.

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HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION

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Chapter III

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Chapter III

HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION

The background of the headquarters organization of United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe is to be found in the organizational history of the Eighth Air Force and VIII Air Force Service Command for the second half of 1943. The achievement by January 1944, in the form of United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe Headquarters, of an organization combining logistical and operational functions on an equal level, was the logical culmination of six months of organizational thinking, planning and experimentation by the American Air Forces in the United Kingdom.

Origins of Combined Headquarters

The original impetus for consolidation of Air Force Headquarters and Service Command Headquarters functions in the United Kingdom came from the Service Command, and the plans advanced during the course of 1943 all originated in the Service Command. The concept of a logistical control which embraced all functions short of actual operations was gaining adherents throughout the Air Forces, and particularly in VIII AFSC. As developed by VIII AFSC planners during the course of 1943, logistics came to represent the all-embracing form it assumed with the establishment of USSTAF. The belief in the equal importance of logistics with operations and the necessity to raise it to the same level with operations in order to insure maximum efficiency of the logistical function were among the impelling motives in the campaign conducted by VIII AFSC to achieve a combined headquarters.

Practical considerations were also on the side of the advocates of a combined headquarters. The belief that the Service Command was being hampered in carrying out its functions by the operations of a duplicate and

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sometimes obstructive staff at Air Force Headquarters was a prime factor in the move by the Service Command to consolidate the Air Force A-4 and Service Command Headquarters.[1] This consolidation, it was recognized, would also raise the Service Command indirectly to the Air Force Headquarters level, and enable it to speak with maximum authority in the name of the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force. The eventual achievement of this consolidation in October 1943, the result of many months of constant advocacy by the Service Command, represented an important step toward the establishment of a combined headquarters which organized all operational and logistical functions under two deputy commanding generals--one for operations and one for administration (logistics). The achievement of such a two deputy system in the form of USSTAF Headquarters in January 1944, was particularly significant because of its recognition of the theoretical and practical division of all Air Force functions into two categories--operations and logistics (administration).

The problem of the place of the logistical function in the military command structure was also faced by the Theater Headquarters during 1943 and 1944. The Theater helped point the way to the Air Force by discontinuing G-4, Headquarters, ETOUSA, and transferring its duties to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, on 27 May 1943,[2] thereby enabling the Commanding General, SOS, to carry out functions in the name of the highest headquarters in the theater. On 8 October, G-4 Section, Headquarters, ETOUSA, was reestablished,[3] but on 1 December, the Commanding General, SOS, once

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1. Memo, Lieutenant Colonel Jerome Preston, VIII AFSC, to Brigadier General Hugh J. Knerr, D/C, VIII AFSC, 7 Oct 1943.
2. GO No. 27, Hq, ETO, 27 May 1943.
3. GO No. 71, Hq, ETO, 8 Oct 1943.

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more assumed the functions of G-4, ETOUSA. Fifteen staff sections of Headquarters ETOUSA and SOS were consolidated and placed under the control of the Commanding General, SOS.[4]

The Theater approach to the problem of raising logistics to the top level of command was made simpler by the existence of the Theater Headquarters as a purely administrative headquarters. ~~All~~ Operational functions were assumed by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, during ~~in~~ February 1944 and succeeding months.[5] This combined British-American headquarters exercised no administrative functions except through the person of the Supreme Commander, himself, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was also Commanding General, ETOUSA. On 17 January 1944, SOS and ETOUSA Headquarters were combined, and Major General John C. H. Lee, Commanding General, SOS, was appointed Deputy Theater Commander,[6] becoming, in effect, the chief administrative and logistical officer for the theater. The actual physical consolidation of SOS and ETOUSA Headquarters which occurred during the course of 1944 represented the culmination of the integration of all administrative and logistical functions of the Theater. This consolidation of functions paralleled the similar development within the Air Forces in the Theater and indicated that the problem was one of basic military significance and importance. It is possible that there was an interplay of influence between Air Force and ETOUSA Headquarters in the developments which consolidated the administrative and logistical functions at the top headquarters in their

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4. GO No. 90, Hq, ETO, 1 Dec 1943.
5. Administrative and Logistical History of the ETO, Part II, Organization and Command in the ETO, Vol. II, pp. 6 - 10.
6. GO No. 5, Hq, ETO, 17 Jan 1944.

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respective spheres. The additional problem of the integration of operational and administrative (including logistics) functions in one headquarters, was a problem the theater did not find it necessary to resolve.

Like the Theater, the Air Force was faced with the practical problem of achieving the most efficient and economical headquarters organization possible. Perhaps the earliest suggestion for the consolidation of A-4 and Service Command Headquarters was advanced by Captain Albert Lepawsky, of the Plans Division, VIII AFSC, in a memorandum, on 15 May 1943, to Colonel David H. Baker, Chief of the Plans Division. Captain Lepawsky, in the course of a discussion of Service Command functions, suggested that the Service Command

> ...might also do all of the A.F. Headquarters Staff work involved for the Commanding General and for this purpose, it might be desirable to make the Commanding General of the Service Command act as A-4 of the 8th A.F.[7]

There was no evidence of a reaction to this suggestion by anyone within the Service Command.

The role of chief organizational thinker and planner in the Air Forces in the ETO was played by an officer with extensive experience in both military and business affairs--Major General Hugh J. Knerr. As Chief, Control Division, Air Service Command, Patterson Field, in 1942 and 1943, General Knerr (then Colonel) was the moving spirit behind the organization of the Service Command along functional military management lines.[8] In May 1943, he left his new position of Deputy, Air Service Command to become

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7. Memo, Captain Albert Lepawsky to Colonel David H. Baker, Chief, Plans division, VIII AFSC, 15 May 1943.

8. Memo, Colonel Hugh J. Knerr, Chief, Control Division, ASC, to CG, ASC, November 1942.

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deputy to Major General Follett Bradley, Air Inspector, Army Air Forces, on a committee designed by General Arnold to study and make recommendations on the organizational and manpower needs of the Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom and North Africa.[9] This unique opportunity to observe and study Air Force organization and operations in two active theaters of war, coupled with a comprehensive knowledge of Air Service Command organization and operations, helped to ripen General Knerr's thinking on Air Force organization. His services were requested by the Eighth Air Force to help organize and administer VIII AFSC so that it might meet the tremendous demands being made on it. Accordingly, on 24 July 1943, Brigadier General Knerr became Deputy Commander, VIII AFSC,[10] and on 24 October he assumed command of VIII AFSC.[11]

Even before his assignment to VIII AFSC, General Knerr's ideas on Air Force organization had crystallized into a concrete suggestion for the amalgamation of service and operations functions at the Air Force level. In his "Report on Air Service Command in Africa", 23 June 1943, in which he suggested, for the first time, a two deputy system, General Knerr found that

> ...a difficult command situation exists as a consequence of lack of adequate communications that could be materially improved through the simple device of designating two Deputy Commanders for the Commanding General of the NAAF, one for operations and one for maintenance, with the Commanding General and his two deputies located at the same headquarters and using but one staff.... A vast amount of unnecessary staff work and consequent delay

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9. Ltr, Major General Ira C. Eaker, CG, 8 AF, to General Henry H. Arnold, CG, AAF, 18 May 1943.

10. GO No. 20, Hq, VIII AFSC, 24 July 1943.

11. GO No. 45, Hq, VIII AFSC, 24 Oct 1943.

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could be avoided if these three men, in close personal contact and conversant with basic policies, could make major decisions on the spot as the rapidly changing situation of air warfare demanded. The orthodox ground army type of command and staff is not equal to the time and space factors of this war in the air.[12]

General Knerr went on to make specific recommendations for the application of the deputy system. He recommended that:

a. Action be initiated to authorize the function of a Deputy for Operations and a Deputy for Maintenance for Air Force Commanders; such deputies to execute a primary command function within their jurisdiction in execution of the Air Force Commander's decisions and policies.

b. Present staff functions be consolidated into one Air Force headquarters staff.[13]

General Knerr also recommended that all Air Service Commands be redesignated Air Maintenance Commands. This was the result of his belief that the term "service" carried with it a connotation of subservience and servility which was harmful to the morale and functioning of maintenance units.[14]

Upon his assignment as Deputy Commander, VIII AFSC, General Knerr lost no time in advancing his organizational principle of a two deputy system. On 26 July, two days after his appointment as Deputy Commander, he wrote to Major General Henry J. F. Miller, Commanding General, VIII AFSC, and recommended that the Eighth Air Force adopt a two deputy system, with a deputy for maintenance and a deputy for operations. He recommended that the deputy for maintenance also be the Commanding General of the Maintenance Command. The administrative staff was to be left under the Chief of Staff, so that, in effect, there would be three deputies.[15] This first definite proposal

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12. Ltr, subj: "Report on Air Service Command in Africa," Colonel Hugh J. Knerr, Deputy, ASC, to CG, ASC, 23 June, 1943.

13. Ibid.

14. Ltr, subj: "Revision of Staff and Maintenance Functions," Brigadier General Hugh J. Knerr, D/C, VIII AFSC, to CG, VIII AFSC, 26 July 1943.

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for an integration within the Eighth Air Force of the service and operations functions was forwarded to General Eaker by General Miller on 30 July.[16] There was no action by General Eaker in response to the proposal, although he was probably giving some thought to organizational problems at the time.[17]

The rapid growth of the Eighth Air Force during the summer of 1943, and the continued and even deepened intensity of supply and maintenance problems and conflicts, appeared to increase the efforts of the Service Command to arrive at a clear-cut solution of the organizational ~~picture~~ problem. On 13 September, Colonel Baker, Chief, Plans and Control Division, VIII AFSC, presented a detailed implementation of General Knerr's proposal for a consolidation of the headquarters of the Eighth Air Force and VIII AFSC. In accordance with General Knerr's plan, it listed all functions under the two deputies and the Chief of Staff.

On 14 September, General Miller submitted to General Eaker the memorandum prepared by Colonel Baker, accompanied by a proposed organization chart. A detailed listing of functions showing the reallocation of such functions in the event of a consolidation of the two headquarters was also forwarded to General Eaker.[19] Although General Eaker did not act on these

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15. Ibid.

16. Memo, Major General Henry J. F. Miller, CG, VIII AFSC, to CG, 8 AF, 30 July 1943.

17. Ltr, Lieutenant General Delos Emmons, Hq, AAF, to General Eaker, 6 Aug 1943.

18. Ltr, subj: "Duties and Responsibilities in a Combined Headquarters, Eighth Air Force and VIII Air Force Service Command," Colonel Baker, Chief, Plans and Control Division, VIII AFSC, to CG and D/C, VIII AFSC, 13 Sept 1943 (incl).

19. Ltr, subj: "Revision of Staff and Maintenance Organization," General Miller, CG, VIII AFSC to CG, 8 AF, 14 Sept 1943 (3 incls).

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pointed, specific proposals, General Knerr continued to take every opportunity to bring his views to General Eaker's attention.

> As difficulties developed in connection with A-4 of General Eaker's staff, it in effect vetoed actions of the Service Commander, but it brought a number of things to a head as time went on. With those examples, I talked to General Eaker, and we gradually came around to the agreement that it would be better to consolidate A-4 and Service Command in one person, particularly since the headquarters were practically in the same building.[20]

General Eaker's approval of the consolidation of the functions of Commanding General, VIII AFSC and A-4, Eighth Air Force, announced at an Eighth Air Force Commanders Meeting on 4 October,[21] appeared to be the limit to which he was willing to go in reorganizing Eighth Air Force headquarters in October 1943.

On 11 October, General Knerr was appointed A-4, Eighth Air Force, and the Special Staff Sections of the Eighth Air Force were transferred to VIII AFSC, effective 15 October.[22] The Special Staff Sections of Eighth Air Force and VIII AFSC were merged, and continued to function as advisors to the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force. Although a limited approach, this consolidation represented the first step in the objective of combining the logistical function with the operational function in one headquarters. General Knerr carried the consolidation of A-4 and VIII AFSC a step further when he notified the personnel of VIII AFSC on 29 November that the whole VIII AFSC headquarters functioned as A-4 of Eighth Air Force.[23] By 3 December, General Knerr was able to notify those concerned that all A-4 matters

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20. Interview with Major General Hugh J. Knerr, D/CG, USSTAF, by Captain Alfred Goldberg, Assistant Historian, USSTAF, 12 June 1945.

21. Minutes, Commanders Meeting, 8 AF, 4 Oct 1943.

22. GO No. 182, Hq, 8 AF, 11 Oct 1943.

23. Office Memo No. 39, Hq, VIII AFSC, 29 Nov 1943.

were to be sent by the AG, Eighth Air Force, to the AG, Service Command.[24] This represented the final physical absorption of the personnel and functions of A-4 by the Service Command, with Service Command Headquarters assuming the additional identity of A-4, Headquarters, Eighth Air Force. Thus, by early December 1943, VIII AFSC had completely absorbed A-4 of the Air Force, and had become the sole logistical agency entitled to act in the name of the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force.

Following the consolidation of VIII AFSC and A-4, Eighth Air Force, and his appointment as Commanding General, VIII AFSC, General Knerr reorganized his headquarters in accordance with his principles of grouping functions in large blocks under principal staff officers, thereby providing a greater measure of vertical control. In the reorganization of 23 November 1943, General Knerr eliminated the position of Chief of Staff, and added instead, the position of Deputy Commander. At the same time, he appointed a Chief of Administration under whom were grouped all of the special and administrative staff sections, totalling fourteen.[25] These sections now reported to the Chief of Administration, who, like the Chiefs of the Maintenance, Supply, and Personnel and Training Divisions, reported directly to the Commanding General or his Deputy. Instead of spreading equal authority among twenty or more sections in the headquarters, General Knerr centralized top control in the hands of a few chiefs, with whom he could deal directly.

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24. Memo, General Knerr, CG, VIII AFSC, to AG, Plans, Chief of Admin, VIII AFSC, 3 Dec 1943.

25. Organization Chart, Hq, VIII AFSC, 23 Nov 1943.

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This establishment of vertical control was a principle of organization adhered to by General Knerr in later reorganizations. The reorganized headquarters was in strong contrast to the traditional General Staff organization which permitted lateral dispersion of responsibility and control.

After the consolidation of VIII AFSC and A-4, Eighth Air Force, General Knerr continued to persist in his longer range program of combining Air Force and Service Command headquarters. In this persistence he was influenced and, perhaps, aided by the course of events. The decision to place a numbered tactical Air Force in the United Kingdom made it necessary to arrange for the establishment of some overall theater air agency in order to prevent duplication and waste. On 11 September, General Eaker had been designated Commanding General of all United States Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom.[26] In October, when the Ninth Air Force was formally activated in the United Kingdom, it was recognized that the need for a theater air headquarters was urgent. Accordingly, on 15 October, General Eaker officially activated United States Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom and appointed as his staff the whole general and special staff of the Eighth Air Force.[27] As a result, the Eighth Air Force was given, in effect, control over the administration and operations of the Ninth Air Force. Operational control over the Ninth Air Force was relinquished to Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, on 15 December 1943.[28]

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26. GO No.62, Hq, ETO, 11 Sep 1943.

27. GO No.1, Hq, USAAFUK, 15 Oct 1943 (corrected copy).

28. Ltr, subj: "Directive for Tactical Bomber Operations," CG, 9AF to CG, IX BC and CG, IX FC, 15 Dec. 1943.

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The establishment of USAAFUK made General Knerr the chief air logistical officer in the theater by virtue of his appointment as A-4, USAAFUK.[29] In addition, the role of VIII AFSC in fostering IX AFSC made it necessary for the former to act as a theater air service command. The problems raised during the exercise of this theater-wide function toward the end of 1943 lent added weight to General Knerr's arguments for a combined headquarters.

The performance by VIII AFSC of administrative functions for the Air Force was also an additional factor in favor of integration of the two headquarters. VIII AFSC, for instance, was charged with responsibility for receiving, processing and distributing all of the casual and filler Air Force personnel who entered the theater.[30] During the latter part of 1943 this was an enormous task. In addition, all technical training for the Air Force was the responsibility of the Service Command.[31] Increasingly, during the last months of 1943, the Service Commander acted for the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, in those matters delegated to the Service Command. In effect, his dual role made it necessary for General Knerr to wear two hats--one as Commanding General, VIII AFSC and one as A-4, Eighth Air Force. When dealing with other Eighth Air Force Commands in the name of the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, General Knerr wore his A-4 hat. On other occasions, he wore his Service Command hat. This wearing of two hats was accomplished skillfully by General

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29. GO No. 1, Hq,USAAFUK, 15 Oct 1943 (corrected copy).

30. Memo, 155-1, Hq, 8 AF, 12 Oct 1943.

31. Ibid.

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Knerr, but he may well have felt that neither hat was large enough.

General Knerr continued to urge his ideas on General Eaker. After his appointment as A-4, General Knerr urged the establishment of a combined headquarters with two deputies, one for operations and one for administration, the latter having responsibility for both maintenance (logistical) and administrative functions. The effect of this suggestion was to reduce the power and responsibilities of the Chief of Staff. According to General Knerr,

> With that idea, General Chauncey was not in agreement. As Chief of Staff he had a natural interest in retaining administrative functions and not letting various sections split away. But all during that fall and winter--up to the time General Spaatz came in early 1944--I lost no opportunity in various meetings and personally to point out the manner in which various difficulties that had arisen could have been avoided if we had wished, the principle argument being saving in time....The objection to the three deputy form of organization, especially in an Air Force no larger than the Eighth Force was at that time, is that two deputies can always get along well together. As you inject three deputies, you create a situation where two personalities will gang up against the third. You have three people theoretically with the same amount of authority. I don't know of any instance in history where triumvirates have lasted long.[32]

General Knerr's persistent advocacy of the two deputy system did not achieve its aim during 1943, for General Eaker failed to go beyond his action of consolidating VIII AFSC and A-4, Eighth Air Force.

In November 1943, General Eaker appeared to lend point to the failure to adopt a two deputy system by appointing a single Deputy Commanding General. Major General Idwal H. Edwards, who was appointed Deputy Commanding General on 22 November,[33] acted primarily as General Eaker's agent in dealings with other headquarters and agencies and assumed specific admin-

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32. Interview, General Knerr by Captain Goldberg, 12 June 1945, p. 1.

33. GO No. 211, Hq, 8 AF, 22 Nov 1943.

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istrative functions.[34] The appointment of a single deputy must have represented to General Knerr at least a deferment of the adoption of the two deputy system.

Organization and administration had also been among the major problems faced by General Spaatz almost from the beginning of operations in the Mediterranean area, where he was the senior American air commander during 1943. The problems raised by ~~joint~~ combined British-American operations in the Mediterranean had been reflected in the organizational and administrative structure of the combined British-American headquarters and of the American Twelfth Air Force Headquarters. The Northwest African Air Forces, established on 18 February 1943, was a combined British-American headquarters, exercising operational jurisdiction over American and British tactical units.[35] The various air force headquarters of the NAAF were formed by merging headquarters units of the American Twelfth Air Force with British headquarters units.[36] Administrative control of the American units of NAAF, originally exercised by that headquarters, was later reserved exclusively to the Twelfth Air Force and its commands.[37] Thus, the Headquarters assumed a dual nature in which there was a clear distinction between operational and administrative control, with Headquarters NAAF becoming a purely operational headquarters, and Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force becoming a purely administrative headquarters.

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34. Ltr, General Eaker, CG, 8 AF, to Major General Idwal H. Edwards, D/CG, 8 AF, 27 Nov 1943.

35. GO No. 1, Hq, NAAF, 18 Feb 1943 (4 annexures).

36. Ibid.

37. GO No. 166, Hq, NAAF, 26 Aug 1943.

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The establishment on 1 November 1943, of a second American Air Force, the Fifteenth,[38] in the Mediterranean area made necessary the establishment of an American theater air headquarters, just as a similar event had made necessary the establishment of a theater air headquarters in the United Kingdom shortly before. In December 1943, a single theater air headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, was established in the Mediterranean, and in the same month a theater air service command was also established.[39] Thus, the experience of the Mediterranean theater in finding necessary a theater air command and a theater air service command paralleled the experience of the Air Forces in the European theater. By the time of his return to the United Kingdom in December 1943, General Spaatz may well have had firmly rooted in his mind the concept of a division of Air Force functions between operations and administration (logistics). In addition, he was acquainted with the administrative and logistical problems raised by the existence of two or more Air Forces in the same theater.

Planning USSTAF Headquarters Organization

The decision to set up a higher American Air Force headquarters in the United Kingdom, and to place General Spaatz in command, raised the organizational question again. Before going to the United Kingdom from North Africa, General Spaatz, on 24 December 1943, discussed with his staff of the Northwest African Air Forces,

> ...difficulties and problems connected with his new set-up in UK and the administrative and operational responsibilities result-

38. GO No. 1 Hq, 15 AF, 1 Nov 1943.

39. GO No. 67, AFHQ, MTO, 20 Dec 1943.

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ing from new command. The following conclusions were reached:

1. That staff set-up would follow American plan of C/S, A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, the latter probably to be drawn from sources now utilized by 8 AF. 40

In addition, it was proposed that there be provided an AG, Air Inspector, Statistical Control Unit, a Communications Section and two weather officers as advisors to General Spaatz. It was contemplated that control of operations would involve the issuance of "broad orders and directives" to the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, after coordination with the Air Ministry. Reserved to the new headquarters were determinations of policies regarding combat crew tours of duty, and movement of personnel and equipment between the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces. The headquarters assumed responsibility for strategic planning and the development and selection of targets. Certain reports to be required by Operations and Statistical Control were listed.

On 30 December 1943, immediately after his arrival in the United Kingdom, General Spaatz met with Generals Eaker, Chauncey, and Knerr at Headquarters Eighth Air Force, to discuss the organization of the new theater air headquarters. According to General Spaatz's Journal for the day, he decided as a result of the meeting, that he would have a

> ...Deputy for Administration to coordinate 8th and 9th Air Forces in UK and Deputy for Operations, Anderson, to direct strategic operations of 8 and 15 AFs.
>
> 8 AF is to be redesignated Strategic Air Force, and VIII Bomber Command to be redesignated Eighth Air Force. 41

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40. Notes of Conference held at La Marsa, North Africa, 24 Dec 1943, in Spaatz Diary, Dec 1943.

41. Daily Journal, Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, CG, USSTAF, 30 Dec 1943.

[redacted]

The decision to adopt a two deputy system and not an "A" Staff represented a radical departure from the plan developed by General Spaatz prior to his departure from North Africa. It is possible that recognition by General Spaatz of the need for a large operational and administrative headquarters, and his desire to divest himself of details, helped make acceptable to him the two deputy system of organization.[42]

General Knerr considered the 30 December meeting, and the subsequent one on the following day, as the authority for the headquarters organization which was established. It was his opinion, expressed much later, that

> ... the opportunity came to set up the deputies and directorates when General Spaatz arrived, and with his agreement with my point of view. That is why two deputies were appointed.[43]

General Knerr's ideas on organization were not the only ones considered at these meetings. At the meeting of 31 December, attended by all Air Force Commanders in the United Kingdom, General Doolittle, soon to be named Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force, proposed an alternate type of organization which was rejected by General Spaatz. In the opinion of General Knerr, General Doolittle's organization was "extremely unwieldy and excessive of overhead."[44] On the other hand, according to General Knerr,

> At those meetings I stressed my point of view and my recollection was that General Spaatz indicated his agreement with that point of view, and as a result, the draft charts that I presented for discussion were then picked up as a plan of action.[45]

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42. Interview, General Spaatz by Dr. Bruce Hopper, Historian, USSTAF, 20 May 1945, pp. 8-12.

43. Interview, General Knerr, by Captain Goldberg, 12 June 1945, p. 1.

44. Ibid., p. 2.

45. Ibid.

[redacted]

General Spaatz announced that it would be necessary to have a single commander for all of the American Air Forces in the theater and also to set up a theater air service command. In addition, he announced that there would be a deputy for administration and a deputy for operations at the Strategic Air Forces Headquarters, and that Headquarters, VIII Bomber Command would become Headquarters, Eighth Air Force.[46]

On 1 January 1944, Major General Walter B. Smith, soon to be Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and representing General Eisenhower in the United Kingdom at that time, notified General Marshall that General Spaatz had decided on a two deputy headquarters organization.

> Spaatz deputy for operations will be Maj. Gen. Fred L. Anderson for control of strategic operations, including Pointblank operations of 15th AF, coordination with RAF and 9th AF. Deputy for Administration Brigadier General Knerr for coordination, personnel and logistic requirements between 8th and 9th Air Forces in UK.
>
> ... The above planned organization...provides a single Air headquarters for coordination on administrative requirements of 8th and 9th Air Forces and provides essential elements for control of strategic operations. Spaatz, Eaker and myself are convinced that it will work and that it is the minimum organization necessary for general control and coordination of all elements involved.[47]

The new organization was discussed with AAF Headquarters in a teletype conference between General Spaatz and Major General Barney Giles, Chief of Air Staff, on 4 January.

> Spaatz asked if Giles had seen message sent by Bedell Smith to Eisenhower and if it was agreed to by Arnold and Giles. Giles answered yes...Spaatz then asked if he understood that Knerr will be Deputy for Administration to coordinate 8th and 9th Air Forces, and that Anderson will be deputy for operations for

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46. Daily Journal, General Spaatz, 30 Dec 1943.

47. Cable, Smith, Signed Devers, to AGWAR, for General Eisenhower, 1 Jan. 1944.

> control of Strategic operations of 8th and 15th, and that operations of 15th will be directed through Eaker...Giles answered that this is understood, is all right and very good.[48]

Actually, General Spaatz's administrative control over the Ninth Air Force was vague and undefined at this date. It was not until two weeks later that the relationship of the Ninth Air Force to the new headquarters was clarified.[49]

Establishment of USSTAF

On 5 January, authority for the establishment of USSTAF as of 1 January, was received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff,[50] and on 6 January, General Order No. 1 of U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe was published, appointing Generals Anderson and Knerr as Deputy Commanders for Operations and Administration respectively.[51] Formal authorization from the War Department for the establishment of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrons for USSTAF and ASC-USSTAF was not forthcoming until February, and did not take place until 1 March 1944.[52] On 8 January, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Eighth Air Force, was removed to High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, where the personnel of the disbanded VIII Bomber Command Headquarters formed the nucleus for the new Eighth Air Force headquarters.[53] Most of the former Eighth Air Force Headquarters personnel remained at Camp Griffiss, AAF 586, Teddington, Middlesex, new USSTAF Headquarters.

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48. Notes, Teletype Conference, General Spaatz and Major General Barney M. Giles, Chief of Air Staff, Hq, AAF, 4 Jan 1944.

49. GO No. 6, Hq, ETO, 18 Jan 1944.

50. Cable, WAR, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to AWWA, 5246, General Spaatz, 5 Jan 1944.

51. GO No. 1, Hq, USSTAF, 6 Jan 1944.

52. GO No. 12, Hq, USSTAF, 1 Mar 1944.

Organization of a theater service command responsible for base services was announced by General Knerr at an VIII AFSC Staff Meeting on 7 January 1944, when he explained that the Commanding General of the Service Command would also be the Deputy Commander for Administration of U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe. This meant that General Knerr would continue to wear two hats, but they would be larger hats than his previous ones. Strategic Air Depot Area, (the sub-command directly servicing Eighth Air Force stations) General Knerr announced, would become VIII AFSC and revert to control of the Eighth Air Force.[54] It was not until 1 March that the separation of the base and strategic air depot areas took place, and Air Service Command, USSTAF and VIII AFSC were established.[55] Until that date, the administrative side of USSTAF was still officially known as VIII AFSC, although it was already functioning as the theater service command and as part of Headquarters, USSTAF.

At a meeting attended by the depot area commanders and the chief staff officers of the Service Command on 9 January 1944, General Knerr outlined the new organization of United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe. He announced that

> The ASC will provide technical control and Base Services for the 9th Service Command because they are resident in the Base Area; not because they are under General Spaatz's command or control.
>
> The 9th AFSC will continue to be independent.
>
> If the Ninth Air Force comes into the picture it will only be administratively.

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53. GO No. 6, Hq, 8 AF, 8 Jan 1944.

54. Minutes, Staff Meeting No. 117, Hq, VIII AFSC, 7 Jan 1944.

55. GO No. 12, Hq, USSTAF, 1 Mar 1944.

> General Spaatz does not expect to concern himself with any details. He will delegate all responsibility for detail to his two Deputy Commanders. Don't look to a higher Headquarters or staff division. There is no Staff. You cannot have an A staff and a Deputy Commander.[56]

It was not until 20 January that Headquarters, United States Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom, was closed.[57] On the same date, General Spaatz assumed responsibility for the administration of all U. S. Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom, including Hq, USSAFE and the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces.[58] Authority for the assumption of administrative control over all American air units in the European Theater of Operations had been received from General Eisenhower two days before.[59] This assumption of administrative control over the Ninth Air Force was in keeping with General Spaatz's avowed intention of assuming administrative control over all of the Air Forces in the United Kingdom,[60] and permitted General Knerr to plan more positively the functions of the administrative side of USSTAF and of ASC-USSTAF.

General Spaatz explained his conception of the organization of USSTAF in a letter to Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, on 23 January 1944.

> It was very apparent upon arrival here that there must continue to be an overall air administration of all American Air Forces

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56. Notes on Meeting, Hq, VIII AFSC, 9 Jan 1944.

57. GO No. 6, Hq, USSTAF, 20 Jan 1944.

58. Ibid. On 4 Feb 1944, USSTAF was announced as the official abbreviation of the name of the Hq, in place of USSAFE which had been used originally.

59. GO No. 6, Hq, ETO, 18 Jan 1944.

60. Interview, General Spaatz, CG, USSTAF, by Dr. Hopper, 20 May 1945, pp. 8-11.

> in U.K., unless the Theater Commander were to build up a sizable air section in his headquarters to insure administrative coordination. The pattern for this coordination had been established previously in the 8th Air Force headquarters. In view of the experience had in the Mediterranean, I believe, and Eisenhower agrees, that the task should be given to me in addition to my other duties. Enclosed is a chart which is self-explanatory as to the present organizational set up within the USSAFE. Am sure that it will function and function well.[61]

The detailed planning of the headquarters organization had devolved on General Knerr immediately after the decision was made at the two December conferences to establish a two deputy system. On 1 January 1944, in conjunction with his chief advisor on organizational planning, Lieutenant Colonel Jerome Preston, Chief, Plans and Statistics Office, VIII AFSC, General Knerr drew the charts which served as the basis for the organization of USSTAF.[62] In accordance with General Knerr's preferences, the major staff sections under the deputies were called directorates and their chiefs were called directors.

The use of the terms operations and administration to denote the two distinct major command functions were characteristic of Royal Air Force organization. Students of organization among Eighth Air Force and VIII AFSC planners during 1943 were acquainted with RAF organization in terms of "admin" and "ops".[63] General Knerr was not aware of RAF organization until after he had already formulated his ideas on the deputy

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61. Ltr, General Spaatz, CG, USSTAF, to Mr. Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary for Air, War Dept, 23 Jan 1944.

62. Interview, Colonel Jerome Preston, Chief, Statistical Control Office, USSTAF, by Captain Goldberg, Assistant Historian USSTAF, 12 June 1945. Draft, organization chart, USAAF ETO, 1 Jan 1944.

63. Memo, Captain Lepawsky, Plans and Control Division, VIII AFSC, to Colonel Baker, Chief, Plans and Control Division, VIII AFSC, 6 Aug 1943.

system independently. He recognized the similarity of the two organizations and felt that the terms, as used by him, were basically in agreement with their use by the RAF.[64] General Spaatz's experiences with organizational problems in the Mediterranean had evidently imprinted on his mind also the concepts of administration and operations. The agreement on these terms between General Spaatz and General Knerr probably represented a joint belief, derived from independent experience, in the aptness of these terms in describing the two sides of the new headquarters organization.

The use of "director" and "directorate" in place of "chief" and "section" was a development which may be traced to two sources. When reorganizing Air Service Command in the United States in 1942, General Knerr drew on his business experiences of the previous three years to suggest that the headquarters be organized along business lines using business terminology.[65] In addition, Royal Air Force organization also used the terms director and directorate.[66] The adoption of these terms by Headquarters, USSTAF, may have been inspired by a desire to go as far as possible in constructing a headquarters organization different from the traditional military staff in name as well as in functional structure.

A revised organization chart, the finished product of the work begun by General Knerr and Colonel Preston on 1 January, was published as of 21 January 1944,[67] and became the guide to the merger of the sections of

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64. Interview, General Knerr, by Captain Goldberg, 12 June 1945, p. 2.

65. Interview, Colonel Preston, by Captain Goldberg, 12 June 1945, p. 3.

66. Memo, Captain Lepawsky, to Colonel Baker, 6 Aug 1943. See also organization charts, RAF.

67. Organization chart, USSTAF, 21 Jan 1944.

the two headquarters which followed its appearance. The Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Edward P. Curtis, was given control of only one staff section, the Adjutant General Section, which was a combination of the former Adjutant General Sections of the Eighth Air Force and VIII AFSC Headquarters. A sub-section of the Adjutant General, USSTAF, was established to act in the dual capacity of an Adjutant General section for ASC-USSTAF, although the Adjutant General himself acted in a dual capacity for both Headquarters. Shortly after, the Air Inspector was also placed under the Chief of Staff with the title of Inspector General, and a separate Air Inspector for ASC-USSTAF established.[68]

Two directorates--Operations and Intelligence, were placed under the control of the Deputy Commanding General for Operations. The Operations Directorate, successor to A-3 of the former Eighth Air Force Headquarters, was also responsible for weather services, but was shorn of its training, organization and movement functions. Responsibility for combat crew training was delegated to the Eighth Air Force,[69] and technical training functions were assumed by the Director of Personnel, who also acquired the organization and movement functions.[70] These traditional functions of A-3 involved the assignment and movement of units, in addition to the planning and distribution of troop bases, bulk allotments and Tables of Organization. Intelligence was the successor to the former A-2 of the Eighth Air Force Headquarters [redacted]

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68. Organization Chart, USSTAF, 12 Feb 1944.

69. VIII Composite Command retained its combat crew training function.

70. Organization Manual, ASC-USSTAF, 1 Mar 1944.

[redacted]

Under the Deputy Commanding General for Administration were four directorates--Supply, Maintenance, Personnel, and Administration and other Arms and Services. The personnel of these directorates, and all other personnel responsible to the Deputy Commanding General for Administration, were actually assigned to Air Service Command, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, although they performed functions as members of USSTAF headquarters. The Directorates of Supply and Maintenance were direct sucessors of the Supply and Maintenance Divisions of the former VIII AFSC. The Director of Administration and other Arms and Services was given supervision of the special staff sections and certain administrative agencies. He was, therefore, the successor to the former Chief of Administration of VIII AFSC. The Directorate of Personnel ~~was a combination of~~ Combined the functions of A-1 of the Eighth Air Force and the Personnel and Training Division of the VIII AFSC. In addition, the Directorate of Personnel took over the movement and organization functions of the former A-3 Section. Also placed directly under the Deputy Commanding General for Administration, although not accorded the status of a directorate, was the Statistical Control Office, formerly the Plans and Statistics Office of VIII AFSC.[71] By 1 March 1944, all staff assignments had been announced and the organization of the headquarters in accordance with the chart of 21 January was complete.[72]

Recognition by General Knerr of the problems raised by the dual status of the directorates under the Deputy Commanding General for Administration was shown in a headquarters memorandum of 28 January 1944. The four directors and the Chief, Statistical Control Office, were authorized

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71. Ibid. Organization Charts, Hq, USSTAF, 21 Jan and 12 Feb 1944.

72. GO No. 10, Hq, ASC-USSTAF, 1 Mar 1944.

[redacted]

[redacted]

to sign USSTAF correspondence "For the Deputy Commanding General for Administration", and to prepare correspondence of Headquarters, USSTAF "By Command of Lieutenant General Spaatz", for the signature of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration--General Knerr.[73] The problem of when the Administration directorates were acting for the Deputy Commanding General for Administration, USSTAF, and when they were acting for the Commanding General, ASC-USSTAF, was one which persisted throughout 1944 and influenced organizational thinking in the headquarters.

Late in February, authority was received from the War Department for the activation of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrons for USSTAF and ASC-USSTAF.[74] On 1 March, the order establishing these Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrons was published,[75] thereby providing the new headquarters with a solid foundation for meeting the burdens which were to be placed on it.

Developments of 1944-45: The Staff Sections

The original headquarters organization of USSTAF and the reorganizations which followed during 1944 and 1945, were reflections of the ability of Air Force leaders to meet the requirements of modern air warfare, as well as specific Theater needs, even though these led them away from traditional systems of staff organization. Strong arguments could have been advanced against reorganization in time of active combat on the basis of inconvenience and delay to operations. This consideration proved

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73. Headquarters Memo, VIII AFSC, 28 Jan 1944.

74. Cable, WAR No. 9746, to General Spaatz, 23 Feb 1944.

75. GO No. 12, Hq, USSTAF, Mar 1944.

[redacted]

[redacted]

secondary to a positive tendency for development according to newly understood principles and changing conditions.

The atmosphere was so receptive to organizational change, that the history of USSTAF as well as the Eighth Air Force before it, is almost bewildering in the number and rapidity of the changes which took place. In reviewing these events after the end of the fighting, in June 1945, Brigadier General Alfred R. Maxwell, Director of Operations, USSTAF, quoted one observer he labeled a cynic as saying in the early part of the war: "Every war is famous for something; I believe this war is going to be known as 'The War of Staff Reorganization'". However, in General Maxwell's judgment and that of other competent observers, the changes were for the most part sensible and logical and followed changing conditions.[76]

The headquarters changes which did occur in USSTAF during 1944 and early 1945 came in some aspects in response to new needs of the war, and in others, as revisions of earlier principles caused by the difficulties and problems raised in their application. Historically the reorganizations were important, both for their demonstrations of the specific experiences of this war, and for their expression of organizational principles which have been added to the body of military theory and practice.

The Directorates.

As USSTAF responsibilities expanded and staff functions were clarified, the need for new directorates and staff agencies developed. The first new directorate to appear was that of Weather Services, which was

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76. Interview with Brigadier General Alfred R. Maxwell, Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3, USSTAF, by Dr. Bruce C. Hopper, Historian, USSTAF, 22 June 1945, p. 41.

[redacted]

separated from the Director of Operations in February 1944.[77] This move recognized the wide function of weather information in the Theater. The ground forces, as well as tactical and strategic Air Forces, were dependent on the central supervisory weather agency at USSTAF.[78] The scope and importance of its work required the stronger, more freely functioning position of an independent directorate reporting to the Deputy Commanding General for Operations.

Another new directorate appeared under the Deputy Commanding General for Operations, in April, in response to needs of the intensive planning activity connected with the imminent invasion of the Continent, and related with these, the need to prepare for the post-hostilities period. The problems of control of the German Air Force and equipment, Air Force participation in the military control of Germany, and redeployment were all natural accompaniments of planning for the invasion of the Continent. Based on the directive which charged USSTAF with administrative responsibility for all U. S. Air Forces in the theater,[79] General Spaatz requested and received from ETOUSA specific responsibility for determining Air Force policies on all post-hostilities air matters.[80] As a result, the Plans Directorate was created to discharge this function. Later in the

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77. GO No. 9, Hq, USSTAF, 12 Feb 1944.

78. Office Memo, Director of Weather Services to Director of Personnel, USSTAF, 18 Feb 1944.

79. GO No. 6, Hq, ETOUSA, 18 Jan 1944.

80. Ltr, subj: "Responsibility of Commanding General, USSTAF," Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz to CG, ETOUSA, 22 May 1944, and 1st Ind, CG, ETOUSA to CG, USSTAF.

year its title was changed to Post-Hostilities Planning, to conform with the major aspect of its activities. In April 1945, the directorate returned to its older designation of Plans.[81]

In February 1944, the Air Technical Section of ETOUSA, was transferred to USSTAF. The Air Technical Section dated its earliest activities of technical liaison with the British from the days of the Special Observers Group in the latter part of 1941, and was later activated as a section under ETOUSA in July 1942.[82] The transfer to USSTAF was preceded by negotiations on the part of General Knerr, based on the understanding that this agency logically belonged with the overall Air Force headquarters of the Theater.[83] The Air Technical Section became the ASC Directorate of Technical Services, and was charged with the function of supervising technical modifications within Air Forces under the administrative control of USSTAF, in addition to its original activities of coordination and liaison on technical developments.[84]

In a reorganization occurring within ASC-USSTAF, (USSTAF-Admin) in September, the Directorate of Administrative Services was abolished, and most of its elements, consisting of the Special Staff Sections, were apportioned among the other divisions. The Director of Administrative Services, Brigadier General Clarence P. Kane, now became the Deputy

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81. Ltr, subj: "Office of the Director of Plans," Major General Anderson to Brigadier General C. P. Cabell, Hq, USSTAF, 22 Apr 1944; Hq Memo No. 32, Hq, USSTAF, 2 Apr 1945.

82. GO No. 13, Hq, ETOUSA, 10 July 1942.

83. Ltr, subj: "Air Technical Section," General Knerr to CG, ETOUSA, 12 Jan 1944.

84. GO No. 19, Hq, ETOUSA, 21 Feb 1944; GO No. 10, Hq, ASC-USSTAF, 1 Mar 1944.

Commanding General, ASC-USSTAF.[85]

In December 1944, the dual role of General Knerr was eliminated, and General Kane became Commanding General, ASC-USSTAF. (ASC-USSTAF was later redesignated Air Technical Service Command in Europe).[86] The three Directorates of Supply, Maintenance, and Technical Services remained assigned to ASC-USSTAF, and were separated from the office of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration. General Knerr retained Personnel as a USSTAF directorate, and three new directorates were formed to discharge the functions of Armament, Communications, and Medical Services.[87]

The Communications Directorate was transferred to the Operations side in April 1945, in response to increasingly evident indications that its function was closely allied to operational activities.[88] The move was simplified by the fact that the restricted signal supply and maintenance functions had been, earlier in September 1944, placed under the Supply and Maintenance Directorates.

The last reorganization which affected the directorates was that of 15 May 1945. The two deputy system was eliminated, and returning to the five sections of the "A" staff system, the eight directorates of the headquarters were absorbed into the categories of A-1 Personnel, A-2 Intelligence, A-3 Operations, A-4 (served by ATSCE) and A-5 Plans.

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85. GO No. 47, Hq, ASC-USSTAF, 1 Sep 1944.

86. GO No. 17, Hq, USSTAF, 10 Feb 1945.

87. GO No. 98, Hq, USSTAF, 11 Dec 1944; GO No. 100, Hq, USSTAF, 15 Dec 1944.

88. Hq Memo, Hq, USSTAF, 13 Apr 1945.

[redacted]

Weather Services and Communications became sub-sections of Operations, Medical Services was absorbed by Personnel, and Armament now operated under A-4.[89] The extensive consolidation of former directorates indicated the contrast between the complexity of combat needs and the simplification allowed by the minor operational needs of the post-hostilities period. One specific organizational principle associated with the deputy system in its early development was retained in the new organization. The Commanding General, ATSCE, became A-4 of USSTAF and operated supply and maintenance functions for the headquarters with his own staff. This was an obvious and striking turn of the circle back to the days in late 1943 when the Commanding General, VIII AFSC served as the A-4 of the Air Force staff.

The Special Staff Sections.

The Special Staff Sections posed an important organizational problem which affected all USSTAF Headquarters reorganizations in 1944 and 1945. In the traditional General Staff form of headquarters organization, the Special Staff had occupied a secondary but distinct position next to the "A" Staff Sections. As representatives of the Arms and Services serving the Air Forces in their specialized fields of supply, maintenance, and administrative services, they acted as separate staff agencies with direct access to the Commanding General and his Chief of Staff.

Their position in USSTAF Headquarters was affected by two dominant trends in recent Air Force history. The first, the trend toward an independent logistical system for the Air Forces, clearly contradicted any special separate position for the representatives of the Army Service

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89. GO No. 49, Hq, USSTAF, 15 May 1945.

[redacted]

Forces in the Air Force staff structure. The principle of Air Force autonomy pointed toward the elimination of distinctly labeled links with the service branches of the Army.

The second trend affecting the Special Staff was the development in headquarters organization toward functional simplification of the number and type of agencies reporting directly to the Commanding General. This program led toward an absorption of the Special Staff Sections into the specific Air Corps staff agencies which paralleled their functions.

The development of the deputy system on the USSTAF Headquarters level served, along with its other purposes, as a device to regroup and integrate the staff sections so as to eliminate the separate, appended position of the Special Staff in the headquarters organization. At the same time, the Special Staff Sections, concerned as they were with supply, maintenance, and administrative services, were placed within the distinct logistical agency of USSTAF, the Air Service Command, and thereby fused with the Air Force logistical system.

To supplement the steps taken at the headquarters level, a further organizational development reflected the principle of integrating the Arms and Service units on the lower operating echelons. The miscellaneous field units of the Arms and Services had maintained separate status on the station level alongside of distinct Air Corps service units such as the sub-depot. The development of a new standard service unit in 1944, the Service Group, Special, was a move to integrate the several types of service elements into one complete and specifically Air Corps unit which could be applied at

all operating levels.[90]

The role of this program of integration in staff reorganizations was even more clearly pronounced in the United States than in the Theater. As the story was traced by Lieutenant General Barney M. Giles, Chief of Staff, Headquarters AAF, in correspondence with General Knerr, the new Service Group and a new three deputy system of headquarters organization in the United States, both arose from the activities of the Arms and Services Integration Committee of Headquarters AAF. The committee was established in November 1943, under the Chief of Air Staff, with the mission to "facilitate integration of ASWAAF units and organizations into functionalized AAF units and organizations both in the United States and overseas."[91]

At the first meeting of the committee in November, its chairman, Brigadier General Byron E. Gates, Chief, Management Control, Headquarters AAF, presented an outline of the three deputy system in answer to questions on what staff regrouping would result from the integration program for the Arms and Services. All activities were to be consolidated under a single commander and his deputies, apportioned under the three headings of Administration and Services, Supply and Maintenance, and Operations and Training.[92]

This was a program of functional simplification, for, as General Giles put it, there were now only three principal assistants for the

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90. Ltr, Lieutenant General Barney M. Giles, Chief of Staff, Hq, AAF, to General Knerr, 1 July 1944.

91. Ibid.

92. Minutes, First Meeting of Arms and Service Integration Committee, Hq, AAF, 16 Nov 1943.

base or air force commander, as opposed to the previous system where up to thirty officers had direct access to the commander. The parallel in the ETO was the two deputy system. Under the two deputy system, Special Staff Sections were removed one step from the Commanding General and now worked through the channel of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration. At the same time this would not have been a great reform if the various sections still reported separately to the Deputy Commanding General. Therefore, the Special Staff Sections were combined to operate under the Director of Administration and Other Arms and Services on the basis established originally in VIII AFSC in October 1943.

The Directorate of Administration and Other Arms and Services (later called the Directorate of Administrative Services) held an anomalous position in that it remained a collection of formerly separate agencies, still working in specialized fields, though now headed by a single spokesman and coordinator. It was doubtful whether a real step toward functional integration had taken place. The point was emphasized by the Special Staff reorganizations which followed during the year.

The plans developed in Washington proposed a consolidation of the various storage, maintenance, and issue services which worked for the Air Forces. A more definite step in that direction took place in USSTAF Headquarters in early September 1944. The Directorate of Administrative Services was abolished, and the sub-sections of the Directorate dealing in supply, maintenance and technical development were functionally separated and distributed among the Directorates of

Supply, Maintenance and Technical Services.[93] All of the personnel of the Quartermaster, Fiscal, Transportation, Engineering, and Chemical sections were transferred to Supply. Ordnance personnel were split among Supply, Maintenance, and Technical Services. The Signal Section underwent the greatest fragmentation with its personnel distributed among Maintenance, Supply, Technical Services, Personnel, Adjutant General, and the Director of Operations (who now controlled certain planning and operating functions in connection with radio and radar).[94]

Yet even this type of redistribution did not succeed in eliminating all traces of the Special Staff concept. It became necessary in this reorganization to set up an identity known as the Headquarters Staff to accommodate such agencies as the Surgeon, Judge Advocate, Counter-Intelligence, and Defense Officer. More significantly, the Headquarters Staff included the senior officers of the sections which had been absorbed by the other directorates, and in this category they were enabled to report directly to the Deputy Commanding General, ASC-USSTAF (formerly Director of Administrative Services). The move served as a recognition that it would not be advisable to completely obscure the important role of the former Special Staff Sections while they operated under the directorates. In contradiction to a program of wholesale integration, it was becoming apparent that certain sections of the Special Staff had developed functions of peculiar importance to the Air Forces which transcended the category of miscellaneous supply and maintenance agencies.

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93. GO No. 47, Hq, ASC-USSTAF, 1 Sep 1944.

94. Par 1, SO No. 197, Hq, ASC-USSTAF, 8 Sep 1944.

One staff officer's early discussion of this point deserves mention. Major Albert Lepawsky, formerly of the Plans Office, VIII AFSC, and later a member of the Statistical Control Office, USSTAF, expressed himself in this connection to Lt. Col. Preston in January 1944, when the establishment of Special Staff Section desks in the Supply and Maintenance Directorates was first being discussed. It appeared to him that the Special Staff question was being treated irrationally because of the persistent family quarrel with SOS. Major Lepawsky went so far as to suggest a reorganization of the existing directorates which would permit the assignment of intact Special Staff sections rather than require that they be broken up. He further proposed that some of the Special Staff Sections, such as Ordnance, Engineer, and Signal, be raised to the position of directorates. He contended that the urge to wholly absorb the sections identified with the Arms and Services into distinctive Air Force agencies, was leading to a neglect of their importance, and, indeed, hampered their functions.[95]

There were interesting prophetic implications in this analysis as demonstrated by subsequent events. The December reorganization of the headquarters raised Armament, Communications, and Medical Services to the level of directorates. Although their specific supply and maintenance functions remained separated under the Supply and Maintenance Directorates, the reorganization recognized the important

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95. Memos, subj: "Reorganization of the Special Staff Sections," "Further Reorganization Suggestions," Major Albert Lepawsky, Statistical Control Office, Hq, VIII AFSC, to Lt. Colonel Preston, Chief, Statistical Control Office, VIII AFSC, 4, 5, 12 Jan 1944.

specialized problems of policy and control with which these sections were concerned.

The background for the formation of the three new directorates was discussed in retrospect by General Knerr in May 1945, in letters to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, in which he indicated some of the major lessons learned during the air war in Europe. He mentioned the stress the Air Forces had always placed on the planes, the crews, and the flying of the planes. The war in Europe had brought a new stress on the weapons themselves, the bombs, and also the acutely important signal equipment which, to a large extent, set bombing operations free from the restrictions of weather.

As he stated his point on Communications,

> I believe that the most important lesson learned during the past two and a half years in connection with Communications requirements is that the Communications Section of the headquarters of an air force such as USSTAF in Europe should be set up as a separate division under an officer who ranks with the top-line staff of the deputies.[96]

In a separate letter on the subject of Armament, he said

> If it is realized that combat air planes have as their primary mission the damage and destruction of targets on land, on sea, and in the air, and that this destruction can be accomplished by Air Forces only by the proper use of aircraft armament equipment, then the importance of having an adequate armament organization is obvious.[97]

In this case, he recommended a strong armament organization which extended to all echelons and combined the functions and personnel of Armament, Ordnance, and Chemical Warfare.

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96. Ltr, subj: "Air Signal Communications in the ETO," General Knerr to CG, AAF, 9 May 1945.

97. Ltr, subj: "Air Force Armament," General Knerr to CG, AAF, 9 May 1945.

At the same time, General Knerr indicated concurrence with conclusions which evaluated the role of Medical Services as overriding the limitations of any one staff division under which it might be placed. Its



position as a separate directorate in any Air Force organization was justified by its dealings with all staff sections and all command echelons. Like Communications and Armament, the importance of Medical Service activities required a control position close to the Commanding General.[98]

Development were in this way verifying the view that certain former Special Staff Sections were too important in their express Air Corps functions to remain obscured in any miscellany of administrative staff agencies, or totally absorbed in the General Staff divisions.

The requirements of the war went so far as to raise one category of the Arms and Services to the level of an Air Force Command. This step was taken when the specialized field activities of the Engineers eventually required the centralized control which only a command status could afford. The Ninth Air Force activated the IX Engineer Command in March 1944, in preparation for the invasion of the Continent, when the

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98. Memo, Brigadier General M. C. Grow, Director of Medical Services, Hq, USSTAF, to General Knerr, 13 Apr 1945.

99. GO No. 83, Hq, 9th AF, 30 Mar 1944.

To parallel the Engineer Command development, there were indications that planners on General Knerr's staff, in November 1944, were thinking in terms of a Signal Command and a Medical Command. As described by Colonel Preston, the plan for a Signal Command had the purpose of providing USSTAF-controlled Signal units which would be available to support base activities or to meet the requirements of the tactical elements. The proposal envisaged the Communications Chief of USSTAF acting as the commander of the units. It was pointed out that this move had ample precedent in the Ground Forces. At the same time, it was a logical extension of the operating principles back of the deputy system in USSTAF, which defined the deputies and directors as sharing in the command function.[101]

The planning for a Signal Command was abortive. Colonel George P. Dixon, Communications Officer, USSTAF, clarified the difficulties of this move and made certain distinctions which apparently rendered it inadvisable. In a memorandum to General Knerr he pointed out that the units of the Engineer Command played a mobile operational role, were not integral parts of any specific headquarters, and were practically independent operationally in pursuing their own projects. On the other hand, Signal units had stable assignments with particular headquarters, and the system under which they operated created little need for direct control of their operational activities by a higher headquarters.[102]

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100. GO No. 81, Hq, USSTAF, 20 Oct 1944; Organization Manual, Hq, USSTAF, 15 Dec 1944.

101. Memo, Colonel Preston to General Knerr, 1 Nov 1944.

102. Memo, Colonel George P. Dixon, Communications Officer, ASC-USSTAF, to General Knerr, 17 Nov 1944.

[redacted]

At the time of the 15 December reorganization, there were indications from rough drafts of organization charts prepared by General Knerr, that he was also thinking of a Medical Command under USSTAF. This recommendation was forwarded to General Spaatz along with the general proposal for the December reorganization.[103] General Spaatz indicated disagreement with this approach, and favored instead a Directorate of Medical Services, which was finally established by the new headquarters organization.[104]

After the first attempts to wholly absorb the Special Staff Sections had demonstrated the difficulties involved, the trend had developed which strengthened the position of the more active and effective sections (the sections best assimilated in terms of Air Corps functions) by raising them to the directorate level even at the expense of increasing the number of separate agencies on the staff. It was characteristic of the history of the Special Staff that later, near the end of hostilities, the organizational trend reversed itself again. Planning in April 1945 for the post-hostilities air force headquarters took the direction of an "A" staff organization in place of the two deputy system which did not leave room for as many parallel directorates as existed under the deputies. General Spaatz called for a traditional five section General Staff in the latest reorganization of May 1945. General Knerr, on the other hand, convinced by what he believed were important lessons of the war, proposed that there was need for separate Communications, Armament, and Medical Services directorates on a line with the five "A" staff sections.[105] However, the decision was

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103. Ltr, subj: "Office of the D/CG Admin, USSTAF," General Knerr to CG, USSTAF, 3 Dec 1944.

104. Minutes, USSTAF Commanders Meeting, 5 Dec. 1944.

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thought it advisable to point out at the first staff meeting of the new headquarters, that although the Special Staff Officers would be directly responsible to the Assistant Chief of Staff under whom they functioned, he intended that they should operate with the freedom which they previously had under the directorate system, and be accorded the titles of Deputy Assistant Chiefs of Staff.[107]

DEVELOPMENTS OF 1944-45: The Deputy System

The lessons learned from the application of the deputy system to USSTAF Headquarters organization deserve detailed analysis. It was apparent to everyone that the two deputy system was a sharp departure from traditional military principles of organization. It was inevitable that argument should persist, and that analysis and reiteration of the principles involved be continuous throughout 1944. Events themselves, the headquarters reorganizations of late 1944 and early 1945, became demonstrations of the validity and permanence of those principles. On the face of developments, it may appear that the system was found wanting. However, a close study is required for an evaluation that does justice to the form of organization that served the Air Forces in the European Theater of Operations during the climactic period of the European war.

An analysis of the deputy system must necessarily begin with the assertions in favor of its adoption made by the men who proposed and established the headquarters organization. It was evident that two standpoints of judgment were effective in its origin. One approach,

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107. Minutes, Weekly Staff Meeting, Hq, USSTAF, 18 May 1945.

which might be termed the view of expedience, confined itself primarily to a judgment of the particular requirements of the USSTAF Headquarters from the nature of its command structure and its responsibilities. In contrast, General Knerr's original program went beyond this view, and asserted that the basis of the deputy system was in a revised military theory of organization which supplanted the traditional General Staff system insofar as the modern Air Forces were concerned. It was in the test of the latter view that the experiences, difficulties and later reorganizations of the USSTAF headquarters system have chief interest.

From the standpoint of expedience, the deputy system was certainly well adapted to the particular requirements of the USSTAF command structure. Two distinct spheres of command control had arisen in the Theater, defined by the terms operations and administration, and it was no coincidence that the two deputy commanding generals were similarly defined. Control over the Fifteenth Air Force was restricted to operations, and control over the Ninth Air Force was restricted to administration. This confronted General Spaatz with two distinct responsibilities to be exercised in separate regions and along separate lines. In General Spaatz's mind this unique circumstance seemed to stand out as the primary argument for the deputy system. As he stated in reviewing the headquarters history, he had felt the need for well defined organizations to deal with his responsibilities as separated in two theaters. Through General Knerr, his Deputy CG for Administration, there was a clearcut administrative line of control over the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces. Through General Anderson, the Deputy CG for Operations, there was a channel of operational responsibility over the Eighth and

Fifteenth Air Forces. To General Spaatz, the deputy system appeared to be the only form of organization possible in the complex situation in which he found himself, and he specifically stated that the ordinary General Staff system would have broken down in confusion under the same circumstances.[108]

Further, in terms of the specific requirements originally facing the headquarters, the top echelon position of USSTAF, involved it in the field of high policy and posed the need for assistants to share the load of the Commanding General. At the start, General Spaatz laid down the principle that in view of his policy responsibilities, he would not deal directly with commanders of forces under his control.[109] This principle was used by General Knerr himself in explaining the deputy system. In his words,

> When an organization that is under complete control of a commander gets to such a level that a commander must give his time to political or other considerations at a higher level, he must delegate his responsibilities on others in order to carry on his work at the political levels.[110]

Yet General Knerr would be the first to assert that the deputy system had significance that extended beyond any particular situation or any distinct echelon of command. It is evident from voluminous correspondence carried on through 1944, that as the chief proponent of the USSTAF headquarters organization, he considered it a permanent development of

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108. Interview with General Carl A. Spaatz by Dr. Bruce C. Hopper, Historian, USSTAF, 20 May 1945, pp. 9-11.

109. Daily Journal, Lieutenant General Carl A. Spaatz, CG, USSTAF, 12 Jan 1944.

110. Interview with Major General Hugh J. Knerr by Captain Goldberg, Assistant Historian, USSTAF, 12 June 1945, p. 8.

military organization applicable, under flexible handling, to all levels of AAF command, to all theaters, to peace time as well as war time.[111] General Knerr's viewpoint was influential in Washington and elsewhere. There can be little doubt that the principles he persistently put forward were the same as those which influenced organizational changes in the Zone of Interior and in other theaters.

As summarized in a letter to General Spaatz in June 1944, when active interest in his views was being expressed by Washington planners, the arguments for a deputy system were first of all based on economy of personnel and efficiency of operation.

> It is submitted that the so-called general staff organization is no longer applicable to Air Forces for the following reasons:
>
> a. Time and space factors do not permit of formal overhead coordination in advance of action to be taken without great loss in efficiency.
>
> b. Division of responsibility and authority inherent in a staff organization causes fatal delays through the unwillingness of some to assume responsibility when necessary, and the enthusiasm of others to assume authority without responsibility.
>
> c. A large staff is a convenient means for making jobs for the 'deserving' without commensurate gain to the organization.
>
> d. In those organizations where vertical command authority has been substituted for lateral staff coordination, a marked increase in efficiency has become immediately apparent.
>
> e. Economy in personnel is possible in every organization where vertical command through deputies is substituted for the staff system.[112]

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111. Ltr, subj: "Organization," General Knerr to CG, USSTAF, 2 June 1944; Interview with General Knerr by Captain Goldberg, 12 June 1945, p. 8.

112. Ltr, subj: "Organization," General Knerr to CG, USSTAF, 2 June 1944.

Vertical command through deputies was described by General Knerr at one of the staff meetings:

> The directorates participate in the command functions of the Commanding General, as passed down through the two deputies. Those matters which fall within the field of the directorates are presumed to receive initial and positive action, and any coordination required within the headquarters is the responsibility of the originating directorate, with all coordinating directorates to be kept informed of action.[113]

It becomes evident that the stress in General Knerr's mind was on a new staff organization with general application, which functionally divided the work of the headquarters among agents who possessed combined authority and responsibility in their fields. Within their own fields, the deputies and directors emerged from the status of staff advisors, and participated directly in the command function, relieving the bottleneck which existed when direct action was forced through the coordinating agency of the Chief of Staff or the Commanding General himself.

It is necessary to go beyond the statement of principles, and in writing the history of organizational developments of 1944 and 1945, to analyze the problems that were raised in the application of such principles. These problems were not minor and their role must be interpreted in the final events which reorganized the headquarters system. At the same time, it must be stressed that in terms of efficiency and successful application to the practical needs of the Theater, the success of the deputy system was not disputed by any available testimony. Nor is there much basis for doubting the permanent value of certain organizational principles evolved. It was in terms of the wholesale value of the structure of Headquarters, USSTAF as it existed from January 1944 to December 1944, that there developed considerable debate and reserved judgment which

113. Minutes, Weekly Staff Meeting, Hq, USSTAF, 20 Dec. 1944.

questioned the usefulness of its application in other military situations.

The history of the USSTAF deputy system can be divided for purposes of discussion into three major areas in which evaluation and analysis took place. Requiring study first of all, were the problems emerging from the demarcation between Operations and Administration, and the operating relationships between the two sides of headquarters. Another region of difficulty included the practical problems arising from the dual identity of the Administration side as ASC headquarters. As a third division of the subject were the problems involved in the controversy which developed in 1944 over the proper relationship of service and combat elements at the various echelons of Air Force structure, and which directly affected the role of the Air Service Command in USSTAF Headquarters.

Finally, the problems and difficulties which faced the headquarters system must be interpreted in the light of the eventual reorganizations of 15 December 1944 and 15 May 1945. These reorganizations changed in principle and form two basic concepts of the headquarters organization: that of 15 December separated ASC-USSTAF from the office of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration; that of 15 May dissolved the deputy system as such, substituting for it a traditional five section "A" staff. These were significant changes of direction, and in the interest of military history, require explanation.

Relations Between Operations and Administration

A study of the organizational changes which took place requires understanding of the relations between the two sides of the headquarters. Any speculation on the smoothness of their relationship must first consi-

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der General Knerr's own retrospective remarks:

> General Anderson and I always worked in complete harmony...Differences were very, very minor....There was no instance of any conflict of interest, basically, because I always insisted that Operations was the number one consideration....We gave precedence to operational requirements.[114]

The deputy system was predicated on the assumption that there were two distinct spheres of control in any command situation--operations and logistics.[115] (The latter was in this use a term expanded to include all administration and services). There was evidence to believe that this demarcation itself, backed up as it was by the dual identity of the Administration side as the Air Service Command, held within it dangerous implications for its own survival.

This point is supported by an evaluation of the two deputy system which came from Brigadier General Alfred R. Maxwell, Director of Operations, USSTAF. He pointed out the schism that was inherent in the deputy system, and the weakness that lay in the tendency of each half of the staff to develop around the personalities of the Deputy Commanding Generals. This was accentuated by a physical separation in housing the two sides of headquarters both in the U.K. and in France. In his belief, staff operations could have been improved by more attention to administration of the staff as a whole, and he favored strengthening the position of the Chief of Staff for the sake of pulling the staff sections together under specific centralized control. In the absence of such cohesive control, the satisfactory functioning of the headquarters depended on the good-will and ability of the individuals concerned. That there was no real problem could be attributed

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114. Interview with General Knerr by Captain Goldberg, 12 June 1945, p.8.

115. Ltr, subj: "Organization," General Knerr to CG, USSTAF, 2 June 1944.

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to the caliber of the two deputies and the personnel involved. As it was, there were slight differences of policy relating to handling of personnel, promotions, and billeting which developed to create a small amount of friction. Though on the whole the deputy system worked very well at USSTAF, it "began to wear a little thin in time" and in General Maxwells' mind it was questionable whether it would work well in other applications.[116]

In his own retrospective review of events, General Spaatz agreed that the principle which delegated combined authority and responsibility to two deputies held dangers of division and conflict. His judgement held that the deputy system would not work without "very good men" and "very loyal men" at the top. The fact that the two deputies had full authority and responsibility in their fields might have wrecked the system, if they had tended to go in opposite directions, or if one of them had the narrow interests of an "ambitious empire builder."[117]

General Knerr himself saw the divisive character of the headquarters system and made efforts to overcome it. In his words there was a

> ...tendency for Operations directors and Administration directors to consider themselves as two separate entities. It was a constant endeavor of mine to make the eight directors feel as one entity. That was the basic reason why I insisted on a meeting at least once a week presided over by the Commanding General himself, in order to impress that idea upon their minds. I feel that during the last three or four months that was well crystallized. It was unfortunate that we did not have space to put all headquarters into one building for that tended to maintain the idea of a separate entity; but it was very well consolidated finally.[118]

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116. "A Historical Review of the Functions of the Directorate of Operations" Part VI, "Discussion and Comments by Brigadier General Alfred R. Maxwell," June 1945; Interview with General Maxwell by Dr. Bruce C. Hopper, Historian, USSTAF, 22 June 1944, pp. 34-35.

117. Interview with General Spaatz by Dr. Hopper, 27 June 1945, p.8.

118. Interview with General Knerr by Captain Goldberg, 12 June 1945, p.9.

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Significantly, from the date of the interview which produced this statement, 12 June 1945, "three or four months" places the successful fusion well after the time when ASC Headquarters was no longer identified with the whole Administration side. The directors meetings referred to did not begin until a few days after the 15 December reorganization. The implication here is that the improved union was made possible or at least easier by the formal relegation of ASC-USSTAF to a distinct and subordinate position. The chief factor in a divided sense of identity would therefore seem to have been the dual status of the Administration side as a separate command headquarters.

Since the deputies had full power in their own fields and required a minimum of coordination in the usual staff sense, it would be obvious that a clear and lasting definition of their fields of activity would be necessary. Any extensive overlapping of functions or confusion of authority would be evidence to attack the general usefulness of the deputy system. The divided nature of USSTAF responsibilities in relation to the various Air Forces made it easier to maintain the demarcation in the headquarters than might have been the case otherwise. However, the developments that did indicate a convergence of the two spheres of activity, later in 1944, must have played some role in the withdrawal from the full deputy program in December, 1944 and May 1945.

In the first place, as was pointed out by General Maxwell at the close of events, the work of the Operations side could itself be defined as administrative. The combat operations exercised through the agency of USSTAF were a minor percentage of the task, and apparently, in General Maxwells' sense, the job was necessarily one of administering control of combat operations through the services of intelligence, weather, and strategic planning. Perhaps this interpretation involved a struggle

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with definitions, but it revealed the uncertainty with which the terms administration and operations were received, and the inability of the terms to define the functions of the two sides of headquarters without leaving room for debate. In any case, in General Maxwells' meaning and according to his statement the activities of the Operations side were in large part administrative and in time became more so.[119]

It is not difficult to find support for General Maxwells' view that the Operations side was assuming more of an administrative character. Convergence of the two spheres of activity developed most strongly in the period in 1944 when the time came to plan and execute policies for such post-hostilities problems as redeployment, and disarmament and control of the enemy.

The post-hostilities planning function was assigned to a new directorate on the Operations side in April, 1944. It developed that the Post-Hostilities Planning Directorate was forced to draw persistently on agencies and personnel of the Administration side for help in executing its functions. In October, General Knerr found it necessary to write a memorandum to the Deputy Commanding General for Operations, restricting the availability of services and personnel from the Administration side in sharing the Post-Hostilities responsibility.[120] In reply, General Anderson made a distinction between planning and implementation of the plans, pointing out that it would be necessary to call in all USSTAF agencies to complete the plans which were the responsibility of the directorate.[121]

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119. Interview with General Maxwell by Dr. Hopper, 22 June 1944, p.34.

120. Memo, General Knerr to D/CG, Ops, USSTAF, 28 Oct 1944.

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There consequently developed an interaction of lines of control between the two sides of headquarters extending downward to lower echelons. The implementation of disarmament plans in the field was placed in the hands of the Ninth Air Force, and in consequence, it was found that the only agency equipped and available to do the job was IX AFSC, normally an agency in the administrative sphere of control.[122] In the same sense, the Post-Hostilities Directorate was forced to delegate to the Supply Directorate the supply control aspect of its activities in disarming the German Air Force.[123] Redeployment activities penetrated all headquarters agencies, and seemed to be primarily an administrative matter, yet redeployment planning was centered in the directorate of the Operations side. Just before the implementation of the program was to begin in April, 1945, this responsibility was transferred to the Deputy Commanding General for Administration, and specifically, to the Director of Personnel.[124]

Coincident with these developments, confusion arose over the responsibility for disposal of surplus property. In March 1945, Post-Hostilities Planning presented a plan for coordination with the Foreign Economic Administration and other agencies on the disposal of surplus property to foreign countries and to the Zone of Interior. It was necessary for the Administration side to point out that these functions were already, and had been for months, taken care of by ASC-USSTAF and its successor, ATSCE.[125]

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121. Memo, subj: "Responsibility for Post Hostilities Planning," Major General F. L. Anderson to D/CG, Admin, USSTAF, 28 Oct 1944.

122. Report on Air Disarmament and Disbandment Conference, Hq, USSTAF, 22-23 Mar 1945.

123. Memo, General Anderson to D/CG, Admin, 7 Dec 1944.

124. Hq Memo No. 35, Hq, USSTAF, 8 Apr 1945.

125. Office Memo, General Knerr to Brigadier General C.P. Kane and to D/CG, Ops, USSTAF, 6 Mar 1945.

The inference from all this seemed to be that a plans directorate with wide responsibilities sat a little uncomfortably in a two deputy set-up. A further inference appeared to be that inevitably with the preparation for a stabilized post-war situation, the two sides of headquarters were coming together. The implication was that a sharp division between two deputies having command control in separated spheres may have been useful and practical in an active combat period when battle operations were a consuming responsibility, but that the approaching end of operations tended to throw the deputy system out of balance, and what seemed to be required was a more integrated headquarters than the deputy system could provide.

Corroboration for the viewpoint that a dual system is unbalanced in a non-combat situation by the greater stress on administrative functions, can be found in organizational developments in the United States during 1944. In July, Lieutenant General Barney M. Giles, Chief of Staff, Hq, AAF, communicated to General Knerr a program of headquarters reorganization which certainly paralleled and was possibly influenced by the organizational changes in the European Theater of Operations. A functional program to "eliminate the top-heavy, block-ridden staffs in the several air forces and commands" had been developed after much experimentation and put into practice on the stations. The device used, however, was a three deputy system, based on a concept of three rather than two major functions at each station, and in turn at each higher echelon. The base or air force commanders had three principal assistants, namely: a Director for Operations, a Director for Administration, and a Director for Supply and Maintenance.[126]

126. Ltr, Lieutenant General Barney M. Giles, Chief of Air Staff, Hq, AAF, to General Knerr, 1 July 1944.

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The three deputy system, though it derived considerably from organizational principles similar to those established at USSTAF, was basically different from the two deputy approach, and General Knerr in his correspondence with Washington criticized it strongly. As explained in a reply to this criticism by Brigadier General Byron E. Gates, Chief, Office of Management Control, Headquarters, AAF, it had been found that in domestic installations the volume of administrative, supply, and maintenance activities upset the balance of a two deputy organization. The two deputies had indeed been tried experimentally at the AAF School for Applied Tactics, Orlando, Florida, the year before, and the plan had been abandoned on the basis that a too heavy load was being placed on the administrative side. At the same time, Washington was willing to grant the effectiveness of a two deputy system under theater conditions.[127]

It is important to analyze General Knerr's basis for opposing a three deputy organization and his insistence on two deputies, for in this distinction lay a major significance of the organizational approach in the Theater. In replying to General Giles in July 1944, General Knerr commented as follows:

> "The three director system" is undoubtedly an improvement on the old 'A' Staff, but misses the point of the two deputy system....(It) retains the essential weakness of the military type staff....Necessity for coordination still largely remains....Two will be apt to gang-up on the third. The incentive to play politics is increased....The Deputy Commanding Generals are not staff officers, but share in the command functions, permitting direct and positive action from top to bottom within the authority of each. 128

This was the departure that required new understanding; the deputies were removed from the category of staff officers and defined as commanders.

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127. Ltr, Brigadier General Byron E. Gates, Chief, Management Control, Hq, AAF, to General Knerr, 11 Aug 1944.

128. Ltr, General Knerr to General Giles, 27 July 1944.

This principle was established with certainty on the Administration side by the fact that the Deputy Commanding General was at the same time the Commanding General of ASC, and his staff agencies consisted of ASC Headquarters. Perhaps this was needed in the first place to bulwark the principle, in concession to the strength of traditional ideas on staff functions. But it was in this aspect that the chief obstacles to the survival of the system arose, as well as the chief items of controversy.

Problems of the Dual Role of ASC-USSTAF

The problems raised by the dual existence of the Administration side received preventative treatment before the surgical operation of December occurred. At first, there was danger of an overloaded Administration side involved in specific operational activities of ASC as well as its USSTAF responsibilities. It was on this basis, perhaps, that the principle of headquarters decentralization was outlined repeatedly and put into practice. In the early days, in January 1944, it was stressed at ASC staff meetings that USSTAF would be essentially a planning and policy making headquarters. Insofar as ASC was concerned, everything pertaining to actual operations would have to be decentralized to Hq, Base Air Depot Area.[129] The list of functions thereupon assigned to BADA became imposing, and, in effect, BADA became the operating arm of ASC-USSTAF.

There was a sound motive in this delegation of functions, but it led to some curious results. The expanded administrative identity of ASC was partially communicated to BADA, and its responsibilities began to extend beyond base area supply and maintenance functions. Such secondary command agencies as the 27th Air Transport Group and the Combat Support Wing were

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129. Minutes, Special Staff Meeting, Hq, ASC-USSTAF, 8 Jan 1944.

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placed under its control.[130] The early planning also called for BADA command of the Replacement Control Depot.[131] One curious case arose with the assignment of the ASC Veterinarian to BADA as part of the decentralizing process. At one point this officer found it difficult to get approval for travel orders for a trip to stations outside BADA's strict jurisdiction. The headquarters at BADA apparently had not been sufficiently educated to see anything more than the original restricted role of its organization, and did not understand that it had under its command the Veterinarian for USSTAF itself.[132]

These were minor difficulties in the face of the sound thesis that USSTAF responsibilities covered a wide field and that its staff could not be encumbered by operating details. Apart from the Air Service Command, USSTAF could easily maintain a policy and planning headquarters, because immediately supporting it were almost self-sufficient Air Forces and Commands. In the same sense, in order to go the same road, ASC had to raise BADA to a somewhat similar command status. In considering this development, Colonel Preston, Chief, Statistical Control Office, pointed out that

> As a result of defining Base Functions to include all administrative services rendered by this Headquarters and of our policy to decentralize all operating Base Functions to the Base Air Depot Area, we seem to be working towards the establishment of a Headquarters immediately below Headquarters, ASC which covers approximately the same ground.[133]

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130. GO No. 5, Hq, VIII AFSC, 24 Jan 1944.

131. Minutes, Special Staff Meeting, Hq, ASC-USSTAF, 15 Jan 1944.

132. Office Memo, subj: "Request for Orders," Lieutenant Colonel B.D. Blood, VC, to AG, BADA, ASC-USSTAF, with indorsements by Deputy Commander, BADA, ASC-USSTAF, and Surgeon, ASC-USSTAF, 13 May 1944.

133. Memo, Colonel Jerome Preston, Chief, Statistical Control Office, Hq, ASC-USSTAF, to General Knerr, 28 July 1944.

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It was perhaps this status of BADA that made it possible for Colonel Preston to recommend later in the year, in November, the complete absorption of Headquarters, ASC into the office of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration, thereby solving the main problems under discussion at the time. Eliminating the separate command status of Headquarters, ASC was one approach to the problem of bringing the logistical arm more fully into the main command channel of USSTAF, and of more closely integrating the two sides of headquarters.[134] This approach would seem to have found a ready made situation, since an operating headquarters for ASC already existed at BADA. Yet there remained strong arguments against the proposal to absorb ASC Headquarters into USSTAF Headquarters and the situation which made it desirable developed only from the problems raised by the dual identity of the Administration side.

The confusion inevitably caused by two titles and two identities must be given consideration. Early in 1944, there were noted feelings of uncertainty, confusion, and a lack of sympathetic understanding among staff officers in the field and in headquarters itself.[135] Colonel Preston, gave expression to these difficulties, and foresaw their danger to the permanent establishment of the system as an organizational principle. In a memorandum to General Knerr in July, he expressed criticism of the way in which the responsibilities of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration were couched in organization manuals and staff documents.

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134. Memo, Colonel Preston to General Knerr, 18 Nov. 1944.

135. Memo, Major Albert Lepawsky, Statistical Control Office, Hq, ASC-USSTAF, to Colonel Preston, 4 Mar 1944.

> It [the organization manual] tends to convey the impression that the duality of your position is an expedient rather than the application of a sound organizational plan....All the statements of functions of the chiefs and yourself...are couched in terms of Air Service Command, USSTAF, and the responsibilities are limited to Service Command matters and the Base Area principally.[136]

The Administration side was apparently adhering too closely to its other identity as ASC Headquarters. Colonel Preston urged that since it was difficult "to envisage and understand a situation where a lower echelon is giving orders to a higher" a program of clarification be conducted to make everyone aware that in working through the main command channel of USSTAF, the ASC agencies acted under the authority of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration. It was obvious that in matters relating to the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces the only authority which applied was that of General Spaatz, which pertained to the ASC only through the medium of General Knerr as Deputy Commanding General, USSTAF.[137]

As was conceded in retrospect by Colonel Preston, these difficulties, insofar as practical effects on operations were concerned, were essentially mental hazards and not great obstacles to the business of fighting the war.[138] However, when the time came to continue the headquarters system after the expedient needs for it had diminished, an unfriendly psychological atmosphere based on the ambiguity of two titles and the lower echelon connotations of ASC, as well as the novelty and strangeness of the deputy system itself, must have played some role in the reorganizations of December 1944 and May 1945. General Maxwell, in his comment on

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136. Memo, Colonel Preston to General Knerr, 13 July 1944.

137. Ibid.

138. Interview with Colonel Preston by Captain Goldberg, 12 June 1945.

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the deputy system, pointed out the problems raised by a form of headquarters organization that differed from that of other agencies and lower echelons. He explained that confusion resulted from the fact that the organization and functional divisions of Theater Headquarters, of USSTAF, and of the major commands under USSTAF were all somewhat different. An important fundamental of staff organization required that the structure of a staff be readily understandable to other staffs and organizations.[139] General Knerr knew the importance of this and had consistently proposed without great success that the deputy system be extended to all echelons below USSTAF.[140]

It is significant that when the program for the May 1945 reorganization which abolished the deputy system was broached, General Spaatz put forward the idea of the need to be uniform with other branches of the Army in staff organization.[141] The handicap of difficult understanding was further implied by General Spaatz in the terminology he used when stating that after the cessation of hostilities, USSTAF would not require the "complicated" operational and administrative set up needed during the prosecution of the war.[142]

The Integration Controversy

The deputy system and the dual position of Headquarters, ASC in the Theater were part of an ambitious attempt to solve a long standing problem

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139. "A Historical Review of the Functions of the Directorate of Operations," Part VI, "Discussion and Comments by Brigadier General Alfred R. Maxwell," June, 1945.

140. Ltr, General Knerr to Major General Walter H. Frank, CG, ASC, 24 May 1944.

141. Interview with General Knerr by Captain Goldberg, 12 June 1945, p. 5.

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in the relationship between service and combat elements in Air Force organization. Colonel Preston succinctly defined the problem in June 1944, when general application to it in Europe and in Washington reached a climax. As he stated it, there originally was a division of theory on the nature of the relationship between service and combat elements. Those charged with supply and maintenance functions had supported a "hotel method" of supporting the combat units. Their point was that supply and maintenance were a continuous process which had to be united under one vertical command cutting through all echelons. The combat commander should be relieved of all administrative responsibilities, so that he could concentrate on his job; therefore, entire responsibility for the base should be given over to the Service Command, with combat units present on a lodger basis.

The combat commanders themselves held an opposite point of view. Supply and maintenance were controlling and limiting factors in the combat commander's mission; it was intolerable that there should be two commanders on a station; therefore, all elements should be under the complete control of the combat commander.[143]

The question of who should command the station was never actually an issue in the Theater. All conceded that the man most concerned with operations would command at each echelon. Nevertheless, the two approaches required reconciliation and compromise from two points. First, according to Colonel Preston, it was necessary to maintain the vertical command structure of logistics -

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142. Minutes, Weekly Staff Meeting, Hq, USSTAF, 10 Apr 1945.

143. Memo, Colonel Preston to General Knerr, 11 June 1944.

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> ... to insure that logistical functions are integrated within themselves; are an efficient whole; are not dispersed and competitive, and particularly that their importance is properly recognized... and embodied in the framework of the organization. (To make clear that the Service Commander is something above the category of the 'garbage collector or the garage attendant.')

Secondly, it was necessary to reconcile logistical control with operational control, to integrate them at each echelon, and give the commander at each echelon control over both.[144]

General Knerr had addressed himself to the problem of meeting these two requirements. At the USSTAF level, the solution was attempted in establishing the principle of uniting the office of the Service Commander with that of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration. Logistical functions were expanded to include all administration, thereby raising the broad logistical function to a level equal to that of the operational function. At the same time, the Service Command channel was brought into the main command channel and integrated within it by the deputy device. One overall commander united both deputies and within his control the deputy commanders had vertical command authority in their spheres, thereby maintaining the continuity of their activities.

Similarly, the problem on the lowest echelons was met with the device of the sub-depot, wherein the sub-depot remained a service unit assigned to the Air Depots of the Eighth Air Force Service Command, while under the immediate command control of the station or combat commander to which it was attached.

However the problem of uniting service and combat elements, especially in respect to the lower echelons, had evidently not reached a stable and

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144. Ibid.

[redacted]

complete solution and a further program developed in Washington in 1944, which was proposed for application to the ETO and other theaters. As reported by General Giles in correspondence with General Knerr in July, the program developed in the United States concentrated on the problem at the station level, but was extended to provide integration at all levels. Plans were made for a new service unit called the Service Group, Special, which was to replace the sub-depot on the station. This was to serve as a device to combine sub-depot units with the various Arms and Services units on the station such as Quartermaster, Ordnance and Signal companies and detachments. However, whereas the sub-depot had remained assigned to the Air Force Service Commands while attached to the station, the Arms and Service units had been directly assigned to the combat elements. In contrast to the status of the sub-depot, the new Service Group which combined all service units, was to pass under the direct control and full assignment of the air bases and tactical organizations. As stated by General Giles,

> The combat and service elements would be under a single commander at each succeeding echelon thus eliminating the necessity, as at present, to adjudicate service group or depot group and combat unit differences at Theater Air Force level. This plan provides a uniform pattern under which all the air forces in the several theaters should be organized.[145]

In extension to other echelons, the plan called for an absorption of not only the sub-depots but also the air depots into the combat organizations they served and apparently eliminated the command structure of the Air Force Service Commands entirely.

The program as thus developed again raised to an issue the two ap-

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145. Ltr, General Giles to General Knerr, 1 July 1944.

parently opposing standpoints and military needs previously described. It renewed the argument raised by the original contradictory premises, by judging in effect that the need for a strong Air Service Command with elevated power and prestige was outweighed by the need for unreserved unification of service and combat elements at all echelons.

In this sense the approach made in Washington varied sharply from that of the Theater. Although it was proposed to serve the commander in his new integrated command with a deputy system rather than the traditional staff organization, as mentioned previously, Washington proposed three deputies rather than two. Here the difference appeared in that the logistical function was not extended as it was in the Theater, and administration (including personnel, medical, legal functions, etc.) was separated from supply and maintenance. This came into conflict with a fundamental element of the Theater's approach. As communicated to Washington by Colonel Preston, General Knerr's chief assistant in organizational planning, (in a letter signed by Brigadier General C. P. Kane, Director of Administrative Services) the plan to split the service side of headquarters into two parts, administration and materiel, would destroy the equality with operations and the consolidated strength which the logistical or service functions had achieved in the Theater.[146] It was in part due to this increased emphasis on the role of logistics in the air war, that the deputy system had arisen in the first place.

The main item of contention in the new program concerned the future

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146. Ltr, Brigadier General C. P. Kane, Director of Administrative Services, Hq, ASC-USSTAF, to Brigadier General Byron E. Gates, Chief, Management Control, Hq, AAF, 18 Aug 1944.

[redacted]

of the Service Command as such. Integration in the ETO had brought the Service Commander into the top headquarters, as deputy to the Commanding General, but had maintained his identity as Service Commander at the same time by the "two hat" device. The outline presented by General Giles mentioned no such reservation. Rather, as General Knerr pointed out in replying to General Giles,

> It appears that the Air Service Commands, as such, disappear. A necessary condition of such a change is that the organization chart shall make crystal clear the fact that all logistical functions are united into an integrated whole under an administrative officer of rank and authority.
>
> [In the general approach to unionization at all levels there was danger/... in the desire to marry the service and combat elements ... [of losing sight/ of the necessity for operating all our logistical facilities as one organization, as otherwise there will be waste of effort, materiel, and effectiveness.[147]

In a buckslip note to Colonel Preston, commenting on General Giles' plan to assign service units to the same command agencies as combat units, General Knerr was even more direct and conclusive. He viewed the scheme as basically unsound because of the disappearance of technical and command control by the Service Command, and pointed out the duplication of stocks and confusion in supply activities which would result from the absence of a central control which extended to all echelons.[148]

Earlier, in writing to Brigadier General Lyman P. Whitten, Chief, Air Services Division, Headquarters, AAF, General Knerr emphasized that in his meaning of the "marriage" of service and combat elements, he emphatically had no intention that the identity of the Service Command

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147. Ltr, General Knerr to General Giles, 27 July 1944.

148. Office Memo, General Knerr to Colonel Preston, 20 July 1944.

[redacted]

[redacted]

should be lost in any integration plan. The Deputy Commanding General for Administration was necessarily and concurrently a member of the Service Command, and belonged to that command channel, though at the same time brought into the closest possible relation with the combat commander through the deputy system.[149]

It is of some significance that at this point, Colonel Preston, who had worked closely with General Knerr in the early organizational planning, diverged from General Knerr's views. In a memorandum in November 1944, he expressed the view that the Air Service Command could indeed be eliminated in the new integrated structure, as the Washington plans for overseas Air Forces indicated. He believed this to be consistent with General Knerr's organizational thinking as well as with developments in the United States. One advantage, he thought, would be the elimination of the cumbersome device of one man holding two apparently separate titles and offices.

> Some people fail to appreciate the reasons why this was necessary and others did not understand how it worked. Actually this intermediate step was absolutely necessary and served a very useful purpose. That it can be eliminated now is due solely to the widespread acceptance of your idea of the functions and position of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration.[150]

Colonel Preston was keeping in mind a fundamental reservation that if the vertical authority of the Service Command were thus eliminated, its substitute would be assured in a deputy system established at Air Force, Wing, and Group levels, with all service elements under the direct control of a deputy at each level. He believed that the logistical system could be

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149. Ltr, General Knerr to Brigadier General L. P. Whitten, Chief, Air Services Division, Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Material, Maintenance, and Distribution, Hq, AAF, 29 May 1944.

150. Memo, Colonel Preston to General Knerr, 1 Nov 1944.

[redacted]

preserved without dispersion, through further education and instilled principles which would train the combat commanders to understand the vertical unity of logistics.[151]

In actual fact, the reception of an integration program on those terms in the Theater levels below USSTAF, was not promising. The Eighth and Ninth Air Forces maintained A-4 staff sections parallel with their own Air Service Commands, although General Knerr constantly proposed a wedding of the two agencies similar to that at USSTAF.[152] When the Eighth Air Force did finally adopt a modified deputy system, in August 1944, it took the form of three deputies, Operations, Administration, and Materiel, without drawing VIII AFSC into the headquarters picture.[153]

Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, particularly, represented the thinking of the so-called "combat school", which was sensitive to any implications of a split command on the combat station and at other echelons. They objected to the status of the sub-depot on the station, and their program, as it finally developed, called for a complete absorption of air depots and service groups into the combat elements and a consequent horizontal slicing of the service structure.[154] When the plan for a Service Group, Special was first presented in detail from Washington by General Whitten in May 1944, the Eighth Air Force objected to the concept of a

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151. Memo, Colonel Preston to General Knerr, 4 Dec 1944.

152. Ltr, subj: "Consolidation of Functions," General Knerr to CG, 9th AF, 10 May 1944; Ltr, General Knerr to Major General Walter H. Frank, CG, 24 May 1944.

153. Roster of Key Personnel, Hq, 8th AF, 15 Aug 1944 (Prepared by Statistical Control Section, Hq, ETOUSA).

154. Memo, subj: "Reference Comment on Plan of Operation, Hq, 8th AF, and Hq, VIII AFSC," General Knerr to CG, USSTAF, 13 Nov 1944.

separate Service Group at all, and desired the absorption of the group elements into the combat group on the station.[155]

General Knerr, on the other hand, could not share this concern over a "split command" on the station.

> The great value of the sub-depot on the station lies in the open channel created between the combat unit and the full resources of the Service Command, with the Service Commander thereby joining in the responsibility for tomorrow's combat operations.[156]

He strongly opposed a situation where the commander was given not only command control of the service units (while the units remained assigned to the Service Command, as in the case of the sub-depots) but also absorbed the personnel.

> Supply and maintenance is just as specialized as medical services and must be controlled as a unit. If such be not done a temptation to remove outstanding individuals from the service echelons and place them in another activity where a dire need exists for ability, cannot be resisted by station commanders.[157]

It was apparent in General Knerr's thinking that insofar as lower echelons were concerned, he held a fundamental mistrust of the ability of leaders occupied with combat to handle administrative matters at the same time.

> All will concede the glamor of combat to the youngsters but some day, with luck and some intelligence, these same youngsters will be content to ride in the back seat of a transport. Then they, too, will be mature enough to handle the myriad problems connected with keeping airplanes off the ground.[158]

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155. 4th Ind. CG, 8th AF to CG, USSTAF, 15 June 1944, (to Ltr, subj: "Tables of Organization and Equipment for the Service Group, Special," Brigadier General L. P. Whitten, Chief, Air Services Division, Office of A/CS, Material, Maintenance, and Distribution, Hq, AAF to CG VIII AFSC, through CG, USSTAF, 25 May 1944).

156. Ltr, General Knerr to General Giles, 2 June 1944.

157. Ltr, General Knerr to CG, USSTAF, 13 Nov 1944.

158. Ltr, General Knerr to General Giles, 2 June 1944.

In this sense he did not want to entrust the lower echelon commanders with complete power over service personnel. With these considerations, his theory of integration proposed sections of the Service Command residing on stations and at all other echelons, as units under the commander's control, but handling all administrative and service matters for the preoccupied combat commander.

The Reorganization of 15 December 1944

The climax of the controversy came in November 1944, when General Spaatz called together all of the leading Air Force Commanders of the ETO and MTO to discuss certain major problems facing the Air Forces at the time. The Conference of Commanders held 25 November at Cannes, France, forced a decision on the issue which was now clear-cut; whether the Air Force Service Commands or the Air Force Combat Divisions could contain in assignment the new Service Group, Special. Against General Knerr's opposition it was decided that the Service Groups would be assigned directly to the combat elements. General Knerr succeeded in making his points strongly enough to obtain a declared proviso from General Spaatz against the unwarranted transfer and misapplication of technical personnel by the station commander.[159] Yet there was no evidence that this reservation was substantiated by directive or formal principle or really modified the implications of the change.

It apparently became necessary to reconsider the whole approach to the integration problem in the Theater. In General Knerr's mind, the Cannes decision extended in its implications to the highest echelon of USSTAF.

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159. Minutes, Air Force Commanders Meeting, Cannes, France, 25 Nov 1944.

In consequence, General Knerr addressed himself to General Spaatz shortly after the Cannes conference, and while stating his satisfaction with the deputy system as such, recommended that the Air Service Command be separated in identity from the Deputy Commanding General for Administration.[160] The separation was officially confirmed on 15 December, and Brigadier General Kane, formerly Deputy Commanding General, ASC-USSTAF, became the Commanding General. General Knerr remained as Deputy Commanding General for Administration, USSTAF, retaining with him all of the purely administrative staff sections, such as the Personnel Directorate, plus three new directorates for Armament, Communications, and Medical Services.[161]

As stated by General Knerr, the December reorganization was in conformity with the spirit as well as the letter of the Cannes decision.

> At the conference during the discussions, a number of people present indicated that they thought I had too much to do. They didn't think that one man could carry the load without cracking up because of the amount of detail involved. While I didn't personally feel I was cracking up, I felt compelled to carry General Spaatz's decision out, not only in letter but in spirit, all the way through; and with the changed point of view it seemed to me better to have a fresh mind to grab hold of the situation as it changed rather than have a previous mind that was firm in its belief that the previous system was better.[162]

It was evident that a defeat of the principle of Service Command residence on the combat stations was interpreted as a defeat of the concept of a dual role for the Service Command at the top. The Cannes decision appeared as a decision against the extended function and authority of ASC, based on the objection to a "split command". No one, it would

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160. Ltr, subj: "Office of the D/CG Admin, USSTAF," General Knerr to CG, USSTAF, 3 Dec 1944.

161. GO No. 98, Hq, USSTAF, 11 Dec 1944; GO No. 100 Hq, USSTAF, 15 Dec. 1944.

162. Interview with General Knerr by Captain Goldberg, 12 June 1945, p.6.

[redacted]

seem, offered a program of integration which called for a complete absorption of the Air Service Command at all levels, with a deputy system substituted to maintain a strong logistical structure. In any case, it was not likely that General Knerr would have accepted such a solution, since he had previously indicated its undesirability. The program that was developing seemed rather to call for the absorption of the lower echelons of the Service Command without offering any substitute form whatever. A decision had been made against that type of unionization of service and combat elements which maintained a semi-independent status for Service Command units such as the sub-depot. The decision had been extended to USSTAF headquarters where the Service Commander had maintained his identity while acting as deputy to the Commanding General. However, in conformity with neither the principle of total absorption nor the method of integration embodied in the dual role of ASC, the Air Service Command was now simply relegated to a distinct and subordinate position in the USSTAF command structure. Instead of disappearing entirely, the Air Service Command stepped down among the parallel commands and Air Forces. Rather than a solution of the problem of integration this was a retreat from it. It is possible to infer that it was perhaps better in General Knerr's mind to withdraw from a program of integration and define more sharply the identity of ASC by separating it at the USSTAF level, than to encourage the kind of integration he could not welcome. A consistent application of the Cannes decision eliminated the possibility of the Air Service Command sharing direct command functions in the headquarters at all echelons, as the sub-depot and deputy system provided. Thereby the choice was forced in USSTAF Headquarters between that method of integration which proposed

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the total absorption of ASC Headquarters into the office of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration, or a retreat from integration which brought ASC down from its previous dominant position where it shared command functions on a level with the Operations side of headquarters, and placed it on the level of a subordinate USSTAF echelon. It seemed obvious that General Knerr preferred the latter alternative.

The comments of Colonel Preston on the December reorganization expressed the sentiments of one who had been very anxious to see the program of integration succeed, and was willing to see it succeed in terms of an elimination of the Air Service Command in the belief that in its place a deputy system extending to all echelons could maintain the strength and vertical unity of the logistical system.

> The Air Service Command has been weakened, and the concept of service very much narrowed. We have abandoned the idea that service embraces the supply of all things necessary to enable the aircraft to perform its mission, and yet by retaining the Service Command with its separate channel we have failed to establish the concept that all logistical control moves down the main command channel....In this new confused compromise we appear to have retreated on all fronts.[163]

It is evident that to General Knerr, "retaining the Service Command with its separate channel," was so fundamental in any effective logistical structure, that to maintain it he was ready to sacrifice the original ambitious purposes of the deputy system which expanded the definition of logistics to include all services and administration, and which brought the logistical commander, as deputy, into close unity with the main command channel.

In the final analysis, it was obvious after the 15 December reorgani-

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163. Memo, Colonel Preston to General Knerr, 4 Dec 1944.

zation that General Knerr's personal control over a combined logistical and administrative function remained much the same. In practical effect, the same staff agencies continued to perform the same functions. The new distinctions were distinctions in directive, form, and title. However, in this aspect, the retreat in principle was real.

In effect, the Air Service Command, soon to be redesignated the Air Technical Service Command in Europe, served as the A-4 staff section of USSTAF, turning back to the 1943 days when VIII AFSC held the same position. ATSCE now included the former ASC-USSTAF directorates of Supply, Maintenance, and Technical Services, plus a Personnel Directorate of its own to take the place of the Personnel Directorate which had cast off its ASC identity and remained with the Deputy Commanding General for Administration. The term logistics resumed its restricted meaning.

> ATSCE is the logistical arm of USSTAF. Its mission is to procure, service, and deliver the aircraft, equipment, and supplies for all of the AAF combat units in the European Theater. Its three major functions are therefore supply, maintenance, and transportation.[164]

The USSTAF organization chart which appeared after the reorganization did not list any staff agencies of supply and maintenance, and did not formally identify ATSCE as the equivalent of an A-4 for USSTAF, but simply listed it as a subordinate command element.[165] The USSTAF organization manual of 15 December more specifically listed the supply and maintenance functions as the responsibility of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration, and added a final paragraph which simply stated that he had

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164. Ltr, subj: "Highlights of ATSCE," Brigadier General Clarence P. Kane, CG, ATSCE, to Mead Senatorial Investigating Committee, 23 May 1945.

165. Organization Chart, Hq, USSTAF, 15 Dec 1944.

delegated certain of his responsibilities to the Commanding General, ATSCE. Certain staff officers (such as the Surgeon, Ordnance Officer, Communications Officer, and Chaplain) who had originally carried out overall functions for USSTAF while remaining elements of ASC-USSTAF, continued to perform dual functions. However, they now had their status dignified and elevated by virtue of their assignment to Headquarters, USSTAF, rather than to ATSCE, while they continued to carry out the same functions for Headquarters, ATSCE. Emphasizing the aspect of an expedient union, the organization manual stated that the purpose of this duality was simply to avoid duplication while Headquarters, USSTAF, and Headquarters, ATSCE, were located on the same post.[166] Certainly, this statement could not serve in support of any principle that the Service Command Headquarters should be or always ought to be assimilated with the A-4 functions of an Air Force Headquarters.

The Reorganization of 15 May 1945

The culminating development in headquarters reorganization came immediately after the end of hostilities, though it had been planned a month earlier. The reorganization of 15 May replaced the deputy and directorate system with a traditional five section "A" staff, topped by one Deputy Commanding General and a Chief of Staff. All of the former divisions were absorbed under the five headings of Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Supply and Maintenance, and Plans. ATSCE was to continue to function as the equivalent of A-4 in the new headquarters.[167]

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166. Organization Manual, Hq, USSTAF, 15 Dec 1944.

167. GO No. 49, Hq, USSTAF, 15 May 1945.

[redacted]

The impetus for a return to a traditional form of organization appeared to come from General Spaatz himself. In explaining the desirability of this type of organization, he pointed out that it was directed toward post-hostilities needs as distinct from the requirements of active combat, which supported the deputy system. He was considering that the operational responsibility for the Fifteenth Air Force would soon be defunct, that the operational arm itself would soon lose its combat responsibility, and that the main problems remaining were administrative in terms of redeployment, training, the disarmament and intelligence programs, and Air Force participation in the control of Germany.[168] In an even more simple explanation of the change, the effective date of the reorganization was set for the date when with the cessation of hostilities, one of the deputies, General Anderson, would move to another assignment.[169]

The May reorganization was admittedly an adjustment to post-war conditions, and as such did not reflect strongly on the efficacy of the deputy system during the strain of war itself. But it did seem to answer the question whether the deputy system could be preserved intact in application to less complicated peace time situations as well as particular war time emergencies. In this sense it contradicted the original theory which proposed the two Deputy system for widespread use as a permanent contribution to air force organization.

The factors which go further to explain the disappearance of the USSTAF deputy system are implicit in the story of previous developments. The impasse reached in the general problem of integration and the contro-

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168. Interview with General Spaatz by Dr. Hopper, 20 May 1945, p. 12.

169. Minutes, Weekly Staff Meeting, Hq, USSTAF, 23 Apr 1945.

[redacted]

versy which it involved, without doubt weakened the structure of the deputy system. The 15 December reorganization removed what was perhaps the strongest support of the device. The emphasis and prestige of the deputy title was no longer needed to represent the position of the Air Service Commander in the headquarters. The concept of logistics which expanded supply and maintenance to include all administration and services had lost acceptance, and it was no longer necessary to insist on a dual division of headquarters functions in terms of operations and administration. The ambiguity of a distinct command status for one of the deputies had been removed, and it was easier to consider the deputies as closer to the categories of staff officers than the deputy system originally intended.

The demarcation between two sides of headquarters had been as time went on increasingly blurred by an over-lapping and similarity of functions. At the end of hostilities, the predominant administrative character of the Headquarters seemed to end entirely the usefulness of the division between operations and administration. The judgment of those who earlier believed a duality to be unbalanced in a non-combat situation seemed to have been borne out.

The deputy system had operated in an atmosphere of hybrid strangeness within and outside of headquarters. Though its influence was strong, its principles had not received uniform and widespread acceptance in other headquarters and lower echelons. The involvements of the dual role of the Deputy Commanding General for Administration and the new terminology had made orientation difficult in the field. It may be inferred that in the end when the great factors for the existence of the deputy system had disappeared (namely, the dual role of the Air Service Command and USSTAF's

active operational control of the 15th Air Force) it became easy and natural to return to a normal, more widely accepted and understood form of headquarters organization than the deputy system ever became.

General Knerr who was closest to the deputy system and believed in it most firmly, in consistency opposed its elimination. As he summarized the story of the May 15 reorganization:

> With the termination of the war, the necessity for two deputies disappeared as far as General Spaatz thought it went. The time had come to dispose of the top key personnel, and General Spaatz eliminated the Deputy for Operations and just retained one Deputy Commanding General....The two deputy system with subordinate directors was firmly established before D-Day, and demonstrated its soundness throughout the invasion period, the early part of 1944, and early into 1945. Along in April of this year, in preparation for the end of the war and the transition from war-time organization to the organization best adapted for occupational uses, General Spaatz had many discussions with a number of us and indicated the advisability of going to the standard War Department five section staff organization for the reason that the rest of the Army was accustomed to that method of operation and had never understood our method. With the factor of time disappearing as an objective, we could afford the luxury of a more dispersed type of organization. I argued against this....However, after General Spaatz clearly indicated that he wanted this other type of organization, I went ahead to devise the best one that could be established and still retain the basic plan of our former organization.[170]

General Spaatz and General Knerr agreed that certain basic principles of a functional management type of organization should be salvaged. In a memorandum to the Deputy Commanding General for Operations whose Plans Directorate was drawing up the new organization, General Knerr made proposals that were meant to safeguard these principles and maintain the progress achieved in military organization. He proposed that restrictions be made to prevent the office of the Chief of Staff again becoming a bottleneck in

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170. Interview with General Knerr by Captain Goldberg, 12 June 1945, p. 5.

171. Memo, subj: "Staff Organization," General Knerr to D/CG, Ops, 13 Apr. 1945.

staff operations. He urged that it be made clear that the staff heads were to be endowed with vertical command authority as distinguished from the lateral staff responsibility of the normal General Staff. If that were established it would make little difference whether the staff heads were called assistant chiefs of "A" staff or directors.[171]

It is not clear by what method these principles were to be safeguarded, except perhaps by writing them into staff directives. The role of terminology and form would seem to be important in that the break from traditional staff organization in 1943 and 1944 was made in terms of new labels as well as clarified operating principles. To assume that this was an educative device, and that terminology was no longer of any concern, discounted the possibility that an outmoded body of principles, not long dead, but long associated with the labels of the General Staff, could be revived easily in the case of personalities and situations removed from the experience of the Theater.

CHRONOLOGY

1943

22 May - G-4 ETOUSA and Hq, SOS combined.

10 June - "A" Staff eliminated from Hq, VIII AFSC.

23 June - Knerr "Report on Air Service Command in Africa" submitted to CG, ASC.

24 July - Brigadier General Hugh J. Knerr appointed Deputy Commander, VIII AFSC.

26 July - General Knerr recommended two deputy system to CG, VIII AFSC and CG, 8 AF.

11 Sep - Major General Ira C. Eaker appointed CG of all U.S. Army Air Forces in UK.

8 Oct - G-4, ETOUSA and Hq, SOS separated.

15 Oct - Hq, USAAFUK activated and staff appointed.
CG, VIII AFSC appointed A-4, 8 AF.
9 AF organized in UK.

24 Oct - General Knerr appointed CG, VIII AFSC.

1 Nov - 15 AF established in Italy.

22 Nov - Major General Ira H. Edwards appointed D/CG, 8 AF.

23 Nov - Special Staff Sections of VIII AFSC grouped under Chief of Administration.

29 Nov - General Knerr designated whole VIII AFSC Hq, to act as A-4, 8 AF.

1 Dec - G-4, ETOUSA and Hq, SOS, combined again.

15 Dec - Operational control of 9 AF assumed by AEAF.

24 Dec - General Eisenhower appointed Supreme Commander, AEF.

30 Dec
31 - Meetings at Hq, 8 AF to decide on organization of USSTAF.

1944

1 Jan - Cable of Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized [illegible]



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24 Dec - General Eisenhower appointed Supreme Commander, AEF.

30 Dec
31 - Meetings at Hq, 8 AF to decide on organization of USSTAF.

1944

1 Jan - Cable of Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized establishment of USSTAF.

6 Jan - Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz assumed Command of USSTAF. Two deputy system instituted and Air Force Commanders appointed.

[redacted]

[redacted]

1944 Cont'd

16 Jan - General Eisenhower assumed command of ETOUSA.

17 Jan - Hq, SOS and Hq, ETOUSA combined. Major General John C.H. Lee, CG, SOS, appointed Deputy Theater Commander.

20 Jan - General Spaatz assumed administrative control of all Army Air Force units in UK.

12 Feb - Directorate of Weather Services established.

13 Feb - Supreme Headquarters, AEF, established in UK.

22 Feb - Technical Services Section, Hq, ETOUSA transferred to Hq, ASC-USSTAF and became Directorate of Technical Services.

1 Mar - Hq, and Hq, Squardon of USSTAF and ASC-USSTAF activated.

19 Apr - Directorate of Plans established.

7 June - SOS redesignated as Communications Zone.

1 Sep - Hq, ASC-USSTAF reorganized. Directorate of Administrative Services eliminated. Special Staff Sections grouped under Supply and Maintenance. Brigadier General Clarence P. Kane appointed D/CG, ASC-USSTAF.

25 Sep - Hq, USSTAF (Main) established at St. Germain, France.

15 Oct - Hq, AEAF redesignated Air Staff, SHAEF.

20 Oct - Engineer Command (Prov), USSTAF, established at St. Germain. First Tactical Air Force (Prov) established at Vittel, France.

26 Nov - Conference of Air Commanders held at Cannes, France.
27

1 Dec - Sub-depots and service groups removed from control of Service Commands and placed under administrative control of Air Force Commanders.

10 Dec - Continental Air Depot Area established at Compiegne, France.

15 Dec - Hq, USSTAF reorganized. ASC-USSTAF separated from Administration side of USSTAF. General Kane appointed CG, ASC-USSTAF.

1945

10 Feb - ASC-USSTAF redesignated Air Technical Service Command in Europe.

20 Feb - IX Engineer Command transferred to USSTAF and redesignated Engineer Command, USSTAF.

5 Apr - Engineer Command (Prov) disbanded.

13 Apr - Communications Directorate transferred from Admin to Ops.

15 May - Reorganization of Hq, USSTAF. Two deputy and directorate system eliminated. Single D/C and "A" Staff appointed.

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INDEX OF ORGANIZATION CHARTS

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VIII AIR FORCE SERVICE COMMAND

ORGANIZATION CHART



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AIR MINISTRY AND ROYAL AIR FORCE
ORGANIZATION CHART



ORGANIZATION OF U.S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCE IN EUROPE & USAAF IN U.K.



ORGANIZATION OF U. S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCE IN EUROPE



APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION 4e FEBRUARY, 1944

RESTRICTED

ORGANIZATION OF U.S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCE IN EUROPE



ORGANIZATION OF U.S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE



APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION 6 Jun 1950 MAJOR GENERAL, USA

U.S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE



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APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION [signature] 1944 MAJOR GENERAL, USA

10 Sept.

AIR SERVICE COMMAND
U. S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE



Approved 10 September 194[illegible]
Maj.Gen., USA

8a

OPERATIONS DIVISION
US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE



11 September 1944

9.

U.S STRATEGIC AIR FORCES EUROPE



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APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION [redacted] MAJOR GENERAL, USA
15 DEC 1944

AIR SERVICE COMMAND-US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE



APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION L. P. Hawe BRIG GENERAL U.S.A.
6 JANUARY 1945

U.S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE



NOTES: 1. PERSONNEL STRENGTH INCLUDED DATA ARE ESTIMATED.
2. UNITS CONSTITUTING AERIAL OPERATIONS INCLUDE ASSIGNED GROUND ELEMENTS.
3. STRENGTH OF PERSONNEL INCLUDED PERTAINS MERELY, CHAPLAIN AND WAC PERSONNEL.
4. EIGHTH AIR FORCE, NINTH, AND FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE ARE UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND FOR PURPOSES OF UTILIZING TROOP CARRIER AIRPLANES FOR SUPPLY OF THE COMBAT FORCES WHEN THESE AIRPLANES ARE NOT BEING USED FOR CARGO OPERATIONS.
5. IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND, AIR FORCE, NINTH, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER IX AIR FORCE AND 1ST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROVISIONAL).
6. 12TH ARMY GROUP (ADMINISTRATIVE ECHELON) HAS OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND.

U. S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE



NOTE:

1. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

3. [redacted]

1 MAY, 1945

ORGANIZATION OF HQ. USSTAF



15 May, 1945