

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V.

Manning, Bradley E.
PFC, U.S. Army,
HHC, U.S. Army Garrison,
Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
Fort Myer, Virginia 22211

**Prosecution Objection to
Providing an “Example” Witness
to Examine the Viability of
Reasonable Alternatives to Closure**

Enclosure 7

3 April 2013

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl 7 to
APPELLATE EXHIBIT 512
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Witness | US v Pfc. Manning, Lt. Col. Brian Kerns, Executive Officer (XO), 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division

By Alexa O'Brien on December 8, 2011 11:55 AM

US v. Pfc. Bradley Manning is being conducted in de facto secrecy. This page is a work in progress and may contain errors. The page is developing and may be updated. All updates and amendments will be noted.

For more information on the lack of public and press access to United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, visit the [Center for Constitutional Rights](#), which filed a petition requesting the Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) "to order the Judge to grant the public and press access to the government's motion papers, the court's own orders, and transcripts of proceedings, none of which have been made public to date."



Lt. Col. Brian Kerns was the Executive Officer (XO) for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, and the second most senior commanding officer in Pfc. Manning's chain of command within the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division.

Lt. Col. Brian Kerns, Executive Officer (XO), 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division provided a sworn statement for the Secretary of the Army's 15-6 investigation into the alleged unauthorized disclosures.

The Government objected to the defense request for the testimony of Lt. Col. Brian Kerns, Executive Officer (XO), 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division at the December 2011 Article 32 Pretrial Hearing, stating his testimony was "not relevant to the Article 32 investigation and will only serve to distract from the relevant issues." While there is no official public record of Almanza's denial of this witness' testimony, Lt. Col. Brian Kerns, Executive Officer (XO), 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division did not appear during any open session of the Article 32 Pretrial Hearing. The public record shows that at least fourteen witnesses were granted to defense for the Article 32 Pretrial Hearing. In Lt. Col. Almanza's ruling on the Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses, 12 witnesses were granted to the defense, 10 of whom were also requested by the Government. Defense said in open Court on December 16, 2011, that Lt. Col. Almanza granted two additional witnesses to defense that morning.

The defense's account of Lt. Col. Brian Kerns, Executive Officer (XO), 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division sworn statement is contained in Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses.

No. 14 on the December 2, 2011 Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses

[Lt. Col. Brian Kerns, Executive Officer (XO), 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division] He will testify that he was [Maj. Cliff Clausen, Brigade S2] direct supervisor. He believed that [Maj. Cliff Clausen, Brigade S2] could not provide [WHO IS THIS?] with accurate or timely estimates or intelligence, and could not talk to [Col. David M. Miller, Commander of the 10th Mountain Division's Second Brigade] in a way that served the Commander's [WHAT IS THIS?] needs. The brigade commander [Col. David M. Miller, commander of the 10th Mountain Division's Second Brigade] finally lost confidence in [Major Cliff Clausen, Brigade S2] and made the decision after approximately 6 months to move him. He will testify that the unit did not conduct a formal relief for cause, but moved him to a transition team. According to [Lt. Col. Brian Kerns], [Major Cliff Clausen, Brigade S2] performance was weak, but not so weak as to warrant a relief for cause. [Lt. Col. Brian Kerns] did not believe [Major Cliff Clausen, Brigade S2] was not a strong leader. He tried to decentralize operations but didn't have enough oversight to control. He empowered junior members who were too inexperienced to do the job and did not step in to correct when they made mistakes. He will testify that [Maj. Cliff Clausen, Brigade S2] was unable to mentor or develop younger officers and didn't have much direct control over the shop. He will also testify that [Maj. Cliff Clausen, Brigade S2] was handicapped by weak NCO [Non-commissioned Officer] leadership in his shop. Specifically, his NCOIC [Non-commissioned Officer in Charge], then [Master Sergeant Paul David Adkins (now Sergeant First Class due to administrative action)] was not an effective leader. In his opinion, both [WHO IS THIS?] and [WHO IS THIS?] were weak leaders. He will testify that he was unaware of any leadership guidance provided in the S2 sections regarding enlisted personnel management. He will testify that it did not surprise him that [WHO IS THIS?] put out information that Warrant Officers and Noncommissioned Officers were to defer all management responsibilities to [Master Sergeant Paul David Adkins (now Sergeant First Class due to administrative action)]. He will testify that perhaps the command was too generous with [WHO IS THIS?] and that removing him from his position earlier would have been advantageous. He will testify that he believes PFC Manning's mental and emotional issues were more than enough to put others at risk and should have resulted in an immediate DEROG. He will testify that he did not know anything about PFC Manning's conduct until a recommendation for separation was made by the chain of command. He will testify that none of the mental or emotional health concerns, prior to May of 2010, made it to his level. [Lt. Col. Brian Kerns] will testify that the failure to properly DEROG PFC Manning's was the unit's biggest failure. He believes that the unit should have pulled PFC Manning's access to classified information much earlier. He will testify that the unit should have recognized him as needing help and that his condition made him unfit for service as an intelligence analyst. He will also testify that the assistant S6 for the brigade, [CPT Thomas Cherepko] came to him with concerns about unauthorized personal media on SIPRnet machines. According to [CPT Thomas Cherepko], personnel were putting unauthorized media on computers such as programs, games, videos, and music. [Lt. Col. Brian Kerns] will testify that it was fairly common when the unit arrived to see games, music and movies on the SIPRnet. He believed that it was fairly common across Iraq. He will testify that he tried to get the staff to do the right thing, but media on the SIPRnet continued to be the standard. He will testify that at no point was UCMJ punishment applied to those who were placing unauthorized information on SIPRnet. He will acknowledge that with respect to the media on the SIPRnet, he believed that the Army had become too comfortable working on SIPRnet while deployed. It is his opinion that this may have bred some complacency because of the ease of access. He believes that most Soldiers did not realize that placing music and other media on SIPRnet computers was wrong because of how prevalent those items were across Iraq. He will also testify that after PFC Manning was arrested, [WHO IS THIS?] ordered him to take a complete look at INFOSEC across the brigade. He formed a working group consisting of the SGM [UNIDENTIFIED SERGEANT MAJOR], S2 [Captain Steven Lim, then Assistant S2 and Military Intelligence Company Commander], S6 [UNIDENTIFIED S6] and IO [Information Operations] [UNIDENTIFIED INFORMATION OPERATIONS] personnel to look at how the brigade was operating. Based upon this review, the S6 [UNIDENTIFIED S6] removed universal ability to write to disks; there was additional compartmentalizing of information within the BCT based on a need to know; the S6 [UNIDENTIFIED S6] instructed staff on how to lock out directories and the brigade established an SOP on the implementation for reviewing infractions for potential DEROG actions.

Other Resources

- Fox, Lt. Colonel Brian Kerns, "Iraq Security 'Phenomenally' Improved" (Video)
- Defense Request for Article 32 Witnesses

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kennethlipp Email to Attorney Jason Flores-Williams Regarding the Motion to Quash Prosecution's Subpoena to Cloudflare bit.ly/14NC1YZ
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• **Defense Request to Compel the Production of Article 32 Witnesses**

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18 USC 2703d (1)
 18 USC 641 Public money property or records (2)
 18 USC 793 espionage (3)
 Article 13 (8)
 Discovery (20)
 Harm (2)
 Lesser Included Offenses (3)
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380-14

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| PUBLIC AFFAIRS (CCPA) | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|------------------|--------|---------|
| Information revealing | Classification | Declassification | Reason | Remarks |
| Public affairs contingency statement | U | N/A | N/A | |

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| PROVOST MARSHAL (JSD) | | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Information revealing | Classification | Declassification | Reason | Remarks |
| Deployment / redeployment of security augmentation troops when combined with dates and/or locations | U | N/A | 1.4(a) / 1.4(g) | Classified only during periods of increased threat; Included are numbers of personnel, dates, and locations. |
| Enemy prisoner of war (EPW) information that reveals locations of units or EPW camps; unit strength and/or military capabilities; or number of EPWs | S | Upon completion of operation/ hostilities | 1.4(a) / 1.4(c) / 1.4(g) | |
| Physical security vulnerabilities and vulnerability to terrorist attack | S | Upon correction or after 5 years if uncorrected | 1.4(g) | |
| Threat condition | U | N/A | N/A | |
| Detailed terrorist threat level/condition | C | 10 years | 1.4(a) / 1.4(g) | May be classified higher upon direction of an OCA |
| General terrorist threat information | U | N/A | N/A | All terrorist threat information must contain unclassified tear line for widest dissemination |

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| FORCE PROTECTION (JSD) Cont. | | | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Information revealing | Classification | Declassification | Reason | Remarks |
| Vulnerability assessments and trends | S | 10 years | 1.4(g) | May be declassified upon resolution of all vulnerabilities without a waiver |
| Purchase request package | U | N/A | N/A | For Official Use Only |
| Electronic Sweeps | | | | |
| General information not revealing any details | C | 10 years | | See AFI 71-19 for strict need-to-know guidance |
| Specific information revealing date range and area to be swept | S | 10 years | | |
| Target area weather information | S | 10 years or upon plan execution, if executed | 1.4(a) | |
| Top secret options; discussion of | TS | 10 years | 1.4(a) | |

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Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE

for

JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO)

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This document contains information
EXEMPT FROM MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
Under the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA).
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Security Classification Guide

for

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)

Date: _____

Approved By: _____
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Joint IED Defeat Organization

Issued By: Joint IED Defeat Organization
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Joint IED Defeat Organization
703-601-4744

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1. PURPOSE

This Security Classification Guide (SCG) is a living document that provides guidance and instructions on the classification, marking and distribution of information involved in the development and eventual employment of tactics, techniques, procedures (TTP) and technologies that enable the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (IED) Organization (JIEDDO) to defeat the IED threat. This SCG addresses security measures to safeguard developmental efforts within the organization as well as already developed end items that require ongoing protection measures. As the organization matures, JIEDDO will update the SCG to address additional IED defeat developmental efforts requiring protection. Future revisions to this SCG will update declassification dates in light of fielding dates and other program milestones, as well as technology commercialization and/or obsolescence. Any suggested changes or updates to this SCG will be provided in writing to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) as indicated in paragraph three.

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This SCG is issued under authority of Executive Order (E.O.) 12958, as amended 25 March 2003, and DoDI 5200.1-R (Information Security Program). This SCG constitutes authority and may be cited as the basis for classification, downgrading, or declassification of material related to the JIEDDO activities in support of DoD Directive 2000.19E, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat. Unless otherwise noted, information or material identified as CLASSIFIED by this SCG is classified by authority of the JIEDDO Original Classification Authority identified on the title page.

3. OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY (OPR)

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11. DISCLOSURE OF INTELLIGENCE/THREAT INFORMATION

Data or information relating to threat systems or other intelligence derived material must bear the security markings of that intelligence/threat material. All dissemination of intelligence / threat information is controlled by the Director, COIC. Intelligence/threat information may be reproduced, released to subcontractors, provided instructions, and procedures approved by the COIC Director. Intelligence/threat information may be reproduced, released to subcontractors, provided instructions, and procedures approved by the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) are followed. Questions regarding such releases shall be referred to the SIO.

12. LOSS, COMPROMISE, OR SUSPECTED COMPROMISE

Report the loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified JIEDDO information or material to the JIEDDO Security Office, 703-601-4744, within 24 hours of the incident.

13. COMPILATION OF INFORMATION.

In some circumstances, classification may be required if the compilation of unclassified items of information provide an inference that warrants classification. Similarly, a higher classification may be assigned to a compilation of information if the compilation provides an added factor that warrants higher classification than that of its component parts. Classification on this basis will be used sparingly, and complete justification of this classification method will be stated on the title or first page of the document. The classification and marking process is as follows:

- When a document comprises individually unclassified items of information is classified, by compilation, the overall classification shall be marked conspicuously at the top and bottom of each page and the outside front and back covers (if applicable). An explanation of the basis for classification by compilation shall be placed on the face of the document or included in the text.
- If portions, standing alone, are unclassified, but the document is classified by compilation or association, those portions shall be marked "U" and the document and pages shall be marked with the classification of the compilation. An explanation of the classification or the circumstances involved with association must be included.
- If individual portions are classified at one level and the compilation is a higher classification, each portion shall be marked with its own classification and the document and pages shall be marked with the classification of the compilation. An explanation of the classification by compilation is required.

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14. REASONS FOR CLASSIFYING

The reasons for classifying information in this SCG are in accordance with Part I, Section 1.4, Executive Order 12958 (as amended). They are:

- 1.4a – Military plans, weapons systems, or operations
- 1.4b – Foreign government information
- 1.4d – Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources; scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security
- 1.4 e – Scientific, technological, or economic matters
- 1.4 g – Vulnerabilities or capabilities of the system, installation, projects, or plans relating to the national security

15. DEFINITIONS

Classified Performance Capabilities or Limitations: Information that if disclosed would;

- 1) damage national security through facilitating adversary denial, degradation, disruption, deception, or destruction of mission essential or critical system(s), or
- 2) would require major modifications to an acquisition program or operational system to maintain the technological advantage of the system during its projected operational life time.

Compromise a Future Capability: Anything not in the inventory now and is planned to be developed; not a current capability. Applies to research, development and acquisition efforts.

Confidential: Shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

Critical Information: TBD by the supported organization. Different organizations may deem information differently as to its criticality. Determination and defense of information as critical is up to the supported organization.

Critical Program Information (CPI): Information, technologies, or systems that, unto themselves, if compromised would degrade combat effectiveness, shorten the expected combat-effective life of the system, or significantly alter program direction.

Effectiveness of Forces: TBD by supported organization. Usually refers to squad to division level. Different organizations may deem information differently as to its impact on the effectiveness of forces. For example; information that may impact the effectiveness of a Special Forces unit compared to a Battalion is potentially considerable. Determination and defense of information is up to the supported organization.

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Effectiveness of Major Forces: TBD by supported organization. Usually refers to theater level; unified command; combination of Military Departments (MILDEPS). Different organizations may deem information differently as to its impact on the effectiveness of major forces. Determination and defense of information is up to the supported organization.

Enhanced System Capability: An improvement over existing performance or capabilities found on similar systems.

Low- Level Intelligence Collection Capability: Focused on low- level counterintelligence, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources, e.g., bartender, "beat cop," or low- level detection capability, e.g., unattended ground sensors.

Mission Critical: A mission essential item whose disruption or destruction immediately degrades the ability of the force to command, control, or effectively conduct combat operations. For example, disruption or destruction of the mechanism used to fuse a system-of-systems (e.g., C4ISR) would result in the immediate inability for the separate system to act in concert as a system-of-systems.

Mission Essential: Those items required to support approved emergency and/or war plans, and where those items are used to:

- 1) destroy the enemy or the enemy's capacity to continue war;
- 2) provide battlefield protection of personnel;
- 3) communicate under war conditions;
- 4) detect, locate, or maintain surveillance over the enemy;
- 5) provide combat transportation and support of men and materiel; and/or
- 6) support training functions.

National Military Objectives: Protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; prevent conflict and surprise attack, and prevail against adversaries. These are the ends of the strategy and help to assure allies and friends, dissuade adversaries, and deter aggression and coercion while ensuring the armed forces remain ready to defeat adversaries should deterrence and dissuasion fail. They serve as benchmarks to assess levels of risk and help to define the types and amounts of military capabilities required.

National Objectives (for DoD): The aims derived from national goals and interests, toward which a national policy or strategy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied.

National Security Strategy (for DoD): The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called national strategy or grand strategy.

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NOFORN: (NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS) Under authority of Director of Central Intelligence, this marking is used for identified *classified intelligence* that may not be released in any form to foreign governments, foreign nationals, foreign organizations, or non-US citizens without permission of the originator and in accordance with provisions of DCID 6/7 and NDP-1. Cannot be used with REL TO [country codes] or EYES ONLY on page markings (when a document contains both NOFORN and REL TO or NOFORN and EYES ONLY portions, NOFORN takes precedence for the markings at the top and bottom of the page).

Reveal a National Security Objective: Fact of statement that would reveal an undisclosed objective or intention— that is covert in nature. Details of how we plan to achieve national security objectives (primarily planning oriented).

Secret: Shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

Senior Leadership: President of the US (POTUS); Cabinet Members, Pentagon Senior Leadership, etc.

Sensitive Information: TBD by the supported organization. Different organizations may deem information differently as to its sensitivity. Determination and defense of information as sensitive is up to the supported organization.

Sensitive Intelligence Collection Capability: To be determined by the user or developer of that capability.

Significant Impairment: Any characteristic or concept, design or component that offers a technical disadvantage of enough magnitude to be potentially disruptive in an operational or advanced system.

State of the Art: The highest level of development, as of a device, technique, or scientific field, achieved at a particular time. For a system or technology that has no known baseline to determine its relative level of development, the very nature of it being the first of a kind, makes it state of the art.

Strategic Advantage: Operational superiority provided via military instruments that enables one nation or group of nations effectively to control the course of a military or political situation beyond a battle or engagement.

Strategic Disadvantage: Inverse of strategic advantage (see above definition).

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Tactical Advantage: Operational superiority provided via unit and system performance and capabilities during battles and engagements planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.

Tactical Disadvantage: Inverse of tactical advantage (see above definition).

Threaten the Country's Ability to Wage War: Identification of details of war plans that would reveal overall objectives or intentions.

Top Secret: Shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

Weaken the Country's Ability to Wage War: Identification of specific details of war plans in a theater of operation including use of tactical capabilities and mission essential items.

Significantly Weaken the Country's Ability to Wage War: Identification of specific dependencies and objectives in a theater of operation or sub area of a Unified Command to include strategic capabilities and mission critical items.

Threaten the International Position of the US: Damage US credibility with a foreign government.

Weaken the International Position of the US: Negative impact to the international position of the US and its ability to negotiate with foreign governments.

Significantly Weaken the International Position of the US: Inability of the US to successfully negotiate with a foreign government for a significant period of time.

Unique and Fragile Intelligence Collection Capability: To be determined by the user or developer of that capability.

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Only trained FDOs who have been issued a Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter (DDL) can authorize the disclosure or release of classified military information to authorized representatives of foreign governments or international organizations as outlined in this guide.

ADMINISTRATION DATA

| Element | Level | Duration | Remarks |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| JIEDDO Goal, Mission and Purpose | | | |
| JIEDDO mission | U | | Public Release and Distribution Statement A applies for the following description: JIEDDO shall focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support of Combatant Commanders and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices as weapons of strategic influence. (DoDD 2000.1E) |
| JIEDDO organizational structure (Line and block chart identifying position only) | U | | |
| JIEDDO organizational structure (Line and block chart identifying personnel by name) | U | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| JIEDDO Goals and Objectives | U | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. Specific technological goals and objectives associated with real or postulated threats will be addressed by other portions of this SCG |
| JIEDDO Resources | | | |
| Financial plans | U | | |
| Financial plans with classified program Names | U | | Classify as directed by program security classification guide, FOIA 1(b)(2)(a). |
| JIEDDO budget | U | | |
| Cost, pricing, or funding for individual systems, subsystems, or components | See Remarks | | IF UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 or 4 applies. FOIA exemption 4 may apply to certain proprietary or trade secret information provided by vendors. |

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|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|--|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Budget levels for projects | See Remarks | | | If individual project budget reveals a sensitive relationship between the JIEDDO and other DoD organizations, US government organizations, or a foreign government or foreign owned company then classify in accordance with the guidance provided by the other organization, government, or the contractor relationship portion of this document. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Production quantities and delivery rates | U | | | If individual project budget reveals a sensitive relationship between the JIEDDO and other DoD organizations, US government organizations, or a foreign government or foreign owned company then classify in accordance with the guidance provided by the other organization, government, or the contractor relationship portion of this document.. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 or 4 applies. |
| Manpower, overall by year, category, skill, and system | U | | | |
| Manpower, overall by year, category, skill, system, and individual name | U | | If classified, declass in accordance with proponent SCG. | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| Identification of a particular installation, facility or range associated with the JIEDDO | U-S | | | Classify as directed by program security classification guide. |
| Aggregate number of C-IED systems deployed in a particular theater of operation or to a particular unit | See Remarks | | | Peacetime Situations: Derivative according to documents such as Table or Organization and Equipment. Combat Situations: Derivative according to operational SCG such as MNF-I or OEF SCG. |
| JIEDDO Schedules | | | | |
| Organization master schedule | U | | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| Specific program/project status | U-S | | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| Development milestones | U-S | | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |

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| Procurement milestones | U-S | Contractor Relations | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| Partial or full list of contractors producing or procuring IED defeat systems or component pieces | U | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| Data on parts, accessories and equipment available in the open market or produces for commercial use not tied or related to IED defeat capabilities | U | | Public release and distributions statement A applies. |
| DD 254s | U - S | Declassify 10 years from date of creation | Classify in accordance with the SCG for the program or system. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| Statements of work | U - S | Declassify 10 years from date of creation | Classify in accordance with the SCG for the program or system. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 or 4 applies. |
| Organization Security | | | |
| Results of program protection risk management processes / analysis | See Remarks | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 5 applies. Specific information may be derivatively classified from documents such as threat assessments, etc. |
| Details of specific protection measures associated with the JIEDDO Note: Specific protection measures are those relative to the JIEDDO and not generalized guidance | See Remarks (U-S) | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. RAM Measures at a minimum is SECRET Specific information may be derivatively classified from documents such as threat assessments, etc. |

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JIEDDO OPERATIONS

| Element | Level | Duration | Remarks |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| General information regarding the requirements for the JIEDDO and IED defeat systems | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of creation | Classify in accordance with the SCG for the program or system. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Specific technical requirements associated with a specific system, subsystem or component | U-S | Declassify 10 years from date of creation | Classify in accordance with the SCG for the program or system. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Identification of key performance threshold/objective parameters associated with the JIEDDO and specific IED defeat system, subsystem or component | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | Classify in accordance with the SCG for the program or system. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Operational capabilities/shortfalls | See Remarks (U-TS) | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | Classify in accordance with the SCG for the program or system. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 and/or 5 applies. |
| IED- Related SIGACTS | See Remarks (U-TS) | | Classify in accordance with SCG for the program or system. All theater derived SIGACTS are SECRET. |
| JIEDDO specific tactic's techniques and procedures (TTPs) | See Remarks (C-TS) | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | Classify in accordance with the SCG for the operation, program or system. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 and/or 5 applies. |
| JIEDDO CONOPS | U-S | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | Classify in accordance with SCG for the operation, program or system. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 and/or 5 applies. |
| Movement of JIEDDO related personnel and equipment. | See Remarks | | If supporting combat operations, refer to applicable operational classification guide (MNF-I, OEF, etc.) If |

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| Field team locations | See Remarks | | UNCLASSIFIED FOIA 2 potentially applies. If supporting combat operations, refer to applicable operational classification guide (MNF-I, OEF, etc.). |
| Field Team Composition, disposition, and strengths | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If supporting combat operations, refer to applicable operational classification guide (MNF-I, OEF, etc.). If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2. |
| Field Team requirements and mission | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If supporting combat operations, refer to applicable operational classification guide (MNF-I, OEF, etc.). Specific information not covered in an operational classification guide; classify in accordance with the SCG for the operation, program or system. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2. |
| Analysis products by JIEDDO intelligence analysts | See Remarks | | Classify in accordance with the applicable Intelligence Community classification guide. If no guidance is available refer to DoDD 5240.08 (DOD CI SCG, December 2005, if UNCLASSIFIED FOIA 2, 4 and 5 applies). |
| JIEDDO intelligence requirements | S | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | Classify in accordance with current markings or the SCG for the operation, program or system, (if UNCLASSIFIED FOIA 2, 4 and 5 applies). |
| Specific IED- related system employment locations | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If supporting combat operations, refer to applicable operational classification guide (MNF-I, OEF, etc.) (If UNCLASSIFIED FOIA 2, 4 and 5 applies). |
| Specific IED- related system employment methods | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If supporting combat operations, refer to applicable operational classification guide (MNF-I, OEF, etc.). Specific information not covered in an operational or system specific classification; classify in accordance with the SCG for the program or system. Classification of employment locations may be classified a higher levels or within compartmented channels based upon operational guidance. |

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| IED lessons learned | U-S | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 and 5 potentially applies. If resulting from combat operations, refer to applicable operational classification guide (MNF-I, OEF, etc.). For JIEDDO specific developed lessons learned treat as: Classify in accordance with current classification or the SCG for the program or system. |
| Initial Review Group (IRG) internal decision- making processes and results | U-S | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 and/or 5 applies. Classify in accordance with current markings or the SCG for the operation, program or system. |
| Technology Review Group (TRG) internal decision- making processes and results | U-S | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. Classify in accordance with current markings or the SCG for the operation, program or system. |
| JIEDD Requirements, Resources and Acquisition Board (JR2AB) internal decision making processes and results | U-S | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. Classify in accordance with current markings or the SCG for the operation, program or system. |
| Joint Integrated Product Team internal decision- making processes and results | U-S | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. Classify in accordance with current markings or the SCG for the operation, program or system. |

C-IED Operational/Intelligence Integration Center (COIC)

For Further Information Refer to Annex A of this Classification Guidance

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| COIC mission | U | |
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RED AND BLUE TEAM ACTIONS

| Element | Level | Duration | Remarks |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Fact that JIEDDO performs red teaming and blue teaming | U | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| Red team and blue team reports | See Remarks | | Results are to be classified at the same level as the items or systems being Red Teamed or Blue Teamed – classify in accordance with information revealed. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. Specific information not covered in a component classification guide is treated as derivative from other sections of this SCG. Classification of red team and blue team plans and results is dependent on the security classification of the information involved. Prototypes without accompanying explanatory information will be handled as FOUO. FOIA 4 potentially applies. |
| Field team prototypes of possible new threat modes or techniques | See Remarks | | When associated with specific Red Team and Blue Team reports classify at the same level as the associated report. |
| Limitations or vulnerabilities associated with IED defeat systems or subsystems revealed by Red Teaming or technical gaming | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | Classify according to the level of information revealed through the association of limitations or vulnerabilities of specific IED defeat systems. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. Specific information not covered in a component classification guide is treated as: CONFIDENTIAL if loss of information would reveal or |

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| | | | compromise a future capability. SECRET if details would lead to loss of research, development and engineering; scientific, or technical information that would lead to a tactical disadvantage. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and/or 5 applies. |
|--|--|--|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

JIEDDO SYSTEM AND SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE AND CAPABILITIES

This section applies to all IED detection and defeat systems and subsystems.
(Many such systems fall under a different Original Classification Authority than JIEDDO owned information – i.e. Warlock Red falls under the authority of PM SW and PEO IEW&S and therefore all classification determinations for this system are found in the Joint counter radio controlled improvised explosive service electronic warfare Program Security Classification Guide) (CREW)

| Element | Level | Duration | Remarks |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| General information regarding the capabilities of IED defeat systems or subsystems | U | | General information is that which can be found in unclassified requests for proposals and approved JIEDDO press releases and media guidance, and documents marked with FOIA distribution statement A. |
| Specific details regarding the capabilities of IED defeat systems or subsystems | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 or 5 applies. |
| Emerging IED defeat capabilities or systems | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| (CREW) System or Subsystem | See Remarks | | For guidance on all CREW system, refer to the Joint Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Service Electronic Warfare Program Security Classification Guide, 8 August, 2006 (OPNAVINST 5513.8B-88). |
| Maximum range of detection / defeat for | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify |

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| IED defeat system or subsystem | | from date of this document | in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Detection rates | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| The fact that specific IED defeat systems will be used to protect specifically named VIP's | See Remarks (S-TS) | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | The general statement that C-IED systems are used for VIP protection is UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 and/or 5 applies. The fact C-IED systems are being used to protect specific VIPs is classified SECRET based on the program SCG, the loss of information could lead to a tactical disadvantage. Classification of C-IED systems being used to protect specific VIPs may be classified at higher levels or within compartmented channels based upon operational guidance. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Effectiveness of IED defeat systems or subsystems against general threats | See Remarks | | General categories of threats that C-IED systems are designed to counter (e.g. car alarms, cell phones, etc) UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Effectiveness of IED defeat systems or subsystems against specific threats | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Specific system Concept of Operations (CONOPS) | See Remarks (C-S) | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |

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| | | | | exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Specific system tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | |
| Frequency ranges when expressed in general terms (such as Band A / Band B) | See Remarks | | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. Frequency bands expressed in general terms that do not reveal actual operating parameters is UNCLASSIFIED. |
| Frequency bands associated with specific IED defeat systems | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. Listing of actual operating frequencies, frequency bands, or entire spectrum coverage is SECRET – the loss of information could lead to a tactical disadvantage. If UNCLASSIFIED, FOIA 4 potentially applies. |
| Antennas associated with IED defeat systems or subsystems | See Remarks | | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. The fact that specific antennas are being used for C-IED systems is UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. If performance characteristics of an antenna are classified, then classify in accordance with the applicable SCG. |
| IED defeat system or subsystem reliability, maintainability, and supportability | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Technical details of signal processing or jamming techniques / parameters | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |

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| | | document | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
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| Threat characteristics that are used to determine which IED defeat system or subsystem to employ | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| RF Output power or other information that would reveal effective range of operation | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Input sensitivity or other information that would reveal system or subsystem detection range | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Interoperability between various IED defeat systems or subsystems | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Interoperability between IED defeat systems or subsystems and other equipment (communication equipment, weapons systems, etc) | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |

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JIEDDO RELATED HARDWARE / SOFTWARE

(Some Hardware and Software falls under a different Original Classification Authority than JIEDDO owned information – i.e. Warlock Red falls under the authority of PM SW and PEO IEW&S and therefore all classification determinations for this system are found in the Joint Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Service Electronic Warfare Program Security Classification Guide)

| Element | Level | Duration | Remarks |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Technology Integration | | | |
| General description of technologies being considered for use by JIEDDO | See Remarks | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Note: Technologies that have actually been selected for use by JIEDDO are covered in the respective SCG | | | Specific information not covered in a component classification guide is treated as: UNCLASSIFIED - Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Specific technical details of technologies being considered for use by JIEDDO | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Note: Technologies that have actually been selected for use by JIEDDO are covered in the respective SCG | | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Design Details | | | |
| General information regarding IED defeat systems or components of systems | See Remarks | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| | | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Design specifications of IED defeat systems or components of systems | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| | | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Specific technical details regarding IED defeat systems or components of systems (antennas, etc) | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |

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| | | | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Network architecture system view | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Network architecture technical view | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Network architecture network functions | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Software architecture | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Software source code | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Information assurance technical details (To include Cross Domain Guard, Network Intrusion Detection System, Key Fill Bus, firewall, and switches) | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Cryptographic capabilities and equipment | See Remarks | | | Contact OPR COMSEC material and controlled cryptographic items shall be handled, marked and safeguarded in accordance with policies and procedures of the National Security Agency. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |

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| | | | | exemption 2, 4 or 5 applies. |
| Modeling and Simulation | | | | |
| Fact that modeling and simulation is used for design and validation of a specific system, subsystem or component | See Remarks | | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. Specific information not covered in a component classification guide is treated as UNCLASSIFIED - Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and/or 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Operational parameters for specific modeling and simulation at the force, system, subsystem or component level | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and/or 5 applies. |
| Details of specific items in the modeling and simulation database | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and/or 5 applies. |
| Results of the modeling and simulations | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and/or 5 applies. |
| Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) / Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) | | | | |
| Fact that the JIEDDO uses COTS/GFE systems | U | | | Public Release and Distributions Statement A applies. |
| Association of COTS/GFE used on a particular IED defeat system, subsystem, or component | See Remarks | | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 potentially applies. |
| Modification of COTS/GFE | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and 5 applies. |
| Unusual or unique application of GFE | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify |

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| | | from date of this document | In accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and 5 applies. |
| Technical details about modification of COTS/GFE | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | |
| Manufacturing / Fabrications | | | |
| Fact that unique / non-traditional manufacturing processes are used to develop IED defeat systems, subsystems, or components | See Remarks | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Technical details of unique / non-traditional manufacturing processes used to develop IED defeat systems, subsystems, or components | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and 5 applies. |
| Integration | | | |
| Fact that unique / non-traditional integration processes are used to develop IED defeat systems, subsystems, or components | See Remarks | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Identification of unique / non-traditional integration techniques with specific IED defeat systems, subsystems, or components | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and 5 applies. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |
| Technical details of unique / non-traditional integration techniques relative to IED defeat systems, subsystems, or components | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 3, 4 and 5 applies. |
| External / Internal Views | | | |
| External view of IED defeat systems, subsystems, or components (including | See Remarks | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |

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| drawings, photographs, etc.) | | | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4. |
| Internal view of IED defeat systems, subsystems, or components (including technical drawings of systems, components such as wiring plans, blueprints, and section cutaways) | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and/or 5 applies. |
| Anti-Tamper | | | | |
| General information regarding the fact that anti-tamper is used on IED defeat systems, subsystems, or components | U | | | |
| Technical details regarding implementation of anti-tamper to deter / delay attempts at reverse engineering of hardware / software of IED defeat systems, subsystems, or components | See Remarks | | | Refer to the Anti Tamper SCG, dated 1 March 2001. If UNCLASSIFIED, FOIA exemption 2, 4 or 5 potentially applies. |

VULNERABILITIES AND WEAKNESSES

| Element | Level | Duration | Remarks |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| General information regarding vulnerabilities and limitation of IED defeat systems or subsystems (i.e. information found via open sources related to common vulnerabilities such as the statement that "coalition troops are vulnerable to VBIED attacks") | See Remarks | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. Combination of open source material may classify information General information not covered in a component classification guide is treated as: UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and 5 applies. |
| Details of specific operational limitations and vulnerabilities of IED defeat systems or subsystems | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, FOIA exemption 4 or 5 potentially applies. |
| Identification of system susceptibilities in the presence of a validated threat to a specific IED defeat system or subsystem | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |

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| | | | If UNCLASSIFIED, FOIA exemption 4 or 5 potentially applies. |
| Technical details of specific countermeasure employed (e.g. ECM, Anti-Tamper, Signature Management, etc) | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, FOIA, exemption 4 or 5 potentially applies. |
| Effectiveness of specific countermeasures | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If, UNCLASSIFIED, FOIA exemption 4 or 5 potentially applies. |
| Information regarding signals or initiation means which may not be detected or which may be immune to specific IED defeat systems or subsystems | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If, UNCLASSIFIED, FOIA exemption 4 or 5 potentially applies. |

INDUSTRY TEST AND EVALUATIONS

| Element | Level | Duration | Remarks |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Details of IED defeat system or subsystem test plan | See Remarks | | Testing is to be classified at the same level as the item being tested – classify in accordance with information revealed. If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If, UNCLASSIFIED, FOIA exemption 4 or 5 potentially applies. |
| Identification of specific dates for IED defeat systems or subsystem tests | U | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| Identification of specific test locations associated with IED defeat systems or | U | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |

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| subsystems | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | Classify according to the level of information revealed through the association of specialized test equipment with specific IED Defeat systems. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and/or 5 applies. Testing is to be classified at the same level as the item being tested – classify in accordance with information revealed. |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Identification of specific or specialized test instrumentation or equipment associated with IED defeat systems or subsystems | See Remarks | | |
| Predicted test data | See Remarks | | Predicted test data that provides specific performance and capability data on IED defeat System or Subsystem shall be classified in accordance with that component Security Classification Guide. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and/or 5 applies. Testing is classified at the same level as the item being tested – classify in accordance with information revealed. |
| Raw test data | See Remarks | | Raw data that provides specific performance and capability data on IED defeat System or Subsystem shall be classified in accordance with that components Security Classification Guide. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and/or 5 applies. Testing is classified at the same level as the item being tested – classify in accordance with information revealed. |
| Reduced test data | See Remarks | | Reduced test data that provides specific performance and capability data on IED defeat System or Subsystem components shall be classified in accordance with that components Security Classification Guide. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and/or 5 applies. |

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TRAINING

| Element | Level | Duration | Remarks |
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| Training location specific to the JIEDDO and IED defeat systems, subsystems, or components | U | | Mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| Training that reveals specific system information (e.g. design, development, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.) Note: This element includes live training, virtual training, and constructive training. | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | Classify in accordance with the level of information revealed during the training. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 4 and/or 5 applies. |
| Training Aids (Includes both IED training devices and C-IED training devices) | U | | If, UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |

MAINTENANCE

| Element | Level | Duration | Remarks |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Location of specialized maintenance organizations associated with the JIEDDO and IED defeat systems, subsystems, or components | See Remarks | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. Specific information not covered in a component classification guide is treated as UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| Association of maintenance equipment or tools that may reveal specific system information | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 or 4 applies. |
| Maintenance that reveals specific system information (e.g. design, development, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.) | See Remarks | Declassify 10 years from date of this document | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. |

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| | | | If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 or 4 applies. |
| Field level maintenance | See Remarks | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| Intermediate level maintenance | See Remarks | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |
| Depot level maintenance | See Remarks | | If system specific classification guidance exists, then classify in accordance with that guidance. If UNCLASSIFIED, mark and handle as FOUO, FOIA exemption 2 applies. |

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SECTION X – APPLICABLE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDES

Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum Dated 24 Apr 2006, SUBJECT:
Policy on Discussion of IEDs and IED-Defeat Efforts in Open Sources

Operational Capabilities Infusion Team (OCIT) Technology Efforts In Support of
the Detection and Defeat of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Classification
Guide (Revised 10 March 2004)

MNF-I / MNC-I Security Classification and Marking Guide, Version 5, Change 1,
05 Aug 2005

DoD Security Classification Guide Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation
Noble Eagle, 28 Mar 2002

USCENTCOM Security Classification Guide 0501, Dated: 9 June 2005

Classification Guidance for EC-130H and EA-6B Counter-RCIED Operations in
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

Classification Guidance for EC-130H and EA-6B Counter-RCIED Operations in
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Service Electronic Warfare
Program Security Classification Guide, 8 August, 2006 (OPNAVINST 5513.8B-
88)

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SECTION XI REFERENCES

1. Executive Order 12958, as amended, 5 Jan 2006
2. AR 380-5, "Department of the Army Information Security Program," 14 Jan 2006
3. DOD 5220.22-M, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM)," Jan 1995, Change 1, 31 Jul 1997; Change 2, 28 Feb 2006
4. AR 25-55, "Department of the Army Freedom of Information Act Program." 15 Jan 2006
5. DOD Directive 5230-25, "Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data from Public Disclosure," 6 Nov 1984; Change 1, 8 Apr 1995
6. DOD Directive 5230-24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents." 8 Apr 2004
7. DOD Pamphlet 5230.25-PH, "Control of Unclassified Technical Data with Military or Space Application," 15 Apr 2004
8. DOD 5200.1-R "Information Security Program," Feb 2009
9. DOD 5230.9 "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release," 22 Aug 2008
10. DOD 5230.11 "Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations," 7 Feb 2006
11. DODI 5230.27 "Presentation of DoD-related Science and Technical Papers at Meetings, 6 Oct 1987