Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This letter is in reply to your Freedom of Information Act request of 20 August 2009. The request was received by the AFHRA on 20 August 2009 and was assigned the FOIA case number 2009-3277.

After researching your request, I was able to locate IRIS #1105270, oral history interview for Garland, William C. This document is 222 pages long. Therefore in accordance to your FOIA letter, I am enclosing a copy of the table of contents and the cover page. The estimated cost for the 222 pages, minus the first free 100 pages, is $18.30. Please note that the enclosed table of contents is the best copy available.

Thank you for your request.

Sincerely,

Mrs. Marcie T. Green
Archivist

Attachments:
1. IRIS #110527, extract
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

INTERVIEW

OP

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM C. GARLAND

By

Mr. Hugh N. Ahmann

Date: 21-22 April 1986
Location: Indian Wells, California

Transcribed and Edited by Pauline Tubbs
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AFHRA/RSA
600 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6424 USA

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.

Dear Mr. Greenewald,

This is in response to your September 17, 2009, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request received in this office on 17 September 2009 pertaining to the specific pages from the document with IRIS number 01105270, Call name K239.0512-1707 copy 1. As a FOIA request, it has been assigned the number 2009-03959-F. The request for information number assigned by this office is 09-0939.

I have copied and enclosed the pages you specified from the document: pages 40 - 75, 115 - 125, 130 - 160, and 179 - 200.

Please be advised that under the Freedom of Information Act you can be charged $.15 per page copied. The first 100 pages are provided to you for free. However, the document you requested is a total of 100 so there is no balance due for this FOIA.

Should you have questions, please refer to the FOIA number 2009-03959-F and RFI (request for information) number 09-0939.

Respectfully,

Cathy Cox, Archivist
AFHRA/Research

Enclosure:

1. Copy of original RFI (request for information)
2. Copy of requested pages from the document with IRIS number 01105270.
Dear Sir,

This is a non-commercial request made under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. § 552. Pursuant to the U.S. OPEN Records Act of 2007, my FOIA requester status as a "representative of the news media" -- a status entitling me to an unlimited search processing my request, and the first 100 pages free of charge. For examples of my various publication credits in this regard, I refer you to my radio network, and my own personal radio show (syndicated on FM and AM stations) at http://www.blackvaultradio.com. My internet website http://www.theblackvault.com which holds a vast government document database, along with many freelance articles that I have written, which have also been published in magazines and websites, including OpEdNews.com, UFO Magazine, FATE Magazine, and others.

Additionally, please reference case 2009-03277-F, in which I received a cover page and table of contents. I figured since the case was closed, I had to refile to get other portions of this document:

IRIS Number: 01105270
Main: GARLAND, WILLIAM C.
Call: K239.0512-1707 C.1

I respectfully request the following pages of the above document, which totals less than 100 pages (even including the already received material):

- Pages 40 - 75
- Pages 115 - 125
- Pages 130-160
- Pages 179-200

If the document is considered currently and properly classified, I respectfully request a mandatory declassification review (MDR) of the document, as it is more than 25 years old and should be considered for declassification.

Thank you so much for your time, and I am very much looking forward to your response. Please know that electronic delivery of the requested material or correspondence related to this case is preferred and accepted in lieu of paper copies via snail mail.

Sincerely,

John Grenewald, Jr.
Abstract: CONTAINS RECOLLECTIONS OF SUBJECT'S FATHER; GORDON MILITARY ACADEMY, BARNESVILLE GA; SERVICE IN GEORGIA NATIONAL GUARD INCLUDING QUELLING LABOR DISPUTE IN TRION GA; UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, WEST POINT NY; FLYING TRAINING; BEING STRUCK BY LIGHTNING; BELLY IN LANDING AND DITCHING OF B-17 AIRCRAFT; TRAINING CONDUCTED BY 401 BOMBARDMENT GROUP; TWO COMBAT TOURS IN EUROPE; FIGHTER ESCORTS FOR B-17 FORMATIONS; B-25 AIRCRAFT COLLISION WITH EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, NEW YORK NY; IMMEDIATE POST WAR ASSIGNMENTS; DAVIS MONTAN WEST CAMP AZ; READINESS OF STRATEGIC BOMBARDMENT FORCES AFTER HOSTILITIES; POST HOSTILITIES SCHOOL AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY; OPERATION HAYLIFT; STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES OF B-29 FORCES IN IMMEDIATE POST WAR PERIOD; 509 BOMBARDMENT WING; GEN CURTIS E. LEMAY; CONVERSION TO B-47 AIRCRAFT; F-84 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT; COMMAND AND CONTROLE OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND (SAC) ASSETS IN KOREA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA; POSSIBLE SABOTAGE OF SUBJECT'S B-17 AIRCRAFT PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT TO EUROPE IN WORLD WAR II; 98 BOMBARDMENT WING; GEN THOMAS S. POWER; GEN LEMAY, GEORGE WALLACE AND VICE PRESIDENCY OF UNITED STATES; ASSIGNMENT TO JUSMAG (JOINT UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE GROUP) IN SPAIN (LATER BECAME 16 AIR FORCE); BUILDING OF SAC BASES AND NAVAL INSTALLATIONS IN SPAIN; FRANCISCO FRANCO; U-2 AIRCRAFT AT DAVIS MONTAN AIR FORCE BASE; AIR FORCE PME (PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION) FOR OFFICERS; NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE; CONCEPT AND UTILIZATION OF CHIEF OF STAFF IN THE ARMY AS COMPARED WITH AIR FORCE; GEN JOHN D. RYAN; INTERCEPTION OF SOVIET SHIP GROZNY DURING CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS; INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBM) FOR SAC; ISSUES OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE; DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF RECONNAISSANCE DRONES (RELOCATED PILOTED VEHICLES OR RPV); TODAY SHOW COVERAGE OF 1 STRATEGIC AIR DIVISION; FATE OF ATLAS MISSILES AFTER INACTIVATION; AIR FORCE OFFICE OF INFORMATION; INFORMATION LEAKS AND THEIR SOURCES; ROBERT MCNAMARA; DREW PEARSON; TELEVISION, PUBLIC OPINION AND WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA; TELEVISION NEWS COVERAGE; CHEATING AT AIR FORCE ACADEMY; DEVELOPMENT OF TFX (F-111) AIRCRAFT; CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY; C-5 AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT COST OVERRUNS; AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION; EDUCATING THE PRESS; COMMUNITY RELATIONS; AIR FORCE HISTORY PROGRAM; UNIDENTIFIED FLYING OBJECTS (UFO); PROJECT BLUE BOOK; DEFENSE INFORMATION SCHOOL; CAREER PROGRESSION; VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE CA; DRUG ABUSE; SAMSO (SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS OFFICE); AND OTHERS.
what happened to us. I think the engines got knocked out by flak, and that's what the entire crew felt. If you look out and see oil streaming out, you can break an oil line, or you could have had an oil line knocked out. The only thing we see is the oil pressure goes off to zero, and we can feather the engine before it freezes up, that kind of thing. We thought that we were hit by flak.

A: Did the Germans have radar-controlled guns that they could spot you with?

G: Yes.

A: Did you feel yourself prepared for the air war over Europe? Obviously, combat must be a rude awakening, but did the training you had in the U.S. pretty well fit with this?

G: I can't say too much for the training that we had in the United States. My training was very skimpy because, being a Regular officer, people were inclined to give me an assistant operations job or administrator or something of that sort rather than as an instructor pilot and rather than flying all the time. I felt that I didn't really get as much flying as I would like to have had. Taking the entire war—I flew one tour and went back to start a second, and I don't know how many crews we ran through the group—I can only relate one incident where we lost a crew that I can say this was poor technique. Most of our takeoffs were instrument takeoffs. You had to climb up. Sometimes you were only at 300 feet, and you would be out of clear, but you had fog down here, so you had to make an instrument takeoff. This kid got up a head of steam and then tried to pop up on top.
He was too heavily loaded, and so he crashed. I'm sure there are other instances that we just didn't know about.

I thought the training of the crews that they sent us was outstanding. Then when we got them, we had another training program for them. We took every episode that we could find and cataloged it and had it in our material for the new crews. In other words: "If you were struck by flak and lost an engine, what did you do? Your manuals tell you if you start losing oil and all of that, these things you do. But now, when you are over Germany and you can't keep up with the formation and you've got engines out, what did you do? Well, this guy hit the deck and came home at 100 feet. How did he do it?" This we would tell our new crews: "Here's what this guy did and may not work for you. If you can stay up there in that formation, you do it. But if you can't, here's what this guy did." We also would let the pilot fly at least one mission if not more as copilot with an experienced crew, and we would let the copilot fly as a copilot with an experienced crew. We didn't put that green crew the first time by themselves. We took the gunners and let them fly as gunners on an experienced crew because you always had someone who had a head cold or had the flu or for some reason he couldn't participate, so that was not a problem. Our training program was very, very rigid, and, as a result, our organization had one of the finest records in the Eighth Air Force.

A: Let's talk about this book The 401st Bomb Group. Who put that together?

G: When the war was over, among other things I was group operations, but I was also president of the officers' club.
If you have any funds remaining in officers' clubs, NCO clubs, et cetera, when a base is inactivated, it reverts to the Treasury Department. We didn't think too much of that, so I said, "Everything in the club is free, on the house. The bar is open." The war was over, and we were just getting ready to come home, so everything was free. I forgot the slot machines. As we were getting ready to come home—we brought about 75 airplanes with 20 men to an airplane back to Windsor Locks, Connecticut—and I am just ready to get into my airplane to come back to the States, one of our administrative majors comes out and says, "In the officers' club, we made $10,000. What do we do with it?" We had a board meeting of the board of directors of the club and drew up minutes which said we would give this $10,000 to one of our intelligence officers, Gordon Closway, who was also a publisher from Winona, Minnesota. Gordon, who all during the war had collected these pictures as the intelligence officer and who had the running history, the resumes and whatnot, took all this, and we said, "Put us together a book and give everybody in the outfit a copy as long as the $10,000 lasts," which he did. Ten thousand dollars in those days went a long ways. So that's the way this book was printed.

A: You must have been one of the first ones to do an exercise like that. That is a lot of foresight because once the outfit breaks up, it is difficult to recover.

What did you think of the leadership in World War II in the air war over there?

G: I thought it was magnificent. The leadership of the military, when you start off with General "Hap" Arnold
General Marshall [Gen George C.], Admiral King [Adm Ernest J.], and those people as well, I don't think the leadership has ever been any better. In the theater were General Ira Eaker [Gen Ira C.], who was really a great one, General Doolittle [Gen James H.], and General Spaatz [Gen Carl A.]. Then as we got down to lower levels it continued. In that book, for example, one of our squadron commanders, Bill Seawell [Brig Gen William T.] was the the chairman of the board of Pan Am before the present guy. Alvah Chapman that you see as one of the squadron commanders on the next page was my operations officer, and when I went up to group I gave Alvah the job. He is chairman of the board of Knight-Ridder Publishers, who owns all the newspapers. In other words, we had the cream of the crop in America in World War II. The guys were all fighting to get in the military services, and then most of them were fighting to get overseas. You could not have asked for better men, better leadership, than existed. We never had a minute's problem with anybody. You didn't have AWOLs; you didn't have things of that sort. I don't know what some of the sergeants did down behind the woodshed, but that's all right. (laughter)

I had one or two episodes. In one of them we were going to Berlin one morning, and one of my pilots said he didn't want to go. Well, that's understandable. (laughter) I'm not sure anybody wanted to go, as far as that is concerned. I had two concerns. One of them was, of course, if a person shirks his duty like that, it's a very serious thing. It's serious on him for the rest of his life if it is not handled properly, and I thought of this at the time. In the briefing room for checks of proper people coming in and out, we had two air policemen, so I took this officer out to them and
said, "Okay, we've got a wood pile up behind the officers' club. I want you to take this man up there and let him cut us a little wood. I'll be back this afternoon from a mission, and I'll come by and see how things are going then." He said, "Suppose you don't come back." I said, "Well, you may cut a lot of wood." That's entirely illegal, and there's no justification for that. There was no legal justification or anything else, but this was wartime. When we got back and I got through debriefing and took a shower, I went up. He was there and pretty tired, and he had some blisters on his hands. We chatted for a minute, and he said, "I think I would like to give flying another go." I said, "That's good; I hope so because I would like to give you another go. I hope that this is something we can all forget and you can go on and do your job. On the right side of it, I'll get your hands in shape, a couple or 3 days now. We fly an officer in the tail of the lead airplane so he can see the formation. I want to put you back in the tail when you fly--that will let you get a feel for things--and then I want to move you back up in the cockpit before it's over with." It turned out we did this, and he completed his missions. Was that right, what I did? To me it was completely right since it was successful. Did I have the authority to do it? Absolutely not. Suppose he had refused. I don't know what we would have done, but it worked, so I think it was the proper thing to do.

A: Somebody told me one time a similar thing and they sent the guy home. He was flying in the ATC, Air Transport Command, but he was writing letters back saying how great he had it. Well, they took care of him then. They court-martialed him and threw him in Leavenworth.
G: I had one of a sergeant, and the hospital was worried about him. They thought he was a psycho case. One day my First Sergeant and I were out in front of the orderly room, and this guy came by and started snapping pictures. The sergeant said, "I'll bet you there is no film in that camera." He went over and checked it, and, sure enough, there wasn't any film in it. The medics sent this guy home as being a little bit off center. Later on I got a letter from him. There was a picture of me and the First Sergeant standing in front of the orderly room, and there was a picture of him in a hospital bed with his arm around three of the most lovely nurses you ever saw in your life. He said, "Colonel, who's nuts now?" (laughter) He had it figured out, and he got away with it. You can't win them all, can you? (laughter)

A: When you went over there, 25 missions was a tour, and they raised that to 50 eventually?

G: They raised it to 35.

A: What were the odds of a guy getting through 35 missions?

G: When we went over, about 70 percent of the guys who went over as a unit, the 401st, were shot down. That didn't mean they were all killed. Some were POWs; some walked out through Spain. This was over a long period of time. In our group, though, we had an amazing number of guys who, like myself, had Colonel Bowman [Brig Gen Harold W.] say when I got to 24, "Do you want to fly the 25th and go home for 30 days and come back, or do you want to sit here at 24?" In other words, he wanted to maintain the supervision that he had. This guy I was telling you about, Bill Seawell, who later became the
group commander, myself as group operations, the group bombardier, and the navigator were all second-tour guys like me, and about three or four others in the group that were squadron operations and squadron commanders and that sort of thing, so we had a real continuity factor. We flew the 25 and went home, and those were the rough 25. By the time I came back, things were easing up somewhat, and we were able to expand our group leads more. On the second tour I only flew about 8 or 10 missions.

A: It doesn't say here that you had a break in that tour. It shows you went over in May 1943. When would you have come back after that first 25 missions?

G: I was home for the Army-Notre Dame game in 1944.

A: So that would have been like September or October?

G: It would have been about late October, and I went back around the first of December.

A: How were you able to go back? I've talked to other people like that, and they said they just couldn't get out of the U.S.

G: I would not comment on any individual. When I got my wings at Turner Field, Albany, Georgia, I had to wait to get my orders from Washington because I was a Regular officer. About twice a week at least I would meet Colonel Patrick as he came to work. I would park in the lot and meet Colonel Patrick as he parked his car to walk in the door with him and say, "Colonel, when in the hell am I going to get my
orders to go to war?" His words were: "You are the only SOB on this base that wants to go to war, and I'm going to see that you go!" That's all I know about that, but I never ran in to anybody in my experience who wanted to go over who didn't get over.

When World War II ended, I came home from Europe. We had 30 days' leave, and then we reported in to Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The next shot, I was sent to Tucson to learn to fly the B-29s because I was going to the Pacific, having had two tours in England. Now, why in the hell are they going to send old Garland to the Pacific in B-29s when you've still got guys who never have been?

A: I interviewed a guy one time, and to be honest with you, I don't know his name. His biography was very confusing. I said, "I don't quite understand this." What happened was he got sent back to the U.S. at the end of a tour, and somehow he went back on his own hook and showed up one day.

G: I don't know; I've never heard of that. But all of us that came back from this 401st Group—I imagine it was 10 or 12—our orders were that we were home for X number of days R&R and would report to Atlantic City for return. We weren't assigned to somebody else here in the United States. We were just like you are. You are on TDY out here from your unit. I reported in to Atlantic City, and my group bombardier, Julius Pickoff, who was a big football player at Texas A&M, was also there. This guy Carl Hinkle [Col Carl C., Jr.] was an All-American center at Vanderbilt and also with me at West Point. Julius Pickoff showed up, and we shared a stateroom together on the boat. Julius said, "Can I borrow your razor?"
GARLAND

I said, "You've got a B-4 bag there; what's in it?" He said, "Booze!" (laughter) We were there at Atlantic City.

A: He looks like a happy-go-lucky guy.

G: He was a happy-go-lucky guy. (laughter) He was about 240 pounds, and for 40 yards he was as fast as anybody.

I got four tickets to the Army-Notre Dame game that year. We were sitting around Friday night at Atlantic City having dinner, and a guy alerted us to go back in, so I gave him the seat numbers. I said, "This is where you will find us. Hold the boat because we are going to ball game!" (laughter) Fortunately, we didn't move out till Monday.

A: Were Blanchard and Davis playing yet?

G: Yes. Incidentally, "Red" Blaik [Col Earl H.] was a member at LaQuinta Country Club. I've had lunch with him two or three times just in the last few months, the old Army coach. He will be 90 his next birthday, and he is just as alert as you can believe. He has a balance problem. When he stands up, he has to hold on to a chair to kind of get himself balanced, but otherwise he is fine.

A: Then when you went back after about 30 days, you say you were only able to squeeze in about 10 flights. You've heard this old argument about B-17s being escorted by fighters. Was it an impossible situation to send those airplanes out without a fighter escort?
G: No. In the early days you didn't have many bombers, and the escort would only go as far as the Channel because they just didn't have the range to continue. If the B-17s flew proper tight formations, you had a fairly good defensive system. Now, if the guys got to looking around instead of paying attention to their job and straggled, they were picked off like sitting ducks. In the early days there was no question about it; the Germans were good. They were good pilots, and they had good airplanes. It was one hell of a mess when you got into a fight with them, which you did all the time.

Toward the end of the war that I am talking about now, the caliber of pilot fell off rapidly. They didn't have the time in the air, and they didn't have the training. They didn't have the wherewithal to give them the training. Besides that, our P-51s were roaming Europe like tourists. They were all over the place, and anything that showed up they would shoot it up.

I was on a mission over Berlin one day, again in which we were not in the clouds but heavy contrails, and all of a sudden I saw tracers going over the left wing. I looked back, and here was an airplane I had never seen before—it had no propellers. It was an Me 262 and may have been the first sighting of the jet. What had happened was that he had come up and, flying in the contrails, he had his gear down and his flaps down.

A: To slow him down? (laughter)

G: To slow him down. Now, what did that do? That changed his firing platform.
GARLAND

(End Tape 3, Side 1; Side 2 not used)

A: Had you been briefed that this Me 262 was going to show up?

G: No. I knew from intelligence briefings that the Germans were working on a jet airplane. If you have never seen one and you see a picture of it, you don't really know and you wonder when somebody says that hot gas going out the rear is going to fly this thing 400 miles an hour! (laughter)

A: Did this airplane come through the formation and fly in front of you?

G: He pulled his gear and flaps up and dove out.

A: Was that quite a shock to see that?

G: You can't get shocked like that. You can get shocked when you get on the ground, but if you get shocked at that point in time, you forget to do what you are supposed to do. It was an unusual situation. There were only a couple or three crews that even saw him because they said it was just like flying in the clouds. He came up, and just two or three of us saw him. After that we saw a few more. By that time the experience level was falling off. I'm sure this was a well-qualified guy in this airplane because you don't put a youngster in a new airplane. They had a skilled guy in there. It is my conjecture that with his gear and flaps down it had changed his firing platform and that's the reason he missed us. That's my opinion. I don't know whether that is true or not, but I think it would be.
A: Going back to when you were in training, did you want to get into the heavy bomber?

G: Yes.

A: Any particular reason versus a fighter or attack or pursuit?

G: I thought that the bomber business was the way that you could inflict the damage and that you could do more good than just one guy strapping a little one-engine airplane on him and playing around. That's the way I looked at it. If we were going to bring this thing to a halt, we needed to do the strategic work and hit his rail and oil and all of that sort of thing.

A: When you went to West Point, were you intending to make a career out of the military?

G: I think so. I know today, and I knew then, I never would have in the Army. In the Air Force I never had a bad job. Everything was a challenge. As you know, you see the statistics, most of the enlisted men have a high school education and some even beyond. I had a man who was my senior NCO at Vandenberg who had a doctorate. Your officers mainly are college graduates. You are running a technical, professional business, not that the others aren't also, but it's a different climate in the Air Force.

A: When World War II came to an end, did things seemed to be anticlimaxed for quite a while for you?
GARLAND

G: Yes, when I came home I was at loose ends. As I said we brought the airplane home to Windsor Locks, Connecticut. Then I was given my leave orders, so I went to Greenwich, Connecticut, and stayed there for about a week to sort of adjust to stateside business and get my head screwed on right if I could. While I was there, in the afternoon, there was sort of an English pub type place there, and I would stop by and have a drink or a beer. There was an old gent there, not too old, a kind of a crumpled type guy who looked like he had slept in his suit and sat on his hat. We would have a beer or two and talk a little bit. When I started to leave I asked him about a bank where I could go and get a sizable check, and he told me. He said, "Why don't you get out of the military and go to work for me?" I said, "I'm a Regular, and I had just never thought about it. I am going to stay in." He said, "I need a boy that can read blueprints. You've got an engineer's degree, but you've never practiced. I can teach you how to read blueprints. I do a little building, and I want somebody who can go out and see if I'm getting what I'm paying for, quality lumber and that sort of thing." He had two boys in the Navy, so I said, "This is the kind of job for them." He said, "I'm big enough I can handle all of it. I will give you $75,000 a year." That was astronomical in those days. I said, "You old coot; you are just blowing smoke!" (laughter) His name was Levit, the little builder of Levittown on Long Island. I thought about it, and I thought, "I don't know." I had never heard of him; I didn't know whether he had built two houses or ten. The next morning when I went to the bank I went in to see the president and got my money, and I said, "I would like to tell you a story. Do you know this guy?" He said, "I know him very well." He ended up saying, "If he called me now and
said give you $75,000, I would hand it to you right now." I said, "My god!" (laughter) Anyway, I walked off. It was an interesting thought, but when his two boys came home, the whole thing could have fallen apart anyway; I don't know.

A: When you came back from Europe, you say you went into B-29 training down at Davis-Monthan?

G: Yes, I had better tell you how I got in that. We went to Sioux Falls, and a guy, Ed Ragner [Col Harris E.], who later was one of the other group commanders, got an airplane and was going back to New York, a B-25. So Carl Hinkle that I showed you and I went back with him, and a guy named Bill Smith [Lt Col William F., Jr.]--Hinkle, Smith, and I were classmates at West Point--then took the airplane and went up to Boston. On the way back on Saturday, Smith hit the Empire State Building. He was coming to pick us up. I was on the phone at the Barkley Hotel calling Newark to see if they had anything on him. I had been out on Park Avenue that morning, and the clouds were up and down, up and down. The bellhop came over and said, "Somebody hit the Empire State Building." Well, there wasn't any doubt in my mind that this was Bill Smith and this was our airplane. I don't know why, but anyway I went on over and went up with the firemen. The elevator next to us plunged 60 floors, but ours went on up. The thing was under control and didn't burn that long. One engine went through and down. We went up to the 56th floor or something of that sort. It would have been a real calamity had it been a regular work day, but this was on a Saturday. We had to walk up three or four flights of stairs. I was able to get enough identification so we knew what it was. Then Hinkle stayed and went through the arrangements for the body with
Smith back with his family. Rogner and I went on back to Sioux Falls.

A: How did they ever get that airplane out of there because it literally stuck into the building?

G: It was torn up. I imagine they went in there with acetylene torches and just cut it up.

A: How do you account for something like that, he just didn't know where he was at?

G: He hadn't flown in the United States. This was his first flight in the United States. All of our flying for the past almost 2 years had been in combat, so you didn't have in England the business of flying beams and radar control. You didn't have radar for landing anyway. You didn't have a beam because if you had one, the other guy could use it just as well as you. We had various procedures that you could tell you were not going to run into a barrage balloon. We had a beeper in the cockpit that if you were approaching them it let you know that. You would come back home over your base and sometimes just cock it up like 90 degrees and practically spin in to get the airplane on the ground.

He was flying under visual flight rules. As I said, the clouds were coming in like this, and maybe he could see the ground and maybe he couldn't see the ground. He mistook the Hudson River and the East River. I think he got confused on his navigation. Anyway, he was not quite sure where he was. He was trying to fly visually, and he was down too low to stay under the clouds. That's the only way you can account
for it. Had he been flying the beam or something he would have been away from the Empire State Building.

A: So you went back to Sioux Falls. That was a radio training technical school place, wasn't it?

G: Yes, but it had a lot of barracks. It was a center in which they brought a tremendous number of Eighth Air Force people there. From there they were screened. Some went out of the service, and some were reassigned. Nobody stayed there; everybody was transitory.

As soon as I got back, I called General Lacey [Maj Gen Julius K.], who was one of our commanders who was at Second Air Force in Colorado Springs, and told him Hagner and I needed to get the hell out of Sioux Falls as fast as we could. (laughter) He sent me down to Tucson, and then as soon as the war ended he brought me back to Colorado Springs in operations.

A: They've got you down here at Davis-Monthan West Camp. Was that just a satellite field, or what was it?

G: You have been digging down to the rocks! I was flying B-29s, trying to learn to fly them. One weekend I went down into Mexico to some little old place down there and came back on Monday morning, and they said, "What are you doing coming back over here? You are the commander of West Camp over there." West Camp was the tar paper cantonment area that had been closed for over a year—weeds, dusty, everything. Friday night at Alamogordo, New Mexico, and a couple of other places there was a train coming out to Tucson, bringing some
people. Somebody at the officers' club and NCO club said, "Look, the train is going to Tucson," and everybody got on the train that could possibly walk. The war was over now, and they weren't working very hard, so we had literally hundreds of guys show up at Davis-Monthan on Saturday. They had no records. They were everywhere from field grade officers with ribbons running down their back to guys who had only been in the service 2 weeks. The base commander there took a couple of navigators and said, "Garland is the commander, and you are his associates. Now take care of them over there." And I'm not even around. I don't know how this happened, but these guys opened the place up. They just knocked the doors down or pulled the boards off and in you went. They got cots. They managed to get a cook from someplace, and he opened up a mess hall. They tried to sweep the place out, but it was terrible.

I went over there Monday morning and looked around. We didn't know who we had. We had no administrative section; we had nothing. They were just going in and out. Some of them had gone down to Tucson the night before and hadn't come back. (laughter) So I went over and tried to talk to the base commander, Colonel A. Y. Smith, and he wouldn't talk to me. I asked for a personnel type so we could set up the thing, screen these guys, get their records some way, and do something with them. I asked for a little dispensary and a medic so that at least if the guys got a cold we could send them over to the other place. I asked for some air police, some cooks, and the various things that you would need. I asked for Civil Engineers to come help me with the buildings. The only thing I got was air police—they wouldn't give me anything else—and then I got a letter of reprimand because
the place was in such discredit. (laughter) That night I
got the air police, and I said, "Lock the door. Anybody that
comes in, they can't go out. Keep them all inside." The
next morning I lined them all up. I pulled the majors out
and said, "You've got this bunch, and you've got that bunch.
Does anybody know anything about personnel?" A couple or
three guys held up their hands, so we set up a personnel
office. By that time I had gotten some brooms, mops, and
shovels and said, "We are going to clean the place up, and
I'm going to help you. You are going to be disgruntled, but
this is the way it is going to be." So we started working on
the thing, and it got pretty good. These personnel boys, you
know, if you get a bunch of sergeants, they can do anything;
I don't care what it is. We still hadn't had any help from
the base.

I went back over and tried to see Colonel Smith again, and I
couldn't see him. I saw his adjutant and told him what was
going on and how dissatisfied I was with the place with what
we were trying to do. I said, "Nobody is leaving until we
get it fixed up." He said, "You will have a riot." I said,
"Well, so be it, but you'll have one too because I work for
you." We got the place pretty well shaped up, and I got my
second letter of reprimand. I thought about it and said, "As
a Regular officer I can't afford letters of reprimand. I'll
be through." The next morning I went back. I sat down and
said, "I am going to sit here until I've talked to Colonel
Smith." He hadn't talked to me at that point in time. I was
a lieutenant colonel. So finally the guy said, "All right,
he'll see you." I went in and very respectfully told him the
story—he had made me the commander when I wasn't there; I
asked for help and didn't get it—and I went through the
whole rigamarole. Then I ended up by saying words to the effect, "Colonel, I think my base is better than yours right now. I have gotten these letters of reprimand, which I can't accept, so I am going to call Second Air Force and ask for the IG to come down and inspect my camp. When they get through, I am going to ask them to inspect your camp. Thank you very much, Sir," and walked out.

I went back to my camp, got a Coke, sat down, and thought, "Well, you've done it now!" (laughter) "What do I do now? Do I go through with it, or don't I go through with it?"

About that time, one of the personnel guys came in. He had some problems, and it took about 45 minutes or maybe an hour to go over those things. The processing line was just going beautifully. We could see where we could close the camp down in another couple of days and have everybody taken care of, either having gotten orders to send them someplace or get out of the service. I was real proud of what was going on. I looked out the window and here came a vehicle. It's coming right across the desert—it isn't even on the road! (laughter) A big driver gets out, comes in, salutes, and says, "Are you Colonel Garland, Sir?" I said, "Yes." He said, "I've got a letter for you." He handed me a letter, and I opened it. It was from Colonel Smith. We had just fought a great war, and Eisenhower and Bradley and Patton and Garland had won the damned thing! (laughter) It was a letter like you couldn't beat. He said, "Incidentally, those other two letters have been torn up. They never left my office."

A: He seemed to be a pretty reasonable guy, this A. Y. Smith.
G: At that point in time I thought he was, but prior to that time I didn't.

A: Do you think he even knew what was going on?

G: Yes, he knew what was going on. He signed the letters. I was happy I didn't have to bite the bullet and make the call. I was going to make it, I think, but you never really know what you'll do and what you won't do.

A: Did you get that thing closed down on time?

G: Yes, it was closed out by the end of the week. It just went 4 or 5 days, and then we nailed it back up and went on about our business. I went to Colorado Springs shortly thereafter.

A: Here you are at Colorado Springs, Second Air Force, October 1945 to January 1946. What in the world were you really doing? World War II is over now, and everybody is getting out.

G: You just can't believe the disintegration that occurred. It was just like letting the air out of a balloon. The 509th at Roswell, New Mexico, was maintained. It was an atomic outfit, and it was solid. The 43d Wing at Davis-Monthan was fairly good. The 301st was not too bad, but most of it had disintegrated. The 509th was left alone, but if you ran an air show, which we ran some, the strategic forces couldn't put up 30 airplanes. Of those 30, probably three or four of the navigators had been PX officers for 5 years and didn't even have a sextant that was calibrated. I had a call from a boat squadron commander—he was a master sergeant—up near
Bangor, Maine. He said, "I'm checking in with you, Colonel." I said, "Fine. Why are you checking in with me?" He said, "We belong to you." I said, "Oh, you do?" He said, "I wouldn't be calling you--I've got the best life in the world up here--except we can't get paid, so we thought we had better check in with you." (laughter) In other words, the guys who had handled all of these things, the paper work and all, were gone. We had a warrant officer now, and he was trying to go through and find out where everybody was. When you go through and handle the big stuff, that's fine, but now here is a little old boat squadron. What the hell does that amount to? That's 15 people or something like that.

A: What would they do in a boat squadron, rescue?

G: A gunnery range was up there for fighters and bombers. They would go out and put the targets in, or they were for rescue in case there was a difficulty, I say "boat squadron." They may have had some other technical name, but that's what their purpose was.

I applied for post-hostility school at Columbia University, which I got, and went there in January 1946.

A: What was this all about?

G: This was put together by Dr. Grayson [L.] Kirk, who later became president of Columbia University. It had three classes of 50 Army and Air Force officers. It was a political and economic science type thing and credit toward a master's degree. I got enough credit for a master's degree at Columbia in 6 months, but you had to have a year's residency
to get a master's degree. Henry Kissinger, a guy who was just becoming prominent, was brought down to lecture to us. We spent quite a lot of time at the United Nations. Warren [R.] Austin would come over and talk to us. The French ambassador would come over. We would go over and they would talk to us there, or we would sit and listen to a session if there was some particular good thing. Dr. Carlton [J. H.] Hayes, who wrote the history books that I studied when I was in school, ran the history courses. He never talked about what was in the book because he assumed you read the book. He told you about episodes that he knew from his research. He talked about the political and economic conditions and things that happened in Europe, not in World War II but going back to the earlier times, the Hundred Years War and all those kinds of things and the implications of what happened there. It was a course which was very similar to the National War College when I went there in the sixties. I'm not sure they didn't pattern theirs after this course.

A: I was going to say that that sounds like what I know about the National War College with all these prominent people coming out.

G: It was very similar to that, and it could only have been run if it was supported by the Government. Dr. Kirk's idea was that he would train these Army and Air Force guys and that the Army and the Air Force would put them in positions that could utilize their training. The first 50 were not utilized. I was in the second 50, and we weren't utilized, so he trained the next 50 and cut it off. They offered me an attache in Afghanistan. I was a bachelor, so I went right back to my same desk in Colorado Springs.
That fall—you talk about interesting things—I supervised the first haylift, Operation Haylift, and we didn't have a name for it then. We took three C-47s out at Peterson Field. The ranchers came in and said, "Look, our cows are starving. Somebody has got to do something." They went to the Red Cross, and the Red Cross said, "We'll help, but somebody has got to deliver." Okay, then they came to us. At that time they had two factions. One faction said, "Let them starve. The only reason they were out there was because those ranchers were trying to hold out for more money on their cattle, and they got caught. The rest of us sold, and we didn't get caught, so let them starve." I got the first Gooney Bird and got the Red Cross man and the head rancher. I put them in the airplane and said, "You guys look out the window and tell us do we go or don't. You tell us whether we kick them out. I am not going to tell them whether to kick them out. You guys decide." As soon as they saw the cows, they said, "Feed them." I said, "Okay."

A: They made a movie out of that Operation Haylift.

G: Later on, the next year, I guess they did it professionally. They brought in airplanes where you could slide them out the back.

A: I think it was the Flying Boxcar, wasn't it?

G: Yes. In the C-47 we would take three or four sergeants back there. We would strap them and put harnesses on them and have one guy backed up. These guys would slide it down, and this guy would kick them out the door. It was a Rube Goldberg all the way, but it worked. Normally, when the
bales hit the ground they would break open. Everybody was satisfied with it.

(End Tape 4, Side 1)

A: There is a book called The Hollow Threat. In essence it says up until about 1950 there really wasn't a strategic deterrent in the United States. The premise goes that, one, for example, there were few atom bombs and they were all located at such-and-such a place, and if war broke out you would have to fly down there, pick them up, and then go to war and that General Kenney [Gen George C.] during his tenure in the very early days of SAC really had other things on his mind and General McMullen [Lt Gen Clements] just never was able to get it together and that even after General LeMay [Gen Curtis E.] took over it took 2 years before it really started. Do you want to comment on that?

G: There is a degree of truth in that. Kenney did have a lot more on his mind. General McMullen, although I'm sure he was a fine logistician, from my point of view I don't think that he understood the strategic side. I know that we sent an airplane to Andrews to fly him to someplace, Salt Lake or somewhere. It was a B-29 with one of our hotshot pilots in it. General McMullen was flying the airplane from the left seat, and as he went in for landing he saw the parallax that exists, looking through the nose of the B-29. Everybody who had flown the B-29 knew this. General McMullen wanted to ground the fleet and modify all the airplanes, an airplane that had been through the war and all of that. That didn't bother anybody because it never got off the ground, that kind of stuff.
Fortunately, you had skilled people down at unit level. The 509th Bomb Wing was capable; the 43d Bomb Wing was capable; the 301st Bomb Wing was capable. We ran an exercise in the 301st. General Joe [W.] Kelly, a four-star general whose last job was running Military Airlift Command, was our wing commander, but he was not cleared for the atomic business. Tom Classen and I were the only two lieutenant colonels or supervisors that were. We ran this exercise, which was much as the book said between Kirtland and Smokey Hill. There wasn't any doubt about it that we could take a few of those weapons and do what was supposed to be done with them and put them where they were supposed to be put. The 509th and the 43d could do, and they could do a lot more. Very shortly we were capable with a full complement.

As far as a deterrent goes, the Russians didn't have this thing in the early days, and it's sort of like when you fly a combat mission. One guy will come back and say, "This is the roughest mission I was ever on," because everything happened right around him. The guys half a mile behind him said, "What a milk run," because not a round even came close to them. We had a deterrent from the day that first weapon was dropped in Japan. The Russians didn't want that dropped on them. We could have dropped it on them, and we could have gotten in and put it where the authorities said put it. As far as the total command, you are absolutely correct, but as far as that little part of it was concerned, it was fairly professional.

A: Did you have target folders and that kind of stuff?
G: Not in the way we are talking about today. The 509th had a much more professional system than the outfit that I was in because ours had to be built up and come into.

A: In 1948 General Vandenberg [Gen Hoyt S.], when he was Chief of Staff, sent Charles Lindbergh around SAC to kind of inspect it. Do you remember that?

G: No, I don't.

A: Apparently he took Lindbergh and just had him visit SAC bases and come back and report as to what things were. I was just wondering if you remember that.

G: No, I have nothing on that.

A: By the way, that new biography is out on LeMay, Iron Eagle.

G: Was that written by his ops analyst?

A: This was written by a guy by the name of Coffee. It's a brand new book. There was that book Mission with LeMay written years ago, which apparently LeMay has practically disowned by now.

G: I've gotten letters from various odd guys wanting to know if I know any episodes. I don't even answer them because I don't want to comment on anything like that unless you know who you are commenting to and how it will be used. We are going to get into this with television before it is over because that one I am rabid on. I have seen it too many times. I conducted an interview with George Wilson of the
Washington Post with LeMay. George was a front-page type guy with a byline. George said, "Bill, I want this to be accurate. We'll tape record it. I'll give you a copy of the tape, and I'll give you a copy of my article, and you can correct, and then I will turn it in." That's the way it went. I made no corrections to Wilson's story, none. It was all right. That is the one in which LeMay is quoted as saying, "Bomb them back into the Stone Age." Do you remember that?

A: Yes.

G: What actually was said was, LeMay said, "We have the capability to bomb them back into the Stone Age. I do not recommend it; I do not think it should be done." You never heard those. All you heard was "Bomb them back into the Stone Age." The article when it came out you couldn't recognize it from Wilson's story. He was over in my office like at 10 o'clock that morning when the paper came out. He said, "Bill, I'm sorry. You saw what I turned in, and you saw what the rewrite and the management did to it. I'm sorry." I said, "George, I understand. There are no hard feelings with you, but it's just criminal that that would happen."

A: And you cannot recover.

G: There is nothing you can do about it. I think LeMay is the last of our great military commanders. I'm extremely fond of General LeMay. LeMay is gruff. I don't think LeMay ever fired a guy. You've heard stories that people would shake in their boots. Some of his assistants, General Power
[Gen Thomas S.], would fire the guy. I've seen LeMay mad. As a matter of fact, I had it happen to me once. We were in a meeting. I was a gofer. I carried LeMay's charts a lot to Washington and things of this sort. We had a paper when he was establishing the survival training at Stead Air Force Base for the aircrews. At a meeting almost his entire staff of major generals and whatnot were opposed to what LeMay wanted to do, and they all got to say their piece. Finally, LeMay said, "All right, I've heard everybody. Now here is what we are going to do. I disagree with you, and here's what I want." It ended up that I was supposed to draft the letter, so I did. I took it up, and I got shortstopped. They said, "Look, we've got to protect the old man. We can't let him send this off. Go back and do this."

So I went back and rewrote that one. They said, "That's fine; now take it in to him." I took it in to him, and they didn't go with me. He said, "Son, didn't you hear what I said?" I said, "Yes, Sir." He said, "Do you think you can write what I said down in a letter?" I said, "Yes, Sir." He said, "Well, go back and do it, and I am going to sit here until you bring it back." I went back and smoked a cigarette, pulled the old one out, and took it in. He said, "Now, next time, do this the first time like I told you." (laughter)

A: I met LeMay twice in Washington here in the past few years. He was the speaker at a history thing. Of course, he is an amateur radio operator, and I am too, and I did get him to sign off one of my QSL cards.

One story that has never been told much is that he is a victim of Bell's palsy. He literally, I've been told, cannot smile. Physically the muscles and nerve endings on part of
his mouth are such that he can't smile, and that accounts for a lot of his dower appearance. I don't know if that is a true story or not.

G: He can smile. We had a party at Omaha for one of these SAC films. Phil Harris was in it and some of those kind of people. I forget whether Jimmy Stewart was in it or not. Jeanne and I had the job of taking care of Phil Harris. There was a cocktail party, and then there was a reception and a dinner. We went to the cocktail party, and Phil is a very easy guy to take care of. I was wearing the military uniform with a white shirt and a bow tie. It was before we came out with the mess dress.

A: This was like the Class A? I've seen photos of it.

G: Yes. In some way it just happened that Phil took my bow tie and put his string tie on me. We go on down the street and everybody is waving at Phil and the other stars, and then we end up going in to the reception line. I didn't dawn on me that there was going to be a receiving line. All of a sudden I'm standing there, and I realize that the next guy I shake hands with is General LeMay, and Harris is like that. (laughter) Well, LeMay broke into a guffaw. It was a belly laugh. I thought I was on the way to Kodiak or someplace. (laughter) I think Harris picked this up too, and he said something, so it went along. Yes, LeMay had a friendly side, but he didn't smile very often. He could occasionally, but it was just a flash and then it was gone. I think your story is probably correct.
A: Were you involved in or aware of this radar bombing thing against Dayton in January or April 1949? LeMay had the SAC capability and wanted them to bomb Dayton, Ohio. That was the mission. A terrible percentage of airplanes never even found Dayton, and a terrible percentage of them never even got close to the target. Do you remember this?

G: What year was this?

A: 1949. This was kind of one of the first tests LeMay did of SAC to see what was going on, and it was a complete washout.

G: I don't remember it from the SAC headquarters level. I was in the 301st at that time. I just have a vague recollection of it. It was a complete washout. There was no question about it, the navigational part, and it seems to me like the weather figured into it. But the whole thing was a bust.

LeMay had a oneness of purpose. I've never seen many people that could get a fixation on something and hold on to it. His idea in building SAC was, "All right, let's build one unit. Let's get that unit up to snuff, and then we'll build a second unit. If we've got enough resources, we'll build another one and another one and another one, but we are not going to shotgun our resources around, as General Kenney had done." He had a little capability everywhere, which ended up with not any capabilities to speak of, whereas LeMay just built brick on brick, one at a time.

A: You went to Air Command and Staff February to June 1950. Was that just a short course?
G: Yes. Maybe those dates are wrong. I forget how long it was, but I think it was a longer course than that.

A: It normally runs from September to June.

G: I think it probably did. I think those dates are wrong.

A: How did you feel about going to school? You had just fought a war. Did schooling seem kind of "academic" at this point?

G: I don't think I got a great deal out of that one. I'm sure it was well intended, but it just didn't seem to me that it showed the solution to many problems or that the thinking was along the lines it ought to have been. I thought that most of us there had passed that stage really. It may have been because we were combat veterans.

A: That's the impression I get. How did LeMay feel about professional military education?

G: He was all in favor of it, absolutely. When I went to the National War College, LeMay sent word over and said, "I want all of you guys to go to school. George Washington University has our programs. I want you to take advantage of that." I was the only one who got a degree out of it. He said, "I'll let you stay in the summertime to complete it if you need to." As I said, I signed up for George Washington for the political and economic science thing. I saw him one time—I guess maybe we had dinner at their house. He said, "Did you do what I told you to do?" I said, "Sir, I signed up for George Washington University. I am going to get my degree, and I am going to ask you to let me stay here in the
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summertime." He said, "That is what I'm talking about." Some of the other boys signed up a little bit, but they didn't pursue it. One of two of them didn't have a college degree, so they couldn't pursue it.

A: When you finished ACSC down there, you were at SAC headquarters for 4 years as Requirements Officer and then later as Chief of Programs and then Director of Plans. In Plans, how good was our information about Russia in those days? Did we have any intel as to where their strategic targets existed?

G: I think so. That was not my area. General Sweeney [Gen Walter, Jr.] was the first boss I had and later on became commander of TAC. He was Jack Kennedy's man during the Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy relied on this man more than he did on the JCS or anybody else. Sweeney said to us in the Programs side, "I want you to know everything there is to know about SAC ZIwise or our overseas bases." We were not involved in the operational side. For example, we converted to B-47s during that time period, so it was up to us to handle that part of it, of getting the program laid on of this base, that base, and that base, working with the Civil Engineers and with the Pentagon if you had to do something to a runway or if you had to have another electronics facility, working with Personnel to make sure the people came out of the pipeline when the airplanes did. I don't know whose idea it was. It probably was Ken Hobson's [Gen Kenneth B.]. We had a thing called a programming plan in which we in Programs assigned every task to somebody else. (laughter) In other words, let's say this is putting B-47s at Salina, Kansas. We would say, "The timing is thus and so, and the Civil Engineer
will make certain that..." and then we would put everything down on Civil Engineers, and "Personnel will so and so." Every week we had a progress report on that. Everybody had to report as to the status so we could then put the thing together and say Personnel is a little bit behind or the airplanes are a little bit behind or the spare parts are behind or everything is on schedule. I don't know whether they still use it or not, but it was a marvelous idea. It tied the whole thing together.

A: Were there any great problems bringing a jet aircraft into operation now? You had the B-50, the B-29, and the B-36. Was this any great shakes to bring this revolutionary aircraft into the inventory?

G: No, because the jet is easier to maintain and fly than the conventionals really, but you had to have a system. You had to take the pilot, for example, and reorient him because flying the conventional airplane that just chugs along at 150 or 160, you've got time to figure out your flight plan and everything while you are driving down the road. With the jet, if you start doing that, you just went by the place you figured out you were going to get to! (laughter) So it's an entirely different system of thinking, of maintenance, and the whole kit and caboodle. No, there were no insurmountable problems.

A: About this same time in the early fifties or the late forties, they were starting to come along with the B-52 request for proposals. Did you ever get into helping bring the B-52 in the inventory or even earlier helping to recommend what kind of an airplane it should be?
G: We tried to get involved with the Flying Wing. I guess there were about eight of them that were built. Again, I am not talking about the technical side that was responsible for doing this. This was not our responsibility, but it seemed like a good idea as an Air Force officer, so we tried to get some people up to brief on these things and get some of our top people alerted to the fact that such a thing existed. The B-52 is just another thing like the B-47 really. It's just a follow-on, like the 747 follows on the 707 or something of that sort. It's bigger and longer, and you had to have a little different runway.

A: You were there for 4 years, and you say one of the major projects you had was bringing the B-47 into operations. What were some of the other things you were working on?

G: Of course, the Korean War started the day after. One of the major problems we had there was the rotational problems. I suppose one of the major things was that SAC at that time had fighters.

A: Right, the old F-84s.

G: We had them, and we were rotating units to the Pacific to Korea. That was one of the biggest problems that we had. We had, it seems to me, like five wings—two at Turner, two at Bergstrom, and one at Dow—if I am not mistaken. You send a unit over, and they are there for X number of months. Now they are coming home. Do they bring their own equipment home, or do they leave their equipment over there? If they leave their equipment over there and you send another bunch over to take their equipment, now you have got to get some
equipment for the new guys when you bring them home. Do you bring them home where the equipment is, or do you move the equipment up there? Pretty soon you find yourself like a Waring blender going round and round. That was a very difficult problem.

A: The bomb groups that SAC sent over, they lost control of those. They went to FEAF. A note here says you had the 22d and 92d, and the 19th was already over there. Was there any objection on the part of LeMay that he, in effect, would lose these?

G: I'm sure there was, although it was never too public. You see, he always had somebody over there like General "Rosie" O'Donnell [Gen Emmett] or General Joe Kelly, who really was in command, and, fortunately, the people listened to them for the employment. I'm not sure that everybody agreed with how they were utilized, but that was national policy. No, LeMay never wanted to let anybody else have his units.

A: Obviously during the Vietnam War, the ownership of those B-52s in Southeast Asia never left SAC's command. Like you say, the targeting was different.

G: That was such a screwed up thing.

A: Did you get into this development of the air division formed over in the command structure and the group designation disappeared?

G: It was felt that those were for better control and better supervision. In other words, the air division staff was
supposed to be mainly the eyes and ears of LeMay and the
numbered air force commanders so that you could go in and
look over everything that was going on and you wouldn't be
tied up with personnel and materiel and all of that. Now you
had a personnel officer and you had a materiel officer, but
you were supposed to use them to see if everything was going
right at unit level, rather than being a paper shuffler
themselves.

A: I have a note here about the SAC reorganization of February
1951. It says that the wing now consisted of a more complete
organization too. Did this mean it had a more elaborate
maintenance?

G: During this same time period, we went from an individual crew
chief deal and squadron maintenance to centralized control.

A: How did you feel about that?

G: I thought it was the dumbest thing I had ever heard of—until
we tried it! (laughter) I had to get all of my squadron
together and say, "Look, I don't care how you feel. This is
what we are going to do. I feel the same way you do. So now
let's go out and prove it one way or the other. It will
either work or it won't work, and I don't want to hear any
more arguing from anybody, including me." (laughter) It
worked, and it didn't take long for you to see the value of
it.

A: You were at SAC when General Paul Cullen [Brig Gen Paul T.]
and that whole staff was lost. Did they ever figure out why?
A: Yes.

G: Well, he certainly felt a warm spot in his heart for SAC, and he felt that SAC was the front line of the Air Force. LeMay was a broad enough man so that as Chief of Staff he spread his interest.

I know one thing that he was extremely interested in doing, and did do, was improving Tactical Air. Tactical Air Command, LeMay felt, should have a rotational capability, should have an ability to pick up and go to other places and operate. SAC, for example, had fly-away kits, as it was called in the old days. You could take a group of people and your kits, and you could go to England and operate from that base for X number of days. He wanted TAC to have a similar type capability, which they did not have. If you remember, General Sweeney from SAC was made the TAC commander. Sweeney was Eighth Air Force commander at Westover Field in Massachusetts, was given a fourth star, and made the TAC commander. This sent reverberations throughout TAC to have a bomber man come in, but Sweeney did these things we just talked about. In a lot of people's opinion, Sweeney laid the foundation for the magnificent job that Tactical Air Command was able to do in Vietnam. Had he not had a year or two for TAC to get into these things, they would not have been able to have picked up and gone like they did.

A: One of the things I've often heard is that during the fifties and early sixties the Air Force was "SACumcized." In other words, TAC, after the Korean War, just kept getting a smaller portion of the budget and less emphasis than SAC, and the Air
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Force, in effect, was really a SAC air force. Is that accusation true?

G: There is probably some degree of truth in that. However, you must remember that these things germinate from national policy. It was national policy to keep the strategic force up, and, therefore, when you have a budget cut as you remember we did, some severe budget cuts, something has to suffer. SAC would have been the last thing to suffer. It happened to a degree, and I think one of the reasons that it appeared as it did was the fact that SAC generals seemed to go in as Chief of Staff and Vice Chief and things of that sort. When "Spike" Momyer [Gen William W.] came to the forefront, one of his major objectives was to bring that to a screaming halt. Again, I am giving you my personal opinion. If you will look at it historically from the rise of Momyer, you will see the turn did begin, and now you will see many more TAC people, as right now, as Chief of Staff. I think General "Spike" Momyer should be given a great deal of credit for that. Whether it is good, bad, or indifferent is not the point. I think probably it is good to have changes and not have one service so dominant in it.

A: You had mentioned something off the tape or in conversation yesterday. Were you involved in the U-2 program down at Davis-Monthan?

G: Yes.

A: Where did that plane come from? I have heard stories that the CIA was the one that really developed that, and I've heard that the Air Force developed that aircraft.
G: It was built by Lockheed at what is known as the "skunk works." Who was the designer?

A: Kelly Johnson.

G: Kelly Johnson was a marvelous aircraft designer. He also had a great deal to do, I think, with the SR-71. Who initially developed it, whether the CIA said, "We've got to have this," I don't think so. I think it was the Air Force. As it came along then, you had this airplane that had this unusual capability. You get into the thing then, well, if we fly over Russia and it's a uniformed military man, that is one set of circumstances. If it is a civilian, that is another set of circumstances, which is at a much lower acceptable level on the part of the Russians. In other words, you can handle it better on a spy type basis than you could as a military type basis, which would mean almost like war. Again, I was not in on any of these discussions, but I think that is about the way it developed. The Air Force had the majority of the airplanes.

One of the interesting things about it was that this was Kelly Johnson's baby. The U-2 was supported almost entirely separate from the Air Force supply system. When I was involved with them at Davis-Monthan, on three or four occasions the SAC and Pentagon people would come down and say, "We want to get this under the regular supply system." "Would you make your inspection, do your visitations, and then let's talk and find out what it is now and what you want to change"? Without exception they would come back about Thursday or Friday and say, "Why don't we leave it alone?" It was a small program; it was a small airplane in the way of
spare part requirements. I say small; where you are talking about B-47s with a thousand, you are only talking about a handful of these airplanes. If you needed a spare part and if you were operating from some distant location, you could take over your kit. If you needed a spare part, you didn't have to go through Oklahoma City and Ogden and all the way around the Horn to finally get to it. You went back to your base, went to Lockheed, got the part, put it on an airplane, and the guy had it the next morning and was back in business. That was one of the unusual features of it.

The people involved in the U-2 program obviously were the cream of the crop. They were good, outstanding pilots, and they performed an outstanding mission. I was not involved with them in the early days, and I was never involved with the CIA part of it. I can't have too much to say of the good aspects of that program and the people in it.

A: You went to the National War College in 1961. Was this by choice or request, or were you kind of just blessed?

G: That is the selection process. I was happy to go; I wanted to go, but it is not the kind of thing that you volunteer for. The Air Force has a selection process.

A: You didn't let it be known somehow that you sure would have liked to have gone? Does it work like that at all?

G: I may have at some time or another. Occasionally, you are supposed to fill out career preferences and things of that sort, but I don't think they ever get out of the base. (laughter) Supposedly, it is done by the Pentagon, the
Colonels Assignments Group, in which they are looking at people that they feel have a potential to be general officers or in the Navy an admiral, flag rank.

A: Had you ever been tapped to go to the Air War College and not been able to go or anything like that?

G: No, and I never wanted to go.

A: Why do you say that?

G: I thought I had passed that point, for one thing.

A: That poor Air War College has such a checkered history. In one time period it's the biggest thing since sliced bread, and then again it becomes a dumping ground for the less than best. I have never been able to put my finger on it. It never seems to be a consistent thing, but that's another story for another day.

G: I think the whole educational program of Air Force officers is one that has to be looked at real close. I am adamantly opposed to taking a young Air Force Academy graduate, giving him his 30 days, and sending him to MIT or Cal Tech or wherever, and he gets his doctorate. He serves his 5 years, and he goes out and works for civilians and makes himself a lot of money, perhaps. That's not the way to do it. During Vietnam, McNamara had a young West Pointer—he was a second lieutenant, a Ph.D.—and that's the kind that McNamara wanted. At one time he was involved in how many pilots does the United States Air Force need? He could use his slide rule and all of his quantitative and qualitative analysis
and whatnot, and in his mind a wing commander did not have to be a pilot. You count how many cockpit seats you have, and that's how many pilots you need. You couldn't convince him you needed a backup, that you were rotating guys from here to there so you need fill-ins. You couldn't convince him that the squadron commander or the operations officer need to be pilots. Some of our guys asked him, "Did the Pope need to be Catholic?" (laughter) If you follow his logic, the Pope didn't have to be Catholic. You couldn't get through to him. There wasn't any way to get through to him. I have seen our people come back just pulling their hair out.

I think Andy Goodpaster [Gen Andrew J.], who was a famous Army general, and "Abe" Lincoln [Lt Gen Lawrence J.] started this business of getting everybody educated, and that's not a bad idea. You want as much education as you can get, but, in my judgment, you want it to fit the military requirement not to fit the individual requirement. In other words, get the guy out of the Air Force Academy, and let him serve at least a few years. Let you find out: Is he the right kind of a guy that you want to keep? Do you think he has got some potential? Does he think he wants to stay with you? Now then, you work a deal. "Okay, I'll send you to Cal Tech, but I want you for 20 years at a minimum," or some period and not just go and get his education and in 3 or 4 years leave you and that you have something in mind for him. You see that he has the ability.

As I told you, I went back to school. When I went to the War College, I went to school at George Washington. One of the courses that we took was international law. There were four or five Air Force, Army, Navy types, maybe a dozen or 15 of
us, in the class. Our professor told us at the end of the second session, the second period of about 12 or 15 classes, "You are farther along right now than my graduate students are at the end of the course because, whether you knew it or not, the reason for it is you have been involved in international law all of your lives—the right of the seas, the right of overflying, and all of these kinds of things."

I think it is good for a person to get a college degree, then be out for a few years, get his feet on the ground, and get to see what is going on, and then go back. If you are going to be in electrical engineering or mechanical engineering or something of this sort and if you work for a couple of years in it, now you've got a feel for really what do I need to know? What is going to help me in my job in the Air Force? You will home in on those particular areas. I think we make a great deal of mistakes and lose a lot of money just from a manager's point of view.

A: At the National War College, it's got "war" in its title. Of course, they call it now the National Defense University. The National War College is part of that, and ICAF is the other part, I guess. Do you feel that it was more of a diplomatic finishing school, or did you really study the more war-making aspects of things?

G: No, the tactical or the strategic part of making war was not involved in it. Some subject would come up, and you would have a liberal Democrat and a conservative Democrat and a liberal Republican and a conservative Republican come over on different days and lecture for, say, an hour and a half. They then would meet with about 20 students, and then a little later they would have lunch with maybe a dozen more
who would have chances to have an individual talk with them. There was never any school solution to any of the issues. Your little group had to write a paper on various odd things, but, again, they were not as concerned with what your solution was as they were with the logic which you followed to reach that solution. It is somewhat like a master's degree and in knowing how to study. When I took my master's exam, my George Washington faculty advisor said, "There is no way you are going to pass it. I had to take mine three times before I passed my test. I had to do a lot of outside reading." I said, "I've done a lot of outside reading. I am more able to take my test right now than I am going back to the Air Force and having to work 8 hours a day. All I will do is go downhill from here on." The secret, again, was in taking a position and in justifying that position and in saying, "Henry Kissinger in his book so-and-so says so-and-so," which supported your case. Then a little bit later on you would take somebody else and quote him. By the time you got through quoting a half a dozen people, you had passed, as long as you stuck to your theme and you were supporting your theme. I had no trouble; I passed the first time. (laughter) But you have to know how to take a test.

A: I was out of high school 10 years when I started college as a freshman. It was amazing how college obviously must be a whole different thing from what I went through than for a kid out of high school because I could sit there in a class and within one class period--now I'm taking about undergraduates--you could figure out what the prof was going to want and where this whole thing was going to and what was important and what you had to read.
G: This is what I am trying to say about don't send a guy right out of the Air Force Academy. Let him get out in the world for a year or two and then send him. That is exactly what I am trying to say.

A: While you were saying that, I thought of my own experience there. It gives it a much more mature perspective on this thing.

G: I have always favored education. At Vandenberg we had a program in which you could complete your high school education all the way through to a master's degree in aerospace management right on base. In those days if you had been in the service for 6 months, the Veterans' Administration would pay. I had several ideas in mind. One of them was that because Vandenberg was a little bit isolated this gives people something to do. We had a highly skilled work force there. There were 44 aerospace outfits--Boeing, Lockheed, General Dynamics--their engineers and their wives. A lot of them were very well educated, very smart, who could serve as teachers, so we had the little junior college, Allan Hancock, there, which would do the high school and the junior college part, but we had Chapman, UCLA, and USC. All of these were on base with their little nighttime programs, most of them being run by these civilian people that we are talking about. Some of them had been teachers before they went with aerospace. One of the things that I did was to take some of our Mexican-Americans and our blacks, the minorities, who had trouble passing the military tests to get promoted, to get to go up in skill levels. One of the reasons was because they couldn't read and think well enough in English. I got the little junior college to set up an English program especially
for them at the noon hour and right after work, teaching the kid to think in English, to understand English better. Before when he read his technical order telling him how to do his job, he had to sometimes convert it to Spanish and then back to English, so he couldn't pass his test. He just couldn't do it. Now you get him thinking in English; now he can pass his test; now he gets promoted; and now he is going to stay with the Air Force.

(End Tape 7, Side 1)

G: As a businessman I figured the Air Force had $50,000 to $75,000 invested in this guy, so I would like to keep him. We were successful in some cases. It's the kind of thing though where you have to keep the motivation going. You have to have somebody who is working that side of the street all the time. If the commander is working it, you get people going. If he is not, it doesn't go so good.

A: When you left the War College, you went to be chief of staff at Second Air Force. My impression is that the Army and the Air Force use the chief of staff in two different ways. The Army commander will go through his chief of staff to his DCSs. In the Air Force the chief of staff becomes kind of almost an advisor; whereas the commander will go directly to the DCSs. How were you utilized as chief of staff at Second Air Force?

G: You evaluation is absolutely right. Most of the time the chief of staff is an extremely frustrated individual. (laughter) He is trying to get in. The division heads recognize the problem. They try to keep the chief of staff read in, and they try to help as much as they can, in general.
It's a personal problem, and it depends on how that individual is able to handle it. As you say, it is a frustrating spot. I have never known a chief of staff in the Air Force that was able to really say that he enjoyed it. He wanted to be either up or down.

A: I talked to General Martin Colladay [Lt Gen Martin G.], who was chief of staff of SAC, and I got that impression. In other jobs I've got the impression that they really become kind of like the old adjutant or the executive almost.

G: In some cases, at SAC for example, I think General LeMay let the chief of staff handle personnel more. The director of personnel and the chief of staff could take care of most assignments. Of course, they would go to the old man for a wing commander and things of that sort and some in your legal and some of the other areas, but basically your major problems in plans and operations and materiel the old man wanted to hear it from the horse's mouth. He didn't want it going through a third party. I don't know but what that's right.

A: When you were at the 1st Strat, how did you use your chief of staff? (laughter)

G: I tried to keep him in with me, but I dealt straight with the director of operations and materiel. We had a staff meeting every morning at 9 o'clock, for one thing, and went around the table. That got the problems out, and everybody knew what they were supposed to be doing, and they were advising everybody. Then during the day, the call on the intercom and things of that sort, he was out of it.
since England. I had to dodge V-1s and V-2s and the buzz bombs and whatnot. I bombed the targets in Europe many times, so I was a believer in missiles. When I went to SAC headquarters, I talked to General Sweeney and others about them, but there was not much enthusiasm. SAC was not in the business of developing things. SAC's position was, "If somebody wants to develop them, fine. We don't object to that as long as you don't take our money to put in it. If you get them where they are reliable and will work, then we'll take them, but we are not interested in being the testing outfit and diverting our time and effort to that."

Finally, in about 1952, we wrote the paper in which LeMay told the Pentagon he was not opposed to missiles, and almost the next day money began to go into the missile program.

Now then, when the thing came around and we began to get missiles and you began to have to man the missile force—we are back in the area that you mentioned earlier—there was not a pilot in the command who was interested in missiles. There was not a pilot in the command—I am exaggerating somewhat—who even wanted to know how to spell the word "missile," but somebody had to get involved. I am afraid that in the early days the manning did suffer in that regard. When they first went to Vandenberg, the failure rate was out of this world, but it was not SAC's fault, it was the system. It was not the personnel because you had your topnotch civilian technicians from General Dynamics or Lockheed on the job. It was just the state of the art. I went there many times to watch a missile go, and it didn't go. In the early days they would even try to schedule a spare, so that if you had people from Washington, at least you would get one or the other, and they wouldn't have to keep coming back. (laughter)
Those days were reasonably hectic, but I am reasonably certain that the manning had nothing to do with it, but there was a reluctance on the part of people to get involved in it.

A: When you went out to the 12th Strategic Wing, you had Titan IIs, and the B-47s were beginning to be phased out. Was this a pretty smooth thing? You went out there in March 1964, and they had been activated for about 2 years. All the corrosion problems and the fuel stability problems, had a lot of this been worked out, or were you still fighting some of those things?

G: You always had problems with any outfit whether you were airplanes or missiles. One of the reasons you had problems was because you had such a big turnover in personnel. The Titan missile was a very reliable system. We had very few calamities with the thing, but it was something that you had to handle with kid gloves all the time. The propellant and the oxidizer were highly corrosive, and hypergolic, which means that you don't need a spark plug. You just put them together and they go, so you had to be careful with your plumbing systems, with your refueling and defueling. When you've got that kind of a situation with an atomic warhead sitting on top, you can have a problem. (laughter) You had to handle it gently, and you had to stay on top of it. We had one or two close calls, but we were able to handle them with the good Lord being with us.

A: There was apparently a big discussion about or a difficulty at arriving at ORI and ORIT procedures for these missiles. Apparently there was some problem with how you go to a
missile site and perform an ORI. Were the procedures for that still being developed, or did I read the history wrong?

G: You had a problem because we were airplane oriented. You can say, "All right, we are going to have an operational readiness inspection on a bomb wing." You just go in, inspect them, fly the airplane, and it does its bombing and comes back. It either did it or it didn't do it. Now, what can you do with a missile? You can't do that with a missile. You can't have the crew run through its launch procedures because it's a live missile. You need a testbed that they can work on. So, yes, this was difficult to find out how you can test the quality, but there were ways of doing it, and it was worked out. It just took a little bit more ingenuity.

A: Jumping ahead here, Giant Patriot was an attempt or a program to launch from an operational silo. There has never been an ICBM missile launched from an operational silo in this country. How much of a problem do you think that creates if the day ever came to push the button on those things?

G: I think they will go. You take the missile from the silo and take it to Vandenberg and launch it. You have a track record now of the missile, that the missile can survive X number of years in a silo and then still go. The silo itself, I don't think, is that difficult in maintaining it to the point so that its wiring and plumbing and things of this sort will function. You will get the signals to the missile, and it will then begin with its onboard equipment and get the hell out of there. I was involved in this a little bit, and it was a problem. I don't think it will ever be done--launching from a silo--and I don't think it is that big a problem, but
the scientific community felt like they would feel better about it if it had ever been accomplished.

A: They have never fired a live warhead from a missile and exploded it. This is what I say to these people that have said to me, "We've got enough warheads and missiles to blow the world up a thousand times." My answer to that is, "You know, they have never fired one of those live. Knowing how human beings make things, what are the law of averages that what percentage of those aren't going to go? A lot of that is just damned redundancy."

G: Those people argue the wrong question. They forget what deterrence is all about; they forget what deterrence is. It doesn't make any difference whether we think we've got enough to blow the world up ten times over. It only matters what, right now, Mr. Gorbachev [Mikhail S.] thinks. Does he think we've got enough to keep him from getting adventurous? If he ever felt like that he could do some things and we wouldn't know about it and he could then overwhelm us, he might be tempted to try, but as long as thinks he can't then we've got good deterrence.

This failure of our satellite system now at Vandenberg and the Shuttle. If we end up without the proper number of satellites, that would not in itself be enough to have him try something. It's the will of the American people that is most important in this. As we get around and we'll talk about television before this is over with, no enemy can defeat us, but we can defeat ourselves. American television is doing its damnest every day to help us weaken our will, but we will talk about that a little bit later.
We had the U-2s at Davis-Monthan at that time. We got rid of the B-47s and brought in the F-4s as a training wing. They were a tenant there. Then we had the aircraft reclamation and storage depot there, which was a tenant. I also had Biggs with the B-52s down there.

A: You had some RC-135s. They were up at Offutt, is that right, or was that later? I've got the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, or was that later?

G: That was later. The 4080th was there at that time, which later became the 55th.

A: Yes, here it is. Then you had the 390th Strategic Missile Wing and the 303d Bomb Wing, which was the B-47s. You were host to the 4453d Combat Crew Training Group. That was the F-4s. You picked up Biggs, and you had the U-2s, some C-130s, and even had some helicopters.

G: Yes, they were with the 4080th. I don't know whether this is classified or not. Vietnam was getting going at this time, so I had a detachment at Bien Hoa in Vietnam during this time period. We developed the drone reconnaissance airplane. I don't know whether you've got any notes on that or not.

A: No, I didn't see that as I was reading through this.

G: As I said, this is a classified part. I don't know how to handle it in this discussion. [AU/IN determined this material is not classified 28 June 1988.]
A: What we'll do is, we'll take that part of the transcript and hold it separate so the remainder of the transcript will be unclassified.

G: Ryan Aviation had this little target drone. With that background then they developed this little unmanned reconnaissance airplane. We took it at Davis-Monthan and worked out some arrangements that we could put it under the wing of a C-130. We went down to the range at Huachuca that you mentioned, and we tested it down there a little bit. Then we took it over to the theater in Vietnam, operating out of Bien Hoa. It had a computer, a very, very simplified little thing. You could set your computer, launch it, and control it from the airplane to get it launched and fired up and taking off on track. It would follow its course, getting up in the vicinity of above 60,000 feet, and would stay on track remarkably well and go over and take its pictures.

A: I have seen some of those pictures, and they are fantastic.

G: Then it would come back to the vicinity of Da Nang, which was up in northern Vietnam. The computer had been locked up on its program up until then. At a certain time, a so-called window would open on the computer, and from the ground, with the radar, we had the controls just like you have on a little airplane. We could reduce its power, bring him into a descent, glide him around, bring him down, pop a chute, cut his power, and float him where he would hit in the water. That didn't seem like such a good idea because he would get wet. The film was protected, but the engine, the airframe, and all wasn't. The next step was to take the helicopters with a hook on it. When you popped the chute, you would have
the helicopter come whistling by and grab the chute with his hook, bring him on over to the airdrome, and deposit him right in front of base operations. (laughter) It was a very, very successful operation, a marvelous, amazing little venture.

A: They did a thing on "20/20" here this past year about the Army's attempts at RPVs. They have never gotten their act together on those things. The Air Force has gone ahead and flown these things and modified this drone and never had any problem with it.

(End Tape 7, Side 2)

G: It's interesting that you mentioned "20/20" with Hugh Downs because the week after I arrived at Tucson--I will never forget it; it was in December--I had the "Today" show, which is the famous morning show, the entire 2 hours for 4 days with Hugh Downs. This was Barbara Walters' first go with Hugh Downs, with television. We had 1 day with Downs on the B-47s in which we went through the alert and the scrambling of airplanes. We went through the missile business. We went through the U-2 thing as much as we could show him, which is the preparation of a pilot for flight and all of that which you see now--it's old hat, but it wasn't in those days--and then the reclamation depot. On the fifth day they were downtown with the Chamber of Commerce.

It was interesting in several ways to me. One thing, Barbara Walters would not participate with the military. She made it very clear and told us she hated our guts. I don't know why, as this being her first performance, Downs didn't send her
back to New York or wherever she came from. I figured she must have some very influential relatives in the television business or something. (laughter) She wouldn't get out of the trailer and participate in the thing at all, which didn't bother us, but it was all right.

I found my first technical part on television. We would go out in the morning, and Downs would have on a jacket and a sweater— it was cold. Then we would be working at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and it was hot, but he couldn't take his sweater off because of the sequencing when it went out on the air. (laughter) Some of it was prerecorded. He said, "They will catch this, you see, if I change it." We had to send him to the hospital one day because he was getting dehydrated. It was a very interesting thing, and I got telephone calls from all over the United States afterwards with people saying, "You are the only person I know off in Tucson. Would you please help me sell my house?" (laughter) You just can't believe what happens when you are a 1-day celebrity. (laughter) Everybody is your friend.

A: One question, a little minutiae here, what happened to the Atlases that were phased out in late 1964? What did they actually do with those things?

G: A lot of them they brought to the depot at San Bernardino and put them into storage. Over the years there have been and, at least the last time I checked, there was still one active Atlas launch pad at Vandenberg. I say active; it had never been converted or torn down. You could bring it back in, and they did, over the years, launch a few Atlas missiles with various nonspectacular satellites of some sort or another on
them. In other words, it was not the kind of thing that you
got a great deal of publicity out of. So they have launched
Atlas missiles back and forth during the time period.

A: Do you think your little hosting of the "Today" show led at
all to your getting in the Office of Information up there?

G: I doubt it.

A: How did you get that job? That is such a break. Outside of
your MAG experience in Spain, you've been in SAC all your
life.

G: Well, the SAC people were in the front office. One of them,
Lieutenant General Wheless [Lt Gen Hewitt T.], was a very
good friend of mine.

A: "Shorty?"

G: Do you know that name?

A: I went to contact him about an interview a few years ago, and
he had a stroke and couldn't talk. We got a very nice letter
from his wife.

G: He was up there, and I imagine that he had a lot to do with
it. McConnell did; I had worked directly for McConnell three
or four times. I don't know what they wanted in the Office
of Information. When McConnell called me and said, "You are
coming up to be the Director of Information," I said, "Fine,
Chief, whatever you say, but what is it?"
A: There is nothing written about that job. The Office of Secretary of the Air Force has been very poorly documented as to what people did and how they did it and why they did it, so anything you can tell me on that is really going to be——

G: Can you stay around the rest of the week? (laughter)

(Interaction)

A: You went up there. Did somebody sit you down and tell you what was going to happen now or what your job was? What was the approach here?

G: There was nothing done. Ben LeBailly was the boss, and I went in as the deputy for a short time. Ben left, and I took over. I asked LeBailly to tell me about the job, but he was always too busy to sit down and talk about it. No one had any printed instructions or gave any advice or anything of that sort. In your divisions of SAF/OI, such as Internal Information, there were job descriptions as to what those people would do. It was more or less muddling along for the director. You worked for the Secretary of the Air Force, but you also worked for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. In other words, your interests were the Air Force; therefore, you had to consider them. I figured that in approaching the job you would have to decide who were your audiences. I decided anytime I published a press release or that type of thing and gave out information you had to consider the American people and the impact it would have on them. You had to consider the impact it would have on the governmental officials of the United States, the Congress. You had to consider the impact it would have on your friends and allies;
you had to consider the impact it would have on your enemy.
You had to consider the impact it would have on the internal
Air Force.

To explain a little bit of that, take our rotational policy
in Vietnam. The Russians, of course, and the North Vietnamese
were very interested in knowing how long you were going to
keep people over here, which would tell them the experience
level, the skill level. Are they facing new guys, green
guys, just coming into combat, or are they facing oldtimers?
You start moving people around. The Congress is always
interested in that: "Are you going to close a base in my
area, or are you taking something out?" The internal people,
your Air Force people, are always looking at it: "Are they
still thinking about me, or am I about to get the short shrift
again?" The Air Force personnel manning, the information
area, are extremely capable. They are much smarter; they are
much better trained; they are better educated; they handle
their jobs more professionally than do the other services.
The Air Force has done an outstanding job of training these
people. I am speaking now mainly of your captain-major-
lieutenant colonel level, the guy who would be running base
information or might be at major command level or filling the
staff at SAF/OI. I did have a paper at one time that showed
how many of these people, when they retired, were picked up
by industry and became the key man in American industry in
their information program. The Air Force people are in big
demand by American industry.

The Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, for example,
I don't think he ever gave me any advice at all. Harold
Brown was McNamara's man, and he would not let anything go
out that he had anything to do with unless it was approved by
the Defense Information Office. Anything that we did for him
and he looked at and read, his next instruction was, "Take it
downstairs and get their hack and let them put it out."

A: Zuckert [Eugene M.] was there when you first showed up, is
that correct?

G: Yes, Gene Zuckert. He was a very nervous individual when I
got there. I think he could see that he was on the way out.
He was not a McNamara man, and he could see that his days
were numbered, although he wished to stay around.

A: I have a note here that says in April 1966, "Zuckert almost
quits his first year." He accused McNamara of usurping
power and interference in traditional service affairs. The
Secretary of the Army actually did resign. Then later on
Zuckert became very much a company man apparently.

G: Yes, he wanted to stay. From the very first day that
Mr. McNamara went into office he began pulling things into
the Defense Department. He wanted everything under his
control and supervision, and I suppose by the time he left he
was fairly successful in accomplishing that.

A: Who did you actually find yourself working for, the Secretary
of the Air Force or Chief of Staff of the Air Force? Who was
the man that you really worked for?

G: The Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs, not the Chief of Staff. I attended
his staff meetings, and I briefed them during the staff
meeting on anything that was pertinent; that is, if there were
an article in the press that morning or on TV that morning
that they might be interested in. If something came up
during the day, I would pass that on to the Chief's office.
They considered that I worked for the Secretary, and I did.

A: Arthur Sylvester, was he there when you first arrived?

G: Yes.

A: He had quite an office underneath him. Liebman [Maj Gen
David I.] was his military executive; he was an Air Force
guy.

G: Yes, he was an Air Force guy. That was a joint office; Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marines filled his staff. He had a big
staff, plus civilians. Within his complex was also the
Pentagon press room where all of the press had their desks.
It would be like if your office is here and your staff
occupies this, then they are right there. They just
circulated through your organization all the time, and your
people went through their place all the time. They didn't
come into Sylvester's office without his permission or an
appointment, but they were in and out of there dozens of
times every day.

There is no question that I worked for the Secretary of the
Air Force, but the control was by the Defense Department.
While we were there, they put in the business that any
speech—for example, I had a speech writer's place, where we
would write speeches, or if anybody in the Air Force was
making a speech, we would look at it to see if it fit policy
and things of that sort. We continued to do that, but everything then had to go downstairs and be approved or else you were on your own and subject to whatever violations Mr. McNamara and his people thought you might have made. We were told to send everything down and let them hack it, and then we would send it back to the guy and he could make his speech. This went for Congressional testimony or anything else. They had complete control of what went in and what went out.

A: Did you find yourself being able to exercise any imagination or latitude, or was it really just a focal point for these guys to work through?

G: You couldn't use much imagination, but you could have an idea. Sylvester, Henkin [Daniel Z.], or Goulding [Phil G.] had a staff meeting every morning, which we would attend and go over the things. We would make our recommendations or give suggestions of why don't we do this? or why don't we do that? Very few of them were accepted. We could do what we wanted in the internal side; that is, the stuff that went out to the troops. On public affairs, we could handle the questions that came in from the press, and we had to use our judgment on this. Some guy would maybe want a briefing on the B-52, or he would want a briefing on unit operations or things of this sort, which were just routine type stuff.

A: Almost technical information.

G: That's right. If you got in something that was political or something that was policy or explosive, then we had to touch base downstairs. They were trying to get all the reporters
to submit their queries through the Defense Department, who then would send them to us.

A: Did you find yourself subconsciously realizing that you had to clear a lot of things with DOD and just send the individual down there without trying to answer it yourself?

G: No. If he came to us, we would take care of him. A lot of them realized it. If their office is down there, they are no dummies. They know how things go, and they didn't want to get in bad with the Defense Department people, so they were trying to do it. The thing that happens is they have their own sources that they develop over the years in the Pentagon. They will find a guy in Operations, or it happens in their neighborhood there is a Navy captain that is their neighbor, or there is an Air Force colonel that is their neighbor, and they develop their sources on these things. It's worse today. I just don't understand how in the world the Government can hardly function the way it is today.

A: With the leaks, do you mean?

G: Yes.

A: Was that getting to be a problem?

G: McNamara was doing his best to stop it. That's the reason that he was trying for centralized control.

A: Is this kind of a self-defeating thing—the more you try to control it, the more people are going to rebel and try to go around it?
G: I don't know. The military are not great leakers. They are loyal to the Chief, the President, on down, and very seldom does the military guy try to leak.

A: Where were they coming from, the political appointees trying to aggrandize themselves?

G: Yes.

A: What about the civil servants that were involved?

G: Some of them are involved, too, but mainly it is your political appointees and those kinds of guys.

A: Was it a hostile situation or unfriendly between your office and these guys down there?

G: No, because we had Air Force guys down there who were working there who had been in SAF/OI before, and some of them I sent down there because we had to have a friend in the camp. It was frustrating, and the worst part about it was you had the Vietnam war going on. I was the only guy—or let me say the chief of SAF/OI, whoever that guy happened to be, but, in this case, me—who had a regular appointment with the Secretary of the Air Force. Every morning at 7:30 I was in his office, briefing him on all the bad things that happened to his Air Force the night before. Most of the time he hadn't even had his breakfast.

A: You are talking about airplane crashes or drug abuse?
G: Or some sergeant in Vietnam who has talked to a reporter. The reporter was a corporal when he was in the military, so now he is talking to a sergeant, and the sergeant is drunk. The sergeant is raising hell about the way the war is being fought. So the guy writes the story: "High authority in Vietnam says ...." Now, I had to brief Harold Brown at 7:30 because at 8 o'clock Lyndon Johnson would call McNamara and say, "Find that SOB in Saigon, and let me know what you are going to do to him," and I would get the directive to find him. Lyndon was watching three televisions and listening to I don't know how many radios, and at 8 o'clock, boom, he would want to know what was going on in those things. That meant that we had an outfit there that screened the papers and the televisions and all of that, and they put together a yellow sheet, maybe four or six pages of that, which had extracts or maybe had the article if it were pertinent. We would pass that around. Those things were the basis, plus I had a duty officer who would come in and brief me, and then I would go take it up with Brown.

It was a no-win situation, and it's a situation when you get into those kinds of things you either accept and try to make the harness where it isn't any more chafing than it has to be or else you get out. I just tried to ride with it as best I could. I am not at all satisfied with the job I did as Chief of SAF/OI, and I don't know of anybody who could have been satisfied with it because it was such a nebulous thing to start with, and you had no way of weighing progress or success. With the Defense Department having taken over and with the Defense Department running the thing in Saigon—they had an Army major general out there most of the time, Sidle, but he worked directly back, although he was supposed to be
working for Westmoreland [Gen William C.]. At the same time, they began to take over the Armed Forces radio network that was scattered around the world and the Army photography ventures and things of this sort. We had bands which were under us, and they tried to eliminate as many of those as they could. It was just a continual thing. We had a little office in New York City, for example, as did the Army and the Navy and Marines, so they said, "Why don't we consolidate them?" We resisted that, but we didn't win. As soon as you consolidate, they put a guy in and put a hat on him, and now they've got the little office in New York. With those offices at least that was an area not in Washington, D.C., that you could at least get the story on.

There is a very different philosophy in how you handle information, how you handle a story, between the Air Force and the Defense Department. McNamara was a politician.

A: Contrary to what everybody said, that he was just a businessman.

G: Arthur Sylvester—and I like Arthur Sylvester—is very controversial. On several occasions Arthur Sylvester would tell me, "Bill, why don't you get out of this one because this is going to offend your sense of honesty and integrity and let me handle it. I work for a politician, and I knew that when I took the job, so let me handle it. You go on back to your office, will you." And I would.

My philosophy was if you have a situation, an airplane crash, or some general is accused of having a bunch of GIs fix up his boat from Civil Engineers or he is supposed to have come through Hong Kong and not declared his purchases, there is
only one way to handle it, in my judgment, and that is to get all the facts as quickly as you can and get them all out. Let the dirty linen fall where it may if it's dirty linen, but get it over with. They will write their story, and then that's it. They cannot continue to write a story about something where all the facts are out. It's dead; they won't write it tomorrow. Now, the Defense Department didn't handle things that way. McNamara would try to cover up the bad thing because Lyndon Johnson didn't want the bad thing in the paper, so I am assuming that maybe McNamara's instincts were the same. They would put out something. Any smart newspaperman reading it would know that this was not the whole story. So now they are digging. Now there is something the next day and the next day, so you are dragging it out for an entire week.

I had about three situations with Drew Pearson, who was probably the toughest mudraker that the country has ever seen; he is worse than Mike Wallace. I would get a call like at 3 o'clock in the morning, and he would say, "Here's what I've got, and I'm going to press at 10 o'clock," or whatever his deadline was. I would say, "Fine, I will see what I can find out, and I'll call you back." One of them was a four-star general going through Hong Kong like I said, so I got him out of bed. He said, "I've got my slips; I have declared everything. I am perfectly willing to stand before anybody and prove it." I said, "Okay, I will call you back." I called Mr. Pearson and said, "Here it is. I will have the guy in here at 9 o'clock in the morning with his slips if you want to see them." He said, "No, General, I accept your word for it." Well, on that one he killed the story. Another one was a guy who had bought a boat. I think he was at Eglin or
someplace down there. He was going to fix it himself, redo, repaint, the whole thing. He gets sent to England, and he said, "My god, I wish I could stay here and finish my boat." Well, when he comes back, his boat is finished. The sergeants around there had heard him, and they got Civil Engineers and lumber and fixed it. The Air Force had already found that one, and he had already paid it back. So I gave that to Pearson. Now, he writes the story, and in the last paragraph he says, "But the Air Force has checked this out, and the guy was at fault. They reprimanded so-and-so, and the guy paid it back," et cetera and et cetera. That was a fairness that I didn't run into in a lot of places.

Most of the reporters would write the story, and then one of my guys would get with them and say, "Here are the facts. Why didn't you come to us?" The guy would say, "Well, it wouldn't have been a story. I figured you guys had probably straightened it out." He's just like everybody else, that reporter. He's got kids in school; he's got a mortgage on his house, et cetera.

(End Tape 8, Side 1; Side 2 not used)

A: Was this kind of a universal thing, that the pressures of the job just forced these guys to write this, or was it a certain percentage of the news operations, TV and newspapers? Were there some guys worse than others?

G: Yes, some were worse than others. All of them had a deadline to meet, but the print media is not nearly as bad as television. The print media knows when they put it down they can be sued. It's there forever. They will grab onto
something. They've got to have a story by 4 o'clock, and here it is 3, and they haven't got a bright idea, and boom! (laughter)

The television is really the thing that bothers me. That tube is going to be on all the time. News is going to be there at 6 o'clock or 5 o'clock or whenever, and they've got to fill up that time. In the first place, like Vietnam, the American public cannot stand emotionally, morally, to see a war in their living room every night. We are not temperamentally suited for that; it was never intended. Everybody knows war is terrible—it's hell—and you cannot show this to the American people every night for month after month and survive. Now, what is shown on American television? Our side is shown. We are the bad guys. They are not filming from the other side. You don't see the North Vietnam atrocities. You only see the atrocity the American commits. You saw the Americans maybe shoot a kid. Now, the thing that you did not see and were not told, although in most cases the television guy knew it, was that that same squad last week went through that same village and a child rolled a hand grenade into that squad and blew the legs off of two of their members. So now when that squad goes back out on patrol, and they see a kid approaching them with a sack, are they going to stand there and be blown up, or are they going to take an action? Our television shows this. When you see something on television, like 15 seconds or 30 seconds, that's a long time. If you read 30 seconds in a newspaper, it's not much, but that picture does it.

We had episodes, the Army more than the Air Force, because in so many cases a guy would be with a camera down behind a log,
holding this camera up, and it's taking pictures of sometimes he doesn't know what. He sends that film to San Francisco or Los Angeles. It's developed late in the afternoon. The man in San Francisco calls New York, CBS, and says, "I've got something that's great. It's 15 seconds. Switch to me; I want to put it on." "What is it"? He gives him a verbal. They have never seen it on Cronkite's [Walter] show. Cronkite switches out and here it is. You don't do that in a newspaper. It's seen.

I had occasion to go to New York City in which we took one of the assistant secretaries, and we briefed on logistics to a roomful of about 50 people at the Waldorf Astoria. It turned out that the presidents of ABC, NBC, and CBS News were present. When it came time for the discussion period, but it was not part of the program, one of the fellows asked me what I thought about the television coverage of the war. I told him, without going into a lot of detail, that I would like to see television be at least as responsible as the print media. Well, this opened up Pandora's box. (laughter) These guys said, "If you don't like what we are doing, why don't you put in censorship?" That, to me, was an abrogation of all of their responsibilities. Fortunately, there was a Monsignor there. I don't remember his name; I don't think I knew it. He stood up at that point in time and said that he didn't think that I should degrade myself by even answering that question and that he was sure that the Secretary and I had things to do in Washington since the purpose of the meeting was over, and if we would like to go back to our duties, they would like to keep these three guys there for a little while and talk to them. (laughter) We left the room, and they were there, as I understand it, for another 45 minutes to an
hour in which the other members of the luncheon were really homing in on these guys.

It does no good, but it leads us in to the nerve of the problem. The television guys say that the U.S. Constitution says they have the right and the duty to keep the American people advised, the news media. The news media or the program as seen on television is the news as interpreted by Dan Rather. Now then, if Dan Rather's rating slips, what happens? He then must produce the news as demanded by the president of the company so his rating can get back up, so you can charge enough for television and make more money. The same thing happens in the print media. At some phase in this thing, the news and the demand to make money, sell the papers, or sell the television time cross.

A: The curve has got to cross.

G: It has got to cross, and without a doubt the money angle is dominant every time. It has got to be there. What draws the American public to the television tube? Controversy, confrontation. That's the reason "60 Minutes" is so popular—it's confrontation. It is not necessarily factual, as has been proven time and again. It's confrontation. When the President gave his budget and gave his State of the Union address, why did television turn around and give the Russian 15 minutes to rebut it? Why do we, in a terrorist situation, want the terrorist himself on television saying what a bad guy we are? Why, when we bombed Libya, did they go all over the world, England and other places, to get that Labour man from England to say, "Your President did a bad thing. He has not convinced me that he has the documentation
that Libya was involved”? Why should he have to convince him? We convinced Margaret Thatcher. Do you have to go and convince everybody in the world and let everybody read your intelligence? According to Dan Rather you do. He hasn't convinced Dan Rather because he hasn't let Mr. Rather read his paper! So who is running the foreign policy of the United States? We should let Mr. Rather run it and Mr. Brokaw [Tom] and Peter Jennings?

A: I watch very little television news. As an aside, they demonstrated that the human mind watching television almost closes down.

G: I'm with you, but this is what concerns me. They are changing the entire attitude of the American public. You see how often kids watch television, and the adults do the same thing. There are a lot of them who have stopped reading newspapers. They just get their news from television, and, therefore, they are getting a situation of disrespect for authority. They are getting an education that everybody in Government is bad, that we are shooting from the hips, that the cowboy, the President, can't stay awake in meetings. All of this is nothing but running down and tearing down the basic structure in our country.

A: Let me ask you, you say while you were up there at SAF/OI the intent of the DOD Office of Information was to try to give out as little as they could. Do you think that contributed to this problem of now it has come to the point that television news, especially, doesn't believe anything the Government says because of the situation that developed back in the sixties?
GARLAND

G: A lot of it. I didn't mean to say that they gave out as little as they could. McNamara would call these people to his office and take his top secret book and open it and say, "You see here this is that," and then he would close it. They couldn't see the whole thing, but he was making a point. He was trying to sell a point. No, they tried to put out a lot of information, but if it was bad, they tried to put a blanket over it. They had to say something, so on the bad part they would try to say enough that hopefully it would slide by and would not be pursued. Whereas with us, my approach was I wrote the whole thing and said, "Here it is. Here is the whole thing."

A: You had the hydrogen bomb problem in Spain. How did you handle that?

G: Phil Goulding was the Secretary of Defense for Information. Obviously, we had worked this thing out. We had standard operating procedures that if a difficulty of this sort arises, here is the way you handle it.

A: These were all a waiting-to-be-taken-off-the-shelf type of approach?

G: Yes, and we had exercised them and had gone over them. When the bomb fell out of the airplane over in Spain, I go down to Mr. Goulding's office and here he is typing away on his typewriter himself. He said, "Bill, I've just about got a release worked out on the bomb over there." I said, "Phil, have you looked at the standard operating procedure?" "What standard operating procedure?" So I get that out for him, and then we get things back on an even track and start going
down the system. But, you see, he was a newspaperman, a
civilian brought in for that job, and some way somebody
hadn't briefed him or they hadn't gotten it across to him yet
that before you go tearing off in nine different directions,
ask your military guy if he has any advice on that. But
he had three or four Air Force guys right there who knew it.
All he had to do was ask one of them, and they would have done
that.

A: Okay, but he didn't do that, did he?

G: But you have to look at his background. He was a newspaper
guy. He had never worked with people. He had never
supervised anybody. He was always an individual out getting
a story, relying on himself and himself only and his sources
of information. He had not been a newspaper editor.

Art Sylvester had been editors and managers and whatnot. Art
Sylvester is the guy who said, "In the national interest, I
will lie to newspaper people," and they put him on the
griddle for that. I agree with him. Now, what he was
talking about is like the Bay of Pigs. If somebody pinned
him down and said, "Are you going in the Bay of Pigs in the
morning at 6 o'clock?" Art would have said, "No." He would
not say, "No comment," because when you say, "No comment,"
what does that mean? It means you are too close to the
facts. Art said, "I have a right to lie under that
circumstance and that situation to protect the lives of those
people out there." The newspaper people just tore him apart
on that. He is dead now, but I had a great deal of respect
for Sylvester. He was a straight arrow with me. He would
tell me what he was going to do to other people, but you
judge people by the way they are with you, and I didn't disagree with him.

This brings up an interesting thing. Hold your questions because I know you've got a lot of them and I want to get into them, but let me just point out something. When we went to Grenada, we had a big problem with the press because the press is supposed to know all of this stuff today before it's done. They called in retired Major General Sidle, who was head of the Army Information Service at one time and was in Vietnam for a long time running the information out there, to work out an arrangement so you could have a pool of reporters so that if something came up, another Grenada, you could alert them and they would come in and go with you. That can happen. Do they have any agreement from Dan Rather, let's say, that if he knows about this he won't publicize it?

A: They did a test, remember that? They exercised that. They called up the pool people for a certain day and said, "Okay, meet us out at Andrews at 0600. Something's going on." One guy called up his editor and said, "I'm leaving. There is obviously something cooking." He was supposed to keep his mouth shut, so they demonstrated that it doesn't work.

G: It doesn't work; no way it can work. This is what I was going to say. What will happen is, they will say, "Hugh, you show up at Andrews." You've got a boss, or you will call your friend Dan Rather. You'll say, "Dan, I won't be around for a few days. I'm going on a little trip. I'll be in touch with you when I get back." Dan says, "Oh, ho," because you've already talked. You haven't told him what it is. Dan then calls his folks over in the Pentagon. I've seen this
happen so many times. They are very glib; they are smooth. They will call this guy, and they'll make him think that they already know. They can do this very, very easily. I have seen it happen, not on going to war but on other problems, on a purchase or a buy of an airplane, on a decision. They will ask questions: "I've got a lot, and I can't give you my source, but it's close to you. He has told me that a lot of folks are getting ready and doing this and doing that," and it's things that would have to happen. The next thing is this political guy says, "I wonder who told that SOB! Well, since he already knows--" He doesn't "already know," but by the time he talks to a couple or three guys like that he does know. He will be on that boob tube, and he could care less of the impact that it might have. The American people need to know, and he has got to be the one who breaks the story. That is what he is being paid for. I don't think that he would even hesitate to call Khadafy [Muammar el-] and say, "Are you prepared?" (laughter)

A: They did a thing in TV Guide one time that if Pearl Harbor broke tomorrow, the first thing Rather would be doing was he would be over in Japan interviewing Hirohito.

G: When we went the first time and crossed the line into Libya--I don't know whether you saw this or not--the media hired a jet airplane, and it had a load of the media people, flying out in that area. The Navy turned them around and got them out of there. The Navy had their electronic countermeasures airplanes in there. Their equipment that they had in there had the various beepers on it that when you launch a missile at them the beeper would tell you. This civilian airplane
had nothing. (laughter) In other words, he was a sitting duck.

A: Absolutely, and the radar isn't going to tell the guys at the missile site who he is. He looks like a Navy plane to them.

G: He looks like just another plane, and some of these heat-seeking weapons are going to go toward the closest engine. But these people have a "right to be there."

I think the most dangerous thing that we've got in this country today is the lack of responsibility of the media and mainly of television. I don't know any institution in our country that doesn't have some organization that is supposed to be bringing them toward responsibility. The medical, the lawyers, whether they function properly or not, at least there is an organization that is supposed to kick out the bums. We have nothing in television that does that. I watch it very carefully, and it upsets me. I should be like you and not watch it, but my training requires me to almost. Rather will say, "The Israelis bombed Lebanon today, using U.S. manufactured airplanes." Now, that is not necessary. It is totally irrelevant. They make all kinds of wild statements. They show the pictures of the babies that were killed in Tripoli and Benghazi. That is a bad thing, no question about it, but you keep throwing that up in the press, and you keep throwing it up in here. They haven't shown the picture of the baby that got sucked out of that airplane yet and died when it hit the ground. Now, that's a bad thing. When they say, "Yes, we killed some babies over there, but they also killed some babies," we don't keep it in perspective. Well, you are supposed to remember that, but
the American public doesn't remember that. All they show is
the things that we do. We are the bad guys.

The Americans came home from Vietnam with their tails between
their legs. We are still going through the trauma of the
American military guy, primarily the Army and Marines, who,
when they came home, didn't get any welcoming committee and
didn't get any bands. As a matter of fact, some of them got
spit on. Those boys were over there because their Government
sent them over there. Our Congress could have stopped that
war any week they wanted to by cutting off the money. They
didn't do it. Today they were against it; at that time they
were voting for it. This is the hypocrisy of your elected
representative up there. The American boys that were sent
out were the same kind of redblooded heroes that fought World
War II and that feel like they are heroes. Those boys in
Vietnam were heroes.

Why were they treated the way they were treated when they
came home? I will give you only one man's opinion--Walter
Cronkite. The Americans watched Walter Cronkite every night
tell us what a bad thing we were doing in Vietnam. He
convinced us that it was a bad thing. In order to show that
the war was bad in Vietnam, he showed that the American GI
was bad--he was doing a bad thing. How else can you show
that the war is bad except by showing that those people who
are implementing it are doing bad things? So he convinced
the American public. Consciousy or unconsciously they were
convinced that the people out there were doing bad things.
Whether he intended that or not, that is what he did. He was
aided and abetted by people like Jane Fonda, who went to
Hanoi. We have never been critical of her, even though she
went into our prisoners of war and told them they were murderers and killers, and yet we accept her in society. There is no doubt in my mind that Cronkite, who is everybody's granddaddy, you look at him and you know he is telling you the truth, but he showed the seamy side and he showed the bad side of the war. That's all he could show. That's what the photographers had to send back, or they wouldn't have put it on.

In war there are very few things that are good. Let's go back to World War II. Who reported World War II? Edward R. Morrow and Ernie Pyle. Where was Ernie Pyle? At the 21 Club in New York drinking martinis? He was right there with the dog faces. His feet got frostbitten just like theirs did. He understood what it was. He probably, if he had had a gun, would have done some of the same things they did. Edward R. Morrow was the same way. He was in England, and he was getting buzz bombed.

Cronkite and those guys went to Vietnam, and they thought they were brainwashed when they went out there, but when they arrived there they demanded this, that, and everything, and the military had to practically stop to take care of these people. Any given day there were at least 400 to 500 news media people in Vietnam, having to be taken care of by the military, which is all right. Now, who were these people? The biggest part of them were stringers, which means if their stuff is utilized in the States they get paid for it. If it's not utilized, they are not getting paid for it. That is a bad situation. You can't tell the story that I just told unless you own a television station or unless you buy ink by the barrel, which means you own a newspaper. It is not
were from the colleges. I am pretty sure it was the University of Virginia.

A: There was a Holley [Maj Gen Irving B., Jr.]. He is a retired Air Force two-star Reservist, but he still shows up as a guest lecturer.

G: I had a few guys like that that agreed with me. We sat down and tried to put together a piece of paper that really could be a starting point. They sort of filled in the spaces as to what you would like an organization to do. You would have to have some guy, we thought, up here in the Pentagon to make sure that the Pentagon cooperated in having the major commands and everybody participate. You could centralize it at some location. At that point in time we were not too concerned where you centralized it, but we felt that you did need somebody up here working not for the director of operations but for the Chief or the Secretary that could use his authority to get people to do things.

A: Did you, as you went through your Air Force career at the different levels, find utilitarian value of histories? Did you use them much at all?

G: No. The military has got to reinvent the wheel about every 10 years. (laughter) People are not all that interested in experience or reading what happened. I myself was involved on more than one occasion in a situation where you say, "Let's decentralize." You get in a new guy, and he says, "You can't do that. We've got to pull it back together."
As a matter of fact, we had one of the most interesting experiences when Stuart Symington became the first Secretary of the Air Force. He came from Western Electric, so he said, "You have too many people on your bases. You don't need that many to run a base." We said, "That's right, Mr. Secretary, we don't, except for the fact that we have to provide people for overseas. When we send a man overseas, he has to be trained and fully capable. Somebody has to take the young guy out of school and bring him up to that level and then fill the quota. You have a situation, like your firefighters and like your control tower. They can all be run by civilians, but then when you are called on to send somebody to Weisbaden, who goes? The civilian can't go." He said, "Well, I don't agree with you." Anyway, we took a base, Castle, at Merced, California, and we stripped it down just like he said and just like we thought. About 6 months later, he came out, and we went over the whole thing. He said, "You guys are not as dumb as I thought you were." (laughter) So we went back to the same old system. I don't mean to imply you can't improve on management because you can improve on management.

We have manpower teams, and I was on a manpower team at one time. They are worthless; they are absolutely worthless. Why do I say worthless? Actually, the manpower teams are good at determining the number of people needed to perform the chores as outlined by the supervisor. They do not have the experience or the authority to ask, "Should these tasks be done by your office? Don't they overlap the work of other branches? Should this job be done at all at this level?" Any supervisor worth his salt can convince the manpower people that he is overworked.
At Vandenberg just before I got there, a manpower survey had been made. I guess 3 months or so after I got there I got their report: I needed six more people. Shortly thereafter, General Holloway [Gen Bruce R.] called me, and we were having some cuts in the Air Force. He said that he had a problem. He had to reduce Strategic Air Command by X number of people, and he had squeezed and squeezed and squeezed and couldn't give up any more people without hurting his capability and could I help him. I had not been involved in that before. They had never told me about that. I said, "I'll try. What numbers are you talking about?" He said, "Fifteen hundred." I said, "Okay, Sir, I will be back to you." I had studied Vandenberg fairly carefully by this time. What I concluded was that when we got into the space program no one knew how big it was going to be or what it was going to require, so it was almost like an open-ended type thing. As it went along and developed, a lot of people had been utilized and had been utilized properly and had been needed, but now at the time that I went to Vandenberg the sophistication was getting so that instead of putting up five satellites you would only have to put up one maybe to do the work of five. Therefore, we had reached the point, I felt, where we could begin to narrow down. To make a long story short, I reduced by fifteen hundred people, which was like 23 percent of my command. We did it without hurting ourselves too much. I told him, "We've got a few areas of uncertainty here, like in our fuel section and some of those others, so we need a little help. I am not going to ask you for any more people, but I may ask you to let me shift a guy from here to there." You can't imagine the impact that that had on higher headquarters, on SAC. This was unheard of. Vandenberg would float out to sea! We wouldn't even be able to drive a
vehicle, much less launch a missile. (laughter) As a matter of fact, it improved our efficiency tremendously because we streamlined. They never would allow me to move a man. The staff stopped that. As a matter of fact, I put in for a little more than fifteen hundred. I had a manpower unit of about five people on Vandenberg, so they were the first ones I recommended that we eliminate, but they wouldn't do that. (laughter) They eliminated the other fifteen hundred but not that five.

There is a need for a management look-see in all of our areas. The military is motivated by mission accomplishment—get a better airplane; get a better this or that; get a better bomb on the target. Industry is motivated by the profit factor. We have some people who are supposed to monitor industry. Can you imagine yourself going in and telling the guy in Boeing that you've got too many people working on their line? Can you go in and tell him, "You are paying too much for that spare part that you got from that sub, who got it from another sub, who got it from another sub, and they got all the profits on all of them"? We are at a disadvantage, I think, in that type of an area. Who set the price on that expensive coffee pot or toilet seat? The Air Force didn't set it; some industry guy set it. If we are going to have a toilet on our airplane, that is what we've got to pay for it. Who made that decision to pay for it? It's some guy way down here in the bowels of the thing, and he says he is not going to take on Boeing. (laughter)

A: Another thing and, once again, this is not the most important aspect. What was the status of the flying saucers when you
were in SAF/OI? Did you ever find yourself standing up there and trying to say there are none?

G: Yes. I told them we had the little green men in a hangar at Wright-Patterson. (laughter)

A: You are the one who wrote that one? (laughter)

G: We were having about a thousand letters a month come into our community relations section on flying saucers, UFOs, so we decided we had to do something about it. This was not just SAF/OI. The Air Staff got involved in it. A guy named Randy Holzapless [Gen Joseph R.], a lieutenant general, was involved in this sort of thing. We worked up a program to let the President's Scientific Advisory Board get involved in it. We got about a million dollars from someplace and hired this fellow Dr. Condon, who at that time, I think, was at the University of Colorado. Before that he had been running the Bureau of Standards or something and a highly qualified and capable guy. We gave them the money. Our Systems Command people in the Pentagon drew up the contract with them. We didn't handle it; we said, "This is what we need to do. Here's what we want. We want scientific, top technical people in the country to evaluate this problem. We want them to write a report in detail. We want them to give us a copy of the report, and at the same time we want them to give the press a copy of the report. We don't want to know a damned thing about it until we see the final report, and we get it at the same time that the press gets it. You are going to have to monitor the contract just like you would monitor a contract if you buy an airplane. We don't want anybody in the blue suit side giving anybody instructions on what to
do. That's the way it was handled. I don't know if you have ever seen the report or not.

A: This is Project Blue Book that used to be at Wright-Patterson. We used to have all that down at Maxwell.

G: It's very interesting because in this study they went back to things like "Ezekiel saw the wheel," and they went back to your imagination. In other words, once you started shooting missiles and rockets, now you can imagine that you are going. Of the whole study though, it came out that a very, very high percentage, into the 90s, were explainable. You ended up with only 2 or 3 or 4 percent that were not explainable. In other words, we never questioned that an airline pilot saw something. We questioned what he saw, not what he thought he saw. Most of these things these people were able to reproduce. In a laboratory you could recreate the atmospheric condition, the lighting, and the shadows at that point in time and come up with an answer that the scientific community could accept.

Getting into the technical aspects of it, let's just reverse the situation. If we are going to outer space, there are windows in which you go in, certain time periods. You are going to go in these time periods, or you won't have enough energy to get there. Then you can back that up and say, "If they are coming here, they are going to come in this time period. If they don't come in that time period, then it is something else, and they couldn't come." It is like when you see an object going through here. You know you reach the speed of sound and you break the barrier. You can't go at that speed of sound without breaking the sound barrier, whether you are round, square, oblong, or what. (laughter)
That quieted down the thing for a while. Then we had Major Kehoe, an ex-Marine, and Carl Sagan from Cornell, who is a famous TV character now. Kehoe made a living at this. He had a vested interest in it, so he kept the thing going. Sagan had a vested interest in it because he was trying to get us to put up the radio type things that you could send signals out or you could receive signals from outer space. He couldn't understand why we wouldn't sponsor all of his programs on that. He is a brilliant man; he is a good scientist. He is involved in NASA programs, but when you have a vested interest you can say, "Well, there might be something to it," and then the next thing you know, you've got a big story and got a lot of people interested. It was one heck of a problem to quiet down.

A: Were you responsible for the Defense Information School, or was that strictly an Army run thing?

G: We had a school program, and that was one of them. We sent some people to the University of Wisconsin or Missouri or various places to increase their education in the thing too. That school was just another adjunct.

(End Tape 10, Side 1)

G: As I mentioned earlier, most commanders don't want to have anything to do with the press, and they don't know how to utilize their public affairs officer. They had a commander at Vandenberg, as a for instance, a major general. He has got a bunch of colonels around him that he is used to dealing with. He is not used to going down to the Public Relations Office and getting his captain and relying on his judgment.
The kids have a tough row to hoe, but, in general, they are very capable, and they know what to do, they know how to do it, and they can do it if given a chance.

A: Brown left office with the change of administration, and Secretary of the Air Force Seamans came in. Was this quite a contrast in personalities between these two?

G: Yes, Seamans was a much warmer, more human individual and easier to work with, not that Brown was difficult to work with. Brown would listen and very seldom gave any guidance. If he gave any guidance, it was normally to check with the Defense Department.

A: Here is an interesting note that in the change of administration they appointed the service nominees, and they went up to Congress. There was very little interest in the service secretary nomination hearings in 1969 for Seamans and the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Navy. Was that pretty standard?

G: I think so, yes. Congress, I think, gets involved and creates a hullabaloo over the political appointees. Seamans was not political. This guy Aldridge [Edward C., Jr.] who is in there now is not political. They are technical, and their background shows that they are competent in whatever it is they have been doing, so the Congress doesn't get involved in that too often.

A: That's a good observation. In the late sixties there was a push for the advanced manned strategic aircraft, AMSA. Would
your office have been in the forefront of trying to promote that?

G: No. As a matter of fact, we stayed away from it. We would have not just that part of it, but we had industry all the time coming in saying, "Let's develop a plan, Air Force and us, to sell this product," and they didn't last but just 2 or 3 minutes in my office. (laughter)

A: That would have just been too much of a conflict?

G: That's right.

A: Had you been warned against that kind of thing?

G: Nobody ever mentioned it.

A: One thing that comes to mind talking to you about the job as PA for the Air Force or SAF/OI and different jobs is how frequently, if not only consistently, people are put in jobs and are kind of told, "Okay, now you are it." It's like I've known guys to get jobs in different parts of the world as attaches or something like that with very little if no briefing about what to expect, and on your job you didn't get briefed.

G: Our attache, you see, is supposed to have language training and have been briefed by Intelligence on what he is supposed to be looking for and all that sort of thing before you get into it. Most of your jobs in the military have a job description. If you go in and the boss picks you to be a wing commander, the easiest way to lose that job is to say,
"Boss, what do you want me to do?" In other words, you are through. You will never get to that stage if you ask him that. (laughter) The guy that is put in as a wing commander has normally come through as a squadron commander, so he has got a pretty good feel for what he is supposed to do. You are not going to put these fellows over at the comptroller and things of that sort. Even though you may have been in Operations, you can go across to Materiel and work in that area because you can learn pretty quickly who your points of contact are, and you know what the problem is.

When you get up to something like SAF/OL, and I guess when you get into Legislative Liaison, which was just across the hall, I would think that when you put the guy in you have evaluated his personality and his background to see whether he can do it or not. When I went up to my job, I stopped by Langley to see General Sweeney. Sweeney had cancer at the time and died just a short time later, so I really just went by to pay my respects to him because I thought it would be the last time I would ever see him. He asked me where I was going, and I told him. He said, "I think you have the flexibility to adjust and roll with the punches for that job. I think you will do all right in it." I really didn't know what the hell he was talking about because I hadn't dealt in that arena, although the training at the War College and the master's degree in political and economic science was not bad training for it. Over the years I had dealt with civilians at bases, but that's entirely different than this. I don't know how you would write a job description for it. It's amazing to me how few times we end up with square pegs in round holes when it could be so often, and it does happen, but the selection system is pretty good. As I said, I am not
satisfied with the results of my job in SAF/OI, but, being honest about it, I don't know that anybody else would have done any better during that time period.

A: When you went up there, was it a 3-year tour or a 4-year tour?

G: A 4-year tour.

A: And it was just coincidence that you left at the time the new administration had just come into office.

G: My 4 years were up then.

A: Had you been advised that this was in no way a terminal assignment or anything?

G: At the Pentagon?

A: Yes.

G: No, I hadn't been advised of anything. I guess I handled my assignments pretty stupidly. I never asked for a job, and I never turned one down. (laughter) At that point in time I should have probably worked with the Generals Assignments Group a little closer than I did. As a matter of fact, I didn't work with them at all. Harold Brown nominated me for a promotion, but Jack Ryan didn't see fit to have it that way, so it didn't happen.

A: Why was that, do you think?

G: I don't know.
A: Did you ever ask him?

G: No. I didn't know that he took me off the list until later, but that's all right, what the hell. I don't complain about that. (laughter)

A: Do you ever ask yourself why you think you made general officer as opposed to not making it?

G: No. When I made it I didn't even know I was eligible. I never thought about those things. I made colonel in 9 years, which today you make colonel in about 21 to 23. I was always happy with what I was doing and happy with my jobs and felt like that, if I do the right thing, I will get another good job and, if I don't, I won't, so don't worry about it. I am serious. I never did. I didn't worry about the promotion, one way or the other.

A: Speaking of this, when you went out to the 1st Strategic Wing out there in 1969, the wing had been organized in 1957, and it was the fourteenth change of command. You were the fourteenth commander of that. There had been thirteen commanders of that organization in the 1960s alone. In 10 years, you were the thirteenth commander. What was that all about?

G: I don't know. I've often wondered about it too. Most of the pilot types were not too interested in being in missiles. Some of them I know went in just to get a little experience and get it on their record and then they were moved into other positions. I don't know. I have never talked to anybody, and I've never heard anybody discuss it.

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A: Vandenberg is a SAC base, but you are the "host" of SAMTEC, the Space and Missile Test Center. Did you really find yourself trying to serve two masters out there, or were the divisions of responsibility clear-cut enough that you could handle what you had to do and the general over there working in Systems Command could do what he had to do?

G: I supported him very, very heavily. The responsibilities were clear-cut. The only difficulties we ever had was that I thought that some of their management areas, which were not my problem unless I had to provide them money or vehicles or maintaining the buildings, were in the same situation that I mentioned that my command was in when I reduced my command by fifteen hundred. That let me shut down buildings and everything else. It meant I didn't have to have as many vehicles for their use, all these sorts of things. I went through every activity on the base, so I got them to take me through all of their activities on base. I saw a lot of things that needed changing. For example, one morning about 10:30 I walked into an office, and here were four guys playing cards. I asked them who they belonged to and what was going on. They said they were taking care of the Atlas missile program, spare parts for Atlas missiles.

A: This was in 1969? It had been out of the inventory for 5 years or so! (laughter)

G: You are getting close! (laughter) I said, "Why don't we send them down to San Bernardino?" They said, "We have recommended that." I said, "You fellows don't have much to do, do you?" They said, "No, Sir, but if you don't think we have much to do, what do you think the second shift has to
do?" (laughter) That's a true story! This is only eight people, but that's eight people. When I ran into situations of that sort, I felt like that put me in a position where I was on firm ground when I said, "How about looking at your areas?" I asked the five major contractors as well as Systems Command. I said, "I am not trying to reduce your capability one iota, but if you can save us some money, then we will have a little money and maybe we can do some other things that you do need. Maybe we can shift them from here to there." That caused difficulty, not with the civilians but with the blue-suited side because they felt like I was getting into an area that was not really my responsibility.

A: Did some European satellites get launched while you were out there?

G: NASA launched a little thing or two, and I believe some Europeans were involved in that. They were not biggies.

A: Did you find yourself trying to bring yourself up to speed on what all this missile business was now? Of course, you had dealt with it previously in SAC, but was this much of a different change of job from your experience dealing with missiles before than what you were doing now?

G: Not really. They were working out some new techniques, new procedures, new ways of retargeting the missile, of controlling the launch. If you recollect, they were talking about launching missiles from airplanes and the airplane controlling the missile on the ground and getting into that and launching that. That was all going on. That fits in so simply with your background if you are familiar with missiles.
When you get right down to it, I wasn't going to get down on the drawing board and go through the blue print and the wiring diagram anyway unless it was real critical.

A: You had some operational "silos" there at the time you went there. They were phased out or canceled. They had actually some missile sites at Vandenberg. You had an emergency war order.

G: Yes, that was closed down.

A: Any particular reason they were closed down?

G: We just didn't need them anymore. They didn't contribute that much.

A: In the spring of 1970, Vandenberg provided some communications support for the Apollo XIII mission. Was this something that would have created any kind of special problems?

G: No. This would have been under the Western Test Range. All it meant was that you just bring them up on alert and let them function while Apollo is going and do really the same thing that they would do if we were launching a missile.

A: Here's that note. In 1970 there was a Minuteman abort. You always called them the "Glory Trip." This was Glory Trip 94-B. The Minuteman failed, and it was an O-ring failure. I had mentioned this at lunch yesterday. Do you remember them ever using that term "O-ring"?
G: No, I don't remember ever hearing the term around.

A: It's funny how it jumped out of the page when I read about that because it has been in the news so much.

G: I don't remember that. We had one that malfunctioned and didn't come out of the silo. This was the one that actually got airborne and had to be destroyed.

A: They just had one the other day that blew up 15 seconds into the launch. Was there much local consternation in those days when something like that happened? Were the news people there right away and the local inhabitants worried?

G: Not too much. The television people have got to be there and get it, and most of the time they didn't even know it was going. We didn't announce it.

A: Another thing that happened while you were out there--of course, this may have been so on the periphery you may not even have known about. Did Vandenberg sit on some kind of historical site? There was this big agreement with the University of California at Santa Barbara for the mapping.

G: The Chumash Indians?

A: I don't know. They never mentioned that all these historical archeological sites on Vandenberg were Indians.

G: The Chumash Indians, some of their burial grounds and things of that sort were allegedly there. There are various places on south Vandenberg where on some of the sandstone cliffs
you could have a cave to protect you from the wind and there would be some little drawings. You know the climate of that period. They wanted to find out what it was, so we set up a little program to do this.

A: Another thing the history brought out, people on Vandenberg were constantly doing the equivalent of air rescue, picking people out of automobile accidents on the interstate and picking people up out of the ocean that had been blown out to sea. Was that just kind of a good will thing? It seems like you did a lot of that.

G: We did. The worst sea conditions from Alaska to the tip of the end of South America is right at Vandenberg. It's where the northern and some of the warm southern climates come together. We had so many people who would, with their little boats--these are the kinds of people that we would help pull off the beach. A family would retire that had always wanted to have a little boat and that always wanted to go to Mexico. So they go to San Francisco or somewhere like that and squander their life savings and get a little boat. Now they would get in that little boat and head down the coast. They are going to come to Morro Bay, and then they are going to keep going. They get in the fog or they get in the weather, and the next thing you know they are seeing what they think are oil derricks. We have gantries off of Vandenberg. They don't have the foggiest clue where they are. We monitored, as you can imagine, all communications channels and the emergency channel, so they would call and our people would pick it up. Here's the little boat out there, and we would put a search light on them, and they would want to come in. We would say, "Don't come in because there is nothing but
rocks. Stay there; we will get the Coast Guard." We would then call the Coast Guard wherever they happened to be at that point in time—Santa Barbara, Morro Bay, or wherever—and they would steam on down, and we would vector the two together. Then they would take them in. The ones that we really handled, and we had this quite frequently, was when the guy would see the lights and would think they were oil derricks and that he could come in and that there would be a harbor or something of that sort. He would come in and hit the rocks, and that's all she wrote.

The thing over my desk there, the gantry that you see is Slick Six, which was to be the manned orbiting laboratory, which was canceled. That is the gantry that is being developed for the Space Shuttle. The thing you see above that is the old boathouse down on south Vandenberg, which is only just maybe a mile from this. In other words, the big cylinder for the Space Shuttle will be brought into this boathouse area, which has been completely modified now, and then carried on up and mated with the Shuttle. The building that you see up there was the Coast Guard station. It's a fine old place like you would find back in Maine or someplace—the timbers are out of this world—and housed about 20-odd people, with a commander's office and all that. Every commander that we ever had at Vandenberg said, "What a marvelous recreational area this would be, to have the families with their little boats down here." So we would get some Coast Guard guy or Air Force fellow that knows and bring him in and have him look at it. He would always come back and say, "You have lost your mind. This is the most dangerous area in the world." (laughter) You see the little building down by the dock here. It was a three-stall Coast
Guard boathouse. He would say, "The Coast Guard would lose a boat a quarter out here themselves it was so rough, so you had better keep your families away and don't bring them down." (laughter) The best abalone fishing area in California is just to the left here. Around that corner there are a lot of rocks, and there are good abalone there.

A: ATC activated the Minuteman launch officer training program for SAC officers there in 1970. Was this just a standard procedure that took place? Would that have come under ATC? Would that, in effect, have been another kind of a tenant organization?

G: Yes. Everybody in the world was a tenant at Vandenberg, except the Russians. (laughter) They just kept their patrol boats off the coast and off Eniwetok.

A: The 1st Strategic Wing command post was phased down and reconfigured to a peacetime launch control center. Was that just in conjunction with losing----?

G: You had the air division; that is what we are talking about.

A: This is different from the 1st Strategic Wing?

G: Yes, the 1st Strategic Air Division. Then you had the support group--I don't know whether they ever made that a wing or not--under the division. The division had the communications squadron and the support group. It had the staff that manned the command post. The Systems Command had the range safety offices and things of that sort. They had a
lot of outlying stations with radars and things of that sort that they utilized.

A: The 1st Strategic Wing got their first Outstanding Unit Award while you were there in 1972. Do you recall that?

G: The 1st Strategic Air Division is the same air division that was in B-17s in World War II, the 1st Air Division. We got two Outstanding Unit Awards or something over there, which was interesting. I'm the only guy who ever fought in the 1st Air Division who later commanded it. Our historian up there wrote a thing for the Lompoc papers, great publicity for it.

A: Another thing that was mentioned in the history as I was reading it was in 1972 there was the first mention of some drug abuse problems. Did that start to get to be a problem out there?

G: Not really, but there is a Federal prison near Lompoc right on the southern end of the northern part of Vandenberg. This was a military prison during World War II run by the Army. It became a minimum security type thing, sort of like you have got down at Montgomery at Maxwell, the Federal prison camp. In this one up there, a great number of those people are there because they held up a 7-Eleven Store or shot a man in the 7-Eleven or something of that sort, but their actions were such so they could get money for the drugs. They were drug addicts. When they put them in the pokey, a lot of times their young girlfriends or wives would come with them, and they also were on drugs, so in the local community there was a drug problem. If you remember, it became a problem in society. Every time that happened, as I said before, we also
were getting them in, so we set up a drug program. As a matter of fact, we had at Vandenberg the Strategic Air Command symposiums, figuring out how you handle the problem. How do you get ready for it? How do you indoctrinate? At Vandenberg we did. We had our young people in programs, both the dependents and military.

(End Tape 10, Side 2)

G: I would have them take these young airmen on a bus down to the prison and go in the prison and have them slam the steel gates behind them and then have a little briefing on drug abuse. We found it was very effective when all of a sudden they could see the cold, gray walls of that prison and realize what could happen. We had, with a careful screening, some of the prisoners there actually help us in our drug program, some of the hard heroin users. There was an interesting thing that came out of it though, which we had to be careful of. Without exception, these drug addicts favored legalizing marijuana. Their pitch was that kids in school, high school and all, don't think that smoking marijuana is bad, even though it is illegal. Then the drug dealer goes from selling the kid marijuana to work them into all of the other drugs, even to lacing the marijuana if need be. That gets them started and, shall we say, into his clutches or at least exposed to the drug dealer, and he then tries to work on and get them into the more expensive and the harder stuff, which makes sense in a way. It doesn't mean you've got to legalize marijuana, but you can see what they were talking about because so many of them said that's the way they got started. As far as it being a problem in the work area and on the job, no, or at least not to my knowledge.
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A: The Army was beginning to test its ABM systems a little bit here in this period. Would that have been a big program? Do you recall that?

G: No, not with us.

A: In a little more philosophical question, the Army still has an air defense role, antiaircraft. In your Air Force career did you think that should have been taken over at some point by the Air Force?

G: Not really, but 180 degrees to that, the Army spent great amounts of money trying to get the missile program, which later came to the Air Force. General Maxwell [D.] Taylor and "Jumping Jim" Gavin [Lt Gen James M.] and a few of those people after the war they had recognized that missiles were a thing of the future, and they spent every dime they could get with von Braun [Dr. Wernher] and those kinds of people, that Huntsville type thing. They wanted very badly, relating the missile program to air defense, to try to get the whole program.

A: There was some talk about bringing SAMSO up there to Vandenberg. Was that just talk, or were people serious about that?

G: Yes, they were serious about it.

A: Why would they have wanted to bring it up there? I did not see the report. I only read in the histories where there was a study made.