

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

17 March 2020

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Reference: EOM-2019-00778

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is a final response to your correspondence of 25 June 2019, submitted on behalf of The Black Vault, requesting an Executive Order 13526 mandatory declassification review of the following document:

PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ
Document Number (FOIA)/ESDN(CREST) 0005674817

We have completed a thorough search of our records and determined that the document may be released in sanitized form. We have deleted material that must remain classified on the basis of Section 1.4(c) of the Order. Additional information must be withheld because withholding is authorized and warranted under applicable law as provided by Section 6.2(d) of the Order. Enclosed is a copy showing our deletions and citing our exemptions.

As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel in my care, within 90 days for the date of this letter. Should you choose to do this, please include the basis of your appeal.

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Intelligence Community Assessment**(U) Principal Challenges in
Post-Saddam Iraq***ICA 2003-04
January 2003*

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**National
Intelligence
Council**

ICA 2003-04

(U) Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

*Prepared under the auspices of Paul R. Pillar,
National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia.
Inquiries may be directed to the NIO on*

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January 2003

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Scope Note

[REDACTED] At the request of the Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, this Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) examines the internal dynamics of Iraq that will frame the challenges for whatever government succeeds the regime of Saddam Husayn. It discusses the main political, economic, humanitarian, and security issues inside Iraq that are likely to demand attention during approximately the first three to five years after Saddam departs. In particular, it looks at the prospects for representative government in Iraq and at the ethnic, tribal, and religious forces that will affect its development.

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[REDACTED] How these issues unfold would depend heavily on the events leading to Saddam's removal. The effects of his ouster through the invasion of Iraq by a Coalition military force could vary significantly according to the duration of the war, the damage it caused, and such other factors as the size and cohesiveness of the Coalition. Subsequent occupation by a Coalition force obviously would make that force the dominant influence on events in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. This assessment makes no projections about specific wartime scenarios or the policies of an occupying force. Nor does it focus primarily on the immediate humanitarian demands or need to locate weapons of mass destruction that would be handled by the Coalition military forces in the first days after a war. Instead, it identifies and analyzes the medium- to long-term challenges that any post-Saddam authority in Iraq necessarily would face.

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[REDACTED] The ICA was reviewed in draft by three prominent experts in the history, politics, and regional dynamics of the Middle East. [REDACTED]

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Their comments were taken into consideration in the preparation of this paper.

[REDACTED] The regional repercussions of an ouster of Saddam, including postures of neighboring states toward a post-Saddam Iraq, are addressed in ICA 2003-03, [REDACTED] *Regional Consequences of Regime Change in Iraq* (~~SECRET~~) [REDACTED] January 2003.

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Key Judgments

(U) Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

[REDACTED] The greatest medium-to-long-term challenge in Iraq if Saddam Husayn were ousted would be the introduction of a stable and representative political system in place of Saddam's apparatus of oppression. The building of an Iraqi democracy would be a long, difficult, and probably turbulent process, with potential for backsliding into Iraq's tradition of authoritarianism.

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- Iraqi political culture does not foster liberalism or democracy. Iraq lacks the experience of a loyal opposition and effective institutions for mass political participation. Saddam's brutal methods have made a generation of Iraqis distrustful of surrendering or sharing power.
- The principal positive elements in any effort at democratization would be the current relative weakness of political Islam in Iraq and the contributions that could be made by four million Iraqi exiles—many of whom are Westernized and well educated—and by the now-impooverished and underemployed Iraqi middle class.

[REDACTED] Iraq would be unlikely to split apart, but a post-Saddam authority would face a deeply divided society with a significant chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with each other unless an occupying force prevented them from doing so.

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- Sunni Arabs would face possible loss of their longstanding privileged position while Shia would seek power commensurate with their majority status.
- Kurds could try to take advantage of Saddam's departure by seizing some of the large northern oilfields, a move that would elicit forceful responses from Sunni Arabs [REDACTED]
- Score-settling would occur throughout Iraq between those associated with Saddam's regime and those who have suffered most under it.

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[REDACTED] Iraq's large petroleum resources—its greatest asset—would make economic reconstruction less difficult than political transformation. Iraq's economic options would remain few and narrow, however, without forgiveness of debt, a reduction in reparations from the previous Persian Gulf war, or something akin to a Marshall Plan.

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- Iraq's economic and financial prospects would vary significantly depending on how much damage its oil facilities sustained in a war. If they remained relatively unscathed and any administrative issues involving organization of Iraq's oil industry were resolved, it would be possible to increase oil production within three months from 2.4 million barrels per day (b/d) to 3.1 million b/d.

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- A less oil-dependent economy with a strong private sector would be required to generate the more than 240,000 new jobs needed each year to accommodate the rapidly growing labor force.

[REDACTED] Major outside assistance would be required to meet humanitarian needs. Increased numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, combined with civil strife, would strain Iraq's already inadequate healthcare services, food distribution networks, and supplies of potable water.

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- Most Iraqis depend on government food rations and are not equipped to deal with hoarding, looting, or price gouging. Rapid reconstitution of the distribution system would be critical to avoiding widespread health problems.
- Iraqis have restored their physical infrastructure quickly after previous wars. The difficulty of restoring such services as water and electricity after a new war would depend chiefly on how much destruction was caused by urban combat.

[REDACTED] The foreign and security policies of a new Iraqi government necessarily would defer heavily in the near term to the interests of the United States, United Nations, or an international Coalition but also would reflect many continuing Iraqi perceptions and interests. Those perceptions—[REDACTED]—would increasingly shape the Iraqis' policies as they reasserted their independence.

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
- These threat perceptions, along with a prideful sense of Iraq's place as a regional power, probably would sustain Iraq's interest in rebuilding its military. Unless guaranteed a security umbrella against its strategic rivals, Iraq's interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction would eventually revive.
- A new Iraqi government would have little interest in supporting terrorism, although strong Iraqi sympathy for the Palestinians would continue. If Baghdad were unable to exert control over the Iraqi countryside, al-Q'aida or other terrorists groups could operate from remote areas.

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(U) Iraq: Population Density



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Discussion

(U) Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq

[REDACTED] The ouster of Iraqi dictator Saddam Husayn would pose a variety of significant policy challenges for whoever assumes responsibility for governing Iraq. These include political transformation, controlling internal strife, solving economic and humanitarian challenges, and dealing with persistent foreign policy and security concerns. The greatest medium-to-long-term challenge would be in fashioning an even partially liberal, democratic, and stable polity in place of the system of oppression that Saddam has maintained. Political transformation is the task in which the underlying problems are most deeply rooted in Iraq's history and culture and least susceptible to outside intervention and management.

(U) The Historical Legacy

[REDACTED] Iraq's experience with democratic—or even representative—political institutions has been limited. Its experiments in pluralism ended long ago, and the socio-economic foundations for a more open political system that were laid in the 1960s and 1970s have collapsed.

- Iraq's most promising experiment with representative institutions took place under the Hashemite monarchy (1920-1958), when political parties operated more freely than at any other time in the country's history. Although personal ties, traditional patron-client relationships, and management by the regime greatly influenced the political process, the Iraqi

Chamber of Deputies was a somewhat representative body.

- Formal suffrage requirements in Iraq were comparatively liberal during the monarchy. However, low levels of education and literacy, the absence of transportation and media networks, and the overweening influence of tribal shaykhs in the countryside meant that, outside the cities or among rural elites, voting rates were low and the integrity of the ballot was questionable.
- Modern participatory mass politics was only beginning to emerge when the monarchy was overthrown in a military coup in 1958.

[REDACTED] Iraq's leaders have struggled to create an Iraqi national identity since the country was created following World War I out of three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The Sunni Arab minority has provided most of Iraq's leaders, continuing a traditional leadership arrangement established during Ottoman rule and sustained through the British mandate. Individual Kurds and Shias, as well as Christians and Jews, have held influential positions, but such exceptions were not indicative of Sunni power-sharing. Prior to 1968, the merchant class, the *ulema*, and some tribal shaykhs were influential in government and within their own communities.

[REDACTED] Despite its dictatorial rule over the last 35 years, the Ba'th Party initially made progress in developing institutions that might have supported the growth of democracy. Motivated by a pan-Arabist, socialist

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Occupation and Transition: Likely Iraqi Attitudes

[REDACTED] In the early months after a forceful ouster of Saddam, stability in Iraq would depend partly on the perspectives of Iraqis toward whatever interim authority—military or civilian, foreign or indigenous—was in control, as well as on the ability of that authority to perform the administrative and security tasks of governing the country. The potential for tension would exist between those two elements of stability: the type of authority most acceptable and legitimate in the eyes of Iraqis might not be the same type most capable of running a war-damaged Iraq.

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[REDACTED] That tension probably would be minimal during the first few weeks or months after a war. The top priorities of most Iraqis would be to obtain peace, order, stability, and such basic needs as food and shelter. Personal needs would take preference over politics. Prompt provision of such services as clean water also would help to refute the Saddam regime's propaganda that the US-led West had imposed sanctions to hurt ordinary Iraqis.

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[REDACTED] Once the most pressing needs became less of a worry for most Iraqis, however, politics and the nature of the ruling authority would become increasingly important to them. Iraqis would expect progress in transferring power from foreign occupiers—however much they had been welcomed as liberators—to indigenous leaders. Attitudes toward a foreign military force would depend largely on the progress made in transferring power as well as on the degree to which that force were perceived as providing necessary security and fostering reconstruction and a return to prosperity.

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[REDACTED] Other recent instances of political reconstruction following intervention by a foreign force provide only limited lessons for Iraq, given the major differences between cases. Examples such as the Balkans and East Timor suggest that a foreign military presence might be acceptable to most of the population if it served a clear security need and progress toward indigenous rule continued. The attitudes of most Iraqis would be shaped far more by what they see a foreign force doing in their own land than by foreign models. Some Iraqis, however, might point to Afghanistan as a model for how authority ought to be turned over to an Iraqi-led and staffed government within two or three months of Saddam's ouster.

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[REDACTED] Iraq's history of foreign occupation—first the Ottomans, then the British—has left Iraqis with a deep dislike of occupiers. An indefinite foreign military occupation, with ultimate power in the hands of a non-Iraqi officer, would be widely unacceptable.

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[REDACTED] some senior Iraqi military officers who oppose Saddam find the idea of a western power conquering and governing Iraq anathema and a motivation to fight for Saddam where they otherwise would not. External opposition leaders have expressed similar sentiments. The Opposition Conference in December 2002 formally rejected "any type of occupation, foreign or local military rule, external trusteeship, or regional intervention." The Kurdish leader Jalal Talibani said more pointedly, "If we don't accept an Iraqi general, how are we going to accept an American general?"

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ideology, and a desire to consolidate power, the Ba'th used social reforms, oil wealth, and secularist policies to bridge or paper over many of Iraq's ethnic and religious gaps and engender a sense of "Iraqi-ness."

- In the 1970s, with the help of mushrooming oil revenues, Baghdad invested in its human capital and infrastructure by supporting education and medical services throughout the country. In 1987, UNESCO recognized Iraq as having achieved a literacy rate of 80 percent.
- Baghdad coupled this investment with road building, electrification, and provision of fresh water in rural and urban areas. Although pockets of backwardness remained, the infrastructure contributed to a growing industrial sector and an increasingly urbanized population. At the same time, the regime cultivated rural areas by implementing land reform and establishing agricultural cooperatives.
- Shia actions during the Iran-Iraq War—their defense of Iraq in the name of Iraqi nationalism—demonstrated the extent to which a sense of national identity had been established along the Shia-Sunni fault line.

(U) Saddam's Great Leap Backward

Over the last two decades, Saddam's military adventures against Iran and Kuwait have undermined the social, political, and economic gains previously made under the Ba'thists.

- At least 400,000 Iraqis died or were wounded in the Iran-Iraq War. Although the conflict spurred growth in Iraq's heavy industrial and military-related economic sectors, Baghdad diverted

resources from social and educational programs to support the war effort.

The economic readjustments during and after the Iran-Iraq War and the UN sanctions following the Gulf war exacted a substantial price. Iraq's obstinacy in evading its disarmament obligations has prolonged the economic problems, reducing the general population to a state of dependency while giving rise to previously unseen rampant corruption.

- In 1980, Iraq's per capita GDP was poised to overtake that of Greece. Now Iraq's GDP per capita is \$2,500 while Greece's GDP per capita is estimated at \$17,900.
- Such basic services as electrification and clean water currently reach less than half the population.
- UN figures indicate that literacy has dropped to 50 to 60 percent. Although school enrollments have risen since the Oil for Food (OFF) Program began in 1996, attendance has fallen and dropout rates have risen. A brain drain has continued, and most of Iraq's once thriving middle class has been impoverished.

(U) Eroding Nascent Political Institutions

Saddam's policies increasingly have emphasized his own survival at the expense of the few representative political institutions Iraq had developed.

On assuming power, Saddam gutted the Ba'th Party of independent political power and ideological authority and remade it into an instrument to ensure his survival. The Ba'th has become an instrument of internal security and control rather than a means of political mobilization. Saddam has

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Iraq: Comparative Social Indicators Table

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	Iraq	Iran	Egypt	Kuwait	United States
Demographics					
Total population, 2001 (millions)	23.8	66.1	69.5	2.0	284.8
Population growth rate, 1991-2001 (average annual percent)	2.9	1.4	1.9	3.8 ^a	0.9
Urban population, 2000 (percent of total population)	77	62	45	98	77
Total fertility rate, 2001 (births per woman)	4.8	2.0	3.1	3.2	2.1
Life expectancy at birth, 2001 (years)	65 ^b	68 ^b	64	76	77
Infant mortality, 2001 (per 1,000 live births)	92 ^b	52 ^c	60	11	7
Education					
Literacy rate, 2000 (percent)	58 ^b	77	55	82	100
Enrollment rates (percent) ^d					
Primary	85	98	101	77	102
Secondary	42	77	78	65	97
Post-secondary	12	18	20	19	81
Income					
GDP per capita, 2001 (thousand US \$) ^e	2,475	6,304	3,821	14,798	35,100

^a Figure is average for 1996-2001.^b Estimate.^c 1999 figure as reported to the UN by the Statistical Center of Iran.^d Enrollment rate is the total enrollment, regardless of age, divided by the population of the official age group which corresponds to a specific level of education. Data vary from 1995 to 1997.^e 2000 purchasing power parity rates.

Sources: US Census Bureau and the UN, except as noted.

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emphasized the need to recruit younger members to the party, but real influence remains in the hands of a limited inner circle, and new recruits appear to view the Ba'th as an avenue for landing a job or even obtaining a ration card. Indeed, heavy-handed tactics used to increase the power base of the Ba'th Party have generated strong resentment toward the party in many sectors of society. The party probably would collapse with the regime, although some of its original ideals could find expression through former party members who might form networks for overt or covert political activity.

Saddam has manipulated and rearranged other Iraqi centers of power and political institutions, subordinating them to military/security organizations and to revitalized tribal structures.

- The degradation of Iraq's socio-economic structure, coupled with the reemergence of regional and tribal power bases since the Gulf war, has intensified traditional tribal, religious, and ethnic differences, undermining the progress made in forging a national identity. Rather than erase these fissures, Saddam has exploited them to solidify further his hold on power by nurturing the belief that only he can hold Iraq together.
- Although Iraq had a large, well-trained and competent cadre of technocrats and civil leaders, Saddam has tried to eliminate all those he suspects of nurturing a personal following in the military or in the civil sector.

(U) Iraq's Political Culture: Implications for Democracy

The undemocratic nature of Iraq's political culture means that any development of stable democracy there would be a long

and probably difficult process. Saddam's brutal regime has left its mark on the Iraqi psyche. In addition to fostering pervasive fear throughout the society, the strong distrust between Iraqi groups is unlikely to dissipate quickly. The culture of brute power has direct implications for the forging of a democratic political system. In Saddam's Iraq, the surrendering of power leads to brutal subjugation. Once power is held in Iraq, it is rarely relinquished peacefully. When Saddam leaves the scene, any new authority will need to demonstrate and earn sufficient trust for Iraqis with any degree of power to become convinced they can safely hand it over or share it.

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Iraq's political culture largely is bereft of the social underpinnings that directly support development of broad-based participatory democracy. The non-regime political elite has largely disappeared through exile or death. More than 70 percent of the population has been born or reached adulthood since Operation Desert Storm and know only war, sanctions, deprivation, and Saddam's rule. Few Iraqis have any firsthand experience with pre-Saddam Iraq.

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Development of a new political culture more conducive to democracy would require building upon the now-impoverished but still talented Iraqi middle class. Despite their economic straits, many members of this social stratum—at least those who were adults before deprivations began during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s—may retain attitudes similar to those of liberal bourgeoisie in developed democracies. The political attitudes of their offspring could be more problematic.

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Stable democracy in Iraq would require development of a new system of political parties with nationwide

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constituencies cutting across ethno-religious boundaries.

- Some small "political parties" operate inside the country (primarily in northern Iraq), but none appear to have a sufficiently broad base of support to assume the reins of power following Saddam's departure.
- The major Kurdish political parties are unlikely to develop any significant support among the Arab majority in Iraq.
- The Ba'th Party, having become a repressive instrument of Saddam's regime, has become discredited and is unlikely to serve as a model.

[] The idea of free and democratic elections, although somewhat alien, probably would be a popular concept with the vast majority of the Iraqi population. But the practical implementation of democratic rule would be difficult in a country with no concept of loyal opposition and no history of alternation of power. Those groups that retained a power base following Saddam's removal would be reluctant to voluntarily relinquish whatever influence they had until they felt sufficiently secure—on a personal as well as a group level. The experience of the Kurdish-controlled north, where neither Kurdish party has been prepared to concede power to the other, is instructive (see text box on page 16).

- Although Iraqis might be enthusiastic about casting votes, we do not know what their perception of "democracy" is. Many Iraqi citizens probably would continue to rely heavily on authority figures for their well-being and direction. The history of strong authoritarian rule has left most Iraqis heavily reliant on the central government. Unless Saddam's removal

were followed by re-establishment of a strong and central authority, many Iraqis would begin looking toward more traditional regional, tribal, or religious authorities for support and guidance.

- Some Iraqis would be quick to blame economic problems and other difficulties in their daily lives on a breakdown of the previous order. There might be some longing for the more functional aspects of Saddam's authoritarian regime, similar to nostalgia for an undemocratic past observed in other states that have undergone major loosening of their political systems (such as South Africa and the former Soviet Union).

[] The lack of ingrained democratic traditions, innate distrust of other groups, and the tendency to substitute tribal, ethnic, or sectarian loyalties will impede the development of a stable democracy. Initial expressions of enthusiasm for democratic norms and procedures—not only from ordinary Iraqis, but from any new Iraqi government, which would want to stay in good graces with the US-led Western democracies—would not reflect a sudden alteration of that culture. A stable and democratic Iraqi political system, if one emerges, is likely to be the result of a long evolution that supplants traditional loyalties and practices.

- Democracy or representative institutions could provide a forum to adjudicate competing tribal or sectarian differences.
- However, forcing short-term political accommodations between competing interests before new patterns of trust had developed could be destabilizing. Iraq lacks traditions even comparable to that of the *loya jirga* in Afghanistan, which enables groups there to have some role in

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making or at least ratifying such accommodations.

- Even with a long-term political evolution, sustained nurturing of democratic institutions would be needed to minimize the chance of drift toward the authoritarian patterns that have dominated Iraq's 80-year history.

(U) Political Islam

A factor in favor of possible democratization of Iraq is the relatively low politicization of Iraqi Shiism—the country's majority Islamic creed—particularly in comparison to Wahhabi Islam in Saudi Arabia and the Persian variant of Shiism practiced in Iran. This does not mean, however, that the trend could not take root in post-war Iraq, particularly if economic recovery were slow and foreign troops remained in country for a long period. Academic research indicates that the political vitality of Iraqi Shiism declined throughout the 20th century.

- Since the early 20th century, the Iraqi state has eroded the power and wealth of the Shia religious establishment, established clear boundaries between religion and politics, and generally promoted a secular vision of society.
- In the early 1900s, Shia clerics were primary motivating forces in the rebellion of both Shia and Sunni communities against the British. By the Shia rebellion against Saddam in the 1990s, they no longer played a lead role.
- Nevertheless, traditional religious elites, particularly in the Shia south and portions of Baghdad, have influence through such religious institutions as the Najaf Theological College and Husayniyas (community worship centers) as well as through the *ulema*, religious scholars.

The Sadah, descendants of the prophet, play prominent roles in mediating disputes.

- Islamic non-governmental organizations, such as the al-Khoei Foundation, an international Shia religious, charitable institution based in London, also have influence in the Shia community of Iraq.

No major fundamentalist trend within either the Shia or Sunni communities emerged under the Ba'th—possibly as a result of the regime's repression. Travelers to Iraq report that members of the younger generation are more attracted to fundamentalism than their parents were—perhaps in reaction to the failure of the Iraqi state as well as to the same developments that have boosted political Islam elsewhere in the region. A more politically open society could provide fertile ground for these nascent fundamentalist tendencies. The ability of fundamentalism to take hold in Iraq would depend in large part on how quickly Iraq recovered economically from the lingering effects of sanctions.

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(U) Discredited Arab Nationalism

Another favorable factor, and an unintended consequence of Saddam's rule, has been that one of the prime Arab alternatives to democracy—secular authoritarian nationalism—has been discredited. The appeal of this variety of authoritarianism would be likely to be restricted to a small minority that directly benefited from Saddam's regime.

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(U) Kurdish Democracy—A Case Study

[REDACTED] Iraq's Kurdish groups point to their "democratic experiment" in northern Iraq as an example of how democracy can work in a post-Saddam Iraq. The Kurds have made progress in developing democratic institutions and aspects of a liberal society over the last decade, but habits and perspectives also necessary for democracy are lacking.

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[REDACTED] When Saddam withdrew his forces from large portions of northern Iraq in 1991, traditionally rival Kurdish parties put their differences aside and worked with the international community to establish security, order and humanitarian relief in an extremely volatile environment.

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[REDACTED] Elections were held in May 1992 for a regional assembly and to select a single regional leader. The elections seemed to herald a new beginning for a people whose rivalries had long hampered cooperation and who had known the worst excesses of a brutally repressive regime. The elections were conducted under largely peaceful conditions, with minimal accusations of fraud, and were heralded as a success. However, the parties were unable to live with the results.

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[REDACTED] The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Masud Barzani won the election, 51 percent to 49 percent, but the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Jalal Talabani, refused to accept the outcome. In an effort to forestall fighting, backroom negotiations resulted in an agreement in which the KDP and PUK would have an equal number of seats in the Assembly (with a token number awarded the Assyrians) and the two parties would forge a "unity government" with shared responsibilities and a rotating prime minister. (Such smaller groups as the Assyrians and Communists were given ministerial portfolios, but the real power was distributed between the PDK and PUK.) Neither Barzani nor Talabani took an official post, leaving it to trusted lieutenants to assume the ministerial positions. Although follow-on elections to determine the leader of northern Iraq were scheduled repeatedly, they never took place.

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[REDACTED] Barzani and Talabani continued to jockey for the preeminent position, and full-scale fighting between the two parties erupted in 1994. Combat continued intermittently until August 1996, when the KDP called on Baghdad to help wrest the provincial capital of Arbil from PUK control. The PUK's ouster resulted in the expulsion of the Iraqi National Congress and the withdrawal of the US and Coalition military presence from the north.

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[REDACTED] Since 1996, the Kurds have worked toward gradual rapprochement, with only sporadic intervals of violence. Northern Iraq remains distinctly divided between KDP and PUK zones (with some smaller parties, most notably certain Islamist groups, controlling smaller areas of land). The relationship has reached a level of cautious cordiality—assisted in no small measure by the significant largesse both parties enjoy from the Oil-for-Food Program in northern Iraq and by revenues from smuggling and transit "taxes."

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[REDACTED] With the two militias geographically separated, the parties have managed to establish some "democratic" institutions within their respective areas. Substantial progress has been made in developing elements of civil society and enabling ordinary Kurds to live in non-authoritarian conditions. Efforts have been made to improve freedom of the press, there has been some movement on reforming the judicial systems and police forces, and local municipal elections have been held. The Joint Assembly that was elected in 1992 reconvened in October 2002 after not having met since 1994.

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
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[] The external opposition does not have the popular, political, or military capabilities necessary to play a leading role after Saddam's departure without significant and prolonged external economic, political, and military support.

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[] External Iraqi opposition groups have made limited progress in submerging their differences and developing a unified front. In 2002, several Iraqi external opposition parties held conferences designed to forge unity. At the meeting in December 2002, they called for a democratic and federal Iraq, formed an advisory committee of 65 members, and unanimously opposed a US-imposed post-Saddam political solution. They remained unsure, however, what their role would be in post-Saddam Iraq.

- The conferences could have done little without high-level US input. Interpersonal and organizational problems persist, and many oppositionists worry the US presence will make it difficult for them to gain traction with the Iraqi public.
- Internal divisions and inability to come to agreement led to a postponement of their scheduled mid-January 2003 meeting.

[] Most opposition parties are organized along geographical or ethnic lines, undercutting their ability to attract a widespread political base within Iraq and undermining attempts to forge a united opposition. Some Iraqi Sunni oppositionists criticize the West for compounding that

tendency by supporting Kurds and Shia to the perceived exclusion of Sunni Arabs.

- The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)—an Iranian-backed Shia Arab opposition group—has some following in the Shia tribal areas.

- At the December 2002 meeting, the al-Khoei Foundation played a pivotal peacemaking role between Shia factions. The al-Khoei Foundation, which has a large following in Iraq, promotes the separation of religion from politics.

- The two major Kurdish opposition parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have extensive support within their respective regions in northern Iraq, but they have mounted few successful joint ventures and have no base outside the north.

[] The opposition has made scattered attempts to unite various factions and groups. Such efforts seem to work only when they are formed as a counter to another political party or ethnic group. The Iraqi National Congress (INC) has claimed to be an umbrella group for all opposition groups but the December conference made it clear that it can no longer claim that role.

- Although they are technically part of the INC, the PUK, KDP, SCIRI, and the Iraqi National Accord—an Iraqi nationalist group of former military and security officers—formed the Group of Four to meet informally outside the framework of the INC.
- The various Assyrian oppositionists have coalesced under a US-based umbrella group, ostensibly to protect their minority interests. Turkomen are represented by a

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
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number of groups that do not operate under INC auspices.

Regardless of what political role the external opposition parties assumed, the return of individual exiles could aid the development of political institutions and civil society. The US Committee for Refugees estimates that four million Iraqis live outside Iraq. At least a quarter of them have left Iraq in the last ten years.

- Scattered reporting suggests that a relatively high proportion of these expatriates are middle class professionals or businessmen. Many of them reside in the West, where they have been exposed to democratic norms and values and possibly would bring those values back to Iraq.
- The more skilled exiles would be able to play significant roles in rebuilding Iraq. In so doing they could over time constitute a constituency for democracy.

(U) Domestic Divisions and Conflict

Any new authority in Iraq would face a country with societal fractures and significant potential for violent conflict among domestic groups if not prevented by an occupying force. Some of the domestic divisions are emotion-laden but less visceral and extreme than in some countries in which ethnic conflict has been the basis for genocide.

The principal division is the three-way split among Sunni Arab, Shia, and Kurd, which is based on ethnicity and religion but to some extent involves a geographic concentration of each group in the central, southern, and northern regions of Iraq respectively. The geographic pattern is least distinct with the Shia, especially in Baghdad

and other urban areas, where many Shia live alongside Sunnis. Other societal divisions, including ones based on tribal identities, would add to the challenge of maintaining domestic peace and stability.

- These divisions have not generated constant civil war during Saddam's tenure largely because of the de facto secession of the Kurdish north—protected by the northern no-fly zone—and severe repression by the regime. This suppression includes past use of chemical weapons against Kurds and draining of marshes in the south to help subjugate the predominantly Shia marsh Arabs. The lifting of the repression and the restoration of Iraq's territorial integrity would open the way for heightened competition for power among the different groups and new suspicions about what grabs for power other groups were making.
- Saddam has widened societal splits by exacerbating hostilities and suspicions among ethnic, tribal, and religious groups in an effort to co-opt some and subjugate others.

Despite these societal fissures, Iraq would be unlikely to split apart. Most Iraqis have national identity and pride in being Iraqi that transcends their ethnic and religious differences. More significantly, the alternatives are not attractive.

The harshness of the Saddam regime's methods would form the basis for another split: between those associated with the old regime—and its brutality and

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favoritism—and those who have been its victims. The desire among many of the latter for reprisals against the former would be strong.

If responsibility for internal security had been passed from an occupying force to an Iraqi government, such a government would have to walk a fine line between dismantling the worst aspects of Saddam's police, security, and intelligence forces and retaining the capability to enforce nationwide peace. Those elements most closely associated with Saddam would have to be protected against immediate reprisals if they were to face a judicial process rather than vigilante violence. The Special Republican Guards, Special Security Organization, Iraqi Intelligence Service, Saddam Fedayeen, and Directorate of General Security are all associated with internal repression and surveillance. Local police and the Regular Army are less tainted by association with Saddam's rule and could assist in law enforcement.

- In the immediate aftermath of Saddam's removal, those Iraqi forces capable of putting down unrest and restoring order would tend to employ, if not otherwise checked, the familiar tactics used under the Saddam regime, meaning quick and possibly brutal repression.
- Over the longer term, the police and security forces would need to be rebuilt and restructured if they were to gain the trust of the Iraqi people and avoid the excesses similar to those under Saddam's rule.
- The Regular Army has been relatively unpoliticized below the command level and, once purged of the security and intelligence officers embedded within it, could be used for security and law

enforcement until police or a local gendarme force is established.

Shia-Sunni Strife

For the most part, Iraqi Shia and Sunni have lived peacefully together and do not have a legacy of sectarian strife. Nevertheless, the threat of Shia reprisals for the oppression they have suffered under Saddam's rule is a major concern to the Sunni elite and could erupt if not prevented by an occupying force. The underlying causes for violence involve political reprisals more than ethnic or sectarian divisions.

The broader Iraqi Sunni Arab community does not publicize its views regarding a redistribution of power in Iraq. Anecdotal reporting indicates that some elements of Sunni society would oppose a regime that did not allow the Sunnis to continue to prevail in the military, security services, and government. Other Sunni Arabs, especially ones having extensive interaction with Shia in daily urban life, might view power less starkly in sectarian terms and be open to a more representative political system. In any event, creation of a government that was both stable and more representative would require Sunni acceptance of an end to their longstanding domination of Iraqi politics.

- A decentralized or federal democracy with minority protections might better protect the Sunnis' interests but would still mean loss of their privileged status.


Major sectarian fighting would be likely if the Sunnis retained their political dominance in Baghdad and most of central Iraq but neither they nor a foreign power controlled the south.

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Iraq: Ethnic and Religious Flashpoints

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- Spontaneous uprisings in 1991 showed that civil unrest in the south could quickly spin out of the control of local authorities and open the way to a bloodbath among stranded security and Ba'th Party officials and government troops. While Saddam was able to maintain control during Shia rioting in 1999, demonstrations in the capital illustrated Baghdad's vulnerability, which would be heightened if Iraqi security services were weakened after a change of regime.
- Rather than resulting in the dismemberment of Iraq, Shia revolts could lead to brutal Sunni military operations to reassert control over Shia-controlled areas, if Iraqi military elements retained the capacity to reassert control.
- A severely crippled Iraqi military might not be able to muster a forceful response, notwithstanding the galvanizing effect of a Shia uprising on Sunnis in central provinces.
- Oil facilities and export terminals in southern Iraq would be vulnerable to seizure by Shias.

Shia groups might try to seize some economic assets, but they would be unlikely to stake a territorial claim on any specific portion of Iraq with the aim of establishing a separate "Shia state." To the contrary, statements by major Shia opposition groups with strong ties to the Iraqi Shia population suggest the Shias prefer to assert control over the state through majority rule or, at a minimum, to play an integral part in its governance.

(U) Kurdish Options

Although the Kurds have consistently reiterated their commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq under a

federated system, they could choose to take advantage of a military confrontation, or confusion in the immediate aftermath of Saddam's demise, to wrest control of key areas in order to increase their own leverage within Iraq.

- If not prevented from doing so by an occupying force, the Kurds might try to take advantage of military action, Sunni-Shia strife, or a weak post-Saddam government—as they did in March 1991—by seizing key territory and economic facilities. In particular, Kurds could attempt to seize key oil facilities around Kirkuk and/or Mosul—which constitute nearly one third of Iraq's oil capacity—and then seek to have them included in an autonomy agreement with a new regime. Mosul and Kirkuk have been major sticking points in previous negotiations between the Iraqi Kurds and the central government.
- Property disputes will erupt as Kurds and Turkomen try to reclaim from Arab residents homes lost during Baghdad's decades-old Arabization campaign. Large numbers of Arabs could be displaced in any violence that was allowed to break out, especially in the regions stretching from Mosul in the north, southeast through Kirkuk, to Khanaqin on the Iranian border.
- Kurdish parties, despite their efforts at rapprochement, still harbor political, territorial, and personal resentments and distrust of one another that could erupt into internecine fighting over how to deal with a new regime and/or over control over key territory.

- Armed Kurdish factions control territory and the smuggling of goods and people across the borders with Turkey and Iran.


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(U) Iraq: Tribes and Subtribes^a

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Their ties to a range of illicit activities and groups provide them with extensive revenues. Many of these groups almost certainly will resist being disarmed and being put under the rule of law by a post-Saddam administration.

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Inter-Tribal Conflicts

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Although many Iraqi tribes affiliate themselves with Saddam, for most the ties are based on self-interest. Almost all tribes probably would distance themselves from him as soon as they assessed his demise was inevitable and alternatives were available. Some tribes that remained opposed to Saddam might seek reprisals against those who supported him.

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- Saddam's ruling elite is drawn largely from a handful of Sunni tribes.

Numerous tribe-based coup plots have occurred since 1991, suggesting that powerful Sunni or Shia tribes would seek to play a role in determining a successor regime.

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(U) Iraq's Tribal Structure

About 75 percent of Iraqis identify with a tribe, although many of these are urban residents who probably feel little allegiance to tribal leaders elsewhere in the country. At its most basic, a tribe is a group of people who trace their origin to a common ancestor. There are over 200 tribes in Iraq, some of which have both Sunni and Shia wings.

The importance of tribes to Iraqi society fluctuated during the 20th century. They reached a low point in cohesion and influence in the 1960s under the impact of the 1958 revolution that overthrew the monarchy and the subsequent rapid modernization and urbanization of Iraqi society. After the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars, Iraq's tribes experienced a significant revival. Their fighting prowess caused Saddam to laud their traditional values of courage under fire, manliness, and, increasingly as the repository of "sacred Arab essence."

- While some anti-regime tribal elements have joined the Iraqi opposition, some tribes could take unilateral actions aimed at shoring up their strategic positions within Iraq when Saddam leaves the scene.

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- Key tribes could attempt to wrest control of economic targets—key oil facilities, dams, or other economic assets—either as bargaining chips or as assets that could be sold off. In 1991, Kurdish tribes in the north made sizable profits by selling to the Iranians machinery confiscated at various dams.

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Once a successor regime had consolidated power, the tribes probably would seek accommodation with it. As in the past, tribal leaders could be expected to negotiate with a new regime for their own advantage. The tribes would offer a social structure that could be a stabilizing influence in some parts of the country.

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(U) Humanitarian Issues

[REDACTED] The humanitarian situation in Iraq has improved considerably since implementation of the OFF Program in 1996, but most Iraqis remain vulnerable to disruptions in basic services, particularly food and potable water supplies. The impact on humanitarian needs of a new war would depend on its length and severity. A prolonged struggle to depose Saddam and install a new regime would be likely to cause more flight of refugees and internally displaced persons and to disrupt severely the distribution of food and health services.

- Under the UNHCR's worst-case scenario some 50,000 Iraqis might flee to Kuwait, 20,000 to Saudi Arabia, 60,000 to Syria, 50,000 to Jordan, 270,000 to Turkey, and as many as 900,000 to Iran.

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- Repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons would stretch further Iraq's already strained food and medical supplies.
- Iraq's neighbors could try to influence the political dynamics in Iraq by forcing refugees back into Iraq, or threatening to do so in order to pressure the new government.

(U) Population Displacement

[REDACTED] Some 1 million people are displaced in Iraq—700,000 Iraqis are internally displaced, and 230,000 Palestinians, stateless Bidoons, Iranians, and Turks are refugees in Iraq. In the northern region, many of the internally displaced have been moved a number of times as a result of Baghdad's Arabization campaign and have suffered arbitrary detention, expropriation of property, and destruction of their villages. They depend to some degree on international assistance, and many live in camps where their movement is restricted and they are not permitted to work.

[REDACTED] The internal security situation would affect the humanitarian challenge. Civil strife would cause disruptions in electricity and water purification or distribution if generators, pumps, or plants became damaged, seized, or looted. Food stored in warehouses under the OFF Program would be a prime target for looters, and distribution would become paralyzed by fighting, refugee flows, criminal activity, or hoarding by the military.

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(U) Food and Water

[REDACTED] The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expects a Baghdad-centered military operation would displace another some 900,000 persons internally and create 1.45 million more refugees. If Saddam withdrew his forces into major cities in an attempt to use the populace as "human shields," both civilian casualties and civilian flight could be much larger. These numbers would vary considerably depending on the geographic concentration of the war and its duration.

[REDACTED] Iraq's dependence on the ration basket distributed by the government makes the populace extremely vulnerable to the disruptions in supply. About 60 percent of Iraqis use the food basket as their primary source of food. The average Iraqi does not have the reserve food stocks or financial resources to cope with the panic buying, price gouging, and hoarding that would accompany a breakdown in the food distribution system.

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- Revitalization of the food ration distribution system would be critical in the aftermath of war. UN officials have said that the OFF Program would be suspended during the war and reinstated

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only when the UN regained control of the system.

- Since July 2002, Baghdad has issued double—and sometimes triple—food rations to all Iraqis. This could reduce the number of Iraqis needing food immediately after the war. The World Food Program estimates, however, that 4.9 million Iraqis could immediately require food because of displacement and the selling of food rations to earn money.
- Securing the government's food warehouses after a war and implementing an efficient and equitable food distribution system would be critical to avoiding widespread hunger.
- As of December 2002, Iraq had paid for some 5 million metric tons of foodstuffs to be delivered for 2003 under the OFF Program. This food, provided its delivery is resumed after the war, plus the upcoming spring harvest season, would provide enough of a supply of food. Distribution problems, access to milling facilities, and looting could hinder getting this food to Iraqi households.

The new government would require significant outside assistance to help rebuild Iraq's water and sanitation infrastructure.

- Iraq's infrastructure already has suffered extensive damage. Both the long-term impact of economic sanctions and Saddam's manipulation of resources to shore up his regime have reduced the availability of spare parts and equipment.

Currently, most of Iraq's water treatment plants function well below designed capacity, resulting in shortages of potable water, highly polluted river systems, and increases in sanitation-related health

Iraq: Agricultural Resources Insufficient to Satisfy Needs

A scarcity of arable land, poor agricultural and irrigation practices, frequent droughts, soil salinity, and high evaporation have made Iraq a food deficit country. Only 15 percent of Iraq is arable, and more than 70 percent of this is cultivated. Baghdad imports between 60 and 70 percent of the country's food needs and relies heavily on imported seed for most crops.

Iraq grows a variety of grains, vegetables, and fruit. Grain—primarily wheat, the staple food, and barley—is Iraq's most important crop, totaling 1.9 to 5.0 million metric tons annually, depending on rainfall.


- Wheat and barley (a feed crop for livestock) are planted in the fall and harvested in May and June, mainly in the rain-fed plains and valleys of the north and northeast. Barley also is grown in the Mesopotamian Plain because of its salt tolerance. Rice and corn comprise 15 percent of total grain production.
- The US Department of Agriculture estimates grain production for 2002 reached 2 million metric tons (MMT), an 11 percent boost over the previous year, but still less than two-thirds the 1994 level of 3.3 MMT.

problems. UNICEF estimates that only 41 percent of the population in rural areas has access to safe water, and 30 percent of the population lacks adequate sanitary services. Access also has declined in urban areas, including Baghdad. Underlying causes include unreliable electric power for water and sewage treatment plants, deteriorating water and sewage pipes, and shortages of supplies and equipment. Ongoing lack of spare parts, further damage during a war, and shortages of experienced personnel would make quick rebuilding of facilities difficult.


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(U) Iraq Land Use



(U) Iraq Crop Calendar



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(U) Worst-Case Scenario

Humanitarian challenges will be shaped largely by the military conflict that unseats Saddam. In the worst case, Saddam uses chemical or biological weapons against his own people and Coalition forces and destroys Iraqi oil facilities and dams either to slow an attack or deny the benefits to any successor government.

- Blowing up oil wells or burning them would create significant air pollution and increase the number of people seeking refuge elsewhere.
- The release of toxic hydrogen sulfide gas associated with oil production in the north would add to the humanitarian problem.

Destruction of dams would have a long-term impact on a subsequent regime, however, limiting future flood control, irrigation, and other projects.

- Existing medical facilities simply would be unable to cope with widespread use of chemical or biological weapons.

Deprived of oil revenues, Iraq would be dependent on the international community for food and medicine. The costs of reconstruction of the oil wells would be a further drain on scant resources.

(U) Health and Sanitation

Despite large infusions of humanitarian supplies under OFF, regime mismanagement, corruption, and misguided priorities have caused an overall decline in Iraq's healthcare delivery and sanitation infrastructure. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Health, an estimated \$2 billion

and 2 years would be necessary to restore and fully rehabilitate existing Iraqi hospitals to pre-1991 condition. The current Iraqi medical system is not structured to handle civilian wartime mass casualty trauma and public health problems.

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- A few, primarily private, hospitals in larger towns and government and private outpatient facilities in smaller towns have closed because they lack supplies, personnel, and equipment. Medicines and medical equipment obtained through OFF have not been disseminated widely.
- Public health and preventive medicine currently are inadequate and will deteriorate during war. Sanitation-related diseases including diarrhea, typhoid fever, and cholera have increased along with the insect transmitted diseases malaria and leishmaniasis. Childhood vaccine preventable diseases—measles, pertussis, and diphtheria, also have increased.

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The already poor civilian healthcare situation probably would be severely damaged by the war and widespread civil strife. Cuts in electricity or looting of distribution networks could have a cascading disastrous impact on hospitals at a time when casualty rates are likely to be high. During hostilities, distribution of medical supplies and imports—already scant—will be cut off.

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- Iraq's three main pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities—Samarra Drug Industries, Al-Kindi, and Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine—rely heavily on imported materials that would cease within days of the onset of hostilities. If these facilities were destroyed as suspected dual use BW sites, Iraq would require additional imports of the critical medicines and animal vaccines that they provide in the aftermath of the war.


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- Civil unrest would threaten the continued presence of few UN or NGO workers who play key roles in humanitarian and medical programs in Iraq. This would be in addition to whatever suspension of outside assistance resulted from a military conflict.
- Iraqi aid workers would be unable to fill the gap of departing international humanitarian workers in the short term. They would not have sufficient training and supplies to carry out the work and in some cases would themselves become refugees or would flee possible reprisals due to their affiliation with the old regime.
- A surviving remnant of Iraq's civil authority could move quickly to repair damaged infrastructure, especially if outside assistance were available.
- The UN humanitarian presence in Iraq under OFF has helped to establish and streamline distribution plans and rationing systems that could provide a measure of continuity during the transition period for a new regime.
- Members of the Iraqi opposition and Iraqi expatriates have been studying the Iraqi infrastructure and examining what the most pressing needs of a new regime might be. Return of many of these expatriates and application of the expertise they have acquired in the West would be a valuable addition to meeting Iraq's humanitarian needs.

[] Iraq's already high incidence of disease would likely be exacerbated by the further degradation of infrastructure.

- If populations were displaced into overcrowded and unsanitary living conditions in cities or camps, epidemics of waterborne and respiratory diseases would be likely and would significantly complicate the ability of post-Saddam authorities to return calm to Iraq.
- Fatality rates would be highest in children under age five. Interruptions in routine UN-supplied childhood vaccine deliveries would increase the death toll.

(U) Existing Infrastructure

[] The long-term disintegration of the domestic infrastructure to meet human needs is not inevitable. The military confrontations that have hurt Iraq's infrastructure over the past decade, coupled with long experience battling domestic insurgencies, have provided Iraqi technicians with considerable expertise in repairing damaged equipment with few resources.

[] Financial Strains and Economic Opportunities

[] The combined effects of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars resulted in the destruction of important Iraqi economic assets. Baghdad has made some progress rebuilding Iraq's economic infrastructure, especially in the Sunni heartland, but it still functions below pre-Gulf war levels. Moreover, Iraq's longer-term financial prospects are clouded by the need to use oil and limited non-oil export revenues to pay reparations to victims of the invasion of Kuwait, finance high import and reconstruction costs, and service a large foreign debt load.

- Multiple studies from worst case to best case put Iraq's oil export earnings at \$8-37 billion annually in the first year or two after sanctions are lifted, depending on the price of oil and potential damage to Iraq's oil infrastructure during conflict. If Iraq remains bound by the UN-mandated

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compensation fund requiring that 25 percent of Iraqi oil revenues go to war reparations from Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and if claimants—primarily Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—do not waive their claims, Iraq would have \$6-27.8 billion in revenue.

- The international community's response to Iraqi foreign debt will be critical to Iraq's ability to reconstruct its economy. We estimate that Iraq's total official foreign debt is about \$120 billion, including about \$40 billion owed to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for loans during the Iran-Iraq war. Depending on refinancing terms, Baghdad may have to pay as much as \$12 billion annually just to service the debt.
- Resolution of Iraq's foreign debt issues will be critical to attracting necessary foreign investment.

Without debt forgiveness, a reduction in the war reparations ratio, or something akin to a Marshall Plan, Iraq's economic options are likely to remain few and narrow. Faced with the prospect of laboring under a vicious cycle of deficits and debt for years to come, a new regime almost certainly would ask the international community for debt forgiveness and economic assistance.

- Financial burdens of the magnitudes detailed above, if unrelieved, could impel a more promising successor government toward using repression, out of necessity to quell economically-driven unrest.
- Alternately, a successor government could exploit the economic strains to increase the resentment of the populace against the United States and the West portraying both as attempting to destroy Iraq.

(U) Oil Production Scenarios

If Iraq's oil facilities were relatively undamaged by a war, Baghdad could increase crude oil production from 2.4 million barrels per day (b/d) to about 3.1 million b/d within several months of the end of hostilities.

Boosting production to the pre-Gulf war level of 3.5 million b/d would take an additional 12 to 18 months and cost \$2 to 3 billion for oil well workovers and equipment maintenance in existing oilfields as well as drilling and completing new oilfields such as West Qurna and Majnoon. At \$22-per barrel of Iraqi crude, production at 3.1 million b/d, and assuming exports of 2.8 million b/d, Baghdad could gross \$22 billion per year. Using the same assumptions, when oil production reaches pre-Gulf war levels of 3.5 million b/d, revenues would reach \$26 billion annually.

- Continuation of war reparations would leave Iraq with \$16.5 billion in revenue.

In 1997 the Iraqi Oil Ministry developed an aggressive plan to expand oil production capacity to 6 million b/d within seven years of the lifting of sanctions. To achieve this pace of expansion, extensive foreign assistance would be required as well as about \$15 billion to develop the 10 major oilfields.

If Iraq's oil facilities sustained major damage through Coalition attacks or Iraqi attempts to destroy the oilfields, oil-sector reconstruction costs could exceed \$5 billion. Additionally, at least two years would be needed to restore production to pre-war output.

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[REDACTED] If a successor authority in Baghdad were perceived by investors as both politically and economically stable, Iraq's massive proven oil reserves—second only to Saudi Arabia—could be a significant lure to foreign investment. This could permit Baghdad to expand its oil output rapidly—by an average of 500,000 barrels per day (b/d) per year for several consecutive years—rivaling the recent pace of expansion in Russia and making Iraq the second largest oil exporter in the world after Saudi Arabia as early as 2005.

- The biggest prizes of the Iraqi oil patch are the "giant" oilfields with recoverable reserves of more than one billion barrels each. International oil companies have expressed interest in developing seven of these fields and have signed contracts for two.

[REDACTED] Even with the attractiveness of the Iraqi oil sector, Iraq would need a stable central government and would have to refrain from unreasonable demands on foreign oil companies to realize its full potential as an oil exporter. Iraq would be capable of maintaining current production capacity of about 3.1 million b/d almost indefinitely with its indigenous resources and could even expand it slowly with help from oilfield service companies. Without extensive foreign investment, however, Baghdad would be unlikely to have the financial and technical resources to reach its announced goal of 6 million b/d in capacity.

[REDACTED] A post-Saddam government also would need to focus on developing a strong private sector to set the stage for a less oil-dependent economy. A new government would need to stress fundamentals, such as developing a common currency, providing clear legal protection for private property, revitalizing the domestic financial sector to

provide credit to fuel investment, and developing tax and trade policies that would encourage private commerce.

[REDACTED] Iraq's rapidly growing and young population and current poor socioeconomic conditions will place added strains on the government. Iraq will need to create more than 240,000 new jobs each year for the next five years to accommodate the growing labor force—a difficult task for a country where currently as much as 50 percent of the labor force is unemployed or underemployed. Any significant demobilization of Iraqi military personnel would add to this already high rate of unemployment.

[REDACTED] Immutable Foreign Policy Interests

[REDACTED] The departure of Saddam Husayn—who has been a major cause of regional instability and enmity by twice launching wars of aggression against his neighbors—would offer the prospect of enhancing and stabilizing Iraq's relations with other states in the region. Dependence of a new Iraqi government on the United States, the United Nations, or an international Coalition that overthrew Saddam would heavily affect that government's foreign policies. Nonetheless, substantial elements of continuity in Iraqi foreign policy perspectives would remain. Iraqis would continue to perceive threats growing out of tensions that are grounded in more than Saddam's aggressive behavior and would seek assurance that these perceived threats were being countered. A government in Baghdad also would attempt to build on the relatively stable modus vivendi that Saddam has achieved with his neighbors over the past ten years.

[REDACTED] Baghdad's primary foreign policy focus would be on the states that border Iraq. The main Iraqi concern would be in guarding

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against meddling by one or more of these neighbors in conflicts inside Iraq.

- Turkey would be a concern for a post-Saddam Iraqi regime.
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meddling more than military intervention. Sunni Iraqis would be wary about Tehran's attempts to curry favor with, and perhaps dissension in, the Iraqi Shia community. Over the longer term, Iran's WMD programs would be of high concern to Baghdad, particularly if Iraq's own WMD programs were destroyed and its conventional forces weakened by combat with Coalition forces and subsequent occupation.

1.4(c)

- Unless there is some movement on a tripartite agreement, relations between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria could become increasingly fractious because of water shortages in Syria and Iraq emanating from the Southeast Anatolian Development Project.
- Rivalry with Iran would be a continuing reality for Iraq. The two states are, by virtue of population and petroleum resources, the main contenders for military dominance in the Persian Gulf. Centuries-old enmity between Persian and Arab would remain, as would distrust over the status and exploitation of Iraqi Shia. The territorial and navigational issues that underlay the Iran-Iraq war would continue, as well as issues left by the war itself (unrepatriated prisoners and general rancor from eight years of combat). For the near term, Iran would be a concern to a new Iraqi regime in terms of internal

- A new government in Iraq would be less concerned about Syria than about either Turkey or Iran. The potential for interference is less, there would be continued mutual dependence on Syrian-Iraqi trade, and a collapse of the Iraqi Ba'th Party might reduce some of the Iraqi-Syrian tensions that have involved differing claims to Ba'thist orthodoxy. Both Baghdad and Damascus might be interested in developing a bilateral relationship that would help to counter a perceived Turkish-Israeli-Jordanian alliance.

- The traditionally close ties between Iraq and Jordan probably would remain strong, although the makeup of a new regime in Baghdad would determine how far the relationship would develop.

1.4(c)

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- A new regime in Baghdad likely would renounce Saddam's earlier claims on Kuwait to garner international political and economic support over the near term. In the longer term, traditional Iraqi designs on Kuwaiti territory could resurface. Unsettled territorial issues would be a source of potential friction in the future. Iraqi complaints about the UN demarcated border—which regime

~~SECRET~~

6.2(d)

officials argue restricts Iraq's coastal access—could become an issue with a new government. Iraq has long argued that access to international waters is essential to its national security and future Iraqi regimes could seek enhanced access.

[] Iraq's foreign rivalries extend beyond its immediate neighbors. Foremost among the perceived threats that will worry Iraqis is Israel. A new Iraqi regime almost certainly would stay in the Arab mainstream in voicing strong support for Palestinian statehood and criticism of Israeli actions against the Palestinians. At the same time, the Israeli destruction of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 remains a humiliating memory for most Iraqis, who have an abiding and deep distrust of Israel. []

[] Expansion of relations with a variety of outside powers would be another likely theme of post-Saddam Iraqi foreign policy, partly to try to minimize the influence of any single power. This objective would become increasingly important to the extent that the United States were perceived as having gained overriding influence in a postwar Iraq. Baghdad probably would welcome enhanced political ties with Russia and the European Union—and perhaps also with Asian powers such as India and China—building on commercial relationships.

[] Implications for Iraqi Security Policy

[] New Iraqi leaders would understand that Iraq would have to bend to the will of the international community at least as much on military and security matters as on any other aspect of policy, given the nature of the threat Saddam's regime has posed. Nonetheless, as with aspects of broader foreign policy, there

would be significant elements of continuity in Iraqi perspectives and ambitions. A combination of crushing defeat, disgust with the path on which Saddam had taken Iraq, and inspired new leadership could move Iraq in a markedly less militarist direction, somewhat like Japan after World War II. We believe it more likely, however, that any future government in Iraq would retain interest in rebuilding the Iraqi military, for several reasons:

- To counter the potential threats that Iraqis would continue to see from its neighbors, [] 1.4(c)
- To ensure internal security and provide domestic jobs. 1.4(c)
- To restore the pride in Iraq's historical and regional importance that most Iraqis probably share; Iraqis would consider a significant military capability to be an essential component. 6.2(d)

A security guarantee involving a long-term foreign military presence might partially assuage the first two concerns but not the third.

(U) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

[] The issue of weapons of mass destruction would not go away, even if Saddam's WMD programs were destroyed. Any successor regime probably would be cooperative on disarmament issues in the near term, however, to maintain international support. 6.2(d)

- An immediate challenge in post-Saddam Iraq will be accounting for all of the WMD. The prospect that some material would be siphoned off by military, security, or scientific elements to be used later against Coalition interests will be of immediate concern. 6.2(d)

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6.2(d)

- Long-term foreign monitoring and inspections likely would be necessary to ensure that Iraq's WMD infrastructure was dismantled and destroyed.

their willingness to market their technical expertise or materials to others.

- Alternative occupations for scientists and technicians involved in WMD programs would reduce their availability for a re-established program as well as reduce

Iraq's interest in WMD capabilities has been largely a result of the security environment as well as Saddam's megalomania. Unless guaranteed a security umbrella against its strategic rivals, future Iraqi leaders would likely have a continued

6.2(d)

Post-Saddam Political Reconstruction: A Simulation

6.2(d)

a simulation in July 2002 that revolved around a post-Saddam negotiation along the lines of the Bonn conference on Afghanistan. Participants included Iraq and Middle East experts from both private and public sectors

6.2(d)

1.4(c)

The participants played the roles of several Iraqi actors, including Sunni officers, opposition elements, remnants of the Tikriti elite, prominent Shia figures, and Kurds. External actors included regional governments, the United Nations, the United States and several Security Council members and European countries. Principal observations from the simulation included:

- Political transformation inside Iraq would require an extremely large, long-term US military presence on the ground and willingness for the United States to go it alone.
- Limited US military involvement led to a Sunni-Arab military-dominated regime working with a loose confederation of relatively autonomous groups.
- Iraqi players were preoccupied with short-term personal gains and holding onto power rather than taking a longer-term view on what might benefit Iraq as a nation. Short-term alliances can be formed, however, similar to what happened with the Kurds in 1991.
- Iraq's neighbors were prone to take unilateral steps to ensure their interests were met.
- The UN did not readily step into line with US plans.
- International players were ready to resume business with whoever appeared to hold the power in Iraq.
- Arab League members were more comfortable with the formulas for governance proposed by the Iraqi delegations than with the democratic formula pushed by the Americans. The Arabs were concerned that an uncomfortably high bar was being set for the region.


1.4(c)

1.4(c)
6.2(d)


6.2(d)

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
6.2(d)

interest in WMD. Baghdad might become one of the more vocal proponents of region-wide arms control. Without effective nuclear arms control, concerns about the WMD capabilities of other regional states 


1.4(c)

 probably would lead a future Iraqi regime to consider how to rebuild the country's WMD programs.

(U) Terrorism

 A new Iraqi regime would be less inclined than Saddam to support terrorism, although traditional sympathy for the Palestinians could mean continued ties to some Palestinian organizations. Sponsorship of terrorism would not be seen as fulfilling national pride or meeting regional security concerns in the same way that a strong army or WMD program might.

6.2(d)

 The ability of al-Qa'ida or other terrorist groups to maintain a presence in northern Iraq (or, more clandestinely, elsewhere) would depend largely on whether a new regime were able to exert effective security control over the entire country. In addition, rogue ex-regime elements could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerilla warfare against the new government or Coalition forces.

6.2(d)

