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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



U-15-3048/FAC2A1 (FOIA)

SEP 29 2015

Mr. John Greenwald
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Greenwald:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated July 3, 2008, that you submitted to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) requesting a copy of all issues of the Military Intelligence Digest (MID) created in September 2001. I apologize for the delay in responding to your request. DIA continues its efforts to eliminate the large backlog of pending FOIA requests. In order to properly respond, it was necessary to consult with another office within the agency.

A search of DIA's systems of records located nine documents (68 pages) responsive to your request.

Upon review, I have determined that some portions of three documents (17 pages) must be withheld in part from disclosure pursuant to the FOIA. The withheld portions are exempt from release pursuant to Exemptions 1, 3 and 6 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1), (b)(3) and (b)(6). Exemption 1 applies to information properly classified under the criteria of Executive Order 13526. Exemption 3 applies to information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding. The applicable statutes are 10 U.S.C. § 424, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) and 50 U.S.C. 403(g). Statute 10 U.S.C. § 424 protects the identity of DIA employees, the organizational structure of the agency, and any function of DIA. Statute 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i) protects intelligence sources and methods. Statute 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) protects CIA functions and information. Exemption 6 applies to information which if released would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of other individuals.

Further, I have determined that the remaining six responsive documents (51 pages) must be withheld in full pursuant to the FOIA. These withheld documents are exempt from release pursuant to Exemptions 1 and 3 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3).

If you are not satisfied with my response to your request, you may exercise your right to file an administrative appeal by writing to the address below and referring to case number 0512-2008. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 days after the date of this letter.

Defense Intelligence Agency
7400 Pentagon
ATTN: FAC2A1 (FOIA)
Washington, D.C. 20301-7400

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Alesia Y. Williams for". The signature is written in a cursive style.

Alesia Y. Williams *YSA*
Chief, FOIA and Declassification Services Office

3 Enclosures


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(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i)

4 September 2001
MID-170-01 []

MID

The last two
pgs are
denied in
full.



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0620

The unauthorized disclosure of classified information may be prosecuted under Section 793 and Section 796, Title 18, USC, and is punishable by fine of not more than \$10,000, imprisonment of not more than 10 years, or both.

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(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i)

MID Mission Statement

(U) The *Military Intelligence Digest (MID)* is the Defense Intelligence Community's flagship publication. This fully coordinated Department of Defense product identifies emerging issues and examines their national security ramifications for senior Defense policymakers, force planners, and warfighters. Analysts from the warfighting commands, service intelligence production centers, and DIA contribute articles. As product manager, DIA makes every effort to ensure that these articles represent the best of the Defense Intelligence Community, while permitting analysts to engage in speculative and alternative analyses. The MID's blend of research, estimates, and scientific/technical intelligence complements the [] *Executive Highlights*, which focuses on current intelligence issues.

(b)(3):10
USC 424

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(U) Please send any questions, comments, or suggestions to the MID duty officer, []

(b)(3):10 USC 424

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- ORCON (OC) Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
- PROPIN (PR) Caution—Proprietary Information Involved
- NOFORN (NF) Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
 - FGI Foreign Government Information
- DSEN DEA Sensitive
- RD Restricted Data
- HCS HUMINT Control System

(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i)

(b)(1), 1.4 (a), 1.4 (c)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ These US electronic parts are export controlled, based on their technical parameters. Moscow obtained them from the US manufacturer under an export license that specified the parts would be used in security camera systems. No information is available on whether the Chinese entities knew Elektron was providing illegally transhipped US export-controlled parts.

Assessment

(b)(1), 1.4 (a), 1.4 (c)

ADCs: Critical for Data Handling

(U) Analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) change the continuously varying "real world" of analog signals, such as video and speech, to process digital information. Modern radars, communication systems, and electronic warfare equipment use high-speed ADCs to rapidly process large amounts of data. Increasing the number of bits in the ADC improves the system's overall precision. Of more concern to the United States would be the transfer of greater than 12-bit ADCs with less than 2-nanosecond conversion time.

(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i)

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
(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i)

11 September 2001

MID-175-01- []

MID



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Iran: Exploring FENCER Weapon System Capabilities


(S) One of the greatest potential regional threats in the Persian Gulf comes from Iran's 31 Su-24/FENCER fighter-bombers.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(b)(1),1.4 (c)



Assessment

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

(S) [] (b)(1),1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i),1.4 (c)

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Precision-Guided Munitions

	<i>KAB-500Kr</i>	<i>AS-14a/KEDGE</i>	<i>AS-12b/KEGLER</i>
Type	Guided free-fall bomb	Short-range ASM	Short-range ASM
	(b)(1),1.4 (c)	(b)(1),1.4 (c)	(b)(1),1.4 (c)
Guidance	Television-command	Semiactive laser	Semiactive laser
CEP	10 meters	10 meters	10 meters
Warhead explosive mass	Concrete penetrator	Hard-target penetrator	Blast warhead
	(b)(1),1.4 (c)	(b)(1),1.4 (c)	(b)(1),1.4 (c)

Last 2 pages are denied in full

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3024(i)

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(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i)

14 September 2001
MID-176-01

MID

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denied in full.



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424

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3024(i)

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(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i)

NOFORN//X1

(b)(1), 1.4 (c), 1.4 (h)

(U) An abstract in the proceedings of the May 1999 14th Iranian Congress of Physiology and Pharmacology reported the effects of aerosolized staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) in grivet monkeys. Dr. Ghollam Hossein Riazi and his coauthors stated that they used a nebulizer to administer an SEB spray to monkeys in an inhalation chamber. The studies ostensibly were intended to help find improved methods to treat SEB exposure after ingestion. However, the abstract gave no quantitative information and provided no indication of the number of animals used, the dosage of SEB employed, or whether the monkeys became ill or died from the exposure.

(b)(1), 1.4 (c), 1.4 (h)

(b)(3):10
USC 424,(b)
(3):50-USC
3024(i)

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3024(i)

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