

THIS FILE IS MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE DECLASSIFICATION EFFORTS AND RESEARCH OF:

THE BLACK VAULT

THE BLACK VAULT IS THE LARGEST ONLINE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT / GOVERNMENT RECORD CLEARING HOUSE IN THE WORLD. THE RESEARCH EFFORTS HERE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS THROUGHOUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND ALL CAN BE DOWNLOADED BY VISITING:

[HTTP://WWW.BLACKVAULT.COM](http://www.blackvault.com)

YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO YOUR FRIENDS, BUT PLEASE KEEP THIS IDENTIFYING IMAGE AT THE TOP OF THE .PDF SO OTHERS CAN DOWNLOAD MORE!



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CM-190-61
1961 APR 21 18 APR 1961

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA

SUBJECT: "Doctrine" on Thermonuclear Attack

1. By JCSM-252-61, attached hereto, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward to you their divergent views on Project #2 of Assignment of Projects within the Department of Defense, dated March 8, 1961, in which you asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff present a "doctrine" which if accepted would permit controlled response and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear attack.

2. You will note, from the attached memorandum, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I among them, are in agreement that we do not now have the requisite capabilities for carrying out a doctrine of controlled responses and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear attack. We also agree that attempts at the present time to implement such a doctrine, or to declare such an intent, would be premature and could gravely weaken our deterrent posture.

3. The basic split in this report relates to the extent to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff should make a judgment now that implementing a doctrine of controlled response and negotiating pauses in the event of thermonuclear war is a desirable and feasible course of action in the future.

4. My personal judgment is that we do not now have adequate defenses, nor are our nuclear retaliatory forces sufficiently invulnerable, to permit us to risk withholding a substantial part of our effort, once a major thermonuclear attack has been initiated. Furthermore, the advantages to be achieved by limiting our responses, under such conditions, could only be realized by the enforcement upon the Soviets of a degree of tacit "cooperation" which does not now appear

23 sent 1/15/62 Declassified by
JCS, 19 NW 80

OASD(PA) DFOISR 80-TS-151

~~TOP SECRET~~

realistic. Nevertheless, I believe that further specification of such a doctrine, insofar as it applies to conditions of less than large-scale deliberate attack, would be a desirable undertaking. It would submit the complex problems of controlled responses, negotiating pauses, and their interrelationship with enemy reactions to rigorous analysis. However, except for these lower levels of attack, I believe that an attempt to spell out specific controlled response options would be undesirable until we have more knowledge of the technological possibility of creating the essential building blocks on which safe implementation of the doctrine could be based.

5. It is my judgment, therefore, that it is not now possible to set forth a more definitive doctrine, which if accepted in the proximate future would permit, with safety, controlled response and negotiating pauses covering the full range of the conceivable thermonuclear threat. Nevertheless, I believe the matter to be of such importance that it can, with profit, be examined further, with regard to its application under conditions of less than large-scale deliberate attack and particularly with respect to the conditions and the time-frame under which such a doctrine might realistically be made increasingly applicable over a wider range. Accordingly, I have directed the Joint Strategic Survey Council, as a matter of priority, to examine the problem further from this point of view and to submit their findings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. Therefore, that the answer to Project 2 provided herewith is a first reply, to be followed by further study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment:
JCSM-252-61

Declassified by JCS
19 Nov 80



~~SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

80-F01-1007
Project 3

(4)

CM-172-61

APR 3 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA

Subject: Major Military Force Projections to End
FY 1965

References: a. Multi-address Memo from SecDef Dated
8 March 1961, Subj: Assignment of Projects
within the Department of Defense
b. CM-65-61 Dated 17 January 1961

Enclosure: Major Army, Naval, and Air Force Forces
Funded through FY 1962 President's Budget

1. The Enclosure, showing major military forces by end
Fiscal Years from 1 July 1960 to 1 July 1965, is forwarded in
response to requirement number three ("Prepare a five-year
summary of forces and major weapons.") of reference a.

2. The Enclosure reflects all program changes resulting
from amendments to the FY 1962 President's Budget, including
the major program changes presented to the Congress by the
President on 28 March 1961.

3. As in the case of the 17 January submission (reference b.),
equipment assets projected beyond FY 1962 reflect programs funded
by the amended President's FY 1962 and prior years' budgets. For
example, 22 squadrons of F-105 aircraft funded through the FY 1962
President's Budget as amended enter the inventory by 1 July 1964.
Hence, no increase in this program which would be due to any FY
1963 buy is shown at the 1 July 1965 position.

Declassified by JCS
19 Nov 82

~~SECRET~~

SecDef Cont. No. 508

8-MRB 173

~~SECRET~~

4. Force projections were made on the basis that end FY 1962 military manpower levels will remain constant through 1 July 1965.

5. Data shown in the Enclosure were provided by the Services and are as of 30 March 1961. Where necessary, comments are included to amplify the tabulations.

L. L. Lemnitzer
L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

cc: RAdm McCormick

Declassified by JCS, 19 NOV 80

~~SECRET~~



MAJOR ARMY POSING

COPY NO. 1

FUNDING THROUGH FY 1962 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET (As Approved)

UNIT	FY 1 Jul 61	1 Jul 61	1 Jul 62	1 Jul 63	1 Jul 64	1 Jul 65
MAJOR COMBAT UNIT						
Divisions	14	14	14	14	14	14
Infantry	(5)	(9)	(9)	(9)	(9)	(9)
Armored	(1)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)
Airborne	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Armored Combat Comd.	1	1	1	1	1	1
Brigades	2	2	2	2	2	2
Regiments (Amd Div)	6	6	6	6	6	6
Battle Groups	8	9	9	9	9	9
Special Forces Groups	3	3	3	3	3	3
PA Missile Op (KROFTON)	3	3	3	3	-	-
Air Defense Bn	87 3/4	87 3/4	87 3/4	87 3/4	87 3/4	87 3/4
STIC AJAX	(45)	(17 1/2)	(19)	(14)	(9)	(7)
STIC VINCULUM	(25 1/2)	(14 1/2)	(17 3/4)	(17 3/4)	(17 3/4)	(17 3/4)
ACADEM	-	-	-	-	-	-
RAMC	(2 1/2)	(13)	(21)	(21)	(21)	(21)
STIC SHAN	-	-	-	-	-	-
Supporter Combat Bn						
Armored Rifle	5	6	6	6	6	6
Armor	9	9	9	9	9	9
Field Artillery	38	38	38	38	38	38
Regt Combat	17	17	17	17	17	17
PA in BNC m	5	3	2	2	-	-
MM, "A"	-	-	-	-	-	-
MM, "B"	1846/19 1/2	1700/19 1/2	1755/15 1/2	1613/15 1/2	1507/15 1/2	1477/15 1/2
MM, LITTLE JUNG	-	1758/2	1731/7	1317/7	1233/7	1009/7
MM, LACONNE	1362/8	1706/8	1760/8	1722/8	1662/8	1616/8
MM, CORONAL	1344/12	1318/12	1274/12	1235/9	1234/1	-
MM, ACHILLES	-	-	125/3	1205/7	1301/10	153/10
MM, PIONEER	-	-	10/1	121/3	134/3 1/2	15/3 1/2
Co, Ave	33	34	35	40	40	40
Total Op Apts	4589	4597	4611	4705	4697	4517
STIC/STIC	870000	870000	870000	870000	870000	870000

Includes National Guard on-site installations.

Includes missile units organic to missile commands and divisions.

// Indicates Amd. levels.

Missile levels are insufficient for number of sets of fire control equipment in BNC/AMT and PIONEER units.

1 July 1965 position reflects consumption of PIONEER missiles for training purposes, without aerial replenishment due to accy FY 1965 buy.

MM not shown as this vary. Organic aircraft included in following entry.

- GENERAL COMMENTS:**
1. Unit Equipment (UE) is the number of aircraft in organizational unit.
 2. No deliveries from procurement program subsequent to the FY 1962 Budget are reflected herein.
 3. Current Army program indicates a requirement for additional personnel for FY 63-64 to adequately man the forces shown.
 4. The true effect of limited procurement due to Army combat capability is impossible to portray through a force structure. Basically, the Army equips men, while other services primarily use equipment. The soldier is the principal combat weapon of the Army, but his effectiveness is measured in large part by the quality of the equipment available to him.

Declassified by JCS
19 NOV 80

SECRET

MAJOR NAVAL FORCES

FUNDED THROUGH FY 1962 (RESIDENT'S BUDGET
(As Amended))

UNITS	YE	1 Jul 60	1 Jul 61	1 Jul 62	1 Jul 63	1 Jul 64	1 Jul 65	COMMENTS
Attack Carrier		14	14 (1)	14 (1)	14	14	14 (1)	() New construction CVA's phasing into fleet, older CVA's phasing out.
ASW Carriers		9	9	9	9	9	9	
Tact Command Ship		1	1	1	1	1	1	
Cruisers		13	14	14	14	14	14	
C/M Types		(6)	(9)	(12)	(12)	(12)	(12)	
Gun Types		(7)	(5)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	
Destroyers		246	225	225	225	222	222	
C/M Types		(3)	(19)	(24)	(39)	(43)	(54)	
Gun Types		(223)	(206)	(201)	(186)	(179)	(168)	
Submarines - Total		111	112	109	104	106	106	
Nuclear		(8)	(15)	(18)	(25)	(29)	(32)	
Conventional		(103)	(96)	(91)	(79)	(77)	(74)	
F3M Submarines - Total <i>RES</i>		2 / 4	5 / 96	9 / 170	12 / 268	24 / 310	29 / 310	11 alongside the F3M submarines show the combined total of A-1 and A-2 missiles on hand as of the date indicated. By and FY 65 all F3M submarines will be fitted for A-2 missiles. Missiles programmed through FY 64 for the purpose of ship-filling, training, support, and quality control will not meet the requirements for the F3M submarines programmed through FY 62 but are in commission by FY 65.
Patrol Escort		45	43	43	43	44	45	
Mine Warfare		51	54	54	54	54	51	
Amphibious		113	105	103	103	103	103	
Auxiliary		197	204	206	205	204	203	
TOTAL		812	817	817	818	824	827	
CVG (Attack Carrier Air Group)		16	17	17	16	16	16	
CVSG (ASW Carrier Air Group)		11	11	11	11	11	11	
VP-RON (Patrol Squad)		32	32	32	32	32	32	
VP-RON (Lighter-than-air LTA Squad)		1	0	0	0	0	0	See attached sheet for US of Navy/Marine Corps air combat units as of 1 July 1965.
VN-RON (Warning Squad)		5	7	5	5	5	5	
TV-RON (LTA Warning Squad)		1	0	0	0	0	0	
VAP-RON (VCP) (Heavy Photo Squad)		2	2	2	2	2	2	
VQ-RON (Heavy Electronic Squad)		2	2	2	2	2	2	
EU-RON (Utility Helicopter Squad)		2	3	3	3	3	3	
TOTAL OPERATING A/C		5759	5953	5864	5507	5423	4839	Marine Corps aviation data on numbers of operating aircraft is included in Navy totals.
TOTAL ACTIVE NAVY PERSONNEL		617,904	525,000	528,000	529,000	529,000	528,000	
Fleet Marine Forces		2	2	2	2	2	2	
Division/Brig Teams		3	3	3	3	3	3	
Avy Arty Bn (RJ)		2	2	1	1	1	1	
Light AA Bn (BANK)		1	2	1	1	1	1	* The 1st Medium AA Bn will be redesignated the 1st Light AA Bn during the 4th Quarter, FY 1962.
Med AA Bn (TERRIER)		1	1	0	0	0	0	** One Battalion to be in a cadre status.
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL		175,000	175,000	175,000	175,000	175,000	175,000	

- GENERAL COMMENTS:
- Unit Equipment (UE) is the number of aircraft in organizational units.
 - No deliveries for procurement programs subsequent to the FY 62 Budget are reflected herein.
 - Current Navy/Marine Corps programs indicate a requirement for additional personnel for FY 63, 64, and 65 to adequately man the forces above.
 - Ships shown include new and modernized ships which will replace some of the average ones now in the fleet.

SECRET
(30 Apr 61)Declassified by JCS,
19 NOV 80

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MAJOR AIR FORCE FORCES
FORCED THROUGH FY 1962 POSTION: 8 MONTHS
 (As Amended)

UNIT	US	1 Jul 52	1 Jul 53	1 Jul 54	1 Jul 55	1 Jul 56	1 Jul 57	1 Jul 58	1 Jul 59	1 Jul 60	1 Jul 61	1 Jul 62	COMMENTS
Air Transport Sqdn (ATS)													
C-118	9-2	(7)	(7)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	
C-121	1-2	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	
C-124	1-2	(3)	(3)	(8)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(7)	
C-133	12-10	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	
C-130	12-10				(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	
C-135	12-11			(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	
		Sqs	Sqs	Sqs	Sqs	Sqs	Sqs	Sqs	Sqs	Sqs	Sqs	Sqs	
Logistics Support (AMS)													
C-124	10-12	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
AMAC													
MC-121	10	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	
Air Refueling Squadrons (ARS)		50	55	55	48	49	43						
RF-77	20	(31)	(30)	(23)	(12)	(12)	(6)						
RF-105	20	(6)	(11)	(11)	(15)	(17)	(17)						
RF-105	10	(16)	(16)	(20)	(20)	(19)	(19)						
RF-105	23			(1)	(1)								
US-70	20	6	6	5	5	3	2						
Total Operating Aircraft		15,312	13,616	12,500	12,363	11,519	10,199						This excludes AMS and ARS.
ACTIVE PERSONNEL													
Strength		814,752	822,900	824,900	824,900	824,900	824,900						

- GENERAL COMMENTS:**
1. Unit Equipment (UE) is the number of aircraft in organizational units. (Var indicates variable. UE 45/15 indicates 45 a/c per wing and 15 a/c per squadron. 12-10 indicates unit equipment is 12 or 10.)
 2. No deliveries from procurement programs subsequent to the FY 1962 Budget are reflected herein.
 3. Current OBAF programs indicate a requirement for additional personnel for FY 63, 64, and 65 to adequately man the force shown.
 4. Air Force units are expressed in wings and squadrons. For example:

$$1 \text{ Jul } 60$$

$$1-52 \quad (12)-(36)$$
 indicates there are 12 wings of B-52s composed of 36 squadrons.
 5. In the case of aircraft, procurement levels through FY 62 produce a continued decline in the numbers of operating aircraft.

18-10 a)

Declassified by JCS, 19 NOV 80

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

TYPICAL COMPOSITION OF NAVY AIR COMBAT UNITS AS OF 1 JULY 1963

<u>Typical Attack Carrier</u>			<u>Typical ASW Carrier (CVSG)</u>		
<u>UE</u>	<u>(CVG) Air Group</u>		<u>UE</u>	<u>Air Group</u>	
14	F4H	{1 Squadron}	20	S2F-1/3	{2 Squadrons}
14	F8U	{1 Squadron}	16	HSS-1N/2	{1 Squadron}
24	A4D	{2 Squadrons}			
12	AD	{1 Squadron}			
9	A3D/A3J	{1 Squadron}			
<u>Typical Patrol Squadron (VP-RON)</u>			<u>Typical ECM Recon. Squadron (VQ-RON)</u>		
11	P2V-7S	{1 Squadron} (Shore-based)	<u>UE</u>		
10	P5M-2	{1 Squadron} (Sea-based)	8	A3D-2Q	
<u>Typical AEW Squadron (VW-RON)</u>			3	WV-2Q	
30	WF-2	Carrier-based (Provides detachments of 4 a/c to CVA/CVS)	<u>Typical Helo Utility Squadron (HU-RON)</u>		
39	WV-2	Shore-based. No typical squadron. This number provides LANT and PAC requirements.	<u>UE</u>		
			30	HU2K	
			5	HUS-1A	
			5	HUL-1	
<u>Typical Photo Recon. Squadron (VAP-RON) (VCP)</u>					
30	F8U-1P	Carrier-based (Provides detachments of 4 a/c to CVA)			
10	A3D-2P	Shore-based.			

TYPICAL COMPOSITION OF MARINE CORPS AIR COMBAT UNITS AS OF 1 JULY 1963

Wing varies with Fiscal Year. Typical composition for FY 1963:

<u>UE</u>			<u>Squadrons</u>
18	VMF	{Ftr incl all-weather}	5
20	VMA	{Attack}	4
17	VMCJ	{Reconnaissance}	1
24	HMR (L)	{Light Helicopter}	4
12	HMR (M)	{Medium Helicopter}	1
21	VMO	{Observation}	1
12	VMGR	{Transport, fixed-wing, inflight refueling}	1

Without production, each year subsequent to 1963, the quantities of aircraft will decrease by 25% through attrition and completion of service life.

Delass. filed by JCS, 19 NOV 80

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SECRET

MAJOR AIR FORCE FORCES

RUMMED THROUGH FY 1962 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
(As Amended)

UNIT	1 Jul 61	1 Jul 62	1 Jul 63	1 Jul 64	1 Jul 65
MAJOR UNIT STRATEGIC FORCES					
Bomb Wings					
B-52	125	100	100	100	100
B-47	(13)	(14)	(14)	(14)	(14)
B-58	(1)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
GAM-72 (QUAIL)	12	14	14	14	14
GAM-77 (ROUND DOG)	12	25	29	29	29
Reconnaissance Wings					
RB-47	6	1	1	1	1
Missile Squadrons					
SM-62 SHARK	10-13	10	10	10	10
SM-65 ATLAS	10	10	10	10	10
SM-68 TITAN	10	10	10	10	10
SM-60 Pinned MINUTEMAN (SMO)	50	150	3	500	12
AIR DEFENSE FORCES FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADS					
F-86	25	54	53	51	49
F-89	12	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
F-100	25	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
F-101	10-24	(15)	(17)	(17)	(17)
F-102	Var	(24)	(22)	(20)	(19)
F-104	25	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)
F-106	18-24	(10)	(14)	(14)	(14)
MAJOR UNIT TACTICAL FORCES					
Tactical Fighter Wings					
F-100	72/19 75/25	(13)	(14)	(12)	(12)
F-104	72/18	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
F-105	72/18 75/25	(1)	(1)	(2)	(6)
F-101	75/25	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)
Tactical Bomber Wings					
B-56	48/16	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)
B-57	48/16	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)
Tactical Recon Wings					
RB-47	72/18	(1)	(6)	(1)	(6)
RB-101	72/13	(2)	(8)	(2)	(8)
Troop Carrier Wings					
C-124 (Heavy)	36/12	(4)	(12)	(4)	(12)
C-119 (Medium)	48/16	(4)	(12)	(4)	(12)
C-123 (Assault)	48/16	(2)	(6)	(2)	(6)
C-130 B (Assault)	48/16	(2)	(6)	(2)	(6)
C-130 E (Medium)	48/16	(2)	(6)	(2)	(6)
Tactical Missile Squadrons					
SM-62C (MAGALOT)	Var	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)
SM-76 A/B (MAGALOT)	72/18	(2)	(2)	(5)	(6)

Exact date of phaseout under study.

Incrementally phased. Sqs and US quantities are based on assumptions that FY 62 funding will attain end FY 64 US program.

TITAN forces include 6 missiles assigned training squadron at Vandenberg AFB.

MINUTEMAN forces are currently under review.

Declassified by JCS 19 Nov 86



APR 21 AM 11 41

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CM-192-61

APR 20 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA

Subject: Major Military Force Projections to End
FY 1965

References: a. CM-172-61 Dated 3 April 1961
b. Memo for CJCS from SecDef Dated
14 April 1961

Enclosure: Major Air Force Forces Funded through FY
1962 President's Budget (As Amended)
(Revised 18 April 1961)

Enclosed are revised copies of the Summary of Major Air
Force Forces Funded through FY 1962 in President Kennedy's
budget. The revision has been published in compliance with your
directive of 14 April to reissue the Summary to conform to your
letter to President Kennedy of 20 February.

L. L. Lemnitzer
L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

cc: RAdm McCormick

Declassified by JCS
19 NOV 80

SecDef Cont. No. 668

SECRET

SECRET

MAJOR AIR FORCE FORCES

FUNDED THROUGH FY 1962 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
(As Approved)

UNITS	US	1 Jul 60	1 Jul 61	1 Jul 62	1 Jul 63	1 Jul 64	1 Jul 65	COMMENTS
MAJOR UNITS								
STRATEGIC FORCES								
Bomb Wings		Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	
B-52	45/25	(12) (36)	(13) (39)	(14) (42)	(14) (42)	(14) (42)	(14) (42)	
B-47	45/25	(25) (100)	(20) (80)	(13) (52)	(8) (32)	(4) (16)	(0) (0)	
B-58	40/20	(1) (4)	(1) (6)	(2) (8)	(2) (8)	(2) (8)	(2) (8)	
GAM-72 (QUAIL)	28	1	11	14	14	14	14	
GAM-77 (ROUND DOG)	18	5	12	25	29	29	29	
Reconnaissance Wings								
RB-47	45/15	2 6	2 6	1 3	1 3	1 3	1 3	
Missile Squadrons		Mals Sqs	Mals Sqs	Mals Sqs	Mals Sqs	Mals Sqs	Mals Sqs	
SM-62 SNAKE	30	30 1	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	
SM-65 ATLAS	10-13	9 2	36 4	98 8	145 13	145 13	145 13	
SM-68 TITAN	10	- -	6 -	58 5	92 8	125 12	125 12	
SM-80 Fixed MINUTEMAN (BMD)	50	- -	- -	- -	150 3	600 12	600 12	
AIR DEFENSE FORCES								
FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQDNS								
F-86	25	(6)	-	-	-	-	-	
F-89	12	(6)	(1)	(1)	-	-	-	
F-100	25	(1)	-	-	-	-	-	
F-101	18-24	(15)	(17)	(17)	(17)	(17)	(17)	
F-102	var	(24)	(22)	(21)	(20)	(17)	(18)	
F-104	25	(3)	-	-	-	-	-	
F-106	18-24	(10)	(14)	(14)	(14)	(14)	(14)	
Missile Squadrons								
DM-99 A/B (BOMARC)		8	8	8	8	8	8	
MAJOR UNITS								
TACTICAL FORCES								
Tactical Fighter Wings		Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	
F-100	72/18 75/25	(13) (44)	(12) (42)	(11) (37)	(8) (29)	(7) (25)	(5) (20)	
F-104	72/18	(1) (4)	(1) (4)	(1) (4)	(2)	-	-	
F-105	72/18 75/25	(1) (4)	(2) (6)	(3) (11)	(6) (18)	(7) (22)	(7) (22)	
F-101	75/25	(2) (3)	(2) (3)	(2) (3)	(1) (3)	-	-	
Tactical Bomber Wings		Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	
B-66	48/16	(1) (3)	(1) (3)	- -	- -	- -	- -	
B-57	48/16	(1) (3)	(1) (3)	(1) (3)	- -	- -	- -	
Tactical Recon Wings		Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	
RB-66	72/15	(1) (6)	(1) (5)	(1) (4)	(1) (4)	(1) (4)	-	
RF-101	72/15	(2) (3)	(2) (8)	(2) (3)	(2) (3)	(2) (8)	(2) (8)	
Troop Carrier Wings		Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	Wgs Sqs	
C-124 (Seevy)	36/12	(4) (12)	(4) (11)	(3) (10)	(3) (9)	(3) (9)	(2) (6)	
C-130 (Medium)	48/16	(4) (12)	(4) (11)	(5) (14)	(4) (11)	(3) (9)	(3) (9)	
C-123 (Assault)	48/16	(2) (6)	(2) (5)	(2) (5)	(1) (4)	- -	- -	
C-130 B (Assault)	48/16	- -	- -	- (1)	(1) (2)	(2) (5)	(2) (5)	
C-130 E (Medium)	48/16	- -	- -	- (1)	(1) (2)	(1) (3)	(1) (3)	
Tactical Missile Sqdns								
DM-51C (MADDER)	var	(3)	(3)	-	-	-	-	
DM-76 A/B (MACE)	72/18	(2)	(2)	(5)	(5)	(6)	(6)	

Exact date of phaseout under study.

Incrementally funded. Sqdns and US quantities are based on assumptions that FY 62 funding will attain end FY 64 USAF program.

TITAN forces include 6 missiles assigned training squadron at Vandenberg AFB.

MINUTEMAN forces are currently under review.

Declassified by JCS, 19 NOV 80

SECRET

(19 Apr 61 - Revised)

SECRET

MAJOR AIR FORCE FORCES

FUNDED THROUGH FY 1962 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
(As Amended)

UNITS	UE	1 Jul 60		1 Jul 61		1 Jul 62		1 Jul 63		1 Jul 64		1 Jul 65		COMMENTS
		Wgs	Sqs	Wgs	Sqs	Wgs	Sqs	Wgs	Sqs	Wgs	Sqs	Wgs	Sqs	
Air Transport Sqdas (MACS)			22		21		19		19		19		17	
C-118	Var		(7)		(7)		(3)		(3)		(3)		(2)	
C-121	Var		(3)		(3)		(3)		(2)		(2)		(1)	
C-124	16		(10)		(8)		(8)		(7)		(7)		(6)	
C-133	12-16		(2)		(3)		(3)		(3)		(3)		(3)	
C-130	12-16		-		-		-		(3)		(3)		(3)	
C-135	12-16		-		-		(2)		(2)		(2)		(2)	
			Sqs		Sqs		Sqs		Sqs		Sqs		Sqs	
Logistics Support (AMC)														
C-124	36/12		3		3		3		3		3		3	
AF-AC														
PC-121	10		6		6		6		6		6		6	
Air Refueling Squadrons (SAC)			56		58		55		50		45		38	
KE-97	20		(31)		(30)		(23)		(14)		(8)		(1)	
KE-135	20		(9)		(11)		(11)		(15)		(17)		(17)	
KE-135	10		(16)		(16)		(20)		(20)		(19)		(19)	
KE-135	23				(1)		(1)		(1)		-		-	
KE-135	13		-		-		-		-		(1)		(1)	
Air Refueling Squadrons (ZAC)														
KB-50	20		6		6		6		5		3		2	
Total Operating Aircraft			15,312		13,616		12,820		12,383		11,529		10,199	
ACTIVE PERSONNEL														
Strength			314,752		222,900		224,900		224,900		224,900		224,900	

This excludes ANG and AFB.

- GENERAL COMMENTS:
- Unit Equipment (UE) is the number of aircraft in organizational units. (Var indicates variable. UE 45/15 indicates 45 a/c per wing and 15 a/c per squadron. 12-16 indicates unit equipment is 12 or 16.)
 - No deliveries from procurement programs subsequent to the FY 1962 Budget are reflected herein.
 - Current USAF programs indicate a requirement for additional personnel for FY 63, 64, and 65 to adequately man the force shown.
 - Air Force units are expressed in wings and squadrons. For example:

$$B-52 \frac{1 \text{ Jul } 60}{(12)-(36)}$$
 indicates there are 12 wings of B-52s composed of 36 squadrons.
 - In the case of aircraft, procurement levels through FY 62 produce a continued decline in the numbers of operating aircraft.

SECRET
(16 Apr 61 - Revised)

Declassified by JCS, 19 NOV 80

24 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The January of Major Air Forces Aired through FY 1962 in President Kennedy's Budget, submitted in fulfillment of Project 3, shows the following program for B-47 wings and KC-97 squadrons:

End FY	61	62	63	64	65
B-47 wings	20	13	13	10	5
KC-97 squadrons	30	23	12	12	6

The number of wings shown for End FY 1963, 1964, and 1965 is not in accordance with Page 12, Tab 1 of my letter to the President dated February 29.

You will recall that the program as outlined on Page 12 was discussed with the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 15 and February 17, and at that time there was general agreement that our planning for future years should be based on the B-47 wing program outlined on that page.

I believe that all current planning documents, including the document attached to OS-172-61 of 3 April 1961, should be modified to the program outlined in Page 12. The KC-97 should be phased out concurrently. That is, the approved B-47/KC-97 force is now as follows:

End FY	61	62	63	64	65
B-47 wings	20	13	8	4	0
KC-97 squadrons	30	23	14	8	1

During the consideration of the 1963 Budget, if the Air Force or other offices of the Department of Defense wish to propose alternative programs, these, of course, can be considered at that time. Meantime, the letter to President Kennedy of February 29 should be the basic planning document.

Please arrange to have the attached document reissued to conform to that document.

SIGNED

Robert F. Kennedy

cc: JCS/SecDef

Staff

Chief of Staff


Delivered by JCS
19 NOV 80

SEC DEF CONT NO.

S-355

54/113

RECEIVED



Project 3

(6)



JUN 26 03 34

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFF SECY. OF DEFENSE

CM-250-61

JUN 23 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY McNAMARA

Subject: Major Military Force Projections to
End FY 1965 (U)


References: a. CM-172-61 Dated 3 April 1961
b. CM-192-61 Dated 20 April 1961

Enclosure: Major Naval and Air Force Forces Funded
through FY 1962 President's Budget (As
Amended)

1. Enclosed are corrected copies of the 30 March 1961
statements of Major Air Force Forces and Naval Forces funded
through FY 1962 in President Kennedy's budget.

2. The Air Force prepared new tables after a review of
the forces in the context of their intended use as a basic budget
submission. This review indicated that the Army and Navy had
projected level force structures, while the Air Force departed
from programmed force levels and phased out forces planned for
modernization with funds anticipated in FY 1963 and later budgets.
The present revision reflects a level Air Force force structure,
with notation to indicate those units dependent on FY 1963 funding
for modernized equipment, and on which implied procurement
decisions were made in FY 1962 and prior year budget delibera-
tions.

Declassified by
JCS 19 NOV 80



(SECDEF HAS SEEN)

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

SecDef Cont. No.

1193

~~SECRET~~

3. The corrected Naval Forces submission reflects Navy program changes which had been made prior to 30 March 1961, but which had been omitted from the original submission.

4. The Army and Marine Corps have indicated informally that at this time they do not desire to submit changes to their original 30 March 1961 submissions.

L. L. Lemnitzer

L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Declassified by JCS
19 NOV 80

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

MAJOR NAVAL FORCES

FUNDED THROUGH FY 1962 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
(As Amended)

Copy 4 of 35 copies

UNITS	UE	1 Jul 60	1 Jul 61	1 Jul 62	1 Jul 63	1 Jul 64	1 Jul 65	COMMENTS
Attack Carrier		14	15	15	15	14	14	
ASW Carriers		9	9	9	9	9	9	
Tact Command Ship		1	1	1	1	1	1	
Cruisers		13	12	13	14	14	14	
G/M Types		(6)	(8)	(9)	(12)	(12)	(12)	
Gun Types		(7)	(4)	(4)	(2)	(2)	(2)	
Destroyers		226	223	225	222	225	225	
G/M Types		(3)	(15)	(24)	(36)	(43)	(56)	
Gun Types		(223)	(208)	(201)	(186)	(182)	(169)	
Submarines - Total		111	111	109	108	106	105	
Nuclear		(8)	(15)	(13)	(25)	(29)	(29)	
Conventional		(103)	(96)	(96)	(83)	(77)	(76)	
FBM Submarines - Total		2 /4/	5 /98/	9 /170/	12 /268/	24 /310/	29 /310/	// alongside the FBM submarines shows the combined total of A-1 and A-2 missiles on hand as of the date indicated. By end FY 65 all FBM submarines will be fitted for A-2 missiles. Missiles programmed through FY 62 for the purposes of ship-fills, training, support, and quality control will not meet the requirements for the FBM submarines programmed through FY 62 buy and in commission by FY 65.
Patrol Escort		45	45	43	43	43	40	
Mine Warfare		81	83	84	84	80	79	
Amphibious		113	107	104	104	104	103	
Auxiliary		197	206	206	206	202	200	
TOTAL		812	817	818	818	822	819	
CVG (Attack Carrier Air Group)		16	17	17	17	16	16	
CVBG (ASW Carrier Air Group)		11	11	11	11	11	11	
VP-RON (Patrol Squad)		32	32	32	32	32	32	
ZP-RON (Lighter-than-air LTA Squad)		1	0	0	0	0	0	See attached sheet for U/I of Navy/Marine Corps air combat units as of 1 July 1963.
VW-RON (Warning Squad)		8	7	5	5	5	5	
ZV-RON (LTA Warning Squad)		1	0	0	0	0	0	
VAP-RON (VCP) (Heavy Photo Squad)		2	2	2	2	2	2	
VQ-RON (Heavy Electronic Squad)		2	2	2	2	2	2	
HV-RON (Utility Helicopter Squad)		2	3	3	3	3	3	
TOTAL OPERATING A/C		6759	5953	5864	6845	6587	5406	Marine Corps aviation data on numbers of operating aircraft is included in Navy totals.
TOTAL ACTIVE NAVY PERSONNEL		617,984	625,000	628,000	628,000	628,000	628,000	
Fleet Marine Forces		2	2	2	2	2	2	
Division/Wing Teams		3	3	3	3	3	3	
Avy Arty Rgt Btry (BJ)		2	2	2	3	3	3	
Light AA Msl Bns (HAWK)		1	2	* 3	**4	**4	**4	* The 1st Medium AA Msl Bn will be redesignated the 3rd Light AA Msl Bn during the 4th Quarter, FY 1962.
Med AA Msl Bns (TERRIER)		1	* 1	0	0	0	0	** One Battalion to be in a cadre status.
ACTIVE MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL		175,000	175,000	178,000	178,000	178,000	178,000	

- GENERAL COMMENTS:
1. Unit Equipment (UE) is the number of aircraft in organizational units.
 2. No deliveries for procurement programs subsequent to the FY 62 Budget are reflected herein.
 3. Current Navy/Marine Corps programs indicate a requirement for additional personnel for FY 62, 64, and 65 to adequately man the forces shown.
 4. Ships shown include new and modernized ships which will replace some of the obsolescent ones now in the Fleet.

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DDO DIR. 5200.10

SECRET

(As of 30 Mar 61)
(Corrected 16 Jun 61)

Declassified by JCS 19 Nov 80

SECRET



MAJOR AIR FORCE FORCES

FUNDED THROUGH FY 1962 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
(As Amended)

Copy 4 of 35 copies

UNIT	UNIT	1 Jul 60	1 Jul 61	1 Jul 62	1 Jul 63	1 Jul 64	1 Jul 65	0040278					
MAJOR UNITS STRATEGIC FORCES		Vgs	Sqs	Vgs	Sqs	Vgs	Sqs	Vgs	Sqs	Vgs	Sqs	Vgs	Sqs
Bomb Wings		37	136	34	120	29	100	24	80	20	54	15	48
B-52	45/15	(12)	(35)	(13)	(37)	(14)	(42)	(14)	(42)	(14)	(42)	(14)	(42)
B-47	45/-	(25)	(100)	(20)	(80)	(13)	(52)	(8)	(32)	(4)	(16)	(0)	(0)
B-58	40/-		(1)	(1)	(3)	(2)	(6)	(2)	(6)	(2)	(6)	(2)	(6)
GAH-72 (GAIL)	28		1		8		14		14		14		14
GAH-77 (SCUD DOG)	18		5		12		25		29		29		29
Reconnaissance Wings													
RB-47	45/15	2	6	2	6	1	3	1	3	1	3	1	3
Missile Squadrons		Mals	Sqs	Mals	Sqs	Mals	Sqs	Mals	Sqs	Mals	Sqs	Mals	Sqs
SM-62 SHARK	30	30	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SM-65 ATLAS	10-13	9	2	36	4	98	8	145	13	145	13	145	13
SM-68 TITAN	10	-	-	6	-	58	5	92	8	126	12	126	12
SM-80 Pined MCNUTMAN (H&D)	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	150	3	600	12	600	12
AIR DEFENSE FORCES FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADS			65		54		53		51		50		49
F-86	25		(6)		-		-		-		-		-
F-89	12		(6)		(1)		(1)		-		-		-
F-100	25		(1)		-		-		-		-		-
F-101	18-24		(15)		(17)		(17)		(17)		(17)		(17)
F-102	Var		(24)		(22)		(21)		(20)		(19)		(18)
F-104	25		(3)		-		-		-		-		-
F-106	18-24		(10)		(14)		(14)		(14)		(14)		(14)
Missile Squadrons													
DM-99 A/B (BOMARC)	Var		4		6		8		8		8		8
MAJOR UNITS TACTICAL FORCES		Vgs	Sqs	Vgs	Sqs	Vgs	Sqs	Vgs	Sqs	Vgs	Sqs	Vgs	Sqs
Tactical Fighter Wings		16	55	16	55	16	55	16	55	16	55	16	55
F-100	72/18 75/25	(13)	(44)	(12)	(42)	(11)	(37)	(9)	(32)	(6)	(20)	(7)	(26)
F-104	72/18	(1)	(4)	(2)	(4)	(1)	(4)		(2)		-		-
F-105	72/18 75/25	(1)	(4)	(2)	(6)	(3)	(11)	(6)	(18)	(5)	(27)	(9)	(29)
F-101	75/25	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)		-		-
Tactical Bomber Wings		2	6	2	6	2	6	2	6	2	6	2	6
B-66	48/16	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)
B-57	48/16	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)	(1)	(3)
Tactical Recon Wings		3	14	3	14	3	14	3	14	3	14	3	14
RF-66	72/18	(1)	(6)	(1)	(6)	(1)	(6)	(1)	(6)	(1)	(6)	(1)	(6)
RF-101	72/18	(2)	(8)	(2)	(8)	(2)	(8)	(2)	(8)	(2)	(8)	(2)	(8)
RF-105			-		-		-		-		-		(1)
Troop Carrier Wings		10	30	10	30	10	30	10	30	10	30	9	27
C-124 (Heavy)	36/12	(4)	(12)	(4)	(12)	(3)	(10)	(3)	(9)	(3)	(9)	(2)	(6)
C-130 A/B (Medium)	48/16	(4)	(12)	(4)	(13)	(5)	(14)	(4)	(13)	(3)	(9)	(3)	(9)
C-123 (Assault)	48/16	(2)	(6)	(2)	(6)	(2)	(6)	(1)	(4)	-	-	-	-
C-130 B (Assault)	48/16	-	-	-	-	-	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(5)	(2)	(6)
C-130 E (Medium)	48/16	-	-	-	-	-	-	(1)	(2)	(2)	(5)	(2)	(6)
Tactical Missile Sqds			5		5		5		6		6		6
DM-61C (MACADOR)	360/90		(3)		(3)		-		-		-		-
DM-76 A/B (MACR)	-36 72/18		(2)		(2)		(5)		(5)		(6)		(6)

Line item revised 18 Apr 61.

Incrementally funded. Sqds and UX quantities are based on assumptions that FY 62 funding will attain end FY 64 USAP program.
TITAN forces include 6 missiles assigned training squadron at Vandenberg AFB.

Line item revised 18 Apr 61.

Incrementally funded. Sqds and V quantities are based on assumptions that FY 62 funding will attain and FY 64 USAP program.
TITAN forces include 6 missiles assigned training squadron at Vandenberg AFB.

SECRET
(As of 30 Mar 61)
(Corrected 16 Jun 61)

Declassified by JCS
19 NOV 80

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

SECRET

MAJOR AIR FORCE FORCES
FUNDED THROUGH FY 1962 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
 (As Amended)

UNITS	UE	1 Jul 50		1 Jul 51		1 Jul 52		1 Jul 53		1 Jul 54		1 Jul 55		COMMENTS
		Wgs	Sqs	Wgs	Sqs	Wgs	Sqs	Wgs	Sqs	Wgs	Sqs	Wgs	Sqs	
Air Transport Squadrons (MATS)			22		21		19		19		19		18	
C-118	Var		(7)		(7)		(3)		(3)		(3)		(2)	
C-121	Var		(3)		(3)		(3)		(1)		(1)		(1)	
C-124	16		(20)		(8)		(3)		(7)		(7)		(7)	
C-133	12-16		(2)		(3)		(3)		(3)		(3)		(3)	
C-130 B	12-16		-		-		-		(3)		(3)		(3)	
C-135	12-16		-		-		(2)		(2)		(2)		(2)	
			Sqs		Sqs		Sqs		Sqs		Sqs		Sqs	
Logistics Support (AMC)														
C-124	12/18		3		3		3		3		3		3	
AFWAC														
PC-121	10		6		6		6		6		6		6	
Air Refueling Squadrons (SAC)			56		58		55		50		49		43	
KE-97	20		(31)		(30)		(23)		(14)		(8)		(1)	
KE-135	20		(9)		(11)		(11)		(15)		21		22	
KE-135	10		(16)		(15)		(20)		(20)		(19)		(19)	
KE-135	23				(1)		(1)		(1)		-		-	
KE-135	13		-		-		-		-		(1)		(1)	
Air Refueling Squadrons (IAC)														
KE-90	20		6		6		6		5		3		2	
Total Operating Aircraft			15,312		13,790		12,964		12,329		11,780		11,080	
ACTIVE PERSONNEL														
Strength			814,752		822,900		824,900		824,900		824,900		824,900	

Line item revised 18 Apr 61.

This excludes ANG and AFR.

GENERAL COMMENTS: 1. Unit Equipment (UE) is the number of aircraft in organizational units. (Var indicates variable. UE 45/15 indicates 45 a/c per wing and 15 a/c per squadron. 12-16 indicates unit equipment is 12 or 16.)

2. No deliveries from procurement programs subsequent to the FY 62 Budget are reflected herein, except as follows:

	Units Equipped Thru FY 62 Procurement		Units Equipped Thru FY 63 Procurement	
	WG	SQ	WG	SQ
Tactical Fighter F-105	7	22	9	29
Tactical Reconnaissance RF-105	-	-	-	1
Troop Carrier C-130E (Medium)	1	3	2	6
Air Refueling Sq KE-135 (20 UE Equip)	-	27	-	32

In each of the above cases, FY 63 procurement was definitely implied in FY 62 Budget decisions as defined on page 2 of Instruction Number 1 attached to OASD (Comp) memorandum for the Assistant Secretaries (PM) of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, dated 13 May 1961.

3. Air Force units are expressed in wings and squadrons. For example:

$$\frac{1 \text{ Jul } 60}{B-52} = \frac{(12) \times (36)}{(12) \times (36)}$$

indicates there are 12 wings of B-52s composed of 36 squadrons.

4. The forces shown produce a temporary deficiency in military personnel during FY 62 and 63 compared with the end FY 62 ceiling but return within the ceiling in FY 64 and FY 65.

SECRET

(As of 30 Mar 61)
 (Corrected 16 Jun 61)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: (U) MINUTEMAN Program Lead Times

1. This memorandum is in response to Question 20 in your memorandum of 5 March 1961 on the specific lead times of the various elements entering into a decision to increase the presently scheduled production of MINUTEMAN. We have assumed that all necessary determinations, including the selection, acquisition and construction of sites, must be phased and accomplished at the points in time which will insure our capability to obtain the maximum possible acceleration in the deployment of a larger operational inventory by the end of FY-64.

2. In light of your recent decision and the President's budget message on the revised MINUTEMAN program, I have taken and will continue to take action in accordance with the attached schedule of lead times to obtain the capability to expand the force.

3. The schedule of lead times represents our present best estimates and may require revision in the light of experience.

4. As we previously indicated, presently approved military construction authorization and funding limit the MINUTEMAN program to 600 H&D missiles by mid CY-64. To completely insure our capability to expand to a larger force by mid CY-64, it will be necessary to have a full total of \$120.0 million in both additional MCP authorization and appropriation in FY-62.

5. If we should attempt to proceed with less than full authorization and the capability of full financing in the FY-62 period, we would be forced to so revise and slip schedules that the expanded force could not be obtained by end FY-64.


6. Acknowledging a new obligational authority problem in paragraph 4, above, and the program limitations introduced by paragraph 5, it would be possible to protect the capability to expand the force by providing full authorization of \$120.0 million in FY-1962. With the flexibility inherent in full authorization, the capability to accelerate the MINUTEMAN program during FY-1962 could later be obtained with funds

~~SECRET~~

available to the DOD through Section 535 of the FY-1961 Appropriation Act (which is anticipated to be included in the FY-1962 Appropriation Act).

7. In any event, it is most important that our FY-1962 presentation to the Armed Services Committee on MCP authorization be amended by letter or otherwise to reflect your choice of the two alternatives outlined above.

1 Inclosure
TAB A - MINUTEMAN Hardened
Specific Lead Time Decisions



JOSEPH V. CHARNEY
Under Secretary of the Air Force

cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense

~~SECRET~~

MINUTEMAN HARDENED FORCE SPECIFIC LEAD TIME DECISIONS

PRODUCTION DECISION DATES

1 April 1961

Action underway

- a. Directive to missile contractors to arrange for expanded capacity to meet 800 missile deployment schedule.
- b. Contract for the construction for the expansion of Air Force missile assembly Plant 77.

1 May 1961

- a. Contract for the construction of the expansion of Air Force First Stage Engine Plant 76.
- b. Contract for the construction of the expansion of Air Force Third Stage Engine Plant.

1 July 1961

Contract for the construction of the re-cycle facility expansion at Hill, AFB.

1 August 1961

- a. Contract for industrial equipment for AF Plant 78
- b. Contract for industrial equipment for the engine case fabricators.

15 September 1961

- a. Contract with Boeing Airplane Company for Aerospace ground equipment for the hardened and dispersed force.
- b. Contract with Autonetics to produce ground and airborne equipment.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 December 1961

Contract for industrial equipment for expanded stage three engine plant.

1 January 1962

a. Contract for additional industrial equipment for Autonetics plant.

b. Place firm order for additional stage one engines.

1 February 1962

Place firm order for additional stage two engines.

1 June 1962

Place firm order for additional stage three engines.

DEPLOYMENT DECISION DATES:

1 May 1961

Final approval of deployment areas for squadrons 10 and 11.

1 July 1961

Final approval of deployment areas for squadrons 12 and 13.

1 September 1961

Final approval of deployment areas for squadrons 14 and 15.

1 October 1961

Final approval of deployment areas for squadron 16.

CONSTRUCTION DECISION DATES:


1 July 1961

Approval for land acquisition for squadrons 10 and 11.

1 September 1961

Approval for land acquisition for squadrons 12 and 13.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



1 November 1961

Approval for land acquisition for squadrons 14 and 15.

1 December 1961

Approval for land acquisition for squadron 15.

1 January & February 1962

Start of construction for squadrons 10 and 11.

1 March & April 1962

Start of construction for squadrons 12 and 13.

1 May & June 1962

Start of construction for squadrons 14 and 15.

1 June 1962

Start of construction for squadron 16.

Copies of all documents
released.

#3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 20, 21 in total

7, 13, 15, 16 in part

FDINUM: 100750

Document # 12 referred to NSC
#17 referred to AF

OSPCOMP: ASD(2)
ATSD(LA)
JCS
ASD(PA)
ASD(ISA)
SPECASST
USD(R&E)
ASD(ISP)
ASD(PA&E)

LIVACT: AIR FORCE

SUBJREQ: RECORDS RE: SECDEF MEMO PROJECTS TO BE ASSIGNED WITHIN THE DOD
DTD MARCH 1, 1961. MCNAMARA 96 TROMBONES. PROJECTS 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 12, 13, 19, 23, 19, 23, 41, 43, 50, 87, 38. NAMES OF
PROJECT WORKERS.

LTRHD:
REQSTER: FRED KAPLAN
REQDISP: PARTIAL
TRNSFRD: AIR FORCE, NSC
REMARKS: JCS; MG CHARLES W. DYKE, USA, VD JOINT STAFF; 552(B)(1)
USD(R&E); RONALD D. THOMAS, DIR PROGRAM CONTROL AND ADMIN; 552(B)(1)
552(E)(3) AEA-1954
ASD(ISP); MG RICHARD T. BOVERIE, USAF, PRINCIPAL DEP ASST SECY;
552(B)(1)
DPASE; PHILIPS L. MAJOR, DEPUTY DIR; 552(B)(1)
(R&C) BRANCH

REQCOMP: 810930

519

DOCTITL: MEMO SECARMY ET AL DTD 610322 RE TESTIMONY ON
THE PRESIDENTS PROGRAM (PMD) (6 pages)

520

DOCTITL: ASD(PA) MEMO TO SECDEF DTD 610320 RE ASSIGNMENT
OF PROJECTS WITEING DOD (PMD) (18 pages)

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (PMD)
SECNAV REPORT TO SECDEF DTD 610524 RE ~ 250 pages

#19 denied	521	DOCTITL:	USD(R&E) MEMO TO SECDEF DTD 610502 RE
	522		EVALUATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE EFFECTIVENESS
#18 OK			(TASK 47) (PMD) (11 pages)
#16 partial	523	DOCTITL:	USD(R&E) MEMO TO SECDEF DTD 610301 RE PROJECT
			NO. 41 SKYBOLT (PMD) (11 pages)
#15 partial	524	DOCTITL:	STUDY DTD 610417 RE DDR&E ASSESSMENT OF
			BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM (PMD) (52 pages)
#14 OK	525	DOCTITL:	SECAF MEMO TO SECDEF UNDTD RE MINUTEMAN PROGRAM
			LEAD TIMES (PMD) (9 pages)
#13 (partial)	526	DOCTITL:	SECAF MEMO TO SECDEF DTD 610321 RE PROJECT NO.
			13 (COMPARISON OF PROPOSED B-70 FORCE WITH
			ALTERNATIVES) (PMD) (37 pages)
#11 denied	527	DOCTITL:	REPORT A STUDY OF REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S.
			STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, VOL I AND II PREPARED BY NET
			EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE, NSC (PMD)
#10 denied	528	DOCTITL:	JCSM-387-61 DTD 610623 RE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
			COMMENTS ON DDR&E MEMO SUBJ COMMAND AND CONTROL
			(PROJECT 6) (PMD)
#9 denied	529	DOCTITL:	USD(R&E) MEMO DTD 610419 RE COMMAND AND CONTROL
			(PROJECT 6) (PMD) (54 pages)
#8 denied	530	DOCTITL:	JCSM-250-61 DTD 610418 RE COMMAND AND CONTROL
			SYSTEM (PMD)
#7 partial	531	DOCTITL:	JCSM-241-61 DTD 610413 RE RE-EXAMINATION OF THE
			CURRENT AND LONG RANGE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
			REQUIREMENTS FOR PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
			AND FISSIONABLE MATERIAL (PMD) (4 pages)
#6 OK	532	DOCTITL:	CM-250-61 DTD 610623 RE MAJOR MILITARY FORCE
			PROJECTIONS TO END FY 1965 (PMD) (5 pages)
#5 OK	533	DOCTITL:	CM-192-61 DTD 610420 RE MAJOR MILITARY FORCE
			PROJECTIONS TO END FY 1965 (PMD) (4 pages)
#4 OK	534	DOCTITL:	CM-172-61 DTD 610403 RE MAJOR MILITARY FORCE
			PROJECTIONS TO END FY 1965 (PMD) (7 pages)
#3 OK	535	DOCTITL:	JCSM-252-61 DTD 610418 RE DOCTRINE ON
			THERMONUCLEAR ATTACK (PMD) (2 pages)
#3a denied	536	DOCTITL:	CM-190-61 DTD 610418 RE DOCTRINE ON
			THERMONUCLEAR ATTACK (PMD) (~ 30 pages)
#2 denied	537	DOCTITL:	JCSM-269-61 DTD 610425 RE BASIC NATIONAL
			SECURITY POLICY (PMD) (4 pages?)
#1 denied	538	DOCTITL:	MEMO FOR CJCS DTD 610418 RE BASIC NATIONAL
			SECURITY POLICY (PMD) (18 pages)

DEPARTMENT OF NAVY

1961 APR 6 AM 10 42
OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

April 5, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Phasing of MINUTEMAN Program

This memorandum is in response to your inquiry concerning a lack of balance between funding for recommended MINUTEMAN production and cost for construction and installation and checkout. Military construction authorization and funding presently approved limits the program to 600 HAD MINUTEMAN missiles by summer 1964. If it is desired to retain the ability to obtain a larger force by summer 1964, additional construction authorization and funding during FY-62 will be required; this has been pointed out in the past.

Actions to prepare ourselves for the phasing problem are currently underway even though additional authorization and funding has not been made available. The AF Ballistic Missile Committee directed the implementing commands to take all actions necessary, including field explorations, short of construction, to provide a recommended number of support base locations in order to have a list of follow-on bases readily available. In addition, you were informed of the selection of the 3rd MINUTEMAN wing support base at Minot, and necessary action to advise the field commands has been taken.

The following example will illustrate the sequence and inter-relationship of events between production, construction and I&C:

PRODUCTION: Begin expansion in April 1961. First stage missile obtained in April 1963.

RECEIVED HAS SEEN
7/10

CHIEF OF STAFF NO S-1709-61

SecDef Cont. No. 536
1

CONSTRUCTION:

a. Land survey and acquisition, design of facilities for first squadrons above the IX race (squadrons 10 and 11), and advertisement for award of construction contracts, began May 1, 1961. Construction contract ready for award ~~November 1, 1961.~~ *in December.*

b. Construction contracts for squadrons 10 and 11 let ~~November 1, 1961.~~ *in December.* Construction proceeds for ~~24~~ months, ending December 1963.

23

c. I&C. The last two months of construction run concurrently with I&C. Subsequently, I&C continues for 4 months beyond the end of construction, being completed in March 1964 for Squadron 11.

It is obvious that production, construction, and I&C must be properly related and phased. No single aspect can be emphasized at the expense of another. Expansion of missile production facilities is the item of longest lead time. Unless expansion begins this month, as planned, we cannot reach the 600 force level end FY 64, regardless of the degree of later emphasis on construction or I&C.

A number of factors will make the deployment of MINUTEMAN a considerably simpler task than deployment of its predecessors:

a. The experience and know-how to do the task, gained from ATLAS and TITAN.

b. The formation of the Air Force Systems Command, and the integration of Corps of Engineer capability within it, to obtain unified management control over the acquisition and deployment of MINUTEMAN and other systems.


c. The relative simplicity of MINUTEMAN.

d. The designation of a single contractor - Boeing - with full responsibility for I&C. Planning for I&C has been detailed and thorough. See Enclosure 1.

e. The "pre-packaged" concept, in which the majority of the assembly work for I&C will be done in the factory, rather than in the field.

f. Numbers. The quantity of MINUTEMAN missiles will allow us to use, for the first time, true production techniques in accomplishing the I&C task.

1 attach
Planning for
MINUTEMAN I&C


Eugene M. Zucker

cc: Dep Sec Def

PLANNING FOR MINUTEMAN I&C

The planning for MINUTEMAN I&C began two years ago with creation of a separate organization within Boeing, having the sole responsibility for I&C of the MINUTEMAN.

Based on experience gained from the ATLAS program, a detailed plan was developed. The MINUTEMAN I&C plan is based on prefabricated assemblies, interchangeable sub-systems and components and use of detailed management control techniques. The prefabricated assemblies will be shipped to the site for installation. No assembly of bits and pieces will occur at the site. Interchangeable sub-systems and components will allow considerable speed-up of I&C as personnel become familiar with the equipment and the system.

Management control techniques consist of job breakdowns and sequences, manpower breakdowns and assignment, status reporting system, man hour reports, and a quality control system. The details of this plan can be appreciated when one understands that in the job breakdown and sequences, each job is so scheduled that one crew can accomplish each task within 8 hours.

This I&C plan is being tested, improved and updated at the Seattle Test Facility, which is a proving ground to test and functionally prove out the operational program.

Later, at Vandenberg Air Force Base, the I&C plan will be implemented in the same fashion as if this base were an operational site. At Vandenberg AFB, the USAF intends to make the I&C plan a sound and workable system.

The Air Force objective force has been 12 squadrons of FMD MINUTEMAN by end FY 64. Consequently, our plans have been geared to this force. With the deferment of the mobile MINUTEMAN, additional management talent and manpower can be assigned as, and if required, for I&C.

Jmcl

MAIL ROOM 100-1759-61

01 37-1294-1312

100-1759-61

100-1759-61

OFF SECY OF DEFENSE

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Ballistic Missile Effectiveness (Task 47)

Task Statement:

Prepare a procedure assuring adequate control and measurement of missile firings to test reliability, training, and operations under field conditions.

ICBM's approach to and interpretation of Task 47 has given due regard to the recent and continuing effort of the Joint Staff as outlined in JCS 2012/135. (Described in Tab A along with other background). An important objective has been to avoid resource-sapping duplication in data gathering and evaluation procedures while establishing and preserving an OAD ability for operational effectiveness judgments independent of purely military processes.

ICBM proposes that the procedure requested under Task 47 be as follows:

I. Tasks to be Performed by WWSG

A. Evaluate the developmental and operational test data of POLARIS, ATLAS, TITAN, MINUTEMAN, and SRYGLET missile systems.

B. Develop optimum procedures and criteria upon which to base overall evaluations of such missile systems.

A preliminary report applicable primarily to ATLAS and POLARIS is required by 15 September 1961 in order to be of use in preparation of SIOF 63.

A first phase report presenting more fully developed methodology should be submitted by 1 April 1962. Any serious deficiencies or limitations should be reported as soon as ascertained to permit timely corrective action.

(NOTE: These tasks are coincident with WWSG tasks under JCS 2012/135, and the WWSG program in detail is attached as Tab B. It reflects collaboration and coordination accomplished by CIBER with WWSG and Joint

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS
 100-100000-1000-1000-1000

II. Tasks to be Performed by NSAS

A. Provide continuing technical assistance and guidance to NSAS in the performance of the above tasks. To make this possible and effective:

A-1. Examine the reliability engineering and test procedures followed in the evaluation of missile components and systems as these procedures affect overall operational capability. Initiate improvements as necessary and practicable.

A-2. Examine operating, maintenance and training procedures as they affect overall operational capability. Ensure that meaningful and sufficient procedures are employed.

B. Review and evaluate the reports to be submitted by NSAS in response to NSAS tasks A and B above insofar as they pertain to DTRA's responsibilities. Advise the Secretary of Defense as appropriate.

C. At bi-monthly intervals following 15 September 1961 report to the Secretary of Defense on anticipated system performance of the principal ballistic missiles.

III. Task to be Performed by JCS

A. At bi-monthly intervals following 15 September 1961 report to the Secretary of Defense on anticipated operational effectiveness of ballistic missiles embodied in current SIOGs.

John M. Rebel
Acting Director

Enclosures - 2

1. Tab A
2. Tab B

Capt Maxwell/mex/11/2/61
DTRA (S/P) 3D-135/77926

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF CURRENT ACTIONS RELYING TO TASK 47

1. JCS 2012/135, 27 March 1961, "Evaluation of Operational Effectiveness of Ballistic Missiles" instituted a formal program by which the functions of evaluating the operational effectiveness of ballistic missiles may be performed and the results applied to military matters. It assigns certain responsibilities to the Joint Staff, NSAS, and the Services. The procedure evolved by JCS includes, in essence, these steps:

NSAS (Tab B Describes the NSAS Program)

Obtains, derives, and provides to JCS technical evaluations of developmental and operational test data.

Develops methodology (including definitions, criteria, and procedures) leading to a common basis for overall evaluations.

SERVICES

Make available to NSAS necessary data.

Provide NSAS with technical assistance.

DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

In conjunction with Services, recommend actions to JCS with regard to application of NSAS evaluations.

Coordinate with NSAS and Services in development of methodology.

2. SecDef memorandum of 20 April 1961 requests a plan, to be worked out with Air Force and Navy, for "operational testing" under tightly controlled conditions of ATLAS, TITAN, POLARIS, and MINUTEMAN. OSDRE is developing this plan separate from Task 47. However, this plan can be expected ultimately to become part of the overall evaluation process.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~