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COUNTERINSURGENCY ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS IN NORTHEAST THAILAND (U)

Volume 3

PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS

[redacted]

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Per Director, DARPA S&TO/TIO

6 August 92

Prepared by

RESEARCH ANALYSIS CORPORATION
Field Office-Thailand

for the

JOINT THAI-US MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER

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

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

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PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS

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The other volumes in this series on the counterinsurgency organizations and programs operating in Northeast Thailand are:

Volume 1: COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS

Volume 2 MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS

Volume 4: POLICE ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS

Volume 5: DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS

Volume 6: HEALTH IMPROVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS

Volume 7: US AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS

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July 1968

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Bangkok, Thailand

PREFACE

(U) This volume is one of a series being prepared under a research project carried out by the Research Analysis Corporation Field Office-Thailand for the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD/ARPA) and the Joint Thai-US Military Research and Development Center. The basic objective of this project is to compile a systematic and comprehensive description and documentation of counterinsurgency programs, organizations, and activities in Northeast Thailand. A secondary objective, to be undertaken in a separate research report, is to determine and define the systems relationships that exist among CI programs and activities underway in the Northeast and to describe how these individual programs interrelate within and across functional mission lines.

(U) This project is a support task of ARPA's Rural Security Systems Program (RSSP), a comprehensive research effort initiated in late 1966 to design an efficient and integrated system for improved rural security in Northeast Thailand. It became clear early in the RSSP effort that, because of the extreme proliferation of programs and even organizations engaged in countering insurgency in the Northeast, a comprehensive documentation of all counterinsurgency programs was required before any research on means of improving the security environment could be meaningfully undertaken. Many organizations exist to perform similar or closely related counterinsurgency functions; several programs have essentially the same objectives; many programs overlap; and all are highly interrelated. Because of this proliferation and attendant duplication of function, there is a requirement to examine each of the programs in some detail to discern exactly what each is doing and how they relate to one another, both as independent organizations and as elements of larger functional systems.

(U) The information in this and the other volumes of this series is expected to be of value to those currently involved in managing and advising on CI programs on a day-to-day basis, those concerned with the development of improved CI management structures, US Mission personnel newly arrived in Thailand who require an orientation to ongoing CI programs, decision makers involved in determining the future direction of the CI effort, and research personnel engaged in follow-on studies. While the present volume is designed for use primarily by those concerned with the village security environment in the Northeast and with the capabilities and activities of the various RTG paramilitary elements, it should also be of value to those whose activities are not directly concerned with security but who often must relate their efforts to those of such paramilitary elements.

(U) Each program or organization is described separately in this volume while an introductory Overview section compares the similar facets of each. The program descriptions follow a three-part format, with the details varying depending on the particular program. The first major category of these descriptions is organizational and may include some or all of the following; command and control structure, locations, mission and functions, strength, equipment, logistic systems, mobility, and training. The second major category involves the examination of the activities of the particular organization as they relate to counterinsurgency. This may include the entire spectrum of such activities from armed patrols to civic action projects. The third section of these descriptions deals with interrelationships. The interface between the various programs is examined as well as the relations with local governmental authorities (from phuyaiban to governor) and with special command and control bodies. The intent is to document and describe who works with whom in the day-to-day conduct of counterinsurgency in the Northeast.

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(U) Data collection for this project has covered the entire spectrum of sources. All available reports and other secondary sources describing RTG paramilitary programs in force in Northeast Thailand were examined. Emphasis throughout, however, has been placed on documentation of organizations and programs as they actually exist. Interviews were conducted with the many officials concerned with these programs, both in Bangkok and in nearly all of the changwats of the Northeast. In addition to interviews and document search, extensive data collection in the field was also undertaken. Much of the information contained in this volume was acquired through field trips taken to the Northeast by the researchers concerned, and all of the organizations described in this report (with the exception of the VNV, which does not yet have operational teams) have been observed in operation on the ground.

(U) Although organizations may be briefly examined in their national context and mention may be made of strengths, locations and activities elsewhere in the country where applicable, emphasis is placed on the role of these programs in the Northeast. During the data collection period of this project the insurgency problem was by far the greatest in that part of Thailand and the overwhelming portion of the RTG CI effort was commensurately so located. For purposes of this project, the Royal Thai Survey Department definition of the boundaries of the Northeast has been accepted. This area includes 15 of the 71 administrative divisions of the Kingdom of Thailand known as changwats. These same 15 changwats comprise Police Regions III and IV and the area of responsibility of the RTA Second Army. They are:

Buri Ram	Nakhon Phanom
Chaiyaphum	Nong Khai
Kalasin	Roi Et
Khon Kaen	Sakon Nakhon
Korat (Nakhon Ratchasima)	Si Sa Ket
Loei	Surin
Maha Sarakham	Ubon
Udon	

(U) In the text, transliterations of Thai words have been used (e.g. changwat, nai amphoe, tambon, phuyaiban, etc.) where no exact equivalent in English exists. Most of these words are in common usage and have been anglicized in practice. A glossary has been provided to assist those readers not familiar with these words. Transliteration of place names has generally followed the system recommended by the Royal Institute of Thailand which has also been used by the Army Map Service in the preparation of their maps and by the National Statistical Office, the Department of Local Administration, and the US Operations Mission-Thailand in the joint preparation of their two useful publications, Changwat-Amphoe Statistical Directory and Amphoe-Tambon Statistical Directory of 14 ARD Changwats. Transliteration of officials' names, however, has followed individual preference.

(U) The detailed exposition of these organizations and programs has suggested areas in which improvements could be made. It is planned to make some preliminary, practical recommendations based on the information contained in this volume and to forward them to pertinent agencies through appropriate channels. The necessity of updating the information contained in this and other volumes is recognized, and an effort is being made to establish a mechanism to effect it in a methodical manner.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Special thanks are extended to the many RTG and US officials who contributed their time and guidance to this project and who made available the information necessary to undertake this research. Of special importance for the preparation of this volume were the officials concerned with these paramilitary programs in the Department of Local Administration of the Ministry of Interior and in the Communist Suppression Operations Command. Also important to the success of this effort were the governors of Buri Ram, Kalasin, Nakhon Phanom, Sakon Nakhon, Ubon, and Udon, where many of these programs are operating. They permitted RAC researchers to visit operational teams and discuss the programs with changwat and CPM staff officers, and local administrative officials.

Responsibility for the contents of this volume, however, rests with the authors. Although all the RACFO-T staff members assigned to this project contributed to this volume, the principal researcher and author of the VDC, VSO, VRS, and VFT sections was David C. Bowie, while David L. Morell prepared the PAT, CA, VSP, and Overview sections. Mr. Morell was also the chairman for this volume.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFF	Royal Thai Army Field Forces
AID	Agency for International Development
AMS	Army Map Service
AOC	Air Operations Center
ARD	Accelerated Rural Development
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
BPP	Border Patrol Police
CA	Census Aspiration Cadres
CD	Community Development
CI	Counterinsurgency
CPM	Civil-Police-Military
CSOC	Communist Suppression Operations Command
CT	Communist terrorist
DDP	Developing Democracy Program
DOLA	Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior
DTEC	Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of National Development
DZ	drop zone
JSC	Joint Security Center
JST	Joint Security Team
JUSMAG	Joint US Military Advisory Group
MACTHAI	US Military Assistance Command-Thailand
MDU	Mobile Development Unit
MIT	Mobile Information Team
MMT	Mobile Medical Team
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MOND	Ministry of National Development
MPH	Ministry of Public Health
MRP	Mobile Reserve Platoon
MTT	Mobile Training Team
NSCC	National Security Central Command
PAT	People's Assistance Teams
PP	Provincial Police
PsyOps	psychological operations
RAC	Research Analysis Corporation
RACFO-T	RAC Field Office-Thailand
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
RSSP	Rural Security Systems Program
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTASF	Royal Thai Army Special Forces
RTG	Royal Thai Government
RTN	Royal Thai Navy
SAF	Special Action Force
SOC	Special Operations Center
SRI	Stanford Research Institute
TNPD	Thai National Police Department, Ministry of Interior

USA	US Army
USAF	US Air Force
USASF	US Army Special Forces
USIS	US Information Service
USOM	US Operations Mission
VDC	Volunteer Defense Corps
VDD	Volunteer Defense Division, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior
VPT	Village Protection Team
VSF	Village Security Force
VSO	Village Security Officer

GLOSSARY

Amphoe	Administrative division of a changwat; comparable to a county.
Baht	Thai unit of currency; one baht is approximately equivalent to $.05.
Changwat	The principal administrative division of the Kingdom of Thailand; comparable to a province or state.
Kamnan	Appointed (or, in some cases, elected) head of a tambon.
King Amphoe	A sub-amphoe established when the increasing population of an amphoe or the security situation warrants more decentralized control. (Throughout this volume, a base map of the Northeast has been used which delineats amphoe and king amphoe boundaries as of March 1968.)
Mathayom	Thai secondary school formerly consisting of eight grades following four years of primary school. Currently consists of five grades following seven years of primary school. (In this text the old designations are used.)
Nai Amphoe	Appointed head of an amphoe.
Palad Amphoe	Deputy to a nai amphoe.
Palad Changwat	Deputy to a changwat governor; usually more than one, each with a separate function.
Phuyaiban	Elected chief of a village.
Prathom	Thai elementary school formerly consisting of four grades; currently consists of seven grades. (In this text the old designations are used.)
Wat	An enclosed area containing the buildings associated with Buddhist worship; the temple compound (usually one in every village).

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OVERVIEW
Paramilitary Organizations and Programs

(U) This volume provides detailed descriptions of five Thai paramilitary programs, the Village Radio System (VRS) and the Census Aspiration program.* The primary function of all these programs is to provide security for remote villages. This activity fits into the overall RTG counterinsurgency effort by separating the insurgents from their base of support for manpower, food, and intelligence. A secondary responsibility in the case of most of these programs is to enduce villager respect for and cooperation with the RTG by the conduct of civic-action projects. Together, the five presently active programs field some 5,450 locally recruited volunteers who operate in teams of 10 to 12 members deployed in approximately 750 of the 15,000 villages in the Northeast.

STRUCTURE AND COORDINATION

(U) Except for the Village Protection Teams (a special program initiated by the Governor of Changwat Ubon) all these programs are operated by several divisions of the Department of Local Administration (DOLA) of the RTG Ministry of Interior. Coordination is effected through various committees and through the auspices of the Department's Director-General and Deputy Director-General. Since all these efforts involve village security, they are of direct relevance and importance to the overall suppression coordination and execution functions of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) and the RTA Second Army Forward Headquarters.

(U) At Changwat level these paramilitary efforts fall under the cognizance of the governor and his deputy, the palad changwat for security. Seven of the Northeast changwats have centers of coordination of counterinsurgency activities by civil, police, and military elements known as CPMs. These centers are headed by the governor and have a permanent operations staff. Counterinsurgency efforts in the other eight Northeast changwats are coordinated through Communist Suppression Committees (CSC) chaired by the governor.

(U) Amphoe-level coordination of paramilitary efforts is particularly important to the success of the programs in providing security to the local villages. This is the lowest administrative level at which there are full-time officials concerned with implementation and support of the several DOLA programs, and coordination with other related RTG elements (police, military, and development agencies). The functions of the palad amphoe for security are critical to this effort. This official, usually an army officer transferred to DOLA, is responsible for providing full-time assistance to the nai amphoes in implementing these DOLA programs. Coordination with the amphoe police and any assigned military units is affected by the palad security or nai amphoe.

*Although neither the VRS nor the CA program fields armed forces, they are included in this volume because they serve to expand the capabilities of the five paramilitary programs and are essential to a discussion of the village security environment in Northeast Thailand. The VRS provides a communications link for paramilitary units and local government officials; the CA program, through the information collection activities of its village cadres, contributes to the effectiveness of paramilitary units operating in the same area.

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(U) Below amphoe level, in the tambons and villages where these paramilitary units actually operate, there is little coordination among them, or between them and supporting elements (police, military, or development). The kamnan has no staff to effect such coordination--nor is he usually personally trained or inclined to do so himself. He seldom has any radio communication with elements located in his area of responsibility.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF VILLAGE PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

(U) The principal characteristics of the village paramilitary organizations are shown in Table 1; Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the geographical coverage by amphoe of all seven programs discussed in this volume; and Appendix A indicates deployment in the Northeast by tambon.

Strengths and Coverage

(U) ~~(C)~~ Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC). The VDC has approximately 3,720 armed men stationed in 372 villages in the Northeast providing local protection and is by far the largest program. It has expanded greatly since 1966 when the first VDC were called to active duty in Changwat Sakon Nakhon and assigned to a village to provide armed security. Most activated VDC have been provided with cadre leaders from the Provincial Police. The number of VDC serving on active duty in Northeast villages jumped significantly in early 1967 with the advent of CSOC's "0910 Plan," an operation designed to provide protection to villages and suppress insurgents in 11 designated areas. These VDC serve in Joint Security Teams with police as cadre. In mid-1967, the number of VDC providing village-level security again increased by approximately 1,000 men who were trained and deployed (often in full tambon VDC squad elements) in security-sensitive areas. These men received longer training and more modern weapons and equipment than did the earlier active VDC; they are often led by the kamnan serving on active duty with the unit.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Village Security Officers (VSO) and People's Assistance Teams (PAT). These village security "pilot" programs, initiated in late 1966 and implemented in selected areas of the Northeast in 1967, produced valuable experience and lessons for later village security efforts. The VSO has approximately 800 men serving on active duty in 50 villages of nine amphoes, primarily in Nakhon Phanom. (This is about 60 percent of the VSO members trained; the rest remain at home in their villages, not serving on active duty except when so ordered). The PAT program has about 400 men in 34 teams throughout 7 Northeast amphoes, primarily in Sakon Nakhon.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Village Protection Teams (VPT). A similar effort to provide armed protection to exposed villages,--the VPT program--covers four amphoes of northern Ubon with teams in 26 villages and a total of 360 men. This is a "local VDC" similar to the nation-wide organization and receives much of its funds from the VDC budget. Its members, however, are residents of the village which they protect, and the program was initiated by the local governor and nai amphoes as a separate entity.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Census Aspiration (CA). This program differs from all the others described here in that the man in the village (only one man and, therefore, called a CA cadre and not a CA team) is unarmed. He enhances the security of the village by producing information and intelligence on the subversives in the vicinity. There are approximately 170 people engaged in the CA program in two Northeast changwats, Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom. This includes 138 village cadres and 32 support staff members.

(U) (C) Village Security Force (VSF). The VSF is a new paramilitary program currently being formulated. Available information is, of course, tentative, but indications are that initially the program will operate in 10 Northeast amphoes with about 2,200 men.

Team Size

(U) (C) The armed village paramilitary elements all operate in teams of similar size. Depending on local conditions, they range from a six-man VPT in Ubon to a 25-man VSO element in Nakhon Phanom; most teams have 10-12 members. Each of these elements operates in a semi-autonomous fashion in its assigned village, coordinating with nearby police (tambon or amphoe) or military units, but functioning alone and reporting directly to the nai amphoe or his deputy. At times the units may work in the same village and cooperate to protect its residents; they may be combined with local defense volunteers organized in a variety of forms. The CA man operates alone; in some cases he is located in a village with a VDC, PAT, or VSO unit.

Recruitment Base

(U) (C) The VPT, VSF, CA, and (to a certain extent) the VSO recruit, train, and assign men to

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Table 1

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF VILLAGE PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

ITEM	VDC	VSO	PAT	VSF*	VPT	CA
Approx. Number on Active Duty in NE.	3,726	800	400	(2,200)	360	170
Number of NE Villages Covered	381	50	34	(220)	26	138
Number of NE Amphoes Covered	41	9	7	(9)	4	9
Average Strength of Village Team	10	16	12	(10)	14	1
Recruitment Base	Generally tambon of assignment; serve elsewhere when ordered.	Originally their own village; employment often at tambon level.	Amphoe of assignment.	(Their own village.)	Their own village.	His own village.
Training	15 days for changwat companies 33 days for amphoe units, tambon squads also leadership training.	3 weeks basic training 1 extra week for leaders.	8 weeks basic training 1 extra week for leaders 2 extra weeks for CA/PAT 6 extra weeks for medics.	(8 weeks basic training 1 extra week for leaders 2 extra weeks for CA/VSF)	15 days	4 weeks
Weapons	M1903 Rifle (Springfield) (Some have M1 Rifle or carbines)	12-gauge Shotgun	M1 Rifle M1 Carbine M3 Submachine Gun	(M1 Rifle M1 Carbine M3 Submachine Gun)	M1903 Rifle 12-gauge Shotgun	Unarmed
Communications	TR-20 or FM-1/5 when assigned to CSOC; otherwise may use VRS.	FM-1; links with tambon and amphoe police station.	HT-1; links to amphoe.	(FM-1/5 to be provided by VRS; will link with hamlet and tambon police station.)	None	Use messengers to deliver daily report to changwat.
Uniforms	Fatigues, boots, cartridge belt, soft hat.	RTG administrative uniform (khakis)	Blue denim pants and shirt, canvas boots.	(Will not be uniformed.)	None provided; must have purchased own field clothes.	None
Approx. Monthly Pay (in baht)	480	230	680	(393)	150	500

*This information represents planning as of May 1968 and should be regarded as tentative.

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

Fig. 1: LOCATIONS OF ACTIVE DUTY VDC IN A VILLAGE SECURITY ROLE BY AMPHOE

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Fig. 2: VRS INSTALLATIONS BY AMPHOE

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

Fig. 3: LOCATIONS OF PAT AND CA ELEMENTS BY AMPHOE

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Fig. 4: LOCATIONS OF VSO AND VPT ELEMENTS AND PLANNED LOCATIONS OF VSF ELEMENTS BY AMPHOE

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defend their own village of residence. However, many of the VSO members serve in aggregates or "sector forces" composed of members from several villages providing protection and support for a larger area.

(U) (C) The VDC and PAT programs operate differently in this regard. A VDC member may be called to active duty to serve wherever ordered, but, in practice, those assigned to Joint Security Teams or CPM Village Protection Units have served in their amphoe of residence. The tambon squads called to active duty as units in 1967 and 1968 are composed of residents of the tambon; the squad, often headed by the local kamnan, is assigned to protection duties in a designated village in the tambon. The PAT program recruited on an amphoe-wide basis; the amphoe teams can be assigned by the nai amphoe to any village in the amphoe. In practice, nearly all PAT teams have moved from one village to another within the amphoe at least once.

Major Activities

(U) (C) All the four organizations which presently field armed village teams (VDC, VSO, PAT and VPT), provide armed protection to the villages in which the teams are assigned. Basically, the VDC, VSO, and VPT provide only protection, with limited contributions to intelligence collection and village improvement. The PAT units, on the other hand, are specifically trained and equipped to carry out the broad missions of providing protection to their village through armed presence and patrols, collecting intelligence, and assisting in and stimulating small villager self-help projects. These may include repair of buildings; working on village roads, bridges, and culverts; construction of small dams and shallow wells; and participation in agricultural improvement efforts. In addition, each PAT has one or two members (often women) who are trained as paramedics and who dispense medicines and provide elementary medical assistance for local villagers. Present planning is for VSFs to operate in a manner similar to the PATs.

Weapons and Communications Equipment

(U) (C) There is no standardization of paramilitary weapons or radios. The most prevalent weapon in use is the Springfield rifle M1903. Many VDC trained and activated in 1967, however, received the more modern M1 rifle which is also provided to members of the PATs. Some PAT members also carry M1 carbines and M3 submachine guns, as will the VSF members. Shotguns (12-gauge) are the standard weapon for the VSO; some VPT members have similar shotguns. No paramilitary elements in the Northeast are assigned machine guns, and there are no M16 (AR15) rifles or M79 grenade launchers such as possessed by some units of the BPP and RTA.

(U) (C) There are several kinds of radios being used by the village teams. Many have access to the FM-1 and FM-5 radios distributed by the VRS to amphoes and tambons; some, in fact, take the radio assigned to the kamnan and move it to the team's defensive position in a village within the tambon. Other teams have FM-1/5 or TR-20 radios provided to CSOC to assist the overall suppression operation. The PATs have HT-1 radios which link the teams with a similar set at the nai amphoe's office. The VSF teams are scheduled to have FM-5 radios especially provided by VRS which will link the team on the VRS frequency with the kamnan and tambon police station (the latter will be provided a VRS radio to supplement its police radio, permitting contact with the VSF).

Uniforms

(U) Some of the village paramilitary defense forces (especially the VDC) are issued fatigue uniforms and boots which resemble those of a regular military force. The PAT members wear blue denim pants and shirts, similar to villager dress, but standard for the whole team. The VSO wear the regular RTG administrative uniform of khaki shirts and trousers. Many VSO members serving on active duty, however, wear fatigues and boots, as do VPT members, who were issued no uniform at all. CA members wear their normal civilian clothing. It is not planned to issue uniforms to the VSF.

Pay

(U) Although these are all DOLA-operated programs, there is no standardization of pay for team members which has led to some morale problems. With the possible exception of the VPT, the men serving in these paramilitary units receive pay generally sufficient to meet the costs of living in rural Northeast villages and commensurate with their full-time services. Those residing in their own village (VPT, VSO, VSF, and CA) generally receive a somewhat lower monthly salary than those who are assigned away from their home village (VDC, VSO, and PAT) as their living costs are considered to be less. The figures in Table 1 include both monthly salaries and any per diem or other allowances authorized when serving on active duty.

(U) (C) For most of these paramilitary teams the funds for salaries and per diem allowances come

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from the overall CSOC budget. The money is allocated to the responsible changwat CPM for payment of team members. Actual payment is usually made by the palad amphoe for security, who pays those teams in his area. Funds to pay the CA salaries (and for PAT prior to March 1968) came from US assistance; payments were made by the palad for security.

(U) (C) A joint Thai/US Evaluation of the VSO conducted in 1967 found that a large percentage of VSO members complained about the low level of pay and the irregularity with which it was received, with a consequent lowering of morale. An evaluation of the PAT program in late 1967 indicated that PAT salary levels tended to be resented by VDC members in nearby (or occasionally the same) villages, who felt that they were performing the same functions for 30 percent less pay. When PAT salaries shifted from US to RTG sources in early 1968, there was some fear of lower PAT morale due to lower pay (equal to the VDC). This problem was solved temporarily by extra allowances to keep the PAT salary at $680 per month until June 1968.

Training

(U) (C) As shown in Table 1, no two of the paramilitary units discussed here receive the same training. In fact, even within one organization (such as the VDC) units in different areas or at different times receive quite different training curricula of varying length from different instructors. Training for the VDC is conducted by elements of the RTA at the changwat or amphoe seats from which the members are recruited. The changwat compaines receive 15 days of basic training; the amphoe platoons and tambon squads receive 35 days' training. VDC members also receive refresher training at sporadic intervals, and leadership training for selected individuals.

(U) (C) The VSO training was given by instructors from DOLA and the police (PP). The team leaders (phuyaibans) receive 4 weeks of instruction; all others receive 3 weeks. The training is split between a training center at Udon and the home amphoe of the members.

(U) (C) PAT and CA members received their training at Camp Suan Son, located near Hua Hin. The instructors came from CSOC and DOLA, and the basic training lasted for 8 weeks for PAT and 4 weeks for CA. PAT leaders received an additional week of instruction, and PAT members selected to fulfill an additional CA reporting function underwent a special 2-week course. The PAT medics were trained in a 6-week course at the Public Health Hospital at Khon Kaen. One of the special features of the PAT and CA training was the political and motivational instruction designed to produce an enhanced sense of nationalism, commitment, and motivation on the part of team members. The PAT training also included instruction in village improvement skills (carpentry, masonry, barbering, agriculture, and animal husbandry).

(U) (C) The VPT training lasted 15 days and consisted almost entirely of techniques of armed protection. The training was given by elements of the RTA Special Forces at the four amphoe seats concerned with the program.

(U) (C) The training projected for VSF members will, in many ways, be similar to that provided PAT members. It will be given at a VSF training site at Prachuap Khiri Khan and last 8 weeks. Leaders will receive an extra week's instruction, and CA/VSF reporters will take a special 2-week course. The VSF training will contain political and motivational instruction similar to that given during the PAT course. VSF members will be trained in development skills, but to a somewhat lesser extent than were the PAT members; the VSF team does not have a medic.

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VOLUNTEERS DEFENSE CORPS

SUMMARY

(U) (C) The Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) was established by Royal Decree in 1954 as an element within the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The VDC was deactivated following the assumption of power by Field Marshal Sarit in 1958. In 1962, the VDC was reorganized and revived by General Praphas, the Minister of Interior. A further reorganization occurred in 1966 as a result of the efforts of General Surakij (Chief of Staff of both CSOC and the RTA) and Lt General Sriyud (Director of the Operations and Coordination Center, CSOC). Their aim was to develop a rural security force responsive to CSOC requirements and capable of handling the village security problem in the Northeast in conjunction with CSOC's 0910 Plan and related CPM local security efforts.

(U) (C) There are two basic roles for the VDC. This organization is the major armed reserve force (national guard) of Thailand. In the event of a national emergency or natural disaster, the VDC can be called to active duty in support of the civil government police, or military. The other basic role of the VDC--and its most important in terms of the current counterinsurgency effort in Northeast Thailand--is to provide the major manpower base (active-duty) for village-level and tambon-level armed security and protection elements which are critical to current suppression operations.

(U) (C) There are several different types of VDC organizational units: Changwat Companies, Border Amphoe Platoons, Special Amphoe Companies, Tambon Squads, Village Protection Units, and Joint Security Teams. The first three of these six have never been called to active duty as units; however, they form the primary national reserve capability of the VDC and provide individuals for assignment to CSOC's 0910 Plan Joint Security Teams and the CPM Village Protection Units. These two elements are the major users of the VDC active-duty manpower, and both are very important to RTG provision of armed security to exposed and threatened Northeast villages. The Joint Security Teams, composed of VDC with police or RTA cadres, function in CSOC 0910 Plan areas; the VDC Village Protection Units provide security to villages located elsewhere in the seven CPM changwats (they may, in fact, often be "joint," with police or military leaders). The Tambon Squads, an integral element of the Special Amphoe Companies, began to be trained and deployed as complete village security units in the last half of 1967; the company and platoon headquarters have not been activated.

(U) (C) Available figures indicate that as of early 1968, over 1,500 VDC were deployed in 151 villages in the 0910 areas, and another 2,300 VDC were providing security in an additional 230 villages located elsewhere in the CPM changwats. Thus, as of early 1968, the VDC was by far the major element in the village-level counterinsurgency force structure in Northeast Thailand. Another 830 VDC were serving on active duty as protection and security elements for fixed installations, MDU field and headquarters sites, and as amphoe-level reserve and patrol forces.

(U) (C) The VDC receive training from various elements of the RTA, including the Special Forces. They are paid about $480 per month, and most are armed with Springfield M1903 rifles. Many of the Tambon Squads deployed in 1967, however, are armed with newer and more effective M1 rifles. The primary VDC mission is to provide armed security and protection to the 382 villages in which they are assigned. The organizational structure goes no lower than the tambon, but employment of these forces is primarily at the village level.

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MISSIONS

General Responsibilities

(U) (C) The overall missions of the VDC as reported in a 1965 Joint USOM/MACTHAI evaluation[2] of the VDC are:

(1) to eliminate dangers created by natural hazards or enemy forces;

(2) to cooperate with police in maintaining local security;

(3) to safeguard important buildings and lines of communication;

(4) to be responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence in their local areas;

(5) to support the armed forces in their counteraction against enemy elements; and

(6) to serve during martial law under the command of local military units as ordered.

(U) (C) These rather broad missions are further delineated in VDC Act, Issue No. 2, of 1966 which divides VDC missions into two categories: those during time of peace and those during time of war. There are six VDC missions in time of peace as follows:

(1) to assist local authorities and police in the maintenance of local law and order, with emphasis placed on investigating and reporting;

(2) to assist local authorities in controlling and extinguishing fires;

(3) to assist local development personnel in their activities;

(4) to assist in the repair of government offices and other public buildings, as well as to provide transportation and evacuation of the local populace in time of emergency;

(5) to assist in relief during natural disaster; and

(6) to assist medical and health authorities in giving treatment and hospitalization, and to aid in the prevention of epidemics.

Six additional missions are assigned to the VDC in time of war, as follows:

(1) to assist in relief to problems caused by enemy action;

(2) to cooperate with local authorities and police in maintaining security;

(3) to guard important installations and lines of communication;

(4) to prevent espionage;

(5) to render assistance to military personnel as requested; and

(6) to act as a national reserve force to support and reinforce regular military units.

Counterinsurgency Responsibilities

(U) (C) CSOC has assigned the following additional missions to those VDC called to active duty in CPM areas:

(1) to provide the villages in which they are assigned with security against insurgent action;

(2) to provide tambon-level security against the insurgents;

(3) to arrest insurgents whenever possible;

(4) to destroy insurgent meeting places, weapons, supplies, and logistical facilities; and

(5) to conduct psychological operations and civic action projects.[3]

ORGANIZATION

(U) The overall responsibility for VDC policy, organization, and budgeting rests with the 21-man VDC Committee composed of high-ranking officers from the Ministry of Interior (MOI), Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Finance (MOF), and Ministry of Justice (MOJ).[4] The Chairman of the VDC Committee and Commander-in-Chief of the VDC is the Minister of Interior.[5] The Deputy Chairman of the VDC Committee is the Minister of Defense. The other members of the Committee are the following:

Under-Secretary of State, MOI

Under-Secretary of State, MOF

Deputy Under-Secretary-Executive, MOI

Deputy Under-Secretary-Development, MOI

Deputy Under-Secretary-Technical, MOI

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VOLUNTEER DEFENSE CORPS

Director-General, Public Welfare Department, MOI

Director-General, Thai National Police Department, MOI

Director-General, Public Works Department, MOI

Director-General, Public Prosecution Department, MOI

Chief of Staff, Supreme Command Headquarters, MOD

Chief of Staff, RTA

Director of Joint Operations, Supreme Command Headquarters, MOD

Director of Operations, RTA

Chief, Territorial Defense Department, RTA

Director, Budget Bureau, OPM

Chief, General Accounts Division, MOF

The Committee Secretary is the Director-General of the Department of Local Administration, MOI. He is assisted in this duty by two officials, the Deputy Director-General of DOLA and the Chief of the Volunteer Defense Division, DOLA.

(U) Administrative control of the VDC is exercised by DOLA through its Volunteer Defense Division (VDD). This division is responsible for maintaining personnel rosters and reports, publishing a VDC magazine, and supporting meetings of the VDC Committee. The VDD is represented in each changwat by a small staff which performs primarily a record-keeping function.

(U) In February 1966 the Minister of Interior issued an order establishing a VDC Central Headquarters.[4] Figure 5 illustrates the organization of this element. The Operations Branch of the VDC Central Headquarters is, for all practical purposes, the same as the VDD (the Chief of the VDD is the Chief of Operations, VDC Central Headquarters).[5]

(U) VDC logistics are the responsibility of the Police Quartermaster, TNPD, MOI. VDC weapons for those elements not serving on active duty are kept in Police Quartermaster armories.



(U) Fig. 5: ORGANIZATION OF VDC CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS

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(U) Those VDC operating on active duty under the CSOC/CPM structure are paid and supplied by CSOC. CSOC was responsible for the creation of the VDC Special Amphoe Companies, which provide the majority of active-duty VDC elements engaged in counterinsurgency. Approximately 80 percent of those VDC serving on active duty fall under the CSOC/CPM structure.

(U) These national-level relationships are shown in Fig. 6.



(U) Fig. 6: OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR VDC

(U) Regional (or division) level VDC headquarters were established by the same act (1966) which established the Central VDC Headquarters.[3] Four division headquarters were established: Northeastern, Northern, Central, and Southern. The Northeastern Division Headquarters is located at Khon Kaen; it is responsible for all VDC units in the 15 changwats of PP Regions 3 and 4. Each division headquarters is organized along the same lines as the Central Headquarters shown in Fig. 5. The division headquarters commander has control over all VDC units in the division area for what the VDD terms "tactical operations," and for VDC intelligence activities. These "tactical operations," as defined by the VDD, involve only the provision of administrative support to VDC elements called to active duty, not the actual command of VDC units or elements on active duty. As no VDC elements have been called to active duty as units, the division headquarters have not yet had the opportunity to exercise their functions.

VDC Units

(U) VDC unit organization is composed of three sublevels: changwat, amphoe, and tambon. This organizational structure represents only the authorized organization and not necessarily that found in actual use.

(U) Changwat VDC. The governor is the commander of all VDC units in his changwat and is responsible for the personnel and logistics activities of these units. He reports directly to the VDC Central Headquarters (except for certain kinds of administrative support which are the responsibility of the VDC division headquarters). The governor has the authority to call to active duty any individual VDC member in his changwat. Figure 7 shows those branches that each changwat VDC headquarters is authorized under the VDC Order of February 1966. The authorized organization of the 160-man changwat VDC company and other authorized VDC operational units is shown in Fig. 8.

(U) Amphoe VDC. At amphoe level there presently are two kinds of VDC organizations: Border Amphoe Platoons and Special Amphoe Companies. The VDC reorganization of 1962 established VDC platoons of 40 men each for deployment in designated critical border areas. The Special Amphoe Company program was initiated in 1966 in response to CSOC requirements for local security units in

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

(U) Fig. 7: AUTHORIZED ORGANIZATION OF VDC CHANGWAT HEADQUARTERS



(U) Fig. 8: AUTHORIZED ORGANIZATION OF VDC SECURITY ELEMENTS

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security-sensitive areas. All Border Amphoe Platoons are to be eventually converted into Special Amphoe Companies by the addition of Tambon Squads and a company headquarters.[1] This conversion began in mid-1967. The nai amphoe is commander of the VDC in his area; he reports directly to the governor. These VDC units may be attached to the police or to the RTA for specific operations.

(U) The Special Amphoe Company is composed of a company headquarters (17 men), an amphoe platoon (40 men) available at amphoe level as a reinforcement element, and a varying number of Tambon Squads (12 men per squad--one squad for each tambon in the amphoe). The nai amphoe has a special deputy for security (the palad amphoe--security) to supervise VDC affairs and related security matters. A proposal to have the amphoe platoon commanded by an RTA NCO, directly responsible to the nai amphoe, is under consideration but has not yet been implemented.

(U) Tambon VDC. VDC squads of 12 men each have been formed in each tambon of those amphoes authorized a Special Amphoe Company. The commander of the Tambon Squad may be the local education officer or the kamnan. He reports to the nai amphoe through the palad amphoe-security. The Tambon Squads may be attached to or combined with police or RTA elements as required, with these elements providing leadership cadre for the VDC. These squads are the only VDC elements actively engaged in counterinsurgency activity as units in a village security role.

Future Plans

(U) (C) Changes in VDC organization and role may result from a decision of the RTG Council of Ministers to create a new, village based, security organization, termed the "Village Security Force (VSF)."[7] This organization will be village oriented, as opposed to the VDC's lowest organizational echelon--the Tambon Squads. VSF members will be natives of the villages they are assigned to protect. VSF training will be similar to that given the PATs and its legal structure will build on that of the VSO.

(U) (C) In August 1967 the US Mission approved a 5-year plan for VDC improvement which was submitted by MACTHAI/JUSMAG under its Military Assistance Program. This plan calls for the expenditure of $2,715,000 for 5 fiscal years (FY68-72), providing improved training and weapons for additional VDC members. All FY68 program funding approvals have been received, while the FY69 has been approved at the OSD level as of March 1968.[8]

FUNDING

(U) (C) The VDC budget for 1968 is $21,385,300.[9] The figure for 1967 was $14,080,300. These figures do not include payments to VDC members assigned to CSOC, MDU, or other units. The parent organization requesting the assignment of VDC members pays their per diem (see the section on "Locations and Strengths" for a description of these assignments).

(U) (C) Approximately $20,000,000 has been budgeted annually by the RTG in FY66, FY67, and FY68 to finance the VDC elements (JSTs) assigned to CSOC 0910 Plan Areas and the VPUs located elsewhere in the CPM changwats.

LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS

(U) Accurate and complete information on the exact locations and strengths of VDC elements (both authorized and active duty) is not available. In certain instances, there are conflicting sets of data. VDC members are called to active duty as individuals; once on active duty they may be transferred from one amphoe to another,* or they may even be assigned to a different organization than the one for which they were originally activated. Thus, the data in this section are admittedly incomplete, especially regarding active-duty VDC strength; however, they are believed to be more accurate than any other available data in Bangkok. The information has come from MDI, CSOC, other RTG, and US agencies; field checks of the information on active-duty VDC strengths and locations have been performed in Buri Ram, Kalasin, Nakhon Phanom, Sakon Nakhon, Ubon, and Udon.

Authorized Strength

(U) (C) In the various categories as of early 1968 there were approximately 17,000 VDC authorized in Northeast Thailand. These authorizations are summarized in Table 2 and described in detail in App B.

(U) (C) Changwat Companies. There are a total of 32 VDC companies authorized in the Northeast. Each changwat is authorized two units, except for Nakhon Phanom and Nong Khai which are each

*For example, the only VDC operating in Ring Amphoe Nat Bak in July 1967 were on loan from Amphoe Muang, Sakon Nakhon, and a VDC element activated from Amphoe Waritchaphum was discovered in October 1967 to be assigned to Amphoe Sayang Dam Din.

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Table 2

SUMMARY OF VDC AUTHORIZATIONS IN NORTHEAST THAILAND

TYPE OF UNIT	NUMBER OF MEN AUTHORIZED
VDC Changwat Companies	5,120
Border Amphoe Platoons	1,876
Special Amphoe Companies:	
1966 structure	2,144
1967-68 structure	7,142
Security Guard Duty	775
Total	17,057

authorized three. Each VDC Changwat Company is authorized 160 men, for a total authorization of 5,120 men.[h,w] None of these units is on active-duty status, although many have provided individuals for activation.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Border Amphoe Platoons. A total of 27 amphoes in nine Northeast changwats are authorized VDC Border Amphoe Platoons, with a combined total of 1,876 men.[9] None of these platoons has been called to active duty.[9] Details on the locations of these authorized platoons are presented in App B.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Special Amphoe Companies. There are 14 VDC Special Amphoe Companies in the seven Northeast CPM changwats, based on the 1967 CSOC request.[8] None is on active duty as a unit, although individuals have been called. A total of 2,144 men are authorized in these units. An additional 52 companies (or at least the Tambon Squad components) were authorized following CSOC requests in 1967-68.[h,w] The total number of men involved is 7,142. Details are presented in App B. These authorizations provided the Tambon Squads which were the first VDC elements to be activated as units.

(U) Allocation for Security Guard Duty and Intelligence Collection. Allocations for security and intelligence duty assignments of VDC members are published annually by the VDC Committee. These allocations authorized designated agencies to call to active duty specified numbers of VDC (although funding must be separately obtained). Units are not designated and the number authorized can be drawn from a single VDC unit or from several units. The NSCC regularly uses this system, requesting VDC for security duty with the MDUs or for various separate security and intelligence roles (working with the police, guarding buildings and fixed installations, being bodyguards, or providing assistance in case of disaster). Pay for these VDC comes from the NSCC budget. There were 775 VDC authorized for this role in nine Northeast changwats in 1966 (believed to be a similar number in 1967 and 1968). Details are presented in App B.

Active Duty Strength

(U) ~~(C)~~ Available information, supplemented by field checks, indicates that as of early 1968 there were approximately 4,600 VDC serving on active duty in the Northeast, with nearly 90 percent of them engaged in activities in support of CSOC's overall communist suppression program. These men were assigned primarily to 150 Joint Security Teams (JSTs) in the CSOC 0910 Plan Target Areas, or to CPM Village Protection Units (VPUs) in another 230 villages in designated security-sensitive areas outside the 0910 Areas.

(U) There are no VDC Changwat Companies, Border Amphoe Platoons, or Special Amphoe Companies on active duty as integral units.[9] Individuals from these units are serving on active duty, assigned to JSTs, VPUs, CPM reinforcement elements, MDUs, or in various other roles. Some Tambon Squads are serving as complete 12-man units in a village protection role. All JSTs have police cadres serving as unit leaders; most of the VPUs also have such cadres, although the Tambon Squads are fully composed of VDC personnel, usually led by the local kamnan.

(U) ~~(C)~~ VDC in Joint Security Teams. There are 1,529 VDC members serving on active duty in the CSOC 0910 Plan JSTs.[11,12] These VDC are deployed in 151 villages surrounding the 13 defined target areas in Changwats Buri Ram, Sulasin, Korat, Nakhon Phanom, Nong Khai, Sakon Nakhon, Ubon, and Udon. This deployment is summarized in Table 3; detailed information on village locations and the number of VDC assigned per village is presented in App C.

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Table 3

VDC DEPLOYED IN JSTs SUPPORTING CSOC's 0910 PLAN

TARGET AREA	NUMBER OF VILLAGES IN WHICH DEPLOYED	TOTAL NUMBER OF VDC
1	16	155
2	21	194
3	17	191
4	13	142
5	11	127
6	8	81
7	22	214
8	3	27
9-A	0	0
9-B	6	66
10	16	151
11-A	10	90
11-P	8	80
Totals	151	1,518

(U) ~~(C)~~ VDC in CPM Village Protection Units. The first VPUs were created in Sakon Nakhon in February 1966; many others have been added since then to meet the insurgent threat in the CPM changwats. Information obtained from CSOC[12] and MDI[13] and field checked in several areas[10,11,18-21] indicates that approximately 2,300 VDC are actually serving on active duty in the seven Northeast CPM changwats, in addition to those with the 0910 Plan JSTs. These forces serve under the operational control of the CPM commander (changwat governor), with authority often delegated to the appropriate nai amphoe and palad amphoe-security. Table 4 lists VDC deployment in this role; detailed information on village locations and the number of VDC assigned per village is presented in App D.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Beginning in July 1967 approximately 1,000 new VDC members were recruited, trained, and retained on active duty in Tambon Squads. Most were equipped with M1 rifles and deployed to village security functions; they were primarily recruited on a tambon basis. For example, in Amphoe Muang of Sakon Nakhon each of the 16 tambons provided 16 recruits, including, in each case, the kamnan who served as the full-time leader of the squad.[11] Five more men from the changwat seat were added to the group, for a total of 261. Although each tambon provided 16 men, the Tambon Squad is composed of 12 men; the remaining 64 are on active duty at the amphoe for service, support, and reinforcement roles. The 16 Tambon Squads are assigned to villages for security duty in locations determined by the governor and nai amphoe.* Many squads return to their original tambon, but some security-sensitive tambons receive two or three squads while other tambons have none. Activities of one of these VDC Tambon Squads observed in operation in Sakon Nakhon are described below in the section on "Activities."

(U) CPM Security Roles in Addition to Village Protection. There are additional VDC serving on active duty in CPM security roles, outside of the JSTs and VPUs. They provide amphoe and changwat reinforcement elements, guard local buildings and sites, or perform intelligence duties. Reliable data on the full extent of this VDC role is very difficult to obtain. Indications are that each changwat has active-duty VDC members fulfilling such functions. For example, those identified to date include the following: 17 men as a VDC reinforcement element in King Amphoe Don Tan of Nakhon Phanom; 7 VDC as the amphoe strike force and reserve in Amphoe Sawang Daen Din, Sakon Nakhon; 40 VDC on active duty in Amphoe Muang of Nakhon Phanom fulfilling security and intelligence functions; and 13 VDC stationed at two checkpoints in Ubon. Details on the 400 VDC identified in this category are included in App D.

(U) ~~(C)~~ VDC on MDU Security Duty. Each MDU has assigned to it VDC members to provide security for the unit. There are 10 MDUs in the Northeast with a total of approximately 300 VDC serving with them.[7] These men are assigned as individuals from the quota set forth in the annual NSCC allocation. Information on the precise number of VDC security forces with each MDU is unavailable;

*Complete information on the village locations and strengths of this 1967 deployment is not available.

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Table 4

VDC DEPLOYED IN CPM VILLAGE PROTECTION UNITS

CHANGWAT	AMPHOE	NUMBER OF VILLAGES IN WHICH DEPLOYED	TOTAL NUMBER OF VDC
Kalasin	Kamalasai	1	5
	Kuchinarai	5	49
	Muang	3	14
	Sahatsakhan	7	54
	Tha Kantha	8	82
	Yang Talat	1	4
Loei	(Locations could not be verified)	40[a]	504[b]
Nakhon Phanom	Ban Phaeng	4	21
	Don Tan	5	70
	Khamcha-i	8	131
	Muang	4	18
	Mukdahan	2	22
	Na Kae	5	56
	Pla Pak	5	84
	Si Songkhram	4	22
	That Phanom	5	38
	Tha Uthan	2	11
Nong Khai	(Locations could not be verified)	34	116
Sakon Nakhon	Akat Amnuai	2	24
	Ban Muang	2	36
	Kusuman	2	24
	Kut Bak	5	48
	Muang	11	135
	Phanna Nikhom	4	46
	Sawang Daen Din	7	87
	Wanon Niwat	2	23
	Waritchaphum	2	23
Ubon	Chanuman	7	49
	Khemarat	1	6
	Luang Nak Tha	8	108
Udon	Ban Dung	6	68
	Ban Phu	3	21
	Na Klang	3	12
	Nong Ban Lam Phu	3	14
	Nong Han	3	60
	Si Ban Rueng	3	16
	Si That	5	119
Total		223	2,220

[a]Approximate number.

[b]This figure includes both VDC and locally originated security units; information on the division between the two is not available.

MDUs 1, 2, and 3 (Kalasin, Sakon Nakhon, and Nakhon Phanom, respectively) reportedly have the highest number. There are also approximately 150 VDC members serving as bodyguards and security forces in the Northeast with various elements of MDI and DOLA.

(U) Future Plans - 1968 Activation for Village Security. Information made available in April 1968 indicates that an additional 1,782 new VDC personnel in the Northeast will be trained during May-November 1968.[a] Approximately 1,200 of these will be activated in 100 Tambon Squads following completion of their training. These men will come from 15 amphoes of nine Northeast changwats.[a] The details of this planned expansion are shown in Table 5. In ten cases the units

[a]Throughout the rest of Thailand a total of 1,947 new VDC are scheduled for training in 1968 from 21 amphoes of nine changwats, as follows: Chiang Rai-415; Kanchanaburi-96; Nakhon Si Thammarat-120; Nan-403; Phetchaburi-120; Phetchalong-110; Prachin Buri-40; Prachuap Khiri Khan-93; and Ratchaburi-120. Approximately 1,330 of these new VDC will probably be retained on active duty following completion of training.[a]

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Table 5

NEW VDC SCHEDULED FOR ACTIVATION IN THE NORTHEAST IN 1968

CHANGWAT	AMPHOE	NO. OF TAMBON SQUADS TO BE FORMED	NO. OF VDC TO BE TRAINED			
			In Tambon Sqd.	In Reinf. Plat.	In Co. Hq.	Total
Loei	Dan Sai	11	132	40	17	189
	Tha Li	4	48	40	17	105
Nakhon Phanom	Muang	5	60			60
	Mukdahan	14	168	40	17	225
	That Phanom	5	60			60
Nong Khai	Muang	5	60			60
	Tha Bo	6	72	40	17	129
Roi Et	Phon Thong	11	132	40	17	189
Sakon Nakhon	Akat Amnuai	4	48	40	17	105
	Kamman	4	48	40	17	105
Si Sa Ket	Kanthararom	5	60			60
Surin	Prasat	5	60			60
Ubon	Ban Dan	4	48	40	17	105
	Kong Chiam	8	96	40	17	153
Udon	Ban Phu	10	120	40	17	177
Total		101	1,212	400	170	1,782

being formed are Special Amphoe Companies; in the remaining five amphoes, only Tambon Squads will be trained and then activated, without their organizational superstructure. Information on the planned villages of assignment for these new VDC elements is not available.

PERSONNEL

Recruitment

(U) A candidate for the VDC must reside in the area where recruited; be a Thai citizen; have no mental defects; have a background of good conduct; not be ordained in any religion; not be a member of the Red Cross; and not be an active-duty member of the police or military.

(U) VDC procedures call for the nai amphoes and their staffs to recruit new VDC members. The background of each newly recruited member is supposed to be scrutinized by the same procedure used to clear personnel for the Royal Thai Armed Forces. Each changwat has a security clearance and background investigation committee, headed by the governor. There are indications that some nai amphoes do not rigorously adhere to the list of required qualifications, especially when ordered by the governor to recruit a certain quota in a short period of time.

(U) The 1967 VDC recruited in King Amphoe Kut Bak, Changwat Sakon Nakhon, came from any village or town in that amphoe.[21] They had to meet the standards expressed above, with certification of good conduct and background made by the respective phuyaiban and kamnan. The age limits were between 21 and 45. The amphoe had 3 months in which to select and check the backgrounds of 93 men. The minimum educational level accepted was Prathom 4.**

(U) Personnel recruited in 1966-67, especially those selected to meet CSOC requirements, are generally believed to be better qualified and motivated than those recruited in past years. As an example of the availability of manpower for the VDC, when 162 new VDC slots were authorized in Amphoe Khamcha-I, Changwat Nakhon Phanom, it is reported that over 1,000 young men volunteered.[22]

Pay

(U) VDC members are paid only when on active duty or during periods of authorized travel. The VDC per diem scale is as follows:

*Four years of elementary school. See the glossary for a description of the Thai Education System.

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RANK	BAHT PER DAY	TOTAL FOR FULL MONTH
Private	14	420
Sergeant	16	480
Platoon Leader	18	540
Third-Class Officer	28	840
Second-Class Officer	32	960
First-Class Officer	34	1,020

(U) The actual pay scale for VDC serving on active duty varies to a certain extent between areas, depending on local decisions. Most JSTs and VPU members in the Northeast reportedly receive special allowances so that their total pay equals that of a VDC sergeant ($480/month).[8] Those VDC participating in the JSTs and VPUs are paid by CSOC; they are reported to receive their pay in full and on time.

Promotions

(U) A VDC member may be promoted to the rank of sergeant or acting squad or platoon leader if he has attended the proper leadership courses given by the RTA's TDD and has maintained a good service record. Indications are that, in practice, VDC promotions rarely occur.

TRAINING

(U) The RTA is responsible for the conduct of VDC training, of which there are four types: (1) annual training for VDC Changwat Companies; (2) initial and refresher training for Border Amphoe Platoons and Special Amphoe Companies; (3) leadership courses for selected VDC unit commanders; and (4) on-the-job training through participation in RTA unit exercises. All VDC units are brought up to full strength for initial training.

Changwat Company Training

(U) The VDC Changwat Companies receive a 15-day training session under the direction of the RTA. These units are given predominantly field training, covering marksmanship, squad tactics, and individual military skills. A 1965 study of the VDC indicated that this "annual" training reaches any given company only once every 5 or 6 years.[9]

Border Amphoe Platoon and Special Amphoe Company Training

(U) (C) MTTs from the RTA give both initial and refresher training to the Border Amphoe Platoons and the Special Amphoe Companies. Emphasis is placed on training the Tambon Squads. Initial training is for 4 weeks (176 hours), and refresher training covers 2 weeks (97 hours). Training is conducted under the general supervision of the nai amphoe, assisted by MTT leaders. Refresher training is usually scheduled to begin after all amphoes in a changwat have received their initial training; it occurs on an annual basis.

(U) Table 6 presents the basic VDC training schedule.[10] It covers 14 major subject categories. Refresher training generally covers the same subjects, but emphasizes employment and maintenance of individual weapons, combat tactics, village and tambon defense and security practices, reconnaissance and search techniques, ambush, counterambush, communications, psychological warfare, civic action, and first aid.[11] The daily training schedule used in September 1967 for the VDC in Amphoe Don Tan, Changwat Nakhon Phanom,[12] is presented in Table 7. As can be seen, the actual schedule used in this case does not necessarily follow the basic schedule shown in Table 7, and, in fact, it appears somewhat more extensive in terms of subjects covered.*

(U) In the Northeast MTTs that give this training have been formed by personnel from the following RTA units: 3d RCT, 6th RCT, 13th RCT, 6th Cavalry Bn, Special Forces, and 1st Aerial

*It is interesting to note the curriculum for the 1900-2000 hour time period which covers subjects dealing with Thai history and culture, patriotism, sacrifice, unity, and bravery. This is very much like the "political and motivational" training given to the PATs at Camp Suan Sam, Hua Hin. Discussions in Bangkok, however, have indicated that the PATs were the only village security element in Thailand known to receive this kind of motivational training. There was an apparent knowledge of this kind of training being given to the VDC. Table 6 shows a total of 18 hours which might contain this kind of instruction.

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Table 6

(U) SUBJECTS COVERED IN VDC BASIC TRAINING

SUBJECT	HOURS
Basic Military Techniques	20
Weapons	28
VDC Organization	2
Collecting and Reporting Intelligence	4
Map Reading	14
Small-Unit Tactics	24
Communications Subjects (Use of Tombon Radio)	8
Basic PsyOps (Face-to-Face Persuasion)	6
Aerial Delivery of Supplies and Marking DZ's	8
Demolitions	12
Orientation to Unconventional Warfare and Tactics	4
Village Defense	8
First Aid	8
Operations Behind Enemy Lines	2
Physical Training	8
Commander's Time	10
Testing	6
Miscellaneous	2
Total	176

Delivery Bn. Much of the 1967 training was given by RTA Special Forces MTTs. The composition of a typical MTT is shown in Table 8.

Leadership Training

(U) Leadership training courses are given to selected VDC unit commanders and leaders. Training for VDC company commanders was completed in 1965. Three courses at the platoon-leader level were held in 1966. In November 1966, the 46th Company, US Army Special Forces, provided a short course of instruction for 22 VDC members from Nong Khai.

(U) There are currently some 200 or more PP, plus some RTA members, serving with active-duty VDC elements as cadres and leaders. The men cannot be returned to their parent organizations until an equivalent number of effective VDC NCOs are trained. To expand VDC leadership training, two related courses of action are under consideration. One is to establish a VDC Leadership Center at Camp Narai, Lop Buri, under the RTA Special Warfare Center. Either a 4 or 8-week course would be given to selected NCOs by the RTA Special Forces. The other alternative is to train VDC NCOs at Camp Nam Phung, the combined RTASF/USASF training site in Changwat Sakon Nakhon. The VDC would be trained between regular cycles of RTA company-level counterinsurgency training currently being conducted at the camp.[8]

EQUIPMENT

Weapons

(U) The standard VDC weapon is the M1903 rifle (Springfield). Some M1 rifles, M1 carbines, and M3 submachine guns are also in use, and some VDC officers are issued a .45 cal pistol. VDC assigned to the MDUs use carbines belonging to the Supreme Command.* Weapons for VDC units not on active duty are stored either in the armory of the changwat PP, or in the TNPD quartermaster warehouse in Bangkok. Ammunition is purchased from the RTA. For 1968 the VDC has requested 300,000 rounds of ammunition for use in annual training.[8] Information on the amount of ammunition available to those VDC serving on active duty with CSOC, JSTs or CPM VPUs is not available, but its source is either CSOC or the RTA.

*These were provided by the US Military Assistance Program (MAP) in 1966.[8]

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Table 7

VDC TRAINING SCHEDULE, AMPHOE DON TAN, CHANGWAT NAKHON PHANOM
Sep 67

DATE	TIME	SUBJECT	METHOD OF TRAINING
Monday 4 Sep 67	0600-0800	Drills (Individual Training)	Practice
	1000-1200	Organization of VDC	Practice
	1300-1500	Underground Warfare	Conference
	1500-1700	Underground Warfare	Conference
	1900-2000	Duties of Good Citizens	Conference
Tuesday 5 Sep 67	0600-0800	Individual Training	Practice
	1000-1200	Intelligence & Reporting	Conference
	1300-1700	Characteristics & Operation of M1903 Rifle	Conference
	1900-2000	Patriotism	Conference
Wednesday 6 Sep 67	0600-0800	Physical Education	Practice
	1000-1200	First Aid	Conference
	1300-1500	Receiving Air Drops	Conference
	1500-1700	Commander's Time	Conference
	1900-2000	Definition of Nation	Conference
Thursday 7 Sep 67	0600-0800	Individual Training	Practice
	1000-1200	Intelligence & Reporting	Conference
	1300-1700	Characteristics & Operation of M1903 Rifle	Conference
	1900-2000	Patriotism	Conference
Friday 8 Sep 67	0600-0800	Individual Training	Practice
	1000-1200	Psychological Warfare	Conference
	1300-1500	Receiving Air Drops	Conference
	1500-1700	First Aid	Conference
	1900-2000	Unity	Conference
Saturday 9 Sep 67		Commander's Time	
Monday 11 Sep 67	0600-0800	Individual Training	Practice
	1000-1200	First Aid	Conference
	1300-1500	First Aid	Conference
	1500-1700	Map Reading	Conference
	1900-2000	Sacrifice	Conference
Tuesday 12 Sep 67	0600-0800	Basic Individual Training	Practice
	1000-1200	Receiving Air Drops	Conference
	1300-1700	Field Firing of M1903 Rifle	Practice
	1900-2000	Bravery	Conference
Wednesday 13 Sep 67	0600-0800	Drills (Basic Individual Training)	Practice
	1000-1200	Receiving Air Drops	Conference
	1300-1500	Map Reading	Conference
	1500-1700	Physical Education	Practice
	1900-2000	The King	Conference
Thursday 14 Sep 67	0600-0800	Basic Individual Training	Practice
	1000-1200	Psychological Warfare	Conference
	1300-1700	Field Firing of M1903 Rifle	Practice
	1900-2000	Virtue	Conference
Friday 15 Sep 67	0600-0800	Basic Military Training	Practice
	1000-1200	Psychological Warfare	Conference
	1300-1700	Field Firing of M1903 Rifle	Practice
	1900-2000	Propaganda	Conference

DATE	TIME	SUBJECT	METHOD OF TRAINING
Saturday 16 Sep 67	0600-0800	Field Firing of M1903 Rifle	Practice
	1000-1200	Review Field Firing	Practice
Monday 18 Sep 67	0600-0800	Grenade Throwing	Practice
	1000-1200	Explosive Demolitions	Practice
	1300-1500	Explosive Demolitions	Practice
	1500-1700	Individual Combat Drill	Practice
	1900-2000	Attacking the Enemy (Offensive)	Conference
Tuesday 19 Sep 67	0600-0800	Grenade Throwing	Practice
	1000-1200	Communications	Conference
	1300-1700	Map & Compass Reading	Conference
	1900-2000	Security	Conference
Thursday 21 Sep 67	0600-0800	Grenade Throwing	Practice
	1000-1200	Individual Combat Drill	Practice
	1300-1500	Operating in Enemy's Rear Area	Conference
	1500-1700	Communications	Conference
	1900-2000	Thai History	Conference
Friday 22 Sep 67	0600-0800	Grenade Throwing	Practice
	1000-1200	Communications	Conference
	1300-1700	Explosive Demolitions	Practice
	1900-2000	Thai History	Conference
Saturday 23 Sep 67	0600-0800	Village Protection	Conference
	1000-1200	Review, Village Protection	Conference
Monday 25 Sep 67	0600-0800	Grenade Throwing	Practice
	1000-1200	Village Protection	Conference
	1300-1500	Village Protection	Conference
	1500-1700	Ambush	Practice
	1900-2000	Thai Geography	Conference
Tuesday 26 Sep 67	0600-0800	Grenade Throwing	Practice
	1000-1200	Small Unit Combat Training	Practice
	1300-1700	Map Reading	Practice
	1900-2000	Thai Geography	Conference
Wednesday 27 Sep 67	0600-0800	Physical Education	Practice
	1000-1200	Ambush	Practice
	1300-1700	Ambush	Practice
	1900-2000	Sacrifice	Conference
Thursday 28 Sep 67	0600-0800	Grenade Throwing	Practice
	1000-1200	Immediate Actions	Practice
	1300-1700	Map & Compass Reading	Practice
	1900-2000	Unity	Conference
Friday 29 Sep 67	0600-0830	Grenade Throwing	Practice
	1000-1200	Immediate Actions	Practice
	1300-1500	Reconnaissance (Patrol)	Practice
	1500-1700	Evaluation	
Saturday 30 Sep 67		Evaluation	

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(U) Table 8

MOBILE TRAINING TEAM PERSONNEL

MEMBER	INSTRUCTION DUTIES
Team Leader–Captain	Tactical subjects, intelligence
Deputy Team Leader–Captain/Lt	Demolitions
Master Sergeant/Sergeant	Weapons instruction, tactical subjects
Master Sergeant/Sergeant	Explosives and demolitions
Master Sergeant/Sergeant	Signal communications
Master Sergeant/Sergeant	First Aid
Sergeant/Lance Corporal	Truck drivers (no instruction duties)
Master Sergeant/Sergeant	Mechanic (no instruction duties)

(U) Many of the VDC trained in 1967 by the RTASF received M1 rifles and carbines rather than the older M1903. These VDC also received hand grenades as standard issue. For example, a 12-man squad observed in Amphoe Muang, Changwat Sakon Nakhon, had 11 M1 rifles and one carbine, plus hand grenades. The carbine was being carried by the squad leader, the local kamnan.[7] These M1 rifles are on loan from RTA stocks and do not belong to the VDC.[8] The RTA loaned 1,400 M1 rifles and 200 carbines to the VDC for the 1967 activation.

(U) Weapons pose a potential problem for the 1968 activation for which men will begin training in May 1968. For the 4,000 new VDC to be trained and activated throughout the country, there are available 382 M3 submachine guns (remaining from an original US-support package of 506), 300 carbines, and 800 M1 rifles on loan from the RTA.[9] The remaining 2,500 weapons must either come from additional RTA loans of rifles and carbines, drawing down the weapons held for reserve VDC units in the event of activation, or from some 1,300 8-mm Japanese rifles, vintage 1920 (originally purchased for use at the RTA Military Academy and now loaned to the VDC along with 140 rounds of ammunition per weapon).[8] It is hoped that the RTA will be able to make available to the VDC additional modern weapons in 1968.

Uniforms

(U) VDC members are issued one set of forest-green fatigues (cap, jacket, trousers), one pair of jungle boots, a rifle belt, and a canteen. Officers receive two sets of fatigues. The VDC insignia is distinctive and resembles the Thai civil administrative insignia.

Communications

(U) The VDC does not have an integral communications system. The standard tambon radio from the Village Radio System (VRS) is supposed to be available for VDC use as required. Those active-duty VDC who serve with PP or RTA cadres (or with the MDUs) may have access to police, Army, or MDU radios; some active elements are provided radios by CSOC. In several cases, VDC units have been observed with FM-1 or FM-5 radios from the VRS. When the kamnan is serving as the active head of the VDC Tambon Squad, the radio provided to him through the VRS is generally moved to the VDC defensive compound.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The JSTs in 0910 Plan Areas are supplied radios for their use by CSOC. For example, in Target Area 11, Amphoe Lahan Sai, Changwat Buri Ram, CSOC is reported to have supplied 20 TR-20 radios and 18 "walkie-talkie" sets to the JSTs (composed of three PP and nine VDC each). Each of the 12 villages in this Target Area is assigned one TR-20 radio, with the remaining eight sets kept in reserve at the Target Area Control Headquarters. These JSTs report to the control headquarters five times per day, and the control headquarters reports to changwat seven times daily.[21]

(U) CSOC has been provided 200 FM-1/5 radios for use with JSTs and VPUs. Most of these sets are with the VDC-manned elements in the Northeast.

ACTIVITIES

(U) VDC activities generally fit into three categories: VDC as elements of village security forces; VDC as elements of strike units; and VDC as sentries and security guards.

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VDC As Elements of Village Security Units

(U) (C) The most important and widespread use of VDC members in the Northeast has been as village security elements. Beginning in early 1967, with initiation of CSOC's 0910 Plan, governors in the seven CPM changwats began the practice of combining two or three police or military cadres with 9 to 12 VDC. This type of unit, called a "Joint Security Team (JST)," was designed to act as a defense force for villages in designated security-sensitive areas. These villages, on the fringe of CT base areas, were the targets of insurgent recruitment, food collection, and propaganda activities; placement of forces in these villages was designed to cut off the insurgents from the population in villages near to their bases while other forces pursued the insurgents within the base area. Thus, the JSTs, as the primary village security force, are in many ways the most important elements of CSOC's 0910 Plan. In addition to VDC assigned to 0910 JSTs, other VDC fulfill a village protection role in the VDC-manned CPM Village Protection Units, separately employed to provide village security in selected locations outside 0910 Areas. Some of these units have police cadres; others are entirely VDC manned. Use of VDC on active duty in a village security role in fact antedated the initiation of the 0910 Plan, as they were first so used in Sakon Nakhon in February 1966.[8]

(U) (C) The activities of JSTs and non-0910 VDC village protection elements are basically very similar. The units establish a fortified position of varying effectiveness somewhere in the village. Usually, although not always, this team position is located in the village wat. Rarely, if ever, is the VDC security element located outside the village confines; it is either in the center of the village surrounded by village houses, or it is located on one edge of the village with houses to one side and open fields or rice paddies to the other. The team location usually is fortified with sandbags or rudimentary bunkers; other defensive positions are often constructed, and the team radio is set up with a bamboo-pole antenna rig. Brush may be cleared to improve fields of fire. In some cases a nearby helicopter landing zone may be selected, cleared, and marked. The team position is guarded 24 hours per day, with usually two VDC on guard on a rotating shift throughout the night.

(U) (C) In addition to their armed presence in the village the primary VDC defensive measure is the conduct of armed patrols. Patrols seem to range in size from three to 10 men, depending on the size of the team and the local threat environment, and are supposed to occur daily; night patrols are probably much less frequent, although they do occur. Patrols may range throughout the village in which the team is located, into the nearby fields, and occasionally into nearby hill areas. Patrols may involve setting ambush positions as well as armed movement through an area. When intelligence information (collected by the VDC element or passed to it from another friendly force) indicates the likely presence of armed insurgents, setting of ambushes on trail entrances and exits from the village--and night patrols--are much more likely. For example, field observations determined that the VDC members of JSTs in Target Area 11A, Amphoe Lahan Sai, Changwat Buri Ram, conduct short patrols both day and night. These patrols go through the village in which the VDC are stationed, and into nearby areas as well.[9] The VDC unit stationed at Ban Nong Phak Thiam, Amphoe Phanna Nikhom, Changwat Sakon Nakhon, also observed in the field, conducts day and night patrols, and ranges out several kilometers from the village when information indicates the possible presence of armed insurgents.[10]

(U) (C) VDC village security units may be ordered by higher echelons to respond to a reported CT sighting, or to an incident or clash between CTs and friendly forces. The only reaction force in Amphoe Sawang Daen Din, Sakon Nakhon, for example, which is directly responsive to the nai amphoe, is composed of seven VDC with mobility in the form of a truck. When the PAT at Ban Kham Ta Ma in that amphoe came under insurgent attack in August 1967, these VDC, plus another nearby PAT, formed the only RTG reaction force to reach the beleagured team before daybreak, even though they arrived several hours after the insurgents had broken contact and disappeared into the forest.[11] When the schoolteacher in Ban Kho Noi, King Amphoe Kut Bak, Sakon Nakhon, fought off many armed insurgents by himself, it was a local VDC unit which the amphoe dispatched to his aid, and which, in fact, reached the village while the fight was still underway.[12]

(U) (C) Another function of the VDC elements assigned to village security positions is to collect information about the insurgents in their area of operations. Little data are available to judge the effectiveness of VDC information collection activities, but amphoe and changwat officials in Sakon Nakhon, for example, report that the teams do collect and report important items of information.[13]

(U) (C) Some VDC elements providing village security in the Northeast engage in local development and self-help projects, although this kind of activity is not specifically part of their assigned mission. In Amphoe Lahan Sai, Changwat Buri Ram, VDC in the local JSTs have occasionally provided assistance to village development projects.[14] In Sakon Nakhon (especially in areas where the PAT elements have been engaged in such work as a specifically assigned mission), VDC elements also seem to be participating. In Ban Maet of Amphoe Muang, Sakon Nakhon, for example, the local VDC Tambon Squad (part of the 1967 VDC activation and headed by the kamnan) was observed to be working with villagers and PAT members from a nearby village in bridge repair activities. In Ban Nong Phak Thiam, Phanna Nikhom, where the VDC and PAT share the same compound

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in the village wat, villagers report that both the VDC and PAT help the villagers in house repairs, road construction, and similar projects."

(U) (C) VDC units assigned to village security duty often are involved in conducting local-level population and resources control programs. This primarily involves issuing and checking passes for villagers who desire to leave the village for another area. The villager, prior to departing, must check with the unit, state his reason for leaving, planned destination, and expected time of return. Some teams issue special passes, others simply check to be sure the villager's regular government identification card is in proper order. Movement control programs enforced by the VDC are operating in Amphoes Waritchaphum, Phanna Nikhom, and Muang of Changwat Sakon Nakhon." In Changwat Ubon VDC are assigned to man designated checkpoints.

(U) (C) The VDC on numerous occasions during the past 2 years have engaged in clashes with armed insurgents in the Northeast. Information on these incidents other than the data presented here is not available. Between the months of January 1967 and May 1967, CSOC-supplied information indicates that the VDC-manned JSTs in 0910 Target Areas clashed 40 times with armed insurgents. This gives an average of about four clashes per target area for this period and a monthly average of eight clashes for VDC JSTs. Since there are a total of 151 JST elements with VDC assigned (as listed in App C), 40 total clashes in 5 months means that in this relatively short period of time more than one team in four clashed with the insurgents. This figure of 40 clashes covers only VDC in JSTs, and does not include clashes between 0910 strike forces and the insurgents, or between insurgents and VDC village security elements outside the 0910 Areas.

VDC as Sentries and Security Guards

(U) (C) VDC activities in this category include acting as security guards for MDU's, as personal bodyguards for changwat and amphoe officials, and as sentries and guards for various CPM field elements and for selected changwat facilities. The VDC attached to MDU-9 headquarters in Changwat Ubon are unarmed. Their weapons are kept at the amphoe headquarters, several kilometers distant. These men help the MDU teams in local civic action projects, both in the headquarters compound and in nearby villages. They do not conduct patrols."

VDC as Elements of Strike Units

(U) VDC members have on many occasions during the past 2 years been used in conjunction with other RTG security forces in sweeps and other operations conducted by these forces. The VDC are usually assigned to act as a blocking force, while the other elements conduct the active portions of the sweep. Other members may be tasked to serve as guides, or to participate in patrol operations.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

National Level

(U) At the national level the VDC Committee is responsible for formulating policy and guidance for the VDC. Participating ministries, plus CSOC and NSC, all interrelate in support of the VDC program.

(U) (C) The Chairman of the VDC Committee, General Praphas, is the Minister of Interior as well as Commander-in-Chief of CSOC (plus being Deputy Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Army). The Director-General of DOLA and the Chief of the Volunteer Defense Division, DOLA, are civil representatives at CSOC. The Chief of the VDD (who is for all practical purposes the acting commander of the VDC) is a Deputy Commander of CSOC's Operations and Coordination Center (that part of CSOC which plans operations). The Chief of Staff of the RTA, a member of the VDC Committee, is also Chief of Staff of CSOC. The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command Headquarters, another member of the VDC Committee, is a Deputy Commander of CSOC as well as being on the NSCC Policy Board. The Minister of Interior, Chairman of the VDC Committee, is also a member of the NSCC.

Regional Level

(U) (C) The VDC Regional Headquarters in the Northeast responsible for VDC "tactical operations" (as defined by VDD) has had little opportunity to exercise its functions primarily because no VDC units have been called to active duty as complete entities, and, consequently, they have not required tactical logistics and administrative support. The regional headquarters are collocated with PP Region Headquarters and they relate directly to the PP at this level. Certain aspects of the TNPD logistics role with regard to the VDC may be coordinated at this level, although most such coordination takes place between TNPD and DOLA/VDD in Bangkok.

(U) (C) Another regional-level organization concerned with VDC employment is the RTA's Second Army Headquarters (Forward) located at Sakon Nakhon. This organization keeps records of the loca-

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tions of deployed VDC security elements in the villages in the Northeast, coordinates with the governors and nai amphoes concerning the details of VDC employment, and (on occasion) uses VDC elements to support Army suppression operations.

Changwat Level

(U) The governor has the authority to call VDC units or individuals to active duty, but usually passes this power on to the particular nai amphoe. The nai amphoe is then responsible for filling the requests for recruitment, coordinating with the RTA for training, and calling individual VDC to fulfill changwat (CPM), CSOC, or NSCC requirements. The nai amphoe often delegates this work to the palad amphoe-security, who is usually an RTA officer assigned to DOLA to assist the nai amphoe in running the VDC program.

(U) (C) The changwat CPM is directly concerned with VDC tactical employment and security activities. This includes the governor (as CPM commander), the RTA military advisor and the CPM staff who are involved on a full-time basis with village security and counterinsurgency matters in the changwat. There is a palad changwat for security or protection who is responsible for VDC matters, as well as for VSO, PAT, or other similar security elements. The changwat PP Chief also deals with the VDC on a regular basis, as do the police at amphoe and tambon level. Police-VDC relationships concern tactical employment of security forces and police logistics support for deployed VDC elements. Those VDC assigned to security duties with MDUs operate under the control of the local MDU commander, and relate directly to that organization.

Village Level

(U) (C) VDC elements deployed in a mission of providing village protection relate to many other RTG organizations operating in the same area. This is true for both the VDC assigned to the 0910 JSTs and the VDC operating as village protection forces outside the 0910 Areas. Many VDC elements have police assigned as cadres who usually act as their leaders. Often these police leaders are experienced NCOs, who are able to impart their experience and training to the VDC unit. In some cases the local kamnan fills this role and leads the VDC village unit.

(U) (C) Relationships with Tambon Police. When police from a tambon station patrol through a VDC village, they usually contact the VDC members in the local area. The VDC unit when it collects information will usually report it to the nearby tambon police station, if there is one. In reverse, information collected by the tambon police station, or by another unit and reported to the police, may in turn be passed down to the village VDC. At times the nai amphoe might direct the VDC to act on this information with a patrol or ambush. An interesting case, whether typical or not, of VDC-tambon police relationships occurs in Ban Khem Bit, Amphoe Waritchaphum, Sakon Nakhon. The police station in this tambon has only one policeman assigned; the remainder of its forces are 10 VDC and one teacher (who was, in fact, the commander of the station). The tambon police station in Ban Khem Muang, Amphoe Sahatsakhan, Changwat Kalasin, visited in March 1968, housed the CPM control team for the five VDC protection units stationed in nearby villages. This control team, headed by a palad changwat, was composed of eight VDC and six PP. There was no tambon police station operating as such, although the control team occupied the police building.[10]

(U) (C) Relationships with RTA. VDC may be located in villages where RTA suppression operations are underway. When this occurs, the VDC may be asked by the Army to provide a blocking force, local information, a guide, or similar assistance. In some areas, including Sawang Daen Din, Sakon Nakhon, and Pla Pak, Nakhon Phanom, RTA elements are assigned to the same villages as the VDC.

(U) (C) Relationships with PAT. VDC contacts with PAT elements, especially in Sakon Nakhon where most of the PATs are operating, are frequent. In several instances the PAT and VDC actually live together in the same village, providing protection and village development stimulus. In Ban Nong Phak Thiam, Phanna Nikhom, Sakon Nakhon, the PAT and VDC live together in the village wat. They patrol together, conduct development projects together, stand guard duty together, and share cooking responsibilities. In another case where the two elements were residing together, when the leader of one unit was absent the other leader acted as head of both VDC and PAT. In many instances VDC village units near to PAT village locations pass messages for the PATs, which are not provided with FM-1 and FM-5 radios. In one village the VDC and PAT arranged to share responsibilities for local resources-control measures. The VDC unit was empowered by the nai amphoe to grant permission to travel to another village, but both units checked villagers when they leave to visit another village.[11]

(U) (C) Relations with VSO. In certain areas of the Northeast, especially Nakhon Phanom, VDC and VSO elements operate in close relationship to one another. Since they are both under the control of the nai amphoe, coordination is not too difficult to effect. The units may patrol together, provide security in the same village, and otherwise support one another.

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(U) Relationships with Village Radio System. This system provides most of the radios available to VDC village security elements, at least outside of 0910 operational areas where CSOC-CPM radios may be provided. This means that the VDC unit usually has the use of the VRS FM-1 or FM-5 set as its primary means of communication. The placement of these radios and deployment of VDC village teams, however, is not coordinated, and on several reported occasions the location of the radio was altered with the arrival of the VDC unit so that the security team could have use of the radio in its assigned village.

(U) (C) Relationships with the Census Aspiration Program. In many VDC-secured villages of Sakon Nakhon, where the CA program is primarily operating, there is a resident CA village cadre. The CA man gets security from the presence of the VDC, and the VDC may get information on insurgent activities and villager aspirations from the CA program. Coordination is effected through the changwat governor.

(U) Relationships with Mobile Medical Teams. In certain villages with VDC, RTG Mobile Medical Teams (MMTs) visit to provide medical assistance to the villagers. The team, while in the village, may set up its activities near the VDC site and the presence of the VDC element provides the MMT with protection from insurgent attack. The same is true of USIS Mobile Information Teams, which also may visit villages having VDC.

(U) Relationships with CD and DDP Programs. The primary VDC-CD relationship occurs in those VDC villages in which CD has trained the local village Development Committee (through the CD Village Leader Training program). The existence of such a committee in the village may influence VDC activities or employment. The same statement may be made about the DDP tambon council training program.

US Assistance to the VDC

(U) As of March 1968 there was no program of direct US assistance to the VDC in the form of funds, advisors, or commodities. Some US training assistance was provided, however. Relations between the US Mission and the VDC occur primarily at the level of the VDD and RTA G-3. The primary US contacts with the VDC program are JUSMAG's Army Advisory Group and those elements of USOM which deal regularly with DOLA and the VSF.

PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

(U) (C) Because of their selection, training, morale, and other related factors, many of the VDC elements deployed in counterinsurgency assignments in the Northeast have little impact in their assigned villages other than providing an armed government presence. However, those VDC activated in 1967 (who are armed with M1 rifles and who have been trained by RTA Special Forces) give indications of representing a major improvement over the earlier groups.

(U) (C) The joint USOM-MACTHAI Evaluation conducted in 1965 concluded that although the VDC is hindered by a reliance on government officials acting as unit leaders (such as nai amphoes and school teachers, who have other primary duties) and by insufficient training and communications, its long tradition as a paramilitary force and its members' familiarity with local areas forms a sound basis for a counterinsurgency unit.

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VOLUNTEER DEFENSE CORPS

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VILLAGE SECURITY OFFICERS

SUMMARY

(U) (C) The Village Security Officers (VSO) program was initiated in mid-1966 as a joint DOLA/USOM pilot project to determine the feasibility of training and arming phuyaibans and selected village members to prevent the spread of insurgent activity. The first VSO members completed training in December 1966. As of April 1968, about 1,000 VSO from five amphoes in Changwat Nakhon Phanom had been trained; approximately 600 of them are serving on active duty. Another 300 VSO, from Changwats Kalasin, Sakon Nakhon, and Ubon, have been trained and approximately 200 of them are actually on duty.

(U) (C) Although the original VSO concept called for operations in the villages from which the men were recruited, the insurgent threat in many of these areas (and the relatively short-range VSO weapon--the shotgun) forced the VSO to aggregate in larger groups. The active VSO in Nakhon Phanom are serving in 50 villages in teams of 6 to 23 men. VSO phuyaibans receive 4 weeks of training; all other VSO members receive 3 weeks' training. When on active duty they are paid $120 per month. Many lessons have been learned from the VSO experience that are of value to the developing Village Security Force (VSF) program.

MISSIONS

(U) The missions assigned to units made up of VSO personnel are: (1) to provide protection to the villagers; (2) to act as a source of intelligence; (3) to provide armed government presence at the village level; and (4) to assist the overall RTG counterinsurgency effort.[1]

ORGANIZATION

(U) The VSO members operate under the direct control of local DOLA officials. Each unit is led and administered by the phuyaiban, himself a VSO member. All other VSO members are appointed assistant phuyaibans to give them the authority to arrest lawbreakers. The phuyaiban reports to the kamnan who, in turn, reports to the nai amphoe.

(U) Technical advice, training, and commodity support for the VSO are provided by the PP. All reports, especially VSO radio reports, are supposed to be coordinated through nearby tambon and amphoe police stations.

(U) VSO organizational structure is presented in Fig. 9.

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

(U) Fig. 9: ORGANIZATION OF THE VSO PROGRAM

FUNDING

(U) RTG funding for the initial phase of the VSO program (FY67) came from the Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation (DTEC) and DOLA in the amounts of $150,000 and $1,260,000, respectively ($1,410,000 total).[1] US funding during this same period was provided by USOM in the amount of US $110,000. Funding for the program in 1968 is covered under the new VSF budget.

LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS

Deployment Concept

(U) ~~(C)~~ The initial VSO deployment concept called for placement in villages which were not dominated by the insurgents but were subject to future insurgent subversive attack. In many areas this concept was not implemented as VSO units were deployed in some of the most security-sensitive areas of the Northeast. Additionally, the VSO teams were originally to be deployed in and responsible for their own village.[2] However, after three teams were overrun by insurgents, DOLA modified the deployment concept to allow some teams to aggregate as sector or tambon units for greater strength and protection.[3] Available data on VSO deployment indicate that a mix of individual village VSO units and sector forces is the actual case in early 1968. Of the 50 units on active duty in Nakhon Phanom, 35 are village elements (six to nine men) and 15 are sector forces (10-100 men).

Areas of Recruitment

(U) ~~(C)~~ The initial phase of the VSO program recruited 625 VSO from 92 villages in Changwat Nakhon Phanom, and after training returned these men to their villages in 5 to 12-man units. These 92 villages are located in the following five amphoes: Khamcha-I, Mukdahan, Na Kae, Pla Pak, and That Phanom. At the end of September 1967 the number of villages in Nakhon Phanom provided VSO was increased to 136, and the number of VSO increased to 1,021 men.

(U) ~~(C)~~ In August 1966, 100 VSO were trained for Changwat Ubon; 40 came from eight villages in Amphoe Det Udom and 60 from 12 villages in Amphoe Khemarat. At the end of September 1967 an additional 100 VSO were trained from 16 villages in King Amphoe Ban Muang,* Changwat Sakon Nakhon, and 100 from 20 villages in Amphoe Kuchinarai, Changwat Kalasin.

(U) Table 9 summarizes available information on areas of VSO recruitment, and Fig. 10 shows these locations and the number of VSO personnel trained per amphoe.

*At that time, these villages were a part of Amphoe Wanon Niwat.

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Table 9

AREAS OF VSO RECRUITMENT

CHANGWAT	AMPHOE	TAMBON	NUMBER OF VILLAGES	NUMBER OF VSO
Kalasin	Kuchinarai	Khum Kao	11	54
		Na Khu	9	39
Changwat Total			20	93
Nakhon Phanom	Khamcha-I	Nong Sung	15	112
	Mukdahan	Ban Sak	9	57
		Wan Yai	13	85
	Na Kae	Na Khu	6	100
		Nong Sang	13	97
	Pla Pak	Kak Sawang	9	56
		Ku Ta Kai	8	72
		Mahachai	3	5
		Na Ma Kua	9	80
		Nong Hi	9	78
		Pla Pak	28	177
	That Phanom	Na Kan	14	132
Changwat Total			136	1,021
Sakon Nakhon	Ban Muang	Ban Mai	16	100
Ubon	Det Udom	Na Yia	8	40
	Khemarat	Pho Sai	4	20
		Sam Rong	8	40
Changwat Total			20	100
Total VSO Recruitment			192	1,314

Active Deployment

(U) As of early 1968 there were approximately 800 VSO members serving on active duty of the original 1,314 trained and armed. The number permitted on active duty at any one time re stricted by budget limitations to approximately 60 percent of the total.[6] To provide added security protection, the VSOs often operate in an aggregate group of 10-25 men (called a "sector force"). Those VSO members not serving on active duty remain in their original villages. Since they keep their weapons with them, off-duty VSOs could presumably defend themselves and their villages if threatened. The locations of active-duty VSOs and their numbers by amphoe are shown in Fig. 11.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Deployment in Nakhon Phanom. The active-duty deployment of VSOs in Nakhon Phanom in January 1968, based on best available information, totaled 599 men.[6,8,7] They are stationed in 50 village locations in groups of 6 to 100 men. Table 10 lists the number of VSOs serving on active duty in Nakhon Phanom and their village locations. The remaining 422 VSOs are in their home villages.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Comparing the data in Tables 9 and 10 produces some interesting results. VSO active deployment in the two tambons covered by the program in Amphoe Mukdahan is almost identical with that called for in the original VSO concept. Of the 142 VSOs trained, 141 were counted as active-duty forces in January 1968. They were serving in the same 22 villages from which they were recruited in units of five to seven men per village. In Amphoe Khamcha-I, however, the opposite is true. Although 112 men were originally recruited from 15 villages in one tambon, in January 1968 only 19 VSO members were on active duty in one location (the "tambon seat"). Another variation of the pattern may be seen in Amphoe Na Kae which has two VSO tambons. In Tambon Na Khu all 100 VSOs are reportedly on active duty, but grouped in one location. In Tambon Nong Sang, 90 of the 97 trained VSOs were reportedly on active duty. They were serving in seven villages, as opposed to the 13 villages from which they were originally recruited. A similar situation prevails in the one VSO tambon of Amphoe That Phanom, where 93 of the 102 VSOs are on active duty, grouped into six of the original 14 villages.

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

Fig. 10: AREAS OF VSO RECRUITMENT

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

Fig. 11: LOCATIONS OF ACTIVE DUTY VSO BY AMPHOE

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Table 10

DEPLOYMENT OF VSO MEMBERS IN NAKHON PHANOM

AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF VSO ON ACTIVE DUTY
Khamcha-I	Nong Sung	Ban Nong Sung	VD314220	19
Mukdahan	Ban Sok	Ban Khem Pa Lai	VD650488	6
		Ban Nak om Pan	VD673538	6
		Ban Na Kong Yau	VD652544	5
		Ban Na Phoeng	VD695482	7
		Ban Nasong Hong	VD685459	6
		Ban Na Sua Lai	VD639542	6
		Ban Nata Beeng	VD647531	7
		Ban Sam Kha	VD639448	7
		Ban Son Sa-ad	VD638497	6
	Tamban Total			56
	Wan Yai	Ban Chanada-3	VD738444	6
		Ban Chanada-4	VD739440	7
		Ban Don Muang	VD721470	7
		Ban Na Di	VD708508	6
		Ban Nong Phu	VD718481	6
		Ban Phai Lam	VD737504	6
		Ban Phaluka	VD732420	7
		Ban Pang Kham	VD733522	6
		Ban Song Khon Nua	VD725546	8
		Ban Song Khon Tai	VD725544	6
		Ban Wan Nai	VD742460	6
		Ban Wan Yai-1	VD743471	7
		Ban Wan Yai-3	VD741482	7
	Tamban Total			85
Na Kae	Na Khu	Ban Na Khu*	VD530756	100
	Nong Song	Ban Khem Mak	VD450775	9
		Ban Na Khem	VD345801	12
		Ban Nong Hong	VD479760	6
		Ban Nong Kung	VD471779	6
		Ban Nong Song	VD432775	23
		Ban Wang Yang	VD420859	18
		Ban Yat Chat	VD339864	16
	Tamban Total			90
Pla Pak	Kak Sawang	Ban Krung Kana	VD528955	9
		Ban Na Kradao	VD531910	9
		Ban Phak Iru	VD525928	7
	Tamban Total			25
	Ka Ta Kai	Ban Nong Kak Khun	VD598964	8
	Mahachai	Ban Mahachai	VE423125	23
		Ban Nak Ho	VE427044	17
		Ban Si Than	VD423978	20
	Tamban Total			60
	Na Ma Khua	Ban Phan Than Klang	VD610928	8
	Nong Hi	Ban Khak Klang	VE508064	18
		Ban Nong Hi-1	VD583909	8
		Ban Nong Hi-2	VD593906	9
		Ban Phone Than	VD602943	10
	Tamban Total			46
	Pla Pak	Ban Chanuk Tool	VD561936	9

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AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF VSO ON ACTIVE DUTY
That Phanom	Na Kon	Ban Khom Phak Phoen	VD720583	7
		Ban Na Kon	VD724657	15
		Ban Nam Kam	VD717693	22
		Ban Nong Song	VD692698	21
		Ban Sai Mun	VD727598	7
		Ban Um Mao	VD658630	21
	Tambon Total			93
Total VSO Deployment				599

*The distribution in this tambon is not known; it is believed that all are serving in the village of Ban Na Khu.

Jan 1968

(U) ~~(C)~~ In January 1968 there were 156 VSOs serving on active duty in 13 locations in King Amphoe Pla Pak out of 468 trained. This compares with the 66 villages from which they were originally recruited.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Deployment in Sakon Nakhon. All the 100 VSO members trained in King Amphoe Ban Muang are reportedly serving on active duty. For mutual protection they are grouped in one village, Ban Mai.[4,8] Presumably at any one time some of these 100 men are on leave in their home villages, with the number on duty in Ban Mai commensurately reduced.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Deployment in Ubon. In Amphoes Det Udom and Khemarat 100 VSOs have been trained. The only available information on their duty status indicates that all 100 men are on active duty; details of their locations were not available.[8]

(U) Deployment in Kalasin. Of the 93 VSOs trained from 20 villages in Amphoe Kuchinarai, few are reportedly serving on active duty.[8] Visits by researchers to this area in March 1968 unearthed little evidence of VSO deployment in an active village defense role.[9] Two VSO members in uniform with a shotgun were identified in the 11 villages visited. One more was seen in the amphoe town.

Future Plans

(U) ~~(C)~~ Initial programming for the VSO project called for recruitment of VSO as follows:[10]

FY66	1,325
FY67	1,100
FY68	1,100
FY69	2,000
Total	5,525 (from 800 villages)

However, during 1967 steps were taken to begin development of the new VSF. As a result, VSO recruitment will not be implemented beyond the 1,321 men already trained. The VSF, to be initially trained and deployed in Changwats Kalasin, Sakon Nakhon, and Udon (plus Prachuap Khiri Khan outside the Northeast), will be village-based, receive PAT-type training, and conduct and stimulate village self-help projects as well as provide village protection. It will be an extension of the VSO structure. Plans call for approximately 20,000 VSF members to be trained and deployed. Existing VSO units and members will be absorbed into the VSF as the new program reaches their area of operation; no new VSO members will be trained. Most of the current VSO members will receive VSF training and exchange their VSO shotguns for VSF carbines or rifles when the program reaches their tambons; those not selected for VSF will be "demobilized."

PERSONNEL

Recruitment

(U) In each VSO village the phuyaiban is the unit leader; he selected the assistant phuyaibans

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to receive VSO training with him. The men selected were then approved by the kamnan and the nai amphoe.

(U) A joint Thai/US evaluation of the VSO in mid-1967 found that most VSO members are family relatives of a phuyaiban, kamnan, or nai amphoe.[11] This study also found that there are no minimum educational requirements for the VSO and that some were illiterate. There are no minimum health standards, and approximately 45 percent of the units reported having men sick with such illnesses as diarrhea or malaria. Furthermore, this evaluation found that there was no biographical investigation of prospective VSOs, and that some were suspected of having communist associations.

Pay

(U) Active-duty VSO members are each paid $50 per month and a per diem of $6 when serving on duty in their village, and $16 when stationed elsewhere. This provides a monthly gross income for active-duty VSOs of $230-530. The evaluation found that many of the VSOs complained that they were not paid on time and, in some cases, did not receive all the pay and per diem that they had been promised.[11]

TRAINING

(U) All VSO members, including phuyaibans, have received 3 weeks (145 hours) of training, the first 2 weeks of which are at the PP Chaiya Training Center in Udon, and the third week in the amphoe from which they were recruited. Phuyaibans received an additional week (39 hours) of special leadership training prior to the main course conducted at the Chaiya Training Center. Table 11 presents information on the subjects taught to phuyaibans during the special leadership course while Table 12 lists the subjects taught to all VSOs.* Instructors were furnished by the PP and DOLA.

(U) Some VSO members received a short period of in-service training in April 1967. This training was conducted by personnel from DOLA, PP, and BPP. Subjects taught were: counterambush and counter-raid techniques, withdrawal under fire, practical firing, and political training. The USAF 56th Air Commando Wing in Nakhon Phanom provided aerial support and instruction on receiving air drops and marking drop zones.

(U) The joint Thai/US evaluation found that VSO members wanted more training in first aid, weapons repair, patrolling, and information collection. This joint evaluation also found that some of the subjects taught were too complicated for the VSO members. There was an inability to convey knowledge during the training owing to instructor unpreparedness, lack of handout materials, and illiteracy on the part of some VSO members. In addition, some of the instructors could not speak the local dialect.[11]

EQUIPMENT

Weapons

(U) Each VSO member is issued a 12-gauge pump shotgun and 25 rounds of ammunition. The VSO Evaluation found that there was some dissatisfaction among VSO personnel with the shotgun as a weapon of issue. Those interviewed tended to feel the shotgun did not have sufficient range and limited their effectiveness. The carbine was generally preferred. Complaints were also expressed about the quality and amount of ammunition provided. Evaluation teams also found that many of the weapons were in need of repair and that there was a shortage of equipment.[11] There appears to be no fixed regulation governing arms repair and maintenance for the VSO organization.

(U) Questions have also been raised in the US Mission about the adequacy of VSO weapons, especially in view of the fact that the VSO are deployed in security-sensitive areas (as opposed to the original deployment concept which called for placing VSO elements in non-threatened areas). The insurgents in these VSO operational areas generally have superior firepower, such as carbines, rifles, and submachine guns.

Dress

(U) The administrative official's uniform (khaki shirt and trousers) is authorized for the VSO. Approximately one-half of the VSO have field uniforms (fatigues and jungle boots). Those with-

*Although the information in these tables is for courses taught in September and November 1966, it is fully representative of all VSO training.

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(U) Table 11

VSO LEADERSHIP TRAINING FOR PHUYAIBANS

COURSE TITLE	HOURS
Registration	4
Orientation (Introduction to Subjects)	2
Domestic and International Events	3
Northeast Rural Development	1
Development Problems and Programs	2
Preventing and Resisting Communist Infiltration and Subversion	6
Public Relations	3
Function of the Tambon Council	3
Improving Tambon Council Functioning	3
[illegible]-l Development Concepts	3
[illegible]ernment Official's Responsibilities to the Public	1
Group Discussion on Government Official's Behavior	2
Functions of the Phuyaiban	2
Weapons	3
Total	39

out field uniforms are scheduled to receive them when funds become available. There is no official VSO insignia, but DOLA is preparing a special ID card for issue to each VSO.

Communications

(U) Radios. Approximately 55 FM-1 radios have been made available for VSO use. Eight of the 18 VSO tambons shown in Table 1 have tambon police stations which have radios installed. VSO radio frequencies are the same as the tambon police stations which have radios installed. USOM is reported to have ordered an additional 75 FM-1's and 75 FM-5's for the VSO.

(U) Air Panel Communication System. Each VSO phuyaiban has been provided with four large colored panels (red, yellow, blue, and white) which are displayed (either individually or in combination) to communicate with an aerial observer flying a predetermined route twice a day.* The aerial observer logs messages observed and airdrops the log to the tambon police station for action or information as required. It has been alleged that villagers have little confidence in this system because of past failures to respond to messages of "CTs in the area." However, the system is still used to signal "all okay," and "need medical supplies," "need commodity support," and so on.

Logistical Support

(U) VSO logistics are provided by the PP. It is reported, however, that the PP no longer provide ammunition backup through PP channels to VSO units in the field. Instead, they provide the VSO Director at the Chaiya Training Center in Udon with the initial ammunition issue for each man. An exception to this exists for VSO units stationed in CSOC's 0910 Areas which receive ammunition from CSOC. This practice results in some VSO units having sufficient ammunition while others do not.

ACTIVITIES

(U) VSO activities are grouped into three categories: village protection, intelligence collection, and the conduct of civic action projects.

*A total of nine combinations can be made to communicate different messages; e.g., the red panel alone means "CTs are in the area"; the blue panel alone means "everything is okay"; and all four panels displayed together means that the "village is under attack."

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Table 12

SUBJECTS COVERED IN VDO TRAINING

COURSE TITLE	HOURS
First Week (at Chaiya Training Center, Udon)	
Registration	4
Orientation, Introduction, and Opening Ceremony	1
Introduction to Weapons	1
Use of Shotgun	4
Government Policy on Northeast Rural Development	4
Village Defense	3-1/2
Working with Villagers and Rural Development	2
Demonstration of Weapons Firing	2
First Aid	4
Patrolling	4
Tactics and Raids	4
Communications	4
Shotguns (Field Firing)	8
National Welfare Practices	3-1/2
Drills and Self-Defense Training	6
Total	50
Second Week (at Chaiya Training Center, Udon)	
Coordination with District Officers and Other Security Elements	2
Patrolling	4
Reconnaissance and Counterinsurgency Techniques	4
Logistics	2
Tactics and Raids	4
Security Duties and Responsibilities	4
Immediate-Action Drills	6
Patrolling	2
Security Measures	2
Village Development	9
Drills and Self-Defense Training	4
Total	40
Third Week (at home amphoe)	
People's Rights and Duties Toward Community and Nation	3
The People, Country Development, and Self Government	3
Government Policy and People's Welfare	3
Thai History	3
Government Security Programs and Coordination with Other Authorities (kamnans, phuyaibans, tambon police, VDC, rai amphoes, and police superintendents)	3
Execution of Tambon Village Security Plans, Different Kinds of help to Villages, and Cooperation with RTG Development Units	30
Total	42

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Village Protection

(U) (C) VSO village protection activities are similar to those of other paramilitary units. Their presence in a village deters insurgents from collecting food or conducting recruiting and propaganda activities. Those VSO aggregated in tambon units conduct patrols from one village to another within the tambon. Some VSOs in Nakhon Phanom participate in Joint Security Teams in 0910 Plan Target Areas (see APP C, Tables C7, C8, and C9) and in CPM village protection units (see APP D, Table D3). An added benefit of the deployment of VSO has been a decrease in crime in the villages to which they are assigned. This was considered equally important with insurgent suppression by the villagers interviewed in the course of the aforementioned evaluation. By the end of May 1967, VSO members had engaged in 23 encounters with communist terrorists, one of which (a joint operation conducted with RTA and PP elements on 16 March 1967) resulted in the death of 11 insurgents and the CT unit leader.[10]

(U) (C) VSO not on active duty, but who remain armed, indirectly contribute to village protection. For example, in August 1967, an inactive VSO killed two insurgents and captured one weapon.

Intelligence Collection

(U) (C) Some 87 intelligence reports had been filed by the VSO in the 6-month period from their activation to May 1967. One such report was the basis for the joint operation of 16 March 1967 discussed above.[10] One source reports that the VSO are responsible for 95 percent of the intelligence reports generated in Amphoes Na Kae, Pla Pak, Mukdahan, Kamcha-I, and That Phanom.[11]

(U) Contact between US officials and the VSO program occurs primarily through USOM's Division of Public Safety. There is a USOM-RTG project agreement for US commodity support, especially ammunition, weapons, medical supplies, and communications equipment.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

(U) On the national level, the VSO, as an element of DOLA, is in contact on a regular basis with the TNPD (especially the PP) and with CSOC. In addition, coordination is effected at the working level within DOLA between VSO project officers and VDC officials. Most DOLA officials who had been concerned with the VSO program turned their attention in early 1968 to the development of the new VSF program.

Conduct of Civic Action Projects

(U) VSO teams had conducted a total of 121 civic-action projects by May 1967. The bulk of these were small-scale village improvement projects such as repairs to village wats, construction or repair of simple school structures, road and trail improvements, and others of a similar nature.

(U) At the changwat level the governor and his staff are directly concerned with the operation of the VSO program. The palad changwat for security of the changwats involved in the program deal with VSO matters on a daily basis. Coordination occurs within the changwat CPM structure and directly with other agencies such as PP, CD, and ARD. A similar pattern holds true for the VSO amphoes, with the nai amphoe and his staff being the officials principally concerned with VSO matters.

(U) The VSO evaluation found that most VSO interviewed were satisfied with the support given by the RTA, especially in King Amphoe Pla Pak and Amphoe Na Kae, Changwat Nakhon Phanom, two areas of large RTA presence. There was less satisfaction with support from the police and amphoe officials, although a majority of those interviewed felt that they were satisfied with their relations with these officials. The success or failure of the relationships (as viewed by the VSO) with the RTA, police, or amphoe officials depended to a great extent on the activities and aggressiveness of these supporting organizations in the particular area. Another factor noted was that the tambon police stations were either so new, or so far away, that there was little contact between the VSO and the PP and, thus, little support in such cases.

(U) The relations between the VSO and the villagers were also considered in the VSO evaluation. It was reported that these relations are, on the whole, very good and that the VSO has helped in development projects. About 65 percent of the VSO interviewed said that they were concerned with villager aspirations and a similar percentage of villagers affirmed the VSO's concern. The villagers also felt that VSO discipline was good. The villagers interviewed also indicated that they felt more secure as a result of VSO presence, although they recognized that the VSO cannot on their own provide sufficient protection.[12]

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PEOPLE'S ASSISTANCE TEAMS

SUMMARY

(U) (C) The People's Assistance Teams (PATs) program was initiated in 1966 as a pilot project to assess the applicability to Thailand of village-based security and development concepts conceived in Vietnam. Development of the program was personally approved by the Minister of Interior and responsibility assigned to DOLA and the civil section of CSOC. A special new training center for PATs was established on 22 September 1966 at Camp Suan Son near Hua Hin in Changwat Prachuap Khiri Khan. It was decided to concentrate the initial efforts of the PAT program and the related Census Aspiration (CA) program in Changwat Sakon Nakhon.

(U) (C) By the end of 1967, the pilot phase of the program was completed and no additional PATs are to be trained. There are now 24 PATs, with from 7 to 16 members each, in six amphoes of Sakon Nakhon, 10 teams in Amphoe Pla Pak, Nakhon Phanom, and 2 teams in Amphoe Kui Buri, Prachuap Khiri Khan. A total of 442 villagers have received PAT training, including 56 women who serve as team medics. The 9-week training provided team members with capabilities in paramilitary actions, conduct of village improvement projects, psychological operations, and information collection. One of the special features of the PAT training is the political and motivational training designed to instill a sense of commitment and "elan" in the team members.

(U) (C) Team members are recruited on an amphoe-wide basis. Upon completion of training the teams are assigned to specific villages in the amphoe of recruitment. They may be moved to other villages in the amphoe at the discretion of the changwat governor and the nai amphoe. The PATs provide armed village protection, work to improve the village, and collect information from the villagers. They carry small arms (carbines, rifles, and submachine guns), wear villager-style clothing, and are provided with tools and equipment to conduct village improvement projects. Team medics, two per team, provide medical assistance to the villagers. PAT members each receive $680 per month in salary and allowances. Each team has an HT-1 radio to communicate with other PATs and with the nai amphoe's office.

(U) (C) The PAT program forms much of the conceptual base for the new Village Security Force (VSF) program being developed by the RTG. Current planning envisions that VSF members will receive PAT-style training (including political and motivational instruction) and utilize PAT operational concepts, but will be restricted to their own village of residence. A US Mission-sponsored evaluation of the PAT program is underway to assess the implications of the PAT experience for the new VSF program, and, while not yet completed, some of its tentative findings are incorporated in this section of the volume on paramilitary organizations.*

*The information in this section was collected by the RAC researcher who is, at the same time, the principal investigator for the "Evaluation of the PAT Program" now in progress. To collect this information, several visits have been made to Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom to observe the teams in action and discuss the program with RTG officials responsible for it and with their US advisors. To date 22 of the 24 PATs have been actually observed in the field in Sakon Nakhon. Several teams have been visited more than once. Discussions about the PAT program have been held with the changwat governor, palad changwat-security, palad changwat-development, palad changwat-administration, CPM staff, several nai amphoes and palad amphoes for security and PAT, with PAT members, team leaders, and, of course, with villagers in PAT operational areas. Several visits have been made to the PAT training center to observe training in progress and discuss the program with the center's staff. The DOLA/CSOC office in Bangkok and its Director, Mr. Anek Rachanapaiban, were contacted for their perspective on PAT activities.

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MISSIONS

(U) The mission of the PATs is to provide security to the village in which the team is located. A particular concept has been developed to support this provision of security by the PAT, since much more is involved than simply providing armed defense.

PAT Doctrine and Concept

(U) (C) The concept of a village-level defense and development team, composed of local villagers receiving special motivational training and aggressively armed and employed--generally known as a PAT--was initially developed in Vietnam, although several earlier variants were used in the Philippine and Malayan counterinsurgency experiences and elsewhere. This program represents an attempt to apply the concept to Thailand, modified to the Thai environment.

(U) (C) It is generally agreed that the major problem in dealing with the insurgency in Thailand involves effectively separating the insurgents from the rural population--the villagers-- thus removing the insurgents from their required base of support for manpower, food, and information. According to the PAT concept, only village-level permanent security elements can successfully fulfill this mission. These elements must be locally recruited and specially trained in the conduct of rural development and village improvement projects, self defense and aggressive paramilitary techniques, psychological operations and attitude change techniques, and information collection. Further, these specially selected villagers must be instilled with a deep sense of commitment to providing permanent security and development for their assigned village.

(U) (C) PATs conduct basically two kinds of activities: armed protection and attitude change. Through these two roles, both of which according to the concept are essential to the success of the program, the team is able to collect intelligence about the insurgents from the villagers. This intelligence allows the team to anticipate insurgent movements, report to higher authorities, set ambushes, and, in sum, to obviate the usual condition where the insurgent has all the initiative.

(U) (C) The basic proposition underlying the PAT concept, therefore, is that an improved village defense posture plus favorable attitudes on the part of villagers resulting from a government presence, which provides both protection and village improvement, lead together to better intelligence. This in turn allows for the creation, over time, of a permanent viable security environment in that village. The PAT concept requires that both defense and attitude change be carried out by the team; with either missing, the vital link of intelligence will not be forthcoming from the villagers. The concept is predicated on the assumption that villagers from the local area, given special training, can best fulfill this mission; police and military units, as outsiders, will not be able to do so. The concept relies on external support to the village-level teams from police or military patrol and reaction forces, but rests on the basic premise that only village-oriented local elements can provide permanent security to the village.

Adoption of the Concept in Thailand

(U) (C) Assigned Missions. The missions assigned to the PATs in Thailand have differed significantly from the basic concept in two categories: aggressiveness of the teams and mobility throughout the operational area. These two features of the PAT concept have been deemphasized by the RTG in place of an emphasis on the direct "development and attitude change" aspects of the program. RTG officials state that the primary mission of the PATs is to "bring the people to the side of the government." They stress village improvement projects and intelligence collection rather than aggressive defense. The teams at night protect primarily themselves rather than the entire village in which they are stationed. Adoption of the PAT concept in Thailand called for the teams to provide armed presence in the village rather than complete armed protection; and, similarly, the teams were movable from village to village within the amphoe upon order of the nai amphoe, but they are not mobile in the true sense of the word.

(U) (C) In all other respects, the PATs in Thailand are functioning along the lines called for in the standard concept. They do provide an armed presence in their villages and some defensive capability. Although they seldom conduct night patrols or patrol outside the village confines, the types of insurgent incidents evident in the PAT villages before the arrival of the teams appear to have been eliminated. In PAT villages there have been no armed propaganda meetings, no assassinations, nor kidnappings, despite the fact that all these had occurred in many of these villages prior to the arrival of the team. Three of the teams have been attacked at night by sizable groups of armed insurgents with no PAT casualties.

(U) (C) In addition to providing armed protection as described, the teams conduct and stimulate a wide variety of village improvement projects and participate in other activities designed to alter villager attitudes toward the team and toward the RTG. These are described in the section below on "Activities." Following through on the PAT concept, the teams have been collecting and reporting a good deal of information, particularly about the presence and activities of insurgents in the local area.

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(U) (C) The lack of a clearly defined legal status for the PATs is clearly one of the reasons for the government's decision to restrict team aggressiveness. As opposed to the VSO or VDC, the PATs were given no legal status. They have no authority to arrest, capture, detain, or interrogate anyone, and many problems could arise if the governor tried to make them a vehicle for the exercise of these powers. This unclear status for the teams probably accounts, in large measure, for the lack of aggressiveness incorporated in the concept of operations.

(U) (C) One additional point about the PAT-assigned mission is important. The concept seems to have evolved in which the PAT acts as the "leading element" in a village to alter villager attitudes and win the people over to the side of the government. Once the villagers have become more friendly to the government, VDC or other protection units can be introduced into the village with PAT being assigned to another difficult village. This process is apparent in several cases in Sakon Nakhon; these are described in the section below on "Locations," along with a discussion of the reasons for team movement.

ORGANIZATION

(U) The PAT program is entirely oriented toward the villages in which the teams are assigned. The program is supported and controlled at levels above the village by various organizations, especially the RTG civil administrative structure.

National Level

(U) (C) There is very little in the way of organizational structure at the national level specifically created to support the PAT program. A small office within DOLA supports the program and represents it throughout the national bureaucracy.* Operational control of the PAT program, to the extent that it emanates from Bangkok, comes primarily from two sections of CSOC involved in program decisions and project implementation: the Operations and Coordination Center and the Civil Section.

Changwat and Amphoe Levels

(U) (C) The PAT program operates under the control of the changwat governor. No special changwat-level organizations were created in Sakon Nakhon or Nakhon Phanom to support the PAT program; rather, existing institutions and individuals were tasked to handle PAT matters in addition to their other duties. Figure 12 shows the existing arrangement of the PAT program in Sakon Nakhon. The Governor has been assisted in operating the PAT program by his Deputy for Security (Palad Changwat-Security) and by the Lord Mayor of Sakon Nakhon city who acts as a special adviser to the Governor. The changwat CFM has at times been concerned with team employment, intelligence reporting, and so on. The changwat PP headquarters has also been involved at one time or another in the operation of the program; and the CA Province Study Center is closely involved in the PAT program, particularly as it collates, analyzes, and reports information collected by team members.



(U) (C) Fig. 12: ORGANIZATION OF THE PAT PROGRAM IN CHANGWAT SAKON NAKHON

*This office also supports the related Census Aspiration program; the office is in essence under the operational control of CSOC.

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(U) (C) At the amphoe level all aspects of operation of the PAT program are the responsibility of the nai amphoe, assisted by a new palad amphoe for PAT in four cases, and by the palad amphoe for security in the other two. These latter officials are also responsible for VDC activities, whereas the other four are able to spend full time in support of the PAT program. These 12 officials make the major decisions about team employment, locations, and activities. They are responsible for selecting, recruiting, and verifying the backgrounds of the villagers eventually chosen for service in the PAT program. They provide day-to-day administrative and logistical support to the teams, including medicines, equipment, and radio repair (at least as middlemen between the teams and the changwat), and fulfill the myriad of other required support functions.

(U) In Nakhon Phanom, the one amphoe with PATs (Pla Pak) has a palad amphoe-security who provides support to the PATs as well as to VDC and VSO in the amphoe.

Team Organization

(U) (C) The PATs in Sakon Nakhon range in size from 9 to 16 people, usually including two female PAT medics. Table 13 illustrates the standard organization of a 10-man team. Field observation, however, indicates that each team's organization is slightly different, depending on the amphoe concerned, wishes of the team leader, aptitudes of the team members, and so on. In particular, except for the medics, the specialization of member skills indicated in Table 13 undoubtedly represents the ideal case only. The equipment items listed have been provided to each team, but the teams observed in the field did not demonstrate any appreciable degree of specialization for village improvement activities. If a team has two members with previous experience as carpenters, for example, they would both use this skill in the team's daily activities. When a unit includes more than 10 members, the additional ones are assigned duties in general support of the team's overall planned activity. Female medics are assigned to the teams in pairs; no team has only one woman.

(U) (C)

Table 13
COMPOSITION OF A 10-MAN PAT

POSITION	WEAPON	SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
Team Leader	Carbine and Pistol	
Medic	Pistol	Medical Kit
Medic	Pistol	Medical Kit
Team Member, Carpenter	M1 Rifle	Saw, Plane, Hammer, Nails
Team Member, Barber	M3 Submachine Gun	Clippers, Scissors, Comb
Team Member, Mason	M1 Rifle	Trowel, Other Small Masonry Tools
Team Member, Printer	M3 Submachine Gun	Hand Stamp, Ink Pad, Paper
Team Member, Photographer	M1 Carbine	Camera, Film
Team Member, Construction Man	M1 Carbine and Grenades	Shovel, Spade, Pick
Team Member, Radioman	M1 Carbine and Grenades	HT-1 Radio

(U) (C) The PATs in Nakhon Phanom are organized in groups of 10 men and 2 women each. However, the initial employment concept for these teams following their return from training in November 1967 called for them to operate in double teams of 24 people each, to provide greater security for the individual elements. Eventually they are planned for assignment in the original 12-man elements.

FUNDING

(U) (C) The PAT program, as a pilot project, was funded in its initial stages entirely by the US Government. This included paying team member salaries as well as providing equipment, training, and logistics support. The money for salaries was not paid directly to the team members by US personnel, but was provided to the nai amphoes (or, as was often the case, the palad amphoes) who in turn paid the teams. Payment of salaries is made once a month at the team location. A 10-man team receives a monthly cash input of $6,850 in salary.

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(U) ~~(C)~~ As of 1 March 1968 the RTG assumed full responsibility for payment of PAT salaries, allowances, and provision of replacement equipment and logistics support. The costs are being included in the budget of the new VSF program for the RTG fiscal year ending 30 September 1968. By June 1968 basic decisions are scheduled to be made by DOLA as to the final utilization of existing PATs, their organizational status, and provision for continued funding.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The program provides for a revolving fund of $2,000 to be available to each nai amphoe for support of his teams. This fund is used primarily for the purchase of locally available materials required by the teams, such as nails, concrete, batteries, and so on. This fund was developed to help decentralize logistics support for the program by making available at the amphoe level the capability to purchase needed items.

LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS

Sakon Nakhon PATs

(U) ~~(C)~~ Team Locations. There are 24 PATs in Sakon Nakhon, located in Amphoes Muang, Phanna Nikhom, Waritchaphum, Sawang Daen Din, King Kut Bak and King P..ang Khon. Figure 13 shows the locations of these teams as of March 1968, and Table 14 lists the name and coordinates of villages in which the teams were assigned as of that time. Listed in Table 15 are those villages previously covered by a since-reassigned PAT. The 24 teams had a total of 271 members actually assigned in the villages.



(U) ~~(C)~~ Fig. 13: LOCATIONS OF PATs IN CHANGWAT SAKON NAKHON

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Table 14

PAT LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS
IN SAKON NAKHON
AS OF MARCH 1967

LOCATION	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED
Amphoe Muang		
Ban Tro Ngal	VD125785	10
Ban Khum Kho	VD096743	9
Ban Huay Hip	VD213809	10
Ban Phon Kho	VD277797	10
Amphoe Total		39
Amphoe Phanna Nikhom		
Ban Nong Phak Thiam	UD690987	10
Ban Khok Manao	UD726994	9
Ban Un Khak	UD765979	10
Ban Un Dong	UD770997	9
Ban Phak Khan Phu	UD799975	10
Ban Kut Nam Sai	UL796949	10
Ban Huai Ban	UE715032	10
Amphoe Total		68
Amphoe Sawang Daen Din		
Ban Khok Don	UE341917	16
Ban Than	UE338373	11
Ban Na Khi Khao *	UE269387	11
Ban Na Khi Khao *	UE269387	11
Ban Khum Mak	UE436285	15
Ban Khum Ta Na	UE472247	14
Amphoe Total		78
Amphoe Waritchaphum		
Ban Huay Lak Fai	UE630054	13
Ban Thung Chuak	UD47592	12
Ban Champa	UE490140	12
Amphoe Total		37
King Amphoe Kut Bak		
Ban Kho Yai	UE487930	13
Ban Bua	UD708876	13
Ban Phon Ngam	UD637909	13
Amphoe Total		39
King Amphoe Phang Khan		
Ban Tan Lian	UE710162	10
Changwat Total		271

*Two teams together for mutual protection.

(U) (C) Selection of Villages for Assignment. The PATs have generally been assigned to perform village security functions in the "hottest" villages in their amphoe. For example, the Nai Amphoe of Waritchaphum stated that his PATs "...were placed in the most dangerous villages in Waritchaphum." These were usually villages from which support to the insurgents for recruits, food, and other necessary items had been heavy. Many of the villages in which the PATs have been assigned had witnessed armed propaganda meetings, assassinations, kidnappings, and other overt insurgent incidents prior to arrival of the teams.

(U) (C) Ban Nong Phak Thiam, Phanna Nikhom, is a village which has, according to many reports, been involved in the communist insurgent movement in the Northeast for several years. Along with Ban Phon Tan in Amphoe Na Kae of Nakhon Phanom, it was an early CT-support village. Seventeen young men from the 51 families in this village were reported as serving with the insurgents in the hills in November 1967. Other insurgents, formerly from this village including CT leaders

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PEOPLE'S ASSISTANCE TEAMS

(U) Table 15

VILLAGES TO WHICH PATs WERE PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED IN SAKON NAKHON

AMPHOE	TAMBON	COORDINATES
Muang	Ban Tao Ngoi	VD125708
	Ban Na Kop Koe	VD043850
	Ban Huay Yang	VD283773
	Ban Na Si Nuan	VD235795
	Ban Huay Hunt	VD109712
	Ban Na Tan	VD089876
	Ban Bung Tawai	VD1[illegible]70
Phanna Nikhom	Ban Nong Phu	UD735020
	Ban Na Nai	UD752019
	Ban Nong Pling	UD664012
Sawang Daen Din	Ban Khok Si	UE340[illegible]
	Ban Nong Chim	UE457172
	Ban Nong Waeng So	UE470152
	Ban Dong Saen To	UE460204
	Ban Phan Sawang	UE400158
	Ban Puai	UE362283
	Ban Nong Thum	UE269387
Waritchaphum	Ban That Phu Wong	UE450022
	Ban Don Yao	UE454143
King Kut Bo	Ban Klang	UD702983

Ue Khotama and Boonsi Malithong, have been killed. The nearby village of Ban Khok Manao has been in the past another strong supporter of the insurgency. Ban Phak Kham Phu (also in the southern Phanna Nikhom area) was the scene of a serious CT incident in July 1967 when an estimated 200 insurgents entered the village and conducted a forced propaganda meeting. They also took 10 villagers, tied their hands behind their backs, and beat them in front of the villagers. Two of these 10 men--the village CD cadre and his messenger--were then killed; the other eight were released. All these villages have had PAT teams assigned. In Waritchaphum, the PAT location, in Ban Huay Leb Fai operates in another one of the "hottest" villages of the Northeast, at least historically. The same may be said of the PAT in Ban Klang of King Amphoe Kut Bak. In Amphoe Sawang Daen Din, the PATs in Ban Kham Ta Na and Ban Kham Mek are located in villages right on the edge of the Dong Pra Chao forest, a major insurgent base area; these villages have reportedly provided the insurgents with much support. All villages selected for PAT assignment have, to a greater or lesser degree, been deeply involved in providing support to the insurgents.

(U) Selection of villages for PAT assignment is made by the nai amphoe assisted by his palad amphoe-security. The changwat governor is also very influential in selecting PAT villages. The teams may be assigned anywhere in the amphoe and moved to a new village at the discretion of the nai amphoe and governor. Teams have, to date, been assigned to "hot" villages, as noted above. Some teams have been assigned to villages which also had Army, VDC, or tambon police presence; most, however, were on their own. Some teams have been assigned to villages located on good roads, others are in very remote locations reached, without arduous travel, only by helicopter. Some teams were assigned to very poor villages, others to villages which had already undergone much improvement (in one case, at Ban Khok Si of Sawang Daen Din, the team was located in a "model village" on a main ARD road--the team was there only for one month, then was moved to nearby Ban Khok Don, an extremely poor village at the far end of the road).

(U) Team Movement The PATs in Sakon Nakhon have been movable, but not mobile in the true sense of the word. Nearly all of the teams have been moved at least once since their original formation. Those villages which previously had a PAT assigned are listed in Table 15. The primary reason for moving a PAT to a new village seems to have been the accomplishment of its assigned mission in the original village. In this sense, the PATs have been used as the "leading edge" of RTG response to the village security problem, remaining in a village until village attitudes there are improved and the overall security situation bettered, then moving to another "hot" village. The PATs have usually been replaced in the original village by VDC, PF, or RTA security forces. For example, the teams in Ban Nong Phu and Ban Na Nai, Phanna Nikhom, were moved to new villages where RTG officials felt that they could be better employed, leaving the security of the Nong Phu/Na Nai area to the tambon police station located at the former vil-

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[illegible] that their teams be moved to new locations, as they felt their basic mission had been well accomplished. The PATs in [illegible] Ban Song, Warit [illegible], Ban Nong Plia, [illegible] Amphoe, and Ban Nong Chan, Muang, were [illegible], with security duties in the village left to local [illegible] (previously, both PAT and [illegible] had been located in the villages). The PAT in a Ban [illegible] of Waritchaphum switched assignments with the [illegible] located in Ban Chanpa. In Ban Nong Wieng So and Ban Nong Chim, Sawang Daen Din, removal of the PAT to a new location left the security duties in the hands of RTA elements also assigned to these villages.

(U) (c) PATs have also been moved to new villages in response to an insurgent incident. In these cases the PAT is brought into the village to provide security and, thereby demonstrating to the villagers that the government is interested in their well-being, to restore what ever sense of confidence may have been lost. One example of such movement occurred in Sawang Daen Din in November 1967 when the Ban [illegible] PAT was moved to Ban Phon on the AH3 road north of the main Udon-Sakon Nakhon highway. Three days previously, insurgents had killed the kamnan who lived in Ban Phon. The nai amphoe decided to move a PAT into that village in response to this incident.

(U) (c) In Amphoe Muang in early 1967, a village CA cadre and his messenger were killed in Ban Huay Hoat, a village located deep in the hills of the southern part of the amphoe. Two PATs were moved into this village shortly after the incident to provide security and RTG armed presence.

(U) (c) Another example of using a PAT as an RTG response force, this time in response to intelligence rather than a specific incident, can be cited from Phu A Pee Phang Khon where, for several months, a CT hospital had been reported by various sources to be in the vicinity of Ban Tin Liap. A PAT was sent to this village to work there and attempt to collect information to locate this insurgent facility. As of early [illegible] the hospital had not been located, although the PAT had been at Ban Tin Liap for several months. However, there have been no new reports of the existence of this facility.

PAT Locations in Other Changwats

(U) (c) As stated previously, villagers from Chanwats Chai, Sakon Phanom and Prachuap Khiri Khan have been trained as PATs with only those from Prachuap Khiri Khan actually operating as PATs. However, by its location in the mid-south, activities in Prachuap Khiri Khan are outside the scope of this project on counterinsurgency organizations and programs in the Northeast.

(U) (c) The PAT-trained personnel from Chai (in [illegible] 2 waves) were reportedly never used as a complete team and are now [illegible] integrated into the local CD program (discussed elsewhere in this volume).

(U) [illegible] PAT [illegible] volunteers trained as PATs but functioning [illegible] all in Amphoe Pla Pak, returned [illegible] in the groups of 26 men with their [illegible] PATs operational [illegible] March 1968 are listed in Table 16.

(U) (c)

Table 16

PAT LOCATIONS IN KING AMPHOE PLA PAK
NAKHON PHANOM

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible] PATs were [illegible] at that time [illegible] the PATs [illegible] and the [illegible]

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PEOPLE'S ASSISTANCE TEAMS

PERSONNEL

Recruitment

(U) The PAT program recruited team members on an amphoe-wide basis. Members were recruited from anywhere in the amphoe, and emphasis was placed on recruiting rural villagers who are best suited to fulfilling the PAT mission. After completing the special training they returned for assignment with their team anywhere in the amphoe of recruitment. Teams can be, and most have been, moved from one village to another within the amphoe. No team has been used operationally outside its home amphoe. Selection of the right personnel for the program--those who can be effectively motivated--is a crucial cornerstone of the entire PAT concept.

(U) The program set forth the following selection criteria: those villagers selected for the PAT program must be between 21 and 45 years of age and in excellent physical condition. They must be literate, with a minimum formal education of Prathom 4. They must have a record of good conduct certified by their local phuyaiban and kamnan.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Responsibility for selection of team members rests with the nai amphoe, assisted by the palad-security and other members of the amphoe staff. The nai amphoe is informed by the governor of the number of PAT recruits allocated to his amphoe and the date scheduled to begin training. He must then select and recruit this number of people. In most cases sufficient prior notice was given to the nai amphoes so that established selection procedures could be used. However, in the case of King Amphoe Kut Bak, administrative problems forced the entire recruitment process to be telescoped into 7 days; personnel problems are evident in the three Kut Bak teams which were recruited in this manner. In actual practice, the nai amphoe passes down the requirement for a certain number of recruits to the kamnans and phuyaibans, who then perform the actual recruitment, submitting names subject to the approval of the nai amphoe. In most cases those selected by the village officials are then called to the amphoe seat for a personal interview with the nai amphoe or the palad amphoe-security.

Backgrounds of PAT Members

(U) Initial analysis of data collected for the PAT evaluation indicated that the average age of PAT trainees was 29.6; the oldest member was 49 and the youngest 17. The average educational level calculated at Mathayom 2.4, with approximately 50 percent of the members completing Prathom 4, 25 percent completing Mathayom 6, and the remaining 25 percent in between, except for one trainee who had completed Mathayom 7.*

(U) ~~(C)~~ Field observations in Sakon Nakhon indicated that a large proportion of the men in the PATs had prior RTA experience, almost all in the infantry units stationed in the Northeast. A sizable number of the team members seem to have prior skills in carpentry, masonry, and similar work directly applicable to PAT participation in village improvement projects (this was a significant factor in the apparent competence of PAT in village projects)

(U) ~~(C)~~ Many PAT members had relatives in other government positions; some had relatives who had been killed or kidnapped by the insurgents. When questioned about the actual individual recruitment practices used, most indicated that personal relationships with relatives or government officials were important to their hearing about the PAT program and being induced to volunteer.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Less than half of the PAT teams in Sakon Nakhon have members who actually came from the village to which they were assigned. All teams seem to have representatives from the general area in which the team is operating, and some teams had two, three, or even four members from the PAT village itself. In one case, the team leader was the phuyaiban of the village in which the team is assigned; in another case, the team leader was the local kamnan. One team in Amphoe Muang had four members from the PAT village, including the team leader who is a former phuyaiban of the village.

Movement of Individuals

(U) ~~(C)~~ One of the apparent advantages of the PAT amphoe-level recruitment and assignment base is the flexibility this gives the program for team movement (discussed under "Locations") and for movement of individuals from one team to another when this would benefit the overall program. This flexibility in personnel assignment allows individuals to be assigned where best suited, leaders to be moved and changed, and for changes to be made after the teams gain experience and individual strengths and weaknesses can be determined.

(U) ~~(C)~~ An interesting example of such flexibility is provided by two of the teams in Amphoe Warichaphum. The leader of the Ban Huay Lek Fai team was a former resident of that village and had many relatives in the local area. Although in most respects he was performing well as team

* See the Glossary for an explanation of Thai educational levels.

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leader, many team members were dissatisfied with his lack of aggressiveness and accused him of nepotism. As a result, the nai amphoe decided to trade this leader for the team leader from the PAT then assigned to Ban Tat Phu Wong. This change worked very well, with both teams operating much more effectively following the switch in leaders.

Leadership Selection

(U) (C) PAT leaders are selected while the group is undergoing training. About halfway through the course, the group from the entire amphoe is asked to vote on whom they would like to see as team leaders and deputy leaders. These choices are then approved by the instructor staff at Camp Suan Son to ensure that the leaders chosen have what the instructors consider to be the proper qualifications. Those selected then act as team leaders for the remainder of the course, under the observation of the instructors, and the final choice is confirmed just prior to the completion of the course. The leaders then undergo an additional 2-week leadership training session after the rest of the team returns to the Northeast.

Pay and Allowances

(U) PAT members receive a basic salary of ฿500 per month, paid on a monthly basis. In addition, they receive a daily food allowance of ฿6 and the team leader receives an extra allowance of ฿50 per month.* The teams in Nakhon Phanom, paid under the VDC structure, receive ฿500-550 per month per man.

(U) All PAT members receive 3 days leave per month to visit relatives and family. They are provided by the government with tear clothing and boots.

TRAINING

(U) (C) All PAT training was conducted at Camp Suan Son near Hua Hin. The course lasted approximately 9 weeks, with team leaders remaining after the regular course for an additional 2-week leadership training session. The training provided PAT village recruits with basic skills in the three major areas called for by the PAT mission: paramilitary action for village protection; conduct of village improvement projects and attitude change programs; and collection of information and intelligence from the villagers. One of the unusual features of PAT training, a basic prerequisite to the PAT doctrine and concept, was the inclusion of political indoctrination and motivational training as an integral element of the PAT training course. This instruction was designed to give the PAT members a reason to fight and an understanding of the importance of developing an effective relationship between the armed element in the village and the villagers who are being protected by the team. The PAT medics received additional instruction in basic medical skills, given at the Public Health Hospital in Khon Kaen.

(U) (C) Four groups of PAT teams were trained during the course of the program. The first class trained 80 students and the second class 120 students, all from Sakon Nakhon. These teams completed their training and returned to Sakon Nakhon for operational deployment in their villages in December 1966 and March 1967, respectively. PAT Class III included 92 trainees from Sakon Nakhon, 20 from Prachuap Khiri Khan, and 12 from Ubon; this group completed training in June 1967. The fourth (and last) class included 100 men and 20 women from King Amphoe Pla Pak of Changwat Nakhon Phanom; these teams completed their training in November 1967. With the development of the VSF program, training of PATs (as such) in Thailand has been completed. PAT training forms the basic model for VSF training.

PAT Curriculum

(U) (C) PAT training was divided into five major subject areas, as shown in Table 17. The 337 total hours were divided into 225 hours of classroom instruction and 72 hours of fieldwork. These figures do not include night firing, night patrols, and practical exercises conducted outside usual training hours. The last 10 days of the course were devoted to a comprehensive field exercise, also not included in the 337 hours.

(U) (C) Political and Motivational Training. This training is unique among paramilitary training programs in Thailand and is an essential element of the PAT doctrine and concept. The curriculum used to instill motivation in PAT trainees was primarily a combination of history and politics. It was designed to teach PAT members the historical genesis of Thailand and the Thai

* The total PAT salary of ฿[illegible] per month is about ฿[illegible] per month more than the average VDC pay. This has reportedly led to some dissatisfaction on the part of VDC members working near PATs. As of March 1968, pay and allowances for the Sakon Nakhon PATs become the responsibility of USOM under agreements creating the new VSF program.

[illegible] their return from training, these [illegible] were also [illegible] into the VSF program, discussed elsewhere in this [illegible] [illegible] a PAT.

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(U) Table 17

SUBJECTS COVERED IN PAT TRAINING

SUBJECT	HOURS
Political Indoctrination and Motivational Training	36
Conduct of Village Self-Help Improvement Projects	75
Propaganda and Psychological Operations	29
Weapons	70
Tactics and Intelligence	127
Total	337

people and to instill greater patriotism and nationalism in the students--its objective was expressed as making the students "feel proud to be Thai." The instruction demonstrated that the country is now facing a new enemy threat--Communism--and that the consequences of a defeat would be to lose their identity as Thais. The response of the government to this subversive threat was discussed, with particular emphasis placed on the role of the PATs as a key element in this response. The importance of the monarchy and Buddhist religion were stressed, and the instruction included a series of strictures and rules regarding behavior by PAT members in the villages.

(U) This section of the course was developed by the Director of PAT Instruction, based on his knowledge of Thailand, understanding of PAT doctrine, and his acquaintance with PAT training given in Vietnam. Most of the motivational training for PATs at Suan Son was given in one-hour lectures presented personally by this officer, who is scheduled to be the Director of Instruction for VSF training.

(U) Self-Help Village Improvement Projects. In this section of PAT training, the team members were taught certain basic techniques of conducting village improvement projects. They learned how to work with the villagers and improve the village using carpentry, masonry, animal husbandry, agricultural techniques, giving hair cuts, first aid, and prevention of plant and animal diseases. The use of these various skills by the teams in the villages is described in the section on "Activities."

(U) (U) Propaganda and Psychological Operations. This section of the course was designed to teach PAT members how to speak effectively with the villagers, both privately and in public sessions. They were also taught about the nature of communist propaganda and rumor, and how to counter them either orally or through use of simple handmade leaflets. (One man on each team is responsible for producing field leaflets; he is given a small hand-stamp set, an ink pad, and several kinds of paper.) The team was also taught the importance of explaining clearly to the villagers, upon first arrival, the role of the PAT in that village, the ways in which the team will help the villagers, and the need for support from the villagers. Team conduct of various kinds of psychological activities is described in the section on "Activities".

(U) (U) Weapons Training. The weapons instruction taught the students how to use all five PAT weapons: M1 rifle, M1 carbine, shotgun, M3 submachine gun, and M1911A1 (.45 cal) pistol, plus hand grenades. Emphasis was placed on instinctive firing and immediate action.

(U) (U) Tactics Instruction. The para-military training given to the PATs was divided by the PAT instructors into 10 categories, as follows:

Small-unit tactics

Ambush and counterambush

Raids and defensive measures

Security and self-protection techniques

Patrols and reconnaissance

Individual tactics

Guerrilla warfare

Map reading and use of the compass

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Communications (voice radio, HT-1)

Intelligence collection and reporting

The teams were basically not trained as offensive elements. Their training did show them how to exploit intelligence through an ambush or a small raid on a CT camp, but the training was basically defensive in nature. The teams were, in essence, trained to provide armed protection in remote rural villages, while engaging in self-help and development activities to improve the intelligence base which is the heart of permanent viable village security.

(U) (C) Although all members of the team were trained to consciously collect intelligence and information from the villagers, one member of each PAT is trained to fulfill a specific intelligence reporting function. This man is given an abbreviated version of the CA course--2 weeks instead of the usual 4. He submits daily reports through the CA system and is known as a CA/PAT or "mobile" CA.

Other PAT Training

(U) Medical Training. Each team includes two medics who conduct basic medical assistance programs in their assigned villages (described below under "Activities"). Essentially they involve dispensing several kinds of basic medicines to treat common Northeast village ailments. The PAT medics, many of whom are female, underwent a 6-weeks' medical training course at the Public Health Hospital at Khon Kaen. Usually they attended this course prior to undergoing PAT training at Suan Son, so that they were ready to accompany their teams upon return to their villages. (The female PATs underwent the normal PAT training course, including the full range of weapons instruction and paramilitary training. All female PATs are medics, while 36 of the 56 PAT medics in the Northeast are females.)

(U) Leadership Training. Midway through the first year of the program, it was determined that PAT leaders should undergo some additional training, following completion of the basic course. Thus, teams returned to their home amphoes while the leaders remained at Suan Son for the leadership course which lasted 10 to 14 days.

(U) (C) Refresher Training. No refresher training has been given to the teams as a whole. However it was realized that many aspects of the paramilitary instruction were basically inadequate for the teams to operate aggressively in security-sensitive areas. This is particularly important given the changing nature of PAT employment described under "Mission" above. The team members themselves realize the skills which they are most lacking, as shown by interviews conducted in October and November 1967. The members desired more training in ambush, patrol, attack, raid, night movement, and counterambush. As a result, a retraining course in paramilitary activities was planned for 1968. PAT medics during November 1967 received refresher training given in the changwat seat by the PAT medical supervisor and PAT advisor. CA/PAT members attended a CA seminar in December 1967.

Training Center Organization

(U) The PAT training center was located within the compound of the Phetchaburi Military District headquarters, Camp Suan Son, Tambon Nong Kae, Amphoe Hua Hin, Changwat Prachuap Khiri Khan. The center, founded on 22 September 1966, was administratively attached to CSOC and divided into two sections: training and support. Personnel from DOLA, TNPD, and RTA were assigned on a TDY basis to CSOC to act as instructors.

(U) (C) As of November 1967 there were 14 full-time PAT instructors assigned to the center. They concentrated on the political and motivational instruction.* Part-time, special instructors were obtained from the PARU (Camp Naresuan), Prachuap Khiri Khan Vocational School, Thai-Israel Rural Development Demonstration Center (located in Cha-Am, Phetchaburi), Hua Hin Animal Inspection Station, and Prachuap Khiri Khan Veterinary Section.

EQUIPMENT

Weapons

(U) (C) Providing team members with small arms of high firepower is a basic feature of the overall PAT concept, which calls for the teams to conduct aggressive defense of their assigned villages. The PATs in Thailand have generally received a weapons package which meets this requirement.

(U) (C) The standard weaponry for a 10-man PAT was originally established as follows:

*All 14 were recruited in late 1967 as political and motivational instructors for the new VSF program.

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Two M1 rifles

Four M1 carbines

Two M3 submachine guns

Three M1911A1 pistols, cal .45

It was planned for the team leader to carry both a carbine and a pistol and the two medics to carry only a pistol. Shotguns are not issued as standard PAT equipment, but they have been provided to the nai amphoes for PAT use when required (for example, for an ambush or special security duty where a shotgun would be useful). To date, these weapons have not been called for by an operational PAT. Team members receive training in all five weapons.

(U) ~~(C)~~ PAT teams on site seem to have a slightly different combination of the four basic weapons, but the four were the only ones in evidence with the PATs. Each team also had some hand grenades. The weapons package may be changed, replacing some of the M1 carbines and M1 rifles with M2 automatic carbines. This would give approximately half of each team automatic weapons. At the same time, the PAT medics would receive an M1 carbine for use on patrols, team movement and security duty, but while conducting their medical activities in the village they would continue to carry only a pistol, leaving their carbine in the team location.*

Dress

(U) ~~(C)~~ In keeping with their status as a village-oriented security force, the PATs do not wear a military-type uniform. They are issued dark blue denim clothing without any distinctive insignia, similar to that regularly worn by Northeastern villagers. They are also issued rubber-soled canvas boots, plus limited field equipment such as a blanket, mosquito bar, and field pack. The program does not require that members wear the complete standard issue, and many PAT members observed in Sakon Nakhon were wearing a mixture of PAT-issued and regular civilian clothing.

Communications

(U) ~~(C)~~ The PATs use the Hallicrafters HT-1 radio, a hand-carried VHF voice set. With an antenna placed in a tree or on a long bamboo pole the effective range of this radio is between 5 to 7 km, in tactical use on the move, the radio has an effective range of about 1 km. Each PAT has one of these HT-1 radios and another is provided the amphoe office.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The teams within an amphoe communicate with each other if they are within range. They also communicate with the nai amphoe's office, either directly where range permits or through a relay arrangement with a nearby [illegible] unit or tambon police station. In early 1967 in Phanna Nikhom, for example, there were four PATs all operating in close proximity to one another. One of these teams was located in the same village as the tambon police station and acted as the net control station for all four teams, receiving messages from them and passing the information to amphoe through the police radio.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The PAT radios do not net with the FM-1 and [illegible] radios generally available to the VDC and tambon police or provided to kamnans through the Village Radio System project and scheduled for the VSs. Contacts with these units, if desired, must be made by messenger.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Due to their location, the PATs in southern Phanna Nikhom are in radio contact with the nearby teams in [illegible] Amphoe Kut Bak and with the Kut Bak amphoe office, they cannot, however, contact the Phanna Nikhom amphoe office directly.

Logistical Support

(C) Support for the deployed teams comes primarily from two sources: the appropriate amphoe office and the US advisor at changwat level. As noted in the section on Organization, [illegible] changwat-level organization has been developed to support the PAT program. At amphoe level the nai amphoe and his staff are responsible for supporting their teams. They have a [illegible] fund to purchase locally available items such as [illegible], nails, rope, or certain [illegible]. All other items needed to support the operations and activities of these teams, [illegible] and [illegible] improvement activities, are supplied by the American advisors [illegible] at the PAT ad [illegible] office in Sakon Nakhon. [illegible] radios, [illegible], carpentry [illegible], field equipment, etc., and replacement and repair of items as necessary [illegible] through the [illegible] changwat [illegible] staff [illegible] for [illegible].

*The team members stated a preference for the M1 rifle, even though it is heavier than the carbine. [illegible] range was greater. [illegible] range fire required. The medics, including the women, expressed a desire for a [illegible] carbine or M1 rifle in addition to their pistols.

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(U) (C) Medical support is somewhat of a special case. A Thai registered nurse works with the US advisors to the program and advises the PAT medics on their medical assistance visits. She maintains records of stock levels for medicines, checks inventory statements, conducts medical retraining sessions, and fulfills a wide variety of related functions in support of the PAT medical program. Whenever possible, medicines are purchased locally.

ACTIVITIES

(U) (C) PAT activities in the villages may usefully be divided into three major categories, as follows:

Protection/Defense Security

Development/Self-Help/Village Improvement/Attitude Change

Intelligence/Information Collection and Reporting

As noted earlier, the PATs are assigned to a particular village. They may be moved to another site, but until that happens they are primarily responsible for the village in which they are located. Some teams, on their own, have been covering more than one village; but this is the exception rather than the rule.

(U) (C) Upon arrival in the village, the PAT's first job is to explain to the villagers their purpose in being there, explain the assistance they intend to provide, and ask for support from the villagers. This is usually done in a group meeting, followed by visits to individual families by the medic and one or two other team members. The villagers may be given a leaflet produced by the team which explains PAT assistance, and in all cases the villagers are encouraged to avail themselves of PAT medical assistance.

(U) (C) One of the next tasks undertaken by the PAT is to establish team living accommodations. These are usually set up in the wat, although some of the teams have constructed separate buildings made of bamboo and wood. Limited defensive fortifications are established around and under the team shelter, and the team radio antenna is set on a bamboo pole. Brush may be cleared to improve fields of fire, and procedures for 24-hour guard shifts are arranged.

(U) (C) Following these initial steps, the team is ready to begin activities in the three categories listed above. Most teams try to start a high-impact village improvement project soon after their arrival. This project, combined with intensive medical assistance during the early weeks in the village, establishes the basis for development of effective rapport between the team and the villagers.

Village Protection

(U) (C) The PATs conduct several kinds of activities in support of this objective. They provide, first and foremost, an armed government presence in the village--10 or 12 men with weapons, and the skill and motivation to use them if necessary.

(U) (C) During the day, the team is in the village working on improvement projects. In addition, daylight patrols are conducted on the fringes of the village. The size of these patrols and their frequency depend primarily on the size of the team and the local threat environment. Night patrols in the village are conducted by the PATs, since this is considered outside of their basic mission as currently assigned. When information indicates the likely presence of armed insurgents in the immediate vicinity, however, night patrols may be conducted within the village and perhaps a short distance outside. With such intelligence, ambush positions may be set at likely points of insurgent entrance and egress from the village. The PATs in Ban Kiat Mai, Amphoe Sawang Wan Din, and Ban Huay Lek Pai, Amphoe Saritchaphum, for example, have prepared ambush positions at points where the main trails enter the village.

(U) (C) Constraints placed on the teams have severely limited their aggressiveness and the extension of their protection role beyond the confines of the assigned village. For example, the teams seldom responded directly to intelligence reports which indicate the presence of insurgents several kilometers away. However, the PAT at Ban Pa Dong in Phanna Nikhom responded when about 20 armed insurgents entered Ban Na Nai, several kilometers to the north. This PAT had previously been located in Ban Na Nai, and when the CT arrived 18 men from that village ran to the PAT in its new location and pleaded with them to respond. The team asked for permission to do so from the nai amphoe, and this responded on its own while amphoe "studied the request." By the time the PAT arrived at Ban Na Nai, the insurgents had left, but the villagers were reportedly very pleased that the PAT had come to their aid.

(C) Another example of the kind of operational constraints placed on PAT operations outside

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(U) [illegible] assigned vill[illegible] in incident involving [illegible] for[illegible] placithan is [illegible] village. [illegible] the insurgents and [illegible] two of his men as a blocking [illegible] main trail to Ban Fun[illegible] headed for Ban Nong Thong; thi[illegible] chastised by the nai amphoe [illegible] The nai amphoe said that [illegible] deaths would not have been the responsibility of the amphoe and [illegible] have been paid to their [illegible] according to the team leader [illegible] must receive approval from amphoe [illegible] it wants to send a man outside the [illegible] the village.

(U) (b) The employment concept was [illegible] in late 1967, with the teams permitted to be [illegible] more aggressive. The leaders were told to the governor and [illegible] to conduct patrols outside the village when information indicated that these may be productive, and to [illegible] intelligence when necessary, even if it is not possible to receive prior approval from the amphoe.

(U) (c) It may be useful to describe an attack against a PAT by armed insurgents, since these village teams in security-positive areas--and other similar teams including [illegible] to be faced with such situations in the future. The team at Ban Khan [illegible] was attacked on the evening of 29 August 1967. The attack began about [illegible] with several bursts of submachine gun fire from a schoolhouse 20-30 meters away. This was covering fire for a man who then lobbed a hand grenade at the PAT shelter; it hit a wooden cover placed there for that purpose, and exploded on the ground. The PAT guard drove the CT back behind the school, and the entire team--12 men that night--was able to get into their bunkers. [illegible] estimated at about 20-40 men, fired sporadically at the PAT with rifles, carbines, and [illegible] guns for the next 4 hours. The PAT team leader made the rounds of his position, telling men to conserve ammunition, fire only at good targets, and caution [illegible] that in all possibility they would have to hold out until daybreak, with reinforcements not likely until then. The insurgents broke contact at approximately 0100 the next morning.

(U) (d) The PAT had been able to pass word of the attack shortly after it began via the radio to the amphoe. The nai amphoe requested assistance from Udon Airbase and CPM-1. Around 2100 a flareship from Udon arrived on the scene, but inadvertently dropped its flares at the wrong location--a village several kilometers away. The nai amphoe dispatched the seven [illegible] constitute the amphoe reserve force to Ban Khan Ta Na, to rally forces with a PAT located there. The two units then walked into Ban Khan Ta Na, a distance of about [illegible] km, along the edge of the Nong Pra Chao forest. The PAT and reserve force reached the PAT at [illegible] 7 hours after the attack began and 3 hours after the CTs had broken [illegible] back into the forest. At 0400 that morning the first of four squads of [illegible] by CPM-1 arrived by helicopter.

(U) (e) The team morale after the attack was reportedly very high. Many villagers visited the PAT to assure themselves that no one was hurt and to congratulate the team [illegible] fense. Team conservation of ammunition during the 4-hour fight was [illegible] period of time the PAT members expended a total of 95 rounds of carbine ammunition, [illegible] of .45 caliber (primarily from M3 submachine guns) and 40 rounds of [illegible] team leader believes that the reason the CTs kept up the attack for such a long period of time was that they hoped the PAT would exhaust its ammunition supply so that they could [illegible] run the position without fear of casualties. It is interesting to note that [illegible] Khan Ta Na reported on 24 August that it had received information that [illegible] reliable--that the insurgents would attack their location with about [illegible] between the 20th and 30th of August; the attack took place on the 29th.

Village Improvement and Attitude Change

(U) The PATs have conducted, initiated, and stimulated numerous improvements [illegible] villages in which they have been located. The following sections discuss [illegible] tion techniques, describe projects undertaken, and explain direct attitude [illegible]

(U) Project Initiation. Most projects in which the team participates [illegible] the team in conjunction with village leaders; then the villagers are [illegible] and [illegible] Then a village development committee is present in the [illegible] committee structure is used; where no formal committee exists, the [illegible] teacher, senior [illegible], and other [illegible] the PAT team leader [illegible] committee [illegible] project [illegible]

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If the committee is in agreement, a village meeting is scheduled for early in the morning on the day of the project. At this meeting the members of the development committee speak to the villagers, tell them of the value of the project, and encourage them to participate.

(U) Roads and Bridges. PATs spend a good deal of time working with the villagers in improving existing roads within the village. Every team has engaged in this activity to a greater or lesser extent. The roads are straightened and smoothed, and fill and drainage ditches are added. All the work is done by hand, using a long-handled hoe common to the Thai village.* This road work is usually performed by a large group of village men, assisted by the PAT, often the PAT suggests to the villagers that such a project be undertaken. In several PAT villages, new roads have been constructed using these techniques. In at least two cases, one in Sawang Daen Din and the other in Phanna Nikhom, two teams have helped to improve roads linking their adjacent villages, with each doing half the road. In one case, the PAT repaired the access road leading to the village from the Sakon Nakhon-Udon highway (Route 22). This was the first time this road had been opened in over a year.

(U) All the teams have, at one time or another, repaired bridges in the local area in conjunction with villager-provided labor. They have added new lumber, improved abutments, and, in several cases, have constructed completely new bridges to replace ones beyond repair.

(U) Wells. The PATs have worked with the villagers to dig new wells and to improve existing ones. In several cases, they have added a concrete edging around the exterior of the well.*

(U) House Repair and Construction. Next to work on the roads, the most common projects for the PATs involve repair of village houses and assistance in construction of new ones. In every village visited during the PAT Evaluation (22 of the 24 PATs were observed), PAT house repairs were in evidence. The teams provide both skilled labor and tools for repair work and construction. In some villages, PAT members have assisted villagers in moving houses from one location in the village to another and in constructing new schoolhouses.** In several villages the PAT has engaged in extensive cleaning under the village houses. All this work around individual villager houses is very important to the PAT image and to successful conduct of the mission because it brings the team members in direct constructive contact with the villagers in their own homes.

(U) Construction of Sanitary Privies. The PATs receive instruction during their training course in the construction of sanitary privies for the village. Several such facilities have been built, using a concrete base, wooden walls, and metal roof. In most cases these were the only privies which had been built in the village. They were usually put up in the wat; often the usage rate by villagers seemed very low--one was locked, in fact, and the monks had the key as well as the status symbol.

(U) Wat Repairs. The teams often reside in the wat and spend time and effort in repairing wat facilities and constructing new ones. Repairs have been made to the "sala wat" in many villages; in two cases, entire new buildings were under construction by the PAT and the villagers. In Ban Khae Kha, Amphoe Muang, a kitchen with a concrete floor has been constructed in the wat by the PATs. Many monk's quarters had been renovated, gates built on wat entrances, and fences constructed around the wat. During festivals and wat fairs, the PATs assist in decorating, cleaning up, building temporary facilities (such as a "mohlam" stage), and generally stimulating villager participation in the celebration.

(U) Fences. New fences are much in evidence in PAT villages. These are made of wood and bamboo, cut by hand; the PATs furnish nails, tools, labor, and impetus. In one village of Phanna Nikhom (Ban Ko Khok), the resident team generated literally 5 miles of new fences. Each villager worked on the fence in front of his own house, assisted by other villagers and the PAT.***

(U) Irrigation Facilities. Several PATs have worked with the villagers to build simple irrigation facilities nearby. These are usually earth dams, but may include irrigation ditches and connecting channels, as well. In one Phanna Nikhom village (Ban Un Dong) the team built a fishpond for the village and stocked it with fish purchased in Sakon Nakhon city.

*PAT experience regarding wells provides several examples of the vagaries of villager reaction to well-intentioned improvement projects. In Ban Ko Manao the team built a wooden pulley arrangement for the village well so that villagers would no longer have to draw water using a bucket attached to a long pole. However, the pulley is not often used by the villagers who prefer their traditional technique. In another PAT village, where the team initiated the digging of a new well, the villagers continue to use an older well even though the water is much dirtier, because "the water from the new well does not taste right."

**In Ban Tat Phu village of Maritchaphum, the matter of PAT house construction was discussed with a local building contractor with a [illegible] were force. When asked if the PAT takes business away from him, he said that the PAT only performs house repairs for people who could not afford his services. He also confirmed that the PAT does not charge the villagers for the assistance rendered, and remarked that the quality of PAT work was surprisingly high.

***The pressure for conformity in this village must have been quite strong, for every house, even the most poor and run down, has a nice fence, often of better appearance than the house itself.

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PEOPLE'S ASSISTANCE TEAMS

(U) (U) Work with Villagers in the Fields. The PAT members often help the villagers in the rice fields with plowing, transplanting, and harvesting. Whenever possible such assistance is provided to those most in need, such as widows. The amount of time spent by PATs in this kind of activity varies greatly with the season; when the villagers are spending a great deal of time in the fields, so are the PATs. Some PATs have established vegetable gardens near the team shelter for the team and the village to use.

(U) (U) Medical Activities. There are indications that PAT medical activities are the most important single facet of PAT development work, extremely important to the success of the team in people-to-people relations, attitude change, and generation of villager-provided intelligence. The medics personally visit every house in the village on a regular basis, talk with the residents, provide any desired medical service, and demonstrate clearly the government's interest in the villagers' welfare and betterment. Also, the medical role of the PATs seems to be the "cover" most often used by a villager in coming to the PAT shelter to report information about the CTs.

(U) The PAT medics, usually two per team, are trained in basic techniques of preventive and curative medicine. They are aware of the major diseases in the area and know which medicine to prescribe for which ailment. They are provided with some 20 different types of medicine and trained in their use. Some of the PAT medics have delivered babies in their villages; they receive a little training in midwifery. Most of the PAT medics are women.

(U) Haircuts. The PAT members receive training in giving haircuts to the villagers and are provided with a haircut kit. Most teams set up a "barbershop" near the PAT shelter which villagers visit to get a haircut. This has the advantage of encouraging the villager to come and visit the PAT, rather than avoid all contact with the team as is often the case with government armed units in remote villages.

(U) (U) Direct Attitude Change Activities. The PATs engage in two kinds of activities which may usefully be termed direct attitude change: production of written leaflets and spoken propaganda. The team has a small hand-stamp for producing leaflets. These are often used when the team first arrives in a village to explain the PAT program to the villagers. They are also used to prepare anticommunist leaflets or to inform villagers of particular government actions. Verbal or spoken propaganda by the PATs is supposed to take place every day when the team members come into contact with villagers. This activity goes on in individual meetings, while the team is working with the villagers, when the medics are visiting villager houses, etc. At times the PAT will call a village meeting to explain its presence, activities, and plans. This may be done in conjunction with a wat fair, village celebration, visit of a Mobile Information Team, or other gathering.

Intelligence and Information Collection

(U) (U) Collection of information from the villagers is one of the primary elements of the PAT concept; it is the basic rationale for the teams engaging in many kinds of village improvement work. The concept provides that once a relationship of rapport and trust has been developed between the team and the villagers, information will be provided to the team and the creation of a permanent security environment will become possible. The PATs collect information from the villagers by talking with them, working with them, and becoming a trusted part of the community. The team members are taught what to look for and what kinds of questions to ask but the villagers must have a reason to provide such information to the team.

(U) (U) The PATs have collected information on CT sightings in the area, CT presence including CT supporters in the village, CT equipment, CT activities, and CT plans. In most cases, as discussed in the section on PAT village protection activities, the PAT does not itself act on the basis of information collected, but reports it to amphoe for action or for instructions to act.

Other PAT Activities

(U) (U) Conduct of Resources Control Programs. Some of the PATs are engaged in carrying out RTG programs for controlling the movement of people through security-sensitive areas. For example, in southern Phanna Nikhom the PATs participate in an extensive program of movement control, along with the CPM and police. This primarily involves issuing and checking passes for villagers who desire to visit other villages. The villager, prior to departing, checks with the PAT, states his reason for leaving, planned destination, and expected time of return. Some PATs issue special passes, others simply check to ensure that the villager's regular identification card is in proper order. Other teams in the area check strangers to be sure they have proper movement credentials. At times, the team will radio ahead to the next village to tell them of the expected arrival of the villager. These control programs seem in evidence in all six PAT amphoes of Sakon Nakhon.

(U) (U) Defector Inducement. Some of the PATs, because of their activities in village attitude change, have become involved in inducing insurgents to surrender and give themselves up to the

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government. The team in Ban Huay Lek Fai, Waritchaphum, is the most notable in this regard. Five CTs have been encouraged to defect because of the efforts of this team, and especially its leader, who is strongly oriented in this direction. Other teams have been requested by the families of insurgents to assist in inducing the relative to give himself up. All PAT members are taught during their training the necessity of treating surrendered insurgents properly, so that more CTs will be encouraged to give themselves up.

Role of Women

(U) There are 56 women in the PAT program in Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom, all trained and acting as team medics. These women, often in their late teens or early twenties, are extremely active in the conduct of their medical activities. They visit every house in the village, talking with the villagers as well as giving medical treatment. The presence of women in the PAT gives it a different character and image than it otherwise would have; it also permits contact with the female population of the village. The girls do the cooking for their teams as well as conducting medical activities. They seem to hold their own as regards PAT paramilitary responsibilities; they stand guard at night, carry a weapon when working, and know how to use it. There have been no problems reported by mixed teams, although all-male teams state that if they had female medics, there might be difficulties.

Multi-Village Coverage

(U) (C) Some PATs, although assigned to one village and movable but not mobile, have covered more than one village. The team at Ban Phak Kham Phu, for example, visits the village of Ban Choeng Doi on a regular basis because this latter village--located in the hills--is "where the action is." The PAT at Ban Don Khao splits into three four-man teams, each with a female medic; one "subteam" stays at the PAT location while the other two visit nearby villages. In a similar manner, the team at Ban Khok Si moves out during the day to adjoining villages to conduct development work, hand out medicines, and collect information. Nearly every PAT team has collected intelligence not only from residents of its base village, but also from people in nearby villages. One PAT, formerly in Ban Na Nai, brought many sources with it when it transferred to nearby Ban Un Dong; the Ban Na Nai villagers now report to the Ban Un Dong PAT, rather than to the police station at Ban Nong Phu which is much closer to their village. Often these visits to other villages are made by the PAT without telling the nai amphoe because they are contrary to operating instructions. The team leaders, however, felt that it was both possible to cover more than one village and important to do so.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Above Village Level

(U) (C) At the national level, the PAT program is the responsibility of CSOC and DOLA. In the Northeast the RTA Second Army Forward Headquarters has an interest in PAT protection activities, especially in villages near RTA operational locations. The PAT program is the responsibility of the changwat governor. In the conduct of this program, he coordinates with the CPM, changwat PP headquarters, changwat CD officer, and other ministry representatives. The PAT program relates closely to the CA Province Study Center, passing to it information collected by the teams.

(U) (C) At amphoe level, the PAT program operates under the control of the nai amphoe, assisted by a palad amphoe for PAT or for PAT/VDC, and by other amphoe-level ministry representatives. In support of PAT protection and improvement activities, the palad amphoe-PAT coordinates with the amphoe police, CD officer, CA amphoe supervisor, and others. Employment of the PATs, their movement to new villages and activities in their assigned villages are of interest to the CSOC 0910 Plan control headquarters elements for Areas 3, 4, and 5 in Amphoes Sawang Daen Din and Waritchaphum, and to Area 8 control headquarters in Pla Rak.

At Village Level

(U) (C) PATs providing protection and improvement in the villages relate to many other RTG organizations operating in the same area. At times the PAT is assigned in the same village as other organizations, such as VDC, police, CA, or RTA; at other times the supporting organization moves through the PAT village, and the elements interrelate only for that period of time when they are both in the village. Figure 14 is a schematic of some of the interrelationships which are discussed in this section.

(U) (C) Relationships with the VDC. In several cases in the past, a PAT has been located in the same village as a VDC unit. In most cases when the teams are both located in the same village they live together in the sala wat. They patrol together, conduct development projects together, stand night guard together, and share cooking responsibilities. When the leader of one

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

(U) Fig. 14 FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PATs AND OTHER VILLAGE LEVEL ELEMENTS

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[illegible]

[illegible]

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(U) In Nakhon Phanom the Pla Pak PATs actually fall under the jurisdiction of the VDC structure.

(U) (b) Relationships with Civil Aspirations Program. In about half of the present PAT villages there is a resident CA cadre. The CA man derives security from the presence of the PAT, and the team obtains information on insurgent activities and villager aspirations from the CA cadre. The relationships between the team and the CA man is generally very close, but attempts are made to maintain a separate identity for the CA cadre, who reports his information directly through the CA structure not via the PAT.

(U) (c) As indicated earlier, each team has one member who has received special training in information collection, survey work, and reporting; he is designated "CA/PAT," or "mobile CA." This man collects information from the villagers on insurgent activities in the local area and on villager aspirations and grievances. He also debriefs all team members each evening to find out what they have learned from the villagers during their daily activities. The CA/PAT reports this information on a daily basis directly to the CA amphoe officer, where it becomes part of the CA system, as do the reports submitted by the CA village cadres. This information gathered by the CA PAT is, of course, made available to the team leader for his use, as well as being reported to the CA system.

(U) (d) Relationships with VSO. The only amphoe of Sakon Nakhon to have VSO is Wanon Niwat, where there are no PATs assigned. In Nakhon Phanom, however, the two elements both operate in King Amphoe Pla Pak; however, available information indicates that there are no VSO members serving on active duty in the five villages in which the PATs operate.

(U) (e) Relationships with RTA. In several villages of Sawang Daen Din, both PAT and RTA elements have been assigned to the same village at the same time. The presence of the RTA brought additional protection to the village and to the PAT in such cases. The RTA troops reportedly come to the PAT medics for medical assistance. At times the RTA has requested the PAT to provide a guide or scout for a particular operation, since the PATs are more familiar with the local area. In Ban Nong Waeng, for, the RTA and the PAT resided in the same compound, inside concertina barbed wire. The PAT in this village reportedly took its guidance from the Army unit, seldom strayed from the compound, and did very little in the way of people-to-people relations. This was a very unsuccessful experience for the PAT, undoubtedly the worst case the program to date. RTA forces are located in some other PAT villages. Ban Phai, for example, served as headquarters for a large Second Army sweep operation. Following the 4-hour attack on the PAT at Ban Khan Ta Na (described above under "Activities") several squads of RTA troops were sent to the village. They arrived by helicopter at 0400 the morning after the attack and remained in Ban Khan Ta Na about one month.

(U) (f) At other times there are PAT-RTA relationships when the RTA unit passes through a PAT village on an operation, rather than actually being assigned there as described above. At Ban Nong Thum in Sawang Daen Din, for example, where PAT and VDC reside together, the Army moves in and out of the area on sweep operations against the insurgents. On three or four occasions the PAT from this village has provided a guide to the Army.* On one such occasion, the PAT member was gone on the Army operation for more than 2 weeks. This PAT has provided information to the RTA troops on the local insurgent threat, including CT sightings by the villagers and probably CT locations. The team has, at times, carried food from the villagers to Army elements stationed in the forest outside of the village. When the Army is operating in this vicinity, they maintain radio contact with the VDC set at Ban Nong Thum, but not directly with the PAT (both units live together in the wat).

(U) (g) Relationships with Tambon Police. The PATs relate closely with the local tambon police stations where they exist. In Tambon Na Nai of Phanna Nikhom there is a seven-man police station at Ban Nong Phu and six PAT teams operating within the tambon. The PATs pass information which they collect to the police station.** When the PATs first arrived in Phanna Nikhom they were all stationed in the vicinity of the Ban Nong Phu police station. The teams maintained radio contact using their PT-1's with the team at Ban Nong Phu acting as net control station to pass messages to amphoe using the police radio net. The PAT at Ban Nong Phu at first set up a shelter at the opposite end of town from the police, but were later ordered to move into the police compound to provide additional protection for the police station.

(U) (h) Other PATs in Sakon Nakhon interrelate with nearby tambon police stations; for example, the PAT at Ban Champa, Waritchaphum, with the police station in Ban Khan Bit; and the PAT at Ban Khok Don in northern Sawang Daen Din with the tambon police station in Ban Khok Si. In Amphoe

*Regulations call for prior approval from the nai amphoe for such use of a PAT member, however, on few occasions the Army commander has taken the PAT guide without checking with the nai amphoe, feeling that in an urgent situation, the Army can render assistance without waiting for amphoe approval.

**For example, the team at Ban Nong Phak Chan received information in early October that a CT leader, named Bunmi Nalithong, had been in the village the previous evening to visit his family. This information was, in fact, given to the PAT by Bunmi's family itself. The PAT passed this information to the police. Together with other information on Bunmi sent in from other villages, the police were able to set an ambush for this leader in late October. They killed him along with one other CT.

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[illegible] Relationships with Village Radio Sets. Original employment of the PATs in Sakon Nakhon [illegible] the teams were [illegible] to villages which had been provided with [illegible] However, the evidence indicates that during the first [illegible] of the program [illegible] occurred. The radio sets have been [illegible] from their original locations [illegible] operational sites for use by the CDC. [illegible] the PAT teams with the CDC, as has been [illegible] in several villages, the team is able to use the village radio. In Ban [illegible] Amphoe Kut Bak, the village radio was taken by the insurgents during a forced village [illegible] in mid-1967; this is now a PAT village. No villages in which the PATs have been [illegible] themselves have had CRS radios available.

(U) Relationships with Phuyaibans and Retrained Village Development Committees. In most PAT villages the phuyaiban takes a personal interest in directing the activities of the team, especially PAT village improvement projects. These projects are guided by the village development committee if one has been designated and trained by the CD village leader training program. For example, in Ban Huay Pip of Amphoe Muang, the development committee, with the PAT team leader and senior monk participating as invited members, determines which village improvement projects ought to be undertaken and when. Several PAT team leaders are themselves phuyaibans or [illegible]

(U) In Ban Ue Khok, Thanna Nikhom, where the PAT and villagers constructed the many miles of new village fences referred to earlier, a village development committee has existed since [illegible] 1967. The committee members were told that they would soon receive leadership training, however, the committee had not received its training as of November 1967 and seldom saw the CD worker, who was reported to have sent instructions and suggestions for new projects via messenger. The committee, however, in spite of its lack of training was working closely with the PAT in the fence project and in other village improvement projects.

(U) (U) Relationships with PP and PPP. In addition to the interrelationships noted between the PATs and the tambon police stations, there is some contact with the PP assigned at amphoe and changwat levels. In King Amphoe Kut Bak, for example, the amphoe police constitute the primary amphoe reserve force. In addition they occasionally visit the PAT villages of Ban Klang and Ban Phon Nam on a motorized patrol. Both these villages are located on ARD roads in Kut Bak. In all five PAT amphoes the police radio system is important to PAT communications; messages may be sent from the teams to amphoe, and by amphoe to changwat, using the police net (or the civil administrative net). At one time during mid-1967 in King Amphoe Kut Bak, a BPP Mobile Reserve Platoon was assigned to patrol and provide security. This unit at times patrolled through PAT villages.

(U) Relationships with USIS Mobile Information Teams. On several occasions the MIT program has visited PAT villages to show movies and provide assistance and information to the village. Usually this is done in conjunction with a wat fair or other village celebration in which the PAT participates. At times, because of close working relations between US advisors to the PATs and the USIS officer in Sakon Nakhon, an MIT visit has been specifically scheduled for a particular village because it had a PAT in residence.

(U) Relationships with Second Class Health Centers. On one known occasion--at Ban Khok Si in Sawang Daen Din--a PAT has been assigned to a village which had an RTG Second Class Health Center. The PAT, in fact, resided in a village meeting hall located directly next to the Health Center. This reportedly undercut the impact of PAT medical assistance programs, although the PAT female medics on this team visited houses in the village. The Health Center personnel received patients, but did not search them out. This PAT, while in Ban Khok Si also visited nearby villages on daily patrols which included a medic. No other relationships were noted between PATs and Second Class Health Centers.

(U) (U) Relationship to VSF Program. Beginning in early 1968, US financial assistance to the PAT program ceased, and this responsibility was assumed by DOLA under the overall arrangements calling for creation of new VSF elements. The final utilization of the 36 teams (24 in Sakon Nakhon, 10 in Nakhon Phanom, and 2 in Prachuap Khiri Khan) had not yet been determined as of this writing (April 1968); 16 PATs are in Priority I VSF amphoes. Funds for the program are available through the RTG fiscal year ending 30 September 1968. The teams may be used to provide armed support to the new VSF elements created in their amphoes, or they could serve as mobile elements moving among several VSF villages, providing protection and improvement assistance, collecting information, and advising the VSF on their operations. With some retraining they could serve as "mobile instructor cadres" in VSF areas, providing periodic refresher training to the VSF members in their own villages. While VSF members from a tambon are in training and thus absent from their villages for about 2 months, these villages may be especially threatened by insurgent pressure. PATs could be brought in to provide enhanced security until the new VSF teams return from training.

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CENSUS ASPIRATION CADRES

SUMMARY

(U) ~~(C)~~ The Census Aspiration (CA) program is a village-level information collection effort. One man (unarmed) operates within his own home village to collect and report data on the village and its residents, information on the aspirations and grievances of the villagers, information on the subversive/insurgent infrastructure within the village, and on insurgent activity in the vicinity. He reports this information to an amphoe supervisor on a daily basis. From amphoe the information is forwarded to a Province Study Center (PSC), where it is collated, analyzed, and filed. The PSC distributes information to the changwat governor and others in the form of a daily report, plus a weekly summary.

(U) ~~(C)~~ This program was initiated in late 1966 as a pilot project designed to test the applicability to Thailand of an information collection program extensively used in Vietnam.* As with the closely related PAT program, Changwat Sakon Nakhon was chosen as the test area. The first 40 village CA cadres became operational in December 1966; by March 1968 there were 104 village cadres operating in Sakon Nakhon, backed up by a support structure incorporating 27 people. In addition, the program was operating on a limited basis in Changwats Nakhon Phanom (34 village cadres) and Prachuap Khiri Khan (20 village cadres). All village CA cadres have been long-term residents of the village in which they are functioning. They are selected by the nai amphoe and receive 4 weeks of special training in information collection and reporting techniques. Following training, they return to their villages. Each village cadre receives a monthly salary of $500.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Since the program's inception, the cadres have collected a great deal of detailed information on insurgent movement and locations, identities, intentions, and incidents as well as having passed on villager aspirations for government assistance of a collective nature (e.g., for wells, roads, medical care and medicines, etc.) and individual desires (e.g., for seeds, fertilizer, cement, etc.). They have also been responsible for bringing to the attention of government authorities villager grievances concerning the conduct of local government officials and other villagers, and those expressing dissatisfaction with things beyond the villagers' control, such as thievery, natural disasters, and restrictive government regulations.

(U) ~~(C)~~ To date, RTG response to CA-generated intelligence has not been significant; in those instances where response was forthcoming, there has been a considerable time lag between the initial report and reaction to it. Response to villager aspirations, upon which the CA cadre is dependent for villager cooperation, has been practically nonexistent due to problems of program coordination, lack of sufficient funds, and other difficulties. As of early 1968, however, there were indications of increased awareness on the part of RTG officials (particularly at the national level) of the importance of timely response to CA-reported villager aspirations and improvement in the situation should result.

* The CA program in Thailand is a modified version of the Vietnamese "Census Grievance" program, which operates some 6,000 village and hamlet cadres. Mr. Jean Coudous, who initiated the program in Vietnam and shepherded its development, has been brought to Thailand to assist in adapting the program to the Thai situation.

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(U) (C) It is likely that the program will be expanded in 1968 with the addition of some 15 to 30 more cadres in Sakon Nakhon and 40 to 50 in Nakhon Phanom. It is also possible that coverage may be extended to other changwats in the Northeast, commensurate with the training and deployment of the VSF in these areas. Further modifications are likely to result from an evaluation of the CA program underway in early 1968 being conducted by the Research Analysis Corporation for ARPA.*

MISSION AND CONCEPT

(U) (C) The village cadre forms an unofficial link between the villagers and the government by reporting their aspirations and providing a channel for the outlet of their grievances. The CA concept is predicated on the belief that the cadre's role (and success) in these two areas will lead to the development of a strong personal rapport between the cadre and the villagers culminating in the provision to the cadre of information on insurgent identities and activities--the ultimate objective of the program.

(U) (C) If the CA conceptual basis is accurate, the effectiveness of information collection on subversive activities from the villagers is dependent on government response to villager aspirations and grievances; if the villagers can see that the government will take action in response to their aspirations, they will realize the value of continuing to work with the CA cadre in providing him with information on insurgent activities, and even protecting him from the insurgents if necessary. Conversely, if no response to their aspirations is forthcoming over an extended period of time, the villagers may become increasingly reluctant to pass sensitive information to the cadre.

ORGANIZATION

(U) There are three levels at which the CA program operates: village, amphoe, and changwat. Support to the CA effort from the national level comes from a small office within DOLA/MOI. This office is also responsible for providing national-level support to the PAT program, and actually functions under the operational control of CSOC's Civilian Section.

Village Cadre

(U) (C) The CA cadre who works in the village and reports information which he collects from the villagers is the key element supporting the entire program; all the rest of the CA structure exists to receive this information, collate, analyze and file it, and pass it to responsible RTG official who can use it. Each cadre is selected for training by the nai amphoe, based on recommendations from the local kamnan and phuyaiban. After 4 weeks of special training, he returns to his village to begin full-time operations. In March 1968 there were 104 village CA cadres operating in Sakon Nakhon, 34 in Nakhon Phanom, and 20 in Prachuap Khiri Khan.

Amphoe Supervisors

(U) (C) Each amphoe in the CA program has a full-time supervisor assigned to support the village cadres in a variety of ways; some larger amphoes have two supervisors.** The daily village reports are forwarded by messenger in a sealed envelope from the village cadres to the amphoe CA office. There they are grouped and forwarded to the PSC. The amphoe supervisor does not open the village envelopes; however, he may pass to the nai amphoe timely tactical information if verbally advised to do so by the village cadre or his messenger. This kind of information might be a sighting of a CT armed band or the report of CT intentions to attack a government unit; it would not include unverified sensitive information, which is held entirely within the CA system, crosschecked, then passed directly to the governor for his action. The daily report issued by the PSC is sent to the amphoe CA supervisor, who gives it to the nai amphoe.

(U) (C) The amphoe CA men provide logistic and administrative support to the village cadres in their areas. All village cadres visit the amphoe CA office at least once each month to receive their pay. During this visit, the amphoe supervisor reviews the village situation with the village cadre, including subversive developments and new village aspirations and grievances. The two men discuss the cadre's activities, and the session is used to reinforce some

*The information in this section was collected by the RAC researcher who is the principal investigator for this evaluation. To collect this information, several visits were made to Sakon Nakhon to observe the CA program in action. Discussions about the program were held with the changwat governor, deputy governor for security, CPM staff, nai amphoes, deputy nai amphoes for security--and, of course, with the chief of the CA Province Study Center, center staff, CA amphoe supervisors, and several village CA cadres. In addition, this section also draws on information contained in questionnaires completed by each village cadre. A visit was made to the CA training center, and several lengthy discussions were held with the originator of the CA concept (and principal instructor), Mr. Jean Coudoux. The DOLA/MOI office in Bangkok and its Director, Mr. Anob Bochanapaibun, were contacted for their perspective on CA operations.

**In Prachuap Khiri Khan there are no amphoe supervisors; the 20 village cadres report directly to the PSC.

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of the main points of CA training. New reporting requirements might be levied on the village cadre at this time. The identities and activities of insurgent supporters in the village are discussed, and the specific reasons for their being designated as CT supporters by the village cadre are reviewed.

Province Study Center (PSC)

(U) (C) At changwat level in each area in which the CA program is operating, a PSC is organized. This facility is designed to receive the daily reports from the village cadres (through the amphoe forwarding setup). The information is recorded in a series of files and provided to the governor and other officials in the form of a daily CA report for the entire CA changwat. The PSC also issues weekly and special reports on aspirations and subversive activity. Since the major activity of the CA program is information collection and reporting, the description of PSC files and reports is included in the section below on "Activities."

(U) (C) The stated formal organization of the PSC in Sakon Nakhon is shown in Fig. 15, along with the relationship to the center of amphoe CA supervisors and village CA cadres. This organization exemplifies an "ideal" 18-man PSC structure. The PSC in Sakon Nakhon is actually organized somewhat differently from the structure shown in Fig. 15, and its size in March 1968 was 17. Figure 16 illustrates the apparent organization of the Sakon Nakhon center as of that date. As shown in Fig. 16, nearly all PSC members report directly to the chief of the center, with no intervening hierarchy.

(U) In changwats with a smaller number of village CA cadres, such as Nakhon Phanom and Prachuap Khiri Khan, the size of the PSC is commensurately reduced.



(U) Fig 15 AUTHORIZED ORGANIZATION OF THE PSC IN CHANGWAT SAKON NAKHON

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

(U) Fig 16 ACTUAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PSC IN CHANGWAT SAKON NAKHON

LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS

(U) As of March 1968, the program was operating in Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom in the Northeast, operations began in Sakon Nakhon in December 1966 and in Nakhon Phanom in October 1967. (There is also a small CA operation underway in Changwat Prachuap Khiri Khan but since this area is outside the scope of this Northeast CI Manual, activities there will not be discussed in this report.) Figure 17 shows the locations and strengths of the operational village CA cadres in the Northeast by amphoe. These numbers are summarized in Table 18 along with figures for the amphoe and changwat totals.

Criteria for Village Selection

(U) The changwat governor is responsible for selecting the villages in which he desires CA coverage. The objective is to select villages in which the CA cadre can collect a great deal of information on subversive activities. Thus, the ideal village should be located near to an area of insurgent dominance or current operational emphasis, but not be too insecure since the cadre is unarmed and his life may be threatened. Wherever possible, a village is chosen at a trail junction, so that one CA cadre can collect information on more than one village. Location in a village to which the insurgents come for supplies or other support is also desirable. There is a tradeoff between placing cadres in villages with government security forces like PAT or VDC, where the CA man can be protected--and placing them elsewhere in more dangerous locations without security forces to maximize collection coverage.

Insurgent Incidents in CA Villages

(U) An indication of the security-sensitive nature of the villages in which the CA cadres are functioning is the fact that three of them have been killed by the insurgents; in several other cases specific threats against the lives of CA cadres have been issued. As of January 1968, in addition to the three cadres killed by the CTs, another two village cadres were unable to remain in their villages on a continuous basis because of insurgent activity. One of these cadres was in Amphoe Wanon Niwat, and the other in Phanna Nikhom. As of January 1968 a total of approximately 29 village cadres were residing in villages secured by RTG village security elements (usually VDC or PAT). This number varies slightly, depending on the movement of security forces. In several of these villages the CA cadre, for his own protection, actually lives with the unit in its compound.

Village Coverage in Changwat Sakon Nakhon*

(U) Amphoe Muang In Amphoe Muang, there is good village coverage in Tambon Tau Sawi (one

*For security reasons, precise village locations of CA cadres are not included here. The information may be obtained on a need to know basis from the office of Public Safety, USOM-Thailand.

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

(U)

Fig. 1.7 LOCATIONS OF CA CADRE IN CHANGWATS SAKON NAKHON AND NAKHON PHANOM BY AMPHOE

(U)

Table 18

CA LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS BY AMPHOE

LOCATION[a]	PSC	AMPHOE SUPERVISORS	VILLAGE CADRES
Sakon Nakhon			
Muang	17	1	20
Phanna Nikhom		2	14
Wanitchaphum		2	13
Sawang Daen Din		2	29
Wanon Niwat		1	3
Tao Ban		1	11
Akat Amnuay		[illegible]	6
Ban Muang[b]			5
Phang Khon[b]			3
Changwat Total	17	10	104
Nakhon Phanom			
Muang	17		
Pla Pak		2	10
Na Kae		2	24
Changwat Total	17	4	34

a. In security sections, precise locations of CA cadre are not included here.

b. Ban Muang and Phang Khon are separated from Wanon Niwat and Phanna Nikhom [illegible] in an amphoe [illegible]

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of the most sensitive areas of the amphoe), and another group of village CA cadres is located in villages on both sides of the main Sakon Nakhon-Na Kae road in Tambons Tong Khon and Lao Phon Kho. The rest of the cadres in this amphoe are widely scattered in the southern, central, and western parts of the amphoe; only five are located more than a few kilometers north of the main Sakon Nakhon-Na Kae highway (Route 223) which bisects the amphoe. Several CA cadres are located in villages close to the border with Changwat Nakhon Phanom. Of the 20 total cadres in the amphoe, available information indicates that two are located in villages which also had VDC security teams, and another three are located in villages secured by PATs.

(U) (C) Phanna Nikhom. Amphoe Phanna Nikhom, with 14 village CA cadres, has two main areas of concentration. One is Tambon Na Nai, the most sensitive section of the amphoe, where five of the nine villages have resident CA men. The remaining 9 cadres are placed in villages within 5 km of the main Udon-Sakon Nakhon Highway (Route 22) which bisects the amphoe. Four CA villages in Phanna Nikhom have government security elements: two VDC, one PAT, and one with both PAT and VDC.

(U) (C) Waritchaphum. In Amphoe Waritchaphum there is good coverage by the CA program in those villages located in the western areas of the amphoe, in the vicinity of the 0910 Target Areas. Seven of the 1[illegible] CA cadres in this amphoe reside in secured villages, five with VDC in their village and two villages in which PAT security elements are functioning.

(U) (C) Sawang Daen Din. Amphoe Sawang Daen Din, with 29 men assigned, has the largest number of village cadres. Seven of these cadres are located in villages north of the main highway (Route 22), 14 are along the road or just south of it, and the remaining eight are in villages in the southwestern portion of the amphoe. A relatively small number are functioning in the villages near the Phu Pha Lek and Dong Pra Chao government operational areas. Six cadres in this amphoe are operating in villages secured by VDC or PAT armed elements.

(U) (C) Wanon Niwat. Of the three cadre in this amphoe, two operate in villages in Tambon Ta Kla and the other is in Tambon Khua Kai, east of the amphoe seat.

(U) (C) Kut Bak. The 11 cadres in this amphoe provide good overall coverage; many are located in security-sensitive villages. Six of them are in villages secured by PAT or VDC elements.

(U) (C) Ban Muang. The cadres here are in villages along the main trail in the middle of the amphoe where subversive activity was particularly heavy in 1967.

(U) (C) Phang Khon. The three cadres in this amphoe are all in the eastern part near the Phanna Nikhom town.

(U) (C) Akat Amnuoi. Half of the six CA cadres in Amphoe Akat Amnuoi are located in villages on either side of the main road to the south of the amphoe seat. The other three cadres are in widely separated locations, and each appears to be centrally located in a group of several villages. None is located in a village which has government security forces.

PERSONNEL

Recruitment

(U) (C) The program, when initiated in a changwat, recruits personnel first for the PSC. The head of this facility, because of the sensitivity of much of the information for which he is responsible, and because he reports directly to the governor, must be someone in whom the governor can place full trust. After the PSC staff has been recruited and trained, selection of amphoe supervisors and of villagers to be CA cadres can be initiated. All cadres are selected by the governor and the nai amphoe for the area concerned. The nai amphoes rely to a great extent on the kamnans and phuyaibans in their area to recommend good candidates. A team from the PSC is supposed to visit each amphoe to help screen and select candidates.

(U) (C) The selection criteria are that the candidate must be a native of the village in which he is to work, male, between 18 and 55 years of age, and completely trustworthy. He should be a man who is respected by the villagers.

Pay Scales

(U) (C) Those officials responsible for the CA program feel strongly that adequate pay is necessary to maintain high motivation on the part of the village cadres and to attract skilled people into the program at the higher levels. Therefore, the pay scale shown in Table 19 has been established for the CA program.*

*This scale is for Sakon Nakhon; in changwats with a smaller PSC, PSC personnel salaries are lower, but all village cadres receive $500 monthly. CA PAT members receive no extra allowance beyond their regular PAT salary.

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Table 19

CA PROGRAM PAY SCALE
(in baht, month)

PERSONNEL	SALARY (in Baht, Month)
Chief, PSC	2,000
Deputy Chief, PSC	1,800
Section Chief, PSC	1,600
Deputy Section Chief and Field Investigators	1,400
Clerk, PSC	700
Amphoe Supervisor	650
Village Cadre	500

TRAINING

(U) All village CA cadres receive 4 weeks of special training at Camp Suan Son near Hua Hin, Changwat Prachuap Khiri Khan (the same facility used for PAT training). The training consists of four basic curriculum sections, as follows: (1) nature of the CA program and explanation of the cadre's role in the overall program; (2) political and motivational training; (3) information collection techniques, including techniques for interviewing villagers, visual observation, census and survey activities, and relationships with the village population; and (4) reporting techniques, including completion of forms used in the program, processing of reports, drawing sketch maps, and procedures for passing the daily reports to the amphoe supervisors and PSC. Since the CA program uses specific reporting formats to a great extent, much of the training is procedural--which form to use when, how to complete it, and how to collect the necessary information.

(U) Classes in CA training are relatively small, no more than 70 to 80 men. Close attention is paid to individual receptivity to the training, and small evening sessions are held by key instructors and advisers with the trainees to discuss the program and the trainee's role in it. The instructors report that much of the cadres' motivations result from these sessions.

(U) The CA PAT men who serve in the PAT elements in which the team is located at that time, receive a 15-day concentrated course of CA training. The same material is presented in compressed form in this session, which follows the completion of regular PAT training. Further information on CA PAT functions is contained in the section on "Activities." CA VSF men will receive a similar compressed course, following regular VSF training.

ACTIVITIES

Village Cadres

(U) As residents of the villages in which they work, the village cadres live among the people, reside with their families in their own home, and are an integral part of the village. They have no uniform, no weapon, and no radio. In some cases there is no evident change when the cadre joins the village following training; in other villages they are known as government development workers. In no case are the villagers aware of the full extent of the village cadre's responsibilities as a government representative.

(U) The information collected by the village cadres is reported daily to changwat authorities. These daily reports are sent to the PSC using a wide variety of techniques. Except in Amphoe Hua Hin, all village cadres within an amphoe forward their daily reports to the amphoe supervisor, who is then responsible for forwarding to the PSC. Daily reports are entered daily. In Amphoe Hua Hin, some of the cadres send their reports directly to the PSC. Figure 15 shows the flow of information through the CA system.

(U) The village cadres send in their daily reports via messengers. The mode of transport [illegible] depends on the availability of bus, bicycle, motorcycle, and on the distance [illegible] the work site. The messengers must travel to the amphoe [illegible]

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

(U) Fig 18 FLOW OF CA-GENERATED INFORMATION WITHIN THE CHANGWAT

foot; others use a combination of foot and bus to make their daily trip. Often several CA villages are grouped close to one another, and they use one joint messenger to carry all daily reports to the amphoe supervisor. The cadres receive an extra allowance to cover the costs of the messenger, with the amount dependent on the actual costs involved. In many cases the messengers are relatives of the CA cadre.

(U) (c) Initial Actions. When he returns from CA training, the cadre's first job is collection of census information on the village where he is, of course, already known to all of the villagers. In most cases the villagers see the CA man not as a government official, but as their representative vis-a-vis the government regarding village development.* In relationships with the government, he comes "from the people" and not "from the government." This is the reason why he has no weapon, no uniform, and no official status. In some cases, the villagers may be told that the government has tasked the CA cadre to collect census information and villager aspirations so that better, more accurate, and more timely decisions on government development programs can be made. The cadre, in other words, forms a link between the villager and his government for expression by the villager of his wants and desires.

(U) (d) The CA cadre collects information on each family in the village, including size of the family, number of children, ages, sexes, and occupation. Based on this information, he prepares a detailed map of his village, showing the location of every house, plus streams, roads, and other distinctive features. Each house is given a number, and all reports indicate family information by this number designation. This census information is updated periodically by the village cadre.

(U) (e) Information Collection on Subversive Activity. Following initial development of census information, the village cadre begins to develop his sources of information on subversive activity and identity, while continuing to collect information on individual villager's aspirations, wants, needs, desires, and grievances. The cadres use the interview and elicitation techniques they were taught during training. Further discussion of the content of aspirations and grievances collected by the program to date is presented below; this section concentrates on information collected about the insurgency and the subversive infrastructure in the village.

(U) (1) Subversive Movements and Locations. The category of information most frequently reported is that of sightings of subversives and their locations. This reporting on insurgent movements represents a large advance in the availability of this kind of information over what was previously available at changwat level.** Villagers working in the fields may be approached by small groups of insurgents who ask them questions or elicit support; these contacts are reported by the village CA cadre, using identifiable physical or geographic features. The location is translated into UTM map coordinates by the study center. Other villagers may see insurgents in the distance while working in the fields or collecting firewood at the edge of the hills. Their reports often include the number of men seen, a description of their dress, whether or not they had weapons, etc. Some reports indicate the direction in which the group was moving.

*Apparently in most cases this relationship seems to be accepted by the villagers. Several independent sources indicate that in well over half of the CA villages, the cadre is accepted in this role of semiofficial village representative. The current CA Program evaluation will examine this issue in more depth, using interviews with village cadres and other information sources.

**The official in the Changwat Sakon Nakhon CPM who handles all incoming intelligence information estimated that 60 to 80 percent of his information came from the CA program.

CENSUS ASPIRATION CADRES

(U) [illegible] An example of a reported sighting is contained in a CA field report for September 1967. This report from Village [illegible] stated that "[illegible] of suspicious [illegible] was a group of CIs who were concentrating at Ban Nhai Tai, [illegible] southeast of Ban Nhai, [illegible] VD047817." Another report from A [illegible] illustrates [illegible] reporting on the movement of insurgent elements. This report stated that:

> Village CA cadre 0012 has learned from a source that on [illegible], eight strangers, dressed like soldiers yet some wearing rubber slippers and others wearing shoes, [illegible] with NLF weapons, entered Ban Nhai Khaen Nai. They walked about in the village and then proceeded to Ba Nhai Khaen Tai, 5 kms (about 200 meters) west of Ban Nhai Khaen Nai. The source followed them and found they had stayed at Ban Nhai Khaen Tai until 2400, when they departed toward the southeast.

(U) [illegible] Another report, this time from A [illegible] is illustrative of CA reporting on insurgent locations. This report, dated 1 September 1967, states that:

> Village CA cadre 0302 learned from a reliable source, a native of Ban Nhai Tasy, Tachom Sawang Daen Din, (FN9419), that there were about 40 CIs, including 10 women, who have a base camp at Khe Phae Kor in place where water oozes from the ground, located about [illegible] km east of Ban Ning Thum (4426). The CIs live on food supplied them by people from the Sawang Daen Din municipal market, which is taken to them by Vietnamese truck riders who load tree bags [illegible]. This CI base camp is reached by the road used by the Vietnamese lumberjacks of Sawang Daen Din. Before reaching the camp, there are about 20 men serving as guards and as sentries to receive the provisions. Guards were stationed under the cover of hanging vines in the big trees along the road. Upon arrival of the trucks, the guards give the following signals: (a) during dark they would cry like an owl, (b) during daylight they would cry like a bird. During daylight hours, the CIs would disperse to various positions; some are disguised as woodcutters, while others stayed with people who are caring for cattle or working in the fields.

(U) [illegible] Using this detailed information on CI sightings and locations, the PSC derives maps showing apparent insurgent movement patterns; these [illegible] are included each week in an attachment to the weekly report. These present an interesting [illegible] of insurgent movement throughout [illegible]. However, [illegible] insurgent locations has been extremely limited. Although the CA reports [illegible] timely, the lack of response [illegible], the problems of command and control [illegible] their use, and the constraints placed on local village security forces with respect to responding to such CA-generated information all contribute to this result. Airmobile and [illegible] operations have been initiated [illegible] study of the patterns [illegible] as seen in CA reporting. The information [illegible] intelligence base [illegible] locations and activities has grown greatly, but [illegible] government response [illegible] commensurately.

(U) [illegible] Supervisor Identities. The village [illegible] information on the activities [illegible] Village [illegible]. These reports may describe in [illegible] the village [illegible] Some CA reports [illegible] government [illegible] main [illegible] government [illegible].

(U) [illegible] As of mid-September 1967, a total [illegible] meetings had taken place in CA [illegible]. In all of these cases the [illegible] usually [illegible] in his house. [illegible] were killed as the CIs, the village [illegible] cadre at the time [illegible].

(U) [illegible] Supervisor Identities. Another [illegible] identified in the village CA cadres [illegible] with the identities of insurgent [illegible] in his village. The daily CA reports [illegible] village intelligence [illegible] the governor for his [illegible] identities are passed to the governor for his [illegible] these people for [illegible].

(U) [illegible] One frequent problem is the [illegible] identification by the village cadre and [illegible] the cadre [illegible] killed in a [illegible]. A killed [illegible] information to the [illegible] such a train incident apparently led to the murder of [illegible] Anpone Thong, [illegible] with [illegible].

(U) [illegible] A list [illegible] insurgent [illegible] and supporters [illegible] interesting [illegible] information [illegible] the village [illegible] of the villages [illegible].

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Table 20

VILLAGES IN SAKON NAKHON WITH CA ASSIGNED IN WHICH FORCED PROPAGANDA MEETINGS HAVE OCCURRED

LOCATION (Village/Tambon/Amphoe)	DATE/TIME	DESCRIPTION
B. Tanton T. Ton Naeng A. Sawang Daen Dir	23 Jan 1945	Approx. 64 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food, shot and killed schoolteacher. CA cadre hid in his house, CTs unaware of his presence in village.
B. Huai Huat T. Tau Ngoi A. Muang	16 Mar	Approx. 50 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food, captured village CA cadre and phuyaiban and killed them outside village.
B. Lao Phan Kho T. Lao Phun Kho A. Muang	30 Mar	Approx. 200 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food, seized radio from Kamnan's house and medical supplies from village public health station. Village CA cadre hid in his house.
B. Muang Khom T. Tau Ngoi A. Muang	4 Apr	Approx. 200 CTs, including seven women, closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food, village CA cadre hid in his house.
B. Na Tan T. Tau Ngoi A. Muang	6 Apr	Approx. 200 CTs, including seven women, closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food, seized weapon and hand grenade from PAT member while village CA cadre slipped away from village.
B. Na Ang T. Tau Ngoi A. Muang	9 Apr	Approx. 200 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food, shot and killed two villagers. Village CA cadre slipped away from village and reported directly to PSC.
B. Nong Khrang T. Tau Ngoi A. Muang	11 Apr 1600	Approx. 130 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food, they did not know identity of CA cadre.
B. Huay Hip T. Tong Khon A. Muang	22 Apr 1830	Approx. 40 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food. Village CA cadre hid in his house, CTs unaware of his identity.
B. Huay Khoen T. Tong Khon A. Muang	24 Apr 1730	Approx. 50 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food. They clashed with VDC and PAT element, and captured two PAT members. CTs seized their boots and a hand grenade and released them. Village CA cadre slipped away.
B. Chan Pen & B. Bung Sa T. Tau Ngoi A. Muang	26 Apr 1530	Approx. 114 CTs, including 12 women, closed these two nearby villages, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food. Village CA cadre slipped away.
B. Lao T. Lao Phan Khu A. Muang	20 May 2000	Approx. 200 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food. Village CA cadre had resigned in Apr 67 to receive PAT training.
B. Nong Kho T. Na Mong A. Kut Bak	31 May 1730	Approx. 200 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food, they did not know identity of village CA cadre.
B. Phak Kham Phu T. Na Nai A. Phanna Nikhom	4 Jun 1700	Approx. 200 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food, they took village CA cadre and his messenger and totally stabbed them outside the village.
B. Bua T. Kut Bak A. Kut Bak	10 Jun 1700	Approx. 150 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food. Village CA cadre slipped away from village.
B. Kho Noi T. Kut Bak A. Kut Bak	18 Jun 1500	Approx. 200 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food. Local schoolteacher fought with CTs, killed two of them and captured an M3, M1, and three hand grenades. CA cadre slipped away.
B. Nong Kho T. Na Mong A. Kut Bak	10 Jul 1900	Approx. 150 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food. Village CA cadre slipped away prior to entry of CTs.

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CENSUS ASPIRATION CADRES

(U)

LOCATION (Village Tambon Amphoe)	DATE TIME	DESCRIPTION
B. Na Ngoi T. Tau Ngoi A. Muang	13 Jul 1965	Approx. 80 CTs, including 20 women, closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food. Village CA cadre slipped away prior to entry of CTs.
B. Huay Khoen T. Tong Khon A. Muang	15 Aug 1900	Approx. 60 CTs, including 13 women, closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food. Village CA cadre slipped away prior to entry of CTs.
B. In Ploeng T. Khu Sakham A. Wanon Niwat	30 Aug 0200	Approx. 50 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food, captured village CA cadre and totally stabbed him outside village.
B. Wan T. Khu Sakham A. Wanon Niwat	9 Sep 1900	Approx. 100 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food. Village CA cadre slipped away.
B. Na Tae T. Khom Ta Klo A. Wanon Niwat	10 Sep 1900	Approx. 35 CTs closed village, held meeting, forced villagers to provide food. Village CA cadre slipped away prior to entry of CTs.

*Other sources indicate that during some of these forced village meetings, the CTs paid for the food taken from the villagers, the data shown here imply that all food was obtained by force.

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average number of days which elapsed between the report and the pickup was 20, the most rapid reaction was 3 days, and the longest gap was 42 days.

(U) (C) Subversive Intentions. Another kind of information which may be collected by the village cadres deals with the intentions of the insurgents. A villager may report that a group of CTs stopped him in the fields and asked the way to village "X", or the strength of a government unit at village "Y". Another villager may have a relative with the insurgents; it is possible that this relative might tell the villager of insurgent plans, and the villager might pass this information on to a village CA cadre. An example of CA reporting on subversive intentions is contained in a report from Sawang Daen Din dated 11 October 1967. This report states:

> Village CA cadre 0018 learned from source 1-12-5 that on 10th October, a villager from Ban Song Paen, Tambon Waeng (UTS 102640), told the source and the villagers of Ban Song Paen that "I know all VDC locations and am searching for the people who cooperate with the government. I will lead CTs to kill them soon. Any person who cooperates will be killed. I go to Ban Khok Klang every day in order to train people to take over the government."

(U) (C) Aspirations. As noted earlier, the CA program collects from the villagers information on their aspirations, needs, and desires. As with information on the insurgent situation, this information is forwarded on a daily basis by the village CA cadres to the PSC. However, information on aspirations may also be passed directly at the village level from the CA cadre to the phuyaiban, who reports it through the local administrative chain of command to the kamnan and nai amphoe for their action (see Fig. 18). This procedure makes the information available also to the tambon and amphoe community level government workers, so that they could perhaps take appropriate action or modify priorities already established for their efforts.

(U) (C) The CA program divides aspirations into two basic categories: individual aspirations of the villagers and collective aspirations of the entire village. This division is made to focus government response, either in terms of development projects and construction of village-wide facilities to satisfy collective aspirations, or provision of desired commodities or services to a particular villager to satisfy an individual aspiration.

(U) (C) The kinds of aspirations reported by CA cadres in Sakon Nakhon are shown in Table 21, which summarizes aspirations reported from 109 villages over the period 1 March to 30 November 1967. As indicated, more villages have requested wells than any other single item, with blankets a close second, and roads a distinct third. The statistics indicate that about half of all CA villages have desired wells and blankets.

(U) (C) It is important to note that village and villager aspirations as reported by the CA system do not necessarily reflect a real picture of true village needs and wants. The program has emphasized reporting by the village CA cadre of items for which there may possibly be a government response forthcoming. This explains the large amount of reporting on blankets and seeds,

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PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS

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Table 21

ASPIRATIONS REPORTED THROUGH THE CA PROGRAM IN SAKON NAKHON
1 Mar to 30 Nov 67

ITEM REQUESTED	NUMBER OF VILLAGES FROM WHICH REQUEST HAS BEEN REPORTED	TOTAL QUANTITY REQUESTED
Collective		
Wells	54	56
Roads	30	31
Dams	13	14
Movies and similar entertainment	12	13
Bridges	5	6
Local schools	5	5
Toilets	4	9
Health Centers	3	6
Community Centers	1	1
Sermon Halls	1	1
Individual		
Blankets	50	688
Seeds	25	747 (requests)
Medicines and medical care	22	30 (requests)
Fertilizer	19	2,545 kg (432 requests)
Student uniforms	7	46
Clothing	6	27
Animal vaccine	1	8 (requests)
Cement	1	30 pks

which were likely to be available, as opposed to educational advancement, improved communications, rural electrification, or other similar projects which might be desired by the villagers but which seemed unlikely to be fulfilled by the government. Therefore, use of this information for research on actual village aspirations is severely constrained.

(U) As noted earlier, government response to the aspirations reported by the CA program has been negligible in most cases and nonexistent in others. The only requests to which response was at all adequate during 1967 were those for blankets and seeds, and this was true only because CA officials themselves managed to obtain the desired items. Reportedly, the requests for blankets and/or seeds have been filled in 65 villages. In nearly all cases the request for construction of a road or dam or for a new village well went unfilled. There are indications, however, that the response to CA-reported aspirations will be improved in 1968.

(U) Grievances. Collection of information on villager grievances by the village CA cadres and reporting it through the CA system for appropriate action by the government forms a vital element in the overall CA effort. This activity is an integral part of the CA concept, which calls for the village cadre to act as a link between the villagers and their government for satisfaction of their aspirations and mitigation of their grievances. These actions, according to the concept, enhance the ability of the village cadre to collect information on subversive identities and activities, his primary mission. The creation through the CA program of a reliable and unique structure for reporting villager grievances to governmental authorities who will, hopefully, take appropriate action is very important in creating the psychological climate best suited to optim functioning of the village cadre.

(U) Special Handling. S the information collected by the village CA cadres on villager grievances is often very sensitive, special channels have been established to ensure its secure handling and distribution. Often the cadre will personally bring the information to the PSC and report it orally to the chief of the study center. When he elects to include it in a

written report, it is sent with the regular daily report to the PSC via the amphoe CA supervisor. As with the normal daily report, the information arrives at amphoe in a sealed envelope, which the amphoe supervisor does not open; thus, he is unaware that it contains grievance information. Upon arrival at the PSC, the information is passed directly to the officer who handles villager grievances, and goes from him to the chief of the center. The chief may decide that verification of the information is required; if none is required, or once it is completed, the information is sent to the governor in a special report. The information goes only to the governor; no other copies of this report are disseminated. Grievance information is not included in the regular daily or weekly CA reports,* nor is it included in the regular village book or village file. Separate files are kept for grievance information, with access restricted to the grievance officer and center chief.

(U) (C) Verification. At times the CA study center chief will decide that the information reported is so important--or so unlikely--that it must be independently verified prior to informing the governor. To a great extent this seems to depend on the previous reporting record of the village cadre and the faith which the center chief is prepared to place in his report. The chief may verify the report himself, by interviewing the village cadre at length, or even by actually visiting the area of the reported incident. More frequently, a field investigation cadre from the PSC would be sent to investigate the report and prepare an independent evaluation. The amphoe CA supervisor might be asked to participate in the verification, but this reportedly seldom occurs.

(U) (C) Volume and Kinds of Reports. It is difficult to make an accurate estimate of the volume of reports being handled as grievances by the CA program. In Sakon Nakhon the monthly volume seems to range between about 8 and 25 reports per month.

(U) (C) There are several different kinds of reports included by the CA structure under the category of "grievances." The most sensitive category deals with misbehavior of local government officials and security units. Some examples follow: a member of a local security unit drank too much liquor and fired his weapon in the village; a local telegraph office was overcharging the villagers for all its services; a village teacher was refusing to hold classes; local officials were sponsoring illegal gambling activities; and an official was extorting money from a local merchant.

(U) (C) Another grievance category deals with misbehavior by villagers themselves. Some wealthy villagers were reported to "act like officials" and take advantage of others in the village. In another case, a villager was reported to be taking land that was not rightfully his. Some villagers from a neighboring village were prohibiting local villagers from cutting lumber in a nearby area, but were doing so themselves.

(U) (C) A good number of the reports cite the activities of thieves in stealing chickens, cattle, or other livestock. Other reports deal with the villagers' desire for protection from local insurgents.

(U) (C) Other grievances deal with natural events, such as "caterpillars are eating my rice" or an epidemic of illness among cattle in the village. Sometimes, such reports are listed as "aspirations," in that the villagers desire vaccine or spray; at other times they are listed simply as "grievances" or gripes on the part of the villagers.

(U) (C) Additional kinds of grievances are directed at the liquor laws and forestry regulations. Villagers complain of inequities in the implementation of these rules, which stop them from engaging in activity which they consider justified.

(U) (C) Actions Taken in Response to CA Grievance Information. As noted above, special handling procedures for this information have been created to inform the changwat governor directly of the grievance being reported. It is up to the governor to take whatever action he deems appropriate. The PSC is not necessarily informed of the action taken and considers its responsibilities ended with the forwarding of the information to the governor.

(U) (C) In some cases it is known from follow-up reports from the village CA cadre that the activity reported as a grievance has ceased. In a few cases, in fact, the village cadre was threatened by the perpetrator of the offense, but no action was taken by these officials against the CA man. (These cases occurred in the early days of the program in Sakon Nakhon before the handling of grievance information was tightened by instituting special procedures.) In one case, in which the grievance was that the villagers could not remain in their village because they were afraid of the CTs, the government provided them with free land elsewhere and 10 families voluntarily relocated.

*This is true for Sakon Nakhon. In Nakhon Phanom, however, grievance information is included in the daily and weekly PSC reports

Province Study Center (PSC)

(U) (C) The PSC receives the daily reports from village CA cadres (in most cases, through the amphoe CA supervisors), organizes the information, records it, analyzes it (a function really beginning to receive emphasis only in late 1967), and reports it to interested clients (especially the changwat governor) in the form of a daily report.

(U) (C) Receipt and Internal Flow of Information. The village CA cadres file daily reports on their village and the surrounding area, recording any new information on the subversive situation, village aspirations, and villager grievances. These daily reports are received in the PSC, where the information is broken down into appropriate categories for filing, analysis, and further reporting. Figure 19 illustrates the flow of information within the PSC.



(U) (C) Fig 19 FLOW OF CA-GENERATED INFORMATION WITHIN THE PSC

(U) (C) All daily reports from the village CA cadres are received at Station 1 on Fig. 19, where they are stamped with a control number and immediately distributed to officials responsible for CT movement, villager aspirations, and villager grievances (Stations 2, 3, and 4 on Fig. 19, respectively). The information on CT movements and subversive activity is rewritten into Central Thai at Station 2, then passed to the PSC chief (Station 3) for his review. It is then returned to Station 2 for inclusion in the PSC's daily report. The daily report prepared by Station 2 also includes inputs from Stations 3 and 6 Grievance information is not included in the daily report.

(U) (C) The information on aspirations is rewritten into Central Thai at Station 3, passed to the center chief (Station 5), and then returned to Station 2 for inclusion in the daily report. Grievances flow into Station 4, where they are rewritten and passed to the study center chief. Once approved for distribution, they are set forth in one copy of a separate letter to the governor; however, these grievance reports are not included in the daily or weekly reports, nor are they filed with the regular information on the village.

(U) (C) CA/PAT reports from the CA/PAT members go directly to Station 6, where they are entered, sent to the PSC chief, and then forwarded to Station 2 for inclusion in the regular daily report. For the CA weekly report, however, these reports are compiled by Station 6 into a CA/PAT separate weekly report, which is submitted as part of, but a distinct entity within, the combined weekly CA report.

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(U) Station 7 prepares the weekly report based on information in the daily reports and the CA/PAT weekly reports prepared by Station 6.

(U) Reports Issued by the PSC. The center issues several kinds of reports, each serving a somewhat different purpose. Six different report categories may be identified as follows: (1) daily report, (2) emergency or immediate reports, (3) in-depth reports, (4) weekly reports, (5) summary weekly report, and (6) special grievance report.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Daily Report. The daily report issued by the PSC provides a summary by amphoe of the information contained in the reports received that day from the village CA cadres and CA/PAT members. The report includes information on CT movements and activities and on village aspirations.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The original copy of the daily report is sent to the changwat governor and a copy is sent to each of the following:

PSC Village File

PSC Tambon File

PSC Amphoe File

PSC Changwat File

Each Nai Amphoe (through the CA amphoe supervisor)

Changwat Palad-Security

Changwat CPM

Mayor of Sakon Nakhon Town

PSC Weekly Report Desk

American Advisor*

(U) ~~(C)~~ The copy of the CA daily report sent to the governor is endorsed by him with his orders for alerting other members of the changwat staff or other specific persons to the information contained in the report. The original is then returned to the PSC, which notifies the changwat officers by letter of the governor's comments on the daily report.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Emergency Report. When information comes into the PSC which is so vital that it should come to the immediate attention of the governor, it is sent with a cover letter declaring it of emergency value. (These reports are not later included in the daily report, since they have already been seen by the governor.) Such reports are usually generated by a personal visit to the PSC on the part of the village CA cadre who has collected some time-sensitive information. The cadre is usually debriefed in person by the chief of the PSC.

(U) ~~(C)~~ In-Depth Report. The PSC will produce an in-depth report on special subjects, such as a forced propaganda meeting or unusual actions or movements of the insurgents. These reports are usually based on the work of a field investigator and written by the PSC chief. It is planned that the PSC will do more analysis in 1968 than it did in 1967, particularly analysis of insurgent activity patterns; if so, this should result in an increased number of in-depth reports.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Weekly Report. The three basic elements which make up the CA weekly report are information on CT movements and insurgent activity, information on village and villager aspirations, and CA/PAT information (this section of the report is prepared separately). The report is basically a repetition of individual items cited in the daily reports, but usually also includes a brief compilation of aspirations or CT movements reported during the week and analytical comments by the chief of the PSC on the past week's activities and apparent trends in the general situation in the changwat. No new village information is reported in the weekly report. Beginning in late 1967 the weekly report has been accompanied by a map showing all CT movements reported during the week, the size of the group reported, and the direction in which it was moving.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The distribution of the CA weekly report is as follows:

Changwat Governor (1 copy)

PSC Files (1 copy)

American Advisor (1 copy)*

PAT/CA Office, DOIA, Bangkok (1 copy)

CSOC Headquarters, Bangkok (2 copies through CPM channels)

*This copy is translated into English and copies of the translation are filed in the advisor's office in Sakon Nakhon and the office of the PAT/CA advisor in Bangkok.

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(U) (C) Summary Weekly Report. Prior to completion of the regular weekly CA report, a brief summary report is prepared and submitted to the changwat CPM in one copy; no other distribution is regularly made of this report. Preparation of this report was initiated in November 1967 at the request of the governor; the report apparently contains only information on CT movements, not aspirations.

(U) (C) Special Grievance Report. Information on villager grievances is not reported in the standard daily and weekly CA reports. It is submitted to the governor in a separate letter. This process is discussed above.

(U) (C) Other Distribution of CA Information. The direct distribution for CA reports lacks two important recipients: RTA Second Army Headquarters-Forward, located in Sakon Nakhon, and the Joint Security Center (JSC-4) in Udon. The Army Headquarters, with an overall responsibility for counterinsurgency suppression operations in Northeast Thailand, has an apparent requirement for rapid and complete receipt of all CA-generated information on CT movements and insurgent activity in and around CA villages. However, the PSC does not disseminate its reports directly to the RTA, relying on the Sakon Nakhon Changwat CPM to incorporate CA information in its daily report, which does go to the RTA.*

(U) (C) JSC-4 in Udon, responsible for regional intelligence collation and processing in several changwats, including Sakon Nakhon, would also seem a logical recipient of CA information. It does not, however, receive directly either the daily or weekly CA reports. The American advisors to the CA program in Sakon Nakhon, to circumvent this problem area, pass a copy of the translated daily report to the American advisors at JSC-4, who then use the information with their Thai counterparts in Udon.

(U) (C) Information on CT movements near the borders of the changwat would appear to be of vital interest to the governors, CPMs, and police elements in adjacent changwats. No formal channels seem to exist to pass CA information of this kind on a timely basis. In the case of Nakhon Phanom, where there is another CA study center, passage of the information may be effected directly via this route. However, for Udon, Kalasin, and Nong Khai, it is up to the Sakon Nakhon CPM to pass the information to the appropriate CPM.

(U) PSC Files. The PSC maintains a large amount of data divided into various categories in which the CA information may usefully be stored for retrieval purposes. Records of the PSC are maintained in three separate ways: (1) in files, grouping together a variety of papers and reports; (2) as handwritten books; and (3) as special village books.

(U) (C) The Files. There are 14 different kinds of files kept by the PSC, as follows:

1. The village folders, containing the daily reports for each CA village.

2. The tambon folders, containing the daily reports grouped by tambon.

3. The amphoe folders, containing the daily reports [illegible]ed by amphoe.

4. A changwat folder, containing the original copies of the daily report sent to the governor, with his written comments and notes for action.

5. An incoming correspondence folder, for all correspondence to the governor's office

6. An outgoing correspondence folder, for all correspondence to the governor's office.

7. An outgoing correspondence folder, for all other outgoing correspondence (e.g., to a nai amphoe or an amphoe CA supervisor).

8. An emergency reports folder.

9. An in-depth reports folder.

10. A weekly reports folder.

11. A summary weekly reports folder.

12. A folder for all grievance information sent to the governor.

13. Folders of CA/PAT reports, filed by village.

14. A folder for all office memos.

* Several spot-checks have indicated that CA information was being passed accurately to the Second Army in this manner. Timeliness, however, was less encouraging, with several days passing between the original CA report and the notification of Second Army via the changwat CPM

(U) ~~(C)~~ The Handwritten Books. There are 10 different kinds of handwritten books, logs, or similar records maintained by the PSC, as follows:

1. The entry log for all village CA reports, listing a summary of information only.

2. The entry log for all CA/PAT reports, listing the entire message.

3. The CA movement log, listing each complete report.

4. The aspirations log, listing each complete report.

5. The grievance log, listing each complete report submitted to the governor.

6. A daily log of activities of the PSC, including visits of PSC officials outside the office.

7. A log of all field investigation activity conducted by either of the two PSC field investigators, along with the findings and results of the investigation

8. A log of all government actions taken against the insurgents based on CA reports.

9. A log of all forced village propaganda meetings reported by village CA cadres.

10. A log listing all aspirations fulfilled by distribution of commodities.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The center also keeps several books of names cited in the CA reports. The names are listed chronologically, along with details relating to the individual cited. These name books are as follows:

1. A record of all Vietnamese names noted in the daily report.

2. A record of all people who have joined the jungle soldiers, from those villages in which there are village CA cadres.

3. A record of all people who have joined the jungle soldiers from villages which do not have resident village CA cadres.

4. A record (with photos) of all insurgents or insurgent supporters captured or arrested, (or who defected to the government) who were previously cited in a village CA report, and who were confined in the Sala Klang jail in Muang Sakon Nakhon.

5. A record of all other captured or surrendered insurgents, subjects of CA reports, who were not sent to the Sala Klang jail.

6. A record of all informants who have offered information to the village CA cadres.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The Village Books. Maintenance of village books is a major effort of the PSC. These books are maintained on each village in the CA program and contain a great wealth of information on the village, as reported by the resident cadre. The information contained in the village books includes the following:

1. A map showing the locations of all houses in the village, with each house identified by number. The map also shows major physical features in and near the village, such as streams or roads. An overlay to this map depicts the houses of identified insurgent supporters in the village. The map is always located inside the front cover of the village book.

2. Village statistics, including population, economics, number of families, religions, schools, and government facilities.

3. Long-range aspirations of the village, requiring government development projects.

4. Personal aspirations of the villagers, requiring individual government assistance.

5. Village residents by family group, listing each village resident. This item also includes a notation of the loyalty of the person to the government or to the insurgents, or his ambivalence toward both.

6. Persons in the village who have been praised or rewarded by the government.

7. Persons in the village who are respected by the villagers.

8. Well-educated persons residing in the village.

9. Government actions which have been taken in the village. This may include education activities, wells, health programs, or other government programs.

10. Government officials who have evidenced "bad behavior" in the village.

11. Government officials who are disliked by the villagers.

12. Poor families in the village.

13. Wealthy families in the village.

14. Families who have been victims of insurgent actions.

15. Families who have members working for the government, at any level.

16. Surrendered insurgents or insurgent supporters now residing in the village.

17. Families who have received aid and assistance from the insurgents.

18. Families who support the insurgents.

19. Insurgents who might possibly be recruited to work for the government.

20. Persons who are ambivalent and waver between the government and the insurgents.

21. Insurgents active in the vicinity of the village.

22. Insurgents active outside the general vicinity of the village, but who have families living in the village.

23. Insurgents residing in the village.

(U) Activities of CA/PAT

(U) (C) Each of the PATs trained in Thailand has one member who has also received training as a CA representative. This man is often termed a "mobile CA" because he functions as an information collector and reporter wherever his team is stationed, as opposed to the "static" or regular CA cadre who operates at all times in his own home village. The CA/PAT undergoes an abbreviated version of the regular CA training in 15 days.

(U) (C) The CA/PAT members are each supposed to submit a daily report to the PSC. This report is usually submitted by messenger to the amphoe CA cadre who forwards it to the PSC. However, in several cases CA/PAT reporting is sporadic and irregular.* The report may be supplemented by a radio message from the team on the same subject, but this does not occur in every case. The CA/PAT reports at the PSC are incorporated directly into the overall daily report issued by the CA center. In the weekly report, however, they are included as a separate annex.

(U) (C) CA/PAT reporting responsibilities are similar to those of the regular village CA cadres. However, the CA/PAT members report primarily insurgent movements, with much less reporting on the local insurgent infrastructure and subversive infrastructure in the village. Officials of the CA study center stated their belief that only long-term residents of a village, like the village CA cadre, could ferret out much detailed information on the CT infrastructure. Some reporting comes to the PSC from CA/PAT members on villager aspirations and grievances, but this is quite limited in volume. The volume of their reporting on CT movements is quite extensive, however, comparable to the output of the village CA cadres.

(U) (C) In essence, the CA/PAT man is equivalent to an intelligence specialist within his village security team. He has received special training in information collection and reporting and on relations with the people. Each evening he is supposed to debrief all team members on the day's activities, eliciting any information of intelligence value. He encourages PAT members to collect information from the villagers.

*The CA PAT receives no additional money beyond his PAT salary. Some of those who report infrequently claim they should be given extra money for their extra responsibilities.

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CENSUS ASPIRATION CADRES

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

(U) The CA program relates closely to many other ongoing programs and organizations in Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom [illegible] the CA effort has been underway for a much longer time in the former changwat, most examples of interrelationships come from this experience.

(U) (c) Figure 20 illustrates some of the other organizations with which the CA program relates. Primarily, these relationships involve the flow of CA information to the other elements and their response to the information provided. They may be divided into relationships concerning CA reports of subversive activity, locations and identities, and reports of village aspirations. Grievances fall into a separate category, handled directly by the governor with the agency concerned.



(U) Fig 20 FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE CA PROGRAM AND OTHER CHANGWAT-LEVEL ELEMENTS

Relationships with Changwat Governor

(U) (d) This official fulfills a key role in the conduct of the CA program. The CA operation falls directly under his personal supervision, and the chief of the PSC reports directly to him. All PSC daily reports are sent to the governor, who reads them and adds instructions for action by ministry representatives in response to the CA information. The governor is responsible, in conjunction with the nai amphoes, for selecting the villages from which CA cadres will be recruited and for approving the actual candidates chosen. Flow of CA information to the Second Army Forward headquarters in Sakon Nakhon, to adjacent changwats and to ISC-4 in Udon depends on the governor and his CPM staff. Without the full and active support of the changwat governor, the CA program could not function properly.

Relationships with Changwat Security Elements

(U) (e) All CA information dealing with movements, locations, activities, and identities is passed to the appropriate security elements for their action. Regularly included in Sakon Nakhon are the following organizations: (1) the CPM (which receives a copy of the PSC daily report); (2) the central point at changwat level for CPM, PAT, and VSO in Sakon Nakhon--the palad changwat for security [illegible] of the daily report), (3) the changwat Provincial Police; and [illegible] the RTA Second Army Forward headquarters. The latter facilities receive CA information [illegible] the changwat [illegible] Amphoe-level police, CPM, PAT, and VSO elements may receive CA information either from their higher headquarters at changwat level, or from the local nai amphoe, [illegible] direct receipt of tactical-type information

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[illegible] from the CA amphoe supervisor to the nai amphoe for immediate reaction at [illegible] level, prior to forwarding to the PSC. This practice occurs fairly infrequently, however, and the usual chain of information flow is from the CA village cadre through the amphoe supervisor to the PSC, which then prepares the CA center daily report for distribution.

Relationships with Changwat Development Elements

(U) Relationships with development organizations within the changwat primarily involve the passing of CA information on village and villager aspirations. Hopefully, these organizations will be able to respond rapidly to these reported aspirations; however, in practice response has been either negligible or nonexistent. The organizations most often involved in this process would seem to be the following: ARD, CD, Health, Agriculture, Livestock, Education, Irrigation, plus the MRCs, MITs, and Psyops (MAVU) teams for action in their special areas of expertise. Interrelationships between the CA program and these development elements primarily occur at changwat level between the PSC and the ministry representative concerned--for example, the changwat CD officer. This changwat representative would then pass orders for appropriate action to his field agencies at amphoe level or below. After the governor sees the daily reports and includes his notations for agency action, the CA PSC communicates directly with the organization concerned to inform them of the village aspiration reported and of the governor's desires for response.

Relationships at the National Level

(U) As a source of information, the CA program relates with several organizations in the Northeast above changwat level, especially Second Army Forward headquarters and JSCC-NE. Neither of these [illegible] is a direct recipient of the PSC daily report, however, and reliance is placed on intermediate agencies to ensure timely passage of CA information.

(U) In Bangkok the program is supported by an element of DOLA, which actually functions under the operational control of CSOC's Civilian Section. As a result, major program decisions are made jointly by DOLA and CSOC. Within the RTG at Bangkok-level, only CSOC and DOLA are directly concerned with the functioning of the CA program; response to CA reporting by the many other agencies concerned seems to occur only at changwat level and below. These two agencies are the only ones in Bangkok to receive the PSC reports (weekly--but not daily).

Relationships at the Village Level

(U) Within the villages in which they work, the CA cadres relate directly with the other RTG organizations and programs also operating in the vicinity. However, these relationships seem to vary greatly between individual village cadres, depending on how open the cadre chooses to be with other government officials about the information and about the full extent of his information collection role. Usually contact is kept to a minimum in order to protect the CA [illegible] that [illegible] passes to the local [illegible] on village and villager aspirations. On rare occasions, the village [illegible] passes to local armed security elements information which he collects on subversive elements in the area. In any event, the presence of a PAT, VDC, VSO, RTA, or police element in the CA man's village will provide him with increased personal security from communist reprisal.

Special Relationship with PAT Program

(U) The CA program and the PAT program are closely related within the RTG and both receive American support. The reporting activities of the CA-trained PAT members were described above. Information from these PAT members flows into the PSC, where it is incorporated into the center's reports. Both CA cadres and PAT members have been trained at the same facility, Camp [illegible] at [illegible], and the relationship between village CA cadres and PATs working in their [illegible] villages generally seems closer than the relationship between the CA man and a local RTA, VSO, police, or Army security element.

PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

(U) As of March 1968 several important changes in the CA program were under consideration. These changes are designed to improve the program, expand it, and incorporate additional information sources from new programs, such as VSF.

Program Improvements

(U) The organization and functioning of the CA study centers are under examination to determine [illegible] in which they can be improved. Changes should simplify record keeping and reporting [illegible], and provide the capability for increased collation and analysis of information reported to the PSC by the CA cadres.

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(U) (C) In some cases changes may be made to improve the cost effectiveness of the program. For example, the cost of receiving daily reports from the CA/PAT members by messengers seems excessive when it is realized that: (1) the PATs all have radios which could be used to report tactically perishable information and (2) the information being reported by the CA/PATs on a daily basis is seldom used for immediate armed response.

(U) (C) Government response to the village and individual aspirations reported by the CA program has been very poor during 1967, in most cases practically nonexistent. There are indications that this performance will be improved during 1968. Late in 1967, following a seminar held for all village CA cadres in Sakon Nakhon, the Director-General of DOLA indicated a personal interest in solving this problem and developing an effective RTG capability to respond to these aspirations. Early in 1968 a meeting was held in Sakon Nakhon of all ministry representatives concerned with development and village improvement. This meeting, chaired by the palad changwat for development, discussed the problem of responding to CA-reported aspirations. Future actions by all these officials should do much to improve the situation.

(U) The CA program is currently the subject of analysis and evaluation by ARPA and the Research Analysis Corporation. The results of this research are likely to involve other program modifications, many designed to exploit the information gathering potential of this program, which is now not being fully tapped

Incorporation of New Sources of Information

(U) (C) It is planned that each new VSF team will have one man trained as a CA reporter, similar to the "mobile CA" in each current PAT element. These VSF members, trained for 15 days in the techniques and responsibilities of the CA program, will report--probably weekly--on the aspirations and grievances of local villagers and on insurgent movements and identities in the areas in which their team is working.

(U) (C) The priority changwats for the VSF program are: Sakon Nakhon, Udon, and Kalasin in the Northeast; and Prachuap Khiri Khan in the mid-South. CA/VSF reporting in the first and fourth of these changwats will add to the information already flowing into the existing CA study centers. In Udon and Kalasin, new CA centers will have to be created to receive information from the CA/VSF members and from new village CA cadres possibly trained for these areas during 1968.

Program Expansion

(U) (C) It is likely that the CA program will be expanded during 1968. Plans call for some 25-30 more village cadres to be selected and trained for Sakon Nakhon to complete program coverage in that sensitive changwat. An additional 40-50 village cadres in Nakhon Phanom will be added for the same reason, while more cadres may be added in Prachuap Khiri Khan as well. New changwats in the Northeast may be added to the CA program, probably commensurate with the training and deployment of the VSF in these areas.

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VILLAGE RADIO SYSTEM

SUMMARY

(U) The Village Radio System (VRS) is placing FM-1 and FM-5 radios at amphoe and tambon level in many security-sensitive areas throughout Thailand, with emphasis on the Northeast. The primary purpose is to establish a communications capability between the kamnans, nai amphoes, and amphoe police stations.

(U) The VRS operates under the combined sponsorship of the DOLA General Services Division, TNPD Signal Division, and USOM Public Safety Division. As of March 1968 a total of 924 VRS radios had been placed in 10 Northeast changwats: Kalasin, Khon Kaen, Loei, Maha Sarakham, Nakhon Phanom, Nong Khai, Roi-Et, Sakon Nakhon, Ubon, and Udon.

(U) The ultimate objective of the VRS program is to place a VRS radio in every tambon and amphoe of the 44 changwats; the system is projected to become the primary communications net for the new Village Security Force (VSF) program.

OBJECTIVES

(U) The primary VRS objective is to establish a network of communications links between civil government officials at amphoe, tambon, and village levels. Greatest emphasis is placed on establishing a communications capability between the nai amphoes and the kamnans. Another objective is to provide security forces in the area with an "as needed" means of communications for reporting intelligence to and requesting assistance from the amphoe Provincial Police headquarters.[1] This latter objective has gained increased emphasis with the decision to have the VRS provide the communications network for the new VSF program.

ORGANIZATION

(U) The VRS operates under the combined sponsorship of the DOLA General Services Division, TNPD Signal Division, and USOM Public Safety Division. The specific responsibilities of each organization are as follows.

(U) USOM's responsibilities for VRS include providing the FM-1 and FM-5 radios, spare parts, and other support items. USOM also makes available the services of US and Thai technicians to train TNPD and DOLA personnel in the operation, maintenance, repair, and installation of the equipment. These technicians also assist in the conduct of other TNPD telecommunications projects. USOM's Public Safety Division is responsible for US support to the program.

(U) DOLA provides storage batteries, D-cell batteries, antenna masts and accessories, miscellaneous installation material and hardware, and per diem and travel expenses for the police and DOLA members of the installation teams. DOLA also provides gasoline, oil, and maintenance for the police and DOLA vehicles used by the installation teams, plus a petty cash fund for the regional team chiefs' purchase of miscellaneous items. The General Services Division is responsible for carrying out DOLA support to this program.

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(U) The TNPD Signal Division is responsible for the installation [illegible] and other equipment. It is also responsible for training DOLA personnel to install [illegible] the radios so that DOLA may eventually take over [illegible] in these activities by USOM. During 1968, TNPD will take over the responsibility for procuring batteries which is currently being done by DOLA.

FUNDING

(U) Statistics on funding for this program by both the US and RTG for fiscal years 1966, 1967, and 1968 are presented in Table 22. The total US budgets for these 3 years are: $800,000, $781,000, and $2,138,000, respectively. The total RTG budgets for these 3 years are: ฿4,415,720, ฿2,235,000, and ฿12,930,000, respectively. Thus, over this period the RTG is paying for approximately 20 percent of total VRS costs, with the US paying 80 percent.

(U) Table 22

VRS FUNDING

FISCAL YEAR	US FUNDS		RTG FUNDS	
	COMMODITIES	CONTRACT SERVICES	PROJECT FUNDS	TRUST FUNDS FOR CONTRACT US EMPLOYEES
1966	$ 725,000	$171,000	฿3,915,720	฿ 500,000
1967	631,000	150,000	1,660,000	750,000
1968	1,988,000	150,000	11,450,000	1,480,000

CONCEPT OF OPERATION

(U) The VRS radios are being installed in selected amphoes and tambons in security-sensitive areas of Thailand. The installation priority is established by DOLA, TNPD, and USOM. One radio is to be installed in the office or residence of each kamnan in the amphoe, one in the nai amphoe's office, and one in the amphoe police headquarters. (Thus, it is not really a "Village Radio System" but a "Tambon Radio System.") A specific frequency is assigned to each amphoe and its respective tambons so that any station in the amphoe can communicate with any other. Adjacent amphoes cannot communicate with each other because they operate on different frequencies; and, for the same reason, VRS sets cannot communicate with stations in the tambon police station communications network.*

EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

(U) The VRS uses FM-1 and FM-5 radios. The range of the FM-5 varies depending on conditions as follows:

1. In open, flat country:

   25 miles for fixed station to fixed station (using external ground plane antennas)

   15 miles for fixed station to mobile station

   8 miles for mobile station to mobile station

   5 miles for pack set to pack set (using whip antennas)

2. In jungle:

   100 yards for pack set to pack set, depending on density of foliage.

The range of the FM-1 is 3 miles in open flat country and 100-880 yards in jungle, depending on foliage density.

* [illegible] police station, even in the same tambon, the VRS operator would contact [illegible] which would pass the message down to the tambon station through the police network. In USF paramilitary [illegible] police station is scheduled to receive a second radio set on the VRS-VHF frequency.

VILLAGE RADIO SYSTEM

(U) The primary power source for the majority of installations is a 12-volt storage battery. Each station is issued two batteries; one to be used and the other to be held in reserve. After 10 days, the battery in use is to be sent to the amphoe police station for charging and the reserve battery put into use. This cycle is supposed to be maintained.

(U) When distance or terrain prohibit transport of the storage batteries to the amphoe police station, the operating site is issued standard D-cell flashlight batteries. In installations where the FM-1 radios are fixed stations, they will also be powered by D-cells. The FM-1 radio requires eight batteries at one time and uses approximately 24 D-cells per month for continuous operation. The FM-5 requires 11 cells at one time and uses approximately 33 per month.

(U) The TNPD Signal Division has established operational and repair facilities at all police regional headquarters. In Northeast Thailand there are two such facilities, at Korat and Khon Kaen. These facilities also serve as a base of operations for the VRS installation teams. The facility in Khon Kaen is staffed by one US technician, four Thai contract technicians, and four police technicians. The Korat facility has one US technician, five Thai contract technicians, and three police technicians. The technicians at these facilities find it necessary to travel extensively because the kamnans often do not send their inoperable radios into the repair center.

(U) Spare parts and test equipment are stored at the regional repair shops and are sufficient for most repair work. Radios which cannot be repaired at the regional repair shop are sent to Bangkok. When a radio needs repairing the kamnan sends it to the nai amphoe, who, in turn, sends it to the regional repair center.

(U) Installation of VRS radios has proved troublesome and time consuming. During 1966 the project received helicopter support from the USAF for installation of radios in remote tambons. This USAF support ceased in January 1967; limited RTAF H-34 support was received for VRS installation until July 1967, when problems of funding the RTAF for per diem and POL costs forced an end of this support. As of March 1968 this problem still remained unsolved, and no air support was being received from any source for VRS installations. All installations are being made using ground transportation (vehicles, oxcarts, bicycles), boats, or walking, as appropriate.

RADIO LOCATIONS

(U) The installation status of the 924 FM-1/5 radios in the Northeast, as of March 1968, is summarized in Table 23 while Figure 20 shows the changwats and amphoes where the radios are located. Appendix E to this volume provides data on the exact locations of the installed radios as of the above date. These radios were installed in Phase I of the project, using FY66 funds. Phase I installations were completed during February 1968.*

Table 23

(U) **VRS INSTALLATION SUMMARY**
Northeast Thailand

CHANGWAT	NUMBER OF RADIOS INSTALLED
Kalasin	61
Khon Kaen	40
Loei	53
Maha Sarakham	82
Nakhon Phanom	97
Nong Khai	55
Roi-Et	112
Sakon Nakhon	75
Ubon	269
Udon	80
Total	924

*The total number of VRS radios installed throughout the country in Phase I was 1,509. The 585 located outside the Northeast are in the following changwats: Chiang Mai (76), Chiang Rai (126), Nan (71), Mae Hong Son (78), Pattani (121), Satun (29), Songkhla (24), Uttaradit (70) and Yala (58). Details on VRS locations in these changwats may be obtained from USOM Public Safety Division.



Fig. 21. LOCATIONS AND NUMBER OF RADIOS INSTALLED BY AMPHOE

VILLAGE RADIO SYSTEM

RADIO USE

(U) During the course of an investigation on the security environment in five Northeastern amphoes (Ban Dung, Nong Han, and Kumphawapi in Changwat Udon, and Sanatsakhan and Kuchinarai in Changwat Kalasin) conducted in March and April 1968, ARPA researchers obtained much information on VRS activities in the area. Their findings are summarized here to illustrate how the VRS actually operates.

(U) The researchers visited the locations of 46 of the 49 radios in the area. They found that 35 were in acceptable operating condition; six could transmit only and five were completely inoperable. The causes of inoperability were insufficient power (due to weak or dry batteries), blown fuses, antenna damage, or lightning damage. One of the inoperable radios had been so for 9 months and there was little indication that it would be repaired. The other four had been inoperable for an average of 1 month. None of the radio operators maintained the 10-day battery recharging cycle indicated above under Equipment and Maintenance, and few locations had ever been issued a second 12-volt battery. The average recharging cycle was once a month.

(U) All radio nets in these five amphoes operate on some sort of fixed schedule. One net made 16 to 18 scheduled contacts per day, between the amphoe and each of the tambon or village locations; another made only three. Only 5 of the 46 radios remained on a standby status. Those that did not do so usually gave as the reason that to remain on standby would drain the battery too quickly.

(U) The bulk of the radio traffic was of an administrative nature with only seven operators specifically mentioning having used the radio to report insurgent activity. However, many of the operators interviewed indicated that the radio would be used to report CT activity should the need arise. It was noted that few of the radios were located in the sections of these amphoes where insurgent activity has occurred.

(U) In most cases, the principal operator was a kamnan or a phuyaiban; in all cases at least one secondary operator (usually a family member of the principal operator) had been trained in the use of the radio. Five of the 46 radios have been moved from their original location to that of a CSOC joint security team, a village protection unit, or a tambon police station.

PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Phase II

(U) The second phase of the VRS effort consists of providing an additional 1,125 FM-1-5 radios throughout the country (331 specifically in Northeast changwats) for expansion of the system in critical tambon locations not covered in Phase I, for replacement of some TR-10 radios distributed under an earlier MAP project, and replacement of 200 radios loaned to CSOC for use in suppression operations. This phase is funded in the USOM FY67 program. The radios are expected to arrive in Thailand in May or June of 1968, with installation beginning shortly thereafter.[4] Table 24 summarizes the 331 Northeast installation sites for the Phase II radios. They are all allocated to three changwats: Buri Ram, Si Sa Ket, and Surin. Many of the 200 radios going to CSOC will undoubtedly be used in the Northeast to support CSOC operations.

Table 24

(U) **VRS PHASE II PLANNED INSTALLATIONS**
Northeast Thailand

CHANGWAT	NUMBER OF RADIOS: AT AMPHOE OFFICES	AT TAMBON [illegible]	AT AMPHOE POLICE STATIONS	TOTAL
Buri Ram	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Si Sa Ket	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Surin	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]		

[illegible]

Phase III

(U) The third phase of the VRS project, funded with FY68 and later money, will provide 200 FM-1 radios and 1,000 FM-5 radios to further extend the coverage of the tambon system.[8] Only 367 of these radios are scheduled for the Northeast, since this area received emphasis in the earlier phases of the program.* These will go to three changwats: Chaiyaphum (73), Korat (178), and Khon Kaen (116), completing coverage of all 15 Northeast changwats.

Support to VSF

(U) The VRS program is scheduled to provide additional radios to develop the primary communications net for the new VSF effort, which is placing local security elements in villages in security-sensitive areas.[9] VSF tambons will already have a radio installed in the tambon police station, operating on the police frequency. The frequency of the new radio in VSF villages would be the same as that of the VRS radios in the amphoe. The tambon police station will be provided with a radio on the VRS frequency to permit contact with the kamnan and VSF teams. The relationships between this VSF network, the current VRS net, and the police net are shown in Fig. 21.



(U) Fig 22 PROPOSED VRS COMMUNICATION SUPPORT TO THE VSF PROGRAM

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

(U) As indicated above, the General Services Division of DOLA, the Signal Division of TNPD, and the Public Safety Division of USOM are involved in running the VRS program. The amphoe police stations are involved at the local level in recharging or issuing batteries for the radios. In those cases where the radio has been moved to a paramilitary unit's facility or a tambon police station, the kamnan, phuyaiban or other local government representative must visit the facility to conduct his routine traffic. Conversely, paramilitary units and police patrols may make use of the village radio to pass messages to the amphoe.

*The Phase III installations outside the Northeast by changwat are as follows: Chachoengsao (79), Chanthaburi (71), Phetchabun (67), Phetchaburi (8?), Phitsanulok (80), Prachinburi (94), Prachuap Khiri Khan (50), Ratchaburi (106), and Trat (39), for a total of 663. There are an additional 170 spares programmed, making a grand total of 1,200. Details on VRS locations planned for these nine changwats outside the Northeast may be obtained from USOM Public Safety Division.

VILLAGE RADIO SYSTEM

REFERENCES

1. Department of State, Agency for International Development, US Operations Mission-Thailand, "Project Agreement (PROAG), Village Radio Project," 3 May 67.

2. _____, _____, _____, Office of Public Safety, "PM-1/5 Village Radio Installations," (machine print out) 24 Feb 68.

3. Unpublished notes on field investigations in Amphoes Ban Dung, Nong Han, and Kumphawapi in Changwat Udon, and Sahatsakhan and Kuchinarai in Changwat Kalasin, by LTC W. Steinberg USA, et al., OSD/ARPA R&D Field Unit, Bangkok, Mar-Apr 68.

4. Interview with Mr. Wendell Ritter, Office of Public Safety, US Operations Mission-Thailand, 29 Feb 68.

5. Department of State, Agency for International Development, US Operations Mission-Thailand, "Project Agreement (PROAG), Village Radio Project FY-68 (Draft)," 29 Jan 68.

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VILLAGE PROTECTION TEAMS

SUMMARY

(U) ~~(C)~~ Government officials in four amphoes of northern Ubon have created 25 village security units composed of local village residents and have charged them with the mission of defending the villages in which they are assigned against insurgent attack and of helping enforce civil law. These Village Protection Teams (VPTs) were first developed in mid-1966 in Amphoes Loeng Nok Tha, Amnat Charoen, Chamuman, and Khemarat. A total of 364 men are involved in the program.[1]

(U) ~~(C)~~ The VPTs are armed primarily with Springfield M1903 rifles. They received 15 days' training at the amphoe seats from an RTA Special Forces Mobile Training Team. They operate under the command of the phuyaiban, and all team members are designated "assistant phuyaibans" to give them legal authority to arrest and detain suspects. Members receive B150 per month for full-time service. The teams conduct the full range of activities associated with a static village defense force.

BACKGROUND

(U) ~~(C)~~ This program was established in mid-1966 under the impetus of the Governor of Ubon (Nai Phat Bunyarataphan) and the (then) Nai Amphoe of Loeng Nok Tha (Nai Saisit Phornkeo). These units have at times also been known as "Peoples Defense Volunteers" and "Peoples Defense Volunteer Corps." The program discussed here operates only in Changwat Ubon and should not be confused with similar organizations in other changwats (although they may be organized along the same lines), VDC, VSO, PAT, or the VSF.

ORGANIZATION

(U) The nai amphoe controls all VPTs in his area. Within the village, the phuyaiban commands the local VPT. All team members have been designated "assistant phuyaibans" to give them legal authority to arrest and detain suspected insurgents and lawbreakers. In this respect the VPT program resembles the VSO and VSF programs. The command and control relationships for the VPT program are shown in Fig. 23.

FUNDING

(U) This program is financed entirely by the RTG. Funds for salaries come from the Ubon CPM; some of these funds probably originate at CSOC in Bangkok. Detailed information on the size of the VPT budget is not available, although the number of men in the program and the established salary scale indicate that salary costs run about B550,000 annually.

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

(U) Fig. 23. ORGANIZATION OF THE VPT PROGRAM

LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS

(U) ~~(C)~~ There are 364 members, grouped in 26 village teams. The amphoes involved in the program are: Amnat Charoen, Chanuman, Khemarat, and Loeng Nok Tha. Figure 24 shows those amphoes with VPTs and the number of teams per amphoe. Table 25 presents information on the exact locations and numbers of VPTs in these four amphoes as of March 1968. The number of men per VPT varies from 6 to 24, partly dependent on the number who volunteer for the program. The average team size is 14 men. Team locations were chosen on the basis of the insurgent threat to the area, with teams placed in security-sensitive villages.[2,3]

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

Recruitment

(U) VPT members are recruited from and assigned to their village of residence except in one case where VPT recruits from one village were assigned to a team in a neighboring village because enough volunteers could not be found in the latter village. All are volunteers whose loyalty is certified by the phuyaiban. Some VPT members are former CTs.

Pay

(U) The VPT members are paid five baht per day (about $150 per month), and are usually paid once or twice each month. VPT interviewed in the field said that they would like to be paid more--at least as much as the VDC ($480 per month), since they are performing a similar function.

Training

(U) The VPTs received their training from an RTA Special Forces unit sent to Ubon from the camp at Phitsanulok. The training was given in the four VPT amphoe seats. Subjects covered in the 15-day course included: use of weapons; day and night patrolling; ambush and retreat; intelligence collection and reporting; jungle survival; first aid; map and compass reading; and marking of landing zones for helicopter resupply.

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

(U)

Fig 24 VPT OPERATIONAL AREAS

EQUIPMENT

Weapons

(U) The VPT members are issued Springfield M1903 rifles drawn from the changwat VDC headquarters. In Amphoe Loeng Nok Tha they have also been furnished 28 shotguns (single shot). Ammunition for VPT weapons is furnished by the changwat CPM.

Uniforms

(U) VPT members are not issued uniforms or boots by the RTG. However, most of the men have purchased their own green uniforms similar to the standard VDC uniform.

Communications

(U) (U) The 12 VPTs in Amphoe Loeng Nok Tha each had a TR-20 radio, supplied by CSOC. After a short period of use, however, eight of these radios became inoperable and were returned to CSOC for repair. Two of the remaining four radios are located in Ban Sam Yaek, the VPT control headquarters for Amphoe Loeng Nok Tha; there is one each in Ban Dan and Ban Kut Kho Kam. It is not known if the other amphoes with VPTs have any radios supplied by CSOC/CPM.

(U) Each tambon in Changwat Ubon has a radio supplied by the Village Radio System (VRS). The data in App E (on VRS radio locations) list only three villages where VPTs are located: Ban Kam Duay in Amphoe Chanuman, Ban Phon Thong in Amphoe Amnat Charoen, and Ban Sam Yaek in Amphoe Loeng Nok Tha (which already has two TR-20's). This radio can be used in an emergency by any VPT that can get a message through to the nearest radio's location.

Logistical Support

(U) Logistical support is provided through the chain of command shown in Fig. 23. Support comes primarily from the Changwat CPM, with limited assistance from CSOC in Bangkok. The VPT have no assigned vehicles.

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Table 25

VPT LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS IN UBON

LOCATIONS	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF VPT MEMBERS	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
Amphoe Amnat Charoen			
Ban Kum Kha	VC688705	12	45 RTA
Ban Kut Nam Kin	VC698686	15	5 PP
Ban Na Nong Yai	VC635773	12	2 RTA
Ban Na Kai Yai	VC629714	15	106 RTA
Ban Na Saad	VC710756	12	12 PP and 12 VDC
Ban Nong Kha	VC657783	12	12 PP and 12 VDC
Ban Nong Hai	VC764700	12	15 PP and 12 VDC
Ban Phon Thong	VC710718	15	20 PP and 12 VDC
Ban Rai Si Suk	VC593788	15	45 RTA
Amphoe Total		120	
Amphoe Chanuman			
Ban Kam Duay	VC863837	12	7 VDC and 5 PP
Ban Kok San Theang	WC015869	12	7 VDC and 5 PP
Ban Nong Hai Noi	VC863647	12	7 VDC and 5 PP
Ban Putarasak	VC928758	12	7 VDC and 5 PP
Amphoe Total		48	
Amphoe Khemarat			
Ban Phanom De	WC004630	6	6 VDC and 2 PP
Amphoe Loeng Nok Tha			
Ban Don	VC507933	14	
Ban Don Muang	VC490980	7	
Ban Hin Siu	VC574889	9	
Ban Khok Thoe Loe	VC622887	19	
Ban Khum Chat	VC545970	20	
Ban Kud Hui	VC488969	16	
Ban Kud Jote	VC474934	24	
Ban Kut Kho Kan	VC555872	22	
Ban Na Pho	VC419023	13	
Ban Sam Yaek*	VD527914	12	
Ban Si Samporn	VC554913	12	
Ban Wai	VC450950	20	
Amphoe Total		188	

*VPT Control Headquarters for Amphoe Loeng Nok Tha.

Note: There are an additional two VPT members assigned to Loeng Nok Tha Amphoe Headquarters.

ACTIVITIES

(U) The activities undertaken by the VPTs in their assigned villages are primarily those of a static village defense force. For example: in Amphoe Loeng Nok Tha the VPTs are on full-time duty and conduct patrols around the village during the day, check people carrying baskets to the rice fields, patrol through the village, and set up ambushes outside the village at night. Night patrol assignments are made on a rotational basis. In the villages of Ban Don, Ban Kut Kho Kan, and Ban Sam Yaek one VPT member stands a radio watch at night.

(U) CT defectors questioned in Amphoe Loeng Nok Tha said that their groups tried to avoid contact with any village having a VPT. In addition to acting as a deterrent to insurgent attack, the number of criminal cases in VPT villages has reportedly decreased.

(U) Time permitting, VPT members assist in village development and improvement projects.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

(U) (C) The VPTs cooperate fully with other RTG security units operating in the local areas. The RTA has elements operating in these four amphoes. Some are assigned to 0910 Target Areas 9A and 9B, while others operate as separate elements under the control of the Ubon CPM. They come primarily from the RTA's 6th RCT located in Ubon city. Police security forces also operate in the VPT areas of northern Ubon. They include changwat and amphoe PP elements and forces from the BPP, especially the Mobile Reserve Platoons used as strike forces and reaction elements. When these forces are operating near VPT villages, there is mutual support between the VPT and the military or police unit.

(U) (C) Changwat Ubon has developed two 010/020 teams which operate in these amphoes. Their task is to search out and destroy insurgent elements in the hills. These special strike teams rely at times on the VPT for various kinds of support including intelligence, logistics, and communications facilities. The activities of the strike teams combined with those of the VPT provide a unique balance of villager-constituted protection elements both in the villages and in the nearby hills.

(U) (C) As shown in Table 25, in all 14 VPT villages in Amphoes Amnat Charoen, Chanuman, and Khemarat there are other armed protection elements also operational. In nine of the villages VDC are on duty; 10 have PP members; and four have RTA elements providing additional security. These units and the VPTs work together to provide the maximum armed protection to these villages.

(U) (C) There are two operational tambon police stations in VPT areas of Ubon: one each in Amphoes Amnat Charoen and Chanuman. There is no evidence of any direct working relationship between these tambon police stations and the VPTs in these amphoes, although armed support could be provided by the police to a VPT under insurgent pressure.

(U) As noted above, each tambon in northern Ubon has a radio from the Village Radio System. At times the VPTs may make use of these VRS radios to communicate with the amphoe seat.

(U) Each tambon in this area is reported to have a CD worker. His activities in stimulating local self-government and village self-help projects are enhanced by the presence of the VPT in these villages as the team provides both armed security and manpower available at times to assist in village improvement projects.

REFERENCES

1 Interview with (then) Nai Amphoe Saisit Phornsee of Amphoe Loeng Nok Tha, Changwat Ubon, 22 Sep 1967

2 Interview with Governor Phat Bunyarataphan, 9 Mar 1968

3 Royal Thai Government, Ministry of Interior, Department of Local Administration, unpublished information on VPT locations and strengths, Apr 68 CONFIDENTIAL This information originally provided to DOLA by CSOC

4 Interview with Capt Surachit Chamareuk (RTA), Deputy Nai Amphoe for Security-Loeng Nok Tha, Changwat Ubon, 22 Sep 1967

These defectors referred to all RTG paramilitary groups operating in the Ubon area, including VPT, VDC, and PPC, as "CT"

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REPLACEMENT

VILLAGE SECURITY FORCE

SUMMARY

(U) ~~(C)~~ The Village Security Force (VSF) program being developed by the RTG in 1968 is designed to form groups of local villagers capable of providing armed protection and stimulating self-help development projects in their own villages. This new program is based, to a great extent, on the experience in village-level security gained through the VSO, PAT, and CA projects. Plans call for training approximately 20,000 VSF members by the end of 1972. Organizationally, the program falls within DOLA, but its success depends upon support from many other RTG ministries, agencies, and programs. The program will receive commodity assistance from USOM, while the Office of the Special Assistant to the US Ambassador for Counterinsurgency played a special role in its formative stages.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The VSF units will average 10 men in size and will operate under the authority of the Village Council headed by the phuyaiban. The members will be volunteers who have met health, age, education, and security qualifications. They will receive 8 weeks of training designed to inculcate a high sense of motivation and a strong loyalty to the RTG. They will be armed with carbines and submachine guns, and will be paid $393 per month.

BACKGROUND

(U) ~~(C)~~ Beginning in late 1966 the RTG initiated three "pilot" programs--VSO, PAT, and CA--to enhance security in remote villages threatened by harassment from armed communist terrorists. The VSO program trained local phuyaibans and assistant phuyaibans to protect their own villages; the PAT program, in addition to village protection training, gave the volunteers special motivational training and instruction on the conduct and stimulation of village development projects. The CA program develops information on the village and its environs from an unarmed but trained village reporter. The new VSF program draws heavily on the experience and lessons of these three earlier pilot programs, plus that of many other RTG counterinsurgency programs.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Beginning in September 1967 joint RTG/US working groups were established to develop detailed plans for implementation of the VSF program. These working groups (Intelligence and Area Selection; Training; Budget; and Economic Development and Interface) functioned under the supervision of a joint committee chaired by the Director of the Volunteer Defense Division, DOLA. This group in turn reported to three senior officials designated by the RTG Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of the Interior. They were the MOI Deputy Under-Secretary, the Director-General of DOLA, and the Director of CSOC's Operations and Coordination Center.

*Because this program is in the formative stages at this writing with planning still underway, information on training schedules, team composition, deployment, pay, and other specifics [redacted] gram should be regarded as tentative. The information provided represents the latest available data as of May 1968. Changes in the VSF concept or in its programmatic form will be reflected in revisions to this volume.

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REPLACEMENT

(U) These working groups and supervisory committees developed recommendations on such matters as the priority locations for VSF units, content of training, equipment and weapons to be provided to VSF members, legal status of the members, and administrative structure for the new program. Problems of budget and of US support were discussed and resolved. Additional VSF instructors were recruited, and the location for the VSF training site was determined. As of this writing (March 1968) details concerning specific budget allocations and facilities at the training site were still being determined, and the first class for training VSF instructors was awaiting their resolution. Plans called for a 5-week instructor-training session, followed shortly thereafter by the first group of 400 VSF trainees.

(U) The VSF concept, drawing heavily on the PAT experience, calls for the team of local villagers to provide security with their weapons, which they are trained to use effectively. At the same time, the conduct of development projects and comportment of VSF members, instilled by the special motivational training, will develop the kind of rapport between the team and the villagers seldom found in remote village situations. This rapport will encourage residents to provide the team with information on the identities, activities, and intentions of subversive elements in the vicinity. This information, in turn, will permit the small VSF team to gain the initiative and, over time, create a permanent viable security environment in the area.

ORGANIZATION

(U) The key element of the VSF, the village unit, is to be composed of 6 to 14 full-time members, depending primarily on the size of the village. (Villages with less than 50 families will have six VSF members; villages with 50-100 families will have 10 VSF members; and villages larger than this will have 10-12 VSF members.) Most teams will have 10 members.[1] The unit will operate under the general direction of the village council, with day-to-day operation controlled by the team leader. At tambon level, a newly formed "tambon control team" will direct operations of all VSF elements in the area. The VSF will be supported by the DOLA administrative structure at amphoe, changwat, and national levels, and closely coordinated with all appropriate RTG ministries and agencies.

National Level

(U) The overall national-level organization for VSF is shown in Fig. 25. This structure, newly formed in March 1968, has been approved by the Commander of CSOC.[2] The RTG officials shown as directing each element were to assume these roles at that time. Many will divide their time between VSF and their other responsibilities, although key operating officials are assigned to the VSF program on a full-time basis. Figure 25 illustrates the formal organizational structure; in actual fact those officials on the lower line report directly for most matters to the VSF Project Director.

(U) The National Policy Committee, chaired by the Deputy Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, will be composed of representatives from ARD, CD Department, DTEC, Budget Bureau, TNPD, and DOLA, plus others. This committee is scheduled to meet on a monthly basis to review the overall progress of the project and determine steps required to resolve policy issues and institute actions to improve and accelerate this effort.[1]

(U) The Coordinating Committee, chaired by the VSF Project Director, will be responsible for coordinating the work of specialized working groups and the established VSF administrative structure. Membership of this committee will consist of senior operating-level representatives from the RTG ministries and organizations principally concerned with implementation of the VSF program (DOLA, CSOC, RTA, TNPD, Budget Bureau, DTEC, and others as appropriate), plus their US counterparts. The committee is scheduled to meet regularly on a weekly basis.[1]

(U) Support for the large VSF training effort comes from the Training Support Section, providing inputs to the Deputy Project Director for Training (who is also the head of CSOC's Civil Section). The camp commander is the Governor of Changwat Prachuap Khiri Khan, and training responsibilities are divided between a Chief of Instruction and a Chief of Training Operations.[2]

(U) The primary operational section for VSF planning and implementation will be the VSF Division under the Deputy Project Director for Administration and the Chief of Administration. The Foreign Affairs Division will handle contact with the US and other countries, while the Programming Division will handle budget and financial matters. The Special Division will administer the ongoing PAT and CA programs and relate them to the VSF effort. The heads of all these sections are assigned full-time to the VSF effort.

Changwat Level and Below

(U) The structure to be formed for control of the VSF effort at changwat level and below is shown in Fig. 26. In each changwat selected for establishment of VSF units, three new offi-

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

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Fig 25 NATIONAL-LEVEL ORGANIZATION OF THE VSF PROGRAM[2]



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Fig 26 PROPOSED CHANGWAT LEVEL ORGANIZATION OF THE VSF PROGRAM[2]

cers for VSF are to be assigned under the governor: a palad changwat for VSF and two assistants for operations and development.[a] In VSF amphoes two new officers will be assigned to assist the palad amphoe for security with operations and development.[a]

(U) At tambon level a new position (also a palad amphoe) is to be created.[a] This officer will be the chief of a "tambon control team," composed of himself, the kamnan, and the head of the tambon police station. The team will be responsible for the implementation of the VSF program and for control of actions of individual units within the tambon.[1] It will also have responsibility for local VDC elements, Village Radio System nets, and the assets of tambon police stations. The men assigned to most of these new positions would probably be RTA officers (captains/majors) transferred to DOLA for this assignment. This was the method used to staff the new palad changwat-security and palad amphoe-security positions created to support the VDC expansion of 1966-67.

FUNDING

(U) (C) The VSF project is jointly supported by the RTG and the US. RTG support covers monthly payments to VSF members, construction of training facilities, provision of commodities for VSF development projects, and a myriad of other important categories. The budget for FY68 for VSF is approximately ฿23,000,000, with expenditures of ฿39,000,000 projected for the following year. Money for the project is allocated by the Bureau of the Budget to DOLA and CSOC.[4]

(U) (C) US support for FY68 is estimated at $1,500,000; the figure for FY69 is twice as large. Approximately 80 percent of the total USOM assistance is in the form of commodities. The US will provide weapons (carbines, rifles, and submachine guns) and ammunition for the VSF, vehicles for administrative and logistical support of deployed teams and the training operation, FM-1/5 radios provided to VSF villages, and other necessary commodities.[3]

LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS

Designated Areas

(U) There are 10 priority amphoes for VSF assignment during 1969. The nine VSF amphoes located in the three Northeast changwats of Kalasin, Sakon Nakhon, and Udon are shown in Fig. 27 (the 10th, Amphoe Kui Buri, Changwat Prachuap Khiri Khan is in the mid-South). Table 26 lists the 10 priority amphoes and shows the schedule for the first three VSF training classes.

(U) ~~(C)~~

Table 26

PROPOSED VSF LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS IN 1968

TRAINING CLASS	CHANGWAT	AMPHOE[a]	NUMBER OF MEN
1	Prachuap Khiri Khan	Kui Buri	200
	Udon	Ban Dung	200
Total			400
2	Udon	Nong Han	200
	Udon	Kumphawapi	200
	Kalasin	Sahatsakhan	300
	Kalasin	Kuchinarai	300
Total			1,000
3	Sakon Nakhon	Kut Bak	
	Sakon Nakhon	Muang	
	Sakon Nakhon	Phanna Nikhom	
	Sakon Nakhon	Wanon Niwat	
Total			1,000[b]

[a]At the time of their selection for VSF deployment, Amphoes Kumphawapi, Phanna Nikhom, and Wanon Niwat had not yet been sub-divided into King Amphoes S. That, Phang Khon, and Ban Muang, respectively. As teams will be formed throughout the area of the original amphoe and the new king amphoe, all 12 have been shaded on Fig 27

[b]Allocation of these 1,000 trainees among the four amphoes in Sakon Nakhon has not yet been made.

[a]The RTG Civil Service Commission has stated that the manpower required for these new positions cannot be made available until FY69 (beginning 1 October 1968) at the earliest

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

Fig. 27: PRIORITY LOCATIONS OF VSF ELEMENTS BY AMPHOE

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(U) Those tambons proposed by the changwat governors for formation of VSF units are shown in App A, along with the actual tambon-level locations of other paramilitary programs. A VSF unit is to be formed in each village of a VSF tambon.

(U) Present plans call for training approximately 20,000 VSF members (covering about 2,000 villages) by the end of 1972. The projections will be reviewed by the National Policy Committee at appropriate intervals based on evaluation of VSF training and changing security and economic conditions.[1]

Area Selection Criteria

(U) VSF units are to be established in areas where intelligence indicates that subversive organizational efforts are underway, but which have not been subject to operations by large insurgent elements.* The areas for VSF teams will be related to the locations of other security and development organizations, especially the tambon police stations.[1,4]

(U) The working group on Intelligence and Area Selection selects changwats and amphoes for VSF formation. Authorities in the area, especially the governor and nai amphoes, then propose to DOLA the tambons in which VSF units should be formed; these recommendations are then approved or rejected by DOLA. Tambon selection criteria are supposed to follow the standards set forth in the CSOC Concept and Plan No. 110.[1]

PERSONNEL

Method of Selection

(U) In the tambons selected for VSF formation, phuvaibans and kamnans (with the advice of the village council) are to solicit applications from volunteers and select candidates for each village. Two or three alternates are also to be named. The men selected will undergo an initial security check by the tambon control team, followed by an amphoe-level security check and a physical examination. Candidates eliminated by these procedures are to be replaced by a designated alternate.[1]

Selection Criteria

(U) The primary objective is to select villagers for the program who closely identify with the village and have a stake in its security. Villagers selected for the VSF program are to meet the criteria set forth in Local Administration Act No. 4, BE 2510 (often termed the "VSO Act"). Particular consideration is to be given to the acceptability of candidates by their fellow villagers and to the special physical and mental requirements for motivational, paramilitary, and village improvement duties. For example, an age of 20-35 years is preferable, as well as previous experience in the RTA, police, VDC, PAT, or VSO programs, or two years spent as a novice monk.[1]

Legal Status

(U) Local Administration Act No. 4 forms the legal basis for creation and operation of the VSF. As in the VSO, VSF members are to be designated assistant phuvaibans, with commensurate status and authority. Except for those cases set forth in the statute, VSF members will be subject to RTG civil jurisdiction in the same manner as other citizens of Thailand.

(U) One of the primary VSF missions is to protect the village population, its leaders, and any visiting government officials from insurgent action. In accordance with existing legislation, when pursuing this mission they will have the power to apprehend and detain suspected individuals until investigation can be undertaken by the police.

Pay

(U) It is intended that all VSF members will receive monthly allowances totalling ฿393.[3] This is composed of the regular VSO monthly salary of ฿50, a daily food allowance of ฿5 for 20 days per month (when serving in their home village), a per diem allowance of ฿16 for the remaining 10 days (when away from their village), and a special honorarium providing an additional ฿1,000 per year (or about ฿83 per month). Payment is to be made through regular

(U) *(U) Political constraints within the RTG and over-riding security requirements appear to affect this criteria for VSF locations. For example, the nine priority amphoes in the Northeast include some areas which have, in fact, been the site of quite heavy insurgent activity (e.g., Nanon Niwat, Kut Bak, Ban Dung). However, these are precisely the areas which require additional village-level armed protective elements as soon as possible, and, therefore, RTG agencies such as CSOC--and the local governors--are likely to pressure for VSF units to be formed there. In addition, the deteriorating security situation in Kut Buri and the royal interest in this area led to its inclusion in the first group of VSF trainees. Tambon Kut Buri, the "hottest" of the five tambons in the amphoe, is apparently being excluded from the VSF program, being left to the police, Army, or other security forces to handle.

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DOLA administrative channels, with the nai amphoe (or the palad) actually delivering the payroll to the phuyaiban who will pay the team members.

(U) During training VSF members receive a per diem allowance of $16. Costs of transportation to the training site are paid by the VSF program.

TRAINING

Curriculum

(U) All VSF members will receive 8 weeks of training, given at the VSF Training Center at Changwat Prachuap Khiri Khan.* The curriculum consists of the following six basic subject areas:

1. Understanding subversive operations and tactics.
2. Village protection techniques (weapons, tactics, individual skills).
3. Information collection and reporting.
4. Political, motivational, and ideological training.
5. Organization and stimulation of village self-help projects.
6. Skills of immediate use in conducting village development projects.

Each training course is to be concluded with a 2-week field exercise in which each VSF team will practice what it has learned, under the supervision of VSF instructors.

(U) The development projects to be undertaken by VSF teams fall into five basic categories:

1. Construction or improvement of shallow wells.
2. Construction of small dams or reservoirs.
3. Construction or improvement of village tracks and roads.
4. Conduct of small agricultural projects.
5. Construction or repair of local schools, wats, or public buildings.

To be skilled in carrying out these projects, the VSF members receive instruction in carpentry, masonry, animal husbandry, and agricultural practices and modern methods, as well as in the organization of village development projects and of techniques to motivate the villagers toward self-help operations.

Leadership Training

(U) Following the field exercises, one week of leadership training is provided to one member of each VSF unit. This team leader is to be selected by the training staff on the basis of demonstrated leadership capability.

Specialist Training and Modifications to the Course

(U) ~~(C)~~ Two-week sessions are given to team specialists following regular training. Included is the special course to train one CA member within each VSF unit. This man will serve as the intelligence specialist within his team and will report his information to the changwat CA collation and analysis center through regular CA channels. The activities of the CA/VSF member are basically the same as those of CA/PAT members described in the PAT and CA sections of this volume.

(U) The length of VSF training and its curriculum and content may be modified as the program progresses, in the light of experience gained. In addition, VSF members and units are to receive periodic in-service training. The PATs and/or the staff of the tambon police stations are presently being considered to supply this in-service training.

VSF Instructors

(U) Since one of the critical areas of VSF training is the political and motivational instruc-

*The selection of a site for VSF training has been one of the primary causes of delay in program implementation. After several other sites were considered but then proved unavailable for a variety of reasons, the Prachuap site was chosen. It was formerly used for VDC training, and, without improvements, it has a maximum capacity of approximately 100 trainees at a time. Therefore, construction of new facilities and buildings--even of a very temporary nature--is necessary before the first class can get underway.

tion, the instructors to impart this subject area must be specially selected and trained. Those instructors who participated in similar training with the PAT program have been recruited as the cadre for the VSF instructor group.* However, it was determined that 53 additional political/motivational instructors were required for the VSF effort. To obtain these men, nominations were requested from various RTG agencies, and names of candidates were received. The new instructors have come primarily from CD, DOLA, Ministry of Agriculture, and others. They have been transferred to CSOC for VSF instructor duty. These new political/motivational instructors all are to receive special training in advance of the first regular class for VSF trainees. This 5-week course, a condensed version of the regular VSF course, places emphasis on the content of the political/motivational instruction and on teaching techniques. The Chief of VSF Training is the principal instructor for the VSF instructor training session.

(U) VSF instructors for weapons and tactics are obtained from the RTA and TNPD. Instructors in development skills come from RTG ministries engaged in such work; some are "guest lecturers" assigned on a temporary basis; others are assigned to CSOC as full-time VSF instructors.

EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

(U) VSF members are not provided operational "uniforms" or equipment, such as boots or jackets. They are to be armed with M1 and M2 carbines and M3 submachine guns; they have operational control of the village radio provided to the village upon arrival of the VSF teams; teams have medical first-aid kits.[1]

Weapons

(U) For the standard 10-man VSF team the weapons package will consist of:

four M1 carbines,

four M2 carbines, and

two M3 submachine guns.

This will provide 60 percent of the team with automatic weapons.

(U) The TNPD, through its changwat, amphoe, and tambon echelons, exercises its traditional role with respect to the registry and control of weapons in the possession of citizens who are not members of the RTG military forces. VSF weapons, which are to be provided to DOLA by USOM, will be delivered at the training site where they will be registered by TNPD officials. They will then be shipped under police control to VSF amphoe seats where the amphoe police will distribute the weapons to tambon police stations for registration in accordance with Thai law, and issue to VSF members, a specific weapon by number being assigned to each VSF member by name. Replacement arms and ammunition are to be issued through the same channels, as required. Items requiring repair will be forwarded to the appropriate police repair facility.[1]

Communications

(U) Each village designated to have a VSF team will receive an FM-1 or FM-5 radio, as part of the ongoing Village Radio System (VRS) operation.** This radio will net with existing VRS radios held by the kamman, nai amphoe, and amphoe police station. An additional radio on the VRS frequency will be provided to the tambon police station. These communications relationships are shown in Fig. 28. As with regular VRS tambon radios, the TNPD is responsible for radio repair.

Support to VSF Development Projects

(U) Village development projects stimulated or conducted by VSF teams are expected to fall into one of the five categories noted in Table 27. Although the costs of these projects will vary greatly from case to case, some typical cost figures are shown.

(U) To the extent that the costs of these projects exceed the contributions of local village residents, the additional costs are to be covered whenever feasible within the budgets of the DOLA Shallow Well Division, ARD (including the Amphoe Farmer Groups), CD, Ministry of Agriculture, Royal Irrigation Department, or other agency as appropriate. In this manner VSF village

*The Chief of PAT Instruction has been recruited as the Chief of VSF Instruction, ensuring that the experience gained in political/motivational training will be incorporated into the VSF program.

**See the section describing the VRS effort in this volume. The current USOM commitment only covers 1969 VSF villages; provision of radios for VSF villages in 1970 and following years will depend on fund availability and project progress.



(U) ~~(C)~~

Fig 28 PROPOSED VSF COMMUNICATIONS NET

(U) ~~(C)~~

Table 27

COST ESTIMATES FOR VSF VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES[1]

(Based on 400 Villages with VSF teams during the first year of the program)

ITEM	NO. OF PROJECTS (First Year)	ESTIMATED COST PER PROJECT	ESTIMATED TOTAL COST
Construction or Repair of Shallow Wells	600	฿2,915	฿1,749,000
Construction of Small Dams or Reservoirs	100	5,000	500,000
Construction or Improvement of Tracks and Ponds			
Track Repair or Construction	400	(No cost, labor and tools locally available)	
Bridge Repair or Construction	50	3,500	175,000
Culvert Repair or Construction	50	2,850	142,500
Construction or Repair of Schools, Wats, and Public Buildings	200	4,000	800,000
Agricultural Projects	(No. and Cost of projects not yet determined)		

improvement activities will not duplicate existing programs of other agencies, but will help to expedite their implementation.

(U) In those cases where the necessary commodities and services cannot be furnished by other RTG agencies--whether because they cannot match the required technical scope, financial capability, or timeframe of the VSF project--the items may be procured at tambon, amphoe, or changwat level, according to their availability. The VSF budget contains an allocation of $3,000,000 to purchase commodities which cannot be furnished by other RTG agencies.[1] This avoids problems of timing, transport, and warehousing connected with procurement from Bangkok; it also stimulates business in the local areas. Funds are made available to the nalad amphoe for VSF in the same manner as such funds are made available to CD officials at the lowest administrative levels. Distribution of commodities to the VSF villages is usually made by truck, one of which is provided (by USOM) to each VSF amphoe.

ACTIVITIES

(U) Activities of VSF units and members in their villages may be divided into three basic categories: village protection, intelligence and psychological operations, and village development. Throughout the entire range of their activities, one of the primary objectives of the VSF members will be to elicit a positive commitment from the villagers toward their government and its institutions.[1]

Village Protection

(U) The VSF units are to provide protection to their village on a 24-hour per day basis. They will combat insurgent assassination and intimidation teams and small armed subversive bands which the unit is capable of handling with its own weapons. When faced with large insurgent bands in excess of their defensive capabilities, VSF units are--as much as possible--to evade combat and call for reinforcements. They will, of course, defend themselves to the maximum extent when attacked, while requesting assistance from RTG reaction units outside their village (including tambon and amphoe police, VDC, and changwat-based police or military units).[1]

(U) Each VSF unit is to develop and carry out a defense plan for its village. This will include patrols within the village and in the contiguous area on the perimeter; establishment of sentries and listening posts; establishment of hidden warning signals; and plans for defense of the village radio, team weapons (and any villager-owned weapons), and of other supplies of value to the insurgents, such as food and medicine.

(U) VSF units are to attempt to stop support from their village to insurgents and outlaws, using both persuasion and force when necessary. In pursuit of their village protection role, they will make contact with tambon/amphoe police and VDC patrols in the vicinity of their village, and may organize, train, and lead a village auxiliary force if the security situation so warrants.

Intelligence and Psychological Operations

(U) (C) VSF members are to alert the villagers to the dangers posed by the subversives and directly and indirectly counteract subversive propaganda. They will identify, report, and attempt to neutralize or convert village subversive elements and their supporters. They will also teach other villagers how to assist the VSF unit in this role, and organize intelligence and information cells for reporting on insurgent organization and methods of operation in side and near to the village. Each VSF unit will have one member who has received extra training as a CA reporter; this man is instrumental in the team's intelligence effort.

Village Development

(U) The VSF teams are to stimulate villager effort toward the five kinds of village development projects listed in Table 27; team members will participate fully in the work of the project. The team will work with the village council, tambon council, village development committee, CD village organizer (patanakorn), village health committee, and others in determining which projects to undertake, how to organize them, arrange for purchase of needed items, and obtain necessary financial support. Whenever possible, the projects are to be supported by regular agency program allocations; VSF has been provided with a separate budget allocation for those instances where progress must be made unilaterally.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

(U) The RTG Cabinet of Ministers has instructed all appropriate ministries, departments, and agencies of the government to provide maximum support and assistance to the new VSF program

and to cooperate closely to ensure its speedy progress. Whenever possible, these agencies are to place priority in their projects and programs toward efforts in VSF villages and areas. Examples of the kinds of activities which directly support the VSF effort are presented below, grouped into the three major kinds of VSF activity. Many of these programs are currently underway in the 10 priority VSF amphoes, while others are planned for initiation in these areas in the near future.

Interrelationships Concerning Village Development

(U) Accelerated Rural Development (ARD). The overall ARD effort is to give priority, whenever possible, to public works and related projects of benefit to VSF areas. Emphasis is to be placed on ARD support to VSF-initiated village development projects. When possible, ARD main-road and service track operations should permit increased access to VSF villages and operational areas. In their own work to repair and improve village tracks and roads, VSF teams are to receive assistance from ARD in construction of bridges and culverts. Such assistance is likely to involve commodities (such as lumber, nails, hardware, culvert tiles, and cement) and technical advice. Upon occasion ARD construction equipment operating on nearby projects might be diverted for brief work in direct support of VSF village development efforts (e.g., a bulldozer may be used for a half day to cut a new track to a VSF village). The Amphoe Farmers Groups(AFGs) in VSF areas will be an important source of support to the teams. The Mobile Medical Teams operated under ARD auspices will, to the extent feasible, be reoriented to provide medical assistance in VSF areas.

(U) All 10 priority VSF amphoes are located in ARD changwats. ARD activities in the three Udon VSF amphoes include road and well construction and improvement of rice, livestock, and poultry production. Amphoe Nong Han has an AFG. In the four Sakon Nakhon VSF amphoes, ARD activities include road construction, water projects, fish raising in paddies, and improvement in vegetable production. Amphoes Muang and Phanna Nikhom have AFGs, and one is planned to be initiated in Waren Niwat during 1968. In Kalasin, ARD is building roads and working to improve coconut raising and swine production. Prachuap Khiri Khan is a new ARD area (late 1967), and has road building equipment diverted from Korat; an ARD survey made in November 1967 provided information for developing both short-range and long-range development programs for the area.[1]

(U) Department of Local Administration (DOLA). All projects administered by DOLA, including construction of village shallow wells, primary education, DDP, and normal local administration, are to be reoriented as feasible to provide maximum support to VSF, also a DOLA project. Such support may involve allocation of qualified personnel, services, funds, or commodities.

(U) In late 1967 DOLA assumed the responsibility for the village shallow well program formerly administered by MOPH. This program has a budget of ฿152,000,000 for construction of shallow wells and small dams and reservoirs over the next 5 years. These all fall within the charter of the VSF teams for their village improvement activities. The CD Department also has a capability for digging village shallow wells, and MOPH has the reputation for building the best, most sanitary shallow wells of any RTG agency. Although all VSF shallow well, dam, and reservoir activities could probably be financed from the overall DOLA budget allocation, the technical capabilities of CD and MOPH are likely to be applied in support of VSF as well; some central planning and coordination may be required.

(U) In the 10 priority VSF amphoes there are, of course, DOLA officials (nai amphoes, palad amphoes). These men will be critically important to the effective implementation of the VSF program. The DDP program operated by DOLA has been initiated in 12 of the 30 tambons in the Udon VSF amphoes, 12 of 37 in Sakon Nakhon, and 4 of 17 in Kalasin; the remaining 56 tambons are all scheduled for DDP "sapha tambon" training by the end of 1969, as are most of the VSF tambons in Prachuap Khiri Khan.[1] (The relationships between VSF and other DOLA-administered programs which provide village protection--VDC, VSO, PAT, CA--are discussed below.)

(U) Community Development (CD) Department. The training and demonstration projects of the CD Department are of direct relevance to the effectiveness of VSF village improvement activities. CD support may include both financial and technical assistance. Whenever possible, CD is to give priority to expansion of its efforts in VSF operational areas. This may include support to VSF projects to improve or construct shallow wells, dams and reservoirs, construction of village roads, assistance to VSF-initiated agricultural projects. The CD efforts to train village and tambon development committees provide direct support to the overall improvement of tambon and village capabilities to implement the VSF program.

(U) There are [illegible] workers in Amphoe Muang Udon and 23 in Nong Han in Changwat Udon, and the program is scheduled to expand to [illegible] Khamphaphi in 1969. In Changwat Sakon Nakhon there are 16 CD workers in Amphoe Waren Niwat, [illegible] in Phanna Nikhom, and 36 in Muang Kut Bak. Kalasin has 15 CD workers in Kamalasai and 10 in Sahatsakhan.[1]

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(U) Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) This ministry and its various departments, especially Agriculture, Rice, Livestock, Fisheries, and Forestry, are to give priority, whenever possible, to the provision of personnel, services, and commodities to VSF villages and areas. Most of the MOA support will be provided to VSF-initiated agricultural improvement projects. In all priority VSF changwats and amphoes there are MOA officers for agriculture, rice, and livestock. The regional agricultural center is located in Changwat Khon Kaen.

(U) Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) This ministry is to place priority, as feasible, on VSF villages and operational areas for the provision of new health facilities, medical and paramedical personnel, medical supplies, Mobile Medical Teams, and other services. MOPH support for VSF shallow well construction will be important. The training of village health committees by MOPH field personnel will enhance the village's ability to use effectively its assigned VSF team.

(U) Ministry of Education (MOE) MOE is to give priority, whenever possible, to VSF villages for the assignment of new teachers, provision of school supplies, books, and so on. Schedules of Mobile Education Units and training programs are to be modified to give priority to VSF villages.

(U) In Udon there is a Mobile Trade Training Unit available for use in the VSF amphoes, and a Mobile Adult Education Unit which gives training in literacy, barbering, and tailoring. There is a Mobile Trade Unit operating in Amphoe Muang of Sakon Nakhon, and a Mobile Education Team is in operation in Prachuap.

(U) Mobile Development Units (MDUs) These field arms of the NSCC are capable of providing a wide range of support to VSF-initiated development efforts in villages near MDU operational sites. MDU No. 7, located in Amphoe Phen of Changwat Udon, has 39 men, it could work in Ban Dung and Nong Han on request. MDU-2 in Wanon Niwat consists of 18 people. MDU-1 in Kalasin has only seven people and operates in Amphoe Kuchinarai.

(U) Royal Irrigation Department (RID). The construction activities of the RID may support VSF development and construction projects, particularly the dams and reservoirs. At times RID funds may be used to pay for VSF-initiated projects of interest to the RID. In all nine Northeast VSF amphoes the RID has built several water reservoirs. RID dam construction is being considered for Prachuap.

Interrelationships Concerning Village Protection

(U) (C) It has been clear since the first formulation of the VSF concept in Thailand in mid-1967 that the village teams would not be able, by themselves, to protect their villages against all threats by large, armed insurgent units. They should be capable, with their assigned weapons and the training given them, of defending themselves and their villages against small bands of insurgents, and of holding out for several hours should they be attacked by a relatively large insurgent unit; hopefully, long enough for reinforcements to arrive.

(U) (C) The primary response force for the village VSF teams is the tambon police station. Other elements which may be available to assist VSF units include: VDC, ISO, PAT, RPP, amphoe and changwat PP, RTA, and RTAF. The CRS is related to VSF requests for assistance; it provides the VSF village with its radio, linked with the kamnan and another set at the tambon police station.

(U) (C) Tambon Police Stations. The policeman assigned to the nearby tambon police station will form the basic reinforcement asset available to the VSF units. VSF teams will maintain constant radio contact with the tambon police station and with police patrols in the vicinity of their village. They are to report to the police information and intelligence collected on insurgent activities, movements, capabilities, and intentions. The police, assisted by other forces as available, will be responsible for coming to the aid of a VSF unit under insurgent attack.

(U) (C) The presence of the tambon police station (of 8-20 policemen) as the primary armed support element to reinforce the VSF units has been deemed so important as to be considered virtually a prerequisite for formation of VSF units in a tambon; VSF units will generally not be established in any tambon which does not have an operational tambon police station.

(U) (C) As of November 1967, in Udon there was one tambon station in Amphoe Kumphawapi, two in Ban Dung, and one in Nong Han. In Kalasin there were four tambon police stations in Kuchinarai, and two in Sahatsakhan. In the third Northeast VSF changwat, Sakon Nakhon, there are three tambon police stations in Phanna Nikhom, six in Muang, two in Kut Bak, and five in Wanon Niwat.[8] Prachuap Khiri Khan had one station completed as of late 1967, with two more scheduled for completion during 1968; all are in Amphoe Kui Buri.

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(U) (C) Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC). There are active-duty VDC units currently providing village protection in all 10 VSF priority amphoes. As of early 1968 there were approximately 3,000 VDC members serving on active duty in village protection teams in the Northeast, providing protection to approximately 300 villages. Half of these were in 0910 Target Areas, in which the VDC served in Joint Security Teams (JSTs); the remainder were in CPM Village Protection Units (VPUs) elsewhere in the CPM changwats. In those cases where VSF teams are formed in tambons with operational VDC elements, the two will be able to provide mutual support and assistance. Eventually the VDC will become a tambon-level reinforcement and patrol force, basically an armed adjunct to the tambon police. However, for the near future the two elements in many areas are likely to coexist in neighboring villages.

(U) (C) Village Security Officers (VSO). In two of the 10 priority VSF amphoes there are trained VSO members: Wanon Niwat, Changwat Sakon Nakhon, and Kuchinarai, Changwat Kalasin. There are 100 VSOs in the former amphoe and 93 in the latter. In some cases they are in a reserve role in their home villages; in other cases they are serving on active duty somewhere in their home tambon in a village protection role.

(U) When VSF implementation begins in these two amphoes (and later in the program in other VSO areas), many of these men will be retrained and re-equipped as members of the VSF; those not so selected will be "demobilized." In sum, the VSO program will be absorbed into the VSF program as the latter effort reaches the original VSO tambons. No additional VSO members are being trained and no new units formed.

(U) (C) People's Assistance Teams (PATs). There are operational PATs in four of the 10 priority VSF amphoes: Phanna Nikhom, Muang, and Kut Bak of Sakon Nakhon; and Kui Buri of Prachuap Khiri Khan. The status of these teams when VSF becomes operational in these areas in late 1968 has not yet been decided. The same statement applies to PATs in other amphoes which may receive VSF teams in 1969 or later years. The PATs may be used to provide armed support to the village-level VSF; they can assist the VSF in their development activities or provide on-the-job training to local VSF elements. This support could be provided to the several VSF teams in a tambon by one or two PATs which would move between these villages providing assistance to the static VSF team located there. While villagers are at the VSF training centers, PATs could be used to provide security to the area, pending the return of the VSF units.

(U) During 1968 it is not anticipated that any additional PAT units will be formed. The costs associated with the existing program during 1968 will be borne by the VSF project; NULA is supposed to decide by June 1968 about the ultimate disposition of existing PATs.

(U) Border Patrol Police (BPP). Support to the VSF teams from nearby BPP elements may take a variety of forms. Although none of the priority VSF amphoes is located along the borders of the country, and thus no BPP line platoons are present, Mobile Reserve Platoons (MRPs) may be used on occasion in these VSF areas. These MRPs would provide armed support to the local VSF teams, patrol through the area, and also provide medical assistance to residents of VSF villages. Some BPP support could also be provided to VSF development activities, including assistance in construction and physical improvement projects

(U) Amphoe and Changwat Provincial Police (PP) and Special Action Forces (SAF). VSF teams receive support from regular PP elements at amphoe level and above. Policemen may patrol through VSF areas and respond to calls for assistance from VSF units. The police fulfill a role in issuance, control and repair of VSF weapons, and repair of VSF radios (plus replacement of unusable sets). They participate in the security and background screening of VSF members and exercise a major voice in the selection of members. TNPD members assist in training VSF members by furnishing instructors and technical advice. Periodic retraining sessions may be given to VSF teams by amphoe (and tambon) policemen.

(U) Royal Thai Army (RTA). In areas where RTA units are operating to suppress the insurgents, they may be called upon to provide direct support to VSF teams. Their presence in the area should improve the overall security environment. Conversely, the RTA units may request support from the VSF for intelligence, guides, and so on.

(U) (C) RTA units may operate anywhere in the 10 VSF priority amphoes, depending on the requirement. As of early 1968 those VSF amphoes most frequently covered by RTA operations were: Wanon Niwat, Changwat Sakon Nakhon; Kuchinarai, Changwat Kalasin; and Kui Buri, Changwat Prachuap Khiri Khan.

(U) (C) Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) RTAF flare support may be available for those VSF units attacked at night by the insurgents. Such support could be requested through the VSF radio contact with the tambon police station, which would pass the request to amphoe for action by amphoe PP or the nai amphoe. Flare ship support is likely to come from either Udon RTAFB or Nakhon Phanom RTAFB.

(U) It is unlikely that RTAF helicopter support would be required by VSF teams, but occasionally reaction forces coming to aid VSF elements would be ferried by RTAF helicopters. Urgent resupply requirements might be brought by RTAF helicopters to VSF units in remote areas impossible to reach by truck in a timely manner; medical evacuation by helicopter might occur.

(U) Village Radio System (VRS). This project will provide the FM-1/5 radio to be made available to each VSF village for use by the team (and phuvaiban). This set will operate on the VRS frequency, permitting 24-hour-per-day contact with the kamnan and the local tambon police station (also to be provided a VRS-frequency radio).

Interrelationships Concerning Intelligence and Psychological Operations

(U) Each VSF unit will have one member who has received training as a CA cadre. This man is to be the team's intelligence specialist, and he will report his information to the regular changwat CA collection center. The team will receive information of immediate tactical significance from their CA trained member or from a regular CA cadre if one is located in the same village. There are presently CA cadres operating in five of the 10 priority VSF amphoes: Muang, Kut Bak, Phanna Nikhom, and Wanon Niwat of Changwat Sakon Nakhon; and Kut Buri of Changwat Prachuap Khiri Khan.

(U) VSF units may receive support from the several ongoing psyops programs which have a village-level impact. Mobile Audio-Visual Units (MAVUs) trained by CSOC are attached to changwat CPMs and to Second Army Forward headquarters. When they operate in VSF areas they will provide direct support and assistance to the teams. The same is true of USIS Mobile Information Teams (MITs) which bring changwat and amphoe officials in contact with villagers and disseminate pro-government and anti-communist propaganda. Radio Station 909, located in Sakon Nakhon, operates mobile teams to record items of Northeast interest for broadcast on the air. The teams are likely to visit VSF villages.

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2. Interviews with Mr. Santhan Sirten, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior, Royal Thai Government, 29 Feb and 20 Mar 68.
3. Interview with Mr. Hansen Green, Special Assistant to the Director, USOM-Thailand, for VSF, 28 Mar 68.
4. Department of State, [illegible] Limited Official Use
Research Analysis Corporation, [illegible] Operations Manual, Northeast Thailand, Phase [illegible] report [illegible] 1968.

Appendix A

PARAMILITARY FORCE DEPLOYMENT BY TAMBON

Northeast Thailand

(U) This appendix is designed to show the combined distribution of paramilitary organizations in Northeast Thailand by tambon. It consists of a map (with tambon boundaries), and a table listing known active duty strength by tambon for each of the six Northeast changwats significantly covered by these paramilitary programs.

(U) ~~(C)~~ As can be seen in Table A1, paramilitary units are on active duty in 9 of the 15 Northeast changwats shown in Fig. A1. In addition to those deployed in the six changwats described in detail in this appendix, there are active-duty VDC deployed in Loei, Buri Ram and Korat. It was impossible, however, to accurately determine the number and location of those VDC serving in Loei. In Buri Ram and Korat, there are only 170 VDC on active duty. They support operations in 0910 Plan Target Areas 11A and 11B and their locations and strengths are given in App C, tables C13 and C14.

(U) VDC personnel serving in 0910 Plan Joint Security Teams and village protection units are listed together. In addition to these, there are other VDC on active duty, usually at the amphoe level, assigned to reinforcement elements or security and intelligence duty. These are indicated in the "Remarks" section of the tables in App D. CA tambon locations are not given because of their sensitivity nor are the locations of VRS radios as nearly every tambon in the changwats listed here has at least one radio. Details of VRS locations are given in App E.

(U) Figures A2 through A7 were derived from the joint publication of DOLA, the National Statistical Office, and USOM, titled Amphoe-Tambon Statistical Directory of 14 ARD Changwats, updated by the inclusion of king amphoes and tambons created subsequent to the Directory's publication. The National Statistical Office code has been given for each tambon in which paramilitary forces are located to facilitate obtaining other information on the tambon such as that found in the Amphoe-Tambon Directory, and in the other volumes in this series. The code consists of 6 digits; the first two indicate the changwat, the second two indicate the amphoe, and the last two indicate the tambon.

(U) It should be noted that paramilitary organizations are, by their nature, extremely flexible--unit strengths are likely to be affected by sickness, death or simple absense; locations may be changed at the discretion of a nai amphoe or governor. Thus, while the information presented represents the best obtainable from official sources supplemented by field checks in many areas, the authors cannot guarantee that a visitor to a particular tambon will find there the exact number of personnel listed.



(1) Fig A1 NORTHEAST THAILAND

~~(S)~~ (U)

Table A1

PARAMILITARY FORCE DEPLOYMENT BY CHANGWAT
Northeast Thailand

CHANGWAT	VDC	VSO	PAT	VPT	CA
Buri Ram	90				
Kalasin	305	?[a]			
Karat	80				
Loei	504[b]				
Nakhon Phanom	807	599	120		34
Nong Khai	310				
Sakon Nakhon	935	100	271		104
Ubon	229	100		242	
Udon	465				

[a]Although 93 Kalasin residents were recruited and trained as VSO, it is not known if any are actually serving on active duty.

[b]This figure includes both VDC and local volunteers, information on the proportion between the two is not available

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

Fig A2 CHANGWAT KALASIN

- Changwat Boundary
- Amphoe Boundary
- Tambon Boundary
- Amphoe Seat
- 0101 NSO Code Number

[redacted]

Table A2

PARAMILITARY FORCE DEPLOYMENT BY TAMBON
CHANGWAT KALASIN

NSO CODE NUMBER	AMPHOE TAMBON	VDC	VSO	PAT
02	Kamalasai			
0207	Samakkhi	5		
03	Kuchinarai		?[a]	
0305	Chum Chang	8		
0304	Kham Bong	8		
0303	Khum Kao	88		
0302	Kut Wa	13		
0307	Na Khu	9		
0310	Sam Kha	10		
0309	Song Pluai	10		
01	Muang			
0105	Bung Wichai	3		
0107	Muang Tha	7		
0103	Na Mon	4		
05	Sahatsakhan			
0504	Samran	38		
0502	Thung Klong	16		
06	Tha Khantho			
0601	Tha Khantho	40		
0602	Sahatsakhan	42		
04	Yang Talat			
0406	Huai Mek	4		

[a]One hundred residents of Amphoe Kuchinarai were recruited and trained as VSO; it is not known if any are actually serving on active duty.

[redacted]



(U) Fig A3 CHANGWAT NAKHON PHANOM

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(U)

Table A3

PARAMILITARY FORCE DEPLOYMENT BY TAMBON
CHANGWAT NAKHON PHANOM

NSC CODE NUMBER	AMPHOE TAMBON	VDC	VSO	PAT
06	Ban Phaeng			
0601	Ban Phaeng	11		
0602	Na Thom	5		
0603	Nong Waeng	5		
08	Don Tan			
0804	Ban Bak	16		
0803	Ban Roi	12		
0801	Don Tan	10		
0805	Lao Mi	32		
02	Kamcha I			
0205	Ban Kho	55		
0207	Ban Lao	12		
0201	Ban Song	45		
0202	Kamcha I	12		
0205	Nong Ian	24		
0203	Nong Sung	12	19	
0204	Nong Sung Tai	38		
01	Muang			
0115	Ai Somat	5		
0113	Ban Klang	3		
0104	Kuruku	10		
07	Mukdahan			
0705	Ban Sak	11	56	
0702	Dong Yen	10		
0712	Kham Pa Lai	44		
0707	Phan Sai	9		
0706	Phong Doet	0		
0708	Wan Yai		85	
05	Na Kae			
0504	Dong Luang	53		
0503	Ban Luang	22		
0502	Kok Tum	48		
501	Na Kae	20		
0505	Na Khu	9	100	
0506	Nong Bo	18		
0507	Nong Bua	19		
0508	Nong Song	42	90	
0509	Prasong	21		
10	Pla Pak			
1003	Pak Sawang	20	25	24
1002	Pu Ta Kai	36	8	24
1005	Mahachai	18	60	24
1004	Na Ma Klua		6	
1006	Phang Hi	17	46	24
1001	Pla Pak			24
09	Si Songkhram			
0903	Tha Due	5		
0904	Na Wa	5		
0902	Tha Bo Songkhram	12		
04	That Phanom			
0405	Nam Rum	18	93	
0419	Pen	14		
0401	Sno Phai	6		
03	Tha Uthen			
0304	Pha Tagi	4		
0309	Phon Sawan	7		

[redacted]



Fig. A4 CHANGWAT NONG KHAI

(U)

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(c) (U)

Table A4

PARAMILITARY FORCE DEPLOYMENT BY TAMBON
CHANGWAT NONG KHAI

NSO CODE NUMBER	AMPHOE/ TAMBON	VDC	VSO	PAT
04	Bung Kan			
0401	Bung Kan	6		
0403	Chumphu Phan	54		
0402	Khok Kong	124		
0405	Nong Doen	18		
0404	Nong Khong	2		
01	Muang			
0105	Ban Dua	4		
0111	Hin Ngam	2		
0102	Kuan Wom	2		
0107	Mi Chai	2		
0108	Wiang Khuk	8		
05	Phon Pisai			
0501	Chumpt on	6		
0502	Kut Bong	6		
0507	Pak Daet	2		
0508	Phon Phaeng	2		
0504	So	6		
0510	Wat Luang	2		
07	Sangkhom			
0701	Kaeng Kai	12		
02	Seka			
0203	Dong Bang	2		
0204	Tha Kok Daeng	6		
06	Si Chiang Mai			
0604	Ban Mo	6		
0601	Phan Phrao	2		
0605	Pha Tak	6		
03	Tha Bo			
0305	Ban Dua	2		
0302	Kong Nang	4		
0304	Nam Mang	6		
0301	Tha Bo	14		

[redacted]



(1)

Fig A5 CHANGWAT SAKON NAKHON

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Table A5

PARAMILITARY FORCE DEPLOYMENT BY TAMBON
CHANGWAT SAKON NAKHON

NSO CODE NUMBER	AMPHOE/TAMBON	VDC	VSO	PAT
05	Akat Amnoi			
0601	Phan Ngam	12		
0602	Phan Phoeng	12		
09	Ban Muang			
0901	Ban Mai	36	100	
02	Kusuman			
0202	Na Pho	12		
0203	Pho Phaisan	12		
03	Kut Bak			
0302	Khok Phu	12		
0301	Kut Bak	28		26
0303	Na Mong	28		13
01	Muang			
0112	Ban Phan	24		
0117	Muai Yong	35		
0116	Lao Phan Kho	24		20
0110	Na Kaso	12		
0108	Tao Ngoi	23		19
0107	Tong Khop	26		
10	Phong Khon			
1003	Rae			10
04	Phanna Nikhom			
0404	Na Noi	44		68
0408	Rai	12		
08	Sawang Daen Din			
0803	Khok Si	14		16
0802	Khc Tai	30		
0807	Phan Sung	24		33
0808	Phan Na			29
0801	Sawang Daen Din	73		
0810	Song Dao	104		
0804	Tan Hoeng	12		
0811	Tha Sila	44		
0809	Woeng	48		
0812	Watthanc	13		
05	Wanon Niwat			
0505	Dua Si Khon Chai	12		
0504	Khom Ta Ria	11		
07	Waritchaphum			
0702	Khom Bo	102		12
0703	Ning Lat	12		12
0704	Pla La	13		
0701	Waritchaphum	71		13

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

(D) CHANGWAT UBON

(U)

Table A6

PARAMILITARY FORCE DEPLOYMENT BY TAMBON
CHANGWAT UBON

NSO CODE NUMBER	AMPHOE/TAMBON	VDC	VSO[a]	VPT
19	Amnat Charoen			
1901	Bung	6		
1902	Khum Yai			15
1916	Phon Thoong	36		
1918	Senang Nikhom	24		66
07	Chanuman			
0701	Chanuman	21		12
0703	Kham Khuan Kaeo	14		24
0702	Khok Kong			12
0704	Nong Kha	14		
03	Khemarat			
0306	Nong Phu	6		6
17	Laeng Nok Tha			
1704	Ba[illegible] Kha	19		19
1706	Hong Saeng	24		33
1702	Kut Chiang Mai	17		7
1701	Sawat	36		129
1705	Som Pho	12		

[a]The 100 residents of Amphoes Det Udom and Khemarat trained as VSO are supposidly all serving on active duty, however, information on where they are serving within these two amphoes is not available.



Fig A7 CHANGWAT UDON

Changwat Boundary
Amphoe Boundary
Tambon Boundary
Amphoe Seat
0101 NSC Code Number

(U)

Table A7

PARAMILITARY FORCE DEPLOYMENT BY TAMBON
CHANGWAT UDON

NSO CODE NUMBER	AMPHOE/TAMBON	VDC	VSO	PAT
05	Ban Dung			
0503	Ban Chan	16		
0501	Ban Dung	12		
0502	Dong Yen	16		
0504	Na Mai	12		
0505	Om Ke	12		
07	Ban Phu			
0707	Nam Som	7		
0706	Na Yung	14		
01	Muang			
0102	Kut Chan	26		
0109	Mah Ye	24		
09	Na Klang			
0901	Na Klang	5		
0902	Na Li	7		
03	Nong Bua Lam Phu			
0310	Hua Na	5		
0302	Kao Loi	24		
0301	Nong Bua	81		
0306	Nong Sawan	5		
04	Nong Han			
0402	Chai Wan	60		
10	Si Bun Ruang			
1001	Na Kok	16		
1002	Yang Lo	4		
11	Si That			
1103	Nong Yuchai	119		

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Appendix B

AUTHORIZED LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS OF VDC UNITS

Northeast Thailand

(U) ~~(C)~~ Table B1 summarizes all known VDC allocations in the Northeast by changwat. As shown, all 15 changwats in the region are authorized VDC. The total authorization in the Northeast is 17,055; this figure comprises allocations for changwat companies, amphoe companies, border amphoe platoons, and intelligence and security roles.*

Changwat Companies

(U) ~~(C)~~ Each changwat in the Northeast is authorized two VDC changwat companies, with the exceptions of Nakhon Phanom and Nong Khai which are authorized three. The company strength is 160, they are formed and trained, but none has been called to active duty.

Border Amphoe Platoons

(U) ~~(C)~~ These platoons of 40 men each resulted from the reorganization of the VDC occurring in 1962. Their purpose was to protect critical border areas. Twenty-seven such platoons were authorized in nine Northeast changwats. However, with the exception of two (one in Amphoe Kantharalak in Changwat Si Sa Ket and the other in Amphoe Sanyikha of Changwat Surin) all have been converted to form the reinforcement platoon for the amphoe companies. Like the changwat companies, these platoons have been trained and formed, but none has been called to active duty.

Amphoe Companies

(U) ~~(C)~~ At the request of CSOC, 74 amphoe companies have been authorized in the Northeast. Their coverage is indicated in Fig. B1. These companies consist of a 17-man headquarters, a 40-man reinforcement platoon (25 of which are former border amphoe platoons), and 14-man squads in each tambon of the amphoe. Some of the tambon squads have been called to active duty as units to serve in Joint Security Teams or as village protection units (see App. C and D); however, none of the companies as a whole has been activated. These authorizations are shown in Table B2.

Other VDC Authorizations

(U) ~~(C)~~ As noted in the VDC section of this volume, VDC are authorized for assignment for security and intelligence duty. The bulk of these authorizations are used by the NSCC to provide security elements for its MDU's. Table B3 lists the 1966 authorizations for this role. It is believed that the authorizations were similar in 1967 and 1968.

*Sources referred to in this appendix are those listed [redacted] of this volume.

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

Fig 81. AUTHORIZED LOCATIONS OF VDC AMPHOE COMPANIES

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Table B1

SUMMARY OF VDC AUTHORIZATIONS IN NORTHEAST THAILAND BY CHANGWAT

CHANGWAT	CHANGWAT COMPANY		AMPHOE COMPANY		OTHER	TOTAL
	NO	STRENGTH	NO	STRENGTH		
Buri Ram	2	320	1	117	12	449
Chaiyaphum	2	320				320
Kalasin	2	320	7	963		1,283
Khon Kaen	2	320				320
Korat	2	320	1	105		425
Loei	2	320	6	834	135	1,289
Maha Sarakham	2	320				320
Nakhon Phanom	3	480	10	1,376	220	2,076
Nong Khai	3	480	8	938	100	1,518
Roi Et	2	320	1	189		509
Sakon Nakhon	2	320	8	1,164	25	1,509
Si Sa Ket	2	320	1	60	105*	485
Surin	2	320	1	60	115*	495
Ubon	2	320	20	3,708	125	4,153
Udon	2	320	10	1,566	18	1,904
Total	22	5,120	74	11,080	775	17,055

* Includes Border Amphoe Platoon of 40 men. These are the only two platoons which have not yet been converted to Amphoe Companies.

(U)

Table B2

AUTHORIZED LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS OF VDC AMPHOE COMPANIES[4,8,12]

Chaiyaphum Amphoe	Number of Tambon Squads	Number of Members: Headquarters	Platoon	Tambon Squads	Total Authorization
Bamnet Narong					
Laram Sai	5	17	40	60	117
Kaleum					
Kamalasai	[illegible]	17	40	84	141
Kuchinarai	10	17	40	120	177
Muang	11	17	40	132	189
Sarabubkhan	6	17	40	72	129
Sanmet	3	17	40	36	93
Tha Khantho	2	17	40	24	81
Nong Talat	8	17	40	96	153
Changwat Total	47	119	290	564	963
Khon Kaen					
Khon Kaen	4	17	40	48	105
Loei					
Chiang Khan	[illegible]	17	40	54	141
Dan Sai	11	17	40	132	189
Muang	10	17	40	120	[illegible]
Pak Chom	3	17	40	36	93
Tha Li	4	17	40	48	105
Nong Saphung	6	17	40	72	129
Changwat Total	41	102	240	492	834
Nakhon Phanom					
Ban Phaeng	3	17	40	36	93
Don Tan	3	17	40	36	93
Khamcharoen	7	17	40	84	141
Muang	5		40	60	100
Nakhonhan	14	17	40	168	225
Na Kae	11	17	40	132	189
Na Ruak	6	17	40	72	129
Srisongkham	7	17	40	84	141
That Phanom			40	60	100
Tha Uthen	9	17	40	108	165
Changwat Total	70	136	400	840	1,376
Nong Khai					
Bung Kan	[illegible]	17	40	72	129
Bung Kan	[illegible]		40	72	112
Muang	5		40	60	100
Phon Phisai	[illegible]	17	40	120	177
Sang Khom	2	17	40	24	81
Seka	[illegible]	17	40	60	117
Si Chiang Mai	3	17	40	36	93
Tha Bo	6	17	40	72	129
Changwat Total	43	102	320	516	938
Pattani					
Phan Thong	11	17	40	132	[illegible]

[redacted]

(U)

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]					
[illegible]	4	17	40	48	129
[illegible]	4	17	40	48	129
[illegible]	[illegible]	17	40	36	[illegible]
[illegible]	17	17	40	204	261
[illegible]	11	17	40	132	[illegible]
[illegible]	10	17	40	120	[illegible]
[illegible]		17	40	72	129
[illegible]	4	17	40	48	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	136	320	708	1,164
[illegible]					
[illegible]	5			60	60
[illegible]					
[illegible]	5			60	60
[illegible]					
[illegible]	23	17	40	276	[illegible]
[illegible]	4	17	40	48	[illegible]
[illegible]	3	17	40	36	[illegible]
[illegible]	4	17	40	48	[illegible]
[illegible]	14	17	40	168	[illegible]
[illegible]	8	17	40	96	153
[illegible]	10	17	40	120	[illegible]
[illegible]	8	17	40	96	153
[illegible]	14	17	40	168	225
[illegible]	6	17	40	72	[illegible]
[illegible]	6	17	40	72	[illegible]
[illegible]	11	17	40	132	[illegible]
[illegible]	16	17	40	192	249
[illegible]	[illegible]	17	40	180	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	17	40	36	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	17	40	60	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	17	40	180	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	17	40	228	[illegible]
[illegible]	15	17	40	180	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	17	40	180	[illegible]
[illegible]	214	[illegible]	800	2,568	[illegible]
[illegible]					
[illegible]	5	17	40	60	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	17	40	120	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	17	40	156	[illegible]
[illegible]	14	17	40	168	[illegible]
[illegible]	3	17	40	36	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	17	40	120	[illegible]
[illegible]	9	17	40	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]		17	40	84	[illegible]
[illegible]	9	17	40	108	[illegible]
[illegible]	3	17	40	36	93
[illegible]	[illegible]	170	400	996	1,566
[illegible]	[illegible]	1,156	2,890	[illegible]	[illegible]

[redacted]

[illegible]

(U)

Table B3

VDC ALLOCATIONS FOR SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ROLES 1966

CHANGWAT	VDC AUTHORIZED
Buri Ram	12
Loei	135
Nakhon Phanom	220
Nong Khai	100
Sakon Nakhon	25
Si Sa Ket	65
Surin	75
Ubon	125
Udon	18
Total	775

Appendix C

VDC DEPLOYMENT IN 0910 PLAN JOINT SECURITY TEAMS

(U) The following tables show VDC deployment in all 11 0910 Plan Target Areas, the locations of which are shown in Fig. C1. In each case data are presented on the number of VDC assigned in each village, the number of J.T leaders and their parent organizations, and the presence of other local security forces in the villages protected by the JSTs (when such information is available). For completeness, forces in Target Areas 6, 7, and 8 villages in addition to the VDC are shown; similar information is not available for Target Area 5, which also has a large non-VDC presence in the villages. The VPT members shown in Target Area 9 are local volunteers who received limited training and weapons from the Chamkar Thom CP. These are paid, to a great extent, through the regular CSOC budget used for support of VDC-JSTs, and are described elsewhere in this volume.

(U) Several different sources have been used to compile this appendix on VDC deployment. Information was obtained from CSOC-J3 section,[12] the Volunteer Defense Division of MOLAVM,[13] and the US Embassy.[14]* In several cases this information has been verified or revised on the basis of field investigation. Field visits have been made to Target Areas in the following districts: Kuri Kam, Kalasin, Sakhon Phanom, Sakon Nakhon, Thom, and Lom.

(U) Based on this collation, the number of VDC assigned to active duty in 0910 Area JSTs is 1,505. They are assigned to 151 villages, for an average of 10 VDC per village. In the JSTs, the VDC are led by one or more police cadres, the total police manpower committed to the 0910 JST effort is 5[illegible]. The data are summarized in Table C1, followed by detailed information in the tables following.

*Sources referred to in this appendix are those listed in the references to the CDC section of this volume.



Fig. C1 0910 PLAN TARGET AREAS

(U)

Table C1

SUMMARY OF JST DEPLOYMENT IN 0910 PLAN TARGET AREAS

TARGET AREA	NUMBER OF VILLAGES IN AREA ASSIGNED VDC	NUMBER OF VDC ASSIGNED TO JSTs	NUMBER OF POLICE ASSIGNED TO VDC UNITS	REMARKS
1	16	[illegible]	64	
2	21	194	65	
3	17	191	37	
4	13	142	26	
5	11	127	21	
6	8	81	38	There are seven [illegible] protecting villages in the Target Area. Five have RTA protection elements, [illegible] has VSC protection, and one has both RTA and VSO
7	20	202	164	
8	3	27	14	There are also RTA, VSC, and PAT elements [illegible] ing village protection
10-A	5	0	0	There are [illegible] PT [illegible] 17 villages in the Target Area
10-B	6	66	29	In sector 7, Target Area villages there are VPT, RTA, and PP. In other VDC villages there are also VPT units
11	16	151	33	
11-A	10	99	30	
11-B	8	8	[illegible]	
Total	149	[illegible]	[illegible]	

(C)(U)

Table C2

JST DEPLOYMENT IN TARGET AREA 1
(Udon)[12,14]

AMPHOE VILLAGE	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF VDC	CADRES LEADERS	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
Amphoe Muang				
Ban Huay Chiang	TE322249	6	4 PP	
Ban Huay Duu	TE375080	12	4 PP	
Ban Kak Nong Kung	TE331260	5	4 PP	
Ban Naon Than	TE408082	12	4 PP	
Ban Nong Jing Soi	TE355184	6	4 PP	
Ban Nong Waeng Deut	TE389156	2	4 PP	
Ban Thung Na Ta Lion	TE256280	7	4 PP	
Amphoe Nong Bua Lam Phu				
Ban Don Khi	TE286058	12	4 PP	
Ban Don Som Hong	TE255075	12	4 PP	
Ban Don Ya Nong	TE232110	12	4 PP	
Ban Mak Luam	TE268048	12	4 PP	
Ban Na La Kwai	TE240085	12	4 PP	
Ban Nong Bua Lam Phu*	TE279040	9	4 PP	BPP Platoon
Ban Nong Phai Sun	TE229085	12	4 PP	
Ban Pho Si Saad	TE245171	12	4 PP	
Ban Thung Prang	TE223210	12	4 PP	
Total VDC in Target Area		155		

*Target Area Control Headquarters

(C)(U)

Table C3

JST DEPLOYMENT IN TARGET AREA 2
(Nong Khai)[12,14]

AMPHOE VILLAGE	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF VDC	CADRES LEADERS	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
Amphoe Bung Kan				
Ban Don Siad	UF873023	9	3 PP	
Ban Had Hai	VF003145	9	3 PP	
Ban Huay Chuam	UF780220	9	3 PP	
Ban Huay Dak Mai	UF739275	9	3 PP	
Ban Huay Luk	UF672025	9	3 PP	
Ban Kam Ban	UF837972	9	3 PP	
Ban Kham Phu	UF819104	9	3 PP	
Ban Kak Kong	UF749243	9	3 PP	
Ban Na Kam	UF663220	9	3 PP	
Ban Na Sabaeng	UF743061	9	3 PP	
Ban Na Soeng	UF863003	9	3 PP	

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(U)

Table C7

JST DEPLOYMENT IN TARGET AREA 6
(Nakhon Phanom)[13,15]

AMPHOE VILLAGE	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF VDC	CADRES LEADERS	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
Amphoe Na Kae				
Ban Chomsri	VD3[illegible]5744			52 RTA
Ban Dong Kwang	VD515681	9	5 PP	
Ban Manow	VD296600	10	10 PP	
Ban Mun Oon	VD342770			14 RTA
Ban Na Phu	VD362775			14 RTA
Ban Na Pong Khong	VD465715	9	4 PP	16 RTA
Ban Na Sak	VD440720	11	5 PP	
Ban Na Kham	VD395801			10 RTA & 12 VSO
Ban Na Thung Mong	VD436736			15 RTA
Ban Nong Kung	VD471779	10		6 VSO
Ban Nong Song	VD432775	11	1 PP	16 RTA & 23 VSO
Ban Pong Doeng	VD352583	9	2 PP	
Ban Phon Ngom	VD291765			19 RTA
Ban Phon Tum*	VD378748	12	11 PP	38 RTA
Ban Yot Chat	VD339864			16 VSO
Total VDC in Target Area		81		

*Target Area Control Headquarters.

(U)

Table C8

JST DEPLOYMENT IN TARGET AREA 7
(Nakhon Phanom)[13,15]

AMPHOE VILLAGE	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF VDC	CADRES LEADERS	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
Amphoe Khamcha-I				
Ban Kho*	VD387394	19	19 PP	
Ban Lao	VD374376	12	3 PP	50 RTA
Ban Nai Pa Khoen	VD383435	10	6 PP	
Ban Phon Ngam	VD401418	15	5 PP	
Ban Tum Wan	VD386421	11	10 PP	
Amphoe Mukdahan				
Ban Fang Khong	VD525370	11	8 PP	
Ban Khom Hi	VD620376	9	4 PP	
Ban Khom Pla Lai	VD650488	8	4 PP	6 VSO
Ban Na Sua Lai	VD635542	7	4 PP	6 VSO
Ban Na Ta Boeng	VD676533	8	4 PP	7 VSO
Ban Som Kha	VD640488	9	3 PP	7 VSO
Ban Song Puai	VD472425	10	7 PP	

(U)

AMPHOE VILLAGE	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF VDC	CADRES LEADERS	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
Amphoe Na Kae				
Ban Dong Luang	VD515590	11	12 PP	34 RTA
Ban Kan Luang Dong	VD508520	6	16 PP	
Ban Lao Dong	VD565525	8	12 PP	
Ban Na Lak	VD401562	14	10 PP	
Ban Nong Khaen	VD480525	10	9 PP	
Ban Nong Yang	VD605572	11	11 PP	
Ban Phon Hai	VD437534	12	9 PP	
Ban Puang Khong	VD524570	1	8 PP	
Total VDC in Target Area		202		

*Target Area Control Headquarters

(U)

Table C9

JST DEPLOYMENT IN TARGET AREA 8
(Nakhon Phanom)[12,15]

AMPHOE VILLAGE	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF VDC	CADRES LEADERS	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
Amphoe Pla Pak				
Ban Ku Ta Kai	VE614040	10	5 PP	170 RTA
Ban Na Ria Dao	VD531410	7	2 PP	9 VSO & 30 RTA
Ban Nong Hi	VD583909	10	8 PP	9 VSO & 180 RTA
Total VDC in Target Area		27		

Note: RTA elements make up the remainder of the Target Area 8 security force, they are separate from separate VDC, VSC, and PAT security elements the locations of which are listed individually in Appt D, the VSO section of this volume and the PAT section of this volume.

Table C10

JST DEPLOYMENT IN TARGET AREA 9-A (Ubon)[13,20,21]

AMPHOE VILLAGE	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF VDC	CADRES LEADERS	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
Amphoe Loeng Nok Tha				
Ban Don	VC507933			14 VPT
Ban Don Muang	VC490980			7 VPT
Ban Hin Siu	VC574889			9 VPT
Ban Khok Thao Lo	VC622887			19 VPT
Ban Khum Chat	VC545720			20 VPT
Ban Kut Hai	VC488969			16 VPT
Ban Kut Jote	VC474934			24 VPT
Ban Kut Kho Kan	VC555872			22 VPT
Ban Na Pho	VD491023			13 VPT
Ban Som Yook*	VC527914			12 VPT
Ban Si Somporn	VC554913			12 VPT
Ban Wai	VC450950			20 VPT
Total VDC in Target Area		0		188 VPT

*Target Area Control Headquarters.

Table C11

JST DEPLOYMENT IN TARGET AREA 9-B (Ubon)[13,20,21]

AMPHOE VILLAGE	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF VDC	CADRES LEADERS	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
Amphoe Amnat Charoen				
Ban Kum Deuw	VC604536	6	5 PP	
Ban Kum Kho	VC686703			12 VPT & 45 RTA
Ban Kut Nam Rin*	VC6[illegible]86		5 PP	15 VPT
Ban Na Nong Yai	VC635773		2 RTA	12 VPT
Ban Narai Yai	VC627713			15 VPT & 10[illegible] RTA
Ban Na Saad	VC710753	12	12 PP	12 VPT
Ban Nong Hai	VC762700	12	15 PP	12 VPT
Ban Nong Kho	VC658782	12	12 PP	12 VPT
Ban Phai Thong	VC7[illegible]8709	12	20 PP	15 VPT
Ban Rai Si Suk	VC595788			15 VPT & 45 RTA
Ban Thap Ma	VC658737	12	15 PP	
Total VDC in Target Area		66		12[illegible] VPT

*Target Area Control Headquarters.

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Table C12

JST DEPLOYMENT IN TARGET AREA 10
(Kalasin, Nakhon Phanom, Sakon Nakhon)[12-14,18]

CHANGWAT AMPHOE VILLAGE	COORDINATES	NUMBER OF VDC	CADRES LEADERS	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES
Changwat Kalasin, Amphoe Kuchinarai				
Ban Chot	UD983573	9	2 PP	
Ban Dong Mu Yai	VD088420	9	2 PP	
Ban Kut Chim	VD099406	9	2 PP	
Ban Kut Pla Khao	VD033480	9	2 PP	
Ban Noi Cham Si	VD025536	9	2 PP	
Ban Noi Khok Kodao	VD059480	9	2 PP	
Ban Noi Na Chareon	VD060459	9	2 PP	
Ban Noi Te Liu*	VD035493	13	4 PP	
Ban Phon Pisai	VD041501	12	1 PP	
(unnamed village)	VD022552	9	2 PP	
Changwat Nakhon Phanom, Amphoe Na Kae				
Ban Kaeng Nong	VD196471	9	2 PP	
Ban Kham Phak Kut	VD11[illegible]46	9	2 PP	
Ban Na Hin Kong	VD16[illegible]506	9	2 PP	
Ban Na Kok Kung	VD076574	9	2 PP	
Ban Pak Chong	VD141521	9	2 PP	
Changwat Sakon Nakhon, Amphoe Muang				
Ban Huay Sai	VD044617	9	2 PP	
Total VDC in Target Area		151		

*Target Area Control Headquarters.

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Table D1

SUMMARY OF VDC DEPLOYMENT IN CPM VILLAGE PROTECTION UNITS

CHANGWAT	NUMBER OF VILLAGES WITH VDC-VPUs	NUMBER OF VDC ASSIGNED TO VPUs	NUMBER OF POLICE ASSIGNED TO VDC-VPUs	NUMBER OF OTHER IDENTIFIED ACTIVE VDC-CPM ELEMENTS
Kalasin	25	208	29	5
Loei*	40	504	unknown	42
Nakhon Phanom	44	453	150	121
Nong Khai*	34	116	60	60
Sakon Nakhon	38	466	63	107
Ubon	16	163	39	18
Udon	26	310	42	55
Grand Totals	223	2,220	383	408

*The figures for Changwat Loei apparently includes both regular VDC and local volunteers, information on the proportion between the two is not available

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Table D2

VDC DEPLOYMENT IN CPM VILLAGE PROTECTION UNITS
KALASIN

AMPHOE/VILLAGE AND DATE OF CURRENCY	COORDINATES	VILLAGE PROTECTION FORCES VDC	VILLAGE PROTECTION FORCES CADRES	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES	REMARKS
Kamalasai (Aug 67)[12]					
Ban Kut Ling	UD670986	5	3 PP		
Kuchinarai (Mar 68)[10]					
Ban Huay Daeng	VD157295	13	2 PP		An additional 5 VDC and 49 PP stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element.
Ban Huay Muang	VD078342	10	2 PP		
Ban Kham I Hong	UD870248	10		Tambon Police Station	
Ban Nong Ma Noang	UD742452	8	2 PP		
Ban Nong Mek	VD167170	8	2 PP	Tambon Police Station	
Amphoe Total		49			
Muang (Aug 67)[12]					
Ban Muang	UD568210	7	unknown		
Ban Na Mon	UD774326	4	unknown		
Ban Nong So	UD410324	3	unknown		
Amphoe Total		14			
Sahatsakhan (Mar 68)[10]					
Ban Din Chi	UD650715	8	2 PP		Ban Kham Muang is the CPM Forward Control Point.
Ban Kham Muang	UD549720	8	6 PP		
Ban Khak Kho	UD575776	8	2 PP		
Ban Na Rui Dieo	UD536788	8	2 PP		
Ban Nong Kung Yai	UD405665	6	2 PP		
Ban Nong Saphang	UD510759	8	2 PP		
Ban Phan Phaeng	UD623753	8	2 PP		
Amphoe Total		54			
Tha Khantho (Aug 67)[12]					
Ban Dong Bang	UD280680	10	unknown		
Ban Khak Krua	UD170472	10	unknown		
Ban Na Tan	UD140734	10	unknown		
Ban Nong Kung Phuak	UD218452	10	unknown		
Ban Nong Kung Si	UD180413	10	unknown		
Ban Nong Mai Tai	UD160465	12	unknown		
Ban Tha Khantho	UD120733	10	unknown		
Ban Yang Um	UD185710	10	unknown		
Amphoe Total		82			
Yang Talat (Aug 67)[12]					
Ban Nong Mek	UD100360	4	unknown		
Changwat Total of VDC in CPM Village Protection Units		208			

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Table D3

VDC DEPLOYMENT IN CPM VILLAGE PROTECTION UNITS
NAKHON PHANOM

AMPHOE/VILLAGE AND DATE OF CURRENCY	COORDINATES	VILLAGE PROTECTION FORCES VDC	VILLAGE PROTECTION FORCES CADRES	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES	REMARKS
Ban Phaeng (Aug 67)[12,13]					
Ban Hua Hak	VE153905	6	2 PP		An additional 5 VDC stationed at the amphoe seat as a reinforcement element.
Ban Na Thom	VE004750	5	2 PP		
Ban Na Wua	VE159860	5	2 PP		
Ban Nong Waeng	VE203653	5	2 PP		
Amphoe Total		21			
Don Tan (Jan 68)[13,15]					
Ban Bak	VD862935	16	3 PP		An additional 17 VDC and 15 PP stationed at the amphoe seat as a reinforcement element.
Ban Lao Mi	VD798060	16	3 PP		
Ban Nuching	VD768064	16	3 PP		
Ban Na Sa Ming	VD865015	10	3 PP		
Ban Nong Mek	VD755935	12	5 PP		
Amphoe Total		70			
Khamcha-I (Jan 68)[13,15]					
Ban Champhu	VD326101	21	3 PP		
Ban Khamcha-I	VD326274	12	3 PP		
Ban Kham Phi	VD303134	17	3 PP		
Ban Ma Nao	VD423367	12	5 PP		
Ban Nam Thiang	VD386325	33	3 PP		
Ban Nong Ian Dang	VD376288	12	5 PP		
Ban Nong Ian Thong	VD423368	12	5 PP		
Ban Nong Sung	VD314220	12	5 PP		
Amphoe Total		131			
Muang (Jan 68)[13,15]					
Kham Sawang	VE414194	5	5 PP		An additional 40 VDC assigned to the amphoe in a variety of security and intelligence duties.
Ban Klang Yai	VD771931	3	9 PP		
Ban Kuruku	VE532147	5	5 PP		
Ban Sa-ren	VE727305	[illegible]	5 PP		
Amphoe Total		1[illegible]			
Mukdahan (Jan 68)[13,15]					
Ban Dong Yen	VD681111	10	3 PP		An additional 20 VDC stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element.
Ban Kaeng Song Pua	VD538497	12	3 PP		
Amphoe Total		22			
Na Kae (Jan 68)[13,15]					
Ban Dong I-nam	VD545872	10	10 PP		An additional 2 VDC and 61 PP stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element
Ban Kaeng Nang	VD195470	12			

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Ban Khar Mak	VD456776	13		9 VSO	
Ban Nong Hong	VD479760	8		6 VSO	
Ban Non Hung	VD489864	13	4 PP		
Amphoe Total		56			
Pla Pak (Jan 68)[13,15]					
Ban Don Du	VE[illegible]5027	17			An additional 31 VDC and 43 PP stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element.
Ban Mahachai	VD425125	18	3 PP	23 VSO	
Ban Na Dak Mai	VD583990	9			
Ban Na Si Nuan	VD462969	7			
Ban Si Thon	VD424978	13	2 PP	20 VSO	
Amphoe Total		64			
Si Songkhram (Aug 67)[12,13]					
Ban Kha	VE076505	5	2 PP		
Ban Na Wha	VE044333	5	2 PP		
Ban Phak Un	VE177515	7	7 PP		
Ban Sieo	VE166514	5	2 PP		
Amphoe Total		22			
That Phanom (Jan 68)[12,13,15]					
Ban Kham Phak Phaew	VD720582	8	4 PP	7 VDO	An additional 6 VDC at amphoe headquarters; 10 VDC are used to gather information throughout the amphoe.
Ban Na Bua	VD561869	8	4 PP		
Ban Nong Kung	VD564882	6	3 PP		
Ban Saeng Poen	VD673888	6	3 PP		
Ban Um Mao	VD658630	10	4 PP	21 VSO	
Amphoe Total		38			
Tha Uthen (Aug 67)[12,13]					
Ban Phon Sawan	VE480347	7	8 PP		
Ban Tan Nong Thow	VE352630	4	5 PP		
Amphoe Total		11			
Changwat Total of VDC in CPM Village Protection Units		453			

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Table D4

VDC DEPLOYMENT IN CPM VILLAGE PROTECTION UNITS
NONG KHAI

AMPHOE VILLAGE AND DATE OF CURRENCY	COORDINATES	VILLAGE PROTECTION FORCES VDC	VILLAGE PROTECTION FORCES CADRES	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES	REMARKS
Akat Amnat (Nov 67)[12,13]					
Ban Pom Phaeng	UE907430	12	2 PP		An additional 10 VDC stationed at Ban Akat (UE903471) as a reinforcement element
Ban Tha Kwai	UE876666	12	2 PP		
Amphoe Total		24			
Ban Muang (Dec 67)[11-13]					
Ban Muang	UE498744	12	2 PP		
Ban Nong Kwang	UE420680	12	2 PP		
Ban Phon Khai	UE493748	12	2 PP		
Amphoe Total		36			
Kusuman (Nov 67)[12,13]					
Ban Phon Thong	VE329219	12	2 PP		An additional 10 VDC stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element.
Ban Tni	VE344230	12	Kamnan		
Amphoe Total		24			
Kut Bak (Jan 68)[10-13]					
Ban Khok Phu	UD770875	12	2 PP		An additional 20 VDC and 12 PP stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element.
Ban Kho Noi	UD683902	14	1 PP		
Ban Kho Yai	UD687930	14	1 PP		
Ban Nong Kho	UD850835	14	1 PP		
Ban Nong Sa Noi	UD878937	14	1 PP		
Amphoe Total		68			
Muang (Jan 68)[10-13,20]					
Ban Huay Khaen	VD166818	12	Kamnan		An additional 19 VDC stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element.
Ban Huay Yong	VD293772	12	Kamnan		
Ban Khok Ngoi	VD126773	11	2 PP		
Ban Klang	VE229060	12	2 PP		
Ban Moet	VD290845	12	Kamnan		
Ban Na Ang	VD076767	12	Kamnan		
Ban Na Chan	VE372053	12	Kamnan		
Ban Na Kap Kae	VD043848	14	2 PP		
Ban Na Si Nuan	VD235796	14	2 PP		
Ban Nong Phai	VD073810	12	Kamnan		
Ban Phan	VD285980	12	2 PP		
Amphoe Total		135			
Phanna Nikhom (Jan 68)[11-13]					
Ban Na Chuak	UE663101	12	2 PP		An additional 8 VDC stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element.
Ban Nong Phak Thiam	UD698987	13	3 PP		

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Ban Nong Phu	UE735019	8	2 PP	Tambon Police Station	
Ban Nong Pling	UE664013	13	3 PP		
Amphoe Total		46			
Sawang Daen Din (Jun 68)[11,12]					
Ban Don Khuang	UE525263	13	3 PP		An additional 7 VDC stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element.
Ban Khom Ban	UE282302	12	4 PP		
Ban Khom Noi	UE256335	12	2 PP		
Ban Kok Si Khrai	UE545332	12	2 PP		
Ban Na Din Chi	UE254419	12	2 PP		
Ban Nong Wueng	UE451602	14	2 PP		
Ban Ton Kun	UE499210	12	2 PP		
Amphoe Total		87			
Wanon Niwat (Dec 67)[12,13]					
Ban Khom Ta Krá	UE685740	11	2 PP		An additional 14 VDC stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element.
Ban Ko	UEb70407	12	2 PP		
Amphoe Total		23			
Waritchaphum[11-13]					
Ban Nong Lat	UE510125	12	2 PP		An additional 20 VDC stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element.
Ban Pla Lo	UE583164	11	2 PP		
Amphoe Total		23			
Changwat Total of VDC in CPM Village Protection Units		466			

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Table D5

VDC DEPLOYMENT IN CPM VILLAGE PROTECTION UNITS
SAKON NAKHON

AMPHOE/VILLAGE AND DATE OF CURRENCY	COORDINATES	VILLAGE PROTECTION FORCES VDC	VILLAGE PROTECTION FORCES CADRES	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES	REMARKS
Chanuman (Mar 68)					
Ban Bung Khiew	WC052798	7	2 PP	2 BPP	An additional 5 VDC and 5 PP stationed at amphoe as a reinforcement/partol element. See section on VPT in this volume.
Ban Kam Duay	VD863837	7	5 PP	12 VPT	
Ban Kok San Thoeng	WC015869	7	5 PP	12 VPT	
Ban Na Si Nuan	VC992978	7	2 PP	2 BPP	
Ban Nong Hai Nai	VC963647	7	5 PP	12 VPT	
Ban Putarasak	VC928758	7	5 PP	12 VPT	
Ban Som Yook	VC972610	7	7 PP		
Amphoe Total		49			
Khamarat (Mar 68)[13.20]					
Ban Phanom Di	WC004630	6	2 PP	6 VPT	
Amphoe Total		6			
Laong Nok Tha (Oct 67)[13.21]					
Ban Bung Khla	VC62[illegible]859	12			
Ban Chong Mek	VC720903	19	3 PP		
Ban Hong Saeng	VC373990	12			
Ban Kham Phai	VC497764	12			
Ban Kut Chiang Mai	VC439994	12			
Ban Kut Kho Kan	VC555871	17	3 PP		
Ban Sawat	VC486905	12			
Ban Sa n Pho	VC362857	12			
Amphoe Total		108			
Changwat Total of VDC in CPM Village Protection Units		163			There are also two vehicle checkpoints established with VDC participating. One, in Amphoe Muang Samsip at VC710145, has 9 VDC, 4 PP, and 2 civil government officers; the other, in Amphoe Warin Chamrap at WC170845, has 4 VDC, 5 PP, 1 RTA, and 2 civil government officers.[13.21]

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Table D6

VDC DEPLOYMENT IN CPM VILLAGE PROTECTION UNITS
UBON

AMPHOE VILLAGE AND DATE OF CURRENCY	COORDINATES	VILLAGE PROTECTION FORCES VDC	VILLAGE PROTECTION FORCES CADRES	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES	REMARKS
Ban Dung (Apr 68)[12,13,17]					
Ban Chan	UE218704	16	4 PP		An additional 15 VDC stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element
Ban Dung	UE148583	12	2 PP		
Ban Muang	UE299591	12	4 PP		
Ban Muang Phai	UE294580	4	3 PP		20 men in Ban Chan at Tambon Police Station.
Ban Nong Lat	UE105706	12	2 PP		
Ban Om Kae	UE221460	12	3 PP		One of 12 VDC in Ban Nong Lat is local Kamnan, 5 of the 12 are local patrol element, defense JST PU has 8 men
Amphoe Total		68			
Ban Phu (Oct 67)[12,13]					
Ban Nam Som	SE960682	7	2 PP		
Ban Nin Nyua	TE011661	7	2 PP		
Ban Nin Yung	TE045845	7	2 PP		
Amphoe Total		21			
Na Klang[12,13]					
Ban Keo Kloy	TE174265	2		14	
Ban Pak Kho	TE033148	5		11	
Ban Na Si	TE154481	5		20	
Amphoe Total		12			
Nong Bua Lam Phu (Oct 67)[12,13]					
Ban Hua Na	TD247826	5		24	
Ban Kong Pho	TD295897	4		17	
Ban Nong Bua Som	TE162045	5		19	
Amphoe Total		14			
Nong Han (Mar 68)[12,17]					
Ban Kham Ban	UE275055	20	1 PP		An additional 25 VDC stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element
Ban Kham Law	UE247066	20	1 PP		
Ban Muang Waeng Tad	UE185305	20	1 PP		
Amphoe Total		60			
Si Ban Ruang[12,13]					
Ban Don Kled	TD015878	5		24	
Ban Na Kok	TD023729	4		22	
Ban Nong Sung Phoay	TD099778	7		19	
Amphoe Total		16			
Si That (Mar 68)[12,16]					
Ban Ba Yao	UD292943	23	3 PP		An additional 15 VDC stationed at amphoe headquarters as a reinforcement element
Ban Muang Kong Thap Ma	UD341828	24	3 PP		

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AMPHOE VILLAGE AND DATE OF CURRENCY	COORDINATES	VILLAGE PROTECTION FORCES VDC	CADRES	OTHER LOCAL SECURITY FORCES	REMARKS
Ban Nong Waeng Nok	UD340743	24	3 PP		
Ban Nong Ya Sai	UD235749	24	3 PP		
Ban Na Nok Choom	UD315850	24	3 PP		
Amphoe Total		119			
Changwat Total of VDC in CPM Village Protection Units		310			

[redacted]

Appendix E

VRS INSTALLATIONS
Northeast Thailand

(U) This appendix presents information on the exact location of all VRS radios in the Northeast installed in Phase I of the project, which concluded in February 1968. The changwat, amphoe, tambon, UTM coordinates, type of radio installed and its assigned frequency are listed. The information was provided by USOM Public Safety Division.

(U) The information is presented by changwat as follows:

Table E1	Kalasin
Table E2	Loei
Table E3	Maha Sarakham
Table E4	Nakhon Phanom
Table E5	Nong Khai
Table E6	Roi-Et
Table E7	Sakon Nakhon
Table E8	Ubon
Table E9	Udon

(U) All 40 VRS radios in Khon Kaen were provided to changwat headquarters for use as desired throughout the area. No information is available regarding VRS operational locations in Khon Kaen.

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Table E1

VRS INSTALLATIONS
KALASIN

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
Kamalasai	Nai Amphoe Office	UD482006	FM-5	156.300 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UD482006	FM-5	
	Ban Koe - Thanya	UC476996	FM-5	
	Lan Sawang - Nong Paen	UC532995	FM-5	
	Dan Nua - Phon Ngom	UD588054	FM-5	
	Na Riang - Samakkhi	UD627035	FM-5	
	Non Tan - Kut Khong Chai	UC408984	FM-5	
	Tha Phloang - Dong Ling	UC542928	FM-5	
	Spare	UD481066	FM-[illegible]	
Kuchinarai	Nai Amphoe Office	UD995283	FM-5	156.350 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UD995283	FM-5	
	Choen Laen	UD941310	FM-5	
	Chum Chang	VD044200	FM-1	
	Huai Phung	UD835400	FM-1	
	Khok Klang - Chum Chang	VD020170	FM-5	
	Khok Kong - Phu Loenchang	UD944477	FM-1	
	Khok Si - Kham Bong	UD750415	FM-1	
	Kum Kod	VD029455	FM-1	
	Na Khu	UD966530	FM-1	
	Nong Hang - Kut Wa	VD045307	FM-5	
	Sam Kha	UD900236	FM-1	
Mukang	Nai Amphoe Office	UD409170	FM-5	156.450 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UD409170	FM-5	
	Ban Lup	UD430135	FM-5	
	Ban Tan - Ban Nua	UD470164	FM-5	
	Kut Khlong-Chiang Khrua	UD597163	FM-5	
	Na Mon	UD587110	FM-5	
	Nong Pho - Nong Phai	UD460254	FM-5	
	Nong Kung - Bung Wichai	UD440256	FM-1	
	Nong So - Lam Poo	UD410323	FM-1	
	Tha Sin - Lam Phan	UD354212	FM-5	
	Yot Kaeng	UD636364	FM-5	
Sahatsakhan	Nai Amphoe Office	UD492551	FM-5	155.850 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UD492551	FM-5	
	Ban Kho - Samran	UD472640	FM-5	
	Ban Phan	UD530645	FM-5	
	Huai Yang - Samran	UD499725	FM-5	
	Kok Sanga - Namakhua	UD545450	FM-5	
	Na Than - Thung Khlong	UD557770	FM-5	
	Nong Bua	UD295456	FM-5	
	Nong Saphang-Thung Khlong	UD510759	FM-5	
	Thung Khlong	UD537740	FM-5	
Somdet	Nai Amphoe Office	UD120732	FM-5	156.3[illegible] MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UD664460	FM-5	
	Mu Mon	UD620546	FM-5	
	Sa[illegible]ng Bardan	UD646572	FM-5	
	Som[illegible]et	UD663460	FM-5	
Tha Khantho	Nai Amphoe Office	UD120732	FM-5	156.350 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UD120732	FM-5	
	Na Tah - Sahat Sakhan	UD140737	FM-5	
	Tha Khantho	UD120732	FM-1	
Yang Talat	Nai Amphoe Office	UD265138	FM-5	156.250 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UD265138	FM-1	
	Ban Sied - Hua Wua	UD330065	FM-1	
	Don Ngoen - I Tu	UD078236	FM-1	
	Huai Mek	UD106360	FM-5	
	Hua Khua - Um Mao	UD364142	FM-1	
	Khok Yai - Bua Ban	UD083142	FM-1	
	Nong Mak To - Bung Na Riang	UD210332	FM-5	
	Nong Waeng - Noe	UD270332	FM-1	
	Spare	UD265139	FM-5	

Table E2

(U) **VRS INSTALLATIONS**
LOEI

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
Chiang Khan	Noi Amphoe Office	QV830806	FM-5	155.150 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	QV830806	FM-5	
	Ban That	QV862605	FM-5	
	Buham	QV899862	FM-1	
	Khao Kheo	QV949718	FM-1	
	Na Chan	QV734679	FM-5	
	Song Puai - That	QV973675	FM-5	
Dan Sai	Noi Amphoe Office	QV285115	FM-5	155.050 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	QV285115	FM-5	
	Huai Mon - Kok Sathon	QU237914	FM-5	
	Kok Cham Pa - Pong	QU314970	FM-5	
	Na Dan	QV453192	FM-5	
	Na Di	QV295228	FM-5	
	Na Kho	QV315379	FM-5	
	Na Phung	QV179257	FM-5	
	Nong Bua	QV510315	FM-5	
	Pi on Sung	QV380130	FM-5	
	Pla Ba	QV510235	FM-5	
	Saeng Pha - Na Haeo	QV126350	FM-5	
	Wang Yao	QV481042	FM-5	
Muang	Noi Amphoe Office	QV891352	FM-5	
	Amphoe Police Station	QV891352	FM-5	
	Ban Sup - Nam Suai	RV005510	FM-5	
	Na Duang - Nam Suai	RV173347	FM-5	
	Na Pong	QV885273	FM-5	
	Nam Suai - Na Din Dam	RV117389	FM-1	
	Nam Suai Sa-At	RV117389	FM-5	
	Nong Na Sai - Na Din Dam	RV015531	FM-5	
	Pak Mak - Na O	QV922529	FM-5	
	Phon Pa Daeng - Sieo	QV793344	FM-5	
	San Tom - Tha Sala	QV632299	FM-5	
	Spare	QV891351	FM-5	
Pak Cham	Chiang Klom	RV125710	FM-5	
	Pak Cham	RV052950	FM-5	
Phu Kradung	Noi Amphoe Office	RU080688	FM-1	155.350 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	RU080688	FM-1	
	Non Pa Daeng - Pha Khao	RU169850	FM-5	
	Nong Mak Kaeo - Puan Phu	QV906010	FM-5	
	Si Than	RU057680	FM-1	
Tha Li	Noi Amphoe Office	QV572500	FM-1	155.100 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	QV572500	FM-1	
	A-mi	QV495535	FM-1	
	Na Muang	QV415480	FM-1	
	Nam Khaem - Tha Li	QV685580	FM-1	
	Nong Phu	QV552429	FM-1	
Wang Saphung	Noi Amphoe Office	QV947146	FM-5	155.250 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	QV947146	FM-5	
	Muang Baeng - Nong Yai Plong	RV055085	FM-5	
	Na Sam Sae - Nong Ngiu	QV775137	FM-5	
	Nong Khan	QU870950	FM-5	
	Nong Yai - Pha Noi	RV160160	FM-5	
	Pha Noi	RV010215	FM-5	
	Sai Khao	QV866080	FM-5	

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Table E3

VRS INSTALLATIONS
MAHA SARAKHAM

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
Borabu	Noi Amphoe Office	TC992738	FM-5	155.000 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TC992738	FM-5	
	Bo Yai	UC066820	FM-5	
	Bua Mat	UC090572	FM-5	
	Dong Man	UC075650	FM-5	
	Hua Nong - Wang Chai	TC788714	FM-1	
	Kut Rang	TC875800	FM-5	
	Lao Ta Ma - Pon Daeng	TC728584	FM-5	
	Lao Yao - Kamphi	UC019624	FM-5	
	Sok Khong	TC842666	FM-5	
	Talat	TC992738	FM-5	
Chiang Yun	Noi Amphoe Office	TD972150	FM-5	
	Amphoe Police Station	TD972150	FM	
	Ban Chan - Chiang Yun	TD948237	FM-5	
	Ban Kheng - Ku Thong	TD903192	FM-1	
	Ban Krabak - Lao Dak Mai	UD043220	FM-1	
	Kut Pladuk - Chum Chom	UD020335	FM-5	
	Nong Khu - Nong Chan	TD995127	FM-1	
Kantharawichai	Noi Amphoe Office	UD186052	FM-5	
	Amphoe Police Station	UD186052	FM-5	
	Khwao Yai	UC080760	FM-1	
	Makho	UC265986	FM-5	
	Nong Khon - Khantharat	UD188049	FM-5	
	Nong Um - Na Si Nuan	UD085022	FM-1	
	Tha Khon Yang	UC150955	FM-1	
	Spare - Amphoe Police Station	UD186052	FM-5	
Kosum Phisai	Noi Amphoe Office	TC938971	FM-5	156.050 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TC938971	FM-5	
	Ban Khuan	TD963071	FM-5	
	Hua Chang - Yang Nai	TD990023	FM-5	
	Khing Daeng	TC980933	FM-5	
	Kok Klang - Khwao Rai	TD770076	FM-5	
	Non Sung - Nong Lek	TC817822	FM-5	
	Nong Ko - Phaeng	TC647957	FM-5	
	Nong Phy - Nong Bua	TD844073	FM-5	
	Thip Sot - Wang Yao	TC737874	FM-5	
	Wang Yao	TC784958	FM-5	
Muang	Noi Amphoe Office	UC185900	FM-5	
	Amphoe Police Station	UC185900	FM-5	
	Ban Khwao	UC290857	FM-5	
	Ban Kaeng	UC230923	FM-5	
	Don Wan	UC250732	FM-5	
	Kae Dam	UC280720	FM-5	
	Kho Noi - Kaeng Saeng Chan	UC175855	FM-5	
	Khok Ko	UC147753	FM-5	
	Nong Bua Noi - Nong Kung	UC268790	FM-5	
	Talat	UC185900	FM-5	
	Tha Song Khon	UC103907	FM-5	
	Tha	UC348892	FM-5	
	Waeng Nang	UC198844	FM-5	
Na Chuak	Noi Amphoe Office	TC893459	FM-5	155.450 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TC893459	FM-5	
	Hua Dong - Samrong	TC865585	FM-5	
	Khing Kaeng - Khwao Rai	TC901491	FM-5	
	Na Phu	TC900360	FM-5	
	Nong Kung - Na Chuak	TC913400	FM-5	
	Nong Pho	TC974451	FM-5	

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
Phayakkhaphum Phisai	Noi Amphoe Office	UC067158	FM-5	155.300 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UC067158	FM-5	
	Don Li - Nong Bua Kaeo	UC165234	FM-5	
	Don Tiu - Kam Phu	UC091210	FM-1	
	Dong Muang Noi-Dong Bang	TC995320	FM-5	
	Loo Mak Kham - Na Phu	TC905337	FM-5	
	Na Si Nuan	UC123265	FM-1	
	Non Ya Nang - Muang Tao	UC264079	FM-5	
	Nong Bua Noi - Khan Rian	TC995275	FM-5	
	Nong Pling - Phan Aen	UC121320	FM-5	
	Pa Tong - Ban Ku	UC055335	FM-5	
	Ta Lak - Mek Dam	TC990174	FM-1	
Wapi Pathum	Noi Amphoe Office	UC269522	FM-5	155.950 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UC269522	FM-5	
	Dong Yai	UC195575	FM-5	
	Kham Pom	UC291586	FM-1	
	Khak Rai - Ngua Ba	UC206640	FM-1	
	Kut O - Hua Rua	UC190462	FM-1	
	Loo Chan	UC265693	FM-5	
	Lin Fa - Nong Phai	UC336447	FM-1	
	Na Kha	UC080516	FM-5	
	Nong Khu - Sua Kak	UC357652	FM-5	
	Nong Thum - Na Dun	UC145390	FM-5	
	Pho Chai	UC296431	FM-1	
	Talat	UC269522	FM-5	

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Table E4

VHS INSTALLATIONS
NAKHON PHANOM

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
Ban Phaeng	Noi Amphoe Office	VE173865	FM-5	155.800 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VE173865	FM-5	
	Don Daeng	UE965737	FM-5	
	Khak Pha Thai	VE173770	FM-1	
	Nong Waeng	VE205655	FM-5	
Don Tan	Noi Amphoe Office	VD925034	FM-5	156.000 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VD925034	FM-5	
	Ban Bak - Don Tan	VC861935	FM-5	
	Pa Chat- Pa Rai	VC710936	FM-5	
Khamcha-i	Noi Amphoe Office	VD385325	FM-5	155.950 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VD385325	FM-5	
	Ban Loo	VD450332	FM-5	
	Ban Song	VD396345	FM-5	
	Nong Ian Thung	VD423368	FM-1	
	Nong Sung	VD315220	FM-5	
	Nong Sung Tai	VD295173	FM-5	
	Tum Wun	VD235421	FM-5	
Muang	Noi Amphoe Office	VE769247	FM-5	
	Amphoe Police Station	VE769247	FM-5	
	Ban Ham - At Samat	VE716320	FM-5	
	Bun Phung - Kurukhu	VE615145	FM-5	
	Don Daeng - Kham Toet	VE68[illegible]007	FM-5	
	Dong Sawang - Kurukhu	VE602093	FM-5	
	Dong Tiu - Ban Klang	VD758970	FM-5	
	Kham Thao	VE789087	FM-5	
	Na Maihua	VE650050	FM-1	
	Nong Saeng - Kurukhu	VE458110	FM-5	
	Sua Kasem - Na Sai	VE696174	FM-5	

AMPHOI	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
Mukdahan	Noi Amphoe Office	VD699280	FM-5	155.900 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VD699280	FM-5	
	Dong Mon - Phung Daet	VD473417	FM-5	
	Kham Pa Lai	VD650488	FM-5	
	Loo Pa Pet - Na Sak	VD480254	FM-5	
	Na Ta Baeng - Kham Pla Lai	VD675531	FM-5	
	Na U-Dom	VD608983	FM-5	
	Nikham Kham	VD520096	FM-5	
	Pa Rai - Ban Khok	VD504372	FM-5	
	Phan Sai	VD580325	FM-5	
	Sam Khua - Dong Yen	VD717110	FM-5	
Na Koe	Noi Amphoe Office	VD472734	FM-5	155.650 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VD472734	FM-5	
	Dong Luang	VD514594	FM-5	
	Don Thon - Kan Luang	VD380762	FM-5	
	Kok Tum	VD190620	FM-5	
	Na Du	VD520759	FM-1	
	Nong Bo	VD333785	FM-5	
	Nong Bua	VD555582	FM-5	
	Nong Sang	VD433775	FM-5	
	Phimon	VD535730	FM-1	
	Phra Song	VD542805	FM-5	
	Phum Koe	VD590695	FM-5	
	Spare	VD472734	FM-1	
Pla Pak	Noi Amphoe Office	VD505990	FM-5	
	Amphoe Police Station	VD505990	FM-1	
	Khok Sawang	VD460925	FM-1	
	Krung Kron - Nong Hi	VD528955	FM-5	
	Ku Ta Kai	VE615040	FM-1	
	Mahachai	VE427100	FM-5	
	Mai Wang Soem	VE529052	FM-1	
	Na Chuak	VD530900	FM-1	
	Sawang Samran - Mahachai	VD382985	FM-1	
	Si Thon	VD424778	FM-1	
	Thung Pathai - Mahachai	VE467058	FM-1	
Si Songkhrar	Noi Amphoe Office	VE175518	FM-5	155.250 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VE175518	FM-5	
	Ban Kho - Bo Si Songkhram	VE077503	FM-1	
	Ban Ko - Ban Uang	VE169401	FM-5	
	Dong Noi - Sam Phong	VE149611	FM-1	
	Na Dua - Si Songkhram	VE268427	FM-5	
	Na Kum - Na Dua	VE316500	FM-5	
	Na Wa	VE045330	FM-5	
	Na Wua	VE050300	FM-5	
	Sam Phong	VE190578	FM-1	
Tha Uthen	Noi Amphoe Office	VE574433	FM-5	155.650 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VE574433	FM-1	
	Ban Klang - Nam Ton	VE556400	FM-1	
	Chai Buri	VE431520	FM-5	
	Ma Kham Tia - Na Khamin	VE460347	FM-1	
	Na Kham - Ban Kho	VE205303	FM-5	
	Phanom	VE400565	FM-5	
	Phon Sawan	VE420295	FM-5	
	Saphang - Ram Rat	VE635313	FM-5	
	Suan Kluai - Pho Thai	VE321694	FM-5	
	Tha Champa	VE510470	FM-1	
That Phanom	Noi Amphoe Office	VD716738	FM-5	155.750 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VD716738	FM-5	
	Ban Renu	VD648850	FM-5	
	Ban Tong - Fang Daeng	VD699707	FM-5	
	Don Deeng	VD630775	FM-5	
	Don Nang Hong	VD735900	FM-5	
	Na Thon	VD738935	FM-5	
	Na Yo Yai	VD630961	FM-5	
	Nam Kam	VD718690	FM-1	
	Phra Klang Thung	VD715770	FM-5	
	Saen Phan	VD733865	FM-5	
	Tha Lai	VD568790	FM-5	

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Table E5

VRS INSTALLATIONS
NONG KHAI

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
Bung Kan	Nai Amphoe Office	UF583310	FM-5	156.450 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UF583310	FM-5	
	Bung Khla - Nong Doon	UF942224	FM-5	
	Don Ya Nang	UE535959	FM-5	
	Ho Kham - Nong Khang	UF347388	FM-5	
	Huai Chuam - Khak Kong	UF780220	FM-1	
	Phan Lam - Bung Kan	UF530343	FM-1	
	Sivilai - Chumphu Phan	UF670125	FM-5	
Muang	Nai Amphoe Office	TE610780	FM-5	156.150 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TE610780	FM-5	
	Ban Dua	TE810904	FM-1	
	Ban Fang	TE536500	FM-5	
	Ban - Wat That	TE682840	FM-1	
	Dua Pak Suai Noi - Ban Dua	TE887884	FM-5	
	Hat Kham - Wat That	TE658834	FM-1	
	Hin Ngam	TE716860	FM-1	
	Muang Mi Yai - Kuan Wan	TE553731	FM-1	
	Nong Song Hong - Bak Wan	TE636660	FM-5	
	Pa Kho - Wiang Khuk	TE567710	FM-1	
	Phra That Bang Phuan	TE545630	FM-5	
	Wiang Khuk	TE530692	FM-1	
	Yang Kham - Sa Khrai	TE655565	FM-5	
Phon Phisai	Nai Amphoe Office	TE968933	FM-5	156.600 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TE968933	FM-5	
	Ban Pak - Saem	UE198722	FM-5	
	Ban Sa	UE351997	FM-5	
	Don Dao - Phon Phaeng	UF274106	FM-5	
	Na Nang - Chum Chang	UE026823	FM-1	
	Nong Bua - Pak Khat	UF206371	FM-5	
	Nong Kung - Kut Bang	UF001064	FM-5	
	Nong Kwai - Chumphon	UF170005	FM-5	
	Nong Luang	UE161938	FM-5	
	Pak Khat	UF209241	FM-5	
	Tang Khan	TE831805	FM-5	
Saka	Nai Amphoe Office	UE893823	FM-5	156.250 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UE893823	FM-5	
	Ban Sang	UE900750	FM-5	
	Don Salt - Pho Mak Khaeng	UF870203	FM-5	
	Nong Hing - Tha Kak Daeng	UE738790	FM-5	
	Sak Kam - Pho Mak Khaeng	UE951957	FM-5	
	Tha Dak Kham - Dang Bang	VF042045	FM-5	
Si Chiang Mai	Nai Amphoe Office	UE893823	FM-5	156.250 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UE893823	FM-5	
	Ban Mo	TE380875	FM-5	
	Ban Mang	TE010120	FM-5	
	Khak Suak	TE288893	FM-1	
	King Sangkham	TE105005	FM-5	
	Pho Tak	TE270734	FM-5	
Tha Bo	Nai Amphoe Office	TE441749	FM-5	156 100 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TE441749	FM-5	
	Ban Dua	TE440677	FM-1	
	Khak Khan	TE360680	FM-5	
	Kang Nang	TE469805	FM-5	
	Nam Mang	TE433775	FM-1	
	Phon Sa - Tha Bo	TE469725	FM-1	

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Table E6

VRS INSTALLATIONS
ROI ET

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
At Samat	Noi Amphoe Office	UC804517	FM-5	156.350 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UC804517	FM-5	
	Ban Chaeng	UC890525	FM-5	
	Ban Du	UC650525	FM-5	
	Ban Khoen - Hora	UC737510	FM-5	
	Ban Moet - Ban Nam	UC880491	FM-5	
	Dong Sawang - Nong Kham	UC755498	FM-5	
	Hua Nong - Nong Bua	UC674546	FM-5	
	Nong Mun Than	UC908397	FM-5	
	Non Kho - Khi Lek	UC775527	FM-5	
	Phan Muang	UC798600	FM-5	
	Sala - At Samat	UC835487	FM-5	
Chaturaphak Phiman	Noi Amphoe Office	UC459521	FM-1	156.050 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UC459521	FM-1	
	Dong Daeng	UC528528	FM-1	
	Dong Klang	UC490477	FM-1	
	Khum Din - Nam Sai	UC510581	FM-5	
	Nong I Khet - I Ngong	UC466445	FM-1	
	Nong Kradoo	UC447590	FM-5	
	Nong To - Hua Chang	UC460485	FM-1	
	Fa Sang	UC550485	FM-1	
	Um Chan - Nong Phu	UC407514	FM-1	
Kaset Wisai	Noi Amphoe Office	UC482311	FM-5	155.250 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UC482311	FM-5	
	Dong Khrang Yai	UC435184	FM-5	
	Nong Ang - Kumphoeng	UC370215	FM-5	
	Nong Kung - Ban Klang	UC343344	FM-5	
	Nong Waeng	UC475325	FM-5	
	Som Hong - Muang Bua	UC500255	FM-5	
	Ummoo - Loo Luang	UC446357	FM-5	
Muang	Noi Amphoe Office	UC562749	FM-5	155.350 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UC562749	FM-5	
	Ban Koen - Nong Koeo	UC575565	FM-1	
	Ban Kho - Rap Muang	UC560675	FM-5	
	Loo Ngiu - Changhan	UC520870	FM-5	
	Loo Yai - Pho Thong	UC525740	FM-5	
	Muang Nam - Po Fa	UC560854	FM-5	
	Na Pho	UC488650	FM-5	
	Noi Nai Muang	UC562749	FM-1	
	Nong Bua Rong - Din Dam	UC585906	FM-5	
	Nong Kheng - Muang Lat	UC517883	FM-5	
	Po Haen - Suan Chik	UC398720	FM-5	
	Plual Yai	UC550710	FM-1	
	Po Phan	UC420776	FM-5	
	Sa-At Sambun	UC520655	FM-5	
	Si Koeo	UC445850	FM-5	
	Tub Tao - Khan Kaen	UC504722	FM-1	
Patum Rat	Noi Amphoe Office	UC223290	FM-5	155.800 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UC223290	FM-5	
	Ban Du - Phan Sung	UC285355	FM-1	
	Bua Khao - Non Sawan	UC285355	FM-1	
	Dak Lam - Bua Daeng	UC203320	FM-1	
Phanom Phrai	Noi Amphoe Office	VC051332	FM-5	155.900 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VC051332	FM-5	
	Khan Hai	VC113276	FM-1	
	Kut Nam Sai	VC008435	FM-5	
	Ma Li - Khak Sawang	VC009141	FM-1	
	Nong Hi	UC930260	FM-1	
	Nong Khun- Den Rat	UC880196	FM-5	
	Non Muang	VC062320	FM-1	
	Nong Thap Thai	UC908345	FM-5	

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
	Pho Chai	VC088247	FM-1	
	Pho Noi - Soen Suk	VC015385	FM-1	
	Pho Yai	UC951400	FM-1	
	Som Sa - At	UC990367	FM-1	
Selaphum	Nai Amphoe Office	UC864726	FM-5	155.150 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UC864726	FM-5	
	Ban Hoe - Ban Klang	UC883683	FM-5	
	Ban Khwao	UC900635	FM-1	
	Don Kaeo	UC918786	FM-1	
	Kut Khoe - Na Ngam	UC872603	FM-1	
	Na Muang	UC872762	FM-1	
	Na Pho - Pho Thong	VC058822	FM-5	
	Na Saeng	UC890835	FM-1	
	Na Thom - Phu Ngoen	UC990755	FM-1	
	Non Kham - Muang Phrai	UC910714	FM-1	
	Thc Muang	UC800814	FM-1	
Suwannaphum	Nai Amphoe Office	UC718257	FM-5	156.150 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UC718257	FM-5	
	Ban Mao - Sa Kao	UC730290	FM-5	
	Hin Kong	UC639250	FM-5	
	Hong Song - Thung Luang	UC717105	FM-5	
	Hua Thon	UC770348	FM-5	
	Mak Yang - Som Kha	UC830100	FM-5	
	Na Yai - Sung Yang	UC677363	FM-5	
	Nong Khong - Muang Thung	UC780273	FM-5	
	Pham Yai - Nong Phu	UC677480	FM-5	
	Pluai	UC815267	FM-5	
	Yang Do - Phon Sai	UC912120	FM-5	
Phon Thong	Nai Amphoe Office	UD913022	FM-5	155.450 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UD913022	FM-5	
	Ban Pong - Non Chaisi	UC804959	FM-5	
	Ban Sawang	UC936941	FM-5	
	Chiang Mai	UC745955	FM-5	
	Don Khwai - Sa At	UC655931	FM-5	
	Kham Bia	UD681044	FM-5	
	Khok Si - Chumphon	VD037084	FM-5	
	Nong Maei	VD083120	FM-5	
	Nong Waeng Huai Sai - Chumphon	VD006042	FM-5	
	Non Phu - Nong Yai	VC013893	FM-5	
	Ummao	UD780025	FM-5	
	Spare	UD913022	FM-1	
Thawatchaburi	Nai Amphoe Office	UC664734	FM-5	155.200 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UC664734	FM-5	
	Ban Do - Um Mao	UC750722	FM-5	
	Ban Ma-U	UC660783	FM-5	
	Ban Muang- Thawatchaburi	UC765815	FM-5	
	Khuang Noi - Mu Mon	UC630862	FM-5	
	Nong Bua - Khwao	UC682611	FM-5	
	Nong Phai	UC633688	FM-5	
	Thaet Thai - Ban Lao	UC773670	FM-5	
	Wai Lum - Mabo	UC630862	FM-5	

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Table I

VRS INSTALLATIONS
SAKON NAKHON

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
Akat Amnuoi	Nai Amphoe Office	UE925455	FM-5	
	Amphoe Police Station	UE925455	FM-5	
	Phon Ngam	UE903550	FM-5	
	Suam - Phon Phaeng	UE910415	FM-5	
	Tha Khwai - Phun Ngam	UE877667	FM-5	
	Wa Yai	UE893488	FM-5	
Ban Muang	Ban Mai	UE424760	FM-5	
	Ton Liao	UE424760	FM-5	
Kusuman	Nai Amphoe Office	VE287161	FM-5	156.300 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VE287161	FM-5	
	Na Phiang Mai - Um Chan	VE165215	FM-1	
	Na Pho	VE255155	FM-5	
	Pho Phaisan	VE325204	FM-5	
	Saen Phan - Um Chan	VE112197	FM-1	
Kut Bak	Nai Amphoe Office	UD743900	FM-5	
	Amphoe Police Station	UD743900	FM-5	
	Nong Taeng - Khak Phu	UD840805	FM-5	
	Phan Ngam - Na Mong	UD836910	FM-1	
	Spare	UD743900	FM-5	
Muang	Nai Amphoe Office	VD102982	FM-5	155 000 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VD102982	FM-5	
	Ban Klang - Na Kaeo	VE140075	FM-1	
	Bung Daeng - Muang Lai	VD261948	FM-5	
	Don Chiang Ban - Chiang Khrua	VE099075	FM-1	
	Dong Chan	VD186912	FM-5	
	Dong Luang - Bung Thawai	VD099870	FM-1	
	Na Dak Mai - Phang Khwang	VE082028	FM-1	
	Na Kaeo	VE177070	FM-1	
	Na Oi - Huai Yang	VD087940	FM-1	
	Nyiu Don	VD123927	FM-1	
	Nong Kaen - Dung Chan	VD170923	FM-1	
	Nong Phu Na Kaeo	VE220110	FM-5	
	Om Kaeo - Ban Phan	VD292997	FM-5	
	Phan Kho - Ban Lao	VD294797	FM-5	
	Pla Khao - Don Muang Kham	VD265880	FM-5	
	Siwicha - Huai Yang	VD038945	FM-5	
	Tha Rae	VE140075	FM-1	
	Tong Khan	VD220860	FM-5	
Phang Khon	Chang Ming	UE720192	FM-5	
	Na Thon - Hai Yang	UE743246	FM-5	
	Phung Khon - Muang Khai	UE798165	FM-5	
Phanna Nikhom	Nai Amphoe Office	UE781184	FM-5	
	Amphoe Police Station	UE781184	FM-5	
	Ban Rai	UE814134	FM-5	
	Ban Sawang	UE885200	FM-5	
	Khak Suwan - Phanna	UE765186	FM-5	
	Kut Kam - Ban Rai	UE776155	FM-5	
	Na Di - Na Hua Bo	UE865114	FM-5	
	Phak Nai	UE900130	FM-5	
	Un Dong - Na Nai	UD770995	FM-5	
	Wang Yang	UE832152	FM-5	
Sawang Daen Din	Nai Amphoe Office	UE366324	FM-5	155.020 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UE366324	FM-5	
	Dong Saen To - Watthana	UE462203	FM-5	
	Khak Si	UE342494	FM-5	
	Na Din Chi - Phan Sung	UE254420	FM-5	
	Na Thom - Ban Sawang	UE310266	FM-5	
	Nan Chim - Song Dao	UE451163	FM-5	
	Nong Thom	UE390261	FM-5	
	Phathumwapi - Song Dao	UE373170	FM-5	

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
	Pu Ta Kam - Tha Sila	UE314048	FM-5	
	Ton Kon - Ton Noeng	UE497211	FM-5	
	Than Samui - Song Dao	UE332187	FM-5	
Wanon Niwat	Nai Amphoe Office	UF680496	FM-5	155.550 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UF680496	FM-5	
	Ban Phaet - Kham Ta Klo	UE755643	FM-5	
	Dua Si Khan Chai	UE653290	FM-5	
	In Phoeng - Khu Sakham	UE526641	FM-5	
	Phon Phoeng - Khua Kai	UE804438	FM-5	
Warichaphum	Nai Amphoe Office	UE555121	FM-5	155.400 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UE555121	FM-5	
	Nong Kung - Kham Bo	UE509088	FM-1	
	Nong Lat	UE510125	FM-1	
	Pla Lai	UE583162	FM-1	
	Spare	UE555121	FM-1	

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Table E8

VRS INSTALLATIONS
UBON

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
Amnat Charoen	Nai Amphoe Office	VC607531	FM-5	155.100 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VC607531	FM-5	
	Amnat	VC630340	FM-5	
	Ban Chuak - Na Chik	VC565485	FM-5	
	Ban Puai	VC664340	FM-5	
	Dong Bang	VC737362	FM-5	
	Dong Mayang	VC616395	FM-5	
	Khok Kao - Na Phu	VC610670	FM-5	
	Khum Yai	VC730671	FM-5	
	Ma Wiang - Na Wang	VC575709	FM-5	
	Na Yom - Na Mo Ma	VC475525	FM-5	
	Nam Prik	VC430475	FM-5	
	Nong Mak Saeo-Song Nok - Tha	VC770467	FM-5	
	Nong Thap Ma-Senang - Nikhom	VC657735	FM-5	
	Phon Thong	VC720710	FM-5	
	Pla Khao	VC757443	FM-5	
	Po Lo Kai Kham	VC620468	FM-1	
	Rai Khi	VC760327	FM-5	
	Rai Si Suk	VC602777	FM-5	
	Tham Moei - Ban Bung	VC580605	FM-5	
Ban Don	Nai Amphoe Office	WB537932	FM-5	156.350 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	WB537932	FM-5	
	Huai Hai - Khong Chiam	WB489871	FM-1	
	Na Pho Klang	WC550200	FM-5	
	Nong Hi - Huai Yang	WC469052	FM-5	
	Wangsabaeng-Nong Saeng Yai	WB418918	FM-5	
	Spare	WB537932	FM-5	
Buntharik	Nai Amphoe Office	WB446313	FM-5	155.700 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	WB446313	FM-5	
	Huai Kha	WB397177	FM-5	
	Kho Laen	WB446417	FM-5	
	Na Pho - Kho Laen	WB320484	FM-5	
	Spare	WB446313	FM-5	

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
Chanuman	Noi Amphoe Office	WC018935	FM-5	156.400 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	WC018935	FM-5	
	Bung Khieo - Khok Kong	WC052795	FM-5	
	Kham Dunit - Kham Khuan Kaeo	VCP65837	FM-1	
	Kham Phon - Nong Kha	VC956643	FM-5	
	Khok Kong	WC002788	FM-5	
Det Udom	Noi Amphoe Office	WB086473	FM-5	156.150 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	WB086473	FM-5	
	Ban Kaeng	WB032225	FM-5	
	Ban Tum - Na Chaluai	WB209090	FM-5	
	Bumbe- Ban Yang	WB060075	FM-5	
	Lup Lao - Ban Klang	WB159327	FM-5	
	Na Chaluai	WB209090	FM-5	
	Na Kham - Som Sa-At	WB024368	FM-5	
	Na Suang	VB950598	FM-5	
	Na Yia	WB070655	FM-5	
	Non Kham - Kut Prathai	WB197552	FM-5	
	Nong Bua - Thung Thueng	VB862360	FM-5	
	Tap Mu	WB136248	FM-5	
Hua Taphan	Hua Dong - Kheng Yai	VC517390	FM-5	
	Hua Taphan	VC420385	FM-5	
	Kham Phra	VC437420	FM-5	
	Khok Lo - Nang Kaeo	VC539350	FM-5	
Kham Khuan Kaeo	Noi Amphoe Office	VC263305	FM-5	156.000 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VC263305	FM-5	
	Ban Yo	VC200375	FM-5	
	Dong Khoen Yai	VC363220	FM-5	
	Khi Lek - Lum Phuk	VC278340	FM-5	
	Ku Chan	VC341329	FM-5	
	Pla It - Na Kham	VC410229	FM-5	
	Phon Than	VC219344	FM-5	
	Song Puai	VC203299	FM-5	
	Thung Mon	VC255401	FM-5	
Khemarat	Noi Amphoe Office	WC247733	FM-5	155.050 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	WC247733	FM-5	
	Kham Pom	WC188650	FM-1	
	Muang Tao	WC206569	FM-5	
	Muang Yai	WC287527	FM-5	
	Na Tan	WC318573	FM-5	
	Nong Phu	WC040665	FM-5	
	Pha Lan	WC350633	FM-5	
	Sam Rong	WC492402	FM-5	
Khong Chiam	Noi Amphoe Office	WC294140	FM-5	155.800 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	WC294140	FM-5	
	Chan Thai - Warin	WC283027	FM-5	
	Fa Huan - Na Kham	WC340170	FM-5	
	Huai Mak Yai - Kham Lai	WC296050	FM-5	
	Kham Bong - Song Yang	WC253237	FM-5	
	Na Koe - Kaeng Kok	WC235119	FM-1	
	Nam Thaeng	WC530212	FM-5	
	Nong Pak Paso - Lat Khwai	WC308207	FM-5	
	Ubat Yai	WC235172	FM-1	
	Spare	WC294140	FM-5	
Khuang Nai	Noi Amphoe Office	VC522013	FM-5	155.750 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VC522013	FM-5	
	Ban Klang - Kha Thong	VC396004	FM-5	
	Ban Thai	VC404095	FM-5	
	Chi Thuan	VB640898	FM-5	
	Klang Noi - Klang Yai	VC399149	FM-5	
	Kut Kasian - Khuang Nai	VB520950	FM-5	
	Na Kham Yai	VB520865	FM-5	
	Non Rong	VC472147	FM-5	
	Phak Waen - Yang Khi Nok	VC444079	FM-5	

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
	Song Tho	VC488101	FM-5	
	Si Suk	VC519098	FM-5	
	Tho Noi	VB575910	FM-5	
	That Noi	VB384926	FM-5	
	Yong Noi - Ko-E	VB588984	FM-5	
Kut Chum	Noi Amphoe Office	VC305715	FM-5	155.750 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VC305715	FM-5	
	Ban Doeng - Phon Ngam	VC146765	FM-5	
	Huai Kaeng	VC240708	FM-1	
	Kut Hin - Kam Moet	VC290632	FM-5	
	Naso	VC250642	FM-5	
	Nong Rua - Non Pluai	VC289776	FM-5	
	Song Chang - Bin Phai	VC240595	FM-5	
	Spare	VC305715	FM-5	
Laeng Nak Tha	Noi Amphoe Office	VC487903	FM-5	155.700 MC
	Hong Saeng	VC373990	FM-5	
	Kham Phai Hua	VC500764	FM-5	
	Kham Toei	VC372785	FM-5	
	Kut Chiangmi	VC440995	FM-5	
	Na Kok - Bung Kha	VC620858	FM-5	
	Sam Yaek - Ban Sawat	VC527915	FM-5	
	Sam Yaek - Ban Sawat Police Station	VC527915	FM-5	
	Spare	VC487903	FM-5	
Maha Chana Chai	Noi Amphoe Office	VC192170	FM-5	155.250 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VC192170	FM-5	
	Ban Khun - Khu Muang	VC150133	FM-1	
	Ban Muang	VC278127	FM-1	
	Ban Po - Fa Huan	VB287980	FM-5	
	Bung Kae	VC292160	FM-5	
	Don Rua - Buk Rua	VC263191	FM-5	
	Fa Huan - Tambon Police Station	VB287980		
	Khu Song Chan - Hua Muang	VC148210	FM-5	
	Kut Nam Sai	VC314035	FM-5	
	Non Kloi	VC217073	FM-1	
	Non Yang - Phasao	VC117210	FM-5	
	Petong - Fa Yat	VC188172	FM-5	
	Tak Daet - Nam Om	VC220047	FM-5	
Muang	Noi Amphoe Office	VB851832	FM-5	155.450 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VB851832	FM-5	
	Ban Du - Pathum	VB870845	FM-1	
	Dong Bang - Don Mot Daeng	WB075930	FM-5	
	Dong Klang - Kham Yai	VB833[illegible]3	FM-1	
	Hua Rua	VB322985	FM-5	
	Kralop	VB953907	FM-1	
	Lao Sua Kok	VC920645	FM-5	
	Noi Muang - Rai Noi	VB868870	FM-1	
	Nam Kham - Kham Hai Yai	VB992899	FM-5	
	Nong Bo	VB684858	FM-5	
	Nong Chan - Chaeramae	VB775880	FM-5	
	Nong Lai - Nong Khon	VB747950	FM-5	
	Pha Kaeo Yai - Kut Lat	WB019916	FM-5	
	Phon Muang	WC057077	FM-5	
	Tha Muang	WC005104	FM-5	
	Wapi - Lao Daeng	WB021994	FM-5	
	Spare	VB851832	FM-5	
	Spare	VB851832	FM-1	
Muang Samsip	Noi Amphoe Office	VC711145	FM-5	155.150 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VC711145	FM-5	
	Bua Yang - Dum Yai	VC744260	FM-1	
	Khum Lek - Phon Muang Noi	VC584300	FM-1	
	Nong Hang	VC515140	FM-5	
	Nong Khai Nak	VC752027	FM-5	
	Nong Lak - Lao Bak	VC670298	FM-5	

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
	Nong Loo	VC663083	FM-5	
	Nong Mek - Nong Chang Yai	VC812198	FM-5	
	Nong Muang	VC732220	FM-1	
	Nong Yo - Chik Du	VC772030	FM-5	
	Phai Yai	VC595255	FM-5	
	Phatuk Ban Toei	VC792148	FM-5	
	Song Tho Noi	VC435300	FM-5	
	Tam Yae - Muang Samsip	VC670140	FM-5	
	Yang Krapho Lam	VC801065	FM-5	
	Yang Yaphop	VC641223	FM-1	
Phanna	Nai Amphoe Office	VC837337	FM-5	155.400 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VC837337	FM-5	
	Chenlon	VC888255	FM-1	
	Na Wa Yai - Ban Lu	VC910557	FM-5	
	Nong Sano - Ban Huai	VC955495	FM-5	
	Phan Muang - Mai Klon	VC802390	FM-1	
	Sao Ruk - Phana	VC870383	FM-1	
Phibun Mangshan	Nai Amphoe Office	WB263853	FM-5	
	Amphoe Police Station	WB263853	FM-5	
	Ang Hin Yai	WB300640	FM-5	
	Ban Dam - Non Klang	WB420660	FM-5	
	Chat Hi - Na Pho	WB218727	FM-5	
	Chik Taeng	WB122970	FM-5	
	Don Chik	WB282748	FM-5	
	Hua Don - Sai Mun	WB340883	FM-1	
	Koeng Pho - Rai Tai	WB167782	FM-5	
	Kutchomphu	WB321815	FM-1	
	Lo We	WB315946	FM-5	
	Na Mon - Tan San	WB184927	FM-5	
	Nong Buahi	WB256699	FM-5	
	Nong Mek - Fang Kham	WB470731	FM-5	
	Pho Si	WB252975	FM-1	
	Sam Rong	WB242990	FM-5	
Trakon Phutphon	Nai Amphoe Office	WC027258	FM-5	155.200 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	WC027258	FM-5	
	Ban Kasem	WC050340	FM-1	
	Ban Kok - Ban Kasem	WC047350	FM-5	
	Ban Nok - Koeng Kheng	WC078463	FM-5	
	Ban Muang - Ban Ka Bin	WC975410	FM-5	
	Ban Poo	WC954336	FM-5	
	Hong Mu - Non Kung	WC173307	FM-5	
	Kham Bia	WC947174	FM-1	
	Kham Kho - Lai Thung	WC970200	FM-1	
	Khao Pun - Kamnan Office	WC990450	FM-5	
	Khao Pun - Tambon Police Station	WC990450	FM-5	
	Khon Sai	WC085344	FM-5	
	Kradian	WC084244	FM-1	
	Kutsakon	WC052210	FM-1	
	Na Dua - Se Pet	WC014170	FM-1	
	Nam Kham - Na Samoi	WC173258	FM-5	
	Non Sawan - Khao Pun	WC994535	FM-5	
	Saphu	WC050164	FM-1	
	Sao Thong Noi - Na Phin	WC034175	FM-5	
	Tak Daet	WC189229	FM-5	
	Trakon	WC036105	FM-1	
Warin Chamrap	Nai Amphoe Office	VB861807	FM-5	155.850 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VB861807	FM-5	
	A-Loo - Kho Noi	VB786487	FM-5	
	Ban Bak - Non Non	VB822736	FM-5	
	Ban Bung Wai	VB705754	FM-5	
	Ban Yang - Kham Khwang	VB940807	FM-5	
	Bung Mang - Pho Yai	VB864824	FM-5	
	Dong Yai - Nong Hai	VB723537	FM-5	
	Huai Khayung - Tha Lat	VB666700	FM-5	

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
	Khom Nok Ploo - Tho Chang	WB031841	FM-5	
	Khok Sawang - So Suming	VB871521	FM-5	
	Sanrong	VB767590	FM-5	
	Sawang	WB120915	FM-5	
Yasotton	Noi Amphoe Office	VC084461	FM-5	155.600 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	VC084461	FM-5	
	Ban Bak - Sam Ran	VC075509	FM-1	
	Ban Phu - Du Thung	UC990555	FM-1	
	Ban Sing	VC177498	FM-5	
	Dong Mafai	VC080693	FM-5	
	Du Lat	VC132687	FM-5	
	K'om Daeng - Ban Daet	VC000636	FM-5	
	Kho Nun	VC006533	FM-5	
	Khuang Khom	VC140404	FM-5	
	Na Wiang	VC087770	FM-5	
	Nong Rua - Kho Dai Yai	VC045602	FM-5	
	Nong Hin	VC214526	FM-5	
	Nong Khu - Tat Thong	VC155630	FM-5	
	Sai Mun	VC155630	FM-5	
	Tap Tao - Nam Khom Yai	VC088496	FM-1	
	Thung Tae	VC133575	FM-5	
	Spare	VC084461	FM-5	

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Table E9

VRS INSTALLATIONS
UDON

AMPHOE	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
Ban Dung	Noi Amphoe Office	UE143583	FM-5	156 100 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	UE148583	FM-5	
	Khi Nok - Na Mai	UE130683	FM-1	
	[illegible] Ko	UE222460	FM-5	
	Pa Poo - Dong Yen	UE290504	FM-5	
Ban Phu	Noi Amphoe Office	TE324572	FM-5	155.650 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TE324572	FM-5	
	Ban Kong - Nam Som	SF929709	FM-5	
	Ban Mai - Muang Phan	TE199570	FM-1	
	Ban Sawang - Na [illegible]	TE079816	FM-5	
	Khao San	TE245462	FM-5	
	Klang Yai	TE240672	FM-5	
	Na Wua - Nong Waeng	TE012661	FM-5	
	Nong Hua Khu - Khua Nam	TE465460	FM-5	
	Non Sawang - Chan Pa Mong	TE240516	FM-1	
	Non Thong - Ban Mek	TE325480	FM-1	
Kumphuwapi	Noi Amphoe Office	TD896931	FM-5	155 550 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TD896931	FM-5	
	Bung Kaeo - Si O	TD830770	FM-5	
	Bung Mak Lan - Pa Kha	TD755880	FM-5	
	Don Klang - Um Chan	TE958047	FM-5	
	Huai Koeng	TD802885	FM-5	
	Na Muang - Huai Sam Phad	TE889068	FM-5	
	Nam Pong - Phan Don	TD840950	FM-5	
	Nong Saeng - Sam Phlan	TD719978	FM-5	
	Pha Si Samran	TD718785	FM-5	
	Tha Puai - Tum Tai	TD905513	FM-5	

AMPHOI	LOCATION	COORDINATES	RADIO TYPE	FREQUENCY
Muang	Nai Amphoe Office	TE657254	FM-5	156.050 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TE657254	FM-5	
	Ban Phia - Kut Chan	TE420273	FM-5	
	Dong Nong Lao - Chiang Yum	TE590298	FM-5	
	Khao San - Ban Tat	TE708160	FM-5	
	Mu Mon	TE635330	FM-5	
	Na Aeng - Nikhom Song Khro	TE562238	FM-5	
	Non Pho - Up Bong	TD414912	FM-5	
	Nong Bua Ban - Mak Ya	TE450155	FM-5	
	Nong Na Khom - Nong Bu	TE760220	FM-5	
	Song Ko - Pa Kho	TE455345	FM-5	
	Song Paen - Chiang Phin	TE522340	FM-5	
	Than Yai - Ban Khao	TE691415	FM-5	
Na Klang	Na Klang	TE034146	FM-1	
	Kut Phung - Na Li	TE107474	FM-5	
	Thung Prong - Koo Loi	TE227210	FM-5	
Nan Song	Nai Amphoe Office	TD417660	FM-1	155.600 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TD417660	FM-1	
	Ban Thin - Hin Siu	TD432774	FM-1	
	Don Po - Nong Bua Tai	RD200724	FM-1	
	Nong Kung Khamhai - Nong Rua	TD354654	FM-1	
	Nong Ta Na - Khak Yai	TD440602	FM-1	
	Nan Muang	TD298634	FM-1	
Nong Bua Lam Phu	Nai Amphoe Office	TE286037	FM-5	155.450 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TE286037	FM-1	
	Kong Po - Ban Kham	TD295897	FM-1	
	Nong Bua Sam - Nong Sawan	TE162044	FM-1	
	Nong Phai Son - Nong Bua	TE229085	FM-1	
Nang Han	Nai Amnhoe Office	TE994203	FM-5	155.800 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TE994203	FM-5	
	Ban Doeng - Soi Phrao	TE943417	FM-5	
	Ban Kang - Soi Phrao	TE902270	FM-5	
	Ban Ye	UE192229	FM-5	
	Chi i Wan	UE131130	FM-5	
	Don Sai - Ban Chit	TE981030	FM-5	
	Kho Yai - Phang Ngu	UE035035	FM-1	
	Na Chum Saeng - Sabaeng	UE078305	FM-5	
	Nikham Sankhro - Phan Ngam	TE825200	FM-5	
	Thung Pan - Ban Chiang	UE165325	FM-5	
Phan	Nai Amphoe Office	TE785573	FM-5	155.950 MC
	Amphoe Police Station	TE785573	FM-5	
	Ban Thin - Ban That	TE660550	FM-5	
	Chiang Wang	TE690516	FM-5	
	Cham Si	TE761729	FM-5	
	Na Bua	TE870427	FM-5	
	Nang Nak Khlan- Na Phu	TE660483	FM-5	
	Nang Phang - Ban Loo	TE940556	FM-5	
	Song Khan	TE985717	FM-5	
	Sum Sao	TE869455	FM-5	
Si Bun Ruang	Hua Na	TD248824	FM-5	
	Na Kok	TD023709	FM-5	
	Nan Klet - Yang Ln	TD016878	FM-5	
Si That	Nong Waeng - Champi	UD062772	FM-5	

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12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
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13. ABSTRACT

(U) This report is one of seven volumes describing counterinsurgency-related organizations and programs operating in Northeast Thailand. It describes in detail five paramilitary programs (the Volunteer Defense Corps, the Village Security Officers, the People's Assistance Teams, the Village Protection Teams, and the proposed Village Security Force) and two related programs (the Village Radio System and the Census Aspiration Cadres).

DD FORM 1473

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