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COUNTERINSURGENCY ORGANIZATIONS AND
PROGRAMS IN NORTHEAST THAILAND (U)

Volume 4

POLICE ORGANIZATIONS
AND PROGRAMS

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Prepared by
RESEARCH ANALYSIS CORPORATION
Field Office-Thailand

for the
JOINT THAI-US MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER

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
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POLICE ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS

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The volumes in this series are:

- Volume 1: COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS FUNCTIONAL MISSIONS
- Volume 2: MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS
- Volume 3: PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS
- Volume 4: POLICE ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS
- Volume 5: DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS
- Volume 6: HEALTH IMPROVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS
- Volume 7: US AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

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December 1969

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APO San Francisco 96346

Military Research and Development Center
Bangkok, Thailand

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PREFACE

This volume is one of a series being prepared under a research project carried out by the Research Analysis Corporation Field Office-Thailand for the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD/ARPA) and the Joint Thai-US Military Research and Development Center. The basic objective of this project is to compile a systematic and comprehensive description and documentation of counterinsurgency programs, organizations, and activities in Northeast Thailand. A secondary objective (addressed in Vol. 1 of this series) is to determine and define the systems relationships that exist among CI programs and activities underway in the Northeast and to describe how these individual programs interrelate within and across functional mission lines.

The information in this and the other volumes of this series is expected to be of value to those currently involved in managing and advising on CI programs on a day-to-day basis, those concerned with the development of improved CI management structures, US Mission personnel newly arrived in Thailand who require an orientation to ongoing CI programs, decision makers involved in determining the future direction of the CI effort, and research personnel engaged in follow-on studies.

This volume describes the counterinsurgency activities of the Thai National Police Department (TNPd), with particular emphasis on the operations of the Provincial Police and Border Patrol Police in the Northeast, the area in which the insurgent threat was most serious when this project was initiated. Data for this volume were collected from all available secondary sources; however, much of the information presented resulted from interviews with TNPd personnel and US advisors to the TNPd, both in Bangkok and in the field.

In the text, transliterations of Thai words have been used (e.g., changwat, nai amphoe, tambon, phuyaiban, etc.) where no exact equivalent in English exists. Most of these words are in common usage and have been anglicized in practice. A glossary

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has been provided to assist those readers not familiar with these words. Transliteration of place names has generally followed the system recommended by the Royal Institute of Thailand which has also been used by the Army Map Service in the preparation of their maps and by the National Statistical Office, the Department of Local Administration, and US Operations Mission-Thailand in the joint preparation of their two useful publications, Changwat-Amphoe Statistical Directory and Amphoe-Tambon Statistical Directory of 14 ARD Changwats. Transliteration of officials' names, however, has followed the individual's preference.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Special thanks are extended to the many TNPB officers and men, and the personnel of the Office of Public Safety, US Operations Mission to Thailand, who provided information for this volume. Responsibility for its contents, however, remains with the author, Mr. Warren B. Stevens, and the editor of this volume, Dr. Dorothy K. Clark.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AOC	Air Operations Center
ARD	Accelerated Rural Development
BPC	Border Patrol Center
BPP	Border Patrol Police
BSVT	Border Security Volunteer Team
CI	counterinsurgency
CPM	Civilian-Police-Military
CPT	Communist Party of Thailand
CSC	Communist Suppression Committee
CSOC	Communist Suppression Operations Command
CSOD	Communist Prevention and Suppression Directorate
CT	communist terrorist
CW	continuous wave
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DOLA	Department of Local Administration
HPP	Highway Patrol Police
JSC	Joint Security Center
JST	Joint Security Team
KIA	killed in action
MLP	Mobile Line Platoon
MOE	Ministry of Education
MRP	Mobile Reserve Platoon
PARU	Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit
PAT	People's Assistance Team
PP	Provincial Police
ProAg	Program Agreement
RAS	Remote Area Security
RP	Railway Police
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTARF	Royal Thai Armed Forces
RTG	Royal Thai Government
SAF	Special Action Force
SOC	Special Operations Center
SSB	single-side band
TACS	Tactical Air Control System
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TNPD	Thai National Police Department
USOM	United States Operations Mission
VDC	Village Defense Corps
VPU	Village Protection Unit
VRS	Village Radio System
VSO	Village Security Officer
WIA	wounded in action

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GLOSSARY

Amphoe	Administrative division of a changwat; comparable to a county.
Baht	Thai unit of currency; one baht (฿1.00) is approximately equivalent to \$.05.
Changwat	The principal administrative division of the Kingdom of Thailand; comparable to a province or state.
Kamnan	Appointed (or, in some cases, elected) head of a tambon.
King Amphoe	A sub-amphoe established when the increasing population of an amphoe or the security situation warrants more decentralized control. (Throughout this volume, a base map of the Northeast has been used which delineates amphoe and king amphoe boundaries as of March 1968.
Mathayom	Thai secondary school formerly consisting of eight grades following four years of primary school. Currently consists of five grades following seven years of primary school.
Muban	Village.
Nai Amphoe	Appointed head of an amphoe.
Palad Amphoe	Deputy to nai amphoe.
Palad Changwat	Deputy to a changwat governor; usually more than one, each with a separate function.
Phuyaiban	Elected chief of a village.
Prathom	Thai elementary school formerly consisting of four grades; currently consists of seven grades.
Tambon	Administrative division of an amphoe; comparable to a township.

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OVERVIEW

Police Organizations and Programs

INTRODUCTION


(U) The Thai National Police Department (TNPD) has for over 100 years been the major governmental element concerned with preservation of law and order and internal security from subversion and insurgency. As the country has developed in recent years, the Department has expanded its traditional functional elements and added new ones. This volume discusses in some detail the Provincial Police (PP) and Border Patrol Police (BPP) and their activities, primarily as these are carried on in the Northeast, not only because they are the largest police elements but because they are in close touch with the rural populace and are actively engaged in counterinsurgency operations. Brief discussions are also included of the Marine Police, Highway Police, Railway Police, and Forestry Police, segments of which also operate in the Northeast countryside and represent other aspects of law enforcement as well as reinforcement potentials for the PP and BPP. Figure 1 shows the countrywide distribution of PP, BPP, and Marine Police elements, including PP Special Action Forces (SAF) and BPP Line Platoons and Mobile Reserve Platoons (MRP) as of late 1968; locations and numbers of units change frequently.

ORGANIZATION


(U) The TNPD is a department in the Ministry of Interior. It is headed by a Director General who is a Police General and who also in 1969 became Minister of Public Health. Subordinate to the Director General is a Deputy Director General and two Assistant Director Generals, all of whom are Police Lieutenant Generals. These three officers exercise direct supervision over the three main groupings of the TNPD as shown in Fig. 2. Under the Deputy Director General are the administrative and support elements, and the Provincial Police who operate in nine Regions and the BPP who operate in eight Areas (see Fig. 1). One Assistant Deputy Director supervises the Educational Branch under which are the several Police Schools, and the Metropolitan Police of Bangkok-Thonburi. The other Assistant Director General supervises

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(U) Fig. 2: Organization of the Thai National Police Department

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the Inspector General and his field inspectors, and the Central Bureau of Investigation which controls the specialized elements of investigation, licensing, and patrol

STRENGTH

(U) (C) The TNPD as of June 1969 had a total strength of 73,967, including some 2000 civilian personnel. The Provincial Police is the largest component with some 41,650, followed by the BPP (including the BAPC and the Police Air Division) with about 8,300, the Metropolitan Police with about 8,440, and the Central Investigation Bureau with about 7,000. The Office of the Director General totals about 3,700 and the Education Bureau about 1,800.

FUNDING

(U) The RTG annual budget for the TNPD is about \$35,000,000 USOM support for FY-68 was \$12,774,000 and \$158,148,000 in counterpart funds; for FY-69, \$7,081,000 and \$132,941,604.

COMMUNICATIONS

(U) The TNPD Signal Division is responsible for all telecommunications within the Department and for support to the various police divisions. It operates a modern TNPD maintenance center located at the Paruskawan Palace, Bangkok.

(U) The headquarters of the various police divisions in Bangkok are connected by teletype, telephone, and messenger. Police Regions 1, 2, and 7 are connected to Bangkok by VHF-FM which furnishes two duplex voice and one duplex CW or teletype circuit. The Signal Division message and operations center maintains a remote transmitter and a remote receiver site about 10 km apart and north of Bangkok on the Friendship Highway. These sites have six single-sideband receivers and transmitters that are used to contact Regional Police headquarters in Regions 3-6, 8, and 9. Equipment is installed which provides one voice and one CW or radio teletype circuit to each Region.

(U) The Signal Department is also responsible for installation and maintenance of the radios in the Village Radio System described in Vol. 3 of the Manual.

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LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

(U) The TNPD Quartermaster Division is responsible for storage, maintenance, transportation, and resupply of TNPD supplies. It is also charged with design and construction of TNPD facilities. During 1968 a new system was put into effect whereby the Quartermaster transfers certain supplies such as vehicle spare parts direct to Police Region depots from which they can be requisitioned by Regional elements without reference to Bangkok. A system is also being developed whereby vehicle maintenance is done at Regional garages and minor repairs to vehicles and weapons are made by mobile teams who go to changwat and amphoe.

(U) US support for TNPD POL was discontinued late in FY-69.

MAJOR TNPD DIVISIONS

(U) As has been mentioned, the PP, BPP, Police Air Division, and the Marine Highway, Railway, and Forestry Police are discussed later in this volume. This section provides a brief description of those major elements of the TNPD not covered elsewhere, which contribute to CI operations in Northeast Thailand. The training activities of the Education Bureau are described in Appendix B.

Special Branch

- (U) ~~(C)~~ The Criminal Investigation Division or Special Branch of the Central Investigation Bureau is the internal security service of the Royal Thai Government. The responsibilities of the Special Branch include the protection of the nation from attempts to subvert its officials and people, and protection for His Majesty the King, senior officials, and visiting foreign dignitaries. Special Branch represents the TNPD's primary mechanism to attack the Communist Party and its front groups at the leadership level by using long-range, high-grade agent operations and its arrest powers under its official charter.
- (U) ~~(C)~~ Special Branch proved particularly effective during 1967 in mounting operations to penetrate and negate the efforts of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) by arrests of several high-level CPT members. Its personnel receive intensive training in techniques of investigation and interrogation.
- (U) ~~(C)~~ Of the seven divisions of Special Branch, Divisions 6 and 7 are the most directly concerned with CI. Division 6 (Anti-Communist) has taken part in planning and directing

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suppression operations in the Northeast. It is presently building a Central Registry for readily retrievable intelligence data. Division 7 (Provincial Intelligence) is responsible for Special Branch operations uncountryside. In 1968 it had outside Bangkok a total of 41 offices and 345 officers, including offices in all the 15 Northeast changwats. Expansion at the rate of 10 offices a year is planned. Special Branch also has a unit concerned with supervision of the some 50,000 Vietnamese, most of whom came into Thailand immediately after World War II and settled along the Mekong River in the Northeast.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Special Branch contributes personnel to the five Joint Security Centers, including JSC-3 and -4 in the Northeast, and furnishes trained interrogators who accompany RTG forces on CI operations. Much of the interrogation of high-level Communist suspects is done by Special Branch personnel.

Immigration Division

(U) The Immigration Division, under the TNP Director General, has two major responsibilities - control of entering aliens including prevention of entry of undesirable aliens, and supervision of aliens within Thailand.

(U) In 1968 the Immigration Division was maintaining a checkpoint in each of 23 provinces, 49 amphoes, and three tambons outside Bangkok, staffed by a total of 235 officials. Immigration officials work closely with local PP and BPP in these areas. In Northeast Thailand Immigration officials staff the following eight checkpoints: Sri Chiangmai, Tha Bo, Nong Khai, Tha Uthen, Nakhon Phanom, That Phanom, Mukdahan, and Chong Mek.

Crime Suppression Division

(U) The Crime Suppression Division is under the Central Investigation Bureau of TNP. It has an authorized strength of 1200 officers and men. This Division has countrywide jurisdiction and covers the following specific violations: offenses involving dignitaries, property losses over a specified amount, tax evasion, black market activities involving commodities of high consumer demand, narcotics, corruption of government personnel, and malfeasance of police and other RTG personnel. The Division also maintains a police unit equipped with transportation, communications, and weapons, and trained in riot control techniques, to assist other police divisions in controlling riots, demonstrations, and similar public disturbances.

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US ADVISORY SUPPORT

(U) Advisory support to the TNPD is furnished by the USOM Office of Public Safety. The USOM Assistant Director, Public Safety, has advisory responsibility to the Director General, TNPD.

(U) There are 51 advisory spaces authorized in the Office of Public Safety as well as 15 contract personnel. Senior USOM advisors normally have as their counterpart the commander of the TNPD division to which they are assigned. In some instances senior advisors may be assigned advisory responsibilities to more than one police division; for example, one senior advisor works with the Highway and Railway Police and his counterparts are the commanding officers of each of these two divisions.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Royal Thai Armed Forces

(U) (2) For counterinsurgency operations the PP and BPP are under the operational control of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) Commander, in the Northeast under Second Army, in the North under Third Army, and in the West Central region under First Army. Furthermore, in these areas the BPP elements adjacent to RTA Special Operations Centers (SOC) are under operational control of these SOCs.

(U) (2) PP and BPP (including the PARU) and their SAFs and MRPs, and Marine Police stationed along the Mekong, participate in suppression operations conducted by the RTA. Highway Police can also be summoned by the RTA for assistance in such operations. The police also contribute personnel to assist the military in setting up checkpoints and ambushes, join in patrols, and (particularly the Special Branch) in interrogation of insurgent suspects. The police are of special assistance to the RTA through their knowledge of local terrain and people. At amphoe and province level the senior police officer is a member of the CSC and participates in CI planning.

(U) (2) The Police Air Division maintains liaison with the RTAF at the Air Operations Control Center at Don Muang and through the DASCs in areas where police aircraft are operating. Division helicopters also take part in joint operations with RTAF and RTA Aviation aircraft.

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- (U) ~~(C)~~ Where there are RTAF bases tenanted by USAF elements, Senior PP and BPP officers take part in Base and Community Councils. Police patrols assist in maintaining air base security.

Paramilitary Organizations

- (U) ~~(C)~~ Provincial Police lead most of the teams of the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC), Village Security Officers (VSO), Village Protection Units (VPU), and other village defense elements in their areas. These paramilitary personnel turn over to the PP for investigation and disposition Communist suspects whom they have apprehended. Under coordination of changwat and amphoe CPs, they take part with the PP in joint activities such as patrols, road blocks, checkpoints, and province-level suppression operations. The Joint Security Teams which operate in 0910 target areas include PP as leaders and representatives of the law along with members from these paramilitary organizations. VDC help to man tambon police stations where the local PP strength is inadequate to provide a full staff.

Department of Local Administration (DOLA)

(U) The various police elements report directly through their own chains of command to their Bangkok headquarters. In many amphoes and changwats, however, the police elements and the Nai Amphoes and governors (who report to DOLA in the Ministry of Interior) have a close working relationship, particularly in the Northeast where PP and BPP police officers are part of the CSC staffs. At this writing the division of responsibilities between police and civilian authorities for investigation of arrested suspects has not been definitely resolved.

Other RTG Elements

(U) The Highway Police are funded by the Department of Highways and the Railway Police by the State Railway but receive equipment and administrative support from the TNPD. The Forestry Police work closely with the Royal Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture. The BPP in their border control activities cooperate with the Customs officials of the Ministry of Finance and the Immigration Division of the TNPD.

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PROVINCIAL POLICE

SUMMARY

(U) The Provincial Police (PP) is the largest operational element of the TNPD. The PP area of responsibility covers all of Thailand except Bangkok-Thonburi, which is the responsibility of the Metropolitan Police.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Overall nationwide strength of the PP is approximately 41,600, of which about 12,500 are assigned to the Northeast. Overall PP strength is presently expanding in order to accommodate its increasing responsibilities at the tambon and mu-ban levels. The PP operates through nine Regional headquarters; Region 3 (Korat) and Region 4 (Khon Kaen) cover the Northeast. A police complement is assigned to each changwat and amphoe, charged with maintenance of law and order and suppression of bandits. PP stations have full powers of preliminary investigation and arrest.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The PP has played a major role in the government's response to the developing insurgent threat. Their counter-insurgency capabilities have been extended through three new organizational elements: Tambon Police Stations, Joint Security Teams (JSTs) and Village Protection Units (VPUs), and Special Action Forces (SAFs). As of February 1969, a total of 321 tambon police stations, staffed by eight to 20 PP, had been created in the Northeast, providing permanent police presence and patrol capability below the amphoe level. PP sergeants have been assigned as team leaders to most of the 380 or so JSTs and VPUs deployed in the villages of Northeast Thailand. The 50-man SAFs, of which there are 15 in the Northeast, constitute the primary police reaction and strike element; these units have made a major contribution to counterinsurgency suppression operations.

BACKGROUND

(U) The PP can trace its origin back to 1860, when King Rama IV ordered the formation of a police division to combat "the

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people's persecution by pernicious feudalism." The first police commander was an Englishman, Captain Ames, a former master of a four-masted schooner, who had settled in Thailand in 1853 and was operating a contracting business. When Captain Ames was commissioned by King Rama IV to organize a police force, he brought in his Malay and Indian employees. The Thai people regarded these early policemen as "watchmen," a job usually performed by non-Thais. Thai nationals became interested in joining the force as the police began to win general acceptance under Royal support, and over the years the police were finally completely staffed by Thais.

(U) During the reign of King Rama V (1868-1910), the police were formed into metropolitan and provincial branches; and the police working outside the Bangkok area were formally called "Provincial Police."

ORGANIZATION

(U) PP organization is shown in Fig. 3; the nine Regional boundaries are shown in Fig. 1. The SAFs, as indicated, are under the control of a separate PP Assistant Commissioner for Operations but are directly responsive to regional and changwat commanders. The Border Patrol Police are discussed in the next section of this volume.

Regional Level

(U) Northeast Thailand is divided into Provincial Police Regions 3 and 4, each commanded by a police Major General. Region 3, with its headquarters at Korat, includes the six changwats of Korat, Chaiyaphum, Surin, Buri Ram, Si Sa Ket, and Ubon. Region 4, with headquarters at Khon Kaen, contains the nine changwats of Udon, Loei, Khon Kaen, Nong Khai, Sakon Nakhon, Nakhon Phanom, Maha Sarakham, Kalasin, and Roi-Et. Figure 4 illustrates these boundaries. Each Region headquarters contains staff sections responsible for administration, intelligence, operations, and supply, each headed by a police colonel. In addition, there is a scientific crime detection superintendent and a laboratory section at each Region.

(U) (c) Regions 3 and 4 PP personnel are also involved in the regional Communist Suppression Operations Division. Each Region commander is the director of the Joint Security Center (JSC) in his Region. The JSCs are intelligence-gathering organizations that collate and analyze intelligence obtained throughout their Region. In practice, a deputy

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Region commander with the rank of colonel usually acts as the full-time director of a JSC, while the remainder of the 52-man staff is made up of military and civilian as well as PP personnel. The changes in Northeast command channels made in October 1967 placed the two Northeast JSCs under the operational control of Second Army Forward.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Regions 3 and 4 also have Special Action Force (SAF) platoons under the direct control of the region commanders. The SAF platoons consist of 50 men organized into a headquarters and four squads of 10 men each, as indicated in Fig. 4. The concept for these units, which were first introduced in June 1966, called initially for one SAF to be assigned to each police Region. As additional SAFs have been created, however, assignment has also been made to the changwats to operate as a mobile reserve force in support of police commanders at changwat level. As of January 1969, there were 10 SAF platoons assigned to Northeast Thailand. During 1969 five more SAF platoons are scheduled for assignment to Regions 3 and 4, bringing the total for the Northeast to 15.


(U) The primary role of the SAF is to provide each PP regional commander with a highly trained and properly equipped body of men to cope, on a quick-response basis, with situations beyond the normal police capabilities available to the Regional commander. The SAFs and the Mobile Reserve Platoons (MRPs) of the BPP (see next section) also complement and provide support to the tambon police station program described later in this section. The tambon stations in themselves are not strong enough to withstand major attacks by insurgent units, and the SAFs and MRPs provide a reserve-reinforcement potential for these stations in changwats in which they are deployed. Secondary missions of the SAF are to perform normal police assignments when not being used in the quick-response role and to act as instructors to give refresher training to other police personnel.

Provincial Level

(U) Directly below Region are the police headquarters at changwat level. Each changwat has a chief of police (usually a lieutenant colonel or colonel), a deputy changwat chief of police (usually a major or lieutenant colonel), and a changwat staff performing administrative, intelligence, operations, and supply duties. The changwat headquarters commands all PP within the changwat.

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(U) Fig. 4: SAF Platoon Organization

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(U) In the seven CSC (Communist Suppression Committee) changwats, which were formerly CPMs*, a special headquarters is charged with counterinsurgency operations. The chief of the changwat police headquarters is a member of the CSC staff, which is headed by the governor and includes an RTA officer as the CSC military advisor.

(U) As noted above, some SAF units have been deployed under the control of the changwat police headquarters to conduct operations within particular changwats. Other units have been held in reserve at the Regional level. The initial RTG response to the new insurgent threat which emerged in the tri-province area (Phitsanulok, Petchabun, Loei) in December 1968 involved rapid deployment of eight SAFs into the area. Those deployed from northeastern locations were returned early in 1969.

Amphoe Level

(U) The next lower PP headquarters is the amphoe police station. The amphoe police chief commands all police within the amphoe and closely supervises the activities of all tambon police stations within his area. In the many tambons in which permanent PP stations have not yet been established, the amphoe police station is responsible for providing police presence and enforcing the law through periodic visits and patrols among the villages.

Tambon Level

(U) The creation and multiplication of tambon police stations is a key element in countering insurgency in Thailand and represents a significant step in the RTG effort to increase rural security and to bring the government closer to the villages. Construction of these stations started in 1965, and 148 country-wide had been built before support from USOM began in 1966. By the end of FY-68, 750 stations had been programmed; and 125 more were programmed for completion in FY-69. An additional 129 are planned during FY-70, bringing the total completed under the program at this point to 1004. By early 1969, 189 had been built,

*Kalasin, Nakhon Phanom, Loei, Nong Khai, Sakon Nakhon, Ubon, and Udon. For more details on CPMs and CSCs, see Vol. 1, "Command and Control Organizations."

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on the authority of a Royal decree, to accommodate 20 men and their families on a permanent basis; 111 of these were in the Northeast in all 15 changwats. It is hoped that eventually all tambon police will live at their posts since familiarity with the terrain and the people is an important asset in their work.

(U) Since its inception, the primary forces in the tambon police station program have been in the Northeast. Through FY-68 there were 440 tambon stations programmed in the Northeast (196 in Region 3 and 244 in Region 1). For FY-69, 15 are programmed in each of the two regions. Appendix A gives the locations of the Northeast stations constructed and planned through FY-69.

(U) Tambon stations are placed in security-sensitive areas and/or where there is no other security element present. A survey in January 1969 indicated that, as had been planned, one-half the stations (completed, under construction, or programmed) were actually in insurgent-threatened tambons. Wherever possible the station is placed in a village in the center of the tambon so that patrols in any direction can reach the station with their FM-1 radios, whether or not this central village happens to be where the tambon chief (kamnan) lives.

(U) The stations are built on a contract basis as funds become available. In some cases the station has been completed before there were sufficient PP to man it fully. In this case three PP have been assigned to protect the property; and, if insurgents were active in the area, Village Defense Corps (VDC) members have been added to complete the staffing.

(U) The land is donated by the people in the village where the station is located. The tambon police concept envisages the station in the middle of the village where it can also serve as a community center. Sometimes, however, land is available only on the outskirts or even some distance away. In a few such cases the villagers for the sake of security have moved to be close to the station.

(U) The standard 20-man staff includes a chief (sub-lieutenant or sergeant-major), an assistant, a radio operator, a medic, a clerk, three patrol leaders, and 12 patrolmen and guards.

(U) The tambon station, besides providing security, is intended to serve as a center for community activities, so as

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to improve police relations with the people and thereby stimulate the flow of intelligence. The tambon police medic has first-aid equipment and a store of basic medicines. At five stations in changwat Korat the station police conduct a youth program which involves construction of a playground in the village and instruction in and encouragement of games and sports. Tambon police are also expected to assist the villagers in digging wells for public use, to cooperate with any units engaged in road construction in the neighborhood, and to distribute seeds and loan out light construction tools. Essentially this development role is the same as that initiated under the BPP Remote Area Security program described in the BPP section. The TNPD by assuming responsibility for development supplies for both PP and BPP appears to be tending toward a merger of these activities.

- (u) (c) The major difficulty in bringing the tambon police program into full operation has been the lack of PP manpower to staff the stations. An increase of 250 stations a year at 20 men per station means that 5000 PP a year must be added to the force. Some 1200 BPP have been borrowed and some volunteers from the Metropolitan Police from Bangkok brought in. These are being replaced by TNPD assignment of new recruits to these other police elements.

Muban Level

- (u) (c) Tambon police not only provide a base for patrols and serve as a response force within the tambon, but PP influence is being extended through outposts in other tambon villages (muban). Ninety such outposts were programmed for construction during 1969. Units composed of two PP sergeants and six full-time villagers, drawn from the regular military conscription rolls for the area, will provide a police presence for the villages which have muban outposts. These muban police elements, which are additional to those assigned to the tambon police station complement, will operate under the command and control of the tambon station. By mid-1969 540 villagers had been drafted for this program and 180 PP NCOs designated as muban police element leaders. The initial program calls for a pilot effort of 90 teams operating in 28 tambons in the more security-sensitive areas of Region 4.

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LOCATIONS AND STRENGTH

(U) (S) The years 1967 and 1968 saw a steady growth of police strength in the Northeast. As of 30 June 1967, there were approximately 8000 PP assigned to the 15 changwats of Northeast Thailand; and by mid-1969 this number had increased to about 12,500. These police are responsible for a land area of about 170,000 km², containing approximately ten million people.


(U) It is extremely difficult to ascertain exact strengths for PP by Region. Figures obtained from USOM Public Safety advisors, Regions 3 and 4 Headquarters, and at changwat, amphoe, and tambon levels all vary. It is believed that the figures given below are within about 5 percent of actual strengths. The figures reported here do not include any of the men assigned to the Border Patrol Police.

Region 3

(U) (S) Region 3, with its headquarters at Korat, had as of mid-1969 about 6000 PP. They were stationed at Regional headquarters, six changwat headquarters, 72 amphoe stations, and 240 of 688 tambons, the other 448 tambons being covered by patrols from the amphoe stations. Each changwat and amphoe has a permanent police headquarters building. The strength per changwat varies from approximately 1100 in Ubon to less than 400 in Buri Ram, and strength at amphoe level anywhere from 30 to 200. New standardized TOEs for police complements at the changwat and amphoe level are now under development. However, because the principle of police deployment in force is one of concentration on those areas where local security needs are greatest, actual assignments in changwat and amphoe will undoubtedly continue to vary widely.

(U) (S) There are six 50-man SAF platoons in Region 3. One platoon is located at region headquarters in Korat; and one each at the changwat headquarters in Surin, Ubon, Buri Ram, Chaiyaphum, and Si Sa Ket (see Fig. 5). All six operate under direct control of the Region 3 commander.

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(U) (S) Fig. 5: Provincial Police Deployment in Northeast Thailand

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Region 4

- (U) (C) Region 4 had in February 1967 approximately 6500 police assigned to its nine changwats, 71 amphoes, and 585 tambons. A total of 177 permanent tambon stations had been constructed, and programmed construction will bring this total to approximately 292 by the end of 1969.
- (U) (C) There are seven SAF platoons in Region 4; one each at the Regional headquarters at Khon Kaen and in changwats Nong Khai, Udorn, Sakon Nakhon, Nakhon Phanom, Kalasin, and Loei. (See Fig. 6.) As in Region 3, these SAF platoons remain under the operational control of the Region commander.

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

(U) Appendix B of this volume, covering the TNPD Education Bureau, describes the several schools and training facilities operated in support of all police organizations. The Sampran Cadet Academy, NCO School, and Detective Training School all produce graduates who are likely to be assigned to the PP.

Recruit Training

- (U) (C) Increasing PP counterinsurgency responsibilities (especially expansion to tambon level) in 1965-69 created a requirement for an increase in strength. During 1968, 11,500 PP were added, raising the total PP strength to more than 40,000. By mid-1969 the total was over 42,000. To permit this strength increase, the recruit training centers enlarged their classes in 1968 to a total of 3860 graduating in each of the two 4½-month classes a year. Table 1 shows the expansion of classes occurring at each of the schools in 1968.

(U) Efforts have also recently been made to increase the strength and improve the quality of the PP officer corps. To supplement the graduates of the Sampran Academy, programs have been inaugurated to upgrade highly qualified sergeant-majors to officer-level by passing a qualifying test and six months of police officer training. A program has also been initiated under which selected law school and political science graduates can become officers after six months of special training.

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TABLE 1

EXPANSION OF PP TRAINING SCHOOLS

PP SCHOOL NO. AND LOCATION	PREVIOUS ENROLLMENT	1968 ENROLLMENT
1, Nakhon Phanom	480	900
2, Korat	700	1,260
3, Lampang	360	510
4, Yala	600	1,080
5, Chon Buri (under construction)	-	1,080

(U) The Education Bureau also operates the five Provincial Police schools currently in operation, located at Lampang, Nakhon Phanom, Yala, and Chon Buri.

(U) The minimum requirements for entrance into recruit training at these schools include being at least 18 years of age and having a Matayom 6 (equivalent of US tenth grade) education. The recruits are all volunteers who have passed a physical examination. Upon completion of recruit training lasting 6 months, they may be assigned to a PP unit anywhere in Thailand. They serve a one-year probationary period before acceptance as full-fledged police constables.

(U) Recruits for SAF units are also all volunteers, but personnel selection procedures for these units are much more rigid. Approval of applications must be endorsed by the next superior officer through to the Regional commander; and candidates must be between 21 and 35 years of age, have five years of unblemished service, and pass a special physical and mental examination.

(U) Training in general and counterinsurgency-oriented training in particular have received increased attention within the PP in recent years. Each recruit school now incorporates some instruction devoted to the fundamentals

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of counterinsurgency and counter-guerrilla operations. Most significant in this regard, however, has been the post-recruit training given at the "Chaiya" training centers.

"Chaiya" Training Centers

(U) The PP operates two "Chaiya" (victory) training centers, one at Udon Thani and the other at Chiang Mai in the North. These centers, which do not come under the Police Education Bureau, but are operated by the PP Region in which they are located, conduct a six-week counterinsurgency training course (jungle warfare, small-unit tactics, etc.) for selected police personnel. The students are assigned on a countrywide basis by PP headquarters in Bangkok.

(U) Participation in "Chaiya" training is a prerequisite to assignment to an SAF unit. All SAF "Chaiya" training is given at the Chiang Mai center. This training has recently been increased from six weeks to eleven weeks. Training at the Udon center is given to other PP personnel and has also been increased to nine weeks. At both centers training classes at one time or another in the program undertake operational assignments as a constituent part of the training program.

Retraining and Other Training

(U) Eventually all PP personnel go through "Chaiya" training which, with the 6 months of recruit training, provides a total of 7½ months of basic training for field operations for everyone. In addition to "Chaiya" training, one-half of the PP force attends one week of mandatory service training annually. This is generally held at the changwat level, where the police complement includes three qualified instructors. When not engaged in operational duties, police personnel also undertake various training activities on a non-programmed daily basis. Commissioned officers, in addition to programmed training, receive three days of special weapons-familiarization training each year.

(U) Retraining for the SAFs is somewhat more extensive than for other PP units. The SAFs get one week of operational retraining at the Chiang Mai "Chaiya" center each year, and in addition receive four weeks of standard service training instead of one. Thus, an annual total of five weeks is spent in training by each SAF.

*These centers have also been used to train VSO personnel; see Vol. 3, "Paramilitary Organizations and Programs."

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(U) A new CI training system is under development whereby the BPP through the PP Commissioner will assume responsibility for CI unit and retraining of all elements of the TNPD. This has been approved by the TNPD and USOM and a TOE is being prepared. Advanced and specialist training (communications, development, leadership) has already commenced at the National Training School in Hua Hin, and the unit training and retraining will be given at Chiang Mai, Songkhla, Udon, and Ubon. Development Consultants, Inc. and their Thai specialists under USOM contract (see section on BPP) will conduct the security development courses at Hua Hin.

WEAPONS

(U) Individual policemen are issued weapons to suit their particular duty assignments. Upon completion of duty, the weapon is returned to the station arms room. Policemen are not permitted to keep police-issued weapons in their homes. Many policemen, however, purchase and register their own weapons; the current favorite appears to be the .38-cal Smith and Wesson "Police Special."

(U) (X) At present most PP elements are armed with the following weapons: M1 rifle, M1 and M2 carbine, M3 submachinegun, Thompson submachinegun, .38-cal pistol, 12-gauge shotgun, .45-cal pistol, and Springfield rifle. Many tambon police stations have been provided with one of the new FN 7.62-mm Belgian automatic rifles.

(U) (X) As their automatic weapon the SAF units are armed with the NATO .05 rifle, which uses .223 ammunition similar to that of the M-16. They also have carbines and the M-79 grenade launcher. Nine M-79s, which have proved very effective in field operations, are provided for each 50-man SAF platoon.

COMMUNICATIONS

(U) The PP in Regions 3 and 4 have an established radio network, covering tambons, amphoes, changwats, and the Region headquarters. The network is complete from amphoe through changwat to Region. In areas where there are no tambon stations, patrols are sent out from the amphoe station carrying either an FM-5 or FM-1 radio (depending on distance and terrain) to maintain communications with the amphoe station. Those tambons with a permanent tambon police station use their assigned FM-5 radio to maintain communications with village police patrols (including those staying at muban police outposts) and with the police stations at

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amphoe level. The FM-5 radio, a VHF set, nets with both the FM-1 radio carried by PP patrols and the FM-5 radio assigned to the amphoe police station. The FM system, however, does not net with the Village Radio System (VRS)* and does not permit contact with the communications equipment of most paramilitary village security units (VDC, VSO, PAT, etc.). In some instances the VRS and tambon police station may operate radios in the same tambon headquarters village, providing parallel communications to the amphoe. As has been mentioned, the tambon police station is supposed to be in the tambon geographic center to permit continuous radio contact with tambon patrols in all directions. All FM-5 and FM-1 police radios within an amphoe operate on the same frequency (see Fig. 6) and have the capability to sustain 24-hour service.

(U) At the amphoe police station, radio communications are maintained with changwat police headquarters through the FM-5 radio. In those amphoes where distance and terrain do not permit satisfactory communications to changwat headquarters by the FM-5 radio, a low-powered, single-side-band set (SBT-20) is substituted. At changwat headquarters radio communications are maintained with the PP Region by 100-watt, four-channel, single-side-band radios. Under a recently inaugurated program Regional and changwat police complements are to be completely re-equipped.

(U) The SAF platoons are equipped with SSB-20, FM-5, and HT-2 radios in the platoon headquarters, and with an FM-5 and FM-1 radio in each of their four squads. The SSB-20 enables the platoon to communicate directly with Region headquarters; the HT-2 is used for communications with air support elements, and the FM-5 serves as the control station for the platoon command (see Fig. 6).


(U) Major problems in the rural areas are lack of radio maintenance facilities and an insufficient resupply of batteries.

(U) At the Bangkok headquarters of the TNPD, the police maintain transmitter and receiver sites. These sites each have six HF-SSB transmitters and receivers, providing one voice and one CW or teletype circuit for each Region. Phone patch equipment is also installed. Although commercial electricity is the primary power source, each site is provided with emergency generators.

*See Vol. 3, "Paramilitary Organizations and Programs."

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(T) Fig. 6: Provincial Police Communications at the Regional Level

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GROUND MOBILITY

(U) Although the PP (with USOM support) have greatly improved their ground transport capability, many problems still remain, particularly shortage of vehicles, inadequate maintenance, and non-standardized equipment which creates difficulties in parts replacement and maintenance. The current inventory includes vehicles manufactured in the US, Australia, Japan, and elsewhere and ranges from 1½-ton trucks to motor scooters and horses. A further factor compounding the standardization problem is the lack of centralized procurement. Recent TNPD programming supported by USOM has provided for more wheeled vehicles (some equipped with FM-3 compatible radio equipment) for use in tactical situations. In addition to the vehicles purchased by PP headquarters and those provided through USOM, each changwat police headquarters is entitled to use up to 20 percent of changwat municipal tax revenues for procurement of vehicles and other required commodities. Motorcycles seem to be the vehicles most frequently purchased with these funds.

(U) There is no specific vehicle assignment at present, although the intent is for every police station to have some form of motor transport. For example, each tambon station is supposed to have a motor scooter. A survey in 1968 indicated that, in Region 3, the PP had 196 four-wheeled vehicles (71 of which were jeeps) and 60 motor scooters assigned; in Region 4 there were about 150 four-wheeled vehicles and 68 motor scooters. In addition, some amphoe and tambon stations have horses and bicycles; most of the bicycles are privately owned by individual policemen, and the horses were provided by the PP Quartermaster some ten years ago.

(U) Lack of vehicles remains the biggest deterrent to ground mobility; but in addition some stations in the Northeast, particularly tambon stations, are not accessible by road. For example, until an all-weather road to the amphoe was completed recently, personnel in the Amphoe Chanuman station in Changwat Ubon, desiring to visit the changwat headquarters, had to walk east to the Mekong River, take a boat north to Mukdahan in Changwat Nakhon Phanom, and then a bus south to Ubon city.

AIR MOBILITY

(U) The primary source of air support to the PP is the TNPD Aviation Division, described in a separate section of this volume.

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WATER MOBILITY

(U) The PP issues boats to amphoe and changwat police stations that have jurisdictional areas accessible only by water. These boats are of the long-shaft (tiger tail) variety, 22 ft. long and with shallow draft; they were supplied through USOM funds. In Region 3, 15 police boats are in use. Twelve are located in Changwat Chaiyaphum, which contains extensive waterways, and one each in Changwats Buriram and Si Sa Ket and at Region headquarters in Korat. There are 21 boats in Region 4, eight in Nong Khai, four each in Nakhon Phanom and Sakon Nakhon, two in Udon, and one each at Khon Kaen, Loei, and Roi-Et.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

TNPD Purchased Supplies

(U) The police quartermaster is the custodian of TNPD-purchased supplies stored at the Bangkok depot. Requisitions for supplies are forwarded to the police quartermaster depot; the amphoe is the lowest level that can initiate requisitions. The amphoe requisition is forwarded to changwat for approval and is then forwarded to the police quartermaster in Bangkok and an information copy sent to Region headquarters.

(U) The police quartermaster after filling the requisition may use any of several delivery means. Normally, supplies are sent by rail or truck (on rare occasions by air) from Bangkok to the changwat headquarters, where they are sorted out and issued to amphoe police stations. Sensitive supplies, such as weapons and ammunition, are usually escorted by an officer or senior NCO from the requisitioning Region, who is responsible for receiving the supplies and accompanying them to their destination.

(U) In the past two years there has been a concerted effort on the part of the quartermaster to decentralize logistical support facilities, and it is expected that the present PP warehouses at the Regional level will become the responsibility of the TNPD Quartermaster Division. This will place quartermaster supplies at Regional levels under one control. In Region 3 there are now a PP warehouse, a police field garage, and an ordnance and radio repair facility at the Korat headquarters and another police field garage at Ubon. When these facilities (built in 1967) are absorbed by the Quartermaster Division, maintenance, repair, and delivery of certain frequently requested items of equipment can be speeded up because requisitions for the type of supplies stored at the Region would then go from changwat direct to the Region quartermaster.

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(U) Region 4 also has a forward PP depot, a police field garage, and a signal repair facility located at Region headquarters in Khon Kaen.

USOM Programmed Supplies

(U) Those supplies provided to the police through USOM dollar purchases are ordered for specific police locations throughout Thailand. Upon arrival in country these supplies are monitored by the Senior Logistical Advisor at the USOM Office of Public Safety, who ensures that they are directed to the locations for which they were ordered. Any deviation from original supply assignment plans must be made through agreement between the TNPD and the Assistant Director of the Office of Public Safety, USOM.

ACTIVITIES

(U) Maintenance of law and order is the primary mission of the PP in Northeast Thailand. This mission is largely performed by those police personnel located at the permanently established changwat amphoe and tambon police stations. In addition, the PP participate in counterinsurgency suppression operations directed by Second Army or the CSCs.

Patrols

- (U) (X) Amphoe and changwat stations dispatch patrols on foot, bicycle, or by vehicle. Most patrols travel to those tambons which do not contain a tambon police station. The patrol may vary in size from three policemen to 20 or more, depending upon the nature of the threat and the size of the area to be patrolled. Normally the patrol sets up a temporary headquarters at the tambon seat and dispatches patrols to the villages within the tambon. The police patrol usually remains in the tambon until replaced by a relief patrol. The length of time a patrol remains at a tambon varies greatly. In a few amphoes such patrols may remain in the field as long as 30 days at a time.
- (U) (X) Permanently established tambon police stations send 3-5 man patrols to local villages. The schedule calls for visits to each village in the tambon at least once each month, on an irregular basis. The primary contribution of these patrols is that they provide an armed government presence throughout the tambon. In some large villages, especially if there is a muban outpost, the police patrol may remain on a semi-permanent basis, returning to the tambon station every 10-15 days and being replaced by another patrol element.

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Sweep Operations

- (U) (C) In the Northeast, suppression operations are normally planned by Second Army Forward. PP from the projected operational area are commonly included because of their familiarity with the local people and terrain. In some cases the PP, with the governor's approval, may plan and conduct small operations within the changwat, using available local assets. If necessary, SAF platoons can be requested from the Region. The PP when supporting an RTA sweep operation fill two main roles - arresting suspected insurgent supporters in the villages, and forming a blocking force in areas to which the insurgents are expected to flee.

Response Operations

- (U) (C) The PP, by virtue of their widely dispersed locations, are often the first force to react to an insurgent incident. If strength in the area is adequate to handle the situation, the response operation is carried out by local police and paramilitary personnel (especially VDC). Otherwise, assistance is requested through the amphoe and changwat stations to Region headquarters; and the changwat station also passes the request to the CSC for relay to Second Army Forward.

Intelligence Collection

- (U) (C) The PP, because of their frequent contact with the local population at many varied locations, are a major element in RTG intelligence collection activities. More CI information flows into police channels than into any other RTG agency. The amount of intelligence actually gathered by the police and its quality vary greatly among stations. The variance is in direct relation to the rapport which has been established between the station and the people under its jurisdiction, and also to the capabilities of the local police themselves. Most policemen attempt to establish a good relationship with village and tambon chiefs and key personnel such as priests, school teachers, farmers, and businessmen. The PP also use agents within their area of responsibility, usually paying them small sums from station contingency funds, although in some instances former policemen, relatives of policemen, or persons with prior military service act as police agents or informants without pay. Proper behavior on the part of individual policemen and friendly relations with the local population are critical to information collection.
- (U) (C) Intelligence collected by the PP is reported through police channels to Region, which gives a copy to the appropriate JSC (Udon or Korat).

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- (U) (C) The PP stations may also be given intelligence gathered by the Border Patrol Police when they are both located in the same amphoe and by crime suppression personnel operating in the area. In amphoes in which military units are operating, intelligence may be shared through the amphoe CPM or through informal arrangements.

Movement and Resources Control

- (U) (C) The PP spot-check personnel in their areas of responsibility, both informally and through surprise roadblocks to check identification cards or alien registration cards. Most Thai citizens at the age of 18 are required to obtain an identification (ID) card through the Nai Amphoe's office*. The ID card contains the following information: photograph, serial number, name, date of birth, address, where issued, date of issue, age at time of issue, and height. These ID cards are good for six years, at which time the individual is required to obtain another card with a new photograph. Loss of the card is supposed to be reported immediately to the amphoe police station.
- (U) (C) Police at roadblocks may investigate goods and people moving through their areas. Carriers, especially those with foodstuffs, are questioned as to the final destination of materials and spot-checks are made to verify their statements. In sensitive amphoes some roadblocks are maintained continuously. Illegal items such as unregistered weapons, smuggled goods, and ammunition are seized and the carrier detained for prosecution. The police also ask mill owners and merchants to report unusually large purchases of foodstuffs or other items possibly destined for an insurgent camp.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

(U) Overall relationships between the police, army, and civil government agencies at the Regional and national levels are discussed in the overview to this volume. This section examines relationships between PP stations at changwat level and below and other elements of the RTG.

Relationships with Changwat Governors

(U) Although the line of command to the changwat chief of police is from the Region PP commander rather than from the

*ID cards are issued under supervision of the Department of Local Administration of the Ministry of Interior.

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governor, the changwat chief is responsive to the local governor on many matters. Close cooperation is maintained in dealing with suppression of the insurgency and collection of information.

(U) Police participation in the CSC mechanism varies somewhat from changwat to changwat. In some changwats such as Ubon the governor uses the local police as his primary operational element for the full range of counterinsurgency activities. They support the deployed village protection teams, conduct patrols, participate in sweep operations, arrest and interrogate suspects, establish checkpoints, collect information, and respond to insurgent incidents--all in coordination with other elements available to the CSC. In other cases the police may retain a great deal of independence from the CPM, funneling their information primarily through police channels and directing their attention largely to matters of significance to the police.

Relationships with Nai Amphoes

(U) There are many similarities at this level with the relationships described at the changwat level. The amphoe police station is responsible to the changwat police station, not to the Nai Amphoe. This permits a great deal of independence in areas where the local police commander chooses to exercise it. In most amphoes, however, the police chief and Nai Amphoe have established a close and friendly working relationship; and the police become the Nai Amphoe's primary operational arm for carrying out his CI policies. For support to deployed village security teams, the palad amphoe for security and the police both play an important role.

(J) (C) In the 28 designated 0910 target areas in Northeast Thailand the appropriate amphoe police stations and Nai Amphoe offices both participate in the operations of the Target Area Control Headquarters.

Relationships at Tambon Level

(U) Local police personnel cooperate with the kamnan and rely on him for information concerning the villages located in the tambon. Relationships between permanent tambon police stations and the kamnan may be hindered by the fact that the stations often are not located in the same village as the kamnan. This illustrates some of the problems involved in the use of the tambon, which is essentially a geographic and historical designation, as an administrative control point.

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Relationships at Village Level

(U) Police contact with phuyaibans occurs during patrol visits. The police depend on phuyaibans for information concerning local lawbreakers or persons requiring surveillance.

(U) The kamnan and phuyaiban, in the absence of police at the tambon or village, are permitted to take lawbreakers into custody with the stipulation that such persons be delivered to the nearest police facility for arrest, detention, investigation, and/or prosecution.

(U) (X) The police role in the village security teams has been very important. Since most VPUs and JSTs are led by PP cadre, relationships between these teams and local (tambon and amphoe) police stations are often close. Patrols from the station are likely to visit the deployed teams, and these stations provide the reinforcement in the event of an insurgent attack.

Relationships with Other Police Elements

(U) At Region level the PP commanding general is titular commander of all police personnel within the Region. The commanders of BPP forces in Regions 3 and 4 are thus considered members of the PP Region commander's staff*. In actuality, each BPP Area commander operates somewhat independently; and his headquarters may be located in a different city than the PP Region headquarters, since the BPP are responsible for border areas. In Region 3 the PP headquarters is at Korat and the BPP headquarters at Ubon; in Region 4 the PP headquarters is at Khon Kaen and the BPP at Udon. A senior BPP officer serves on the staff of the PP Region commander and has a communications link with the BPP Area Headquarters. Operational and intelligence messages from the BPP Area commander are passed to the PP Region commander through the BPP radio located at the office of the BPP staff officer.

(U) Below Region the relationship is quite different. In those border amphoes containing BPP platoons, the PP amphoe chief of police will usually maintain a coordinating relationship with the local BPP commander. This relationship involves mutual exchange of information, problems, and support, although both elements have separate command and communications channels.

*The BPP administrative divisions follow the same boundaries as the PP Regions, but BPP divisions are referred to as "Areas."

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The BPP platoon commander at Amphoe level normally communicates directly to his Area commander, although in some instances his communication is monitored at the BPP Company level. (See the following section on the BPP.)

(C) Local PP Stations also coordinate with Marine Police, Forestry Police, Railway Police, Special Branch, and other police elements operating in their area, but each of these agencies reports primarily through vertical channels to its own parent headquarters.

US ADVISORY SUPPORT

(C) A chief advisor from the USOM Office of Public Safety is assigned to work with the Commissioner of the Provincial Police. A USOM police advisor is also assigned to each of the nine PP Regions. The police advisor's tour of duty is generally two years. In Region 3, as of mid-1969, there was a public safety advisor assigned to Region headquarters at Korat with Region-wide advisory responsibilities and another at Region 4 headquarters in Khon Kaen. There was also a tambon police advisor in Bangkok with countrywide responsibilities.

PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

Strengths

(C) Over the past several years much emphasis has been placed on improving PP capabilities. Police transportation, weapons, communications, and logistical support have been greatly improved. The size of the force has been expanded to allow it to handle newly emerging requirements. More than half of the PP have received counterinsurgency training at the Chaiya centers as part of a continuing program to upgrade individual proficiency. Additional vehicles and the current program to modernize police weapons and communications equipment have contributed to the improved morale and effectiveness of the PP.

(C) The activation of the TNPD Aviation Division has contributed to potential effectiveness of PP counter-subversion and counterinsurgency roles; the SAF platoons are based on the concept of air mobility. Improved communications and air support from the Air Division should mean a more rapid response to incidents, improved aerial reconnaissance and surveillance capability, and an increase in aerial delivery and emergency evacuation when required.

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(U) The construction of tambon police stations has introduced permanent police presence at the tambon level and should bring about a prolonged feeling of security among the villagers in these tambons.

(U) Senior PP officials have recognized the need to develop a greater rapport between the police and the public. This, plus the emphasis being placed on this subject through police training could result in increased cooperation and public support for the PP in Northeast Thailand.

Weaknesses

(U) Communications capabilities from villages to tambon and amphoe police stations are still considered inadequate by most observers. Reports from many villages must still be transmitted in person to tambon or amphoe, unless a police patrol happens to be present. This results in time lags of many hours, and even in some instances, a full day. Many amphoe and tambon radio sets do not remain open around the clock but only operate to receive scheduled calls.

(U) Police transportation is reportedly still inadequate to meet requirements; and the lack of a standard table of equipment has created difficulties in maintenance, resupply, and parts replacement for police vehicles.

(U) Police base pay and per diem allowances are still low, even after the 1 October 1967 pay increase. Many police NCOs and junior officers are reportedly unable to afford further schooling for their children after they complete the free government primary education (currently seven years of primary school).

(U) Police enforcement of unpopular laws and regulations, such as the forestry, gambling, and liquor laws, may hamper their ability to function effectively in a counterinsurgency mode. Alienation of the local villagers through enforcement of these laws makes information collection much more difficult.

(U) Police manpower, although expanding at a rapid rate, is still greatly inadequate to meet all the demands placed on it. The PP are still below their authorized strength in the Northeast; many tambon police stations are staffed largely by VDC. Tentative plans to deploy some muban police would further exacerbate these manpower shortages.

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BORDER PATROL POLICE

SUMMARY

(U) As a police organization, the Border Patrol Police (BPP) falls organizationally under the TNPD within the Ministry of Interior. The Commanding General of the BPP is a deputy of the Commissioner of the Provincial Police (PP).

(U) The general mission of the BPP is to secure the land borders of Thailand. This border security mission includes control of infiltration and smuggling, collection of intelligence concerning border activities in adjacent countries, collection of intelligence on Communist activity in border areas, and development of hilltribes and remote area people.

(U) Prior to 1965, BPP border security operations had been primarily involved with the apprehension, identification, or elimination of bandit and smuggler groups active in the border areas. Since 1965 the BPP has been one of the primary RTG agencies involved in countering the insurgent threat to Thailand.

BACKGROUND

(U) The BPP traces its origin to the Territorial Defense Police formed in 1951. This force, given the mission of providing security along the border between Thailand and Laos, initially consisted of 22 platoons with 45 men each. In 1953 the Territorial Police Organization was expanded to 94 platoons and its responsibilities were increased to provide border security throughout the Kingdom.

(U) In January 1954 the Territorial Police title was changed to Gendarmerie Patrol Force; and the following year another 20 platoons were added, bringing the total to 114. Finally

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In 1960 the name was changed to Border Patrol Police. This organization was reduced in strength to 98 platoons with 17 men each and placed under the Provincial Police organization.

ORGANIZATION: HEADQUARTERS LEVELS

(U) The BPP General Staff Headquarters is located in Bangkok, and there are eight Area command headquarters corresponding to eight of the nine PP Regions.* Each Area headquarters has operational control over all BPP units in its Area. The BPP Areas are identical to the PP Region, as shown in Fig. 1, except that there is no BPP Area 1 (the area surrounding Bangkok). The overall organization of the BPP is shown in Fig. 7.

Bangkok General Staff Headquarters

(U) As shown in Fig. 7, the BPP headquarters consists of a Commanding General (also designated a Deputy Commissioner of the Provincial Police for BPP operations), a Deputy Commanding General, a general staff, and a support staff. The general staff has Administrative, Intelligence, Operations, and Logistic sections. The Remote Area Security Development (RAS) program (G-5) is under G-3 (Operations) Section, and the Medics are under G-4 (Support) Staff. The Staff has elements concerned with Communications, Quartermaster, the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PAR) and Aviation. An Air element, now the TNPP Air Division, was formerly in the BPP Support Staff.

BPP Area Headquarters

(U) Each of the eight Area headquarters consists of a BPP Area commander, deputy commander, and small Administrative (S-1), Intelligence (S-2), Operations (S-3), and Logistic (S-4) sections. The RAS and Psychological Operations (S-5) are under control of the Area S-3.


Company Headquarters

(U) The BPP company directs and controls the operations of three or more line platoons in performing security and border control missions in the company area of responsibility. At present a recommended 15-man company headquarters organization, shown in Table 2, is under consideration at BPP headquarters.

*BPP were introduced in Area 8 in the Kra Peninsula in 1966 when insurgent activity there developed alarmingly.

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(1) Fig. 7: Border Patrol Police Organization

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TABLE 2

RECOMMENDED BPP COMPANY HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION

Company Commander
 Deputy Commander, Executive/Operations Officer
 Deputy Commander/Intelligence Officer
 Company Master Sergeant
 Operations Sergeant/RAS Operations
 Intelligence Sergeant/RAS Intelligence
 Operations Clerk/Supply and Administration
 Intelligence Clerk/files and records
 Radio Operator
 Assistant Radio Operator
 Radio Technician/Commo Supply
 Clerk/Driver Jeep
 Clerk/Driver MLP Power Wagon
 Clerk, Driver MLP Power Wagon
 Medic


(U) There were five BPP company headquarters in Area 3 and four in Area 4, Northeast Thailand, as of July 1969 (see Fig. 8*). About half the company headquarters at present are not fully staffed, and in some instances a senior platoon leader in the company area of responsibility acts as the company commander.

(U) The BPP company is responsible for carrying out the following actions:

1. Coordination of the actions of each platoon in its area of responsibility in all the various fields of border security, including combat missions, patrolling, civic action, BPP schools, medical assistance, and so on.

*The data used in Fig. 8 are as of June 1968 and a few of the more recently formed BPP elements are not shown.

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(U) Fig. 8: Border Patrol Police Deployment in Northeast Thailand

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2. Deployment of Mobile Line Platoons (MLPs) to reinforce line platoons or to carry out combat missions in areas not covered by line platoons. MLPs are also used to reinforce line platoon patrols in shows of strength along the border, and to conduct combat patrolling in unusually sensitive areas or areas which are not normally within the line platoons' patrol capability.

3. Guidance for the intelligence collection effort in its area of responsibility. It is responsible for the analysis of such intelligence and the keeping of intelligence records. It is expected to keep the Area headquarters and its subordinate platoons constantly aware of the intelligence picture.

4. Logistic support to line platoons, ensuring that they are properly equipped and supplied to execute their mission.

OVERALL LOCATIONS AND STRENGTH

(U) (C) Total BPP authorized strength as of July 1969 was 8,344 officers and men, including the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU) at 700 and the TNPD Air Division at 247.

(U) (C) As of September 1969, the BPP were distributed as shown on Table 3. A total of 2,257 BPP were deployed in the Northeast (Areas 3 and 4).

(U) Locations of BPP operational units in the Northeast as of June 1968 are shown in Fig. 8. Details on BPP operational locations in the Northeast are presented in Appendix C.

(U) The line platoon consists of 30 men, six in the platoon headquarters and three patrols of eight men each. This organization and its current weapons are shown in Fig. 9. The TOE replaces the carbines and the submachine gun with M16s.

Mobile Reserve Platoons

(U) (C) Mobile Reserve Platoons (MRPs) were first formed in 1966 to provide the BPP Area commander with a quick-reaction force or reinforcement in combat or to carry out special missions. Their organization is like that of the line platoons, except that an automatic rifleman is substituted for the medic in each squad and they are all equipped with modern weapons. There are 24 in total, with five in Area 3 and three in Area 4 in the Northeast.

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TABLE 3

LOCATIONS AND STRENGTH OF BPP PERSONNEL

September 1968


LOCATION	OFFICERS	NCOS	CONSTABLES	TOTAL
BPP Headquarters-Bangkok	76	227	111	417
Area 2	12	187	128	628
Area 3	23	405	711	1142
Area 4	22	166	927	1115
Area 5	21	344	923	1291
Area 6	14	153	390	557
Area 7	9	110	391	513
Area 8	11	57	416	484
Area 9	20	125	1010	1155
TOTAL	211	1774	5346	7332

(U) MRPs in the Northeast, at the request of Second Army Forward Headquarters, engage in multi-unit operations with the RTA and may operate outside the border area assigned to the BPP. Their quick-reaction capability to respond to insurgent incidents is dependent on the availability of helicopter airlift (see section on Police Air Division). Customarily one platoon remains at BPP Area Headquarters on standby alert, and the other platoons when not engaged in combat operations are rotated on patrol assignments in areas where insurgent activity has been reported or to fill gaps between line platoons. On patrol they carry out the customary BPP activities of intelligence collection and maintenance of security.

Mobile Line Platoons

(U) These platoons are organized, equipped, and trained similarly to the MRPs. They are assigned to company headquarters to reinforce line platoons and to augment patrol area coverage in areas not normally covered by line platoons. While the MRPs are at the disposal of the Area police commander (as a reserve for deployment), the new Mobile Line Platoons are directly under BPP company commanders in the

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(U) ✓
Fig. 9: BPP Line Platoon Organization

field - deployable by helicopters, if necessary - but it is expected that reinforcement will be usually by ground.

- (U) ✓ (2) Eleven MLPs were scheduled to be formed in FY-67, 21 were programmed for FY-68, and six during FY-69, for a total of 38 MLPs. This program lagged behind schedule due to BPP personnel shortages; however, by March 1969 there were two MLPs in Area 4 and five in Area 3 in the Northeast.

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ORGANIZATION: BPP PLATOONS

Line Platoons

- (U) (C) The BPP line platoon is the organization's basic border security unit and its primary information-gathering element. The line platoon is responsible for maintenance of border security in its assigned sector. Countrywide there are 116 line platoons; 41 are assigned to Areas 3 (21) and 4 (20). Their locations are shown in Fig. 8.

Weapons Platoons

- (U) (C) The 30-man weapons platoon is armed with three 3.5-inch rocket launchers, three .30-cal LMGs, and three 60-mm mortars. This unit is retained under the Area commander's control to provide support where needed. There is one weapons platoon at each of the two Northeast BPP Area headquarters.

Development Platoons

- (U) These units consist of five officers and 30 men. One is assigned to each BPP Area. This combination of civic action and construction specialists works in conjunction with line platoons on assigned security and development projects. The platoon contains a headquarters, two construction teams, one psyops team, and one agriculture and animal husbandry team. The platoon's functions are described later under the RAS.

Teacher Platoons

- (U) The term, "Teacher Platoon," is a misnomer, since the teachers in BPP Areas are grouped in this organization solely on paper for administrative purposes. In actuality the teachers are under the control of the BPP line platoon in whose sector their school is located. The line platoon pays the school teachers in its areas and furnishes them with support, such as medical and school supplies, on regular visits to the schools by line platoon patrols. There are three teacher platoons in Areas 3 and 4. Teacher activities are described later in the section on Remote Village Schools.

Border Patrol Centers

- (U) (C) The Border Patrol Centers (BPCs) are fixed outposts in various critical key villages and isolated border crossing points. As of September 1969, the BPP maintained 6 BPCs in the Northeast (5 in Area 4 and 1 in Area 3), (see Fig. 8). The BPCs vary in strength from five to 10 men largely drawn from line platoons, and vary in character from a small shelter to a develop-

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TABLE D1

POLICE SALARIES (in baht)

RANK	SALARY RANGE	PER DIEM
Recruit	75	16
Private	510-600	16
Lance Corporal	600-630	16
Corporal	660-720	16
Sergeant	750-810	22
Sergeant Major	850-950	22
Special Sergeant Major	1000-1300	22
Sub-Lieutenant	850-950	28
Lieutenant (Grade 1)	1000-1300	28
Lieutenant (Grade 2)	1400-1600	28
Captain (Grade 1)	1400-1800	28
Captain (Grade 2)	1900-2200	28
Major (Grade 1)	1900-2650	28
Major (Grade 2)	2800-3200	34
Lt Colonel (Grade 1)	2800-3600	34
Lt Colonel (Grade 2)	3800-4050	34
Colonel (Grade 1)	3800-4550	34
Colonel (Grade 2)	4800-5100	42
Special Colonel (Grade 1)	4800-5800	42
Special Colonel (Grade 2)	6200-6600	42
Major General (Grade 1)	5200-7000	42
Major General (Grade 2)	7400-7800	42
Lt General (Grade 1)	7400-8200	42
Lt General (Grade 2)	8600	42
General (Grade 1)	8600	42
General (Grade 2)	9000	42

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ment center. Their principal purpose is collection of intelligence in particularly sensitive villages or possible infiltration points.

Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit

- (U) (✓) The Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU) is a battalion-size, specially trained and organized ready force, available to police Area commanders to perform special missions. They go through training in parachute jumping and are essentially airborne troops. Operations include long-range patrolling, advising, training, organizing, and assisting local populations in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations; limited civic action; population identification, and collection of tactical and operational intelligence. They are especially trained and organized to operate in remote and normally inaccessible border regions in direct support of the BPP, and to operate in enemy-controlled areas with aerial resupply.
- (U) (✓) The PARU is organized as a headquarters, 10-man PARU detachments, and an Air/Sea Rescue Section. Its strength at present is 700 officers and men. It is planned to increase their strength to 1450 during the next three years, and to include an Air Delivery Company. In July 1968 there were 247 assigned permanently at Phitsanulok and 300 were at the Hua Hin Headquarters. Among the latter are twelve 10-man detachments available to support BPP units throughout Thailand. In mid-1968 one team operated in Udon, and in mid-1969 there was a team in Ubon. Each detachment is armed with six M-16 rifles, three M-2 rifles, one M-79 grenade launcher, and a pistol. The remaining PARU detachments carry on training programs at Hua Hin and elsewhere or are on classified assignments.

PERSONNEL

Officers

(U) The Sampran Police Cadet Academy is the primary source of BPP officer personnel, supplemented by some volunteer officer transfers from the PP and the military services. A few direct commissions may be awarded to outstanding BPP NCOs and selected university graduates who volunteer for police service. No new officers were assigned during 1967-68 but 135 are scheduled to be trained during 1969.

Non-Commissioned Officers

(U) Most BPP NCOs have been promoted to their non-commissioned status because of their leadership and excellent performance of duty. Some BPP NCOs have come into the organization by transfer or exchange of NCOs with the PP. This is in line with the BPP desire to maintain good personnel (preferably below age 40) in their support units. This policy is necessitated by the physical demands of patrolling and related operations in extremely rugged terrain. The lack of junior officers is at present a serious deficiency.

Constables

(U) Until 1968 the major sources of BPP recruits were the Metropolitan and the PP training school. A specified percentage of the graduates of the 4½-month police recruit training course was assigned to the BPP. Beginning in 1968, the BPP received permission to recruit and train their own constables at BPP Area headquarters. In the six months ending in February 1969, 1100 recruits were trained in BPP basics and went on into two-month unit training.

FUNDING AND PAY

(U) BPP rates of pay and per diem are the same as those given for the PP (see Appendix D).

(U) US support for the BPP in FY-68-69 is listed in Table 4. The total for FY-68 was \$1,450,000, whereas in the previous year this support had totalled \$2,100,000.

(U)

TABLE 4

US SUPPORT TO THE BPP (EXCLUSIVE OF RAS PROGRAM)
FY-68-69

SUPPORT	FY-68	FY-69
US Technicians DH	\$136,362	\$125,000
Commodities	\$1,260,443	\$631,018
Counterpart Fund	£17,551,000	£15,193,260

TRAINING

(U) BPP personnel are eligible to attend the various schools operated by the TNPD Education Bureau. These schools are described in the PP section of this volume and in Appendix B.

(U) Basic training for both PP and BPP personnel is provided by PP training schools. BPP recruits get an additional month's training after the basic course and many, particularly those destined for MRPs, get an additional five weeks of specialized training in the use of helio-lift, patrolling and operations in remote terrain, relations with the population, and collection of information and intelligence. Most special BPP training is given at Camp Naresuan near Hua Hin and at Camp Saritsena near Phitsanulok. The MRPs before their deployment in 1966 were given a special training course; a BPP platoon-leader management course was given to all BPP small-unit leaders. BPP have also received refresher and special training from the US Army Special Forces (see section on the 46th USASF Company in Volume 7). BPP Headquarters gives training in intelligence collection and reporting to selected personnel from the Areas. Appendix 2 includes information on out-of-country training of BPP. PARU elements also receive special training, particularly in reconnaissance, small-unit tactics, intelligence collection, and so on.

(U) In mid-1969 the BPP were beginning to assume full responsibility for all CI specialized training and unit training and retraining for the entire TNPD. The system had been approved by the TNPD and USOM and a TOE was being prepared. The specialized training in communications, development work, and leadership was already underway at the National School at Hua Hin, the development and leadership courses being given by Development Consultants, Inc. and Thai specialists under a USOM contract. Unit CI training and retraining will be given at Regional centers in Chiang Mai, Songkhla, Ubon, and Udon.

EQUIPMENT

(U) Police commissioned officers are not issued uniforms or accessories. The cost is borne by them from their pay and allowances. Cadets at the Police Academy are uniformed and equipped during their four-year stay, but upon graduation they must turn in all issued uniforms and accessories. All police commissioned officers and sergeant majors are issued swords on a permanent basis. These swords are retained in the family as a symbol of honor for future generations. All ranks other than commissioned officers are furnished uniforms and accessories by the TNPD.

Weapons

- (U) (X) BPP personnel are armed with weapons of US manufacture. The current inventory of weapons includes the following:

Individual Weapons:

M1A1 and M-2 .30-cal Carbine	M-79 Grenade Launcher
M-3 Submachinegun	Hand Grenades
AR15 Automatic Rifle	.38-cal Revolver
M-1 Rifle	.45-cal Automatic Pistol
12-gauge Shotgun	

Crew Served Weapons:

.30-cal Light Machinegun
66-mm Mortar
3.5-inch Rocket Launcher

- (U) (X) M-2 carbines are programmed for FY-70 to replace all M-1 rifles now in the BPP line platoons. This will reduce the platoon mix to three basic shoulder weapons - the AR-15 rifle, .30-cal carbine, and M-79 grenade launcher.

Communications

(U) BPP communications nets linking line platoons, company headquarters, and Area headquarters are based on the high frequency, 2-12 megacycle AN/GRC-87 radio. This radio is available to platoon and company headquarters. The usual power supply is a gasoline-driven generator (PE 210, 1/2 hp). A hand-cranked generator is also provided as a reserve.

(U) The line platoon maintains communications with its patrols by FM-1/5 radios. These are line-of-sight, voice sets. Area headquarters use both CW and voice to communicate with BPP General Headquarters in Bangkok. This headquarters maintains communications with its eight Area headquarters by GPT-750 TMC transmitters and Collins 51S1.

Vehicles

(U) The BPP does not have a standard vehicle table of equipment. Some platoons are located in areas in which wheeled vehicles cannot be utilized. As of 1 October 1968, Areas 3 and 4 in Northeast Thailand had the following 80 vehicles:

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BPP		
Boat platoon	1	
Motorized platoon		
Platoon	10	8
AT-15 (ASU)		
MBT (Chop)		
AT-15 (ASU) (Chop)	1	9
AT-15 (ASU) (Chop)	1	2
Land Rover	1	1
Armored	-	1
Tank Car	1	-
TOTAL	11	10

Boats

(U) BPP platoons located in areas with extensive waterways are usually issued one 11-16 foot boat with 1000 watt motor per platoon. These are most numerous in Area 1 where most of the platoons are located along the Mekong River.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

(U) The TNPD Quartermaster is the initial recipient of supplies for the BPP. These supplies are then turned over to the BPP Quartermaster for storage and issue. BPP platoons and companies requisition supplies through their Area headquarters. Approved requisitions are forwarded to the BPP Quartermaster for issue. Most supplies for Areas 3 and 4 are sent by rail. Sensitive items such as weapons, ammunition, or explosives are usually escorted by an officer from the requesting Area. Supplies received at Area headquarters are dispatched to the company or platoon by the Area headquarters S-4.

(U) A small quantity of supplies is maintained on hand at each Area headquarters. These supplies are primarily "quick turnover" items such as batteries, cleaning oil and preservatives, lubricants, and so on. Area headquarters also maintains a backup basic load of ammunition for its units.

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1. *Introduction*

For the BPP, the main reason for the success of the program is the active participation of the people. The BPP has been able to do this because it has been able to establish a close relationship with the people. The BPP has been able to do this because it has been able to establish a close relationship with the people. The BPP has been able to do this because it has been able to establish a close relationship with the people.

(U) A fundamental role is the collection of intelligence from the villagers on all aspects of the insurgent movement - infiltration, sightings of insurgent bands, movements, threats, evidences of training. From the beginning the BPP civic action program has been operated for the basic purpose of increasing the voluntary intelligence input to the FPP from villagers who would be led to report through the friendly relations developed by assistance given them under the RAS program. Furthermore, since the FPP are usually the government officials encountered by the people in the remote border area, the RIG image would also be enhanced. From time to time and place to place, this logic has tended to be overlooked, both by the BPP at various echelons and their US advisors; and civic action and resulting village development have been regarded as ends in themselves. Currently, as will be discussed under the A, strong emphasis is being placed on the use of civic action to promote intelligence collection.

Organization of Unit Areas of Responsibility

(C) Each line platoon usually divides its area of responsibility into three patrol sectors. Each squad is assigned a sector and is charged with responsibility for being thoroughly familiar with the terrain and the inhabitants.

(U) The patrols prepare sketches of their areas of responsibility, including plans of villages in their areas, key routes, time and distance factors, resources, checkpoints, and so on. The village diagram will indicate the location of major checkpoints, reporting points (e.g., market places, schools) and established points for the distribution of vegetable seeds and medical supplies. These sketches form a basis for a platoon sketch of its total area of responsibility.

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VEHICLES	AREA 3	AREA 4
Dodge 2 1/2-ton	1	1
International 2 1/2-ton	5	5
Power Wagon	10	8
Willys J-3800	4	0
M37 (Jeep)	3	2
Willys C-J-5 (Jeep)	10	9
Willys C-J-5 (Jeep)	6	2
Land Rover	1	4
Ambulance	-	1
Tank Car	1	-
TOTAL	41	32

Boats

(U) BPP platoons located in areas with extensive waterways are usually issued one 14-16 foot boat with long shaft motor per platoon. These are most numerous in Area 4 where most of the platoons are located along the Mekong River.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

(U) The INPD Quartermaster is the initial recipient of supplies for the RPP. These supplies are then turned over to the BPP Quartermaster for storage and issue. BPP platoons and companies requisition supplies through their Area headquarters. Approved requisitions are forwarded to the BPP Quartermaster for issue. Most supplies for Areas 3 and 4 are sent by rail. Sensitive items such as weapons, ammunition, or explosives are usually escorted by an officer from the requesting Area. Supplies received at Area headquarters are dispatched to the company or platoon by the Area headquarters S-4.

(U) A small quantity of supplies is maintained on hand at each Area headquarters. These supplies are primarily "quick turnover" items such as batteries, cleaning oil and preservations, lubricants, and so on. Area headquarters also maintains a backup basic load of ammunition for its units.

ACTIVITIES


(U) The BPP carry out a wide range of activities, all bearing more or less directly on counterinsurgency. In the security role, the BPP not only carry out the usual police activities directed at maintaining law and order but also take part in pre-planned sweep operations with NTA, PP, VDC, and other forces; serve as quick-reaction and reinforcement elements through the MRPs and MLPs; and participate in air base defense, for example, patrolling around the Udon RTAF base periphery. In civic action and remote area development under the RAS program, the BPP provide medical assistance to villagers, operate schools, build roads, bridges, wats, dig wells, assist in agricultural and livestock promotion, and so on. In this connection they also conduct psychological operations.

(U) A fundamental role is the collection of intelligence from the villagers on all aspects of the insurgent movement - infiltration, sightings of insurgent bands, incidents, threats, evidences of training. From the beginning the BPP civic action program has been operated for the basic purpose of increasing the voluntary intelligence input to the FPP from villagers who would be led to report through the friendly relations developed by assistance given them under the RAS program. Furthermore, since the BPP are usually the government officials encountered by the people in the remote border areas, the RTG image would also be enhanced. From time to time and place to place, this logic has tended to be overlooked, both by the BPP at various echelons and their US advisors; and civic action and resulting village development have been regarded as ends in themselves. Currently, as will be discussed under the US, strong emphasis is being placed on the use of civic action to promote intelligence collection.

Organization of Unit Areas of Responsibility

(U) Each line platoon usually divides its area of responsibility into three patrol sectors. Each squad is assigned a sector and is charged with responsibility for being thoroughly familiar with the terrain and the inhabitants.

(U) The patrols prepare sketches of their areas of responsibility, including plans of villages in their areas, key routes, time and distance factors, resources, checkpoints, and so on. The village diagram will indicate the location of major checkpoints, reporting points (e.g., market places, schools) and established points for the distribution of vegetable seeds and medical supplies. These sketches form a basis for a platoon sketch of its total area of responsibility.



(U)

Fig. 10: Generalized Schematic of Border Patrol Deployment

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(U) The platoon leader usually divides his area into two circles of security. The inner circle covers the part of his area easy to reach in two to four hours. The outer circle encompasses an area more difficult to patrol because of either distance or terrain factors. Patrol coverage of this area may require many hours or even days of travel. When possible patrol units are moved by vehicle into the outer circle area and then released for foot patrol activity. The inner and outer circles and the time and distance factors involved are important to platoon patrol planning and are included in the company and Area headquarters assessments. An idealized sketch of company/platoon/squad areas of responsibility is shown in Fig. 10.

(U) The Mobile Line Platoons located at BPP company headquarters furnish the company commanders with a reinforcement capability of their own.

(U) When in need of additional support, the BPP platoon and company may call upon Area headquarters for assistance. This support, or reinforcement, supplied by the Area commander can be drawn from the Mobile Reserve Platoons at Area headquarters and the weapons platoon.

Line Platoon Activities

(U) The BPP line platoons located along the borders of Thailand encounter a great variety of challenging tasks during their day-to-day operations. These vary from mediating a dispute between two villagers to armed clashes with insurgents. The following descriptions of BPP line platoon activities in the Northeast in 1968 provide the reader with an appreciation of the variety of RPP operations in remote areas.*

(U) Area 3. The commander of Company 1 reported on 4 December 1967 that the headman of Ban Phaeng Phuai (TB646210), Amphoe Nang Rong, Changwat Buri Ram, had been shot and seriously wounded by unidentified assailants. He died the following day. Eight empty cartridges were picked up at the scene. Police believed this to be an act of revenge by Communists of the Ban Phaeng Phuai group since Plian, who formerly was a Communist sympathizer, had recently begun providing information to government authorities. Ban Phaeng Phuai is the locality where eight leading Communist suspects were arrested in a surprise raid in May 1967.

*This information was extracted, as examples of typical line platoon activity, from the BPP inputs for the USOM Public Safety Office Monthly Report of TNPD activities during 1968.

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- (U) ✓ On 19 January 1968, Sergeant Major Thong Sanyabutha, a BPP school teacher at Ban Pak La (WC6829), Amphoe Ban Lon, Changwat Udon, arrested two men who had deserted from Pathet Lao forces operating in Saravene Province, Laos. One man was initially reported to be a Thai citizen, the other a Lao. They surrendered a light machine gun, a magazine, and two rounds of ammunition.
- (U) ✓ On 8 February 1968, a truck loaded with unmilled rice struck a mine on a new road near Ban Nan Charoen, Amphoe Ban Kruat, Changwat Buriram. Damage to the truck and contents amounted to approximately 48,000 (\$100) and one man riding on the truck was injured. BPP platoon 304 was working in conjunction with Amphoe Ban Kruat Provincial Police on the investigation of the incident. This amphoe, adjacent to the Cambodian border, had been the scene of repeated acts of terrorism by Cambodian-backed guerrilla units for several years.
- (U) ✓ Throughout March 1968 BPP platoons along the Laos border reported on Pathet Lao activity, which represents a potential threat of infiltration into Thailand. There were a number of reports of infiltrations of small groups of men and weapons smuggling, but much of this had not been definitely confirmed. The BPP had received many reports indicating that the Pathet Lao intended to infiltrate into Thailand to assist local insurgent groups. Recent Pathet Lao offensives in South and Central Laos appeared to be a possible cover for action of this type.
- (U) ✓ On 22 April 1968, a patrol composed of seven BPP, three VDC, and six VSO took shelter during a rainstorm on Phu Khum Hill (VC828910) on the Nakhon Phanom-Udon Changwat boundary. While it was raining they were encircled and attacked by an undetermined number of insurgents. The firefight lasted for approximately two hours during which there were no casualties to the patrol. At least two insurgents were wounded from sounds of their cries of pain. The insurgents withdrew but the patrol did not pursue because of numerical inferiority. The patrol picked up a hat, knife, pencil, and one rubber slipper at the scene and then went to get reinforcements at Ban Yang Chum (WC8688). Later investigation indicated that approximately 50 insurgents were involved in the attack. Police officials believed the insurgents intended to attack the headquarters of BPP Platoon 322.
- (U) ✓ Area 4. The 27 July 1968 attack on the air base at Udon was reported by Area 4 headquarters. To reinforce the security of the air base, BPP headquarters instructed the Area headquarters to increase the number of police assigned

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to patrol the east side of the base along the Khon Kaen-Nong Khai railway and Udon-Sakon Nakhon highway. BPP Area 4 units continued their investigation of suspected CT activities throughout the Area.

- (U) ✓ On 31 July 1968, BPP Platoon 417 personnel and the village headman of Ban Na Tabeng (VD6753), Tambon Kham Pa Lai, Amphoe Mukdahan, Changwat Nakhon Phanom, led eight former CT members, residents of Ban Na Tabeng, to surrender to Mukdahan district authorities. On 1 August 1968 another five CTs from the same village surrendered to the authorities.
- (U) ✓ On 30 August 1968, BPP Platoon 419 was called in to reinforce a village security team being attacked by the CT at Ban Kham Phak Phaow (VD715584), Changwat Nakhon Phanom. They were also supported by PP, VDC, and Marine Police. The relief group clashed with the CT group at Kan Kam Bing (VD699588); the 10 CTs were able to escape but blood trails found in the area indicated that some had been wounded. The relief force suffered no casualties. They did capture various items of equipment from the retreating CT group.
- (U) ✓ On 5 September 1968, at 1600 hours, 15 villagers of Ban Nong Saeng Soi, Amphoe Nong Bua Lam Phu, Changwat Udon, were hunting in the area of TD4191, about 6 kms southeast of Ban Nong Saeng Soi, when they clashed with an unknown number of CTs. One villager was killed; casualties to the CT group were unknown. BPP forces were sent to the scene but could not locate the CTs.
- (U) ✓ BPP headquarters reported that during the first six months of 1968 BPP losses throughout the Kingdom amounted to 28 KIA (15 in one incident in Chiang Rai) and 19 WIA.

PARU Activities

- (U) ✓ PARU operational teams on standby alert at PARU headquarters, Hua Hin, are available to the Area commanders on request. The prior approval of the Commanding General must also be obtained. During the period 21 July 1968 to 28 August 1968, for example, a PARU team was committed in Changwat Nakhon Phanom, under the operational control of the BPP Area 4 commander. This operation "Recon Patrol 011" was the result of intelligence from BPP sources concerning the infiltration of Communist terrorists into Thailand from Laos. The BPP

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Area commander secured Second Army Forward approval to conduct an operation in the extremely rugged terrain north of the city of Nakhon Phanom.

(U) It was decided to commit a PARU team because of the difficult terrain and the PARU ability to operate for prolonged periods with minimum support. The team operated in the hills and villages of this area for five weeks. A great deal of information was collected, but there were no contacts with armed insurgents.

REMOTE AREA SECURITY DEVELOPMENT (RAS) PROGRAM

(U) As has been mentioned, the purpose of the RAS program is to enhance the BPP intelligence capabilities by building up friendly attitudes on the part of the villagers through civic action and village development projects. Obviously the BPP cannot control by force some 3000 miles of border area, much of it rugged forested terrain. They can, however, create among the inhabitants a hostile atmosphere toward insurgents, infiltrators, and law breakers that will result in voluntary intelligence reporting by the villagers, which in turn will enable the BPP to make effective use of their forces or to summon assistance if needed.

(U) During FY-66-68 USOM contributed to the RAS program a total of \$2,571,000, which provided medicine, communications and transportation equipment, and US SEABEE and contract development specialist services. In FY-69 the total was about \$600,000, half of which was for contract services, and 10 million baht in counterpart funds.

(U) In June 1966 USOM initiated recruitment of 20 Thai specialists to assist the BPP in their development work. In mid-1969 35 of these were employed for the RAS program under the direction of an American firm under contract to USOM, Development Consultants, Inc. The specialists are mostly university graduates. They are given a preliminary one-month training course in the purposes and techniques of the RAS program and in Communist methods of subversion and organization, and three weeks of field training in the Udon Air Base security area.

(U) A few of the Thai specialists are assigned in Bangkok; but the majority are at BPP Area headquarters where they serve as a special staff to the Area commander, each of whom is free to use them as he sees fit. Thus, their duties vary with the jobs to be done, their individual talents, and their relations

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with the commander. An essential part of their duties is to coordinate BPP development programs with those of other RTG elements such as the Ministries of Education, Interior, and Public Health, and Accelerated Rural Development (ARD).

(U) In Area 3 the commander relies heavily on the BPP development platoon's six specialized teams and the two Thai specialists to carry out development projects, and leaves the line platoons to carry out the security and intelligence collection roles although they may assist in development projects.

(U) The Area 3 development platoon received training in 1967 from a US Navy Construction Battalion team (SEABEES), as have other BPP development teams during November 1966-January 1969. The training centered on instruction in village construction projects such as roads and small buildings; the program has now been discontinued.

(U) In Area 4 five of the six Thai specialists under the Area commander's direction work at company level or with the line platoons. The RAS specialists train and guide the platoons in carrying out projects and getting information. They are attempting to develop a pattern for platoon procedure which includes initiation of a development project by holding a village meeting, the establishment of informant nets, follow-up visits by BPP patrols, and maintenance by each platoon of a record by village of contacts made with household heads and information gathered on insurgent adherents and sympathizers. This running record is for the use of the platoon both in planning its operations and as a source for its periodic intelligence reports. Patrol follow-up is believed to be an essential element in continuance of development projects, in maintaining informant nets, and in fostering the desired friendly atmosphere.

(U) In Area 5 in the North, four of the 12 Thai specialists are assigned work with line platoons, two visit BPP schools, three are at Area headquarters at Mae Rim near Chiang Mai, and three are at the BPP Mae Taeng breeding farm.

(U) Important elements in the RAS program are the creation and maintenance of remote village schools and the medical program.

Remote Village Schools

(U) The BPP has long recognized the importance of being able to communicate with the local border population and the

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importance of education in the welfare and progress of a community. The first BPP schools were constructed and staffed in 1955 in the hilltribe regions of Area 3. This was the first extension of any assistance by a government agency to the border ethnic minorities. Since 1955 the BPP has constructed and operated over 300 border schools, and in mid-1969 operates 196 with a student participation of over 12,000. In Area 3 there are 76 BPP schools and another 31 in Area 4. As an area becomes less security-sensitive and the Ministry of the Interior has teachers available, the BPP phase out their teachers and the Ministry assumes responsibility for the school.

(U) These schools are in fact BPP outposts. Villages selected to participate must have requested the school, be willing to participate in its construction, and agree to support the school by sending their children to it. The BPP sets priorities for selection of school locations; security sensitivity is the prime determinant as available manpower and budget are insufficient to meet all requests.

(U) School teachers are volunteers from the BPP ranks. As they normally have limited education themselves and would not be qualified for teaching certificates, the schools only cover kindergarten and the first four years of primary education. The curriculum and books are coordinated and approved by the Ministry of Education (MOE). In most cases, as is to be expected, the schools are below MOE standards. Contributing factors to the lower standards are (1) less qualified teachers, (2) language barriers between the students and teachers since many border people are ethnically non-Thai, (3) lack of compulsory attendance, and (4) inadequate facilities and training aids. The Ministry of the Interior and the BPP do, however, give retraining courses to BPP teachers during summer vacation in teaching techniques, Thai history and folk songs, first aid medical assistance, basic gardening, animal husbandry, and village development and leadership.

(U) The BPP teacher becomes a member of the community in which he lives and so becomes intimately knowledgeable of the people, the village, and everything that happens in or near the village. The teacher's immediate objective is to learn all he can about the village and report to his superiors any information relative to the security situation. His long-term objective is to teach the students the 3 Rs and, in communities of other ethnic cultures, to teach the Thai language so that there will be better communication and the process of assimilation into the Thai culture can begin. The teacher is trained in intelligence collection and reporting. In FY-67 USOM ordered radios for each BPP school to give the teacher an immediate reporting capability.

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Medical Program

(U) Medical aid is the form of assistance perhaps most frequently requested by the villagers from government services. In the border regions of the Kingdom where the population has many ills but few remedies, the BPP civic action program represents the only government medical service available. By responding to villager requests, the BPP establish themselves with the people as an interested extension of the RIG. As the subversives at this time cannot provide this necessary service, the villagers are more prone to protect the source of their benefits (the BPP) by providing information about anything threatening that source.

(U) As a paramilitary organization engaged daily in armed encounters with subversives in remote areas far from medical facilities, the BPP must have trained and equipped medics to care for wounded and sick policemen. Each BPP platoon has a medic in platoon headquarters with at least six months of training in the Police Hospital, each squad (three per platoon) has a less trained medic who accompanies squad-sized patrols. These medics carry out most of the BPP medical civic action programs. In addition, the schools have medical kits and the teachers are given basic first aid instruction. In 34 key hilltribe villages in the North, local medics have been trained and supplied to provide basic medical service to their own village with BPP assistance.

BORDER SECURITY VOLUNTEER TEAM (BSVT) PROGRAM

(U) (✓) The BSVTs are 30-man hilltribe volunteer units being formed in North Thailand to assist the BPP in border areas. As of July 1969, three platoon-size BSVTs had been organized in Area 5; and 15 more were scheduled to complete training during the year for service in that Area. It is expected that eventually the BSVT program will be extended into Loei Province, the only one in the Northeast containing hilltribes.

(U) Personnel for the BSVTs are selected as the result of joint conferences between the BPP Area commanders and provincial officials. The primary BSVT mission is to provide security to their home villages. They also are expected to provide guides and support for BPP personnel operating in their areas.

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(U)

(C) The teams receive nine weeks of training and indoctrination at the Dararasmee camp. Four or five BPP will be attached to each BSVT to assist in its operations. The 30-man BSVTs are organized into a six-man headquarters and three 8-man teams. The 15-man unit consists of a five-man headquarters and 10-man team. Initially armed with Springfield rifles and hand grenades, the teams are scheduled to receive M-1 rifles as the BPP replaces their M-1 rifles with the more modern M-16.

(U) Each BSVT functions under the operational control of the BPP platoon in its area, which provides the BSVT with needed support.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Relationship with RTA

(U) The BPP in the Northeast have been, since October 1967, under the operational control of Second Army (Forward) Headquarters, Sakon Nakhon. As far as can be determined, the relationship between the BPP and Army is usually good. The Army commander does not interfere with the BPP Area commander's day-to-day operations. The BPP commander may, with approval of the Army commander, plan and conduct counterinsurgency operations utilizing his own assets.

(U) On occasion, the Second Army commander may direct the BPP Area commander to support an Army operation (usually with MRPs). During these joint operations, the BPP acts under the operational control of the Army unit commander. The RTA Special Operation Centers (SOCs) located at Nakhon Phanom and Bung Kan have been given a degree of operational control over adjacent BPP platoons. They may direct these platoons to assist SOC teams in patrol operations. The Area 3 and 4 commanders hold staff positions with their province CSCs (Ubon and Udon). This position enables them to communicate directly with Second Army (Forward) Headquarters through the CSC-Second Army (Forward) net.

Relationship with Changvat Officials

(U) The BPP is considered an asset by DOLA representatives. Since the BPP is operating in border areas often difficult to reach, DOLA officials often ask the BPP for assistance in visiting remote villages. DOLA officials are invited to visit RAS projects utilizing TNPD helicopters or fixed wing.

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aircraft when available. In some instances DOLA representatives have accompanied BPP foot patrols in order to gain an appreciation of the problems in their areas.

(U) The BPP coordinates its RAS projects with changwat and amphoe officials so as to prevent duplication of effort. Special coordination is made by the BPP with the Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) program.

(U) In those amphoes with a CSC, the senior BPP officer participates in the amphoe CSC, along with the senior PP officer.

Relationship with Provincial Police

(U) The BPP Area commanders are considered members of the PP Region commander's staff. BPP Area headquarters and PP Region headquarters are not co-located and may not be in the same town. In Region 3 the PP headquarters is at Korat, while the BPP Area headquarters is at Ubon. In Region 4 the PP headquarters is located at Khon Kaen and the BPP Area headquarters at Udon.

(U) The BPP Area commander coordinates closely with the Chief of Police in each changwat. This is true also at company and platoon level. The BPP do not have detention facilities and turn over arrested individuals to the nearest PP station for detention, investigation, and processing. As tambon police increasingly adopt a development-intelligence role similar to the BPP RAS program, the distinctions between the roles of the two forces tend to diminish; and it is possible that they may eventually merge in areas of BPP operations.

Relationship with Paramilitary Forces (VDC, VSO, JST, etc.)

(U) The BPP line platoon works closely with paramilitary forces operating in its area of responsibility. Local VDC and VSO personnel are used to augment BPP patrols. The BPP platoon coordinates the use of local paramilitary assets through the Nai Amphoe.

(U) Although VDC training is normally an RTA responsibility, Area 3 BPP in October 1968 were assigned the training of 400 villagers in Ubon Province. This training consisted of three weeks of basic weapons, patrolling, communications, and village security. Trainees consisted of 96 men from Amphoe

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Phibun to undergo training at BPP Company 5 headquarters; 180 villagers from Amphoe Det Udon to be trained at BPP Company 4 headquarters; and 120 villagers from Amphoe Buntharik to receive training from BPP Line Platoon 316. Upon completion of training, the BPP cadre were to return to the villages with the newly trained VDC personnel.

US Advisory Support

(U) As of mid-1969 there were five BPP Public Safety Advisors, the one assigned to Udon being responsible for the Northeast. Another is scheduled for assignment to Udon (Area 3) late in 1969. The others are assigned to Bangkok and Areas 5, 7, and 9. Of the 9 Devcon advisors, four are assigned to Bangkok, one is assigned to Area 4, two to Area 5, and one each to Areas 8 and 9.

POLICE AIR DIVISION

(U) The Police Air Division received in August 1969 Cabinet approval and the Royal Decree, which would make it a legal separate entity within the TNPD, eligible for its own staff and budget.

MISSION

(U) (X) The function of the Air Division as stated at its inception is to provide air support to all elements of the TNPD in its peace preservation role in Thailand. A more accurate description of the Division's function as it has evolved is to provide helicopter and fixed wing airlift for the operational requirements of all police counterinsurgent and countersubversive activities, including movement of personnel and supplies and evacuation of the sick and wounded.

(U) Other functions which the Division will presumably perform when fully established and equipped include air surveillance and reconnaissance; airlift in response to national calamities such as flood or fire; search and rescue operations; airlift for police CI training activities, police communications installation and maintenance, and for law enforcement activities other than CI.

BACKGROUND

(U) (X) The TNPD and USOM early in the 1960s, realizing the need of the BPP for airlift and resupply because of their locations in remote border areas, supplied a small fleet of helicopters supplemented by an Air America contract (which provided maintenance and spare parts) and the services of two C-47s.

(U) (X) When the MRPs and SAFs (see preceding sections on BPP and PP) were developed in 1966 under the concept of police quick-reaction forces, both the RTG and the US recognized the necessity for helicopter lift to ensure prompt delivery of these units. Since it was clear that the BPP fleet was too

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- (U) small and that RIAF helicopters could not be expected to meet this need in addition to other priority requirements, an Air Division within the TNPD was accepted as the solution. The USOM-TNPD ProAg establishing the Police Air Division was signed on 30 June 1966. The ProAg provided for two US advisors to the Division, expansion of the Air America contract, broadening of US FUL support, and provision by the US of helicopters to be added to the nucleus of BPP helicopters and the few aircraft owned by the Marine Police. Contracts were signed in October 1966 for six Bell 204Bs and 16 Hiller F-1100s costing \$4,488,000 from FY-66 USOM funds. Eight more Bell 204Bs were programmed for FY-67 and thirty pilot candidates were sent to the US for a year's training. Establishment of the Police Air Division was ordered by the TNPD on 13 December 1966.


ORGANIZATION

- (U) (g) An Acting Commander (the Deputy Chief of Staff in the BPP), his deputy for operations (drawn from the Marine Police), and his deputy for support (also from the BPP) were appointed on 27 June 1967 and still occupy these positions. Figure 11 shows the proposed Division Headquarters organization, not yet fully staffed. Civil Service approval cannot be secured for these positions until functional job descriptions and work-load information have been developed.
- (U) (g) While awaiting formal authorization, the Police Air Division remained essentially a part of the BPP and the 247 men from the BPP assigned to it as of July 1969 were customarily included in BPP strength figures. A few more from the Marine Police brought the total to about 300. The Division is loosely arranged and held together mainly by the requirements of its mission and the US commodities and services provided to it. Maintenance and logistics support still comes primarily from Air America.

FUNDING

- (U) (g) Until the autumn of 1968 the Division apparently received limited funds from other TNPD sources when and as required. In September 1968, 77,9000,000 baht was allocated through the local currency part of the RTG-USOM Civil Police project; of this 30 million was earmarked for purchase of land and construction of a Division headquarters. A tentative estimate for RTG FY-69 funding is a total of 132 million baht, 26 million of which is obligated for new aircraft, and 26.5 million earmarked for aircraft maintenance. The RTG is expected

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(1) Fig. 11: Proposed Organization of Aviation Division

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increase contributions for maintenance annually until they assume the whole responsibility in FY-72.

- (U) (C) USOM support for the Air Division other than for aircraft has been: FY-68, \$835,133; FY-69, \$1,646,420.

EQUIPMENT

- (U) (C) The present accepted utility helicopter requirement for the Division totals 31. As of mid-1969, eight Bell 204Bs were in country and 11 Bell UH-1Hs were in the pipeline* as well as four STOL Porters. It seems probable that no further US procurement will be undertaken until the Division has gone through a shakedown period in operating these. In addition, the Division has the BPP and Marine Police nucleus, some of which have been or are being phased out because of obsolescence. Table 5 lists those operational and on order as of September 1969.

(U)

Table 5

AIR DIVISION AIRCRAFT ASSETS (OPERATIONAL AND ON ORDER)

MODEL	OPERATIONAL	ON ORDER
Bell 204B	8 8 (2 in maintenance)	
Kawasaki (Bell) KH-4	6	
Hiller 12E-4	7	
STOL aircraft	2 (Caribou)	4 (Porter)**
Bell UH-1H		11
Fairchild-Hiller F-1100	15 (3 in maintenance)	

*The Bell 204B and UH-1Hs are essentially the same aircraft, except that the UH-1H is newer and has a more powerful engine.

**In country in maintenance and transitional training.

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- (U) (X) The Kawasaki and the FH-1100 carry only three passengers* and are used primarily for command visits and inspections; six of the seven Hiller 12E-4s are used for helicopter pilot training and are not available for CI operations. The Bells, which carry 10 men or 3000 lbs. of cargo, are therefore the backbone of the Division's airlift capability, although the Caribous (bought by the TNPB) and the small STOLs under US procurement provide a very useful supplement.
- (U) (X) In the Northeast, hangars and quarters have been built at Korat (PP Region 3 Headquarters), Udon (BPP Area 3 Headquarters), Khon Kaen (PP Region 4 Headquarters), and Udon (BPP Area 4 Headquarters).

TRAINING

- (U) (X) The Air crews are rated as well trained (most of them were trained in CONUS) and highly motivated.
- (U) (X) Maintenance and logistics training is being conducted by Air America and progress is being made. Air America provides classroom and on-the-job training for English-speaking maintenance personnel (but these are not available in adequate numbers); gives advice and training in the establishment of supply systems and procedures and the development of stock control and parts procurement; and through its ground school upgrades pilot training (17 completed the course in 1968).

MAINTENANCE AND LOGISTICS

- (U) (X) Major current difficulties in maintenance and logistics are lack of supervisory Air Division personnel, problems in maintaining widely dispersed aircraft and delivering spare parts and batteries to them, and keeping inventory records and stock control of spare parts. The wide dispersion of the Air Division helicopters also requires maintenance of fuel depots at each of the likely landing points, an expensive necessity. In the absence of any Air Division provision for safety inspection, Air America determines the suitability of aircraft for flight. It is intended that the Air America contract shall be phased out as soon as the Division can

*A fourth man can be fitted uncomfortably into the FH-1100.

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handle this work itself but at present Division deficiencies in maintenance and logistics are the principal reasons for deferring additional aircraft procurement.

- (U) (C) It is expected that when the remainder of its helicopters now on order arrive, the Air Division will join with the RTAF and RTA in the single-manager arrangement for depot-level maintenance and logistical support of all military helicopters, now under development. This is planned to be under Ministry of Defense jurisdiction with the RTAF as executive agency. The Air Division would be brought in through committee membership.


COMMUNICATIONS

- (U) (C) The current Air Division radios net with the BPP and PP systems and through them to RTAF and other TNPD elements. For rapid communications in combat situations, however, current planning envisages that the Air Division will have a communications system of its own. The MRP and SAF platoons have inter-squad and intra-platoon radios (H. 2) that also permit ground-to-air communication up to 15 miles. Field elements of the TNPD also have Delco 5300 and SSB-20 radios which provide voice and CW communications with Area headquarters or other control centers up to 100 miles in range. In addition, tambon police stations, changwat and amphoe stations, and the village radio system utilize an FM-5 radio system. All of these have common frequencies designated by the TNPD which can be used to communicate with the CPNs or the Direct Air Support Centers and their tactical air control parties. Figure 12 shows the proposed system which would net with other TNPD elements, the RTAF, RTA, and the USAF.

ACTIVITIES

- (U) (C) The Police Air Division at present operates as a CI utility-airlift organization. Present deployment concepts call for the assignment of Air Division assets at the Regional level. Further assignment may be made to the province level if desired. The eight Bell 204Bs, Kawasakis, and FH-1100s currently available are dispersed singly or occasionally in groups of 2-3 in or near critical areas, mainly in the Northeast and the North. The two Caribou and any non-dispersed helicopters are based at Don Muang outside of Bangkok and provide airlift to sensitive areas on request. The Caribous are used mainly for large personnel movements and cargo air-drops.

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(U) The TNM Air Division Headquarters located in Lomé exercises direct operational control over the aircraft and helicopter pool and the supporting organization through the Air Division commander and his two deputies. This pool consists of all TNM aircraft not assigned to the Area or Regional police commanders. These assets are used for training and administrative support, as well as providing a reserve for units assigned to the regions and provinces. The deployed helicopters are under the operational control of the Area BPP commanders.

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(U) By order of the Air Division Commander, the priorities in terms of mission are:

1. Government elements involved in armed clashes with hostile forces and other emergency actions.
2. Government elements being deployed, re-deployed, or resupplied with a high probability of engaging CT forces.
3. Relocation, rotation, and resupply of other government forces and civic teams operating in critical areas.
4. Deployment, resupply, and relocation of mobile civic action teams.
5. Air lift of medical personnel and supplies to fixed medical facilities.
6. Training of CT suppression forces.
7. Remote site command/control, inspection, and resupply.

(U) Priorities by Government Agency are:

1. Headquarters, CT Suppression Operation Command (CSOC).
2. Central Committee for National Security.
3. Accelerated Rural Development.
4. Police Agencies.
5. Government elements under police control.
6. Other government elements.

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- (U) In practice the BPP have first priority for several reasons - the Air Division is largely staffed and manned by BPP; elements of the BPP are frequently engaged in CI operations; and some of the 132 deployed BPP platoons and PARA elements are dependent on airlift and air-supply in at least some months of the year. Consequently, with the presently available aircraft, there is little airlift available for PP and essentially none for other police elements. An attempt is made to reserve three FH-1100s for PP use.
- (U) Routine missions include airlift of food, medical supplies, reinforcement personnel, evacuation of sick and wounded, and command visits to line platoons, MRPs, and SAFs.
- (U) A quick-reaction response capability in terms of a few hours, such as was originally envisioned to be a primary Air Division mission, does not exist except in aircraft and police elements have been alerted to a standby status. The usual response requires at best 18-24 hours. Night operations are almost never carried on because of the rugged terrain along the borders. The wide dispersion of single helicopters makes speedy lift of a platoon or larger impossible unless planned well in advance. The police to be deployed may be in dispersed positions from which they have to be brought to the helicopter embarkation point, thus adding a further element of delay. Customarily, if more than a squad must be moved, one helicopter makes repeated trips. The most common reaction to an insurgent incident is the delivery of a squad or squads of BPP to an assembly area from which they go by truck, on foot, or by short flight, to blocking or support positions.
- (U) The RTAF Tactical Air Control System (TACS), which provides a facility for rapid communications to all elements concerned in specific air operations and assists in coordinating the efforts of all forces, also serves police requirements for air support.* The key elements of the TAC system include an Air Operations Center (AOC) under the operational direction of RTAF Forward Headquarters, a TACS communications net for receipt of request for air resources (pre-planned or immediate), and Direct Air Support Centers (DASCs) which provide rapid reaction to tactical air support requirements at the Regional level.

*See Vol. 2, RTAF Section, for a description of the RTAF Tactical Air Control System.

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(U)

(U) In the Northeast, for example, a request for an immediate air lift requirement would go through police channels to the Regional police commander. If the assets are not available, the request will normally be forwarded to Second Army Forward and if police assets are not available there, the DASC co-located with Second Army Forward will be requested to fill the requirement with RTAF assets under DASC control. If such assets, in turn, are not available, the request is forwarded to the AOC in Bangkok. The TNPD Air Division representative at the AOC then scrambles air assets in adjoining Regions or from the TNPD Air Division pool, if they are available; and if not, then coordinates with the senior AOC controller who scrambles RTAF aircraft from a unit nearest the area or from Don Muang RTAFB. The same procedures would apply for an RTAF or RTA requirement for air support by use of TNPD Air Division aircraft when assets of the former are not available. Under this arrangement, both RTAF and TNPD Air Division units can complement and support each other, at the same time retaining command and control over their aircraft.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

(U)

(U) In CI combat operations mutual support by RTAF, RTA, and TNPD air elements is becoming increasingly the accepted mode, as for example in operations around Lom Sak in the Tri-Province area (Ioei, Phetchabun, Phitsanulok) in which RTA, RTAF, and TNPD air assets operate under a composite headquarters. The RTAF has also established a Tactical Air Control Party at the joint headquarters at Lom Sak.

(U)

(U) Since January 1969, a senior TNPD pilot has served as liaison officer at the RTAF Air Operations Center at Don Muang, which allocates aircraft to preplanned or reaction operations, and the same officer also provides liaison at CSOD to keep up-to-date the location of planes and current procedures. The TNPD has also directed its pilots to file flight plans with the nearest TACS and this is now being done regularly.

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MARINE POLICE

BACKGROUND AND MISSION


(U) The Marine Police division is an element of the Central Investigation Bureau, TNPD. It was formed in 1952 as a result of RTG recognition of the requirement for a US Coast Guard-type organization to suppress the smugglers along the water borders of Thailand. The division is responsible for patrolling territorial waters (including bays and sounds accessible from seaward) and the Mekong River border with Laos to prevent smuggling, illicit entry, subversive activity, and banditry. Patrols along the Kra Peninsula coast of the Gulf of Siam seek to prevent infiltration of insurgents reported in this area. The division is also charged with enforcement of the navigation laws, security of the ports of Bangkok and Sattahip, and protection of the fisheries industry.

(U) By March 1969, the total manpower of the Marine Police was about 1,600 policemen assigned to the 26 patrol bases along Thailand's water borders and to the division headquarters at Paknam.

ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH IN NORTHEAST THAILAND

(U) Seven Marine Police patrol bases are located in Northeast Thailand to carry out Marine Police responsibilities along the Mekong River. Collectively, these bases form Subdivision VI with a total strength of about 12 officers and at Chiang Saen in Changwat Chiang Rai is attached to Marine Police Headquarters at Paknam. The Subdivision headquarters is located at Nong Khai and has a complement of four officers and 80 policemen. The other Marine Police bases in Northeast Thailand are located at Chiang Khan in Changwat Loel, Bung Kan in Changwat Nong Khai, Muang Nakhon Phanom and Mukdahan in Changwat Nakhon Phanom, and Khemarat and Ban Dan in Changwat Ubon. These locations are shown on Fig. 13, and the personnel and water craft assigned are listed in Table 6.

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(U) Fig. 13: Marine Police Locations in Northeast Thailand

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Table 6

COMPOSITION OF MARINE POLICE BASES IN NORTHEAST THAILAND
AUGUST 1969

POST	PERSONNEL ASSIGNED		WATER CRAFT ASSIGNED		VEHICLES ASSIGNED	
	OFFICERS	ENLISTED	30'-40' PATROL BOATS	OUTBOARD MOTOR BOATS	JEEP 1 1/2 TON TRUCK	
Subdivision VI Hq & Section 2	4	48	6	6	2	2
Section 1	2	38	3	4	1	
Sub-Section Bung Kan	1	20	2	2	1	
Section 3	1	44	5	6	1	1
Sub-Section Mukdahan	1	23	6	4	1	
Sub-Section Khemarat	1	10	1	2	1	
Sub-Section Ban Dan	1	10	1	3		

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FUNDING

(U) The RTG allocates roughly 25 million annually to support the Marine Police; a detailed breakdown of how these funds are used is not presently available.

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

Personnel

(U) Marine Police officers are provided from a small annual quota of Thai Naval and Police Academy graduates, plus graduates of the Bangkok Technical Institute who are offered Marine Police commissions on a volunteer basis. Enlisted personnel are procured through the TNPD recruit training centers and given on-the-job training.

Training

(U) There is no formal Marine Police school. Marine Police officers and enlisted personnel are eligible to attend various military and TNPD schools, such as the NCO School, Detective School, and others.

(U) Beginning in 1966, USOM started sponsoring the training of Marine Police officers in the US. Twelve officers had attended schools in the US by the end of 1968. The selected officers attend two of the following - the US Coast Guard Officer Candidate School at Yorktown, Virginia; the US Army Transportation School at Fort Eustis, Virginia; or the Air Sea Search and Rescue School at Governors Island, New York.

EQUIPMENT

(U) The Marine Police are authorized the same standard items of personal equipment issued to all members of the TNPD. Additional issue includes equipment peculiar to Marine Police activities, such as life jackets.

(U) There is no standard weapons authorization for the Marine police; small arms used consist of M1 rifles, carbines, and M3 submachine guns. Their boats are armed with .50 caliber machine guns and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns.*

*Their one ocean-going vessel is armed with a 3.5" gun.

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(U) Although the Marine Police have no standard vehicle authorization, they do have available a number of 1½-ton trucks and jeeps. Table 6 lists the vehicle assets of each base in the Northeast. An additional 25 jeeps for the Marine Police procured by USOM in FY-67 have been received.

COMMUNICATIONS

(U) Marine Police Headquarters has a Cosser 300 w transmitter, two Hallicrafters SX 71U receivers, 2 HAMMERLUND, 1 SSB-1000 w, 1 SSB-100 w, and one Hallicrafters S-409 receiver. This equipment permits the headquarters to communicate with its 26 subdivisions and all boats.

(U) Subdivision VI Headquarters at Nong Khai is equipped with a Hallicrafters HT-20 transmitter, a Hudson Viking-2 transceiver, and a Hallicrafters SX 71U receiver to communicate with headquarters at Paknam and with the seven patrol bases under its operational control. The bases, in turn, maintain communications with their river patrol craft through Viking and HT-20 transceivers.

(U) An additional twenty 30 w marine-type radios programmed for purchase with USOM FY-67 funds will be installed on Marine Police boats. In addition, USOM procured 15 FM-5 and 10 FM-1 radios in FY-67 for Marine Police use in ship-to-shore communications, especially for contact with the Provincial Police. A total of 220 radios have been provided since 1965.

WATER CRAFT

(U) The water craft assigned to Marine Police units in Northeast Thailand are indicated in Table 6. The principal types are 30-ft patrol boats and long-shaft, outboard motor boats. An additional thirteen 40-ft, radar-equipped craft constructed in Bangkok were delivered to the Northeast in June 1968. Seven more such craft will be built later and are expected to be assigned to the Northeast and other critical areas.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

(U) Requisitions for Marine Police supplies are forwarded through subdivision headquarters to Marine Police Headquarters at Paknam which forwards requests to the TNPD Quartermaster depot for action. The TNPD Quartermaster ships supplies to the requesting subdivision by road or rail.

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(U) The Marine Police do not maintain supply dumps but do maintain parts inventories at their various maintenance facilities. The two such facilities in the Northeast (each with a floating drydock and machine shop) are located at Nong Khai and Nakhon Phanom.

ACTIVITIES

River Patrols

(U) The major activity of the Marine Police in Northeast Thailand is patrolling the Mekong River which forms the border with Laos in this area. The stretch of river between bases is covered by craft sent out from each base with a normal patrol range covering half the distance to the adjacent base. These patrols are normally conducted only during daylight hours because of the lack of navigational aids. Patrols are run at night on occasions when intelligence information or support for other police elements indicates that certain areas should be covered. In August 1968 increased night patrolling activities were reported. The patrols stop and check boats along the river that are not crossing at authorized customs and immigration checkpoints, but they do not disturb the hundreds of small fishing craft operating daily on the Mekong. The international boundary lies in mid-navigational channel, which for the most part runs rather close to the Thai side. There are many communities along the Thai and Laos banks of the Mekong with relatives living on the other side of the river. It is difficult but necessary to discriminate between illegal crossers and legitimate visitors who normally are permitted relatively free crossing during daylight hours, provided they return to their side of the river by dark. The Marine Police may arrest and take into custody personnel apprehended in acts of illegal entry, smuggling, and other violations. Such personnel and their boats are taken to the patrol base for investigation and are then turned over to the PP for confinement and prosecution.

(U) The normal five-man crew of the 30-ft patrol craft consists of a coxswain, engineer, and three constables. They are armed with sidearms and with carbines, rifles, or submachine guns as required for the particular patrol. In addition to the crew, the patrol craft can carry a fully equipped squad-sized unit (10-15 men) of police or military as passengers. The 40-ft patrol craft can carry 20-25 fully-equipped men.

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Ground Patrols

(U) During the hours of darkness Marine Police bases are required to maintain ground surveillance along the banks of the Mekong River to a distance of five miles in each direction from their base. The armed patrols sent out for this purpose usually consist of one to three policemen. Their primary function is to detect and apprehend persons attempting illegal crossings.

CI Activities

(U) The Marine Police have an officer assigned to Second Army Forward Headquarters at Sakon Nakhon who has a communication link with Subdivision VI Headquarters. This officer coordinates and assists in planning operations in which Second Army desires Marine Police support in connection with their CI activities. This support usually takes the form of transporting military or paramilitary elements on the river or using Marine Police and their craft in surveillance or blocking actions.

Floods and Emergency Evacuation

(U) The Marine Police are called upon to assist local authorities in evacuating people who have or are about to become stranded because of floods. They also assist in the delivery of medicines and foodstuffs under emergency conditions and may be called upon by villagers along the river to provide emergency evacuation of seriously ill or injured persons.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Relationships with Customs and Immigration Service

(U) The Marine Police maintain a close relationship with RTG Customs and Immigration service personnel and often assist them at checkpoints during busy periods. The two organizations also exchange information obtained from informers regarding possible smuggling and illegal entry activities.

Relationships with Provincial Police and Border Patrol Police

(U) Local Police Units. A close cooperative relationship is maintained with PP and BPP units operating in areas along the Mekong River. The Marine Police often assist in transporting police patrols to points along the river and exchange intelligence obtained concerning smuggling and illegal entry of aliens

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and subversives. Patrol base commanders work closely with the PP and BPP commanders in their areas of responsibility.

(U) PP Region Headquarters. The Marine Police chain of command runs from Subdivision VI Headquarters directly to Marine Police Headquarters at Paknam. Requests from PP Region Headquarters that might interfere with the Marine Police mission have to be referred by the Subdivision commander to Marine Police Headquarters at Paknam for approval.

Relationships with Civil Authorities

(U) The Marine Police will, upon request, often provide transport for civil authorities such as nai amphoes and changwat officials to visit villages located along the river. They also are prepared to assist in emergency medical evacuation cases when called upon.

Relationships with Second Army Forward

(U) Second Army Forward Headquarters has been given the authority to direct Marine Police participation in counterinsurgency operations in the Northeast. The Subdivision VI Commander keeps Marine Police Headquarters at Paknam informed of such participation.

US SUPPORT

(U) USOM Office of Public Safety provides one US Marine Police advisor for all Marine Police operations throughout the country. His counterpart is the Commanding General, Marine Police. This advisor is located at USOM in Bangkok. He maintains contact with Marine Police Headquarters and travels to upcountry facilities on a regular basis. His normal tour of duty is two years.

(U) US assistance to the Marine Police was initiated in 1965; the amount of US dollar and baht support for the Marine Police through FY-68 is shown in Table 7.

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(U)

TABLE 7

US DOLLAR AND BAHT SUPPORT FOR THE MARINE POLICE SINCE 1965

FISCAL YEAR	US SUPPORT	
	Dollars	Baht
1965	\$400,000	฿1,460,000
1966	500,000	5,000,000
1967	424,000	1,870,000
1968	350,000	5,000,000
1969	15,527	4,994,900

PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

Strengths

(U) The Marine Police have reportedly made significant improvements in their effectiveness over the past few years, especially in the areas of communications, overall organization, facilities, equipment, and vessel/engine maintenance. The machine shops at Nong Khai and Nakhon Phanom should provide adequate maintenance support facilities for the new vessels provided by USOM in 1968.

Weaknesses

(U) The current system of patrolling cannot provide adequate protection against illegal crossings of the Mekong River. In most instances at present, single patrol craft, with a speed of about 15 to 20 knots (with the current) are required to cover a distance of about 60 miles round trip.

(U) Although the additional 40-ft, radar-equipped craft have improved the detection capabilities of the police patrols, the overall patrol system is still inadequate. The fact that the Marine Police patrol primarily during daylight hours, with only limited operations after dark because of the absence of proper navigational aids along the river, further increases opportunities for illegal crossings.

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HIGHWAY PATROL POLICE

BACKGROUND

(U) The Highway Patrol Police (HPP) Division was created in 1960 on the basis of RTG recognition of the need for a force to patrol the country's rapidly expanding road network. The HPP Division is an element of the Central Investigation Bureau, TNPD.

MISSION

(U) The HPP is responsible for police protection and law enforcement on the highways and roads outside the metropolitan areas of Thailand. Its responsibilities include traffic control, accident prevention and investigation, crime prevention and investigation on the highways, and highway escort of the royal Family and high-ranking members and guests of the RTG. The HPP is also responsible for escorting military cargoes and convoys on the highways. The HPP has powers of interrogation and investigation.

ORGANIZATION


(U) The HPP organization consists of a Bangkok headquarters and four subdivisions, three of which have their headquarters in Bangkok. HPP operations in Northeast Thailand are under the control of Subdivision 4 with headquarters at Khon Kaen and three sections located at Bansom, Udon, and Khon Kaen (see Fig. 14).

FUNDING

(U) The Department of Highways, which is a part of the Ministry of National Development, provides the budget for the HPP. The overall budget for 1969 is about \$25 million.

LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS

(U) Approximately 200 policemen are assigned to the Subdivision 4 Headquarters at Khon Kaen and its three sections. The



- Routes Patrolled by Section 1
- - - Routes Patrolled by Section 2
- · · Routes Patrolled by Section 3

Fig. 14: Highway Police Patrol Routes in Northeast Thailand

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current total strength of the HPP is about 924. Plans call for an annual increase of about 199 policemen per year through 1971.

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

(U) HPP enlisted personnel are obtained from graduates of the TNPD recruit training schools. Upon assignment to the HPP they are given four weeks of additional in-service training at the Highway Department in Bangkok, which includes such subjects as accident investigation, driver training, and laws regulating the use of the country's highways.

(U) HPP officers are procured primarily from graduates of the Sampran Cadet Academy and transfers from other divisions of the TNPD.

(U) Enlisted and commissioned personnel are eligible to attend the various schools of the TNPD. Sixty-three members of the HPP received four weeks of anti-sabotage training during 1967, given by a combined RTA Special Forces/US Army Special Forces Mobile Training Team.*

(U) Commissioned officers may be selected to attend the International Police Academy, Washington, D. C., for either the senior course (14 weeks) or the general course (13 weeks). HPP personnel may also be selected by the TNPD for observer tours with police departments of other countries.

EQUIPMENT

(U) The HPP are authorized the same individual equipment as other divisions of the TNPD.

Weapons

(U) The HPP are armed with pistols, carbines, shotguns, and submachine guns. Their basic weapon is the pistol. A shotgun is normally carried in patrol cars.

Communications

(U) The HPP use 50-watt VHF-FM mobile radios in their patrol cars and 60-watt VHF-FM base station radios for communi-

*See the section on US Army Special Forces in Vol. 7 of this Manual.

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cations with HPP Headquarters in Bangkok. HPP Headquarters in Bangkok and Region 1 in Khon Kaen also use 120-watt VHF-FM. In addition, HPP stations are equipped with FM-5 radios to permit them to net with the PP system.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

(U) HPP supplies are obtained through the TNPQ Quartermaster depot in Bangkok. Acquisitions are approved at Subdivision Headquarters and forwarded to the TNPQ Quartermaster depot.

ACTIVITIES

(U) The primary activity of the HPP in the Northeast is patrolling along the highways in the area, particularly the Friendship Highway from Korat to Nong Khai. The patrols normally work 12-hour shifts and usually consist of two policemen per patrol car during daylight hours and a third at night, sometimes armed with a submachine gun. The cars carry a 12-gauge shotgun as regular patrol equipment. Subdivision 4, located at Khon Kaen, is divided into three sections for patrol coverage.

Section 1 at Bansom in Amphoe Nong Soong patrols the highway between Korat Municipality and Khon Kaen.

Section 2 at the Subdivision 4 Headquarters in Changwat Khon Kaen patrols the highways between Khon Kaen and Kalasin to the east and Chumphae to the west.

Section 3 at Udon patrols the highway between Udon Municipality and Nong Khai, and between Udon and Khon Kaen.

(U) In addition to patrols, the HPP operate weighing stations and checkpoints. Overloaded trucks detected at weighing stations are required to unload the excess and pay a fine (฿50 is the minimum), depending upon the degree of overload. Resources control checkpoints are maintained along routes where insurgents are active.

(U) The HPP have an established intelligence net of informants who have proven effective against smuggling operations. Persons arrested by the HPP are normally turned over to the PP for confinement.

(U) The chain of command for the HPP runs from Subdivision Headquarters to HPP Headquarters in Bangkok. Any requests from PP Regional Headquarters for HPP assistance which may

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interfere with the HPP subdivision's assigned mission have to be referred to HPP Headquarters in Bangkok for approval. Second Army Forward Headquarters has the authority to direct HPP units in Northeast Thailand to participate in counter-insurgency operations.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

(U) The HPP maintain a close relationship with civil authorities, as well as with other elements of the TNPD. They often provide escort and traffic control services for civil processions and visiting dignitaries.

US SUPPORT

(U) USOM provides one traffic control advisor to the HPP, located at USOM Office of Public Safety. His counterpart is the Commander of the HPP. USOM also provides some training and commodity support such as patrol cars to the HPP and at times in the past has given some technical assistance in such areas as telecommunications.

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RAILWAY POLICE

BACKGROUND AND MISSION

(U) The Railway Police (RP) Division is both an element of the Central Investigation Bureau, TNPD, and a bureau within the State Railway of Thailand. It receives its budgetary support from the latter organization. Organized in 1952, the RP Division is responsible for the protection of life, limb, and property on trains and rail yards throughout the Kingdom. It is also responsible for the prevention of sabotage of the railroads.

ORGANIZATION

(U) The RP Division consists of a headquarters and four subdivisions. The RP Headquarters and the headquarters of the four subdivisions are located at the Hua Lam Pong Railway Station in Bangkok. A fifth subdivision, not yet officially approved, is in process of formation.

LOCATION AND STRENGTH

(U) RP operating in Northeast Thailand are a part of Subdivision 3 Headquarters. They maintain police stations adjacent to the railway stations at the changwat seats of Korat, Surin, Udon, and Nong Khai, and at Krasong in Changwat Buri Ram. These locations are shown in Fig. 15. Together, these stations have a total complement of about 122 policemen, while the overall strength of the RP Division is about 700.


FUNDING

(U) The RTG allocated \$222,020 in FY-68 and \$142,000 in FY-69 for support of the RP.

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

(C) RP personnel are procured through TNPD sources. Enlisted personnel are graduates of the TNPD recruit training schools

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----- Rail Line
△ RP Stations

Fig. 15: Railway Police Stations in Northeast Thailand

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and officer personnel are mainly graduates of the Sampran Police Cadet Academy. Newly assigned RP personnel receive four weeks of in-service training at the RP school located in the vicinity of Don Muang Airport, north of Bangkok. This four-week course includes such subjects as judo, use of pistols, search procedures, and instructions on the regulations governing the operation of the railroad.

(U) During 1967, 52 RP attended a four-week anti-sabotage course taught by a combined US/Thai Special Forces Mobile Training Team.

(U) All RP personnel are eligible to attend the various police and military schools available to members of the TNPD.

EQUIPMENT

(U) The RP are authorized the same individual equipment as other members of the TNPD (see the section on Provincial Police).

Weapons

(U) The basic weapon for the RP is the .38 cal pistol. They also have carbines, M1 rifles, M3 submachine guns, and 12-gauge shotguns.

Communications

(U) The RP use the facilities of the State Railway of Thailand, which consists of radio, telegraph, and telephone communications between stations and Bangkok. Aboard trains there are teletype communications available to the RP for communications to stations.

(U) The RP also have a communications system which includes intercommunications with the Provincial Police. Two-frequency, FM-5 VHF radios are installed at RP stations capable of communicating (on one frequency) with a similar radio installed at the nearest PP station and with FM-5 radios (at the other frequency) installed on trains. In addition, FM-1 radios are used by roving patrols in rail yards and depots to communicate with the RP station, and by roving patrols on trains to communicate with the base FM-5 radio on the train. For trains operating beyond the range of FM-1/5 radios, 100 w SSB radios supplied by USOM are used for communications with Bangkok.

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(U) Material purchases to implement this system were divided into two phases. During Phase I, 50 FM-5, 100 FM-1, and 7 SSB radios and miscellaneous equipment were purchased; and during Phase II, 146 FM-5, 252 FM-1, and 6 SSB radios.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

(U) RP supplies are secured through the TNPD Quartermaster depot in Bangkok. Requisitions are approved at subdivision headquarters and forwarded to the Quartermaster depot for action. Supplies are then forwarded by road or rail to the subdivision for delivery.

ACTIVITIES

(U) The RP normally assign two policemen to ride each passenger or freight train in country. They usually station themselves in a baggage car and patrol back and forth through the passenger cars.* They also spot-check baggage located on the train for smuggled goods. In the event that an incident occurs, the RP may place lawbreakers under arrest and turn them over to the next RP station for confinement. The RP stations have cells for temporary confinement of lawbreakers and usually turn over apprehended individuals to the PP for confinement and prosecution as quickly as possible.

(U) Following mining incidents on the railline from Korat to Ubon in 1967, the State Railway bought Wickham trolleys (armored cars), three of which now operate on the stretch in Surin and Buri Ram and one at the Phang Hoew tunnel on the line to Chiang Mai in Phetchabun Changwat.

(U) The RP are responsible for the security of rail yards and stations. They provide security guards for these installations on a 24-hour basis.

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

Customs and Immigration Service

(U) RP maintain a very close relationship with customs and immigration personnel. There is coordination and exchange of information between them regarding possible smuggling and illegal entry activities.

*A practice among thieves is to ride on the roof of passenger cars and reach through the open windows to steal belongings.

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Provincial/Border Patrol Police

(U) A close, cooperative relationship is maintained with Provincial and Border Patrol Police in the areas through which the railline passes. These police elements are prepared to render assistance to the RP when called upon.

US SUPPORT

(U) USOM Office of Public Safety provides one US advisor on a part-time basis to the RP. The US advisor is located in Bangkok. His counterpart is the Commanding General, RP. USOM project agreement support for the RP was initiated in 1966 and in 1967 allocated \$145,927 for telecommunication support and \$97,207 for training and commodity support. USOM funding in FY-68 totalled \$49,517 and nothing was allocated in FY-69.

FORESTRY POLICE

BACKGROUND AND MISSION

(U) The Forestry Police Division, established in 1960 as an element of the Central Investigation Bureau, TNPB, has as its mission the prevention, investigation, interrogation, and suppression of all offenses against the forestry laws and all other criminal offenses related to or stemming from such offenses.

(U) A brief discussion of this Division's work is included here because the Forestry Police have been a favorite target for insurgent propaganda as a result of RTG law enforcement against villagers who have encroached on forest preserves.

ORGANIZATION

(U) The Forestry Police Division consists of a headquarters and four area subdivisions, the headquarters of which are co-located with the Division headquarters in Bangkok. Subdivision I covers the amphoes on the outskirts of Bangkok and Thonburi; II includes Police Regions 1, 5, 6; III, Police Regions 2-4; and IV, Regions 7-9.

(U) As of October 1968, Division personnel included 36 officers and 385 policemen. The Division is supported entirely by RTG funds.

TRAINING

(U) Officers are allocated from the graduating classes of the Police Academy and policemen from the TNPB Recruit Training Centers. Officers are usually given training at the TNPB Detective Training Center before taking up their duties and policemen receive a two-week course in Bangkok from the Royal Forestry Department of the Ministry of Agriculture on forestry regulations and investigation.

EQUIPMENT

(U) As in other branches of the TNPD, Forestry Police officers purchase their own uniforms and accessories but the TNPD supplies these to the policemen.

(U) The Forestry Police Division issues weapons to policemen on duty - .32 and .38-cal revolvers, US .30-cal carbines, and 12-gauge shotguns.

(U) Forestry Police are dependent on PP and BPP communications nets for maintaining contact with their headquarters. Their only vehicles are jeeps and landrovers.

(U) Requisitions for equipment and supplies are approved by subdivision headquarters and filled by the Division Quartermaster.

ACTIVITIES

(U) The Forestry Police often operate jointly with officials of the Royal Forestry Department. These two organizations, for example, maintain together seven checkpoints along routes by which illegally cut logs are likely to pass. The Northeast checkpoint is at Ban Phai in Khon Kaen Changwat. The others are at Hin Kong in Saraburi, Sena in Si Ayutthaya, Bang Sai in Chon Buri, Chachoengsao town, Kabin Buri in Prachin Buri, and Nakhon Phathom town. The Forestry Police may also use the Department's helicopter to spot signs of illegal logging and Forestry Department officials often tip off Forestry Police as to logging operations to be investigated.

(U) To survey areas where illegal operations are suspected, a two-man Forestry Guard Unit is customarily sent out. They check in with the local PP, enlist their assistance in apprehending violators, and turn these over to the PP for detention, investigation, and processing.

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REFERENCES

Most of the material in this volume is drawn from interviews with USOM Office of Public Safety (OPS) advisors and Provincial Police and Border Patrol Police Officers in Bangkok and in Regions and Areas 3 and 4 in the Northeast; and from documents from OPS files, including TNPD-USOM Project Agreements.

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Appendix A

**LOCATION OF TAMBON POLICE STATIONS
IN REGIONS 3 AND 4**

Tables A-1 and A-2 list the locations of tambon police stations in Regions 3 and 4 in the Northeast, constructed, under construction, and programmed for construction by the end of the calendar year 1969. The order of the listing under amphoe runs from the first built through those planned. The majority of the earlier constructed were in the most security-sensitive amphoes.

TABLE A-1

TAMBON POLICE STATIONS
REGION 3

CHANGWAT/AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE
KORAT		
Muang	-- Maroeng -- Phon Krang Ban Nong Bu	Pho Klang Phanao, Vil. 2 Chaw Haw Ploke Lung Nong Tabok
Non Sung	-- Pol Song Kran -- Chan Ud	Kham Sakair Sang Makar Nong Huafan, Vil. 5 Prasart, Vil. 5
Pak Chong	-- Chan Thuk Mu Si	Klang Dong Wang Sai, Vil. 1 Lai Pattna
Sikhiu	-- Ban Ham Lard Buakao	Klong Phai Ham Nong Yakac, Vil. 15
Bua Yai	Nong Bua Lai Pong Phalai Don Ta Min	Nong Bua Lai Non Ravieng, Vil. 7 Thong Langnoi
Chokchai	Sarapee Tha Ang Thung Arun	Nong Hoa Hai Dankwien, Vil. 8 Non Bo Daeng, Vil. 5
Khong	Ban Prang --	Prang Leaum, Vil. 1
Non Thai	Sa Pra -- --	Pa Dum Samrong, Vil. 2 Chang, Vil. 3
Chakkarat	Sisuk Nong Yang	Khok Samrong, Vil. 13 Nong Yang

TABLE A-1 - Cont'd

CHANGWAT AMPHIE	TAMBON	VILLAGE
KORAT		
Sung Ngon	Bung Khilek	Khok Makok, Vill. 12
Huai Thalaeng	Muang Phlup Phla	Phai Nok Maao, Vill. 3
Prathai	Ban Han Huey Sai	Han Huey Sai, Vill. 1
Dan Khun Thot	Takian	--
	--	Samnuck Takhla, Vill. 1
Chum Phuang	Kui	Nong Bao Vong
	--	Tachong, Vill. 5
	Don Mun	Kok Klang, Vill. 5
Pak Thong Chai	Sa Kare Raj	Ma Darn
	--	Kok Seard, Vill. 1
King Kham Thale So	Nong Sruang	Nong Sruang
	--	Dhonsaensuk, Vill. 3
	Sar Tar Kiean	Lern Sang
	Jorake Hin	Jorake Hin, Vill. 2
Phimai	Bhote	Nong Jig, Vill. 6
	Chiwan	Thong Yoi, Vill. 12
CHAIYAPHUM		
Chatturat	--	Nong Bua Koke
	Ta Non	Tar Nern
	Nong Bua Ban	Nong Bua Raheow
Muang	Ban Kai	Mune Paw
	Na Tai	Huey Ton
	Lad-Yai	Lad-Yai
Bamnet Narong	Kok Rong Rom	Huay Yai Cheu
	Ban Hua Thale	Tai
Khon Sawan	Chong San Mo	Samran
	Huey Yang	Huey Yang

TABLE A-1 - Cont'd

CHANGWAT/AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE
CHAIYAPHUM		
Kaeng Khro	Nong Sang	Nong San
Kaset Sombun	Ban Paw --	Phao Deua
Ban Khwao	--	Non Noi
Phu Khiao	Ban Kang Ban Phet	Kang Phet
King Nong Bua Daeng	Nadad	Nong Hoypung
Khon San	Huey Yang	Huey Yang
King Ban Thaen	Sansuan	Sansuan
BURI PAN		
King Bankruat	Non Charlern Nong Mai Ngan Non Charaen	Luck Nong Mai Ngam Kok Kachai
Lahan Sai	Nong Bua Tong Phanom Rung Pakham	Padum Phanom Rung Hinkhon Dong
Prakhon Chai	Kok Kamin Ban Bua Muang Wan Lavia Bansai	-- Bua Muang Wan Lavia Phaibun
Nang Rong	Yeo Prasat -- Chumni	-- Ba Nongsai Chumni
Muang	Toom Yai Muang Pho -- Ban Dan Sakae Prong	-- Muang Pho Savai Chak Kok Wat Nong Song Hong

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TABLE A-1 Cont'd

CHANGWAT/AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE
BURI RAM		
Krasong	Lam Duan	Du
	--	Sung Neon
	Kok Klang	Nong Don
Satuk	Nong Yai	Chum Sang
	--	Dong Ploy
	Ron Thong	Ron Thong
Lam Plai Mat	Tamane Chai	Talard Tamane Chai
	--	Huey Hin
	Kok Klang	Nong Don
Phutthaisong	Nongwang	--
	--	Du
	Na Pho	Na Pho
SURIN		
Prasat	--	Nang Mud
	Pru	Pru
	Plai	Plai
	Tong Mon	--
	Mo	Mo
King Chom Phra	--	Muang Ling
	--	Bu Krang
	Nong Sanit	Nong Sanit
Sangkha	Sa Dao	--
	Lum Don	--
	--	Truad
	Jan Van	Jan Van
Muang	Sawai	--
	Muang Tee	--
	Ten Mi	Ten Mi
	Phea Ruan	Phea Ruan
	Takuk	Rasai
	Ko Kho	Ko Kho
	Tha Sawang	Tha Sawang

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TABLE A-1 - Cont'd

CHANGWAT/AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE
SURIN		
Rattanaaburi	Sanom	--
	Don Rat	Bung
	--	Nongthep
Chumphon Buri	Mueng Buo	--
Tha Tum	Kra Po	--
	--	Bua Kok
	Promthep	Promthep
Si Khoraphum	Ka La Mare	--
	--	Chan
	Tan	Tan
Samrong Thao	Jarapat	Jarapat
	--	Kor Kao
	Kra-om	Kra-om
SI SA KET		
Kantharalak	--	Don Ah
	--	Nong Waeng
	Toom	--
	Sikao	Sikao
	Kut Selao	Kut Selao
	Bung Malu	Dan
Muang	Payu	--
	Kusord	--
	Bu Sung	Bu Sung
	Nong Hi	Nong Hi
	Non Kwao	Non Kwao
	Non Phek	Non Phek
	--	Yang Chum Noi
	Don Yai	Don Yai
	--	--
Kanthararom	Non Kor	--
	Namklaing	--
	--	Kanthararom
	--	Chan
	--	Pho
	--	Nong Waen
	La-oh	La-oh

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TABLE A-1 - Cont'd

CHANGWAT/AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE
SI SA KET		
King Ban Sa Yo	--	Sa Yo
Uthumphon Phisai	Dode Thung Chai Pho Chai	-- Thung Chai Non Yai
Rasi Salai	Dan	--
Khun Han	Pai Khan Trom Pran	-- Khan Trom Pran
Khukhan	Cha Kong -- Sano	-- Pruiyai Lalom
UBON		
Trakan Phutphon	-- Non Kong Kokchan Pao	Khao Boon -- Kokchan Pow
Maha Chana Chai	-- Praseo Bung Kae	Fah Huan Praseo Dong Chong Ang
Det Udon	Song Na Charuey Na Year Thung Thoeng	-- Fungtho -- Nong Yao
Muang	Leo Ma Kok Krasot	-- Makmai
Warin Chamrap	Sam Rong Tha Lad Pho Yai	-- Huey Khayung Tho Yai
Amnat Charoen	Prs Kaw Nam Prak Amnat Phon Thong Nawang	-- -- Amnat Phon Thong Nawang

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TABLE A-1 - Cont'd

CHANGWAT/AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE
UBON		
Phibun Mangsahan	Kud Chom Pu Na Pho Nong Klang	-- Na Pho Don Ko
Chanuman	Ban Par Keaw Khum Khoen Khoew Chanuman	-- Khum Doeng Kok Santha
Kong Chiam	Nam Tang -- Kham Lai	-- Euad Yai Kham Lai
Buntharik	Kho Lan Huey Kha	Lad Hin Thu Non Ko
Kut Chum	Phou Ngam Kham Mad	Khum Phak Kud Kham Mad
Phana	Lua Chan Lan	Na Wah Chan Lan
Khemarat	Tied Pho Chai Palan	Muang Thao Khum Klang Pak Sang
Loeng Nok Tha	Soapho Khamphai	Sri Kaeo Pok
Kha Khuanm Kaeo	Nakham	Pla Eed
Muang Samsip	Nong Chang	Nong Meg
Khuang Nai	Sang Tho Noi Nakham Ban Thai	Non Kab Nakham Kok
Yasothon	Saimoon Na Vieng	Saimoon Na Vieng
Kut Cnum	Kham Mad	Kham Mad
Ban Dan	Nong Saeng Yai	Nong Saeng

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TABLE A-2

LOCATION OF TAMBON POLICE STATIONS
REGION 4

CHANGWAT/AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE
LOEI		
Chiang Khan	Chieng Klom Khao Kaew Pak Tom That	Chieng Klom Na Si Na Chan That
Muang	Nan Suay Na-or Na Dindam Na Pong Tha Sala	Na Duang Na-or Na Dindam Tue Noi San Tom
Wang Saphung	Nong Ya Prong Nong Ngew Nong Kan Pha Noi	-- Na Samsang Nong Kan Pha Noi
Tha Li	Pong Tong Lad Kang Nong Phue	Yah Plong Lad Kang Nam Kaem
Dan Sai	Pon Sung Na Haew Nadi Kok Satorn Pong	Na Kam Pom Na Haew Huey Na Fa Nam Yen Nam Phu
Plu Kradung	Pha Khao Puan Phu	Pha Khao Puan Phu
NONG KHAI		
Si Chiang Mai	Ban Mo Pho Tak	Kogsang Pho Tak
Kaska	Dongbang	Laulong
Bung Kan	Nongkang Chombhubhorn Nong Khern Don Ya Nang Kok Kong	Haokan -- Bueng Khla Don Ya Nang Huey Cern Tung

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TABLE A-2 - Cont'd

CHANGWAT/AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE
NONG KHAI		
Phon Phisai	So Tunglong Serm Na Nang Si Chompu	So Laotangkhum Serm Na Nang Kok Klang
Muang	Wieng Kook Dan Dua Kha Bokwan Hin Ngom Wat That Kuan Wan	-- -- Dong Wen Si Kai Berd Kuan Wan
Seka	Seka Tha Koke Daeng Pho Mak Khang	Na Kumbon Pong Hai Sok Kam
Tha Bo	Ban Doe Kok Corn	Na Numphai Kok Corn
King Sangkhom	Ban Moang	Na Bon
UDON		
Muang	Kutchub Nong Bu Mark Ya	Pier Sam Phrao Nong Woa So
Phen	Sangoem Chom Si Ban Lao	Sangoem Chom Si Ban Lao
Kumphawapi	Mongyasai Si-or Pho Si Samran	Mongyasai Tom Pakha Pho Chai
Ban Dung	Ban Chan Dong Yen Han Chan	Chan -- Chai
Ban Phu	Klangyai Khaosan Ban Mek Khue Nam	Nontasang Khaosan Noan Thong Phuen

TABLE A-2 - Cont'd

CHANGWAT/AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE
UDON		
Nong Han	Soi Prao Sabang Chai Wan	Daeng Boonmi Kum Lo
King Na Klang	Na Si Kao Klob	Kud Phuang Na Dan
Non Sang	Kud Cu None Muang	Nong Waeng Koke Muang
King Si Boon-Roeng	Nakok	Nakok
KHON KAEN		
Kranuan	Sum Soong Hucy Yang	-- Kok Klang
Muang	Pra Bu Sawathi	Phra Yun Noan Ku
Ban Phai	Puey Noi -- Ban Hun	-- Ban Had Hun
Mancha Khiri	Ban Kok Phon Phek	Koke Nong Hi
Phon	Wang Noi None Thong Don Chim	-- Ratana Waeng Yai
King Sichomphu	Srisuk Na Chan	Pongs Na Chan
Nam Phong	Na Kham	Srisuk
Phu Wiang	Na Wha Ban Kok	Na Wha Nong Na Kum

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TABLE A-2 - Cont'd

CHANGWAT/AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE
KHON KAEN		
Nong Song Hong	Kum Zard Nong Mek	Kum Zard Na Di
Chumphae	Noan Com Noan Udom	Na Fai Noan Saka
Nong Rua	Kud Kwang Yang Kum	Kud Kwang Yang Kum
Chonbot	Wang Saeng Ban Tan	Noan Kha Huey Kae
NAHA SARAKHAM		
Muang	Donwan Thatum Nong Kung Tha Song Corn	Donwan Thatum Soak Daeng Bo Noi
Wapi Pathum	Nadoon Na Kha Sua Kok Dong Yai	Nadoon -- Sua Kok Dong Yai
Chiang Yun	Chemchuen Kuthong Nong Son	Kudpladuk Chod Nong Son
Kantharawichai	Nasrinuan Makha Khao Yai	Nasrinuan Makha Nam Siew
Kosum Phisai	Lao Nong Bua Khuen	Nongkung Phu Khuen
Dorabu	Kudrung Khamphi Noan Daeng Loeng Fak	Kudrung Lao-rao Lao Tam Loeng Fak

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TABLE A-2 - Cont'd

CHANGWAT/AMPHOE	TAMBON	VILLAGE
MAHA SARAKHAM		
Phayakkhaphum Phisai	Napee	Yangsrisara j
	Kham Ruan	Kham Ruan
	Muangtao	Srabak
	Phara-an	Dong Bung
Na Chuak	Perpan	Perpan
	Nong Pho	Nong Bung
	Samrong	Sawang
SAKON NAKHON		
Muang	Kamin	Dongmakfi
	Tao-ngoy	Tao-ngoy
	Ban-Pone	Ban-Pone
	Lao Phone Koh	--
	Huay Yang	Noh Tha Khunkai
	Tong Khop	--
	Nong Bu	Sam Phrao
	Mark Ya	Nong Woa So
Phanna Nikhom	Sawang	Bua-Yai
	Manai	Nongpue
	Rai	--
	Na Hua Bo	Na Hua Bo
Wanon Niwat	Mye	Ponekai
	Khyakhai	Phon Nan Kanplap
	Kham Ta Kla	Kham Ta Kla
	Khusakhan	--
	Duer Sikanchai	Non-U-Dorm
Sawang Daen Din	Wang	Denkhua
	Songdown	Nonbua
	Kokesri	Kokesri
	Tan Noeng	--
	Watana	--
	Bong Nua	Bong Nua
King Kut Bak	Mai	--
	Kok Phu	Sang Kho
	Kut Bak	--
	Na Mong	--
	Nong Lad	Don Yao Noi
	Kumbo	Kumbid

TABLE A-2 - Cont'd

CHANGWAT AMPHOE	AMPHOE	VILLAGE
SAKON NAKHON		
Waritchaphum	Waritchaphum	--
King Akat Amnuoi	Phong Phaeng Phon Ngum	--
King Kusuman	Um-Chan Pho Phaisan	Boi E Pho
KALASIN		
Kuchinarai	Poelanchang Jumjang Don Nadi Ban Kume Hong Kham Bong Song Ploey Naku Kud Wha	Poelanchang Nongmek Kham E Kham E Nong S Chari Kok K
Yang Talat	Huamek E-lue Hua Ngew Wer	Huamek Noan Soeng Siew Na Kung
Muang	Muang-na Lampao Na Mon Bung Wichai Phai	Ban-muang Nong So Lak Liem Bung Wichai Khamin
Sahatsakhan	Tung-klong Samran --	Num-muang -- Ban Nong Moang
King Tha Khantho	Tha Khantho Sahaskhan	Kut Jik Nong Rewnang
King Somdet	Saeng Badan Mu Mon	Saeng Badan Mu Mon
Kamalasai	Sama Nong Pan	Rong Kham Nong Pan

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TABLE A-2 - Cont'd

CHANGWAT AMPHOL	TAMBON	VILLAGE
ROI-ET		
Phon...	--	Nong Mua
	Kham Bua	Pho Chai
	Chiengmai	Chiengmai
	Sawang	Sawang
Muang	Mong-Lard	Tah Lad
	Pho Thong	Nong Waeng Kuang
	Din Dum	Nong Bua Rong
Suwanaphum	Pon-sai	Bua Don Thon
	Ploey	Chang Phuak
	Hua Tone	Hua Tone
Selaphum	Pa Tong	Na Pho
	Chawow	Chawow
Kaset Wisai	Dong Klang Yai	Dong Krung Noi
	Fang	Nong Chiang Kaeo
King Nong Phok	Koke Sawang	Koke Klang
King Pathum Rat	Non Soong	Du Yai
Phanom Phrai	Denras	Nong Koon
	Kut Nam Sai	Kut Nam Sai
Chaturaphak Phiman	Lin Fah	Pa Daeng
	Pa Sang	Rong Kham
Thawatchaburi	Mu Mon	Why Luem
	Lao	Terd Thai
At Samat		Nom
	Du	Ban Du

NAKHON PHANOM

Muang

Bankiang
Kum Tuey
Ban Phung
Kurukhu

Bankiang
Kum Tuey
Ban Phung
Wang Tamoa

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TABLE A-2 - Cont'd

CHANGWAT AMPHOE	TAMBOON	VILLAGE
NAKHON PHANOM		
Na Kae	Donleang	Donleang
	Prasong	Prasong
	Nongsang	Wangwang
	Nong Bua	Latoh
	Nong Bo	Dongkwang
	--	Pluakau
That Phanom	Ranee	Nadon
	Nakum	Nakum
	Praklangtung	Leksila
	Tha Lad	Tha Lad
	Nankum	Khon Sawan
Khamcha-I	Ban-Kho	Kho
	Nongsung	Nongsung
	Nong Sung Tai	Nong Waeng
	Khamcha-1	Khamcha-1
Tha Uthen	Pensawan	Pensawan
	Ban Kho	Kho
Mukdahan	Wanyai	Wanyai
	Pungdad	Pungdad
	Mukdahan	Nasrinuan
	Dongyen	Dongyen
	Kham Soi	Kham Soi
	Kum Pa Lai	Kum Pa Lai
King Pla Pak	Kok Sawang	--
	Kut Takai	Kut Takai
	Mahachai	Nok Hoh
King Don Tan	Pa Rai	Pa Rai
	Nonghee	Nonghee
Si Songkhram	Ban Siew	Siew
Ben Phaeng	Na Tom	Na Tom

Appendix B

POLICE SCHOOLS

The Education Bureau of the TNPD operates directly under the Office of the First Assistant Director General (see Fig. 2). It functions as the central training command for administration of police courses at all levels from recruit training to training for commissioned officers. A limited number of TNPD officers also attend RTA and RTAF Command and General Staff Colleges.

The nine schools supervised by the Bureau are the Sampran Cadet Academy, the Detective Training School, the NCO School, the Metropolitan Police School, and five Provincial Police Recruit Schools. From all these except the Metropolitan Police School graduates are likely to be assigned to the PP in Northeast Thailand. The BPP also draw from the Sampran Cadet Academy and the NCO School.

SAMPRAN CADET ACADEMY

The Sampran Cadet Academy is the primary source of police officer personnel, supplemented by some volunteer officer transfers from the military services, direct commissions awarded to outstanding senior police NCOs, and selected university graduates who volunteer for police service. The Academy maintains an enrollment of about 400 students and graduates 90-100 annually. In FY-69, 350 men were enrolled in a four-year course and 154 university graduates in March 1969 entered a six-month course leading to a commission as police sub-lieutenant.

Students are selected from three sources: (1) outstanding graduates of police recruit schools who have successfully passed competitive examinations; (2) outstanding police recruit school graduates with a high school education and successful completion of competitive examinations, plus one year of probationary service with the police; and (3) cadets from the preparatory school in Bangkok, a pre-academy secondary school which prepares students for both military and police academies.

DETECTIVE TRAINING SCHOOL

The Detective Training School located in Bangkok graduates two-three classes per year. The school has a basic course lasting 12 weeks and an advanced course of 16 weeks. The classes include officer and NCO personnel and about 250 graduate annually. Selection, made on a countrywide basis, depends on a recommendation for training by commanding officers.

A new course started in July 1969 gives eight days of training to 109 police officers in detective theory and practice. Four other groups are scheduled to follow this first class.

NCO SCHOOL

This Bangkok school consists of three months' training for outstanding noncommissioned officers who are given a one-grade promotion on completion. Students are assigned to the school on recommendation of their commanding officers. The annual output is about 250 graduates. In March 1969 a class of 100 entered the school and 60 officers were graduated from a CI combat course.

POLICE RECRUIT SCHOOLS

As mentioned in the section on Provincial Police, the Education Bureau operates five Police Recruit Schools at Nakhon Phanom, Korat, Lampang, Yala, and Chon Buri. A total of 1661 were graduated during June 1968-March 1969. At that time budget restrictions closed down the schools until the start of the next Thai fiscal year on 1 October 1969. To compensate for the reduction of length of course from an earlier six months to 4½ months, the TNPD proposes two years of on-the-job training for Police Recruit School graduates at stations in the changwats.

TRAINING OF POLICE OUTSIDE THAILAND

USOM sponsors attendance of Thai police officers at the International Police Academy in Washington, D. C. The Academy offers two principal courses, a senior course and a general course, in which a diversified program of police administration and operations is presented. The senior course of 14 weeks is conducted once annually. The general course consists of 13 weeks at the Academy and may be followed by up to four additional weeks of specialized training. USOM objectives are to place 10 Thai police officers in each senior and general course.

A total of 132 TNPD personnel attended training in the US during 1968. Twenty BPP officers were included in this group, 18 of whom attended a four-week Special Training Course in Counterinsurgency Operations and Civil Affairs. They also received briefings and classroom instruction at the US Border Police Headquarters and the International Police Academy in Washington, D. C., the Seminole Indian Reservation, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The two other BPP officers attended the Executive Training Course at the International Police Academy.

The following US participant training was scheduled for the BPP in FY-69:

Senior Course, International Police Academy	3
General Course, International Police Academy	3
Executive Orientation	25
Counterinsurgency Courses, Fort Bragg	18
TOTAL	49

Police officers are also sent for observation tours to countries in Europe and Asia. These tours may last two weeks to two months. There is no set annual quota for participants. Travel expenses are paid by the TNPD and per diem costs by USGIA.

Selected Thai police officers attend the Jungle Warfare School at Ipoh in Malaysia. The course is 6-8 weeks and covers CI and jungle operations. During FY-68, 40 TNPD officers attended the course and 21 others visited on an observation tour. Similar groups were scheduled for FY-69.

TABLE C-1 - Cont'd

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UNIT	TAMBON	AMPHOE	CHANGWAT
LP 314	Dompradit	Det-Udom	Ubon
LP 315	Huai Kha	Buntrik	Ubon
LP 316	Phon Ngam	Buntrik	Ubon
LP 317	Fang Kham	Pibul Mangsahan	Ubon
LP 318	Khong Chiam	Ban Dan	Ubon
LP 319	Napho Klang	Khong Chiam	Ubon
MRP 359	Khemarat	Khemarat	Ubon
LP 320	Samrong	Khemarat	Ubon
LP 321	Khemarat	Khemarat	Ubon
LP 322	Chanuman	Chanaman	Ubon
BPC 2		Lahansai	Buri Ram
DP 381	(Assigned to Area Headquarters, Ubon.)		
TP 382	(Administrative organizations; member teachers assigned to Remote Area Schools.)		
TP 383			
TP 384			

^aThree of the MRPs (as yet undesignated) are to be converted to MLPs.

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Appendix C

LOCATION OF BPP PLATOONS IN AREAS 3 AND 4

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TABLE C-1

LOCATION OF COMPANY HQS PLATOONS IN BPP AREA 3
JUNE 1968

UNIT ^a	TAMBON	AMPHOE	CHANGWAT
Co. 1	Nang Rong	Nang Rong	Buri Ram
Co. 2	Kabchoeng	Prasat	Surin
Co. 3	Beung Malu	Kantralak	Si Sa Ket
Co. 4	Muang Det	Det-Udom	Ubon
Co. 5	Kud Chumphu	Pibul Mangsahan	Ubon
Co. 6	Khemarat	Khemarat	Ubon
WP 371	Kham Yai	Muang	Ubon
MRP 351	Kham Yai	Muang	Ubon
MRP 353	Kham Yai	Muang	Ubon
MRP 353	Kham Yai	Muang	Ubon
MRP 354	Kham Yai	Muang	Ubon
MRP 355	Kham Yai	Muang	Ubon
MRP 356	Nang Rong	Nang Rong	Buri Ram
LP 301	Prakham	Lahansai	Buri Ram
LP 302	Lahansai	Lahansai	Buri Ram
LP 303	Ta Chong	Lahansai	Buri Ram
LP 304	Prasat	Ban Kruad	Buri Ram
MRP 357	Kabchoeng	Prasat	Surin
LP 305	Bakdai	Prasat	Surin
LP 306	Bakdai	Prasat	Surin
LP 307	Kabchoeng	Prasat	Surin
LP 308	Dan	Songkhla	Surin
LP 309	Bua Chet	Songkhla	Surin
MRP 358	Beung Malu	Kantralak	Si Sa Ket
LP 310	Preu Yai	Khukhan	Si Sa Ket
IP 311	Si	Khunhan	Si Sa Ket
LP 312	Beung Malu	Kantralak	Si Sa Ket
LP 313	Beung Malu	Kantralak	Si Sa Ket

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TABLE C-2

LOCATION OF COMPANY HQS PLATOONS IN BPP AREA 4
JUNE 1968

UNIT	TAMBON	AMPHOE	CHANGWAT
LP 401	Muang Bang	Muang	Nong Khai
LP 402	Kaeng Kai	Sri-Chiangmai	Nong Khai
LP 403	Pak Chom	Chiangkhan	Loei
LP 404	Tha Bo	Tha Bo	Nong Khai
LP 405	Kaeng Kai	Sangkham	Nong Khai
LP 406	Chumphon	Phonphisai	Nong Khai
LP 407	Beungkan	Beungkan	Nong Khai
LP 408	Nong Doen	Beungkan	Nong Khai
LP 409	Nong Pheu	Thali	Loei
LP 410	Chiangkhan	Chiangkhan	Loei
LP 411	Phran Phrao	Sri-Chiangmai	Nong Khai
LP 412	Ban Muang	Sri-Chiangmai	Nong Khai
LP 413	Chaiburi	Tha Utain	Nakhon Phanom
LP 414	Na Ke	Ban Phaeng	Nakhon Phanom
LP 415	Saen Phan	That-Phanom	Nakhon Phanom
LP 416	Dan Sai	Dan Sai	Loei
LP 417	Muang Mai	Mukdahan	Nakhon Phanom
LP 418	Phon Phaeng	Phon Phisai	Nong Khai
LP 419	Nam Kam	That-Phanom	Nakhon Phanom
LP 420	Pho Chai	Mukdahan	Nakhon Phanom
TP 481	Nong Bua	Muang	Udon
TP 482	Nong Bua	Muang/Udon	Udon
TP 483	Nong Bua	Muang	Udon
MRP 451	Nong Bua	Muang	Udon
MRP 452	Nong Bua Lamphu	Nong Bua Lamphu	Udon
MRP 453	Nong Bua	Muang	Udon
DP 481	Kok Tum	Na Lao	Nakhon Phanom
DP 482	Dong Luang	Na Kie	Nakhon Phanom
DP 433	Na Yung	Ban Pheu	Udon
DP 484	Haw Kham	Beungkhan	Nong Khai

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Appendix D

POLICE PAY

(C) Table D1 indicates police monthly salaries by rank. These rates went into effect on 1 October 1967. They represent increases over the previous salaries of between 20 percent for privates and 8 percent for generals.

(U) The table also indicates per diem rates payable to police personnel when on duty away from their normal duty station. For example, amphoe station personnel receive per diem when on patrol.

(U) Per diem is now allowed for policemen attending training schools. The daily rates for this type of per diem are:

Enlisted Men

- B12 per day in training schools with kitchens,
- B16 per day in training schools without kitchens,
- B14 per day in Changwat Yala.

Officers

- B16 per day in training schools with kitchens,
- B20 per day in training schools without kitchens.

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