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WORKING PAPER

COMPILATION OF PROPOSALS FOR MUTUAL
WITHDRAWALS FROM EUROPE

Historical Division
Joint Secretariat

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EDEN PLAN, 1954-1955

During the January 1954 foreign ministers meeting in Berlin, Foreign Secretary Eden, on behalf of the United States, Britain, and France, proposed a plan for the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a freely negotiated German peace treaty. There was no mention in the original plan of withdrawal or limitation of arms or forces. Mr. Malotev countered with a Soviet plan calling for a neutralized Germany, the withdrawal of all occupying forces from Germany within one year after the conclusion of a peace treaty, and the liquidation of all foreign military bases on German territory. Since the Soviets would not accept free elections in Germany, and since the Western powers would not give up their German bases, no agreement was reached at the meeting.

In a note of 31 March 1954, the Soviet Government requested the US to reconsider the Soviet plan introduced at the foreign ministers meeting. The note also suggested that the Soviet Union participate in NATO if it were to be a truly "defensive" in character. On 7 May, the US rejected these Soviet proposals, stating that collective security would best be safeguarded if the Soviet Government would permit the UN to function as the Charter intended and dismissing the suggestion of Soviet participation in NATO as "unreal".

At the Geneva summit meeting in July 1955, Prime Minister Eden again introduced his plan for German reunification. He also suggested that the United States, Britain, France, and the USSR join in an agreement that would control armaments and armed forces in both Germany and in neighboring states. Premier Bulganin refused this proposal, supporting instead a general European security pact with the abandonment of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the eventual withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of European states. There was no agreement at the summit, but the four heads of state did instruct their foreign ministers to continue efforts to secure a security pact for Europe, or a part of Europe, and the limitation and control of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

The US, British, and French delegations to the 27 October-16 November 1955 foreign ministers meeting again endorsed the Eden Plan for reunification and free elections in Germany. Contingent upon acceptance of this plan, the Western Big Three proposed that Germany, the United States, Britain, France, the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia should: renounce the use of force; limit arms and forces in a zone 100 to 150 miles wide along the reunited Germany's eastern frontier; and provide for inspection and control to warn against surprise attack--including the establishment of a radar network in each other's territories. The Soviets refused to accept the Western proposals, still insisting on a collective security treaty among all European states, with an undertaking not to participate in any conflicting alliance--such as NATO--and a proviso that all foreign troops would be withdrawn from Europe.

(U) US Senate, Com. on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, pp. 146-154, 178-184, 192-209.
(U) State Dept Bulletin, XXX (17 May 54), pp. 756-759.

BULGANIN LETTER, 6 June 1956

On 6 June 1956, Premier Bulganin informed President Eisenhower of a recent Soviet decision to demobilize 63 divisions and separate brigades, including three air divisions and other combat units numbering 30,000 men stationed in the German Democratic Republic. He called on the United States, Britain, and France to make similar reductions in their troops on German territory. The President replied on 4 August that the problem of forces in Germany could not be dealt with as an isolated matter, and he urged the Soviets to live up to previous agreements for reunification and free elections in Germany.

(U) Ltr. Bulganin to Eisenhower, 6 June 56; Ltr., Eisenhower to Bulganin, 4 Aug 56; both w/Sec't Note 112, JMF 092 (4-14-45) sec 66, B.P. Part 7.

SOVIET DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT AND THE REDUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION, 17 November 1956

After noting that the armed attack of Britain, France and Israel on Egypt had "created a situation dangerous to the cause of peace," the USSR presented the United States on 17 November 1956 a broad program designed to reduce armaments and international tension. Included in this program were the following specific proposals: 1) a one-third reduction during the coming year of US, British, French, and Soviet armed forces stationed in Germany; 2) a "significant" reduction during 1957 of the armed forces in the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas; 3) liquidation within two years of military bases on the territory of other states; 4) establishment of a strict and effective international control, including provision for aerial inspection up to 800 kilometers on either side of the demarcation line between the NATO and Warsaw Pact areas; and 5) a summit meeting to consider these proposals.

On 31 December, President Eisenhower suggested that, instead of a summit meeting, the Soviet Union present these proposals through the UN. The President promised to give the Soviet proposals "careful study" and pledged continued US efforts toward the reduction and control of armaments.

(U) State Dept. Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, I, pp 720-730.

SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS, 18 MARCH 1957

In connection with its proposal to the Disarmaments Subcommittee of the United Nations on reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the Soviet Union on 18 March 1957 proposed that during 1957 and 1958 the US, the UK, France and the USSR reduce their armed forces stationed in Germany by one-third in relation to the level of those forces on 30 December 1956. They also proposed that the same nations substantially reduce their armed forces stationed in NATO countries and of the Warsaw Treaty nations as appropriate, and that further reductions be made in 1959.

(U) Dept of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1949, pp. 754-755.

MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S TV PROPOSALS - 2 JUNE 1957

Speaking on US television in a recorded interview, Mr. Khrushchev stated on 2 June 1957: Why could not the United States and other countries withdraw their troops from Western Germany and from the Western countries, that is to say, from France, Italy, Turkey, Greece and from other places where your troops are stationed of which I do not know. We, on the other hand, could withdraw our forces from Eastern Germany, from Poland, Hungary, and Rumania. We do not have troops in other countries.

(U) Hinterhoff, Eugene, Disengagement, (London, 1959), pp. 204-205.

SOVIET PROPOSAL TO UN - SEPTEMBER 1957

In a memorandum to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 September 1957 the Soviet Government stated, "The Soviet Government continues to hold the view that the reduction of the armed forces of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and France which are stationed in the territory of Germany by one-third or by some other agreed figure would play a considerable part in improving the situation in Europe and in the whole world and in solving the German problem as a whole. The Soviet Government also considers that international tensions would be greatly alleviated by agreement to reduce the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France which are stationed in the territory of the NATO countries and the armed forces of the USSR which are stationed in the territory of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The extent of the reduction of the armed forces of these countries might be specified at subsequent talks."

(U) State Dept. Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1949, p. 882.

THE RAPACKI PLAN

On 2 October 1957 Poland's Foreign Minister, Mr. Rapacki, suggested to the UN General Assembly the creation of an "atom free zone" in Central Europe. Marshal Bulganin of the Soviet Union backed this proposal in a letter to President Eisenhower on 10 December 1957 including a general suggestion which stated: "The creation of the necessary trust in relations between states would then make it possible to proceed with the implementation of such radical measures as a substantial reduction in armed forces and armaments, the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production and the destruction of stockpiles, the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territories of all states, including the member states of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact, and replacement of the existing military groupings of states with a collective security system." The President's reply made no mention of withdrawal of forces from NATO or Warsaw Pact territory but did suggest that the US and Russia "take steps to begin the controlled and progressive reduction of conventional weapons and military manpower" and did address atomic controls at some length. The reply tended to play down the Rapacki proposals.

Rapacki's proposals were confirmed in memoranda from Poland to the Three Western powers and others on 14 February 1958. These proposals comprised essentially details of arrangements for insuring against stationing or use of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. However, Poland said it "... had reason to state that acceptance of the proposal ... will facilitate the reaching of an agreement relating to an adequate reduction of conventional armaments and of foreign armed forces stationed on the territory of the States included in the zone."

The US rejected the Rapacki Plan in a note to Poland on 3 May 1958, since the plan provided no method for a balanced and equitable limitation of military capabilities and perpetuated the basic cause of tension in Europe by accepting the continued division of Germany. Also the US pointed out to Poland that "Unless equipped with nuclear weapons, Western forces in Germany would find themselves under present circumstances at a great disadvantage to the numerically greater mass of Soviet troops stationed within easy distance of Western Europe" Notes from the Soviet government in May and June and July 1958 continued to press the Polish proposals, however.

Mr. Rapacki announced a second version of his plan in a press conference at Warsaw on 4 November 1958. This time his plan had two stages: Stage one--a ban on nuclear weapons--Stage two--talks on appropriate reductions of conventional forces. "The reduction," he said, "would be effected simultaneously with the complete denuclearization of the zone and ... would be accompanied by ... appropriate measures of controls."

Hinterhoff, Eugene, *Disengagement*, London 1959, pp. 215, 235, 402-407; US Senate, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1961*, pp. 251-258, 260-267, 297-298, 313-321.

CORRESPONDENCE PRELIMINARY TO SUMMIT CONFERENCE - 1958

In a memorandum from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Western Ambassadors on the agenda for the proposed summit meeting, the Soviet Government proposed a gradual reduction of foreign troops in foreign territories and proposed, as a first step, to reduce during 1958 the armed forces of the USSR, the US, the UK, France, and other states having troops in the territory of Germany by one-third "or to any other agreed extent." These reduced contingents would be withdrawn within their own national frontiers. "The question of a substantial reduction in the armed forces and armaments of states and the conclusion of an appropriate international agreement with this objective, as well as the complete withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territories of the states members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty could be discussed during the following stage of negotiations."

In the continuing correspondence between the USSR and the US on the subject of arranging a summit conference, the Soviet Government reminded the US on 15 July 1958 that it had, in the preceding three years, reduced its armed forces unilaterally by a total of 2.140 million men and that it had reduced its forces in East Germany by more than 90,000 in the same period.

On the same date the Soviet Government presented to the US and to the governments of "European States" a draft treaty of Friendship and Collaboration for "examination." This proposed treaty contained an article 5 which read, "Until the conclusion of a general agreement on the limitations of arms and of armed forces and the banning of atomic weapons the signatories are obligated: a) To reduce in the course of 1 to 2 years their armed forces and arms located in the territory of Germany by 1/3 or by another agreed amount, whereby the reduced contingents of armed forces must be withdrawn from the territory of Germany to within the confines of their own national borders." After this had been done the Soviets wanted to consider further reductions of foreign armed forces in Germany and also reduction of foreign forces located on the territory of other European states.

The US informed the Soviet Government that it would not comment on the draft treaty at present but indicated the matter could be considered by the Western Powers at a summit meeting if held.

(U) US Senate, Documents on Germany 1944-1961, 87th Cong., 1st sess, pp. 303, 325-327, 329.

GRONIKO PROPOSALS, 18 SEPTEMBER 1958

Foreign Minister Gronyko transmitted to the UN General Assembly on 18 September 1958 a memorandum on disarmament measures which again advocated withdrawal of all troops from the territory of foreign states and repeated the first-step formula of one-third reduction of USSR, US, UK and French forces from Germany, the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries.

(U) Dept of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1949, p. 1141.

SOVIET PLAN FOR WEST BERLIN - November 1958

On 27 November 1958 the USSR in identical notes to the US, UK and France repudiated the original agreements on occupation of Berlin and proposed a plan to make West Berlin a free demilitarized city. The Soviet note was in effect an ultimatum with a six-month time limit. The US rejected the Soviet unilateral denunciation of existing accords on Berlin and reminded the Soviet Union of the summit agreements of 23 July 1955, which recognized the "common responsibility" of the four powers for the settlement of the German question. Other western powers concurred in the US stand and declared that they would stay in Berlin so long as their responsibilities required.

(U) US Senate, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 348-365.

**SOVIET PROPOSAL - GENEVA SURPRISE ATTACK
CONFERENCE - NOVEMBER 1958**

In a declaration submitted to the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference on 28 November 1958, the Soviet Government proposed a reduction of at least one-third in the foreign armed forces on the territory of European states lying within an "agreed control zone" and an agreement not to keep nuclear weapons and rockets on the territory of Germany.

(U) Dept of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1949, pp. 1269-1270.

SOVIET PROPOSED PEACE TREATY FOR GERMANY-JANUARY 1959

On 10 January 1959 the Soviet Government transmitted to the US Government the draft of a proposed Peace Treaty for Germany. Article 30 of this draft treaty proposed that: "All foreign troops in Germany must be withdrawn from Germany not later than within 1 year from the date of entry into force of the treaty. (Or: After the entry into force of the treaty, all foreign troops in Germany must be withdrawn from Germany in periods which will be agreed on between the interested parties, along with which during the 6 months from the moment of entry into force of the treaty, the numbers of foreign troops stationed on the territory of Germany will be reduced by one-third.) Simultaneously with the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany all foreign military bases on the territory of Germany "must be liquidated."

In the note accompanying the draft treaty the USSR reiterated its positions that the occupation was obsolete, and that Western rights in Berlin had expired. In reply to the Soviet note, the US on 16 February, proposed a conference of the foreign ministers of the four powers to deal with Germany in all its aspects and implications.

(U) US Senate, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 397, 413-420.

THE WESTERN PEACE PLAN, May 1959

On behalf of the Western Powers, Secretary of State Herter presented at the meeting of foreign ministers at Geneva on 14 May 1959 a Western Peace Plan based on free elections throughout Germany, and the establishment of an all-German Government. Addressing itself to gradual reduction in over-all armed forces by the four powers, the proposal provided in Stage III for the establishment of an agreed zone, comprising areas of comparable size and depth and importance on either side of a line to be mutually determined, in which agreed ceilings for indigenous and non-indigenous forces would be put into effect. After conclusion of a Peace Treaty, no party would station forces in any country in this area without the consent of the country involved, and would withdraw forces so stationed upon request of the country involved. On 18 May the Soviet Union rejected the Western Peace Plan, charging that it aimed at maintaining the Western occupation regimes in Berlin and West Germany.

(U) US Senate, Documents on Germany 1944-1961, pp. 461-465;
Dept of State, Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva,
pp. 98-112.

GRONYKO PROPOSALS REGARDING BERLIN - JUNE 1959

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko outlined new Soviet proposals regarding Berlin and a Peace Treaty with Germany to the foreign ministers conference on 10 June 1959. As part of these proposals he stated that "provisional recognition" of occupation rights of the Western Powers in West Berlin was possible if the West, among other provisions, would agree to "reduce the number of their armed forces and armaments in West Berlin to token contingents." Secretary of State Herter immediately labelled Gromyko's proposals "extraordinary" and "unacceptable." With respect to the Russian proviso on troop withdrawal Mr. Herter said ". . . I thought we had all agreed and assumed that 11,000 Allied troops in a community of over two million people, surrounded by hostile territory and ringed by nearly thirty East German and Soviet divisions, could only be described as symbolic."

(U) US Senate, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 532-538.

WESTERN PROPOSAL ON BERLIN FORCES - JUNE 1959

The three Western Powers presented the USSR with a proposal in the form of a draft agreement on 16 June 1959. This agreement, noting the fact that the Soviet Government had decided no longer to maintain forces in Berlin, would commit the US, UK, and France to limit the combined total of their forces in Berlin to the present 11,000 men and to arm them with conventional weapons only. These governments would consider reductions in these forces if the situation permitted. The Soviets made no reply to the Western proposal but rephrased their own proposal of 10 June and on 19 June presented it to the foreign ministers. The Western Powers considered this newly worded proposal only briefly and rejected it.

At the conclusion of the foreign ministers conference on 5 August 1959, Secretary Herter noted vis-a-vis troop reductions, "We proposed statements noting the decision of the Soviet Government no longer to maintain forces in Berlin and making known the intention of the Western Governments to limit their forces in West Berlin to their present level and to consider from time to time the possibility of reducing such forces if developments permit. The Soviet Union refuses to accept any reference to its projected withdrawal of forces from Berlin--another indication of its consistent position of nonreciprocity--and proposes drastically to reduce our forces in West Berlin below the approximately 11,000 men now stationed there . . . Western forces in Berlin are less than 2 per cent of the forces that surround them . . . the Soviet Union is proposing a drastic reduction of Western forces not for the reason given but as the first step toward total withdrawal of Western forces. When the period specified in an interim agreement had expired, it would then call for still another reduction . . . and so on until we no longer had any forces in Berlin. This situation would not be substantially altered by a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Berlin. These forces would merely be stationed a few miles outside the city limits. To withdraw Western forces from Berlin would be an entirely different matter."

(U) US Senate, Documents On Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 538-540, 551, 578-579.

**SOVIET UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL AND REDUCTION
OF FORCES - 15 JANUARY 1960**

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 15 January 1960 announced a law on the reduction of armed forces and appealed "to the Parliaments and Governments of all the nations of the world" to disarm. It decided, "without waiting for the disarmament issue to be settled on an international scale," to cut its armed forces by 1,200,000 men, which when carried out would leave the Soviet Army and Navy with 2,423,000 men. It recalled that the US, UK, and France in 1956 had proposed that the level of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the US should be established at 2.5 million men. "Over the past four years alone, the strength of the armed forces of the USSR has been unilaterally reduced by a total of 2,140,000 men During these years, the Soviet Union completely withdrew its troops from the Romanian People's Republic, substantially reduced its armed forces stationed on the territories of the German Democratic Republic and the Hungarian People's Republic, and liquidated its military bases on the territories of other States The Supreme Soviet of the USSR expresses the hope that the new unilateral reduction by the Soviet Union of its armed forces will serve as an example to other states, especially those possessing the greatest military might."

(U) Dept of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 16-22.

**SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR TREATY ON GENERAL AND
COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, 23 SEPTEMBER 1960**

The Soviet Union on 23 September 1960 submitted a proposed treaty for general and complete disarmament to the UN General Assembly. It provided, inter alia, that in the first stage the troops of all states be withdrawn from foreign territories to within their own national frontiers. During the second stage: "Armed forces and armaments will be further reduced to levels to be agreed upon." In the third stage: "The abolition of the armed forces of all States will be completed. States will have at their disposal only strictly limited contingents of police (militia), the size of which will be agreed upon for each country"

(U) Dept of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 241-248. Notes: Chairman Khrushchev transmitted substantially the same proposals to the Heads of other Governments on 2 June 1960 and to the Ten Nation Committee on 7 June 1960. A similar proposal to the UN had been made by the USSR on 18 September 1959.

SOVIET UNION'S OFFER OF WITHDRAWAL - SEPTEMBER 1961

The Soviet Union in a memorandum of 26 September 1961 to the UN General Assembly declared that it had

repeatedly offered to come to an agreement with the US and other Western Powers on the withdrawal of foreign troops from European territory, the idea being that Soviet troops would leave Germany, Hungary, and Poland and that the US, the UK, France and Canada would withdraw within their national frontiers their troops stationed in other NATO countries . . . the US is obviously still not ready to accept the Soviet proposals on complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of European States. In these circumstances, it is essential in the Soviet Government's view, at least to settle the question of reducing the number of foreign troops stationed in the territory both of the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries. As a first step, there might be an agreement to reduce the number of all foreign troops stationed in Germany by one-third or by some other accepted proportion over a given period of time and to institute the necessary control over the execution of this measure. A reduction in the number of foreign troops in German territory would have particular importance for the maintenance of peace. . . . A reduction in the number of foreign troops, leading to their complete withdrawal from the territory of Germany, would help to normalize the situation in Germany and in Europe as a whole

(U) USACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1961, p. 501.

**SOVIET PROPOSALS AT THE EIGHTEEN NATION
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, 12 FEBRUARY 1963**

At the Eighteen Nation Disarmament conference, the Soviet delegate offered a four-point declaration calling for the withdrawal from foreign territory of nuclear weapons-carrying missile submarines, aircraft carriers, rocket installations, and strategic aircraft and for the dismantling of bases in foreign territory for the support of such weapons. The United States opposed this declaration as an obvious bid to cripple the deployment of US nuclear weapons under American or NATO auspices.

(U) Council on Foreign Relations, Documents, 1963, pp. 94-97.
(U) Stebbins, ed., The United States in World Affairs, 1963, pp. 65-71.

SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A DENUCLEARIZED MEDITERRANEAN, 20 MAY 1963

On 20 May 1963, the Soviet Union proposed to the United States that the entire area of the Mediterranean Sea be declared a nuclear-free zone. In reply, the US stated on 24 June that it had continuously sought proposals to eliminate or reduce the danger from the use of nuclear weapons. The US note added, however, that for a disarmament measure to have a beneficial effect, it must be balanced so that no state or group of states gained military advantage. The US charged that the Soviet proposal for a denuclearized Mediterranean was clearly designed to change the existing military balance at the expense of the US and its allies.

(U) Council of Foreign Relations, Documents, 1963, pp. 94-97.

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KENNEDY-GROMYKO CONVERSATION, OCTOBER 1963

President Kennedy told Gromyko on 10 October 1963 that US troop strength in Europe was kept constant; in fact, he added, US would have fewer troops in Europe in 1964 than in 1963. Perhaps the Soviet Union would state its intentions in this area too. However, the President felt a formal agreement would raise difficulties in view of the difficult inspection problem.

Gromyko recalled that he had mentioned reduction of foreign troops in the two Germanies by one-third or some other proportion, and withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the two Germanies

The President commented that the Soviet desire to have effective observation posts seemed to indicate that observation posts together with such things as reduction of forces and withdrawal of nuclear weapons, were one package in Mr. Khrushchev's mind. Mr. Gromyko said this was correct. Otherwise, the establishment of observation posts would result merely in increasing the number of military attaches in their respective countries.

(S-Op-3) Memo of Conversation, State Department, US and USSR conferees, White House, 10 Oct 63, JCS 2434/2-2, 24 Oct 63, File 3050 (10 Oct 63).

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SOVIET PROPOSAL, JANUARY 1964

On 28 January 1964, the USSR submitted a memorandum to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, containing the following proposal:

The Soviet Union proposes . . . that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from all foreign territories and that not a single foreign soldier should be left anywhere, in any part of the world. On its part, the Soviet Union is prepared to withdraw all its troops from the territories of foreign States where they are now stationed, if the Western Powers will do likewise. If, however, the Western Powers are not as yet prepared for such a radical solution of this important question, the Soviet Government proposes that agreement be reached immediately that the number of armed forces in foreign territories should first be reduced on a basis of reciprocity, and afterwards it will be possible to lead up gradually, step-by-step, to their complete withdrawal within the boundaries of their national territories. The Soviet Union is prepared to set about such a reduction of its troops in the territory of the German Democratic Republic and other European States, if the Western Powers begin to reduce the number of their troops in the Federal Republic of Germany, and other countries.

(U) Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1964, Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 163-164.

GOMULKA PLAN, FEBRUARY 1964

The plan was first announced by First Party Secretary Wladyslaw Gomułka during a speech at Ploek on 28 December 1963. It was handed on 29 February 1964 to ambassadors accredited to Poland. Gomułka recommended five points, none of which made specific reference to withdrawals. His principal proposals were a freeze on nuclear weapons in Central Europe and negotiations for a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries (consultations for which had been in progress). The other three proposals were for universal and complete disarmament, the creation of security zones in other parts of the world, and economic cooperation. The plan called for an "appropriate system of supervision and safeguards." Rapacki considered the Gomułka Plan an extension of and not a replacement for the old Rapacki Plan.

President Johnson, in a message to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament on 21 January 1964, stated that an agreement on a "verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive vehicles . . . will open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels." The West's reaction to the Gomułka Plan was, on the whole, negative. US and Britain expressed interest but foresaw many difficulties. West Germany objected to being made a part of a regional grouping for arms control.

(U) US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 651-652;
(U) Deadline Data, Poland, pp. 109-110; (U) Documents on American Foreign Relations 1964, Council on Foreign Relations, (1965), p. 162, and The US in World Affairs 1964, Council on Foreign Relations (1965), pp. 107-108.

**US STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM
EUROPE, 10 SEPTEMBER 1964**

While not directly responding to the USSR proposal of 28 January 1964, but rather to Soviet references to the withdrawal of troops made since the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament's first session, the US (ACDA Director Foster) stated to the committee on 10 September 1964: "These delegations (Soviet and others) have also spoken on the reduction and withdrawal of troops With regard to the question of the withdrawal of troops from Europe, it should be obvious to the Soviet delegation that similar problems are presented by this topic as a subject for discussion in this forum. The US does not consider this to be a fruitful subject for discussion. The whole question of forces in Europe and its related political aspects, as the Soviet Union is quite aware, is closely related to serious unresolved political problems in that area."

On 7 December 1964, the USSR repeated substantially its 28 January 1964 proposal in a memorandum to the UN General Assembly.

(U) US ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 396-397, 509-510.

DRAFT SOVIET DISARMAMENT RESOLUTIONS - 27 MAY 1965

The Soviet representative to the United Nations Disarmament Commission submitted two resolutions to that body on 27 May 1965 calling upon "all States maintaining military bases in other countries to liquidate them forthwith and refrain henceforth from establishing such bases" and further calling upon "the States concerned to conclude an agreement providing for the withdrawal of all foreign troops within their national frontiers." The Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, speaking to the Disarmament Commission, labelled these proposals unrealistic.

(U) State Dept Bulletin, Vol LIII, (12 Jul 65), p. 79.

SOVIET PROPOSALS TO FRG - MARCH 1966

In reply to a West German note of 25 March 1966 containing general proposals for world peace and disarmament and addressed to all major nations, the Soviet Union set forth the following proposals for "improving the international situation, strengthening peace, and developing cooperation among states": 1) immediate conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; 2) dismantling of military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from these territories; 3) dissolution of military blocs, including both NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 4) Soviet support of the East German proposal that both the German states renounce nuclear weapons and reduce their armed forces and armaments; and 5) Soviet support of the Rapacki Plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

On 2 April, the US welcomed the "constructive" proposals of the West German note, but made no reply to the Soviet proposals since they were addressed to West Germany.

(U) State Dept Bulletin, LIV (25 Apr 66), pp 254-257. (U) Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 1965-66, pp 21498-21501.
