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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND SECURITY REVIEW
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

1 Feb 2001

Ref: 01-M-0065

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DIRECTOR, ACCESS MANAGEMENT
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20504

SUBJECT: Mandatory Declassification Review

This responds to the telephonic request by Rod Soubers to review the "Report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team (Draft)" for declassification and release.

Attached is a redacted version of the report which is suitable for public release. The information withheld was determined to be currently and properly classified under E.O. 12958, Section 1.5(b), (c), and (d). The duration of classification of the redacted information is extended in accordance with Section 1.6(d)(1), (5), and (6).

Questions regarding this action may be referred to the undersigned at 703-697-4768.


H.J. McIntyre
Director

Attachment

#460 in
RR



READING ROOM

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REPORT OF THE
EL SALVADOR MILITARY
STRATEGY ASSISTANCE TEAM
(DRAFT)



SANITIZED

UNCLASSIFIED

MDR 01-M-0065

1 February 2001

CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

DEW ON 10 NOV 2001

PARA 2-301 C1,5,6, & 7

Fred F. Woerner

BRIGADIER GENERAL FRED F. WOERNER

SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR

12 SEP - 8 NOV 81

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01-25/C-5

PREFACE

(U) There is an inherent pessimism in reports of this type, for they tend to focus on that which requires fixing. Deficiencies are not necessarily presented in context; and, quite realistically, time rarely permits full documentation of the total picture.

(U) I have tried to maintain a balanced perspective but, nonetheless, am certain that this report also is skewed. As one reads of systems deficiencies, there also should be cognizance of those intangible yet fundamental human and institutional qualities so necessary for the successful execution of a military strategy. I found the Salvadoran officer corps dedicated, professionally candid, and knowledgeable of tactics. The Salvadoran soldier is of the people - rugged, steadfast, brave, and loyal. The military is replete with examples of its self-reliance, resourcefulness, tenacity, and spirit of independence.

(U) I firmly believe that the Armed Force of El Salvador has a sound foundation upon which to build and to meet its many challenges. Furthermore, I am convinced that if the National Military Strategy is implemented, peace will be restored to the country.

I shot my basic load on the preparation of the El Salvadoran National Military Strategy leaving only a "meat" reserve to prepare this draft report. I believe it is substantive, but it obviously lacks style. Nevertheless, I release it in this condition, given the urgency of getting on with its implementation.

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*Fred T. Wacner
BG USAF*

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INTRODUCTION

(C) The National Military Strategy of the Government of El Salvador was developed through the combined effort of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team and the Salvadoran Armed Force General Staff. The National Military Strategy is a self-contained document requiring no supportive explanation.

(C) This report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team summarizes the National Military Strategy; explains the rationale for its design; describes the environment within which it was developed; and places the strategy within the larger context of the national political, economic, and social arenas.

(C) The restatement of previously documented information is limited to the minimum required to introduce the issues. The intent of the report is to complement the strategy document with information contributory to the continuing US strategic assessment and understanding of the military situation in El Salvador.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. (U) The National Military Strategy of El Salvador was developed in eight weeks through the combined efforts of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team and the Salvadoran Armed Force General Staff. Military objectives, consistent with the national purpose and interests, were identified and articulated, as were concepts for the attainment of the objectives. The requirements to man, organize, equip, train and sustain the necessary military force were identified. Lastly, a concept for the implementation of the Strategy was developed.
2. (S) The Strategy has two dimensions. The first is the preparation for the war or the force structure and training required. It envisions creating ten additional battalions (8 infantry and 2 quick reaction) for a force structure of twenty-five battalions; the improvement of command control, communications, intelligence system, combat service support system and training base; modernizing the Air Force rotary and fixed wing inventory; and increasing the number of Navy patrol boats. The second dimension is the fighting of the war. Through a tactic of aggressive, small unit, day and night operations, the battle will be taken to the insurgents. Eight of the additional infantry battalions will be stationed in the most highly contested areas of the country. The Strategy provides for coordinated efforts of interdiction and protection of electoral process and the economic infrastructure.
3. (S) The Strategy implementation concept outlines materiel and training requirements which cannot be satisfied by El Salvador. A summary, by options, of the personnel requirements and costs is next under. The options are:

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a. Course of Action 1: Current situation, a defensive strategy forboding limited survival. The military will be forced to submit to the Communist strategy of the "protracted war", with time favoring the insurgents.

b. Course of Action 2: An offensive strategy to gain and maintain the initiative. It provides for partial control of the national territory and partial defense of the economic infrastructure.

c. Course of Action 3: Strategic victory by destroying the insurgents' will and capability to fight. It provides for the reestablishment of public order and creates the capability to defend the territory from internal or external aggression.

4. (S) The High Command has endorsed the Strategy and is prepared to recruit and budget for four battalions prior to the March elections. To further support the Strategy, they are prepared to provide a battalion-size group of officer candidates for out of country training. This leadership will be vital to the fulfillment of the Strategy.

5. (C) This report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team summarizes the National Military Strategy; explains the rationale for its design; describes the environment within which it was developed; and places the strategy within the larger context of the national political, economic, and social arenas.

6. (S) A US commitment to this Strategy will be, necessarily, expensive (approximately \$300 million) and long term. The requirements are extensive, and the absorption capacity precludes a massive one-time infusion. Neither the Strategy nor this report offers a one-time quick fix option for the US.

7. (U) Recommend the US support Course of Action 3, Strategic Victory.

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ARMED FORCE SUMMARY

COURSE OF ACTION NO.1

PERSONNEL

69 FIELD GRADE OFFICERS
360 COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS
13, 507 ENLISTED

COST

\$25,822,010*
MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

\$1,729,236/\$20,750,832**
PERSONNEL

\$6,432,357
INSTALLATIONS

\$1,000,000***
TRAINING

TOTAL COST: \$54,005,199

COURSE OF ACTION NO.2

PERSONNEL

192 FIELD GRADE OFFICERS
1,501 COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS
34,260 ENLISTED

COST

\$181,807,297*
MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

\$6,370,715/\$76,448,587**
PERSONNEL

\$13,600,000***
INSTALLATIONS

\$5,266,989
TRAINING

TOTAL COST: \$277,122,873

COURSE OF ACTION NO.3

PERSONNEL

212 FIELD GRADE OFFICERS
1,667 COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS
39,290 ENLISTED

COST

\$296,586,151*
MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

\$6,868,666/\$82,423,987**
PERSONNEL

\$16,800,000***
INSTALLATIONS

\$6,446,409
TRAINING

TOTAL COST: \$402,256,547

*GOES BUDGET ONLY
**GOES SALARIES MONTH/YEAR
***IMET ONLY

*US PROVIDED MATERIAL ONLY
**GOES SALARIES MONTH/YEAR
***NEW INSTALLATIONS ONLY

*US PROVIDED MATERIAL ONLY
**GOES SALARIES MONTH/YEAR
***NEW INSTALLATIONS ONLY

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TEAM COMPOSITION AND PREPARATIONS

1. (U) Composition. The El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team was initially composed of seven Department of Defense members and one part time Central Intelligence Agency member. The Team was later increased with three Department of Defense augmentees. Team composition included:

a. (U) Team Members.

- (1) Brigadier General Fred F. Woerner, Jr., U/S Army, Team Chief.

- (2) Colonel Eldon L. Cummings, U/S Army, Strategic Concepts,
Personnel and Group Leader.

- (3) Colonel Charles B. Stone, IV, U/S Army, Training.

- (4) Lieutenant Colonel Francisco J. Padron, U/S Army, Logistics.

(5) Lieutenant Colonel Orlando P. Rodriguez, U/S Army, Operations.

- (6) Lieutenant Colonel Carlos R. Salinas, U/S Army, Intelligence.

- (7) Yeoman First Class Jose L. Flores, U/S Navy, Administrative
Assistance.

b. (U) Team Augmentees.

- (1) Lieutenant Colonel Curtis V. Ebitz, U/S Army, Executive
Officer.

- (2) Captain Jerry Thomas, U/S Army, Communications Officer

- (3) Captain Nelson Guadalupe, U/S Army, Communications Officer.

2. (U) Deployment Preparations.

a. (U) Team members were officially alerted on 4 September 1981, for
deployment to El Salvador.

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b. (U) On 8 September 1981, the seven Department of Defense Team members were assembled at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-5 Directorate, Western Hemisphere Branch.

c. (U) On 9 September 1981, the Team received formal briefings on the situation in El Salvador by representatives of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency.

d. (U) On 10 September 1981, the Team reviewed the Terms of Reference for the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team contained in Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 316-81. Additionally, Team members conducted discussions and completed coordination with their respective Department of Defense representatives.

e. (U) 11 September 1981 was devoted to travel. The Department of Defense Team members travelled from Washington, D.C. to Panama. The Central Intelligence Agency representative travelled from San Salvador, El Salvador to Panama to join the Team.

f. (U) United States Southern Command (US SOUTHCOM) representatives, on 12 September 1981, provided the Team detailed briefings on US SOUTHCOM's analysis of the Caribbean Basin threat, Central American options, arms interdiction, and Central American security assistance problems and prospects. Representatives from the Panama Canal Area Military Schools provided briefings on their respective training capabilities and evaluations of the resident training provided to Salvadoran military students. Additionally, 3d Battalion (Airborne), 7th Special Forces Group representatives discussed lessons learned and evaluated the training impact of the Small Unit Tactical training and the Zonal Operational Planning Assistance Training team.

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g. (U) The Team deployed from Panama to San Salvador, El Salvador, on 13 September 1981. Upon arrival, the United States Military Group provided the Team in-processing and security briefings.

3. (U) In-Country Preparations.

a. (U) On 14 and 15 September 1981, the Team devoted its attention to conducting a detailed analysis of the Terms of Reference in order to define its mission and to determine specified, implied, and deduced tasks. The Team further reviewed, discussed, and integrated the ^{ORAL}~~ORAL~~ guidance and suggested tasks received during discussions with Department of State, Department of Defense, US SOUTHCOM, and American Embassy - San Salvador officials. Additionally, the Team used this time to establish its logic framework and to formulate a methodology for guiding the combined strategy development efforts of the Team and Salvadoran Armed Force General Staff counterparts.

b. (U) The Team conducted its initial meeting with the Military High Command on 16 September 1981. Key Salvadoran officials present were Colonel Jose Guillermo GARCIA, Minister of Defense; Colonel Francisco A. CASTILLO, Sub-Secretary of Defense; Colonel Rafael FLORES LIMA, Armed Force Chief of Staff. Also present were the strategy team designees from the El Salvadoran Armed Force General Staff.

4. (U) Team Augmentees. On October 6 1981, the Team Chief requested Team augmentation from US SOUTHCOM. The augmentation requirement was two-fold: first, to provide needed signal expertise to evaluate Salvadoran communications systems and to determine equipment requirements to establish an integrated communications system for the Armed Force; secondly, to provide an individual familiar with the Salvadoran situation to organize and articulate the material being

developed by the Team into a cohesive report. The US SOUTHCOM augmentees arrived in El Salvador on 11 October 1981.

5. (U) Team Chief Observations.

a. (U) Team Composition. The Team represented a composite of diverse professional backgrounds, varying levels of knowledge on the Salvadoran situation, and very limited training or experience in strategy formulation. The common threads which tied the Team together were the members' Latin American experiences and Spanish language ability. The size restriction of only seven Department of Defense members did not allow tri-service participation nor important functional expertise such as signal and ~~Military~~ Police.

b. (U) Team Briefings. The briefings received in Washington and at US SOUTHCOM were thorough and useful. However, the broad range of topics and myriad of details compressed into two days taxed the Team's absorptive capacity, and allowed little time for reflection, substantive discussions, and individual research.

c. (U) Team Preparations. The Team had little time to study and prepare for its mission prior to arrival in El Salvador. The Team literally went from the decision mode to the implementation mode. This denied the Team essential pre-deployment coordination and preparation. As a consequence, necessary mission analysis, team building, education of Team members in strategy formulation, and background research competed daily with the Team's mission of assisting the Salvadoran General Staff to develop a national military strategy.

d. (U) Mission Scope. There was disparity among the mission scope, team composition, and time permitted for accomplishment; for inherent in the mission

was the dual responsibility of developing a war fighting strategy and designing a force structure to execute it. The multiple purpose of the mission included:

- (1) (U) Develop a fighting strategy.
- (2) (U) Design a force structure within El Salvadoran resource capacity.
- (3) (U) Implant in the Salvadoran High Command and General Staff an appreciation for the importance of strategic planning and train them to do it.
- (4) (U) Make a strategic assessment of the military situation in El Salvador.
- (5) (U) Develop an implementation concept for US military assistance.

e. (U) Summary. A new and not totally facetious definition of Challenge. Assist the El Salvadoran General Staff, currently lacking an appreciation of and skill in strategic planning, to develop a national military strategy, within an atmosphere of suspicion as to motive inasmuch as the invitation was made by the government and not the military, with a US team having very little previous training in and no experience in strategic planning and which had never before worked together, led by a General who also was doing it real for the first time, Insuring that the final product was "conceived...produced...and endorsed" by the Salvadoran military, concurrently developing a US military assistance implementation concept (of course with options), all to be accomplished within two months. ~~Incidentally, the mission was successfully accomplished on time.~~

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MISSION STATEMENT AND ANALYSIS

1. (C) Analysis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (JCSM-316-81), 3 September 1981, subject: Terms of Reference for El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team (See Inclosure 1) determined the mission of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team (hereinafter referred to as the Team) to be twofold:

a. (C) To assist the Government of El Salvador (GOES) in assessing the military situation and identifying El Salvador short, mid, and long-term military strategies to defend its territory within internationally recognized borders.

b. (C) To develop prioritized, time phased implementation options that support accomplishment of the Salvadoran military objectives as well as recognize US budgetary constraints and Salvadoran absorption capacity.

2. (C) Detailed analysis of the Team's mission statement and terms of reference, identified the following specified, implied, and deduced tasks:

a. (U) Specified Tasks

(1) (C) Establish the parameters of a Salvadoran military strategy compatible with and supportive of the GOES strategy objectives, requirements, and priorities.

(2) (C) Determine the political, social, and economic events and elements critical to the GOES strategy objectives and key to an effective Salvadoran military strategy to include, as a minimum, the protection of the harvest and the security of the March 1982 constituent assembly elections.

(3) (C) Review the Salvadoran civil-military relationship as an element of the military strategy.

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(4) (C) Analyze the current and projected military situation in El Salvador.

(5) (C) Identify the short, mid, and long-term Salvadoran military objectives and determine timeliness for their accomplishment.

(6) (C) Review the missions of the Salvadoran armed force and security forces and the adequacy of their organizational and operational capabilities.

(7) (C) Determine the effectiveness of the Salvadoran armed force command control mechanism to include the planning and conduct of combined and joint operations.

(8) (C) Determine Salvadoran force structure requirements to correct current shortfalls, and suggest force development options to accomplish the military strategy.

(9) (C) Cost out suggested Salvadoran force development options and relate costs to available Salvadoran financial, material, and manpower resources to sustain force development.

(10) (C) Identify specific constraints that impact on suggested force development options.

(11) (C) Determine Salvadoran materiel and training requirements to support strategy implementation and force development, and identify the most urgent priorities to be funded by FY 82 Foreign Military Sales and International Military Education and Training.

(12) (C) Validate the need for institutionalizing a Salvadoran planning and programming system for current and future needs.

(13) (C) Assess and articulate the role of regional military cooperation

and suggest actions to nurture this cooperation, especially in regard to the bolsones problem.

(14) (C) Assist the High Command in developing operational concepts sensitive to identified resource constraints, and consistent with stated short, mid, and long-term military objectives that support the national military strategy.

b. (U) Implied Tasks

(1) (C) Identify GOES strategy objectives and determine their relationship to critical political, social, and economic events, or elements which must be supported by the Salvadoran Military Strategy.

(2) (C) Assist in developing Salvadoran operational concepts for the protection of the harvest, security of the March 1982 elections, electrical power system, lines of communication, and interdiction of insurgent arms, materiel, and personnel.

(3) (C) Identify areas of cooperation, mutual interest, and potential conflict in the civil-military relationship.

(4) (C) Compare and contrast insurgent and GOES objectives and capabilities for the short, mid, and long-term.

(5) (C) Define short, mid, and long-term.

(6) (C) Determine compatibility of the armed force and security forces missions, organizations, and operational capabilities to determine capacity for conducting mutually supportive planning, coordination, and execution.

(7) (C) Assess Salvadoran communication systems and standard operating procedures essential to command control of joint operations, tactical operations, and intelligence reporting.

(8) (C) Determine the impact of the Salvadoran military and cultural traditions on command control.

(9) (C) Determine materiel and training requirements for Salvadoran force standardization, modernization, and expansion for period FY 82 to FY 85.

(10) (C) Evaluate impact of officer and non-commissioned officer shortages, skill shortages, inadequate training base, operational deficiencies, and logistical shortcomings on force development requirements.

(11) (C) Identify possibilities for third country materiel and training assistance.

(12) (C) Identify shortfalls between current operational capabilities and force requirements.

(13) (C) Identify funding shortfalls between FY 82 force development requirements and available FY 82 Foreign Military Sales and International Military Education and Training allocations.

(14) (C) Demonstrate value of, and need for, a force planning and programming system.

c. (C) Deduced Tasks

(1) (C) Ascertain the Salvadoran High Command's current strategic view and its supportive rationale.

(2) (C) Identify and analyze significant strategy differences between the Team and the Salvadoran High Command.

(3) (C) Identify requirements for development of a national and tactical civic actions program.

(4) (C) Identify supportive and non-supportive external influences and

assess their impact on the military strategy.

✓ (5) (C) Assess the impact of the Armed Force's attitude toward extreme
✓ rightist violence and institutional terrorism on the strategy.

✓ (6) (C) Ascertain requirement for, and feasibility of, developing
✓ regional frameworks for intelligence sharing and combined operations ^{among} ~~between~~ El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.

✓ (7) (C) Predict outcome if GOES does not implement the military strategy;
✓ does implement the military strategy without U/S^Y assistance; does implement
the military strategy with U/S^Y assistance.

✓ 3. (C) From this analysis it becomes apparent that the national military strategy must address both force modernization and war fighting. The resultant
strategy, therefore, will serve multiple purposes which include:

✓ a. Offer a planning guide for the El Salvadoran Armed Force in its efforts
to standardize, expand, and modernize its forces.

b. Provide the operational strategy for defeating the insurgency.

c. Develop within the Armed Force High Command an appreciation for, and
ability in, strategic planning.

d. Provide the US an opportunity for making strategic assessment of the
military situation in El Salvador.

e. Provide a basis for planning US military assistance.

4. (C) The aforementioned specified, implied, and deduced tasks will be
addressed in one or more of the four major products resulting from the Team's
efforts:

a. The GOES National Military Strategy endorsed by the High Command.

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b. The proposed five year US materiel and training assistance implementation concept.

c. The Team's written report of its findings and assessments of the military situation in El Salvador.

d. The Team's oral briefing of the GOES National Military Strategy, the proposed US materiel and training assistance implementation concept, and the Team's written report of findings and assessments of the military situation in El Salvador.

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ORGANIZATION OF EFFORT

1. (U) General. The Terms of Reference contained in JCSM-316-81 directed that the development of a Salvadoran National Military Strategy be a Government of El Salvador product; conceived, produced, and endorsed by the High Command; and capable of being managed and implemented by the Government of El Salvador. In consonance with this guidance, the Team established work procedures which recognized both the unilateral and bilateral responsibilities associated with the development of a Salvadoran National Military Strategy.

2. (U) Organization of Effort.

a. Team Organization. The strategy development participants were organized into separate but mutually supporting and complementary US and Salvadoran strategy groups.

(1) US Strategy Group Participants And Responsibilities.

(a) Colonel Eldon L. Cummings: Strategic Concepts; Personnel; and Group Leader.

(b) Colonel Charles B. Stone, III. Training.

(c) Lieutenant Colonel Francisco J. Padron: Logistics.

(d) Lieutenant Colonel Orlando P. Rodriguez: Plans and Operations.

(e) Lieutenant Colonel Carlos R. Salinas Intelligence.

(2) Salvadoran Strategy Group Participants and Responsibilities.

(a) Lieutenant Colonel Jesus Gabriel CONTRERAS, Director of Operations (D-III): Group Leader.

(b) Lieutenant Colonel Oscar Edgardo CASANOVA Vejar, Director of Personnel (D-I).

(c) Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Alfredo RIVAS, Director of Intelligence (D-II).

(d) Lieutenant Colonel Ricardo Augusto PENA ARBAIZA, Director of Logistics (D-IV).

(e) Major Carlos Alfredo HERRARTE, Deputy Director of Personnel.

(f) Major Guillermo Alfredo BENAVIDES Moreno, Deputy Director of Operations and Training.

b. (U) Functional Responsibilities.

(1) (U) US Effort.

(a) (C) Team Commander. Brigadier General Woerner elected not to participate directly in the daily bilateral strategy group sessions. This decision recognized the facts that: the senior Salvadoran strategy group participant was a Lieutenant Colonel; the Salvadoran military, by tradition and practice, is very formal and sensitive to distinctions of rank; and the heretofore absence of Salvadoran experience in strategy formulation. Consequently, by virtue of his rank alone, BG Woerner's presence unquestionably would have inhibited the freedom of dialogue. This would have been counter to the goal of insuring that the adopted military strategy was a Salvadoran product in both effort and content. BG Woerner's role, therefore, was: to review and assess progress of the bilateral strategy group sessions; to provide guidance and direction to US Team members participating in the bilateral strategy sessions; to conduct frequent meetings with the Salvadoran Minister of Defense and Armed Force Chief of Staff for the purpose of sustaining professional dialogue on substantive issues relative to development of the national military

strategy; and by visiting all major Armed Force headquarters, units, and support facilities (See Inclosure 2) to conduct an independent study of Salvadoran Armed Force capabilities to defeat the insurgents.

(b)1 (0)

(c) (C) US Strategy Group. All unilateral group activities were conducted at the American Embassy, San Salvador. Daily unilateral activities included preparations for bilateral strategy sessions (e.g., develop logic framework, prepare "strawman" concepts, and identify specific group tasks); progress review with Team Commander; and coordination with US Military Group and Security Assistance Team resource personnel. On weekends, and holidays, unilateral group activities included an in-process review with all Team members led by the Team Commander, a review of the methodology, and collection of data to support bilateral sessions for the forthcoming week.

(2) (U) ~~ET~~ Salvadoran Strategy Group. All unilateral team activities were conducted at the Headquarters, Salvadoran Armed Force, San Salvador. Unilateral activities included preparation of concepts and documents to support strategy formulation, data collection, and group task identification.

c. (C)Bilateral Strategy Sessions. Bilateral sessions were conducted at the Headquarters, Salvadoran Armed Force, San Salvador. Sessions were scheduled daily, Monday through Friday. Initially, daily sessions were conducted from 0900 to 1300 hours. However, the unrelenting demands of daily operations placed upon the Salvadoran strategy group prompted the Minister of Defense, during the fourth week, to change the bilateral sessions [Eo] from 0900 to 1200 hours. In addition to the formal bilateral sessions, group members conducted individual counterpart sessions at the Headquarters, Salvadoran Armed Force on an as required and as available basis. Throughout the entire strategy formulation process, the bilateral sessions were characterized by mutually professional respect and candor.

3. (U)Inhibitors to Strategy Formulation. Analysis of the Terms of Reference as well as the Team's initial meeting with the High Command revealed certain inherent constraints and limitations on the bilateral strategy formulation process.

a. Articulation of the National Military Strategy had to be a Government of El Salvador product, endorsed by the High Command. This made the Team's success directly dependent upon the success of Salvadoran efforts.

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c. (C) The Armed Force General Staff lacked an appreciation for, training in, and experience with strategic planning. Staff procedures are highly centralized in the persons of the principal staff officers to such a degree that deputies are constrained even from making recommendations in the absence of the principal. The concept of delegation of authority is virtually non-existent and inter-staff coordination is weak. Staff sections have insufficient personnel; those assigned are, in general, quality officers but inexperienced.

d. (C) The daily demands of operational planning and execution associated with the on-going insurgency, were exacerbated by the fact that the principal staff directors were also the strategy group members. This impacted both on their time and energies and also on their undermanned staff directorates.

✓ e. (C) There was little or no institutional data base on the current friendly and enemy situation readily available to aid in articulating the strategy. This had to be developed as the strategy formulation process evolved.

f. (U) The strategy development methodology was designed so that each sequential step built upon and to varying degrees was dependent upon all that preceeded it. Several factors, but principally time, forced the working of two or more phases simultaneously.

g. (U) There is no documented Salvadoran internal defense doctrine that should have served as a basis for development of the operational strategy.

h. (C) The absence of good intelligence and the derivative understanding of enemy capabilities and intentions was a particularly limiting factor.

1. (C) The completely different frames of reference between the US and Salvadoran strategy groups on the sensitive issue of extreme rightist terrorism and institutional violence precluded any serious discussion. Despite US exhortation, the Salvadoran strategy group participants were unable and unwilling to acknowledge the relationship of this element to the development of an effective national military strategy.

4. (U) Terms of Reference Contradictions.

a. (C) The effort was somewhat reminiscent of the early 1960's when the US, gravely concerned about the growth and spread of Communism in Latin America (insurgencies inspired and supported at least ideologically by Cuba and to a lesser degree the Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China), attempted to redefine the mission of the Latin American military from the traditional one of sovereign territorial preservation to internal security and stability. A fundamental difference now exists. During the Cold War, there may have been in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs (1961), Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and Dominican Republic (1965), a reasonable degree of confidence that the US would honor its

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- ✓ self assumed role of ~~Continental~~ Defender against overt external aggression consistent with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. Now, however, in the ~~Post~~ Vietnam withdrawal era, further colored by the decline of military diplomacy for the Hemisphere (and the abandonment of Tacho Somoza - no matter how righteous), there is Latin doubt as to the intent and resolve of the US to uphold its commitment to hemispheric collective security. This condition results in an inherent contradiction in the Terms of Reference. They specify that the strategy would be endorsed by the El Salvador Armed Force High Command, but also direct that the strategy be one that "Defends its territory within internationally recognized borders". This latter requirement per force led to the development of a strategy and force structure that are fundamentally internal defense oriented while the Armed Force High Command remains very concerned
- ✓ over the growing Nicaraguan capability to protect^J military power externally. They most certainly would like to build a force capable of defending against an attack without concern as to which side of the international border the defense

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b. (C) This same limitation (international boundaries) constrained the development of an interdiction concept, in that it precludes the most effective, if not necessarily the most feasible option of orienting on the source rather than on the recipient.

c. (C) The Team was to address the mission, organization, and operational capabilities of the total Armed Force to include the National Guard, National Police, and Treasury Police (the latter three collectively referred to as the Security Forces). However, there is US law (Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 1961 as amended) prohibiting the provision of training, advice, and financial support to police and other civil law enforcement forces.

d. (S/NOFORN) The combined effort was to consider the command control system and inherently, the communications systems. Furthermore, operational security, particularly in light of demonstrated insurgent communications intercept capability, is a significant issue. However, the US policy ^{AGAINST} providing military communications security equipment to ^{FOREIGN} countries ~~(such as El Salvador)~~ made it impractical to plan with any certainty the acquisition of such equipment.

e. (C) In sum, the strategy was to be El Salvador's, but it was the Team's task to strive to insure that it was compatible with US strategic interests and objectives. In fact, this did not present any insurmountable obstacles. However, there is a disconnect in the prioritization of requirements between those articulated in the implementation concept plan by the US Team which are oriented on the internal defense mission, and that which was preferred by the Armed Force High Command based on its concern over the Nicaraguan overt threat.

✓
STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT: PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

1. (U) Purpose of Strategy Development. The analysis of the mission identified the following specific objectives to be achieved through the labor of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team:

a. (U) Instill within the El Salvador Armed Force High Command and General Staff an appreciation for, and ability in, strategic planning and programming.

b. (U) Produce a national level military strategy that will provide planning guidance to the Armed Force High Command for the expansion and modernization of its force and for the conduct of the internal defense campaign against the insurgency.

✓ c. (U) Develop an implementation concept that will identify the military assistance, materiel, and training, that will be required to achieve the US policy goal and the Government of El Salvador's national objective of restoring peace to El Salvador.

d. (U) Make a strategic assessment of the military situation in El Salvador.

2. (U) Strategy Development Parameters.

a. (U) Problem. In order to achieve the stated purpose and specifically to guide the formulation of the National Military Strategy for the Government of El Salvador, the Team designed a methodology reflective of traditional military planning and responsive to military conditions in El Salvador. In the early effort to place parameters on the strategy development effort, recourse to standard definitions of strategy as indicated below, was not particularly helpful.

(1) (U) JCS Publication 1: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

"The art and science of employing the forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force". (pg 217).

(2) (U) Institute for Defense Analysis Publication: Lexicon of Terms Relevant to National Security Studies on Arms and Arms Control. "...Essentially a plan... in accordance with which various means, including actions and decisions, are directed toward the achievement of objectives." (pg 95).

b. (U) Resolution. The resolution of the problem of defining the methodological parameters was found in Karl von Clausewitz's study, On War. It made crystal clear what must constitute the strategy.

(1) (U) "The activities characteristic of war may be split into two main categories: those that are merely preparation for war, and war proper..."

(2) (U) "The knowledge and skills involved in the preparation will be concerned with the creation, training and maintenance of the fighting forces...the theory of war proper, on the other hand, is concerned with the use of these means, once they have been developed, for the purpose of the war." (Vol II: 1,pgs 131-132).

c. (U) Delimitation. The strategy consists of two interrelated elements, war preparation and war fighting. The first is concerned with force augmentation and modernization; the second with the strategic and tactical concepts of gaining the military objectives. In developing the strategy, we were deliberately and consciously guided by the Principles of War as defined by FM 100-5, 19 February 1962 edition. This appears obvious, but in this case it was imperative in light of the Salvadoran Armed Force's absence of a formal internal defense

and development doctrine. To focus the strategy on the right objectives, Clausewitz's study, On War, again provided the direction.

(1) (U) "The political objective - the original motive for the war - will determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires." (Vol I:1, pg 81).

(2) (U) The ends of strategy "are those objectives that will finally lead to peace." (Vol II: 12, pg 143).

3. (U) The Methodology. The adopted methodology has its derivation in the determination of the national purpose and interests. This determination constitutes the basis for analyzing the threat and for developing national military strategy objectives and concepts that eliminate the threat and support the concurrent attainment of the national purpose and interests. The national military strategy objectives and concepts, prioritized over the short, mid, and long term, serve to determine requirements and to identify national resources to implement the strategy. The requirements, which represent the optimal capability to man, organize, equip, train, and sustain the Armed Force of El Salvador, are compared with the Armed Force's current situation to identify the shortfall. The shortfall is reduced by El Salvador's potential capabilities, by programmed US Security assistance, and by present and programmed third country support. The shortfall that remains is developed into an implementation concept with fully costed options to attain an optimal capability, a lesser enhanced capability, and a minimal survival capability. A risk assessment supports each option of the implementation concept. This methodological process leads the strategy development along a logical path that considers many factors and influences that impact upon the desired national military strategy. The Armed Force of El

Salvador fully supported the use of this methodological process, and recognized its utility as a basis for planning and programming resources to support force expansion and development, as well as the conduct of an internal defense campaign. The methodology works best when followed sequentially, but it can accommodate simultaneous initiatives and alternative ordering. It is a dynamic process in that each successive^S step may require modification to previously accomplished steps. Given the centrality of its role in guiding and disciplining the development of the strategy, the methodology is presented here in outline format with comments amplifying each step.

4. (U) Elements of the Methodology.

- a. National Purpose: Enduring values and beliefs.
- b. National Interests: Fundamental political, economic, social, and military goals.
- c. Political Objectives: Reason or purpose for use of military force.
- d. Threat Analysis: Enemy's capability to influence national interests and possible/probable courses of action.
- e. Military Objectives: Specific missions or tasks to which military resources are applied to achieve the political objective. Military objectives are derived from: mission of Armed Force, assessment of current capabilities; analysis of threat; and the political objectives
- f. Military Concepts: How military power will be employed to achieve the military objectives.
- g. Armed Force Current Situation Current capability to implement the military concepts.
- h. Prioritization of Military Objectives Objectives are prioritized

within two different schemes and for two different purposes.

(1) Strategic importance: Establishes the priority in which resources will be applied.

(2) Resource Intensity: Methodologically facilitates the identification of total resource requirements in that lower resource intense concepts are frequently included among the requirements of high^{ER} resource intense concepts or missions.

1. Requirements: That required to man, organize, equip, train, and sustain the force necessary to execute the military concepts. Requirements are derived from analysis of the mission, objectives, concepts, and threat.

j. El Salvador's Capabilities/Limitations to Support Requirements: Analyzed in terms of personnel, facilities, training, finances, and industry.

k. Third Country Support: Analyzed in terms of training, logistics, and finances.

1. Shortfall: That for which there is no provision after consideration of current Armed Force situation, Government of El Salvador's capabilities, and third country support.

m. Implementation Concept: Various degrees of strategy implementation dependent upon level of US security assistance. Herein, three options are presented in terms of materiel and training assistance phased over the short, mid, and long term. Options are objective rather than resource driven and indicate the support required from US to achieve the objectives of each option.

(1) Option 1 - Defensive Strategy: Avoid defeat.

(2) Option 2 - Offensive Strategy: Gain and maintain the initiative.

(3) Option 3 - Victory Strategy. Destroy the insurgents' will and

capability to fight.

n. Risk Assessment: Risk associated with each option.

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NATIONAL STRATEGY

(C) It is of fundamental importance that a national military strategy be compatible with and supportive of the national strategy. The Government of El Salvador has a draft national strategy that is little more than a philosophic commitment to democratic principles (See Inclosure 3). It provided little assistance in the design of a supportive national military strategy. Therefore, to identify the central political objective, or the reason for fighting, the 15 October 1979 Armed Force proclamation and many public speeches by Junta members were reviewed. The political content of those which appeared to have the most military significance were the government's decision not to negotiate with the insurgents concerning the constituent assembly election and the obvious responsibility of the Armed Force for regaining and maintaining peace and security throughout the land. Collectively, these political objectives imply the destruction of the insurgents' will and fighting capability. The National Military Strategy is designed to accomplish this and provide for the continuing sovereignty of the nation.

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POLITICAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

1. (S/NOFORN) General. Political military relationships in El Salvador are focused in the current relationship between the Armed Force and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). This relationship has its origin in the disintegration of the first Revolutionary Junta Government (JRG) in January 1980. At that time, the PDC's expressed willingness to help form a new government built on the foundation of socio-economic reforms and an open political process was accepted by the Armed Force. The PDC recognizes that its role in the JRG is at the tolerance of the Armed Force, and the Armed Force recognizes the political necessity of the PDC's participation. Consequently, the Armed Force - PDC relationship is a marriage driven not by mutual trust and philosophic orientation, but by accommodation. Plagued by personal ambitions and institutional rivalry, the relationship remains a fragile one. The key partners are Jose Napoleon DUARTE, President of the Republic and PDC leader; Colonel Jaime Abdul GUTIERREZ, Vice President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Force; and Colonel Jose Guillermo GARCIA, Minister of Defense and Public Security.

Institutionally, the power to shape or influence events resides with the Armed Force. Personal power rests primarily in the hands of Colonel Garcia, who maintains a "proper" but cool relationship with President Duarte and Colonel Gutierrez.

2. (S/NOFORN) The Relationship. The relationship between the Armed Force and PDC has been characterized by recurring tensions arising from their differing perceptions. For example:

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b. (U) The PDC View.

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ARMED FORCE'S COMMITMENT TO THE
JUNTA, REFORM, AND ELECTIONS

1. (U) Basis for Commitment. The Armed Force's commitment to the Junta, reform, and elections is firmly rooted in the events of 15 October 1979. On this date, the Armed Force initiated and led the coup that ousted the regime of General Carlos Humberto ROMERO. The concurrent establishment of the Revolutionary Junta Government (JRG), and the Armed Force Proclamation of 15 October 1979, which pledged its support to the Junta and the policies of social and political reform, functioned to alter past power relationships.

2. (U) Commitment in Practice.

✓ a. (U) The first Junta, unable to control the violence, establish its
✓ authority, and develop coalition cohesion, disintegrated less than three months after its birth. It was replaced by the present Junta, which is, in reality, a marriage of accommodation between the Armed Force and the Christian Democratic Party. Although the relationship is one of tension and distrust, it is held together by the mutual goal of political and institutional survival against the common threat of leftist armed insurgency. For its part, the Armed Force, in both word and deed has remained true to its Proclamation. The Armed Force's vigorous implementation of the agrarian reforms and the measures being planned to guarantee both the security and legitimacy of the March 1982 constituent assembly election give evidence to this fact.

b. (U) As observed by the Team during the strategy formulation process, the Armed Force High Command is ever mindful of its obligation to the Armed Force Proclamation. It was the reference point for not only policy discussions

but for the Armed Force's sense of honor.

3. (U) Prognosis for Future Commitment. Upon completion of the March 1982 constituent assembly election, the Armed Force's commitment to the JRG, reforms, and the electoral process will enter a new phase. The constituent assembly will have absolute authority to rewrite the Constitution of El Salvador and to carry out any related changes. It is also the cornerstone for the tentative 1983 presidential election. In the articulation of the National Military Strategy, the High Command again has committed itself to respect the results of the constituent election and to provide its loyal support to the new government.

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RELATIONSHIP AMONG AND BETWEEN
MILITARY SERVICES AND PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES

1. (C) Ministry of Defense Relationships. The Ministry of Defense of El Salvador consists of the Minister of Defense and Public Security, the Sub-Secretary of Defense and Public Security, and the Armed Force Chief of Staff.

✓ Although the Vice President is currently the titular commander of the Armed Force, decisions and guidance concerning daily operations, institutional policies, and future plans, in practice, emanate from the Minister or, when ✓ delegated, from the Armed Force Chief of Staff. ✓

Explicit responsibilities of the Armed Force Chief of Staff include supervision of the Armed Force headquarters operations, the Armed Force General Staff, and the Joint Operations Center of the Armed Force.

✓ Additionally, the Armed Force Chief of Staff has accrued implied responsibilities and authority by his placement in the organizational ✓ structure of the Ministry, the duties and attendant authority delegated to him by ✓ the Minister, and his central and sometimes pivotal role in key Armed Force level decisions that influence the three military services. Thus, the Armed Force Chief of Staff, in actuality, exercises operational control over the Air Force and Navy, and is the de facto commander of the Army.

The three components of the Public Security Forces (National Guard, National Police, and Treasury Police) are each commanded by a Director General who, in practice, reports directly to the Minister of Defense and Public Security.

2. (U) Army, Navy, and Air Force Relationships.

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a. (C) General. The Army is the dominant military service; the Air Force and Navy, small in size, resources, and operating budget, represent little more than appendages of the Army, and are under the operational control of the Armed Force Chief of Staff.

b. (C) Present Relationships. Heretofore, there has been little cross fertilization or mutual interest among the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Armed Force General Staff. At the Armed Force General Staff level, the Air Force and Navy, as a rule, have not participated as full members in the decision/planning process. Their counsel and expertise have been sought only when required to coordinate joint phases of tactical operations. Conversely, the Air Force and Navy have been content to function separately and somewhat oblivious to the General Staff until funding or materiel requirements have motivated them to seek the support and assistance of the Armed Force General Staff.

c. (C) Future Prospects. Force modernization and the attendant improvement in operational capabilities, promise to produce a greater awareness among the military services and Armed Force General Staff of the need to better integrate service expertise and resources into the planning and execution processes. Prospects for the Air Force are particularly encouraging. The Air Force's acquisition of fourteen UH-1H helicopters has functioned as a catalyst for increasing the degree of cooperation and coordination between the Air Force and the General Staff as well as Army field commanders. In recognition of, and the need for, the Air Force's airmobile support capability, the Armed Force General Staff now has a representative from the Air Force present during the planning stages of combat operations. The Navy, however, continues to be treated as a separate entity and at present, is seldom consulted. This is due to two factors.

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First, the focus of combat operations has been entirely oriented to the land battle. Secondly, despite modest improvement in Navy capabilities, the Navy still does not possess an effective sea interdiction capability. However, based upon the Air Force's experience, it can be assumed that inter-service and General Staff cooperation and coordination with the Navy will increase proportionally to the degree of the Navy's demonstrated capabilities.

3. (U) Public Security Forces Relationships.

a. (C) General. The Public Security Forces consist of three separate elements - the National Guard, the National Police, and the Treasury Police. All three forces have both civil law enforcement and internal defense responsibilities. The National Guard is the largest, most seasoned, and most professional of the three security forces.

(1) (C) Public Security Force Operations. The Director General of each security force is an army officer who has been selected for the position by the Minister of Defense and Public Security. Additionally, all other officers assigned to the security forces are army officers or those who have been commissioned from the ranks of the security forces through periodic officer candidate courses. These officers commissioned from the ranks of the security forces, almost without exception, will never serve outside the security forces. The army officers assigned to the security forces serve for a fixed period of time and then are returned to the Army for assignment to positions in their military career field.

(2) (C) Public Security Forces Enlisted Members. Generally, the enlisted members of each security force have completed active military service. The vast majority of the enlisted members are recruited from the Army upon completion of their active duty obligation. Upon entering a security

force, the new member undergoes additional training prescribed by his respective force before being assigned to a field unit. Consequently, enlisted members of the security forces are better educated, better trained, and incidently, better paid than the enlisted members of the military services.

(3) (C) Public Security Forces ^{RIVALRIES} [and Relationships] The only known rivalry among the three security forces that is dysfunctional to their missions and operational effectiveness, is the propensity for each force to withhold or selectively release information related to insurgent or subversive operations. The motivating factor here appears to be nothing more than the desire to gain a public information coup and professional recognition.

4. (U) Relationships Between the Military Services and Public Security Forces.

a. (C) Institutional. Subsequent to the 15 October 1979 coup, which ousted General Romero and a number of senior officers linked to the conservative oligarchy, the relationship between the military services and the security forces was marked by some distrust and tension. This situation emanated from two factors:

(1) (C) The security forces members and rural landowners had enjoyed a long standing and mutually beneficial relationship. Security forces members, especially of the National Guard, had operated autonomously and were under the financial influence of the landowners, managing their areas of responsibility as virtual fiefdoms. The Armed Force commitment to, and subsequent support for implementation of agrarian reforms, served not only to weaken the traditional relationship between the security forces and landed oligarchy, but to raise questions in the minds of the security forces, regarding the ultimate

intentions of Military (Army) Elements.

(2) (C) The power struggle between the liberal followers of Colonel Majano and the more conservative followers of Colonel Gutierrez exacerbated the institutional tension and distrust between the military service and security forces.

(3) (C) The resolution of this feud in favor of Colonel Gutierrez and his followers, which included the security forces, and the attendant restructuring of the Revolutionary Government Junta (JRG) in January 1981, contributed to a reduction of distrust and tension. All indications now are that energies are being directed toward eliminating any remaining vestiges of distrust and tension between the military services and security forces.

b. (C) Ministry Level. Cooperation and coordination at the Ministry level is primarily a function of direct contact between the Minister and each of the security forces directors through private planning sessions or personal communications. Consequently, little coordination is effected with the Armed Force Chief of Staff or the General Staff. This is especially true in the important functional area of intelligence. On the one hand, the security forces provide collected information only on a selective and delayed basis to the General Staff. On the other hand, the General Staff seldom tasks or consults with the security forces. As a result, the security forces are separate operational entities linked to the military services only by the direct and personal chain between the Minister and each director of the three security forces. Nonetheless, the capacity for greater cooperation and coordination between the Armed Force General Staff and the security forces was manifested during the National Military Strategy formulation process.

c. (C) Zonal Level. In the field, the military zone commander, who also commands the Army brigade assigned to each of the military zones, has responsibility and authority over all military and security forces assigned or operating within the military zone. In practice, however, two important factors have impeded application.

(1) (C) The organizational boundaries of the security forces do not coincide with the military zone boundaries. This results in many command control problems. The National Military Strategy corrects this, but it has not yet been implemented.

(2) (C) An integrated communications system to link military and security forces does not exist. This precludes the military zone commander from exercising effective and responsive command control over the security forces within his zone.

(3) (C) During the conduct of large military operations, the security forces cooperate and work with the military forces. Nonetheless, each security force exercises command control over its own forces on a day-to-day basis.

5. (U) Problems and Prospects.

a. (C) Problem. The biggest problem is command control, especially as it relates to the current disparity in the organizational boundaries of the military zone and the security forces. It remains to be seen if the problem will be solved by the decision, during the strategy review, to alter all security force boundaries to coincide with those of the Army. There also is debate as to which ministry the National Police and Treasury Police should be assigned. While most agree that the National Guard should remain within the Ministry of Defense and

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Public Security, many believe that the National Police should be a component of the Ministry of Interior and the Treasury Police, a component of the Ministry of Treasury.

b. (C) Prospects. The Armed Force General Staff has recommended (29 October 1981) the adjustment of the organizational boundaries of the security forces to coincide with the military zones. The decision to realign the security forces at the ministerial level is still pending. Realignment would carry with it a redefinition of traditional functions, which, in the case of the Treasury Police, would reduce its role, responsibilities, and personnel. Thus, there is concern that realignment could be dysfunctional to the overall cohesion of the Armed Force.

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ARMED FORCE INSTITUTIONAL COHESION

1. (U) General.

a. (S) Past. During 1980, political differences between the two military members of the ruling junta, Colonels Jaime Abdul GUTIERREZ and Adolfo Arnaldo MAJANO, became apparent. The manifestation of their differences served to separate, in general, the more junior, liberal officers from the more senior, conservative officers. This horizontal division and resultant tensions led some observers to predict that the institution would fragment into two hostile camps. The majority of observers, as well as the officers of the Armed Force, however, confidently believed that political differences and personal ambitions ultimately would be subordinated to the common good of institutional unity. The latter belief proved correct. The officer corps rallied to the institution, giving Colonel Gutierrez an overwhelming vote of confidence. The results of the vote prompted Colonel Majano's quiet exit from the Salvadoran scene.

b. (S) Present. There are, at present, few indications that dysfunctional or divisive differences exist within the Armed Force. Today, the Armed Force appears to be resolute and united in its struggle against the insurgents and committed (or co-opted) to support the socio-economic and political reforms. Those differences that exist are mainly differences of opinion related to how specific problems and challenges should be approached. There appears to be no fundamental questioning of the Armed Force's goals and objectives by its members.

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2. (C) Forces for Cohesion. In withstanding a serious external threat, overcoming internal tensions, and leading and participating in socio-economic and political changes, the Armed Force has demonstrated a degree of resiliency made possible by its remarkable institutional cohesion. The forces that contribute to this cohesion are examined below.

✓ a. (C) Corporateness. The strongest force for cohesion is the sense of corporateness among the officers of the Armed Force. The most important influence on this corporateness is the Military School. It traditionally has been, with few exceptions, the singular source of entry into the officer corps. Therefore, the officer corps, having experienced a common institutionalization process and having pledged allegiance to a particular Tanda (graduating class), shares a strong professional and personal bond, a bond further strengthened by the smallness of the officer corps and the nation. This smallness affords frequent professional interaction, reinforces shared experiences, and nurtures friendships into strong personal loyalties.

b. (C) Philosophical Purity. The officer corps' corporate quality and shared institutionalization process have nurtured a commonality of values that dominate the officer corps' philosophical frame of reference. These values are loyalty to the institution, anti-communism, and love of country; perhaps, in that order. They are enduring and sacred values; any deviation brings intense peer pressure.

✓ c. (S) Political Homogeneity. The 15 October 1979 coup prompted a shakeup that led to the purging, retirement, or reassignment to lesser or foreign posts of those officers who held extreme rightist or reactionary views. Slightly more than a year later, Colonel Majano and his followers, who shared left of center

political beliefs, experienced a similar fate of institutional exile, retirement, or reassignment. These two political cleansings have, in effect, eliminated the two appendages that previously extended from the institution's main body of political beliefs and consequently, have significantly reduced the potential for political differences and factionalism by increasing the political homogeneity^E of the institution.

d. (S) Common Threat. The Sandinista's armed overthrow of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza and the concomitant disintegration of the Nicaraguan National Guard were an object lesson for the Armed Force. It instilled among the members of the Armed Force a latent concern that a similar fate, fueled by leftist and Communist inspired armed revolution, could be their's. The subsequent adoption of armed insurgency by El Salvador's leftists, aided and abetted by Cuba and Nicaragua, has elevated this latent concern into a fear for institutional and personal survival. Motivated by the most primordial of instincts, the Armed Force has witnessed a closing of its ranks to face the common threat to its existence. Thus, loyalty to the institution has become an overpowering value which guides and influences the behavior of both the Armed Force and its members. ~~(to an extensive degree)~~

e. (S) Institutional Tolerance. The Armed Force, as an institution, has demonstrated a remarkable capacity for tolerating unprofessional and improper conduct which does not threaten the institution. This tolerance has made the institution reluctant to admonish its own for errors of professional judgement, acts of violence, and impropriety. Retirement, reassignment, and, at worse, institutional exile, are the means for dealing with those who fail to adhere to

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accepted standards of institutional conduct. Thus, the Armed Force protects its own, ignoring, suppressing, covering up, or at most imposing minor punishment. This proven institutional loyalty to the general well-being of its members, in turn, breeds a reciprocal sense of personal loyalty to the institution.

EXTREME RIGHTIST TERRORISM AND
INSTITUTIONAL VIOLENCE

1. (C) General. During the bilateral strategy group sessions, it became apparent the the El Salvador Armed Force has a perception of and attitude toward extreme rightist terrorism and institutional violence that is rooted in past traditions and present circumstances. The Armed Force's frame of reference, while not devoid of the classical ethics and values which govern the conduct of war, has been influenced significantly by the most primeval of human motivation -- survival. Actualization of this basic human instinct has been prompted by the fear that an insurgent victory would bring catastrophic change. This change, as perceived by the Armed Force, would place national, institutional, and personal (self and family) survival in certain jeopardy. This perceptual framework has led the Armed Force to define the threat to its survival within ✓ the narrow parameters of armed leftist insurgency. Although, the Armed Force High Command is cognizant that survival is also inextricably linked to the support of the people, international legitimacy, and continued US assistance, this awareness has not permeated the ranks. Consequently, the existence of any significant threat from extreme rightist terrorism and institutional violence is generally dismissed by the Armed Force.

2. (U) Basis for Frame of Reference. In an effort to better understand the Armed Force's frame of reference, the Team identified the following key factors that feed and nurture the present attitude toward extreme rightist terrorism and institutional violence.

a. (C) The coup of 15 October 1979, witnessed the forced retirement or

expulsion of a significant number of experienced senior officers. This contributed to the narrowing of the professional breadth and expertise of the Armed Force by producing a shortage of trained and experienced officers. In the interest of preserving the thin base of professional expertise that currently exists, the Armed Force is reluctant to implement vigorous corrective action for abuses in the use of force. The prosecution or dismissal of those Armed Force members associated with, or guilty of, unwarranted acts of violence is usually deferred to minor disciplinary actions, at best.

b. (C) The institutional fabric of the Armed Force was strained by the sharp division that evolved between the generally younger, more liberal followers of Colonel Majano and the generally older, more conservative followers of Colonel Gutierrez. This crisis, which threatened to polarize the officer corps into two distinct philosophical camps, ultimately was dissipated with the expulsion of Colonel Majano. The reassignment of Colonel Majano's followers to *non-command positions and non-influential roles*, scattered their numbers and their ability to exercise further significant influence within the Armed Force institution. As a consequence, no countervailing force presently exists within the Armed Force to oppose the propensity of the more conservative officers to tolerate the use of excessive force and violence.

c. (C) The peasant revolution of 1932 and the Armed Force's traditional alliance with the nation's oligarchy, established the strongly anti-Communist and conservative values. The Armed Force and the nation's rightist sector stand on common philosophical ground. This factor, and their shared fear of the extreme left, have resulted in a convergence of interests which fosters mutual tolerance.

d. (C) In the absence of institutional alternatives for problem resolution, Salvadoran culture has been marked by a tolerance for violence. This tolerance has served to nurture a self perpetuating and self escalating use of violence as an alternative for attaining desired ends at all levels of Salvadoran society. This cultural reliance on force and violence has been further exacerbated by the terror and counter-terror tactics of both the forces of left and right in their current armed struggle. Driven by the primordial instinct for survival, barbaric conduct has become the norm for both sides. Thus, due to the influence of both the past and present, there exists an acceptance of, and numbness to, the use of force. This, in turn, has promoted a rationalization among the combatants that serves to legitimize violence.

e. (C) In the Army, and in particular, the Public Security Forces, the traditional dichotomy between operational autonomy and highly centralized and personalized decision making process, has produced a command control system built upon leadership by exception and not a functioning chain-of-command. As a consequence, professional norms of behavior, standards of personal conduct, and the concept of accountability are not encouraged and enforced at each organization level. The absence of a functioning chain-of-command is compounded by the predisposition toward violence by some security force personnel, as well as their demonstrated susceptibility for being co-opted by the right.

f. (C) External Threat. External threats to any human organization's survival historically produce a closing of the ranks and a concomitant tolerance for deviations from accepted norms of individual and organizational behavior. In the particular case of the Armed Force, the need to heal internal wounds and improve organizational efficacy, coupled with fear of the leftist threat, have

made solidarity the dominant institutional value. This has nurtured the belief among the rank and file of the Armed Force that punishment of its members for errors of judgement or acts of violence in the perceived defense of the institution, would erode individual morale, breed internal dissension, and divide the institution in the face of its greatest common threat.

3. (C) Impact on Strategy. The Team was unable to persuade the Armed Force General Staff to identify specifically extreme rightist terrorism as a threat. However, the Team did succeed in persuading the Armed Force General Staff to define the threat in a more generalized manner so that it was no longer exclusively oriented on the left. Unabated terror from the right and continued tolerance of institutional violence could dangerously erode popular support to the point wherein the Armed Force would be viewed not as the protector of society, but as an army of occupation. Failure to address the problem will subject the legitimacy of the Government of El Salvador and the Armed Force to international questioning.

ARMED FORCE OPTIMISM

✓ 1. (C) Basis for Optimism. There is a pervasive optimism within the Armed Force over the trend and outcome of the ^{INTERNAL DEFENSE} Counter guerrilla campaign at the tactical level. This appears to be genuine; however, Armed Force High Command propagandistic elements enter the equation. This optimism certainly rests upon assumptions, the most important being the expansion of US military assistance. The reasons given for its optimism are varied and in themselves present insight into the thinking and character of the military. They include in no particular order:

- a. (U) US economic and military assistance
- b. (U) Third Country assistance
- c. (U) Christian Democratic Party (PDC) is working better with the Junta
- d. (U) Army has demonstrated flexibility in working with the PDC
- e. (U) Solidification of the Armed Force's command structure, i.e., reliable officers in all key positions
- f. (U) Armed Force institutional unanimity
- g. (U) Perceived popular support for the Armed Force
- h. (U) Accumulation of ammunition reserves
- i. (U) Armed Force has demonstrated military capability and patriotism
- j. (U) Insurgents have lost their strongholds
- k. (U) Insurgents have had to resort to terrorism
- 1. (U) El Salvador's international image is improving (only one ranking officer subscribed to this thesis). Overwhelmingly, it is perceived that the international psychological campaign is being lost in disastrous proportions.

m. (U) Agricultural sector is functioning, albeit, at a lower rate of productivity.

n. (U) Internationally sponsored terrorism in El Salvador has promoted sympathy from various Latin American republics.

o. (U) Death of Omar Torrijos eliminated an important supportive source for insurgent activity.

p. (U) Insurgents' difficulty in recruiting and resupplying itself after the January 1981 final offensive.

q. (U) Peace Treaty with Honduras.

2. (C) Analysis. The Armed Force's optimism appears instinctive and seems to be based fundamentally on the current relative inactivity of the insurgents to which the above, in various combination, are presented in explanation.

a. (C) There is an important dichotomy between this instinctive optimism and the systematic assessment performed in the course of developing the National Military Strategy. This assessment acknowledged the insurgents' demonstrated operational capability and potential. It concluded that under current conditions, time favored the insurgent, the economic infrastructure could not be defended, and, therefore, the war ultimately would be lost. This assessment was developed by the Armed Force General Staff during the bilateral strategy formulation process and was endorsed by the Armed Force High Command. One cannot deny the possibility of a mouse that roared, but the assessment does appear to have been honestly made. The destruction of the very important Lempa River bridge (Puente de Oro) seemed to reinforce this dichotomy and to carry two lessons. The Armed Force is unable to protect all key infrastructures; and time

is its enemy. With time, the insurgents can selectively destroy elements of the infrastructure to the point of national economic collapse.

b. (C) The Armed Force High Command has a perception that the war will be strategically won or lost external to the tactical battle in-country. This external war consists of two offensive actions fostered by international Communism: infiltration of men and materiel, and the psychological offensive against El Salvador. In the High Command's view, other than positive public declarations would exacerbate an-already disastrous situation.

c. (C) Finally, though over worked, the concept of machismo may play a role - an inability to admit weaknesses in forums other than the institution itself. The dichotomy exists; but as long as honest assessments can be made in-house, the strategy can be implemented inspite of it.

POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED FORCE

1. (C/NOFORN) General. The Armed Force High Command sincerely believes that it enjoys the overwhelming support of the populace. This belief is based upon the High Command's interpretation of past events and circumstances and not on quantifiable data or measureable indicators. As a matter of fact, virtually no data exists to assess the degree of support which the Armed Force may receive from the general populace, except for a public opinion poll conducted in San Salvador several months ago. Respondents to the poll indicated a dramatic drop in support for all political groups associated with the insurgents. While not a clear or definitive endorsement of popular support for the Armed Force, the poll results do suggest a possible new trend in the relationship between the urban population and the Armed Force.

2. (U) Basis for Belief. The basis for the Armed Force High Command's belief that it has a high degree of popular support can probably be explained by, and found in, an interpretation of the results associated with a series of benchmark events and circumstances. The significance of these events and circumstances is discussed below.

a. (U) Events.

✓ (1) (U) Armed Force Proclamation of 15 October 1979. The Armed Force's
✓ proclamation announced the ouster of General Carlos Humberto ROMERO, denounced abuses of power by government officials, proclaimed a commitment to fundamental social reform, and called for a transition to elections and a democratic political system. The public's response to the Armed Force's commitment toward serving as an agent for progressive change to benefit society as a whole, was

both immediate and positive. This event created a sense of guarded optimism for the new role of the Armed Force.

(2) (U) Land Reform, March and April 1980. In March, the promulgation of Decree 153, the Basic Law of Land Reform (Phase I) represented the first step in transferring land owned by the few to peasant cooperatives. This first step was soon followed in April by the implementation of Decree 207, the land-to-the-tiller program (Phase III). This decree enabled each landless peasant family renting or sharecropping land to acquire 17.3 acres of land that they had under cultivation. The actual implementation of Phases I and III validated the Armed Force's 15 October 1979 commitment to fundamental reforms. Furthermore, the Armed Force's break with landowners became evident by protecting government technicians and peasant beneficiaries as the land reforms were implemented. Concurrent with the Armed Force's severance of old ties and the forging of the new, a diminution in the populace's support for and acceptance of leftist mass organizations began to be discernable.

(3) (U) Death of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo ROMERO, 24 March 1980. The assassination of Archbishop Romero by suspected rightists brought forth massive outpouring of grief and resentment toward violence. As thousands attended his funeral, leftist insurgents, brandishing and firing guns and detonating bombs, sparked panic among the mourners, resulting in scores being killed and injured. Despite international press reports to the contrary, the Armed Force did not prompt the violence; the insurgents did. In the people's eyes this insurgent inspired tragedy caused them to question the legitimacy of insurgent actions and motives.

(4) (U) General Strikes, Summer 1980. In the summer of 1980, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), an insurgent front organization for disseminating propaganda, and the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (URD), the insurgents' central executive arm for political and military planning, called for general strikes on three separate occasions in June, July, and August. The popular response to these calls was characterized by disinterest, apathy and noncompliance. The first strike was inconclusive, the second postponed, and the third a total failure, despite all out efforts of violence aimed at intimidating the people to comply with the strike call. These summer failures brought home to both the insurgents and the Armed Force alike, that the insurgents no longer possessed the capability to send thousands of citizens to the streets or the requisite support to build a popular army.

(5) (U) The Final Offensive, 10-17 January 1981. Proclaiming that "the decisive hour has come to initiate the decisive military and insurrectional battles for the seizure of power," the insurgents launched their final offensive on 10 January 1981. The hope was that the people would rise up and join the armed struggle, and that the members of the Armed Force would flee or join with the insurgents. Again, the insurgents miscalculated and failed in their objectives. The people ignored the insurgents' appeals to join them and demonstrated, if not an active, at least a passive rejection of the insurgency. The members of the Armed Force, with the exception of part of one company of a single garrison, remained loyal to their leaders, stood their ground, and fought with valor. These military and popular defeats incurred by the insurgents served to nurture the patriotic bond between the people and the Armed Force.

b. (U) Circumstances.

(1) (U) Electoral Process. With the appointment of an independent Central Elections Commission and the National Constituent Assembly elections scheduled for March 1982, there is genuine hope for free and democratic elections. By accepting change through the electoral process, the public would repudiate the insurgents and their strategy of armed insurrection. The Armed Force commitment to insuring the integrity of the March 1982 elections is a positive affirmation which can promote public confidence in the Armed Force.

(2) (U) Recruitment for the Armed Force. The Armed Force has had no problem in obtaining officer and enlisted candidates for military service. Recruitment goals for enlisted members are consistently exceeded. Economic and local security factors certainly play a role. Nonetheless, there is no shortage of aspirants for military service. Similarly, the Armed Force has been able to expand cadet enrollment at its Military School without any difficulty. The interest in and willingness of young men to seek admission to the Military School appears to be significant; ^{THIS YEAR} ~~illustrative of this fact is that despite a~~
~~quantum increase in the Military School's entering cadet class~~ over 1,000 applications were received for 450 cadet appointments. In contrast, reports indicate that insurgent recruitment efforts are relying on coercion and intimidation to a growing extent.

(3) (U) Independence Day. During this year's celebration of independence (15 September 1981), the public demonstration of the Armed Force was attended by ^{MANY} ~~hundreds of~~ thousands of citizens who expressed popular enthusiasm. The apparent acceptance and support for the Armed Force at this occasion, as well as others, have served to reinforce the High Command belief that it possesses a

significant degree of popular support.

3. (C/NOFORN) Outlook. In assessing the aforementioned events and circumstances as to whether there is popular support for the Armed Force, it would appear that the indicators are more positive than negative. However, what is difficult, if not impossible to assess, is whether this acceptance represents positive support of the Armed Force, rejection of the insurgents, or simply an accommodation with the pain and suffering of the past few years. To some degree, it is probably a factor of all three. The public mood appears to represent a delicate balance of apathy toward the insurgents and acquiescence to the Armed Force. This balance could be quickly and easily altered should the people become intolerant of the violence and its attendant death and destruction. If the pain of struggle is transformed into public ^{OUTRAGE,} ~~numbness or weariness~~, there exists the possibility that in the hope of bringing the struggle to an end, the people might embrace the force that can best demonstrate its ability to win.

ORIGIN OF THE INSURGENCY:

THE ARMED FORCE HIGH COMMAND PERSPECTIVE

1. (C) General. The Armed Force High Command's perspective of the origin of the present insurgency is primarily shaped by its focus on the effects of social discontent and not its causes. As a consequence, their perspective is somewhat shallow in its appreciation of the moral dialectics of social change and parochial in its study of the causes. This limited depth and scope are nurtured by institutional rigidity and personal prejudice.

2. (C) Basis of the Armed Force High Command's Perspective. The members of the High Command, like all other individuals, are a product of their life experiences. Unlike most others, however, their life experiences have been almost totally confined to those of the military institution and the corporate body of officership. Consequently, the High Command has had little opportunity for and the benefit of cross-fertilization beyond the walls of the institution. This limiting effect of infrequent external cross-fertilization has been further compounded by the High Command's geopolitical view of international Communism.

3. (U) Summary of Armed Force High Command Perspective.

a. (C) University Training for Junior Officers. The High Command, in general, has not had experience in civil education beyond the secondary education level. Consequently, it views university training with suspicion. This suspicion is based in the belief that exposure to extra-institutional values, experiences, and relationships functions as a catalyst for divergence from the philosophical mainstream of the institution and the birth of new loyalties outside the corporate body. These factors, it believes, foster insurgency by

weakening the institution whose mission it is to provide for internal peace, stability, and security.

b. (C) National University. The faculty of the National University is perceived to possess extreme political philosophies and disruptive social ideals. The National University is considered to be a haven for student radicalization and the co-optation of national sovereignty by foreign doctrines and philosophies.

c. (C) Indoctrination of School Children. The High Command perceives a direct link between the radicalism of university training and the profession of teaching. Thus, it firmly believes that one of the major sources of the insurgency is the indoctrination of the nation's school children by teachers who share values or sympathies with the insurgents. The teachers, therefore, are agents of radicalism and the school children their innocent victims.

d. (C) Priests and Nuns. Foreign priests and nuns, particularly those of the Jesuit and Maryknoll orders, are seen as proselytizers of the Theology of Liberation which justifies the use of armed revolution to end the social inequities and human sufferings of the poor. The High Command believes that these foreign missionaries manipulate the underprivileged into acquiescence of, or support for, violent social upheaval.

e. (C) Unjust Judicial System. The fact that the judicial system has been traditionally corrupted by the rich and powerful for their advantage is acknowledged. Consequently, the High Command believes that the judicial system's failure to treat all citizens fairly and with equity has favored the privileged at the expense and frustration of the poor.

f. (C) Social Structure. There is a recognition that El Salvador's tradi-

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tional social structure, and its attendant socio-economic inequities, are a source for social discontent. Despite this recognition, however, the High Command believes that it only represents one part of a complex problem.

g. (C) International Communism. Driven by a fervent anti-Communist philosophy, the High Command's perspective is strongly influenced by its geopolitical view of international Communism. It views the insurgency to be, in large part, a product of Communist machinations in the dialectical struggle for hegemony between international Communism and the Western democracies.

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THREAT ANALYSIS:

A SALVADORAN MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

1. (C/NOFORN) General. Development of the National Military Strategy required a comprehensive threat assessment upon which to base the military objectives and strategic concepts. The Director of Intelligence (D-II) of the Armed Force General Staff produced a lengthy but somewhat shallow analysis of the insurgent threat. During the bilateral strategy formulation sessions, however, it became apparent that there are in fact, a number of perceived threats to which the officers of the Armed Force High Command must attend. Some were openly discussed, some addressed obliquely, and others not even alluded to. Of these various threats, only the threat of armed leftist insurgency was committed to written analysis by the D-II.

2. (C/NOFORN) Armed Force High Command Perceptions of Threat. Articulation of the Armed Force High Command's perceptions of threat is necessary for understanding the High Command's motivations and decisions which translate into military objectives, operational concepts, allocation of resources, and execution plans. In the Team's articulation of the High Command's perceptions, no effort is made to justify or criticize them, or to comment on their validity. They are presented and discussed solely for documenting the High Command's view for what-
✓ ever conclusions can be drawn in an effort to better understand the High
✓ Command's frame of reference for viewing the current threats. The basis for this frame of reference is found in the High Command's preoccupation on that which is threatened: the national security, the institution of the Armed Force, and self (individual and family).

a. (C) National Security. The national security, as defined by the High Command, is the survival of El Salvador as a sovereign nation under a democratic form of government and with an economy based on private enterprise. The threats to the national security are both internal and external:

(1) (C) Internal.

(a) (C) The most imminent and obvious internal threat to the national security is the insurgency. The High Command credits the armed insurgent forces with a strength of approximately 15,000 (see Inclosure 29). Its analysis indicates that the insurgents are most active in the first (central) and third (eastern) military zones and least active in the second (western) military zone. The High Command believes that the current insurgent strategy is to bring the Government to its knees by attacking and destroying the economic infrastructure. The most effective means would be the destruction of "Cerron Grande" and "Cinco de Noviembre" hydro-electric dams, both critical strategic sites. Although destruction of the dams would be devastating to national security, the High Command feels that for the short term the insurgents' most probable course of action will be continued small scale attacks on the economic infrastructure as an economy of force measure while concurrently making major effort to seize territory north of the Torola River, in Morazan Department to establish a "liberated area" for the purpose of obtaining international recognition and support.

(b) (C) The High Command harbors a general animosity toward the majority of the nation's teachers and educators. It perceives them as Communists and, consequently, a threat to the national security. This distrust and resentment extends to the students, particularly at the university level. This

perception of the young and educated adversely impacts on force expansion and modernization which requires more officers and technicians than the military is capable of producing through its own institution.

(c) (C) The clerics of the Catholic church are viewed as threats because of the generalized perception that many are advocates of the "Theology of Liberation" and give aid and comfort to the insurgents. This perception of threat was reinforced by the recent admissions made by the Jesuit priest who rallied in Guatemala after having served with the insurgents.

(d) (C) Although generally reluctant to discuss it in any depth, the High Command does have an appreciation for the threat that extreme rightist-terrorism and institutional violence pose to national security. As perceived, however, the threat is viewed within the limited framework of its effect on continued foreign assistance and international support, particularly from the US. The High Command fully recognizes the impact that adverse publicity could have on this necessary assistance and support. Similarly, it recognizes that a military coup sponsored and supported by the Right aimed at removing Christian Democratic Party (PDC) representation from the Junta would destroy the Government's and Armed Force's legitimacy.

(2) (U) External.

(a) (U) The external component of the insurgent threat is twofold.

1. (C) The High Command holds, almost with alarm, the perception that the Government of El Salvador is being decisively beaten, not by the insurgents on the battlefield, but by the international propaganda campaign being waged by the Soviet Union, its allies and surrogates. Its concern over the Government's and Armed Force's bad international image is paramount, causing

it to believe that El Salvador is the victim of a "new type of war", allegedly unseen in the annals of history, in which the outcome will be determined by international opinion.

2. (C) External materiel and personnel support to the insurgency is viewed as a direct military threat in that, if continued, it will alter the balance of military power in clear favor of the insurgents. In expressing this concern, the High Command is quick to point out that the insurgents were the first to field the M-79 grenade launcher, M-16 rifle, and M-60 machinegun. From captured documents they have identified a number of countries involved in providing a full range of military assistance to the insurgents, while only a very small number of countries are providing assistance to the Government of El Salvador.

(b) (C) The principal external threat is Nicaragua. The High Command's concern over Nicaragua's aggressive support of the insurgents, and its feared extra-territorial intentions appear, at times, to make the Sandinista Government the cause of the insurgency. The enormous buildup of conventional military capabilities in Nicaragua has obviously not gone unnoticed.

✓ Nicaragua's ^{se} conventional war capability is viewed as the dominant long term threat which must be addressed now.

b. (C) The Institution of the Armed Force. The threat to the survival of the institution is a dimension which, for the most part, the US military officer ✓ corps has never experienced and may find difficult to understand. ~~[Threatened is]~~
 ✓ the continued existence of the Armed Force as an institution and its traditional
 ✓ role in Salvadoran society ARE THREATENED

(1) (U) Internal.

(a) (C) Although not openly discussed, it is known that the institution faces various threats from within. There exist within the officer corps, a number of factional elements. This factionalism creates undercurrents which surface periodically to disrupt the institution's cohesion, divert its energies, and divest its authority and ability to carry out responsibilities. This factionalism is built on a variety of bases. Some are built on personal loyalties to specific individuals, while others may be based upon a particular (graduating class) Tanda of the Military School. Normally, these groups exist without any particular impact on the effective functioning of the force. However, there is ample precedent whereby at any given moment, any one or a coalition of these groups can disrupt institutional cohesion and alter the Armed Force leadership and authority. For the High Command, these internal machinations represent a potential threat which must be monitored. The 15 October 1979 coup and subsequent events are excellent examples of this phenomenon.

(b) (C) A more insidious threat to the institution is the penetration of the Armed Force by the Left. This threat became painfully clear in January 1981, when a Salvadoran captain led his unit in the destruction of their own garrison (Santa Ana) in support of the insurgent offensive.

(2) (U) External.

(a) (C) The High Command perceives the external threat to the institution as having many faces. The most distrusted is the PDC with which the military feels forced into a marriage of accommodation. The words once spoken by President Jose Napoleon DUARTE, who is also the leader of the PDC, are not forgotten - "there are not enough trees in El Salvador from which to hang the

military." The fact that these words were spoken in a different time and circumstance is irrelevant. Compounding this distrust is the High Command's belief that the PDC would abandon the Armed Force if the insurgents ever appear to have gained a clear edge in the struggle. Specifically, the High Command contends that the PDC has already initiated a secret process of negotiation with the Left. In this regard, the High Command is acutely aware that the Left has publicly set a precondition for negotiation - the dissolution of the Armed Force in favor of a "people's army."

(b) (C) The threat of an insurgent victory carries a profound significance for the High Command. The Cuban and Nicaraguan experiences are not lost on the High Command. It consequently translates insurgent victory into certain destruction of the Armed Force as an institution. Thus there can be no accommodation with the Left. Negotiations with the Left are perceived in the same context as a Leftist military victory or domination by Nicaraguan conventional forces.

c. (U) Self.

(1) (C) From a personal survival viewpoint, the High Command believes the consequences of an insurgent victory or a negotiated settlement are certain and grave. The vanquished will not be allowed to live among the victors. In essence, the very best the officer corps can hope for is exile, without the prospect of ever returning.

(2) (C) High Command perception of threat extends to survival of self and family. Members of the High Command have experienced and survived assassination attempts and attacks on their homes and their families. It is realized

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
that there are no safe havens in the country. Therefore, the threat is not confined to the battlefield, because the battlefield is everywhere.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND
PUBLIC SECURITY AND SIZE OF THE ARMED FORCE

1. (U) The El Salvador Ministry of Defense and Public Security is organized as follows:



2. (S) Strength of the Armed Force is as indicated:

<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>FIELD GRADE OFFICERS</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
a. Military Services			
Army	64	294	13,244
Air Force	4	50	340
Navy	5	12	335
TOTAL	<u>73</u>	<u>356</u>	<u>13,919</u>
b. Security Forces			
National Guard	16	60	3,507
National Police	11	30	3,334
Treasury Police	6	13	1,670
TOTAL	<u>33</u>	<u>103</u>	<u>8,511</u>

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ARMED FORCE TOTAL	106	459	22,430
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
3. (S) Administrative Personnel. The total Armed Force strength depicted above must be increased by some 4,679 civilian administrative personnel who are absolutely essential to the efficient functioning of the Armed Force.

4. (U) Population Base. The total Armed Force strength represents only 0.46 percent of the 5,000,000 population of El Salvador. Thus, El Salvador's population base clearly can support the force expansion of the Armed Force as determined by the National Military Strategy. However, the present shortage of junior leaders and financial resources are serious limiting factors.

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
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SITUATION

1. (U) General.



(b)1

2.- (U) The National Structure.



(b)1

~~SECRET~~

(b)1

3. (U) Intelligence Entities.

a. (U) Department of Intelligence (D-II), Armed Force General Staff.

(b)1

~~SECRET~~

(b)1

b. (U) Department of Strategic Intelligence (D-V), Armed Force General
Staff

(b)1

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(b)1

d. (U) Departments II, Public Security Forces

(b)1

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(b)1

e. (U) Brigade/Battalion S-2 Sections.

(b)1

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(b)1

g. (U) Intelligence Training.

(b)1

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h. (U) Administrative Practices.

(b)1

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CURRENT OPERATIONS SITUATION

1. (U) General Situation of Operations.

a. (U) Tactical Disposition of Forces.

(1) (C) The Armed Force of El Salvador is disposed in fourteen departments, further divided into five military zones. In each military zone, the zone commander has one infantry brigade under his command, and operational control of the Public Security Forces and the Territorial Service located within the zone. The number of military detachments/battalions assigned to each brigade varies with the number of departments in the military zone. As a general rule, there is one military detachment in each department, with the exception of the Department of Chalatenango which has two military detachments and the Department of La Libertad which has none (See Inclosure 4). The Armed Force is extremely small in relation to the existing insurgent threat and the population (0.46%). This disadvantage is increased by the current disposition of ground tactical units, which is not directly oriented toward the insurgent threat. To the contrary, these units are disposed in accordance with the national political-administrative structure. Thus, force organization, disposition, and tactical employment, reflect a peacetime environment oriented to a conventional external threat.

(2) (C) The military zone's brigade command control structure is nothing more than a theoretical organization. It lacks the staff officers, means of communication, combat support, and combat service support that could provide the zone commander the capacity to exercise effective command control over subordinate units or to decisively influence the combat area. The

detachments/battalions assigned to each military zone face the same difficulties as the zone's brigade command structure, though on a lesser scale. The assignment of rifle companies to the detachments/battalions varies from two to four based upon the insurgent threat. Approximately five out of a total of 14 military detachments have a weapons support company (81 MM mortars) and a command and service company.

(3) (C) Strategic reserve forces also operate under severe operational limitations. For example, the Quick Reaction Battalion (ATLACATL), which is the most complete and effective operational unit, lacks sufficient staff officers (about 50%) and mobility. The artillery brigade has two field artillery battalions (105 MM) and one antiaircraft artillery battalion (20 mm) but has only one command and service battery. Forced by the tactical situation and the scarcity of forces, the artillery, like the cavalry regiment, and the communications battalion, are employed as infantry units. Additionally, the engineer battalion, due to the lack of basic engineering equipment, is employed exclusively as an infantry unit resulting in a total absence of engineering support for the Armed Force. The air transport battalion consists of two airborne companies with the primary responsibility of providing security to Ilopango Air Base. Each time this unit is tactically deployed, members of the Air Force (pilots, mechanics, etc.) have to abandon their principal functions to provide base security to the detriment of air force tactical operations. The military police unit is a reinforced company that provides security to the Armed Force General Staff Headquarters. With the exception of the Quick Reaction Battalion (ATLACATL), which is completely dedicated to its mission,

strategic reserve units have been assigned responsibility for specific areas of operations to the degradation of their strategic reserve mission.

b. (U) Tactical Employment of Forces.

(1) (C) The tactical employment of the Armed Force in continuous (diurnal and nocturnal) internal defense operations is limited by several important factors, to include: the physical location of ground units; staff officer shortages; insufficient communications; lack of transportation assets; and the almost total absence of an intelligence system to effectively support combat operations. This situation is aggravated by the need to dedicate more than forty percent of available forces to physical security missions, e.g., guarding military installations, economic infrastructure and national resources. For these reasons, internal defense operations are limited to the organization and assembly of task forces confined to specific areas. This method of tactical employment only enables the Armed Force to conduct one major offensive operation at a time. In addition, single task force operations, directed and controlled by the Armed Force High Command, stifles the initiative and development of zone/detachment commanders. The majority of offensive operations presently conducted can only be realized with great effort and strain on all the branches of the Armed Force. Furthermore, these task force operations generate significant command control and logistics problems which generally limit them to a duration of not more than three days.

(2) (C) Task force operations generally require one week to plan and coordinate the combat, combat support, and combat service support elements necessary to effective execution. This factor, coupled with the limited transportation assets to move units, makes operational security difficult. With the

tactical element of surprise annulled, the insurgents have advance opportunity to withdraw most of their forces while leaving a few well trained groups at critical terrain sites to hinder the penetration of the task force into the area of operations. During the execution of blocking movements, the lack of transport to quickly deploy units restricts successful accomplishment, therefore denying the ability to close with and destroy insurgent elements. The combat support offered by artillery and Air Force capabilities is quite limited for three principle reasons: difficult terrain; the lack of adequately trained fire controllers; and large deficiencies in ground and ground-to-air communications. This results in deficient fire preparation of the objective before penetration, and ineffective support during the execution of the operation.

c. (C) The Navy and the Air Force do not have the capacity to effect nocturnal operations nor to support nocturnal operations. The Navy, due to its limited special units, is incapable of fulfilling its mission even in limited territorial waters.

d. (C) The organization of the Public Security Forces boundaries do not coincide with the present military zone boundaries. Currently, the Security Forces perform the dual mission of carrying out their own activities related to enforcing law and order among the civilian population, as well as participating in internal defense operations in areas under their jurisdiction.

e. (C) Small unit tactical operations (reconnaissance, combat patrols and ambushes) are limited to perimeter defense close to military garrisons. These restrictive operations are imposed by the lack of communications and field rations, but principally by the inability of combat support and combat service support elements (evacuation of wounded, resupply of elements in contact) to respond in a timely manner.

2. (S) Operational Planning. The planning sequence at the Armed Force General Staff includes: the General Staff/local commander analyses of the threat; prioritization of the threat based upon its intensity and the resources available to counter it; target/area selection; task force organization and designation of resources; mission statement; development of operational concept; and execution order/directive. Participants in this planning process include the task force commander, the Director of Operations (D-III) of the General Staff, and the Armed Force Chief of Staff. Generally, the Air Force, Navy, and Public Security Forces do not participate in the planning process at the Armed Force level. Their advice, counsel, and resources are sought only on an as required basis. The planning process, as presently conducted, restricts joint service collaboration and coordination, and denies brigade and battalion commanders and their staffs the advantages of and experience in the staff planning process.

3. (C) Command Control. By doctrine, the Armed Force chain of command extends from the departmental units through the military zone commands and the Armed Force Chief of Staff, to the Minister of Defense and Public Security. Combat support and combat service support commanders report directly to the Armed Force Chief of Staff and the Minister as do the Air Force and Navy commanders. In reality, command control is not characterized by an effective functioning chain, but by excessively broad span of control and unreliable communications. More than 28 separate military organizations report directly to the Armed Force Chief of Staff and the Minister. This multiplicity of parallel lines of command, compounded by a tradition of personalized leadership, no secure transmission capability, and no standardized communications security procedures, preclude effective

tive military command control. At the tactical level, battalion commanders control operations and logistics functions of their companies. During task force operations, a commander is selected, and he exercises direct control over as many as 22 companies. At the company level, the shortage of officers and NCO's results in a normal complement of only one or two officers per company. By contrast, command control in the security forces, particularly the National Guard, is characterized by decentralization and autonomy of action at detachment levels. All elements of the Armed Force violate the principles of command control and fail to properly use the chain of command. At the national level, the Ministry of Defense and Public Security labors under a personalized command structure that is ^{REFLECTED} ~~reflected~~ in an excessive span of control that denies the ability to provide proper command supervision. In the case of the security forces, the decentralization has been exaggerated to the degree that they also do not perform requisite supervision over subordinate elements.

3. (S) Communications-Electronics System. The National Telecommunications Administration (ANTEL) assigns frequencies for long range radios, while FM frequencies and call signs are assigned by unit commanders for each mission. No written Communications-Electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI) exist at unit level until operations orders are published. A three letter Operational Security Code (OPSCODE) system is published, but is changed only when known to be compromised. Secure communications transmission capabilities are almost nonexistent. Departmental units, due to limited range of organic radios and non-standardized CEOI's, cannot laterally communicate by radio without prior personal or telephone coordination. Ground forces cannot communicate directly with air support elements except with the UH-1H helicopters. Telephone and

teletype systems, which are routed through ANTEL, are the primary means of lateral and vertical communications for the military and security forces.

5. (U) Tactical Operations.

a. (U) Army.

(1) (S) General Capability. Due to the fact that battalions can seldom mount an operation with more than one company, a task force is organized, under the direction of the Armed Force General Staff, to conduct larger scale operations. The task force generally is built upon the organic units of the commander responsible for the area of operations. The organic units are augmented as necessary by company elements of the Quick Reaction Battalion or companies from other battalions throughout the country which are not committed and can be spared. Thus, a task force normally consists a grouping of four to 17 separate rifle companies with one or two artillery batteries (105mm howitzer) in support. Command control lines extend directly from the task force commander to each separate company. This broad span of control is exacerbated further by the absence of a functioning task force staff and ineffective unit chain of command.

(2) (S) Combat Support and Service Support. Because the primary emphasis is on infantry operations, there is little appreciation for combined arms/joint operations. Air assets are employed in a preparatory role to soften suspected enemy targets and artillery support is generally limited to employment against fortified or hardened positions. Vehicles remain the primary means of troop movement and support. Task force units are transported by truck to the area of operations and then conduct further movement on foot. Task force units must also provide their own support. This produces long and vulnerable

logistics lines and frequent supply shortages. The Air Force UH-1H helicopters complement ground mobility by providing a limited capability for troop lift, medical evacuation, and resupply on an emergency basis.

b. (U) Air Force.

(1) (S) General Capability (See Inclosure 5). The Salvadoran Air Force (FAS) is a fair weather/daylight Air Force that is capable of performing only limited close air support, visual reconnaissance, visual intercept, and daylight airmobile missions. The FAS, within the past several months, has established pilot/aircraft alert procedures, and an aircraft request system. Nonetheless, FAS air operations continue to lack responsiveness and pre-planning. This factor is primarily a result of the field commanders' tendency to circumvent the established air request system. Field commanders generally communicate their requests for air support directly to the FAS by telephone rather than submitting them to the D-III General Staff for approval and prioritization. Consequently, no command control of air operations exists, and every support request becomes an immediate mission.

(2) (S) Close Air Support. Close air support is characterized by visual target acquisition, undirected target engagement at extensive distances from ground tactical forces, and limited ordnance delivery. These limitations result from several factors.

(a) (S) There is an absence of air to ground communications. The air to ground communications capability is limited to the frequency modulated (FM) radios in the UH-1H helicopter, however, the helicopter is seldom, if ever, employed in an air to ground mode due to nonstandardized CEOI's.

(b) (C) The FAS does not possess forward air control procedures, skills, and equipment. This makes close air support ineffective, uncertain, and potentially dangerous.

(c) (C) The Ouragan aircraft used for close air support are Korean War vintage with antiquated bombing systems, and limited lift capacity. Each sortie is only capable of delivering two 500 pound bombs.

(3) (C) Reconnaissance. The FAS can launch both day and night visual reconnaissance sorties. However, effectiveness is limited by the absence of radar, navigational aids, air to ground communications, and night illumination capability.

(4) (C) Interception. Air interception is virtually non-existent. There is no early detection network. Intelligence information on ingressing aircraft generally arrives after the fact. There ^{ARE} ~~is~~ no ground control intercept radar, radar-equipped aircraft, or precision approach facilities.

(5) (S) Support of Operations. The FAS' ability to keep its current inventory of fixed and rotary wing aircraft at an acceptable operational rate is built upon a weak base. The various types of aircraft from different national and manufacture sources; the generally old age of fixed wing aircraft; irregular availability of spare parts due to poor forecasting procedures and long lead times, and insufficient numbers and skills of maintenance personnel, especially UH-1H intermediate level maintenance, are factors which make maintenance reliability and self-sufficiency a long-term process. Added to these factors is the shortage of pilots. Currently, the FAS only has 43 qualified pilots for an inventory of 84 aircraft. The shortage of qualified UH-1H helicopter pilots is

(b)1

c. Navy.

(1) (S) General Capability

(b)1

(b)1

(2) (S) Intelligence Capability.

(b)1

(b)1

(3) (S) Operations Capability. The Navy concentrates its ineffective surveillance efforts primarily in the Gulf of Fonseca and the southeast coastal area, while El Salvador's southern sea flank remains totally exposed to infiltration. Coastal surveillance is limited to the periodic deployment of a single patrol boat which traverses the Salvadoran coast from the naval base at La Union to the port of Acajutla. Surveillance in the Gulf of Fonseca and outer approaches is accomplished by a single patrol boat which remains underway for a period of three to four days. Relief occurs in port, not on station. During this time interval, which can vary from hours to days, there is a complete absence of surveillance in the Gulf area and its approaches. Surveillance efforts are further restricted by the constant problem of inoperative patrol boat radars, nonavailability of funds to support fuel requirements, and a lack of command interest in, and appreciation for maintenance.

6. (S) Programs Essential to Internal Defense. Successful internal defense is tied to the ability of the Armed Force to implement and sustain effective interdiction, population and resource control, community relations, and civic action programs.

a. (C) Interdiction. The Armed Force does not have the capability to slow or impede the infiltration of arms, personnel, and materiel across international boundaries and within the national territory.

(1) (S) Land. The Army, short of forces, mobility, communications, and intelligence, does not control the national borders. Although the Armed Force has units posted at border exit/entry points and throughout the country, they are not effective at stopping the internal movement of insurgent arms, personnel, and materiel.

(2) (S) Air. The problem of air interdiction is a part of the larger problem of detection, reporting, and intercept. At present, none of these capabilities exist in the FAS. The development of these capabilities would require radar, communications-electronics equipment, and possibly intercept aircraft. Since the FAS currently could not support these more advanced or sophisticated systems, its maintenance infrastructure and training base would have to be developed prior to acquisition. The FAS' interdiction efforts, therefore, are almost non-existent with the exception of periodic air patrols that conduct visual reconnaissance of the border and coastal areas. This effort, however, is limited by the inability of the pilot to communicate directly with ground units.

(3) (S) Sea. The Navy's interdiction capability is a function of intelligence, maintenance, fuel, patrol boat assets, and leadership. The Navy is deficient in all of these areas. To attain an effective sea interdiction capability, it must continue in earnest the efforts initiated by the US Navy patrol boat mobile training teams; increase operational readiness through improved patrol boat maintenance and employment; seek the phased acquisition of additional patrol boats and smaller high speed craft; and improve its leadership.

b. (C) Population and Resource Control. Population and resource control efforts are limited to the cursory screening of displaced persons. The lack of an organized program, and the absence of effective civic action and community relations, ^{HAVE} ~~they~~ resulted in the Armed Force being unable to deny the population and its resources to the insurgents.

c. (C) Public Information/Community Relations. There is no coordinated program in the Armed Force to communicate with the public. Its limited

ability to use and exploit information opportunities to its advantage and the disadvantage of the insurgents was clearly reflected in the insurgents' destruction of the key Lempa River bridge, the Puente de Oro. This incident, which impacted directly on the economic and psychological well being of the populace, was not exploited by the Government. As a consequence, the public did not condemn the insurgents for destroying the bridge but, instead, condemned the Armed Force for not protecting the bridge. .

d. (U) Civic Action. There is no national level civic action program. Presently, civic action activities and their effectiveness are primarily a function of the interest of local commanders which is quite minimal, if not zero.

ARMED FORCE CASUALTIES

1. (C) General. The insurgents' strategy of armed revolution has three basic objectives: destruction of the economic infrastructure; disruption and ¹⁰⁶disruption of the electoral process; and attrition and demoralization of the Armed Force. To achieve the latter objective, the insurgents have sought to maintain the tactical initiative in order to inflict the maximum number of casualties on the Armed Force while minimizing its own casualties. Insurgent tactics have relied heavily on surprise and economy of force measures. The ambush and the mine or boobytrap have become the primary producers of Armed Force casualties. The personal experiences of unit commanders and military surgeons affirm this fact in their estimate that 75% of all casualties are a result of ambushes (primarily vehicular), and mines or boobytraps. Of the remaining casualties, most are produced by precision fire from concealed positions. The success of the insurgents' methods are clearly reflected in the significantly high percentage (6.7% killed and wounded) of casualties incurred by the Armed Force during the first nine months of the year. Nonetheless, despite the success of their methods, the insurgents have, to date, failed to demoralize the Armed Force.

2. (U) Summary of Casualties.

a. (S)

ARMED FORCE CASUALTIES

(1 JAN 81 - 5 OCT 81)

	OFFICER	TROOPS	TOTAL
KILLED IN ACTION (KIA)	10	438	448
WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)	29	1,006	1,035
TOTAL	39	1,444	1,483

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b. (S)

CASUALTIES BY MILITARY SERVICE
(1 JAN 81 - 5 OCT 81)

	ASSIGNED COMBATANTS	KIA/WIA	% OF FORCE
ARMY	12,886	1,093	8.5
AIR FORCE	385	24	6.2
NAVY	278	3	0.1
TOTAL	13,549	1,120	8.3

c. (S)

CASUALTIES BY SECURITY FORCE
(1 JAN 81 - 5 OCT 81)

	ASSIGNED COMBATANTS	KIA/WIA	% OF FORCE
NATIONAL GUARD	3,583	258	7.2
NATIONAL POLICE	3,375	39	1.1
TREASURY POLICE	1,689	66	3.9
TOTAL	8,647	363	4.2

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d. (S)

COMPARISON OF CASUALTIES
MILITARY SERVICES AND SECURITY FORCES
(1 JAN 81 - 5 OCT 81)

	ASSIGNED COMBATANTS	KIA/WIA	% OF FORCE
MILITARY SERVICES	13,549	1,120	8.3
SECURITY FORCES	8,647	363	4.2
TOTAL	22,196	1,483	6.7

3. (U) Analysis of Casualties.

a. (S) The Army, as the largest and most committed force, has incurred the highest percentage of casualties (8.5%) within the Armed Force. Of the Army's eighteen brigade/battalion size organizations, almost 40% (7) have received combat casualties in excess of 10% during the period 1 January 1981 to 5 October 1981. The Armed Force Engineer ^{TRAINING} ~~Construction~~ Center incurred the highest percentage (17.7%) of any brigade/battalion size organization. This high rate is attributed to two factors: the Center has discontinued its engineer training function and is now organized to fight as infantry; the Center is located in La Paz Department, which being relatively free of insurgent activity, permits the companies to participate regularly in major task force operations. Similarly, the Quick Reaction Battalion's high casualty rate of 13.7% is also reflective of its frequent commitment to major task force operations. Comparison of other organizations reflect a direct correlation between Army casualties and the areas of heaviest insurgent concentration and activity as indicated.

(1) Commando Center Battalion located in Morazan Department: 13.9% casualties.

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- ✓ (2) Detachment 4 located in Usulután Department: 13.0% casualties.
- ✓ (3) Fifth brigade located in San Vicente Department: 11.9% casualties.
- (4) Detachment 2 located in Cabanas Department: 10.7% casualties.
- ✓ (5) Detachment 1 located in Chalatenango Department: 10.5% casualties.

b. (S) The National Guard incurred a significantly higher number of casualties (219) than the National Police. This can be attributed to the focus of the insurgent threat which, since January 1981, has shifted from urban to rural areas of the country. In this regard, the National Guard is primarily deployed in rural areas, whereas the National Police personnel generally operate in urban areas.

CURRENT COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS SITUATION

1. (C) General. The Armed Force communications system is a collage of variegated communications-electronics equipment and transmission modes. Each component of the Armed Force has unique communications requirements and problems. However, five basic problems permeate the entire communication-electronics system of the Armed Force: shortage of communications equipment; lack of compatibility and standardization of equipment; age of equipment; absence of the right equipment for the job; and lack of standardized communications-electronics operating instructions (CEOI). (See detailed current communications-electronics situation at Inclosure 7).

2. (C) National Level Communications. The national communications network links the Joint Operations Center of the Armed Force with major subordinate commands via telephone, teletype and radio. This, however, only affords a nominal command control communications system due to its unreliability, vulnerability and limited coverage.

3. (C) Army. The Army's primary means of communication is very high frequency (VHF/frequency) modulated (FM) radios. Current operating requirements highlight the need for additional radios and greater transmission range.

4. Air Force. The Air Force operates with a wide assortment of avionics radio equipment. The incompatibility between aircraft and ground radios has presented two major command control communications problems; the inability to operate an effective air-to-ground communications system; and an ineffective close air support system.

5. (C) Navy. The Navy uses the Collins, KWM-2, radio for internal command control communications. This long range radio links the Navy headquarters, based in San Salvador, with its patrol boat base and three coastal ports. Materiel readiness of these radios is difficult to sustain due to the non-availability of repair parts and the unresponsive repair/supply system. The Navy's patrol boats have a ship to shore and air-to-ground communications capability through the use of the ultra high frequency (UHF) radio, PRC-41, and the VHF radio, AN/PRC-77, respectively.

6. (C) Public Security Forces. The Public Security Forces, headquartered in San Salvador, have command control communications requirements throughout the country. The primary means for meeting this long range command control requirement is the commercial telephone system, Motorola handie-talkies, and base station console radios. There is a general shortage of radios to support the various outposts, and responsive communications for vehicular police patrols in San Salvador are limited to only 30 patrol cars. Coordination problems are common between security forces components due to non-compatibility of radios.

7. (U) Recommendations. Deficiencies in the Armed Force communications-electronics network can be reconciled through a well managed program of standardization of equipment and operating procedures, enhanced equipment allocations, and training in communications security. (See Communications-electronic requirements at Inclosure 8).

a. (C) Tactical unit communications-electronics equipment allocations must take into account the type of tactical operations, increased radio requirements generated by communications support of outposts and static defensive positions,

and the mountainous terrain. Therefore, force planning should include additional AN/PRC-77 radios, RC-292 antennas, and retransmission cables for battalion and brigade headquarters. Additionally, the brigade should have a long range radio capability for special purpose command control requirements, such as a manpack high frequency radio (AN/PRC-74 or AN/PRC-70).

b. (C) The Air Force has two options to obtain optimum air-to-ground communications, but both are long term solutions to an immediate problem. Close air support aircraft consoles should be upgraded to a radio set compatible to the AN/PRC-77 or replacement of current aircraft inventory with aircraft having air-to-ground communications compatibility. In the interim, innovative measures to alleviate the lack of air-to-ground communications will be required.

c. (U) Public Security Forces. Security forces radio allocations should be tailored to their organizational structure. The Motorola radio should receive priority consideration in order to maintain standardization and compatibility within the current system.

d. (U) The national radio system must be upgraded with reliable, logistically supportable, long range radios.

e. (U) Communications procedures must be formalized by a standardized CEOI.

CURRENT TRAINING SITUATION

1. (C) General. Concurrent with the advent of insurgent warfare, the Armed Force High Command made the decision to direct its human resources to daily exigencies rather than to invest them in training for requisite long-term operational effectiveness. This decision resulted in the suspension of most formal training programs and the relegation of training, in practice, to secondary importance. The degradation of the training base and the concomitant dissolution of skilled training cadres, when juxtaposed with the requirements for force expansion and development in an environment of insurgent warfare, represent significant inhibitors to the effective implementation of the El Salvador National Military Strategy.

2. (U) Current Training Situation.

a.(C) Training Management. Training management is centralized at the Department of Operations, (D-III), Armed Force General Staff. Execution is decentralized. General Staff training directives publish general guidance for the preparation and conduct of all training. Implementation training programs are submitted to the D-III for review and approval. Where required, special training courses for the Armed Force are tasked to selected units for implementation. This system is administratively excellent. However, training effectiveness is impeded by a lack of supervision, evaluation, and appreciation for the fact that ultimate effectiveness depends upon command emphasis at the service and unit level.

b. (C) Recruit Training. The training of recruits is, at present,

decentralized to the National Guard, National Police, Treasury Police, Air Force, Navy, and major Army units. An Armed Force General Staff Training Directive, dated 9 March 1981, provides basic standard requirements for the conduct of recruit training. The National Guard, National Police, and Treasury Police conduct four to six months of basic training for aspirants (approximately 80% have had previous military service). This training is centralized by each force and is characterized by relatively high standards of performance and uniform training objectives. Graduates are well disciplined, highly indoctrinated, and capable of participating in combat operations against the insurgents or performing their more traditional missions. Air Force recruit training is also centralized and relatively well well conducted. No formal Navy recruit training is conducted. The majority of Navy recruits participate in informal on-the-job training or are received from the Army after attending Army recruit training. Recruit training in the Army is conducted on a decentralized basis at the battalion and brigade level. Disparities in command interest, trainer skills, and operational requirements, have resulted in marked differences among units in the training scope, quality, and standards. Constant training disruptions result in unsatisfactory and incomplete training programs. Thus, the sending of ill-trained recruits into combat is a norm. Although a centralized recruit training center would be a marked improvement over the existing decentralized mode, the Armed Force General Staff does not favor it at this time, due to security considerations and the desire to recruit and assign personnel close to their home. Nevertheless, the General Staff is considering a centralized Combat Training Center where newly formed battalions would conduct recruit and unit training.

- ✓ c. (C) Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Training. The training of the Classes (NCO's) is similarly decentralized in the manner of recruit training. This training is accomplished through the selection of soldiers of demonstrated ability, who meet time in service requirements, to attend promotion courses to satisfy unit/service needs. Courses are designed to prepare the soldier for the duties of the next grade - corporal, fire team leader; sub-sergeant, squad leader and platoon sergeant; sergeant, first sergeant. Equivalent promotion training exists in all branches/specialties of the Armed Force. A soldier attending the promotion course, who passes the final examination, is promoted. As with recruit training, the scope, quality, and standards differ markedly among the services. The training of NCO's is least effective in the Army, because the exigencies of the insurgency often disrupt training, resulting in modified, reduced, or even no formal training prior to promotion. Small unit leadership in the Army, therefore, tends to be weak. There exists a dire need for the development of a professional NCO corps. Professional development beyond attendance at promotion courses is
- ✓ essential to the improvement of leader and unit effectiveness. Nonetheless, deve^l_l
- ✓ lopment of a professional NCO corps counters the traditional leadership attitudes, institutional norms, and operational procedures of the Armed Force.

d. (G) Officer Production. The shortage of officers, particularly at the lieutenant level, is one of the critical deficiencies which restrict expansion of the Armed Force, and it impacts upon all phases of the strategy. How to solve this problem has become the focus of study and discussion within the Armed Force General Staff. It is an article of faith that good officers can only be created at the Military School, therefore, it remains the traditional avenue for entry into the officer corps. Thus, expansion of the school's officer production capability

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has been, and continues to be, the primary and most obvious solution to reducing the shortage of officers. Prior to 1981, new cadet enrollment was 100 with an annual production of 25-50 officers per class year. Annual production has been ✓ increased in 1981, by eliminating many academic, non_military subjects and acce ✓ terating graduation. Eighty-five ^{SECOND} ~~(SUB)~~ lieutenants were graduated in August 1981, and seventy more are scheduled to graduate with 2 1/2 years training in February 1982. Additional output will be generated by enlarged class enrollments. In October 1981, 450 cadets were selected for admission from more than 1,000 applicants. Upon graduation, most cadets are commissioned into the Army. Cadets to be commissioned in the Air Force and Navy are selected and receive service specific training prior to graduation. Five Navy ensigns (members of class graduated in August 1981), are undergoing training in the US which includes the US Coast Guard Officer Candidate School, while eighteen second lieutenants, of the same class, are undergoing pilot training with the Salvadoran Air Force. Increased cadet enrollment, accelerated cadet graduation, and the suspension of additional branch training prior to assuming duties will help reduce numerical shortfalls at company grade levels. However, the current critical shortage of officers and the projected expansion of the Armed Force will require the development of alternative, more timely officer production sources. Although resistance to other than Military School officer production remains high, the Armed Force High Command is seriously considering the following alternatives:

(1) . (C) Continuation of the Army's Sergeants Course. Sergeants who meet certain prerequisites (to include four years in grade as sergeant) are admitted and, having successfully completed the 6 month course, are commissioned as

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✓ second lieutenants. In 1981, the Armed Force ~~Center of Studies~~ (CEFA) developed and supervised the implementation of the Sergeants Course by the Quick Reaction Battalion and by each of the Public Security Forces. Approximately 30 officers will be commissioned into the Army from this source. Public Security Force candidates of the National Police and Treasury Police will be graduated as professional police officers with assignments limited to their respective force. Officer candidate graduates of the National Guard, in theory, are members of ✓ the Army, but in practice, they are not generally assigned outside the National Guard. Though the Army's Sergeants Course offers precedence for NCO entry to the officer corps, graduates have never been fully accepted by the corporate body of the officer corps.

✓ (2) (C) Recall of Reserve ^{or} and Retired Officers. The records of 85 reserve and 46 retired officers will be reviewed, and those who have good records and talent will be recalled to active duty. Many of these officers will be assigned positions related to training. Several Public Security Forces officers also fit into this category.

(3) (C) Selective recall of active duty officers who were put in suspended service after the 15 October 1979 coup. The Armed Force General Staff has stated that several of these officers are brilliant and could make a significant contribution.

(4) (C) Call-up of civilian personnel who possess particular skills in short supply. They would be given a minimum of military training and then incorporated into the Armed Force. This process might also be utilized for university students who possess needed skills in technical areas. Personnel such

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as civilian pilots, doctors, dentists, and specialists or technicians of various types would be considered.

(5) (C) Selective Recall of Ex-cadets. Approximately 50 cadets who were released from the Military School for minor infractions will be considered for recall. After additional instruction, these individuals would be incorporated as a special class of officer. While many of these may not be suitable, the D-I believes that some can be effectively utilized.

(6) (C) Formation of an officer candidate battalion of young men motivated for, but not admitted to the Military School. This battalion would consist of four companies of 160 men each. Active duty officers would fill the commander, executive, staff and company (two per company) officer positions. The concept envisages sending the battalion to a special infantry officer candidate course in the US in order to produce as rapidly as possible (within six months) the platoon leaders required.

e. (C) Officer Professional Development. Due to the insurgency, the Armed Force ^{EDUCATION CENTER} ~~(Center of Education)~~ (CEFA) courses were suspended in 1980, and the faculty reduced from approximately 25 to 4 members. CEFA had been charged with the responsibility for the professional development of officers of the Armed Force. The Center included a basic infantry officer course, an advance infantry officer course for captains, ~~(majors and lieutenant colonels)~~ and a two year command and general staff course. The Center's facilities are now occupied by the offices of the Ministry of Defense and Public Security (MOD), which moved from downtown San Salvador in the search for a more secure location.

f. (U) Specialized Training.

✓ (1) (C) The Armed Force Engineer ^{TRAINING}~~Instruction~~ Center (CIIFA). CIIFA suspended classes in 1979 and was reorganized into an infantry battalion. Previously, CIIFA had presented specialized engineer training to enlisted personnel. The termination of all engineer instruction has denied the Armed Force

✓ essential combat engineer support, restricted plans to organize new engineer units, and adversely affected development of civic action programs and their implementation.

✓ (2) (C) The Armed Force Signal ^{TRAINING}~~Instruction~~ Center (CITFA). CITFA conducts a basic radio repair course and on-the-job communications training, as required. Communications-electronics maintenance is provided to the Armed Force. Nevertheless, communications-electronics skill development and maintenance training have suffered. Efforts to improve communications-electronics maintenance have focused on upgrading the Center's capability to forecast, stock, and control repair parts and to institute repair procedures.

✓ (3) (C) The Armed Force Commando ^{TRAINING}~~Instruction~~ Center (CICFA). The center's training was suspended in order to allow its resources to become the nucleus of an infantry battalion. The suspension of commando training has, however, contributed to denying the Armed Force the development of small unit

✓ leadership, tactics and ^{INTERNAL DEFENSE}~~counterinsurgency~~ skills requisite to the ~~military~~ defeat

✓ of ^{THE}~~an~~ insurgency.

(4) (C) Intelligence School. The establishment in October 1981, of an Intelligence School represents a first step toward providing effective intelligence-training for the Armed Force and toward filling the existing tactical intelligence void. The school will train a nucleus of instructors to present

courses on a recurring basis for the purpose of improving tactical intelligence skills and professionalizing military intelligence within the Armed Force.

- ✓ g. (C) Air Force. The School Squadron of the Air Force provides limited training to meet its operational needs. It conducts an annual pilot training course for approximately 20 Military School cadets, transition pilot training as required, and maintenance training for the Ouragan, Ralleye, Fougamagister, and Arava airplanes and the Lama helicopter. Other courses include airborne training, industrial security, jet engine mechanic, [Shafrir missile,] air defense artillery, basic supply, and general aircraft maintenance training.

Nevertheless, the diversity of aircraft and the introduction of the UH-1H helicopters have required the Air Force to seek out-of-country training at the Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA) in Panama and UH-1H helicopter pilot training in the US. Though this has helped, the shortage of pilots and the weak maintenance base would require at least a year of aircraft specific training prior to introduction of a new aircraft system.

h. (C) Navy. The Navy has no formal training capability. Previously, the Merchant Marine Academy of El Salvador (National Institute of Fisheries) provided training in navigation, electricity, and engine maintenance to Navy personnel. However, security considerations forced suspension of this training. Informal on-the-job training constitutes the only training capability of the Navy. This capability has and will continue to be augmented with US mobile training teams, attendance at the US Navy Small Craft Instruction and Technical Team School (SCiATT) in Panama, and officer professional development training in the US. Nevertheless, there is a requirement to establish an in-country Navy

training base to meet specific training needs such as maintenance of radar, communications-electronics, hull, navigation, electrical, armament systems, supply procedures, and advanced patrol boat operations. Reestablishment of the training relationship with the Merchant Marine Academy would be an important step in this direction.

1. (C) Unit Tactical Training. Unit tactical training is non-existent.

Although Armed Force General Staff training directives include this requirement, ✓ the security situation in most parts of the country and limited training resources ✓ ~~ces~~ preclude effective unit training. Combat operations and experience gained ✓ under hostile fire represent the primary means for developing and sustaining unit effectiveness. Navy and Air Force unit tactical training is limited to on-the-job training during participation in combat or routine operational missions.

j. (C) Combat Service Support Training. Training throughout the combat service support system is characterized by informal on-the-job training concentrated primarily at the Armed Force ^{ORDNANCE DEPOT} ~~(Centralized Maintenance Facility)~~ (Maestranza) and the Military Hospital in San Salvador.

✓ k. (C) Third Country Training. Though professional development training outside of El Salvador has decreased, various programs continue and are expanding. Inclosure 9 reviews current training support by third countries. Thirty-one Salvadoran officers, cadets, and enlisted men are receiving training outside of El Salvador.

1. (U) Security Assistance Training.

(1) (C) Security Assistance training provided by the US to El Salvador during FY81 has included professional and skill development training at the

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Panama Canal Area Military Schools (PACAMs) (See Inclosure 10). Training conducted at the US Army School of the Americas (USARSA) has concentrated on the professional development of junior officers and non-commissioned officers, small unit tactics, and leadership. Training at SCIATT and IAAFA has focused on the technical training associated with the operation and maintenance of small boats and fixed and rotary wing aircraft, respectively. Training in the US has included UH-1H helicopter instructor pilot and maintenance test pilot training as well as officer production and officer professional development (See Inclosure 11) Twenty-one mobile training teams (MTTs) and two technical assistance field teams (TAFTs) have provided in-country training in such areas as command control, intelligence, small unit skills/tactics, aircraft and small boat maintenance, and combat support (See Inclosure 12).

(2) (C) An assessment of the MTT impact on Salvadoran internal defense capabilities clearly demonstrates that we have barely begun to scratch the surface. To date, the greatest training effort with greatest impact has been concentrated in the functional areas of combat support at the Armed Force level and maintenance operations in support of the 14 UH-1H helicopters provided by the US. The other functional training requirements of tactical proficiency, command control, combat support below Armed Force level, maintenance other than the ✓ UH-1H helicopter, leadership, and intelligence have been addressed only in rudimentary form and to a limited number of military personnel. There is much more to be done. Time, careful planning, and deliberate execution will be essential to building upon the weak training foundation established by our past and present training assistance efforts. Analyses of these functional training

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requirements follow.

(a) (C) The most significant accomplishment has been the establishment of the Joint Operations Center of the Armed Force and the training of its personnel. However, the effectiveness of the Joint Operations Center is constrained by the weaknesses of the military zone tactical operations centers (TOC). These weaknesses include: inability to institutionalize standard operating procedures due to personnel shortages, turbulence, and inexperience; inadequate skill development due to the secondary priority given to training; inadequate material and equipment to effectively carry out TOC tasks; and an obsolete, politically oriented command control structure built upon direct lines of authority and communications between individual field commanders and the Minister of Defense and Public Security rather than a functioning chain of command. Consequently, the military zone TOCs are neither decision centers nor centers capable of executing decisions effectively.

(b) (C) Good progress appears to have been made in training related to the organization and operation of FM ground tactical communications nets. Training weaknesses still exist, though, in the areas of communications-electronics maintenance and air-to-ground communications. To correct maintenance deficiencies, initial training efforts have focused on upgrading the ✓ Armed Force Signal ^{TRAINING}~~Instruction~~ Center's (CITFA) capability to forecast, stock and control repair parts, and to institute maintenance management procedures. ✓ Air-to-ground communications have not advanced beyond the stage of developing an FM air-to-ground communications concept plan. These communications shortfalls hopefully will be reduced via the technical expertise and continuity afforded by

the Logistics and Maintenance Support TAFT and the Logistics, Maintenance and Communications MTT due to arrive in November 1981.

(c) (C) The infantry company is the Salvadoran Army's basic maneuver element. In view of this fact, and a heretofore absence of training in fire and movement, fire and maneuver, fire support coordination, movement to contact, and squad/platoon combat formations, the focus of US training has been on small unit tactics and small unit skills development. Although this training has contributed to improving the tactical proficiency of ground tactical units, it has reached only approximately 16 of 57 rifle companies with the priority of effort being given to the companies of the Quick Reaction Battalion. Personnel losses, personnel turbulence, incomplete and ineffective unit chains-of-command, and the absence of a cadre base will diminish significantly the impact of this training if it is not reinforced. The development of a cadre base that is capable of establishing and operating a combat training center, offers the best hope for insuring long-term impact. "Sweep" operations by ad hoc task forces consisting of separate rifle companies, superimposed with a loose command control structure, point up the need for future training in task force organization, operations, and support. Training in airmobile operations and the tactical employment of helicopters is also required. In regard to air and navy forces, tactical operations training has been considered but not acted upon to date by the Armed Force High Command.

(d) (C) Weapons training has been limited to assembly/disassembly, individual care, and familiarization of individual soldiers in the use of the M-16 rifle, M-79 grenade launcher, M-60 machine gun, and 90mm recoilless rifle.

Training in organizational and direct support weapons maintenance is lacking in all services. Associated training in the storage, handling, classification, and maintenance of munitions has been and continues to be an area that needs assistance.

(e) (C) There has been no training in tactical psychological operations (PSYOPS). This represents an area where Third Country support by a Latin American ally could be effectively utilized.

(f) (C) In September 1980, an Information and Public Relations MTT Survey was conducted. The survey conclusion that "There is no coordinated communications program either in government organizations or in the Armed Forces" is still valid today.

(g) (C) Civic action training has not been conducted. There is no centralized coordinating body for this function. Nevertheless, local commanders on their own initiative are conducting limited civic action. It represents a fertile area for US training assistance.

(h) (C) Helicopter pilot training has been oriented on the effective and safe operations of the UH-1H helicopters. The scope and depth of this emphasis should provide a positive long term impact on future UH-1H helicopter operations. With only two fully qualified instructor pilots, the FAS presently has a limited UH-1H pilot training capability; but through continued US MTT/TAFT support, the Air Force should be self sufficient in UH-1H helicopter training and operations by 1983. Nevertheless, the current UH-1H helicopter pilot base of 15 must be expanded by 13 more pilots in order to provide each UH-1H helicopter with a pilot and co-pilot. The Standardization Instructor Pilot and

Technical Inspection TAFT, in conjunction with Salvadoran instructor pilots, is conducting UH-1H transition training for three pilots qualified on the Hughes 500 helicopter. Continuation of this transition training, which requires three to five months to complete, depending on UH-1H availability and operational requirements, should produce six to eight additional qualified UH-1H helicopter pilots during 1982. Additionally, three to seven UH-1H helicopter pilots are scheduled to receive UH-1H pilot training in the US during FY82.

(i) (C) Ground mobility unquestionably has been relegated a lower priority due to the Salvadoran need for and emphasis on, airmobility. Consequently, the priority of maintenance training has been directed almost totally to the UH-1H helicopter. Although the helicopter maintenance MTT established a strong organizational maintenance base, remaining weaknesses in intermediate maintenance indicates a need for continued US assistance in the short to mid-term time frame. The UH-1H Standardization Instructor Pilot and Technical Inspector TAFT and follow-on UH-1H maintenance TAFTs and MTTs should sustain this base and nurture its long term development, provided additional UH-1H helicopters are not phased in too rapidly. Regarding the Navy, the three small boat maintenance MTTs have improved the individual maintenance skills of Salvadoran naval personnel. However, the MTTs have had little impact on the Navy leadership's attitude toward maintenance.

(j) (C) The focus of the US combat service support training effort has been on improving material readiness reporting, inventory control, and standard operating procedures at the Armed Force ^{ORDNANCE DEPOT} ~~(Centralized Maintenance Facility)~~ (Maestranza). These initial efforts have witnessed progress which should be

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sustained and improved upon by the one year Logistics and Maintenance Support TAFT. The training of logistics personnel at the brigade, battalion, and company levels remains virgin ground for the Logistics, Maintenance and Communications MTT due in-country in November 1981. The Small Unit Training MTTs initiated training to improve base sanitation, individual first aid, and field medic capabilities. The success of this training is measured not only in the number of personnel trained, but also in demonstrating to the Armed Force General Staff and commanders that combat effectiveness is a function of soldier health and medical care. Presently, the Armed Force is conducting a medic training program assisted by a medical MTT. This program will produce a trained medic cadre to extend field medical training to each company size unit.

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CURRENT LOGISTICAL SITUATION

1. (S) General. The current logistics capabilities of the Armed Force are primarily vested in a logistics support base consolidated at the national level with command control centralized at the Armed Force General Staff. As a consequence, logistics support ^{PA}capabilities below national level are primarily a function of the local commander's interest, knowledge, and emphasis. In some instances, unit ^{PA}capabilities are augmented with civilians, whereas in other instances unit capabilities are virtually non-existent. Logistics support is attached to units, as required, to support operations. The centralization of logistics functions and attendant limitations are compounded further by the present non-availability of sufficient service support units. The ability to logistically sustain operations beyond short term, single battalion sized operations has not been demonstrated.

2. (U) Logistics Support Base.

✓ a. (U) ^{EU}Support Facilities. The national level support base includes the Ordnance Center, Signal Instruction Center, Health Services Center, and the Quartermaster, War Materiel, and Subsistence Depots. The physical plants of these facilities are considered to be adequate to support current requirements. Minor upgrade will be required, however, to keep pace with force development requirements. Facilities at brigade level and lower, range from generally adequate to completely inadequate.

b. (C) Training. The focus of the US training effort has been on improving materiel readiness reporting, inventory control, and standard operating procedures at the Armed Force logistics centers and depots. These initial efforts

- ~~[efforts]~~ have witnessed good progress which should be sustained and improved by the one-year Logistics and Maintenance Support Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT). The training of logistics personnel at the brigade, battalion, and company levels remains basically virgin ground. Continued efforts will have to be directed toward developing the logistics skill base and supporting systems at these levels. The Air Force and the Navy also suffer from a lack of trained logistics personnel. In the Air Force, priority of maintenance training has been directed to supporting the UH-1H helicopter. The UH-1H Helicopter Standardization and Technical Inspection TAFT and several planned follow-on MTT's will help to sustain this base and to assist in its long term development. Two Small Boat Maintenance MTT's have provided the Navy with a base upon which to build. However, much remains to be done in the area of electronics/radar repair training.

3. (U) Logistics Policies/Procedures.

a. (C) There is no known policy for the substitution of major end items or components. In lieu of policy, the common practice is to repair or place into service a major end item anyway that it can, to include cannibalization of equipment and vehicles.

b. (C) Cannibalization is performed at various levels of command without any established control procedures. This factor precludes effective management of repair parts from cannibalized equipment and vehicles. An important step for attaining effective control over cannibalization which has been recommended to ✓ the Department of Logistics (D-IV), Armed Force General Staff, would be the establishment of a centralized cannibalization point.

c. (C) There are no established procedures for the classification and disposal of unserviceable equipment. Disposal of equipment requires the approval of the Accountability Section, Ministry of Defense and Public Security, and the Accounting Court, Ministry of Treasury. This is a slow and cumbersome process.

- ✓ d. ^c(U) Brigade and separate detachment commanders have authority for local procurement within the constraints of their respective operating budgets.
- ✓ Procurement needs beyond their capacity are forwarded to the D-IV. The D-IV requests to the Finance Department, Ministry of Defense and Public Security which initiates the procurement action. This system appears to work; but it is inefficient in terms of time and the lack of procurement expertise at all
- ✓ levels. The local procurement function should be at the D-IV level where the procurement expertise should be vested.

4. (U) Assessment of Specific Logistics Capabilities.

a. (U) General Maintenance

(1) (C) No controls currently exist within the Armed Force regarding authorized levels and echelons of repair. Unsupervised maintenance and uncontrolled cannibalization are common place. The Ordnance Center has the capability to perform all levels of maintenance, to include depot level. Efforts have been initiated by the Logistics and Maintenance Support TAFT to assist the Armed Force in defining and designating authorized levels for direct and general support maintenance.

(2) (C) The Ordnance Center has the capability to perform major component replacement. The problem, however, is the non-availability of major components. A major end item is usually deadlined until a major component can be

✓ repaired.

✓ (3) (C) Limited direct exchange programs have been initiated at the Ordnance and Signal ^{TRAINING} ~~Instruction~~ Centers with the arrival of the Logistics and Maintenance Support TAFT. Non-availability of repair parts, however, precludes extending these programs. The non-standardization of equipment also makes it difficult to maintain adequate stockage levels for repair parts.

(4) (C) Other than aviation equipment, there is no evidence of any preventive maintenance programs in the Armed Force. Equipment is normally operated until it fails. Except for aircraft, there exists no capability to forecast maintenance requirements. A preventive maintenance program, which has been recommended, is considered essential to the forecast of requirements and to maximum equipment serviceability.

(5) (S) At the Armed Force level, tools and test equipment are considered to be generally adequate for the density of equipment currently supported. Maintenance facilities below the Armed Force level, however, do not possess adequate tools and test equipment to accomplish proper and effective maintenance. Aviation maintenance suffers from very limited avionics test equipment and calibration capabilities. Avionics and calibration support for the UH-1H helicopter are presently being accomplished out-of-country by US Forces in Panama and in the United States. As density of equipment in the Armed Force increases, the in-country capability for tools and test equipment should be evaluated and increased accordingly.

b. (U) Communications-Electronics (C-E) Equipment Maintenance Capability.

(1) (U) The Armed Force communications-electronics test equipment on

hand is listed at Inclosure 13. The test sets for the AN/VRC-12 series and AN/PRC-77 radio sets are adequate. Additionally, the test equipment found in repair shops ^{is} ~~are~~ in generally good condition.

(2) (S) Specialized Air Force equipment, such as the avionics equipment in the UH-1H helicopter, cannot be maintained due to the non-availability of required maintenance kits and test sets. The Navy's communications-electronics equipment is maintained by the Signal ^{TRAINING} ~~Instruction~~ Center. However, no in-country capability exists for the repair of the Navy's patrol boat radars. The Signal ^{TRAINING} ~~Instruction~~ Center and the Air Force have the capability to maintain tactical, non-tactical and non-military communications-electronics equipment that is not too specialized, up to and including depot level. The Motorola microwave system used partially by the Armed Force is beyond the maintenance capability because it is very specialized and requires equipment not presently in-country. It is understood that the Armed Force General Staff is considering the organization of a special maintenance team to maintain the Motorola microwave system.

(3) (C) Previously, the requisitioning of repair parts was a significant problem due to the non-availability of technical manuals and parts catalogues. With the introduction of Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP), and establishment of document register system, an orderly repair parts supply system is being developed. Stockage levels and reorder points for repair parts are also being established.

c. (S) Transportation. The organic transportation assigned to tactical units is insufficient for commanders to meet operational requirements. Normally, additional transportation is provided by the Ordnance Center, which

concentrates most transportation assets in San Salvador. This practice requires extensive prior coordination and jeopardizes operational security of vehicular movements.

d. (C) Supply Storage/Distribution. There is no integrated supply management system. Although depot/center commanders are responsible for maintaining stockage levels, these levels are not clearly defined nor accurately determined. Only the D-IV can approve the issue of materiel. Assistance in the development of an Armed Force supply management system is part of the mission of the Logistics and Maintenance Support TAFT.

(1) (C) Class I (Subsistence). The Armed Forces is unable to produce sufficient Meal Combat Individual (MCI) to support current levels of operations. In the past, MCI's have been obtained from the United States. This source has been discontinued due to the high cost (\$6.45) per meal, excessive weight, and troop dissatisfaction with meal components which are foreign to the local diet. Currently, the D-IV, has initiated efforts to obtain food processing and packing equipment in order to produce sufficient MCI's for current and future requirements.

(2) (C) Class II (Clothing and Textiles). Clothing and combat boots are produced locally by the Quartermaster Depot and Ordnance Center. Production of uniforms and boots are, however, limited by old and inefficient equipment. Further, the quality of boots is especially poor. Combat boots and combat fatigues have been procured from the US in the past, but they are expensive and present size problems. The Armed Forces General Staff is considering the acquisition of more modern production equipment in order to increase production and to

improve quality.

(3) (S) Class III (Fuel). The Armed Force is dependent on commercial sources for all fuel products. Currently no problems are being encountered with the availability of fuel. Nonetheless, potential for serious problems exists because of limited storage capacity and vulnerability of discharge facilities.

(a) (S) Storage Capacity. Very limited. Ilopango Air Force Base has underground storage tanks with a total capacity of 80,000 gallons. The Ordnance Center in San Salvador has a storage capacity of 21,000 gallons. Storage capacity at brigade/separate detachment cuartels vary from small underground storage tanks (capacity unknown) to outside storage in 55 gallon drums.

(b) (S) Method of Allocation/Distribution. The Port of Acajutla is the only port being used for receiving oil imports. The Armed Force receives its fuel through an allocation system with deliveries made on a scheduled basis. ESSO, SHELL, and TEXACO distributors deliver fuel to Ilopango Air Base, the Ordnance Center and brigade/separate detachment cuartels. Armed Forces Ordnance Center has a limited capacity of delivering fuel to Armed Force units/detachments in the vicinity of San Salvador.

(c) (S) Forward Refueling Capability for Helicopters, Fixed Wing Aircraft, and Vehicles. The Armed Force has the capability to refuel wheeled vehicles located at brigade/separate detachment cuartels and a limited mobile capability to refuel vehicles located in remote sites or field locations. There is a limited capability to refuel helicopters at the Second and Third Brigade

[cuartels with portable fuel pumps and underground storage tanks.] There is a need for forward air refueling equipment to increase the limited station time/range of the UH-1H helicopter. Fixed wing aircraft can be refueled at the International Airport.

(4) (U) Class V (Ammunition)

(a) (C) Storage and Distribution. The storage and distribution system for ammunition is controlled directly by the D-IV. The Armed Force ammunition depot is located in San Salvador with forward deployed depots located at selected brigade/separate detachment cuartels. Ammunition storage facilities controlled by brigade/separate detachment commanders are located at each cuartel. The distribution of ammunition from depots to units uses the combined vehicle assets of the Armed Force Ordnance Center and the supported unit.

(b) (C) Forecasting, Allocation, Consumption Control. There is no evidence of any controls placed on the use of ammunition. Ammunition allocations are based on the rate of usage. Recently, at the initiative of the Logistics and Maintenance Support TAFT, an effort was made to compute days of supply availability. An estimate of the current days of supply available for all ammunition and basic loads at unit, battalion, brigade and national reserve levels has been computed by the General Staff for some units. However, the data base for computation requires additional refinement. The basis for the basic loads is not well defined and does not appear to be accurately based upon issues of the past two to six months.

(5) (U) Class XIII (Medical Services).

✓ (a) (C) The military medical system is in a disastrous state as a result of years of neglect and government disinterest. There is no plan for reacting to natural disasters. Although there is a medical section in the D-IV, there is no established organizational structure for a military medical unit nor procedures for staffing or supplying such a unit. There are a few medically trained personnel presently assigned to tactical units (one medic per rifle company).

(b) (C) Trained field medics are in short supply. This situation is further compounded by utilization of medical personnel in other than medical functions. The shortage of trained field medics is being addressed. A US Medical MMT has trained 34 medics and four instructors to provide follow-on medic courses to an additional 102 field medics by January 1982. Each major command has a medical clinic staffed with a part-time civilian doctor and one or two assistants. There is little real knowledge of combat medicine, although the additional field medics will improve this situation.

(c) (S) Medical evacuation is normally conducted by ambulances assigned to units. During combat operations, particularly areas under insurgent control, evacuation is accomplished by helicopter. In emergencies, commanders use local civilian medical facilities. The only existing military hospital is located in San Salvador. It has a capacity of 97 beds but currently has 277 bed patients. A new 300 bed military hospital is near completion in San Salvador but equipment valued at 16 million dollars must be obtained before this hospital can be operational.

(d) (C) Medical supplies are acquired through the Finance

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AND PUBLIC SECURITY,

- ✓ Department, Ministry of Defense, which procures them from local sources and/or
- ✓ the US, supplies are then stored in the military hospital or locations designated by the hospital. Distribution is made by the hospital based on requirements. There is no significant over/under stockage of medical supplies.

- ✓ (6) (C) Class IX - (Repair Parts). With the exception of the concurrent ^Rspace parts provided by the US for the UH-1H helicopter, there are no established repair parts stockage lists for the various levels of maintenance. At the Armed Force level, lists are being developed for automotive, communications-electronics, and weapons spare parts. Open end Foreign Military Sales cases are currently in effect for automotive and communications-electronics spare parts, and requisitions are about to start. The Armed Force, however, is a long way from establishing prescribed load lists (PLL) and authorized stockage levels (ASL).

EL SALVADOR ARMED FORCE BUDGET

1. (U) General.

a. (U) Economic Analysis. After years of steady economic growth, the year 1979 saw a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decline of 1.5 percent, followed by a 9.6 percent decline in 1980. To this combined two year economic decline of more than ^N11 percent, will be added an estimated 5.0 percent decline for 1981. The decline can be attributed to the combined effects of an armed insurgency; widespread political violence and terrorism; political unrest and uncertainty; and various adverse regional and worldwide factors such as low coffee prices, high petroleum costs, shortage of credit and high interest rates in the US, and negative developments in the Central American Common Market. Taking into account El Salvador's normal 3.0 percent per annum rate of population increase, GDP, per capital will witness a total three year reduction of approximately 25 percent by the end of 1981.

b. (C) Central Government Budget. In spite of the sharp three year (1979-81) decline in GDP, the Government of El Salvador's budget has witnessed an upward trend. This increase ^A in the central government budget is primarily attributed to two factors. the expanded role of the Government in the economy, especially resulting from the agrarian, banking and foreign trade reforms ^Tinsti-
tuted by the Government in early 1980, and the increase in defense and security expenditures necessitated by the general lawlessness and public disorder created by political violence, terrorism, and armed insurgency. Though the central government budget has been marked by a modest increase, defense and

security expenditures have increased at a higher rate. From 1978 to 1980, they have risen from 9.2 percent to 14.38 percent of the central government budget and from 1.6 percent to 2.7 percent of El Salvador's GDP.

c. (C) Public Debt. Compounding the disparity between a declining GDP and increased central government expenditures is the burgeoning level of the national debt (\$864.9 million dollars for 1980). This debt has resulted from declining private sector activity, increased government participation in the economy through the reform sectors, and the exigencies of insurgent warfare.

2. (U) Armed Force Budget Analysis.

a. (C) DEFENSE/SECURITY FORCE VS GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE (IN US \$ MILLION):

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>*1982</u>
Central Government Expenditures	522.1	581.3	661.6	975.4	
Defense Expenditures	36.3	51.9	64.6	65.2	86.8
Defense Expenditure as Percentage of Government Expenditures	6.8	8.9	9.7	8.2	
Security Force Expenditures	13.0	22.3	30.0	44.4	48.0
Security Force Expenditures as Percentage of Government Expenditures	2.4	3.8	4.5	5.6	

*Programmed

b. (C) ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE BUDGET (IN US \$ MILLION):

✓ Allocations are based on current and anticipated needs and availability of funds. Included in the allocations are funds for personnel, expendable supplies and small items of equipment. All other types of supplies, equipment and services are provided by logistics services on a non-reimbursable basis. CY-82 budget provides for an increase of 3600 troops and 150 administrative personnel

in the Army.

	<u>1981</u>	<u>(%)</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>(%)</u>
Army	47.61	73.0	60.2	70.0
Air Force	2.1	3.2	2.2	2.6
Navy	.7	1.0	1.0	1.0
Logistics Services (1)	10.1	15.5	15.5	18.0
General Administrative Services (2)	1.9	2.9	2.3	2.7
✓ Armed Forces Technical Direction and ✓ Presidential and Armed Force General Staff (3)	1.2	1.8	2.9	3.4
Armed Force Education Center (4)	.9	1.4	1.0	1.2
Armed Force Technical Instruction (5)	<u>.7</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>.9</u>	<u>1.0</u>
TOTAL:	65.2		86.0	

(1) Includes the Ordnance Center, Quartermaster Depot and the Military Hospital.

(2) Includes Ministry of Defense.

✓ (3) Includes Armed Force Presidential and ^{GENERAL} ~~Joint~~ Staff.

(4) Includes Armed Force Education Center and Military School.

✓ (5) Includes Engineer and ^{SIGNAL} ~~Communications~~ Training Centers.

c. (C) ALLOCATION OF SECURITY FORCE BUDGET (US \$ MILLION):

Allocations are based on current and anticipated needs and funds availability.

Included in the allocations are funds for personnel, expendable supplies, and small items of equipment. All other types of supplies, equipment and services are provided by logistics and services on a non-reimbursable basis. CY-82

✓ budget provides for an increase of 1230 members in the National Police.

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	<u>1981</u>	<u>(%)</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>(%)</u>
National Police	14.4	32.4	18.0	37.5
National Guard	10.0	22.5	10.0	20.8
Treasury Police	5.8	13.1	5.8	12.1
Fire Department	.4	1.0	.4	.8
Logistics Services (1)	<u>13.8</u>	31.0	<u>13.8</u>	28.8
TOTAL:	44.4		48.0	

(1) Includes the Ordnance Center, Quartermaster Depot, and the Military Hospital.

d. (C) ALLOCATION FOR COMBINED DEFENSE/SECURITY FORCE (IN US \$ MILLION):

	<u>1981</u>	<u>(%)</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>(%)</u>
Army	47.6	43.4	60.2	44.9
Air Force	2.1	1.9	2.2	1.6
Navy	.7	.6	1.0	.7
Logistics Services	23.9	21.8	29.3	21.9
General Administrative Services	1.9	1.7	2.3	1.7
Armed Force Technical Direction and Presidential and Armed Force General Staff	1.2	1.1	2.9	2.2
ARMED FORCE EDUCATION CENTER Center of Military Learning	.9	.8	1.0	.7
Armed Force Technical Instruction	.7	.6	.9	.3
National Police	14.4	13.1	18.0	13.4
National Guard	10.0	9.1	10.0	7.5
Treasury Police	5.8	5.3	5.8	4.3
Fire Department	<u>.4</u>	<u>.4</u>	<u>.4</u>	<u>.3</u>
TOTAL	109.5		134.0	

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COMBAT RATIONS

✓ ← 1. (C) General. The operational effectiveness of the Armed Force is constrained by the absence of an individual combat ration. To a large extent the feeding of troops in the field is dependent on the provision of food from the local rural population.

2. (C) Problem. The absence of an individual combat ration has limited the ability of the Armed Force to sustain combat operations in underpopulated areas. It is one of several reasons why small unit combat operations generally do not exceed 12 hours and are limited to the proximity of ~~the~~ local food sources.

✓ It serves to constrain the Army's combat operations to the defense of the cuartel; to make operational security and tactical deception difficult, if not impossible; and to allow remote areas to become the de facto domain of the insurgent.

3. (C) Resolution. The Armed Force High Command is aware of the problem and its tactical ramifications. It has explored several alternatives. However, as indicated below, these efforts have not achieved an acceptable solution.

a. (C) The use of US individual combat meals (MCI) met with little success. The high cost of the MCI, weight, and food foreign to the local diet made it unacceptable.

b. (C) The use of combat rations produced locally by commercial food processors similarly proved unacceptable due to the high cost.

c. (C) The local assembly of a field ration using imported products from Guatemala and Panama has given some promise. Nonetheless, even though the cost is lower than the MCI and local commercially produced combat rations, the ration

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has little acceptance among the troops.

4. (C) Impact on Strategy. The National Military Strategy formulated by the Armed Force seeks strategic victory over the insurgent through aggressive offensive action. To accomplish this objective, the Armed Force must gain the tactical initiative, take the battle to the insurgent, and destroy his capability to fight within the shortest period of time possible. The availability of an individual combat ration will make this more likely to happen. Minimally, it will eliminate one of the excuses for staying close to the cuartel.

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TRAINING INHIBITORS

1. (U) Inhibitors to Training Effectiveness. The Armed Force High Command and General Staff are fully aware of the important relationship of training to increased operational effectiveness, force expansion, and efficient prosecution of the internal defense campaign. Nevertheless, the demands and urgencies of daily operations, leadership attitudes toward training influenced by culture and tradition, and deficiencies in the training base have relegated training to low level importance.

a. (C) Degradation of the Training Base. The requirement to expand and field forces to combat the insurgency has placed significant demands on available officer and enlisted leader resources. This resulted in the suspension of professional development, specialized, and combat leadership training at the Armed Force Education Center (CEFA), Engineer Training Center (CIIFA), and the Commando Training Center (CICFA) in 1980. Only Air Force pilot training, officer production at the Military School, and ad hoc officer candidate courses conducted by the Army, National Guard, Treasury Police, and National Police have continued. Although formal specialized training in aircraft maintenance and basic supply operations continues in the Air Force, reliance on informal on-the-job training is the norm. Out-of-country professional development training for officers has virtually ceased. Recruit, enlisted leader, and unit training have been decentralized to the unit level. Consequently, it has been reduced in scope and substance and is characterized by a lack of standard programs of instruction, training objectives, and performance standards. This coupled with archaic training methods, which stress lecture rather than "hands-on" training

further reduces training effectiveness. In contested areas, where well trained personnel are most needed, unit training programs have been discontinued. The High Command's decision to reduce or eliminate the training base in the interest of fielding more combat units has compounded the quantitative shortage of leaders by severely curtailing qualitative development. The net result has been to impede individual skills development, weaken small unit leadership, postpone specialized and professional training essential to long-term efficiency, and to retard the development of a professional corps of enlisted leaders. Until this trend is reversed, organizational cohesion, operational and training effectiveness, and establishment of a leadership base to support force expansion will be difficult goals.

b. (C) Leadership and Training Attitudes. Salvadoran officers retain the primary leadership and training responsibilities. They are reluctant to share these responsibilities or delegate authority to juniors, especially enlisted personnel. This tends to stifle initiative, centralize decision making, and deny development of a functioning chain-of-command. Corporals, sub-sergeants, and sergeants are not expected to show initiative, only follow orders. These attitudes inhibit force effectiveness and professionalism.

c. (C) Operational Commitments vs. Training Requirements. Operational commitments constantly disrupt training and relegate it to a secondary importance. This factor, coupled with the degradation of the training base, has made training almost non-existent. As a consequence, raw recruits, poorly trained soldiers, and underdeveloped leaders are routinely committed to combat without the advantages of requisite skills. This is particularly true of the Army but

crosses all components of the Armed Force.

d. (C) Limited Training Facilities and Resources. Facilities for tactical training of small units are inadequate or not fully utilized. There are only a few known distance ranges, and combat firing ranges are non-existent. Thus, individual and crew-served weapons firing is usually limited to zeroing and familiarization firing on "make shift" ranges. Artillery weapons firing is limited to periodic familiarization firing in isolated volcano areas or over water. The constant non-availability of training aids, training facilities, equipment, repair parts, and munitions adversely impacts on both Salvadoran and US mobile training team activities and impairs training initiatives. Wherein the Air Force's organizational maintenance training facilities appear to be adequate, the Navy has no facilities for formal maintenance training. Most Army and Public Security Force units perform their training on athletic fields within the walls of their cuartels. Tactical training outside the cuartels is usually restricted by proximity of population centers, cultivated land, or the real threat of insurgent attack. As a result, individual and unit training is restricted to on-the-job training while participating in combat operations or security patrols.

2. (C) Impact on Operational Effectiveness. The aforementioned training inhibitors have served to magnify existing operational deficiencies and to exacerbate current leadership weaknesses and shortages of the Armed Force. Consequently, there exists a concomitant reluctance to conduct offensively oriented small unit (squad/platoon) operations in contested areas, beyond the immediate vicinity of the cuartel, or for periods of more than 24 hours. Thus,

✓ because the basic maneuver element of the Army, the rifle company, is ineffective for the lack of training, tactical operations which promote defensive rather than offensive mentalities are employed.

3. (U) Actions to Address Inhibitors.

a. (C) In order to gain the initiative from the insurgents, actions must be taken immediately to address these training inhibitors. Fundamental to this goal is the reestablishment of the training base. The reopening of CEFA and other centers of professional/skill development, even if initially on a reduced operational scale, constitutes the first and most important step. The US should be prepared to complement Salvadoran initiatives to reestablish the training base with mobile training teams and to encourage third country training assistance where appropriate. The Armed Force presently plans to reopen CEFA in 1982.

b. (C) Successful prosecution of a tactical offensive strategy is dependent upon small unit proficiency. This makes the promotion of soldier confidence, unit cohesion, and operational effectiveness through establishment of a functioning chain-of-command essential. The shortages of officers and a finite base for officer production, underscore the importance of qualitatively improving officer leadership, supplementing officer leadership with trained enlisted leaders, and strengthening the chain-of-command. In this regard, two actions are considered important.

✓ (1) (C) The first is the establishment of a Combat Training Center (CECFA) with cadre, training areas, and facilities. This center would provide individual and basic unit training to newly formed units, conduct training ~~area~~

evaluations of existing units, and offer enlisted leadership training. In regard to the latter, enlisted leadership development could be positively influenced by CECFA with the formation of a Combat Leadership Course. In the interim, the US should support the out-of-country equipping and training of newly formed companies or battalions.

(2) (C) The transition from a defensive mentality to the spirit of the offensive is a function of leadership. Consequently, the ability to close with, and destroy the enemy is not solely a function of more combat units, equipment, and training; it is also a function of will. To fully realize the transition from a defensive to an offensive state of mind, leader behavior has to be influenced and ultimately changed. By providing on-site evaluations of training effectiveness and shortcomings to unit leaders, through the ^{PERIODIC}~~PERIODIC~~ use of security assistance observer teams, proper tactical procedures and effective leadership behavior can be reinforced or corrected. This training evaluation effort should be supplemented by Operations Planning Assistance Teams located at the Joint Operations Center of the Armed Force and at zonal tactical operations centers to assist in matters of operational planning. By their presence, they could influence the development of effective command control and encourage decentralized decision-making.

ARMED FORCE DEFICIENCIES

1. (U) General. Salvadoran Armed Force deficiencies, which impact on operational capabilities to implement the strategy, are reviewed by functional area.

2. (U) Personnel.

a. (C) No effective personnel management system.

b. (C) Critical officer shortage.

(1) (C) Total Authorized: 1088; Assigned 710; Shortage: 378

(2) (C) Specific Shortages: Senior Staff Personnel

Pilots (43 of 65)

Navy Officers (15 of 28)

Army Officers (388 of 644)

Intelligence Officers

Platoon Leaders (combat units
average 55.7%)

c. (C) Critical NCO shortage.

(1) (U) Since NCO's are not separated out from troops by category, precise shortage is unknown.

(2) (C) No professional NCO system or appreciation of value.

(3) (U) No professional development or training/education.

d. (U) Specific categories of critical shortages (Required personnel and training).

(1) (U) Electronics/radar/avionics specialists.

(2) (U) Radio-telephone operators, communications personnel.

(3) (U) Vehicle/aircraft/boat mechanics.

- (4) (U) Public information specialists.
- (5) (U) Logistics personnel.
- (6) (U) Armament specialists (all services).
- (7) (U) Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel.
- (8) (U) Ammunition specialists.
- (9) (U) Fire support coordinators.
- (10) (U) Intelligence personnel.

3. (U) Intelligence.

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4. (U) Operations.

- a. (C) Offensive spirit/mentality lacking.
- b. (C) Command control and communications inadequate.
- c. (U) Tactical concept deficiencies:

(1) (C) Small unit tactics marked by insufficient training and improper employment.

(2) (C) Navy tactics reflect no interdiction/boarding procedures.

(3) (C) Night operations non-existent for all services.

(4) (C) Indirect fire/close air support are imprecise, ineffective.

(5) (C) Joint operations characterized by insufficient coordination, non-compatible communications equipment.

(6) (C) Combined operations are non-existent.

(7) (C) Tactical cover and deception are not used or understood.

d. (C) Operations security is very poor.

e. (C) Staff procedures and planning indicative of incompleteness and limited experience.

f. (C) Civic action is only sporadically applied and limited to local level.

g. (C) Public information is extremely poor.

h. (C) No psychological operations exist.

i. (C) Insufficient population control.

j. (C) Quick reaction capability is limited and slow.

k. (C) Insufficient mobility assets, no preventive maintenance, unresponsive maintenance support.

l. (C) Interdiction is very limited and ineffective.

5. (U) Training.

a. (C) Training management system ineffective and poor attitude toward training.

- b. (C) Professional development and production of officers and NCOs, specialists inadequate.
- c. (C) Officers do not share training responsibilities with NCO's.
- d. (C) Unit training is sporadic and poorly supervised.
- f. (C) Training facilities/areas/resources are limited and of poor quality.
- g. (C) Marksmanship is not emphasized.

6. (U) Logistics.

- a. (C) Combat service support system is deficient.
- b. (C) Logistics support base is highly centralized.
- c. (U) Maintenance.
 - (1) (C) Forecasting is non-existent.
 - (2) (C) Replacement system for major items is non-functional.
 - (3) (C) Direct exchange limited.
 - (4) (C) Preventive maintenance poor.
 - (5) (C) Severe shortage of tools and test equipment.

d. (U) Supply Management and Storage.

- (1) (C) Class I: Field ration capability is extremely limited.
- (2) (C) Class II: Uniform production is insufficient and of poor quality.
- (3) (C) Class III: Fuel distribution is dependent on civilian sector.
- (4) (C) Class V: Ammunition consumption supply rate and ammunition control totally lacking.
- (5) (C) Class IX: Authorized stockage level/prescribed load list are embryonic in development.

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- e. (C) Medical services support is insufficient but improving.
- f. (C) Equipment standardization plan is embryonic.
- g. (C) Procurement lacks effective management.
- h. (C) Organic transportation at unit level inadequate.

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FORCE DEPLOYMENT

1. (U) General. Historically, Armed Force deployment has been motivated more by political than by military considerations. Traditionally, a detachment consisting of two to five companies is assigned to each of the 14 political departments and quartered in cuartels constructed during the last century. Additional Army organizations and units that form the Armed Force's logistics support base and strategic reserve are located in and near the nation's capital. Although the concentration of Army forces in and around San Salvador is justified by its strategic location, political motives are the primary determinants. Air Force units always have been assigned to a single base located in the vicinity of San Salvador. Navy patrol boat assets similarly have been confined to a single base located at La Union, in recognition of the maritime borders which El Salvador shares with Honduras and Nicaragua in the Gulf of Fonseca area.

2. (C) National Military Strategy Force Deployment Concept. The objective of the Strategy's force deployment concept is to restore the public order as rapidly as possible by destroying the insurgent's war fighting capability. In this regard, the principles of mass and economy of force are key.

a. (U) Army

(1) (C) Forces. The National Military Strategy envisages the deployment of forces primarily upon military rather than political considerations. Accordingly, newly formed infantry battalions will be assigned to specific areas that contain the largest insurgent concentrations and experience the greatest intensity of conflict. Additionally, the current strike capability of one quick reaction battalion located in the central sector of the country

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near San Salvador will be expanded. This expansion will include two more quick reaction battalions which will be located in the eastern and western sectors of the country.

(2) (C) Command Control. A sixth military zone will be created by dividing the Third Military Zone. This command control reorganization will give greater priority of effort and resources to countering the relative geographical isolation of the eastern sector and to addressing the tactical requirements necessitated by the insurgent threat in Morazan Department. The latter will be ✓ further emphasized by establishment of a military zone headquarters in Morazan Department.

(3) (C) Combat Support and Combat Service Support. The responsiveness and effectiveness of combat support and combat service support will be increased by providing the military zone commanders with organic combat support and combat service support assets. This will assist significantly in overcoming the disadvantages of the current highly centralized support system and afford the zone commander greater flexibility in influencing the battle in his zone.

b. (C) Air Force. The Air Force will continue to maintain and operate its centrally located base at Ilopango near San Salvador. However, under the force deployment concept, the Air Force will establish and operate three forward air stations in the western (Santa Ana), eastern (San Miguel) and southern (Cuscatlan International Airport) areas of the country. Each forward station will have a refueling, rearming, and limited maintenance capability. This will improve flexibility and responsiveness of support, particularly in regard to airmobile insertion, resupply, and medical evacuation. Through dispersion of

its assets, the Air Force will be able to more effectively and efficiently support ground operations in the eastern and western sectors of the country, improve operational security, and decrease the vulnerability of its aircraft to insurgent attack.

c. (C) Navy. The patrol boat base located at La Union will continue to be the Navy's main base for operations. However, additional patrol craft will be acquired to provide greater area coverage and on-station time to counter insurgent infiltration activities in the Gulf of Fonseca and its sea approaches. Patrol craft, for the first time, will be stationed along the Salvadoran coast at the ports of Acajutla, La Libertad, Jutepeque, and El Triunfo. This distribution of naval assets will provide a coastal surveillance capability and will complement sea interdiction efforts concentrated in the Gulf of Fonseca area. Additionally, navy patrol craft will be made available for water-borne patrols in the large in-land water bodies (Cerron Grande Reservoir and Lake Guija) for the purpose of protecting these hydroelectric sites from insurgent attack.

d. (C) Public Security Forces. Distribution and disposition of the security forces will remain essentially unchanged. However, command control will be improved by realigning the security forces' boundaries to coincide with the military zone boundaries. This realignment will assure greater security force coordination with, and support of, military operations.

STANDARDIZATION AND MODERNIZATION OF EQUIPMENT

1. (U) Current Situation.

a. (C) General. The standardization and modernization of equipment of the Armed Force is a prerequisite for successful implementation of the National Military Strategy and its supportive force development plan. Consequently, it is the Armed Force's most important logistics priority and challenge. The Armed Force's current equipment inventory is a variegated mix of commercial/military models, manufacturer types, national sources, and ages. This mix is so extensive that it not only impacts on existing logistics and maintenance capabilities but also inhibits their development. This diversity makes the acquisition of necessary repair parts, replacement of major components, and procurement of ammunition difficult, if not impossible. The problems of inventory are not standardly distributed by unit. This exacerbates normal logistics and maintenance problems, overtaxes unit capabilities, and limits operational effectiveness. Illustrative of this fact is that in many units as many as three different types of vehicles can be found performing the same function.

b. (U) Service Specific.

(1) (U) Army.

(a) (C) Some standardization and modernization of weapons systems have been accomplished this year with the provision of M-16 rifles (2,000), M-60 machineguns, 90mm recoilless rifles, and 81mm mortars by the US Government under Section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, 1961, as amended. Nonetheless, the basic infantry weapon for the Army continues to be the G-3 rifle which is

✓ 10-15 years old, badly worn, and in need of immediate replacement. The artillery brigade's 105mm howitzers are also old, in need of repair parts, and planned for replacement in the near future. Additionally, Foreign Military Sales cases have been established to purchase from the US 3,000 more M-16 rifles, and additional M-60 machineguns and 81mm mortars.

✓ (b) (C) The Army's transportation assets are in desperate need of standardization and modernization. The High Command has made the decision to modernize the Army's transportation assets through a program of commercial purchases utilizing Foreign Military Sales credits provided by the US Government. To date, approximately two million dollars have been expended for commercially purchased Ford trucks. An additional 3.1 million dollar contract, utilizing Foreign Military Sales credits, has been entered into with the Ford Motor Corporation for trucks, buses, and carry-all type vehicles. Although these efforts will improve the Army's ground mobility, it represents only the first step toward vehicular standardization and modernization.

(c) (C) The Army's communications system is a collage of communications-electronics assets and transmission modes. The communications-electronics equipment lacks standardization, interoperability, and reliability due to disparities of age and manufacture type. Within the past year, however, the Army initiated its standardization and modernization program by adopting the AN/PRC-77 radio as its standard tactical radio. To date, approximately 500 AN/PRC-77 radios have been acquired, with 200 more requested through establishment of a Foreign Military Sales case.

(2) (U) Air Force.

(a) (C) The Salvadoran Air Force (FAS) inventory of operational aircraft, to include fixed and rotary wing, consists of ten different types. This broad mixture is further complicated by the fact that five are of French manufacture, four of US manufacture, and one of Israeli manufacture. Spare parts for the French and Israeli manufactured aircraft are very difficult to obtain. This has forced the FAS to locally fabricate certain spares in an effort to keep aircraft operational. More often than not, however, the cannibalization of non-operational aircraft becomes the primary means for maintaining some ability for launching operational missions. The process of cannibalization is slowly, but surely, driving the FAS operational fleet into the graveyard. The FAS faces a similar problem with its US manufactured DC-6's and C-47's which are over thirty years old. Although some spare parts have been acquired from the US, the age of these aircraft makes their maintenance a constant problem. The US manufactured Hughes 500 helicopter is not part of the US military inventory, and spares must be obtained from commercial sources. The provision of eight UH-1H helicopters under 506(a) authority (six more have been provided via lease agreement) marks the beginning of the FAS' much needed standardization and modernization program. Acquisition of additional US manufactured aircraft and concomitant phase out of obsolete, non-standard aircraft, would contribute significantly to enhancing the reliability of maintenance support.

(b) (C) The diversity in type and age of existing aircraft contributes to the over extension of the FAS maintenance technicians. Although the FAS maintenance force is talented and reasonably well trained, the requirement

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to maintain several different types of aircraft for common missions impedes overall efficiency and specialty development. This fact is recognized by the FAS commander. He has initiated a specialized maintenance program for the ✓ UH-1H helicopter. The current and planned FAS maintenance system cannot support [no] any more UH-1H's in CY-81 but could support the phased introduction of seven in CY-82 and three in CY-83. Increased numbers beyond these levels, or accelerated phasing would be beyond the FAS absorptive capacity and require either civilian contract or US military maintenance personnel to assist in UH-1H helicopter maintenance.

(3) (U) Navy

(a) (C) During 1st and 2nd Quarter of FY-81, the US Military Group evaluated the Navy's inventory of patrol craft. The evaluation indicated that the patrol craft are structurally seaworthy and that replacement was not necessary. Consequently, a Foreign Military Sales case totalling one million dollars was implemented to overhaul and upgrade existing patrol craft systems. During the upgrade and overhaul process, the focus was on standardization and interoperability of systems. Thus, standardization of patrol craft main engines, generators, radios, weapons has been accomplished.

2. (C) Standardization and Modernization Plan. The Five Year Force Development Plan (1981-1985) represents the High Command's decision for and commitment to the standardization and modernization of the Armed Force. This commitment, as planned, will focus on the functional areas which will enable the Armed Force to move, shoot, and communicate - mobility, weapons, and communications-electronics. The plan has two phases. In the initial phase (short to

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mid-term), efforts will be directed toward reconditioning equipment with an acceptable user life; phasing out and replacing of obsolete and nonstandard items; and the consolidation and redistribution of weapons and equipment by type and characteristic to insure standardization by unit to the maximum extent possible. This phase will also place particular attention on the acquisition of general purpose equipment rather than mission specific equipment in order to promote commonality, simplicity, and standardization of supporting logistics and maintenance systems. The second phase (mid to long-term) will focus on modernization through acquisition of major weapons systems or end items while continuing to insure standardization.

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ARMED FORCE GENERAL STAFF
CONCEPT FOR PROTECTION OF THE ECONOMIC
INFRASTRUCTURE AND NATIONAL RESOURCES

1. (C) General Situation. The most effective means available to the insurgents to destroy the national economy of El Salvador is the destruction of agriculture production. To attain the objective of destroying El Salvador's agricultural production base, the most likely targets for insurgent attack are: agricultural cultivation operations and processing sites (coffee, sugar, cotton, and basic grains); transportation modes (land, air, and sea); lines of communications (highways, railroads, ports, airports, air fields, tunnels and bridges); means of cultivation (tools, fertilizer, and insecticides); supply, storage, and ✓ distribution centers; hydroelectric dams, facilities and transmission modes; and governmental, cooperative, and private offices of commercial agricultural production.

2. (U) Mission. The Armed Force, in cooperation with governmental, cooperative, and private agencies will:

a. (C) Protect and defend the economic infrastructure and national resources.

b. (C) Neutralize insurgent activities in the military zones of operations.

c. (C) Collaborate in the protection and control of the population and national resources in the military zones of operation for the purpose of facilitating the accomplishment of the national objectives.


3. (U) Concept of Operation.

a. (C) General. To facilitate the accomplishment of the military objective of protecting the economic infrastructure and national resources, the Armed

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- ✓ Force, in coordination with the Customs Police, ^{AND} Territorial Service, ~~and Civil~~
✓ ~~Defense,~~ will initiate actions as specified.

b. (U) Specific.



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c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

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ARMED FORCE GENERAL STAFF
CONCEPT FOR PROTECTION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

1. (U) General Situation. On 5 March 1981, President Jose Napoleon DUARTE appointed an independent three-man Central Elections Commission to prepare an electoral law and to oversee procedures for the election of a National Constituent Assembly in 1982, in preparation for a general presidential election, presumably in 1983. The intent is to demonstrate that if the elections are as have been promised - authentically free and democratic - the Salvadoran
✓ people will demonstrate that they are a people who seek change within the fra^{me}
✓ mework of free elections and respect for human values. Nonetheless, the realization of this hope faces the threat of disruptive and violent actions by both
✓ the insurgents and far right extremists whose interest would not be served ^{if} ~~it~~
the Salvadoran people are allowed to express their preferences. The legitimacy and protection of the electoral process, therefore, are key to the credibility of and popular support for the Government of El Salvador.

2. (U) Mission. The Armed Force will guarantee the legitimacy and protection of the March 1982 electoral process.

3. (U) Concept of Operation.

a. (U) Leftist insurgents and extreme rightist can be expected to attack the electoral process. The objectives of their attacks will be the electoral process and the actual conduct of the elections. It is probable that both the insurgents and the extreme right will employ political propaganda to discredit
✓ the legitimacy of the electoral process, and violence to intimidate participants in the process. The Armed Force, consequently, must prevent these anti-election forces from attaining their dual objectives.

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b. (U) Actions to Guarantee Legitimacy. The Armed Force will:

(1) (C) Request its members be exempted from exercising their voting privileges in the National Constituent Assembly elections.

✓ (2) (U) Recommend to the Central Elections Commission that the protection of political leaders and rallies be applied equally, in order to preclude the Armed Force from becoming an instrument for favoring any particular political party.

(3) (C) Recommend to the Central Elections Commission that the Commission determine the best and most correct means for using military transportation so that the Armed Force cannot be utilized for partisan political activities.

c. (U) Actions to Provide Protection. The Armed Force will:

(1) (U) Launch an intensive public information campaign 15 days prior to the date of the National Constituent Assembly elections using all means of communications. This campaign will stress the following themes:

(a) (U) The Armed Force's firm commitment to enforcing the laws, especially those regarding the bearing of arms.

(b) (U) The Armed Force will comply with and enforce compliance with all provisions of the Electoral law, prepared by the Central Elections Commission.

(2) (C) Intensify air and land patrols in urban areas and along the major highways which connect the fourteen political departments.

(3) (C) Establish checkpoints at the entrances to the major cities and at critical intersections.

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✓ Personnel manning the checkpoints will conduct (a) selective searches of persons and vehicles.

✓ (4) (C) Organize, on the day of the elections, special vigilance^A at voting sites for the purpose of preventing any breakouts of disorder.

(5) (C) Conduct small unit offensive actions in the vicinity of voting sites located in rural areas for the purpose of insuring public confidence through a visible, aggressive presence.

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EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCY

1. (C) General. External support for insurgency works to the double disadvantage of the efforts to provide the requisite stability and public order to realize political and socio-economic reforms. First is the international propaganda campaign to discredit the Government of El Salvador with the purpose of denying it the external military and economic support necessary for survival. The second is the arms, personnel, materiel, and training support provided to the Salvadoran insurgents by Communist governments or their surrogates, principally Cuba and Nicaragua.

2. (S) International Propaganda Campaign.

a. (U) Objectives. The objectives of the international propaganda campaign being waged against the Government of El Salvador are:

(1) (U) Discredit moderate solutions to resolve the present crisis.

(2) (U) Destroy the domestic and international legitimacy of the Government of El Salvador while concurrently enhancing the legitimacy of the insurgents.

(3) (U) Hinder or prevent any foreign support for El Salvador that does not benefit the insurgents.

(4) (U) Justify insurgent violence while concealing the external aid that makes it possible.

(5) (U) Misrepresent US policies and actions.

(6) (U) Foster the impression of overwhelming popular support for the insurgent movement.

(7) (U) Defeat the Government of El Salvador politically and militarily.

b. (U) Organization of Effort.

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(1) (C) In April 1980, a front organization, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), was created for the expressed purpose of disseminating propaganda abroad. The FDR is an umbrella coalition which, for appearances sake, includes three small non-Marxist-Leninist political parties that have no representation in the insurgent movement. In practice, the FDR is controlled by the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), the insurgents' central executive arm for political and military planning. The FDR is given an aura of legitimacy by some prominent Salvadorans in exile and is aided by the worldwide propaganda networks of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Communist countries. False claims and accusations are replayed to regional and world audiences by Cuba's Radio Havana, Prensa Latina (the official Cuba press agency), Radio Moscow, and Eastern European media.

(2) (C) The international media propaganda campaign is complemented by foreign governments or international organizations critical of the Government of El Salvador or openly supportive of the insurgents. Cuba and the Soviet Union, with the assistance of their surrogates and allies, promote the insurgent cause through international forums, government-to-government relations, influence among world opinion leaders and organizations, and mobilization of Communist parties and groups worldwide.

c. (C) Impact. The international propaganda campaign has been a model of efficiency, coordinated effort, and sophisticated application. Its propaganda successes have been many and significant. In Europe and the US, the Salvadoran struggle has become an emotional issue which has fanned rhetoric at the expense of objective reasoning. The resultant impact has been the general international

isolation of the Government of El Salvador. With the exception of the small but vital political, economic, and military assistance provided by the US, and several Latin American countries, little assistance or political support for the Government of El Salvador has been forthcoming.

3. (U) Support of Armed Insurgency.

a. (C) Objective. The fundamental objective of the arms, personnel, materiel, and training provided in support of the armed insurgency is to attain decisive military and insurrectional victories for the seizure of power.

b. (C) Organization of Effort. Prior to September 1980, the insurgent ✓ groups in El Salvador were ill-trained and ill-equipped, armed primarily with a variety of pistols, rifles, and shotguns. The insurgents' main sources of armament were the international arms merchants and the remaining inventories of "gun-runners" who had supplied arms to the Sandinistas during their armed struggle against Somoza. However, in the summer of 1980, a series of contacts between Salvadoran insurgent leaders and key officials of several Communist countries, and groups, resulted in commitments to supply the insurgents with approximately 800 tons of modern weapons and equipment. With Cuba, aided by Nicaragua, playing the central role, nearly 200 tons of weapons and ammunition were infiltrated into El Salvador by the end of 1980. This arms support network remains in place today and represents the lifeblood of the armed insurgency.

c. (U) Impact.

(1) (C) Internal Defense. Without the external support of arms, personnel, materiel and training, the insurgents would not pose a serious military threat to the Armed Force. Although they would still be a source for violence

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and instability, the Armed Force could contain and eventually destroy their war fighting capability. With the external support, however, the insurgents are a military force that must be reckoned with. It nurtures the insurgent's capacity for armed warfare, contributes significantly to the insurgent's ability to maintain tactical initiative and boldness, and sustains the insurgents in their objective to erode the Armed Force's resources and morale. Thus, defeat of the insurgency is a function of the degree of external assistance that supports and sustains the armed struggle. .

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ARMED FORCE GENERAL STAFF CONCEPT
FOR INTERDICTION

1. (U) Introduction.

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c. (C) The primary interdiction objective is to cut insurgent supply lines utilizing coordinated sea, air, and land operations to identify movement routes and points of entry; isolate and control the points of entry; interdict the routes; and eliminate the support infrastructure of the insurgents. Such an effort especially requires well trained and well armed land forces capable of day and night small unit, quick-reaction operations and effective close air support. This coordinated effort will necessitate an improved command control system and communications to report time sensitive intelligence and enhance planning and execution for interdiction.

2. (U) Concept for Interdiction.

a. (C) General Situation. At the present moment the Armed Force does not

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have the necessary capability to neutralize the infiltration of insurgent arms, personnel, and equipment into the national territory of El Salvador. However, immediate interdiction efforts must be based upon maximum utilization of every available resource and capability.

b. (C) Mission. To deny the provision of personnel and logistics support from external sources to insurgents conducting hostile operations in the national territory of El Salvador.

c. (U) Concept of Operation:

(1) (C) General. The objective is to obstruct and impede infiltration in order to diminish its effectiveness by increasing the cost and time employed by the insurgents to support infiltration efforts. Interdiction operations must be a continuous process, sustained day and night, and maximizing the initiative of commanders at all levels. Land reconnaissance groups to conduct short and long range patrols will be infiltrated into and extracted from designated areas and points by the methods established in the weekly interdiction plan. These reconnaissance groups will follow a general cycle of flexible employment as indicated:

(a) 1st week. Preparation for the mission and reaction alert.

(b) 2nd week. Conduct infiltration, execution, and extraction operations using flexible time periods. The operational period will not exceed five days and consists of the following schedule: day one - infiltration; days two, three, and four - execution; day five - extraction.

(c) 3rd week. Rest and maintenance.

(2) (U) Specific.

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3. (U) Responsibilities.

a. (C) General. In order to accomplish the military objective of interdicting the infiltration of insurgent arms, personnel, and equipment into the national territory, the Armed Force, Customs Police, and Territorial Service will utilize all available means at their disposal.

b. (U) Specific.

(1) (C) The Armed Force Joint Operations Center will establish a centralized system for interdiction planning and coordination; coordinate intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination efforts; and facilitate decentralized execution of interdiction operations by the respective commanders of the Military Zones, the Air Force, and the Navy.

✓ (2) (C) The Army will provide required reconnaissance units (especially trained and equipped), anti-aircraft units, and the units for land interdiction operations, concentrating their employment in the north and northeast sectors of the country. Interdiction operations will include border control; internal movement control (control/check points); reconnaissance patrols

✓ and ambushes; observation and listening posts; and establishment of a twenty four hour interdiction operations and intelligence communications net.

(3) (C) The Navy will provide coastal patrol and maritime interdiction units with special attention to their employment in the south and southeast coastal areas of the country and the Gulf of Fonseca (See inclosure 30).

(4) (C) The Air Force will establish forward air stations in the eastern and western portions of the country in order to facilitate support of continuous interdiction operations and maintain the required units for providing combat support and transport for combat operations. (See inclosure 31).

(5) (C) The Public Security Forces (National Guard, National Police, and Treasury Police) Customs Police, and Territorial Service, will provide the principal elements for establishment of an information collection network.

4. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

a. (U) Interdiction operations will be supported by civic action and public information plans.

(b) (C) To insure maximum effectiveness of the interdiction programs, necessary contacts will be made to solicit the cooperation of the Armed Forces of Honduras and Guatemala in the establishment of a regional coordination center for the exchange of information related to the infiltration and flow of insurgent arms, personnel, and equipment that affect the respective national territories of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala; and for the coordination^o of operations to neutralize these infiltrations.

POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES

1. (U) General. Population control measures supplement and complement tactical operations aimed at destroying the military capability and will of the insurgents by: separating the insurgents from a base of support among the people; aiding the identification of insurgents; neutralizing insurgent propaganda efforts; and nurturing an atmosphere of security through Government presence and vigilance. Generally, organizations or agencies possessing a civil law enforcement function -- if adequately staffed, trained, and equipped -- are best suited to establish and implement population control measures. Military support of population control measures should be employed only in those instances where insurgent activity or strength surpasses the capability of civil law enforcement authorities. In order for population control measures to gain and maintain the support of the populace, they should be limited to those that are absolutely necessary and supported by psychological operation themes. These themes should focus on the need for population control measures and their positive gains, such as enhanced personal safety and welfare.
2. (U) Current In-Country Situation. At the present time, no government population control measures or system exists in El Salvador. Most members of Salvadoran society carry documents which establish their identity. However, such identity documents are easily obtainable through fraudulent acquisition, bribes, or simply knowing how to use the processing system for various documents. Although birth records are filed and maintained in the various governmental departments, there is no national system of any kind, including

✓ voters' registration, for verifying personal identity^T against official records. Illustrative of this failure to establish even the most rudimentary population control measures is the fact that Salvadoran passports are issued to any individual requestor without any identity or document verification.

3. (U) Corrective Action. Population control measures in and of themselves will not deny the insurgent the freedom of movement and relative assurance of non-detection which he now enjoys. However, in combination with other government actions, population control measures can disrupt and make more costly, in terms of time and effort, the movement of insurgent arms, materiel, and personnel, as well as making insurgent access to the populace more difficult.

Measures to deny insurgent freedom of movement and access which the Government of El Salvador could institute quickly and at limited cost are:

a. (U) Administrative Measures.

(1) (U) National registration and issuance of a new identity document. Documents should be maintained in a central file with individual photo and, if possible fingerprints.

✓ (2) (U) Establish procedures for careful checking of all documents of individuals registering for national identity documents or applying for passports.

✓ (3) (U) Publish and maintain blacklists with photos, of all known insurgents and their aliases at ports of entry/exit, border crossing points, and internal checkpoints. Additionally, these blacklists, with photos, should be published

✓ in all Salvadoran newspapers (^{OFFERING}~~accompanied with~~) a monetary reward for information leading to the whereabouts of any individual on the list. This could eliminate the relative peace of mind about detection that the insurgent presently enjoys.

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b. (U) Direct Actions.

✓ (1) (U) Static checkpoints (permanent sites operated 24 hours a day) could be established along major ^{INTERNAL} lines of ~~Internal~~ communications and at key government facilities, transportation transshipment points, and areas of public convergence, at little cost or effort. Their presence alone would make insurgent movements more costly in time and effort.

(2) (U) Mobile checkpoints (temporary sites employed to interdict primary and secondary lines of communications for short periods) would constitute an effective deterrent to unrestricted insurgent movement. The random selection of sites and times would tend to keep the insurgent off-balance.

(3) (U) An informal block warden reporting system in villages and smaller towns would aid in determining the presence and location of strangers.

✓ 4. (U) Though the role of population control in internal defense operations now is acknowledged in the military objectives and their strategic concepts, specific measures were not discussed nor documented in the strategy.

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REGIONAL COOPERATION

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(4) (U) 14 August, Tegucigalpa, Honduras. First presidential level discussions held between President Jose Napoleon DUARTE of El Salvador and Provisional President Policarpo Paz Garcia of Honduras was a very general exchange related to El Salvador's electoral prospects and mutual concerns over

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Nicaragua.

(5) (U) 18 September, Guatemala City, Guatemala. First presidential level discussion between President Duarte and President Fernando Romero LUCAS Garcia of Guatemala concerned electoral prospects for both countries. President Duarte also extended an invitation to President Lucas to visit El Salvador.

(6) (U) 12 October, San Salvador, El Salvador. President Lucas conducted a brief visit with President Duarte. During the visit, points of view were exchanged and the regional political panorama^{o a} examined.

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(8) (U) 20 October, San Salvador, El Salvador. Honduran Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Chinchilla and Salvadoran Chief of Staff, Colonel Flores^{Lima} met to continue their previous discussions. Both agreed to pursue their discussions further during the Conference of the American Armies in Washington, D.C., the week of 2 November.

(9) (U) 20-21 October, Amapala Island (Gulf of Fonseca), Honduras. First visit of the Commander of the Salvadoran^{Navy} to a Honduran Navy facility. Visit follows the frequent friendly contact between Salvadoran and Honduran naval crews in the Gulf of Fonseca.

(10) (U) 26-28 October, Howard Air Force Base, Panama. The Commanders of the Salvadoran, Honduran, and Guatemalan Air Forces conferred during a regional conference hosted by the United States Air Force Southern Air Division.

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Conference was follow-on to an earlier Chiefs of American Air Forces Conference (CONJEFAMER). Mutual problems and perceptions of US commitment to region were discussed.

b. (U) Description of Cooperation. During the strategy formulation *process*, team members, through interaction with their Salvadoran counterparts were afforded the opportunity to learn more about the cooperative military efforts undertaken to date. Although the Team's Salvadoran counterparts did not fully describe the extent and scope of military cooperation, they did offer a general description as follows:

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(4) (U) Honduras has appointed and posted a military attache to El Salvador. El Salvador is in the process of selecting a military attache to be posted to Honduras. This exchange should assist the sharing of information and improve cooperation.

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3. (U) Prospects for cooperation.

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b. (U) Honduran View.

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(2) (C) Refugee Relocation. Honduras has borne the brunt of the refugee burden with the refugee population reaching a level in excess of 21,000. The Honduran ~~Government~~ and Armed Forces are cognizant that the relocation of refugees away from the Honduras -El Salvador border would contribute to slowing the flow of arms and material^s to Salvadoran insurgents, reduce the present ^{insurgent} rest and recreation aspects of refugee camps, and afford more effective administrative control over the refugees. Nonetheless, faced with serious economic decline and governmental austerity measures, the costs associated with relocation

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represent a significant impediment toward realizing this objective which is mutually shared by the Governments of Honduras and El Salvador.

c. (C) Guatemalan View. The insurgency in Guatemala is growing in scope and intensity. Like El Salvador, the Guatemalan Armed Force, plagued with a shortage of leadership and resources, is finding it difficult to sustain military operations and [the] training concurrently. Even though the Guatemalan military recognizes and appreciates the regional aspects of the armed insurgency, its focus is almost totally internal. Guatemalan military cooperation [military cooperation] with El Salvador and Honduras, possibly would increase if insurgent [s] efforts in the western areas of El Salvador become more active or if the volume of arms and materiel [g] flowing across Honduran or Salvadoran borders into Guatemala were to threaten Guatemalan military operations and objectives.

d. (C) Common View. One view wherein El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are in total agreement concerns Nicaragua. All hold the belief that Nicaragua's military build-up, supported by generous Cuban, Soviet, and East European assistance, is for offensive purposes. All contend that Nicaragua's newly developed and growing capability to project its power regionally constitutes a threat to regional stability and national sovereignty. All suspect Nicaraguan intentions and fear its growing military strength. Thus, the threat of Nicaragua, and not the threat of armed insurgency, may prove to be the greater catalyst for promoting formal agreements and mechanisms that will make effective regional military cooperation a reality.

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BOLSONES AND REFUGEE CENTERS

1. (U) Background.

a. (U) The Bolsones. The disputed pockets of territory located along the internationally recognized land border between Honduras and El Salvador are generally referred to as the "bolsones." The bolsones problem has its origin in the rugged terrain of the Honduras - El Salvador land border which has historically made border delimitation a point for potential dispute. This potential for dispute, fueled by uncontrolled Salvadoran migration into the ill defined border areas, and heated emotions over a soccer match between Honduras and El Salvador, culminated in the 100 hour Soccer War of 1969. Upon termination of the war, the Organization of American States (OAS), mediated a demilitarized zone extending three kilometers on each side of the internationally recognized land border. The 30 October 1980 General Peace Treaty between Honduras and El Salvador ended the official state of ^{belligerency} ~~belligerency~~ stemming from the 1969 Soccer War. The Treaty also defined their common boundary in those border areas where the two governments were in agreement. Those border areas where the two governments were not in agreement were omitted from the Treaty but with the proviso that a commission be established for the purpose of delimiting the remaining six disputed areas by the fifth anniversary of the Treaty (1985). These six zones, of which four are most commonly referred to as "bolsones," are as indicated:

(1) (U) The delta area of the Goascoran River located in the area of the Gulf of Fonseca which borders the Department of La Union.

(2) (U) Dolores-Monteca Bolson (54.8 Sq KM) which borders the

Department of La Union.

(3) (U) Sabanetas Bolson (184.4 Sq KM) which borders the Department of Morazan.

(4) (U) Zazalapa Bolson (51 Sq KM) which borders the Department of Chalatenango.

(5) (U) Las Pilas Bolson (38.1 Sq KM) located at the headwaters of the Sumpul River which borders the Department of Chalatenango.

(6) (U) Tepanguicir, a small area located in the tri-border region of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador which borders the Departments of Chalatenango and Santa Ana.

b. (U) The Refugee Situation. The refugee situation has its origins in the Soccer War of 1969. The 100 hours of hostilities displaced portions of the civilian populace along the Honduras - El Salvador border, particularly in the area of the present bolsones. During the twelve year post war period, a number of refugee centers have been supported by various international organizations and charities. Refugee centers located in Honduras have included San Marcos de Ocotepeque, Valladolid, Colomoncagua, Mapulaca, and La Virginia. In general, the number of refugees declined over the years until 1979, when political violence in El Salvador bloomed in earnest.

2. (C) The Bolsones Problem. The four bolsones, Dolores-Monteca, Sabanetas, Zazalapa, and Las Pilas are no longer problems related solely to disputed territory. The armed insurgency in El Salvador, aided and abetted by the infiltration of arms, materiel, and personnel across the Honduras - El Salvador border, has added a military dimension to the problem of the bolsones. Treated as a "no

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man's land" by the Governments of Honduras and El Salvador, the Salvadoran insurgents have been quick to take advantage of this situation. They now routinely occupy the bolsones and have established supply bases, training camps, and operational headquarters within the bolsones to support the insurgency in El Salvador. A second dimension of the bolsones problem is the refugee centers located in Honduras. The centers' proximity to the bolsones and their loose administration have made it possible for the Salvadoran insurgents to take advantage of their resources. Family members and supporters of the insurgents who reside in the centers allegedly offer them food, medicines, and a safe haven for rest and recreation. Thus, the Salvadoran High Command views the refugee centers, particularly those located at Valladolid and Colomocagua, and the insurgent occupation of the bolsones, as mutually supporting dimensions of the problem. This view of the High Command is given credence by the observations (b)1

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3. (U) Prospects for Resolution. The resolution of the refugee and military dimensions of the bolsones problem will certainly require cooperation between Honduras and El Salvador, time, and resources. Toward this end, certain prospects offer promise.

a. (U) The Salvadoran High Command has urged the Government of Honduras to relocate the refugee centers near the border further into Honduran territory and to exercise better administrative measures to control the freedom of movement in and out of the refugee centers. The Government of Honduras has been receptive to these urgings, but has been slow to act due to the associated costs.

b. (U) A basis for bilateral cooperation on the bolsones problem has been established in the cooperative military-to-military relationship which presently exists between the Armed Forces of Honduras and El Salvador. This relationship has witnessed several meetings of the Chiefs of Staff, a continuing professional dialogue between the Chiefs of Staff, and the coordination, albeit very limited, of commanders at the local/tactical level along the border.

c. (C) US mobile training team support for the Honduran Armed Forces' arms

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interdiction training program, which commenced in July 1981 and is scheduled to conclude in March 1982, represents an important first step toward countering trans-border infiltration. It is developing basic skills that could, with additional advanced training and supportive equipment, lead to improved interdiction and border control operations. The enhancement of Honduran capabilities will not only improve its unilateral efforts toward addressing the military dimension of the bolsones problem, but provide a basis for future combined border operations with El Salvador.

4. (U) Inhibitors to Resolution. The prospects for resolution of the bolsones refugee and military dimensions will be influenced by the following inhibitors.

a. (C) The declining Honduran economy and the concomitant financial woes of the Government of Honduras place the relocation of the refugee centers and their improved administration beyond the capability of the Government of Honduras to support. Without the provision of external financial assistance, relocation probably will not occur.

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c. (C) The terrain of the bolsones is characterized by its ruggedness and inaccessibility. This physical factor, coupled with the inherent tactical intelligence and logistical weaknesses of both the Honduran and Salvadoran Armed Forces, make the effective execution and sustainment of either unilateral or combined military operations difficult at best.

5. (C) Impact on Strategy. Failure to adequately resolve or even address the bolsones problem will preclude full accomplishment of the El Salvador National Military Strategy. Three of the Strategy's thirteen short term objectives which recognize the dependency between public order and the ability to deny the insurgents external support and safe havens, are directly tied to the effective resolution of the bolsones problem. all things considered, there is little likelihood of substantive resolution of the bolsones problem within the short or mid-term.

CURRENT STRATEGY

1. (C) General. Prior to the initiation of the bilateral strategy formulation process, there had been no formal articulation of a National Military Strategy. However, a de facto military strategy had informally emerged as the Armed Force directed its efforts toward the following military objectives:

a. (C) Prevent the isolation of the ~~Eastern~~ geographical region of the country.

b. (C) Prevent the establishment of an insurgent "liberated" zone in the Department of Morazan, which could lead to international recognition of the insurgents as a belligerent force.

c. (C) Protect the economic infrastructure of the country and its national resources to avoid economic/political collapse of the government. This implies protection of the key hydroelectric dams/facilities of Cerron Grande and Cinco de Noviembre, as well as the electrical transmission grid; harvest processing centers such as coffee ^ebenficios, sugar mills, and cotton warehouses; and key bridges, especially those over the Lempa River which give access to the ~~Eastern~~ region of the country. This concept is articulated in the Armed Force's plan for the protection of the harvest [code named "Plan Oro".]

d. (C) Protect the security and legitimacy of the March 1982 constituent election and the government which ultimately emerges.

e. (C) Protect selected rural towns and villages.

f. (C) Interdict the insurgent land and sea (especially the Gulf of Fonseca) infiltration routes used to move arms, personnel, and materiel into El Salvador.

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g. (C) Prevent the insurgents from gaining domestic and/or international psychological victory over the Government of El Salvador which has fallen target ^{to} of an extensive and effective propaganda campaign designed to promote insurgent legitimacy and external support.

h. (C) Establish informal coordination with the Armed Forces of Guatemala and Honduras to initiate regional military coordination, exchanges of information, and ultimately combined operations along the common border areas. In this regard, the main concerns are the insurgent occupation and use of the bolsones and the relocation of refugee camps located near the El Salvador-Honduras border.

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1. (C) Prepare to defend the national territory against a conventional armed invasion from Nicaragua.

2. (U) Operational Application.

a. (C) The operational application of the aforementioned objectives of the Armed Force's de facto military strategy has been a strategic and tactical defense with occasional large scale (four to twenty-two companies) offensive operations in response to insurgent activities.

b. (C) With more than 40 percent of combat forces utilized in static defensive positions, this strategic and tactical defense posture has made effective utilization of available resources difficult. The fact that both the Public Security Forces and the Military Services report to the same minister has served

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to blur their respective responsibilities, increasing rather than decreasing, the commitment of the regular Army to a static defensive role. To^a significant degree, the Army has been coopted into performing missions more appropriate to the^{Public} security forces. The internal defense principle of the offensive through aggressive small unit operations, both day and night has been over^lshadowed by a defensive mentality.

3. (C) The demands of the war have necessitated the creation of new combat units. However, required expansion and effectiveness have been limited by a severe shortage of junior leaders and the compromise of formalized training, which occupies a low priority and, consequently, is seldom accomplished. In a spirit of national survival, the Armed Force High Command has adopted a strateg^eically defensive posture, forsaking long term capabilities for short term urgent requirements. This posture does not provide for winning; to the contrary, it reinforces the insurgent strategy of protracted warfare. Time, within the critical context of popular support, seems to favor the insurgent. The continued attrition of national resources increase the possibility of military defeat via economic and political collapse.

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SUMMARY OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND
SUPPORTING RATIONAL FOR REQUIREMENTS

1. (U) General. The El Salvador National Military Strategy was developed using the classical approach for strategy formulation. A strategy formulation guide was designed by the Team and utilized throughout the bilateral strategy formulation process to produce a written strategy. The written strategy articulated by the Armed Force General-Staff is ²~~(c)~~ titled "Formulation of the National Military Strategy of the Government of the Republic of El Salvador" (hereafter referred to as the Strategy) and is contained in two volumes.

2. (U) A review of each volume with a brief description of its contents follows:

a. (U) Volume 1.

(1) (C) Introduction. A general statement of principles, based on the Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador, for conducting the affairs of the Ministry of Defense and Public Security, thereby demonstrating the legitimacy of the Strategy.

(2) (C) National Purpose. To maintain a democratic, representative state which will improve liberty, health, culture, economic well being, and social justice.

(3) (U) National Interests. Delineated by political, economic, social, and military interests.

(a)(c) Political. Achieve democracy by authentically free elections while establishing close, cordial relations with friendly governments.

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(b) (C) Economics⁶. Achieve economic stability while supporting the economic reforms, increasing productive (private) sector participation in the government, and promoting increased national and international confidence in the credit worthiness of the Government of El Salvador.

(c) (C) Social. Implant regard for human rights, fortify social^o economic reforms, and improve the culture, health and social well being.

(d) (C) Military. Pacify the country to permit political, economic, and social development; protect the electoral process; and improve the military posture to provide national security.

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(5) (C) Military Objectives. The military objectives vital to the Strategy are enumerated⁶ for the short, mid, and long term. These objectives are judged to be feasible and achievable and form the basis upon which the Strategy is

built. (See Inclosure 15).

(6) (C) Objectives and Military Concepts. Each of the objectives, in order of importance and by short, mid, and long term, are conceptualized in considerable detail. The intent is that separate plans will eventually be prepared to achieve each of these objectives. In the interim, the concepts are prepared in sufficient detail to ensure adequate guidance for preparing the implementation plans as well as determining the resources required to support concept implementation.

(7) (C) Current Armed Force Situation. Divided into functional parts (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics), this section describes in considerable detail the current friendly situation, to include strengths and weaknesses.

(a) (C) Personnel. Includes a description of present strengths, recruiting, the Territorial Service, Civil Defense force, morale, and services. An annex describes the organization and strength of all military units to include the ^{Public} security forces.

(b) (C) Intelligence. Describes what actually exists but fails to fully address the shortcomings in intelligence.

(c) (C) Operations. Explains in stark terms the real world situation of the Armed Force and its capability to conduct military operations. While depicting the situation truthfully, the operational section ends by noting correctly that in spite of the limitations mentioned, the Armed Force has made considerable progress in the fight against the insurgents. A detailed explanation of the training situation, outlining the courses normally available in the *Armed Force Education Center* [Center of Military Studies] but which now is closed due to war fighting require

ments, is also provided.

(d) (C) Logistics. Describes the logistics system to include combat support services. This description is followed by charts showing, by type item, the authorized level, on-hand, and requirements with cost data. This information is provided for the Army, Air Force, Navy, National Guard, National Police, and Treasury Police.

b. (U) Volume II. This volume continues in the same format of Volume I.

(1) (C) Requirements. Identifies for each of the four Armed Force General Staff Directorates (D-I, D-II, D-III, and D-IV) the requirements to support the Strategy as dictated by the implementation concepts. These requirements were prepared after prioritization of the implementation concepts in order of their criticality to achieving the strategy. Thus, command control is the first priority of the strategy; and therefore, has the highest priority for resources.

(2) (C) Personnel. Identifies the requirements by field grade officers, company grade officers, and enlisted to support the Strategy and explains how the shortage of officers, which is the principal limiting factor for implementing the Strategy, can be solved. In an annex, the salary costs required by the increased force structure are shown.

(3) (C) Intelligence. Displays in two parts the personnel and equipment requirements to establish the recommended intelligence system.

(4) (C) Operations. Details the organizational and boundary changes needed to implement the Strategy and outlines the training required. Other portions deal with Navy and Air Force organizational requirements.

(5) (C) Logistics. Depicts the requirement for establishing a Logistics

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Support Command to pull together under one operational command the execution of logistical support. The total organization to include personnel, equipment, and related costs is shown. Annexes show Army requirements, by unit, in the areas of quartermaster, signal, weapons, and vehicles. Air Force and Navy needs are discussed in separate annexes.

(6) (C) Third Country Support. Explores the assistance reasonably to be expected from third countries. Except for training, there is very little third country assistance on the horizon.

(7) (C) Shortfall. Annexes show the requirement, the shortfalls in the areas of personnel, intelligence, and logistics. ^{In} operations, a chart depicts the current situation, requirement, and shortfall for every type of Army unit as well as aircraft and patrol boats needed to implement the Strategy. These shortfalls are listed in strategic priority and by implementation concept option.

(8) (C) Implementation. Summarizes the necessary personnel, intelligence, operations, logistical requirements to implement the Strategy, and time phases the requirements by strategic priority expressed in short, mid, and long term time frames. Three options are provided:

No 1: Current situation; survive, avoid defeat.

No 2: Gain the initiative; break the insurgent strategy of "protracted war"

No 3: Strategic victory, Destroy the insurgent will and capability to fight, and defend the national territory from internal and external aggression.

(a) (C) Personnel. Charts provide the requirements by unit and branch for

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each option. Explanation is provided as to how these requirements can be satisfied.

(b) (C) Intelligence. Discusses the implementation requirements that are presented in the personnel and logistics sections.

(c) (C) Operations. Charts depict the training plan to accomplish each military objective.

(d) (C) Logistics. Charts show the materiel requirements and the associated costs, as well as the yearly sustaining costs for each option.

(e) (C) Training. Charts provide training requirements in support of force expansion and modernization.

(9) (C) Risk Assessment. Explains what each option will accomplish or not accomplish and what the risks are if something less than the strategic victory option is supported by external sources.

(10) (C) Summary of the Options. Depicts the three options in comparative format, providing a quick review of how they differ and what they cost.

3. (C) Requirements Rationale. Total requirements were driven by the military objectives selected to accomplish the mission. These objectives were war gamed within the context of the threat analysis to determine the number of friendly units (expressed in terms of infantry battalions) required to deal with the threat in each military zone and the force required to stay in the area to maintain control once it is established. In this entire process, the principles of economy of force and mass were carefully observed to keep to a minimum the total number of units ultimately needed. In this manner, the number of battalions required to gain and maintain control in each military zone and their proposed

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deployment site were decided. It was determined that the required number of infantry battalions for the El Salvador Army is twenty-five, consisting of twenty-two regular infantry battalions and ^{three} [3] quick reaction battalions.

Similarly, the number of combat support, combat service support, Air Force, and Navy units required were determined and their optimum locations suggested.

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COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SYSTEM

1. (C) General. The Armed Force combat service support (CSS) system is characterized by over centralization, lack of uniform policies and standard operating procedures, and the absence of well defined logistics channels between supported and supporting units. Consequently, the CSS system is cumbersome, slow to respond, and disjointed. This has encouraged the common practice of units requesting support directly from national centers or depots without regard to established command or logistical channels. Furthermore, there are also instances of some brigade units performing all levels of maintenance, to include depot level repairs, while other brigade units are not even performing organizational level repairs.

2. (S) Current CSS System. The support base for the current CSS system is consolidated at the national level and consists of a number of national level maintenance centers and supply depots which are responsible for the various combat service support functions.

The Armed Force Ordnance Center (Maestranza) is responsible for maintenance (less signal), transportation and supply of Classes III (fuels), and IX (repair parts, less signal). The Armed Force Signal Training Center (CITFA), is responsible for signal maintenance and Class IX (signal repair parts). The Quartermaster Depot is responsible for Class II (clothing and textiles) and Class IV (construction material). Class V (ammunition) is stored in the War Materiel Depot in San Salvador and distributed through forward deployed detachments. The Subsistence Depot stocks supply Class I (rations), while the Health Services Center is responsible for all medical supplies and services.

The consolidation of the CSS support base at the

national level is further centralized in that the Armed Force General Staff exercises control and authority over all of the national level maintenance centers and supply depots. This consolidation of support and centralized control and authority have hindered development of CSS capabilities at the brigade and battalion levels to the point that they are generally non-existent.

Consequently, the Army has demonstrated the ability to support and sustain only a single battalion sized task force operation for a limited period (generally two to three days). Even the limited scope of a single battalion sized task force operation has required considerable planning, coordination, and time to pool CSS resources. The capability to sustain logistically multiple battalion sized operations concurrently has not been demonstrated.

3. (U) Planned CSS System.

a. (S) Concept. Recognizing the logistical disadvantages and operational limitations of the current CSS system and the need to better integrate CSS resources with unit requirements, the Armed Force High Command is considering the adoption of a Logistics Support Command concept. Under this concept, the Logistics Support Command will be responsible for providing direct, general, and depot level CSS to the Armed Force. The Command will include the Armed Force Ordnance Center; Health Service Center; Quartermaster, War Material², and Subsistence Depots; and initially, three Regional Logistics Detachments. The Regional Logistics Detachments will be assigned responsibility for the logistical support of specified brigade zones and be centrally located within their assigned regions. This will allow dedicated and more responsive combat service support to brigade units. Eventually, three additional Regional Logistics

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Detachments will be created in order to provide a logistics detachment for each of the six brigade zones. The detachments will be organic to and under the direct command control of the Logistics Support Command. As part of this integrated logistical effort, each brigade will have, as an organic element, a Logistics Support Company. The company will be responsible for providing CSS up to direct support level to brigade elements. The Logistics Support Command will also have responsibility for providing specialized training, assignment control, and career management for all logistics personnel.

b. (S) Functions. The function of the Logistics Support Command's national centers and depots will be to provide depot level CSS to the Armed Force. The Command's Regional Logistics Detachments will provide general CSS to brigade and separate units of assigned military zones and direct CSS to separate units. This support will include maintenance, transportation, supply Classes I through X, and medical services. Specific maintenance support will include vehicles, weapons, and communications-electronics equipment. Any brigade equipment requiring depot level support will be processed and forwarded by the supporting Regional Logistics Detachment to the depot responsible for that type of maintenance. Separate units will request required services directly from their supporting Regional Logistics Detachment.

c. (S) Command Relationships. The Commander, Logistics Support Command, will be responsible for logistics operations, exercise direct command control over all personnel and functions of the Command, and report directly to the Armed Force Chief of Staff. The Director, Department of Logistics (D-IV) of the Armed Force General Staff, will be responsible for development, review, and

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implementation of logistics doctrine and policies. This relationship^{will}~~would~~ establish a clearly defined logistics chain~~of~~ command, delineate command and staff functions, and provide a mechanism for developing uniform policies and standard operating procedures and insuring their consistent application.

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THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE

1. (C) The Problem. The prospect of third country military assistance presents a dichotomy between the advantages of demonstrative hemispheric and international support for the Government of El Salvador in its struggle against externally supported insurgency plus non-reliance on a sole materiel and training source and the disadvantage of the resultant lack of standardization in doctrine and materiel.

2. (U) The Problem Examined.

a. (C) As a non-producer of military hardware, diversified sources of training and materiel protect against the sudden loss of a dominant or single source, as occurred in March 1977, when the Government of El Salvador unilaterally terminated US security assistance. This action was a response to the perception that US efforts to insure legitimate elections and to improve human rights were an infringement of the national sovereignty. Additionally, the Government of El Salvador believes that diversified sources of military assistance would serve to counter the perception of international isolation. Nevertheless, the resulting lack of standardization of materiel would create severe spare parts and maintenance support problems that would seriously strain the Armed Force's already heavily burdened logistics support system. The impact of diversified training sources, though less in magnitude, could produce some operational dysfunction by fostering mixed doctrine and procedures.

b. (C) Since the resumption of US security assistance to El Salvador in November 1979, diversified materiel sources have decreased markedly. (b)1

(b)1

[REDACTED] (b)1 [REDACTED]

Third country training has continued on a relatively modest scale, with Salvadoran military students receiving professional development, police, and strategic and combat intelligence training. Presently, twenty-seven Salvadoran military students are receiving training in third countries.

c. (C) Third country materiel support offers few advantages in support of El Salvador's National Military Strategy. Further diversification with the exception of ammunition, would only complicate the strained logistics support system.

d. (C) Third country training support, on the other hand, offers some distinct advantages. Police training, restricted under US law, should be continued from third country sources. Continued professional contacts with Latin American Armed Forces, through attendance at professional development courses, should be supported by the United States. This professional interaction among El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras would be particularly important to promoting regional cooperation and coordination for countering the regional aspects of the insurgent threat. Training in psychological operations and civic action, essential elements of internal defense, offers a fertile area for third country training support. Assistance from Latin American sources would afford El Salvador psychological operations and civic action training with the distinct advantage of language and cultural compatibility.

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EVALUATION OF THE FORCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN
AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

1. (C) Force Development Plan. Under careful analysis the Force Development Plan (FDP) proved to be a well-balanced, sound document. It was utilized as a base for the further study and development of strategic requirements. The objective of the FDP was to develop and upgrade, without significant expansion, the Salvadoran military force structure by providing the command control, combat, combat support, and combat service support elements necessary to man, organize, equip, train, and sustain an effective operational force. Because of budgeting restrictions and specific guidelines, the FDP did not provide all the units required to counter the insurgent threat.
2. (C) National Military Strategy. Once the strategy formulation process identified the requirements for implementation of the National Military Strategy, the FDP was utilized as the base for developing the supportive force structure. The objective of the National Military Strategy is to create an armed force which is capable of countering the present insurgent threat and of ultimately defeating the insurgency by destroying their will and capability to fight. The organization also provides the required elements to control the national territory and defend it from both internal and external aggression.
3. (U) Comparison. A comparison of the ^{current} situation, the FDP, and the National Military Strategy is at Inclosure 16. Maps showing current unit distribution, FDP unit distribution, and National Military Strategy distribution are at Inclosure 4, ¹⁷[18] and ¹⁸[19], respectively.

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VALIDATION OF THE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING REQUIREMENT

1. (U) The National Military Strategy formulation process functioned to validate, to both the US and El Salvador strategy participants, the requirement for establishing a planning and programming system within the El Salvador Armed Force. The completed Strategy, which stands as a reference source and planning guide for the programming of future requirements, affords the foundation for systematizing planning and programming procedures throughout the Armed Force.

2. (U) The bilateral strategy sessions, as they progressed from the articulation of national objectives through the prioritization of military objectives to the development of implementation concepts and the identification of attendant requirements, offered a unique learning experience. An appreciation of, and requirement for, a planning and programming system became self evident to the participating directors and members of the Armed Force General Staff.

Therefore, it is believed that they now possess sufficient knowledge to use the Strategy as a resource and guide for future planning and programming. Also, by virtue of their key staff positions, it is hoped that their knowledge of, and appreciation for, a planning and programming system will ultimately be extended to other components and command levels of the Armed Force.

3. (U) Nevertheless, one should resist the urge to become overly optimistic concerning the implantation of new attitudes and associated skills. A study of Cornell University's Vicos (Peru) experiment is a poignant testimony to the difficulty associated with the formulation and acceptance of new ideas and attitudes.

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IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPT AND
RISK ASSESSMENT

1. (U) Preface. "Should members of the guerilla command believe that they can make gains by military means, no participation in elections, no meaningful negotiations, no political solutions are likely to be forthcoming. The point is not that sustained US assistance might lead to a government military victory. It is that a political solution can only be achieved if the guerillas realize they cannot win by force of arms." (Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders, 6 July 1981)

2. (C) General. The implementation concept for the National Military Strategy is based on the prioritization of identified military objectives and supporting options that articulate levels of military capability for accomplishing the Strategy. For example, ^{because} [since] command control is considered the most glaring deficiency of the Armed Force and the most necessary to accomplish the strategy, it has been assigned top priority.

3. (U) Implementation Concept Options.

a. (C) The implementation concept is delineated into three options, each with a different level of requirements, support, and attendant risks.

(1) (C) Course of Action One: Limited survival; current situation. This course of action is little more than the current capabilities of the Armed Force to conduct internal defense operations. It does not guarantee defense of the national economic infrastructure, thereby risking economic collapse in the near term. It also does not provide positive guarantees for protecting the security of the scheduled March 1982 constituent assembly election.

(2) (C) Course of Action Two: Gain the initiative. This course of

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action provides for limited control of the national territory, partial defense of the economic infrastructure and protection of the March 1982 constituent assembly election.

(3) (C) Course of Action Three: Strategic victory. This course of action provides sufficient forces to assure the destruction of the insurgent's will and capability to fight, and guarantees public order, as well as defense of the national territory from internal or external aggression.

b. (U) Each of the concept options are time phased by short, mid, and long term. These terms are defined as follows:

(1) (U) Short Term. From present until the installation of the constituent assembly following its election in March 1982.

(2) (U) Mid Term. From the installation of the constituent assembly, following its election in March 1982, until 31 December 1983.

(3) (U) Long Term. From 1 January 1984, until 31 December 1986.

c. (U) The implementation concept options are further delineated into materiel and training requirements with associated costs provided for each option.

(1) (C) The costing of each implementation concept option is done in general terms by strategic objective, time phasing (short, mid, and long term), and by total cost of each option. The cost will require a combination of Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education^{and} Training (IMET), and grant aid funding. However, options can be adjusted to specific fiscal guidelines by referring to the prioritization of the objectives and their annotated materiel/training package and making changes as necessary.

(2) (U) A comparative synopsis of each implementation option by Military Service, and the total Armed Force is contained at inclosures 19 (Army), 20 (Air Force), 21 (Navy), and 22 (Armed Force). A summary of Armed Force options follows.

(a) (U) Materiel requirements essential to the implementation of concept three (strategic victory), with aggregated costs for each objective, are identified at Inclosure 23. The total cost per each major equipment item is provided at Inclosure 24. lastly, Inclosure 25 identifies the materiel costs for each military objective by implementation concept option. Inclosure 26 provides sustaining costs, and Inclosure 27 discusses ammunition requirements.

(b) (U) Inclosure 28 summarizes the training required to support the implementation concept. It describes the training to accomplish each military objective and lists selected Salvadoran training capabilities; US training assistance capabilities to include Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Technical Assistance Teams (TATs), Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT), attendance at Panama Canal Area Military Schools (PACAMs), training in CONUS; and third country training assistance. Indicated for each training line is the recommended composition/number of students, duration, statement of training mission, as appropriate, frequency of sustainment, and the particular implementation course of action which the training supports.

4. (U) Risk Assessment. Risk assessment for each implementation concept of the National Military Strategy follows:

a. (S) Course of Action No. 1: The Current Situation of the Armed Force. The means and capabilities currently available to the Armed Force will permit survival (or avoid defeat) for a limited period. The Armed Force will not be able to guarantee the defense of the economic infrastructure, with the attendant possibility of economic collapse. It will also be difficult to guarantee the 1982 electoral process. Lacking the capability to reestablish public and judicial order in all the national territory, the military will be forced to submit to the Communist strategy of the *protracted war* which eventually could result in the fall of the country.

b. (S) Course of Action no. 2: Achieve and Maintain the Initiative. This course of action provides for 22 infantry battalions with associated combat support and combat service support elements. A Logistics Support Command framework with one logistics detachment will be created. Air Force and Navy elements will be increased moderately. This will provide the capability to gain the initiative in the war against the insurgents and will permit gaining and maintaining partial control of the national territory. It will guarantee the 1982 electoral process but will provide for only a partial defense of the economic infrastructure with the associated risks which that entails.

c. (S) Course of Action No. 3: Strategic Victory. This course of action provides for 25 infantry battalions, and required combat support and combat service support units to include a Logistics Support Command with three detachments. The Air Force and Navy will be increased substantially in size and

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effectiveness. This will permit the destruction of the insurgent forces and their capability and will to continue fighting. In this manner, the military objective to "reestablish public and judicial order in all the national territory" will be fully achieved as well as the objective to "establish the operational capability to defend the national territory from internal or external aggression."

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

a. (U) Mission.

(1) (C/NOFORN) The success of the mission exceeded expectations. The El Salvador National Military Strategy was developed bilaterally by the Strategy Assistance Team and the Salvadoran Armed Force General Staff and was endorsed by the Armed Force High Command. It is a sound, pragmatic strategy that can be implemented by the Government of El Salvador, if supported by the United States.

(2) (C/NOFORN) The success of the mission should be judged more in terms of the process-that leading to strategy ownership-than in the product. It was this process which may make the most significant long term impact on the institution. The Salvadoran Armed Force General Staff developed an appreciation for, received training in, and now has the experience of developing a strategy-their own National Military Strategy.

(3) (U) An implementation concept was developed which provides guidance to US programmers for any selected level of materiel and training support.

(4) (U) This report enlarges upon the Strategy and contributes substantially to the US strategic knowledge of the Salvadoran military situation.


b. (U) Prognostications.

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THOUGHTS

1. (U) Thank you, Karl Von Clausewitz and Colonel Harry Summers. Harry Summers' book, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, resurrected Clausewitz from the forgotten hours of Military History-I. It is a superb book, brilliantly measuring U.S. strategy in Vietnam against the Principles of War and the writings of Clausewitz. This book, more than any other source, contributed to my understanding of the mission. Thank you, Harry, and you, too, Karl.

2. (U) Strategy and Doctrine.

a. (U) General. Normally, strategy will be based upon doctrine that is derived from accepted principles of war. Whereas in El Salvador, a body of doctrine does not exist, the principles of war, without benefit of their elaboration into doctrine, must serve as the foundation upon which the strategy is built. Conscious effort was made to avoid casual transfer of US doctrine to the Salvadoran internal defense campaign, given the distinctive capabilities of the two nations. Nevertheless, in a combined effort of this nature, one cannot and should not deny himself the full reservoir of his professional knowledge derived from education, training, and experience.

b. (U) Significance. The significance of an absence of Salvadoran doctrine on internal defense is that there correspondingly is no common institutionally accepted methodology nor norms for executing the strategy. Implementation, therefore, is dependent on the orders and supervision of the High Command, which already is beyond its capabilities because of exaggerated centralization and span of control.

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3. (U) Defense and Defeat. In a war in which both sides are tactically on the defensive, victory will come to whomever is favored by time. This will introduce many variables beyond direct control, but perhaps the most important is the attitude of the populous. If one side, however, is strategically on the offensive, it will certainly have the advantage of freedom of action leading to decisive victory.
4. (U) Strategy and Institutional Values. For the military strategy of a nation to be relevant, it must be consistent with the Armed Forces institutional values. These values may be contrary to US concepts and precepts of professionalism.
5. (U) Transitory Professionalism. Events in El Salvador illustrate the transitory character of military professionalism within a small armed force whose internal, institutional orientation deprives it of the sustaining influence to be experienced through a sense of loyalty to an entity greater than itself--the nation. Institutionally oriented, the military's professionalism suffers tremendously under the attack of conflicting political, economic, or social views and variables of external influences such as US military assistance. The El Salvadoran military, until recently considered the most professional in Central America, has become a shell of its former professional capabilities. This occurred during the past few years as a result of its being subjected to conflicting views on national integration and deprived of US security assistance.
6. (U) Quality of an Armed Force. The briefing I received in preparation for this mission, assessing deficiencies in the Central American military's pro-

professionalism, were dusted off versions of 1961, and were still, or once again, accurate. The quality of an ~~armed~~ force will be reflective of the society from which it comes and which it serves (or exploits). To expect an extra^cordinarily higher standard of performance by the military is to guarantee future disappointment and frustration.

7. (U) *Prospects for Institutional Change.* If tempted to anticipate a new socio-political orientation for the Armed Force of El Salvador, a splash of Walter Lippmann's cold observation on nations (read military institution) will aid in maintaining perspective: "...the behavior of nations (military institutions) over a long period of time is the most reliable, though not the only index of their national interests. For though their interests are not eternal, they are remarkably persistent. We can most nearly judge what a nation (military) will probably want by seeing what over a fairly long period of time it has wanted; we can most nearly predict what it will do by knowing what it has usually done... Even when they adapt themselves to a new situation, their new behavior is likely to be a modification rather than a transformation of their old behavior."

(Walter Lippmann, U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943, p. 138.)

8. (U) A unique revolution? Salvador may be unique in having initiated economic reforms that may lead to revolutionary social change in the absence of political consensus. Normally, the struggle thus provoked would almost always be between those who favor and those who oppose substantive political, economic, and social change. However, in El Salvador's case, the advocating military (no matter the degree of unwilling cooperation) are violently opposed by both those

who profess to be in the vanguard of revolutionary change and those who adversely fight for the status quo.

9. (U) The military as ppseudo-modernizers. The El Salvadoran military does not think strategically and exhibits little institutional identification with the current theories of linkage between national security and socio-economic development that have emanated from the larger military institutions of South America, particularly Brazil and Peru. Nor, in fact, is there the institutional capacity to form the civil-military technocracy that has characterized these strategies of national integration. Rather, the institution seems committed to the agrarian and banking reforms as a necessary evil to avoid catalysmic change to society. Their mentality seems more anti-Communistic than developmentalistic in their tenuous association with the radical enemy of yesterday, the Christian Democratic Party. The role of pseudo-modernizer originated with the Revolution of 1948, and has periodically resurfaced only to be suppressed by the stronger and more conservative factions within the Armed Force. In this pseudo-modernizing role, the military has, at times, advocated modest socio-economic reforms that would not have fundamentally altered the structure of society nor infringed upon the privileged oligarchy. This strategy of "controlled revolution" was both dependent upon and made possible by the commonality of attitude and purpose shared by the military and the privileged sector (Los Catorce). Both were driven by an instinct for survival, one for the institution, the other for a life-style; neither by a true sense of nationalism. Now that the oligarchy's absolute power has been broken definitively, the military is in a state of limbo, not knowing upon whom to transfer their allegiance. Most cer-

tainly the pact with the Christian Democratic Party is one of convenience, necessity, and pain; and if it were not for its amazing 21-month survival, would be easily discounted as one more Latin American futile political grasp at a desperate accommodation. The concept of nation does not have deep roots. The military remains fundamentally oriented on institutional preservation and is yet without a sense of direction on how and with whom this is to be achieved.

10. (U) Importance of Elections. While the United States places great significance on the constituent assembly elections from our own cultural faith in the democratic process, El Salvadoran culture and practical experience of a half century of electoral fraud will impart a tone of suspicion, mistrust, and cynicism in the minds of the people. The result of these differing perceptions may cause the United States to draw overly optimistic conclusions from a successfully accomplished election.

11. (U) Popular support for the military. I was unable to come to a personal evaluation of the degree of support the military enjoys from the civilian populous. However, having heard so often the Armed Force's thesis of its good relations, I am tempted to give it some credibility. This confidence is pervasive throughout the military at all levels of command and in all cuartels with the single exception of Chalatenango. Nevertheless, there is a basic contradiction. Given the density of population in El Salvador, good relations between the military and populous should make the rural area an unsafe, hostile environment for the insurgent. Such does not seem to be the case.

12. (U) Mission Irony. In a sense, the importance that the Minister of Defense gave to the strategy worked against its efficient development in that he

assigned his principal staff officers to the task. They, however, were unable to divorce themselves from the demands of current operations. Furthermore, there was no institutional tradition to provide for the delegation of authority, even in the realm of normal staff responsibility for making recommendations. Thus, during the absence of the principals, very little was accomplished.

13. (U) Fear of too much help. With a few exceptions, I have not detected a concern over potential US military intervention. I wonder how far below the surface of sovereign confidence it lays dormant?

14. (U) Strategic Dependence. The El Salvador National Military Strategy's dependence on the United States for materiel and training support, to an uncomfortable degree, makes the actions of the ^{Government} ~~(Governing)~~ Revolutionary Junta and its successor directly answerable to the American electorate. Care must be taken, as evil as this condition is, that it does not evolve into a condition of reverse dependency.

15. (U) Absorptive Capacity.

a. (U) General. All reports addressing US security assistance for El Salvador, or any other country, pay homage to a group of recipient country limiting factors, collectively referred to as absorption capacity. For El Salvador, these factors include: personnel numbers (leaders); technical base; logistics capabilities; infrastructure, and financial resources, particularly sustainment costs. The aforementioned limiting factors are real, and, in most cases, can be quantified. However, their collective impact on the level of materiel and training assistance that can be productively accepted remains a subjective judgement. Dave Ronfeldt and Ceasar Sereseres in their paper, U.S.

Arms Transfers, Diplomacy, and Security in Latin America and Beyond note that, "For many years, local absorptive capacity has been treated rhetorically as a limiting factor -but in fact little empirical analysis has been undertaken."

b. (U) Analysis. The Government of El Salvador National Military Strategy has been developed with cognizance of the military personnel, operational, and logistical capabilities; but it has not yet been considered systematically within the context of the Government of El Salvador national budget. The Vice President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Force has noted this requirement, and indicated that it would be done. The strategy is optimal, but still pragmatic. At the indicated levels of US support, the Government of El Salvador can absorb the materiel and training, and the Strategy can be executed. Nonetheless, the tolerance associated with national culture, pride, and sovereignty for absorbing large scale infusion of foreign military assistance must be respected. Attempted assistance, no matter the intent, that violates these ill-defined cultural limits, could nurture a dysfunctional degree of dependency, produce the abdication of responsibility by the Armed Force High Command, and rekindle historic concern over US infringement of national sovereignty. Thus, US security assistance must be prudently applied to guard against the situation wherein we, in our willingness to help, become a ^{men}en^{ce} in our own right.

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3 September 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Terms of Reference for El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team (U)

1. (C) Reference a memorandum* requesting the Joint Staff to coordinate on proposed Terms of Reference for the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team and take necessary action to nominate the personnel who will compose the team as outlined.
2. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are acutely aware that the challenges facing the Government of El Salvador involve political, economic, and social factors, as well as military ones. However, since these former issues are not to be addressed by this Strategy Team, they should be examined separately. Military strategy, by itself, can only provide a portion of the overall solution.
3. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you approve the terms of reference as modified in the Appendix for use by the team to develop a national military strategy for El Salvador.
4. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be prepared to nominate qualified team members by 4 September 1981 for deployment on 11 September 1981.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

JAMES E. DALTON
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

Attachment

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Reference:

- * Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, (International Security Affairs), I-08248/81, 26 August 1961, "El Salvador: Terms of Reference (TOR) for a National Military Strategy Assistance Team (U)"

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APPENDIX

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR EL SALVADOR
MILITARY STRATEGY ASSISTANCE TEAM (U)

1. (U) Introduction

a. (C) As a result of recent exchanges of cables between the Department of State and the US Embassy in San Salvador and recent Washington consultations, it is concluded that the United States is clearly at a plateau in its military effort in support of the Government of El Salvador (GOES). The United States has, over the past 6 months, helped the Army turn back the initial attack by the insurgents, begun efforts at refurbishing the armed forces' arsenal, provided limited mobility training, and instituted military-to-military cooperation. This was accomplished with approximately \$35 million of military assistance, including provision of equipment from the US arsenal under Section 506(a) of the Arms Export Control Act and with a small security assistance role that has never exceeded 57 personnel. There is evidence that the war is essentially stalemated and the battle is now one of attrition.

b. (C) The President of El Salvador, along with US officials, has been especially concerned about the lack of an overall strategic plan that will chart the course for the GOES over the next few months and years, and has requested assistance in such a planning process. Although the High Command just completed a Force Development Plan (FDP) that doubles the size of the Army by 1985, there is clearly a requirement for an overall strategy review.

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Therefore, the United States should react quickly by
sending a team to assist the GOES High Command in a
review of its strategic military planning. The FDP will
be a key document but it must be further developed to
provide interim objectives and priorities and to prepare
an implementation plan for the outyears and review the
assumptions on which the FDP is based. By assisting the
GOES in this strategic review and planning process, both
the GOES and the US Government will be in a better
position to insure coordinated actions to achieve common
goals and objectives.

c. (C) Based on these considerations, the President of El
Salvador has requested assistance in developing a national
military strategy, and by approving these terms of
reference (TOR) the Secretaries of State and Defense have
approved the request.

d. (C) The Secretary of Defense will task the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to dispatch a team to advise the GOES as
it develops its national military strategy and to recommend
military priorities for the outyears and assumptions on
which to base a plan.

e. (C) The team is authorized to discuss in detail
with appropriate US and GOES authorities the total
defense requirements as envisaged by the GOES. However,
the team is not authorized to make any commitment on
behalf of the US Government and should take care not
to stimulate unrealistic expectations of US assistance
on the part of the GOES

2. (C) Designation. "El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance
Team" (hereinafter referred to as the Team).

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3. (U) Mission

a. (C) The mission of the Team is to assist the GOES in assessing the military situation and identifying El Salvador near-, mid-, and long-term military strategies to defend its territory within internationally recognized borders. The end result must be a GOES product, conceived and produced by the GOES and endorsed by the High Command, which can be managed and implemented by the GOES. Such a plan will also assist the US Embassy, USSOUTHCOM, and Washington in programming the necessary funding and materiel support. The Team function is to be one of assisting in developing an integrated, coherent strategic plan with implementation annexes.

b. (C) Working realistically within El Salvadoran equipment and training absorption capability, US and El Salvadoran budgetary constraints, and the military and cultural tradition in El Salvador, the plan should also review from the El Salvador perspective the problems of dealing with interdiction of insurgent logistic support from outside El Salvador, the role of intelligence, the need for more mobility, additional firepower, command and control, and the critical area of personnel shortages.

(1) (C) Identify the short-, mid-, and long-term military objectives.

(2) (C) Analyze the current and projected military situation in El Salvador.

(3) (C) Establish the parameters of a military strategy compatible with the overall national strategy.

(4) (C) Review the missions of the armed/security forces and the adequacy of their organizational and operational capabilities.

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- (5) (C) Determine the effectiveness of the command and control mechanism of the GOES Armed Forces, including planning and conducting integrated operations. 1
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3
- (6) (C) Determine the critical events and elements of the economic and political infrastructure requiring major military efforts that are key to the military strategy, such as the harvest and elections. 4
5
6
7
- (7) (C) Determine the force structure to accomplish the military strategy. 8
9
- (8) (C) Identify specific constraints on force development. 10
- (9) (C) Determine the materiel requirements, especially in the short term. 11
12
- (10) (C) Determine the training requirements to support the planning. 13
14
- (11) (C) Cost out the course or courses of action suggested. 15
- (12) (C) Relate costs to the Salvadoran economic capabilities. 16
17
- (13) (C) Determine financial resources, material, and manpower bases available. 18
19
- (14) (C) Recommend force levels, within the identified constraints, that correct current inadequacies, with special attention to priorities for utilizing FY 1982 FMS and International Military Education and Training. 20
21
22
23
- (15) (C) Review the civil-military relationship as an element of the military strategy. 24
25
- (16) (C) Validate the need for a planning and programming system for current and future needs. 26
27
- (17) (C) Assess the role of regional military cooperation 28

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(18) (C) Devise an "implementation concept" for the development of programs and forces consistent with a military strategy that is sensitive to resource constraints.

(19) (C) Provide timelines for accomplishment of near-, mid-, and long-term objectives established for the strategy.

4. (U) Terms of Reference

a. (U) The Team will note the current threat to El Salvador as seen by the GOES

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b. (U) The Team will hold discussions with members of the GOES and appropriate officials within its High Command and Armed Forces. The GOES should be requested to define its objectives, requirements, and priorities in detail.

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7. (C) Arrival In-Country and Duration. The team will be 1
deployed during September/October 1981, following approximately 2
3 days of Washington briefings, and remain in-country 2 to 8 3
weeks. However, the timetable will depend upon the speed 4
with which the El Salvadoran High Command can prepare 5
the necessary input and complete its strategic plan. 6
8. (U) Prebriefs/Consultations. Members of the Team will 7
be prebriefed by the Department of State, Office of the 8
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security 9
Affairs) (OASD(ISA)), OSAA, OJCS, CIA/DIA, and USSOUTHCOM, 10
as desired by the Team Chief. 11
9. (U) Command Relationships 12
- a. (U) The Team Chief will be the representative of 13
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be under the direction 14
of USCINCSO. 15
- b. (U) While in El Salvador, the Team will report to 16
the Ambassador, or in his absence the Charge d'Affaires, 17
and serve under his overall supervision. All formal 18
consultations with the GOES will be conducted subject to 19
concurrence of the US Ambassador. The Ambassador, or his 20
designated representative, will have informed Salvadoran 21
officials of the Team's mission and the appropriate 22
portions of the TOR prior to the team's arrival, and will 23
request that officials be prepared to discuss the Team's 24
mission as defined in paragraph 3 and subparagraphs 4b 25
and 4c above. 26
10. (U) Operation, Administration, and Security Support 27
- a. (U) The Team will report to the US Ambassador on 28
arrival and will operate under his jurisdiction. 29
The Ambassador will request that the Team be accorded 30
privileges and immunity equivalent to those accorded to 31
the administrative and technical staff of the US Embassy 32
during its presence in El Salvador. 33

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b. (U) Civilian clothes will be worn at all times while in El Salvador.

c. (U) The US Embassy staff will arrange and coordinate administrative and logistical support in country. The Team will work out of the headquarters of the Salvadoran High Command.

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11. (U) Public Affairs, Reports, Briefings

a. (C) On an "if asked" basis only, public release of the Team's mission will be confined to the statement: "The US Government has agreed to dispatch a team of defense experts to El Salvador to consult with the GOES on national military strategy."

b. (C) Details of the TOR will not be discussed with news media, and team members will refer press queries to the US Ambassador or his designated representative while the Team is in country.

c. (C) The Team will make periodic situation reports on progress of the mission to USCINCSO, with copies to OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of State.

d. (U) Prior to departing El Salvador, the Team will brief the US Ambassador, or in his absence, the Charge d'Affaires, the GOES, and the Salvadoran High Command on its findings.

e. (U) The Team Chief and/or his designated representative will provide a briefing for USCINCSO and submit a report on preliminary findings prior to his return to Washington.

f. (U) Within 1 week of the return to Washington, a preliminary briefing by the Team Chief will be given

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Appendix



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D C 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

JCSM-

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Terms of Reference for El Salvador Military
Strategy Assistance Team (U)

(C) In response to a request by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (ISA), the attached changes to the Terms of Reference
have been agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Attachment

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DF-099 8
Phone Vote
1400 hours, 9 Sep 81

DIRECTOR'S FLIMSY	1
on	2
TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR)	3
FOR	4
EL SALVADOR MILITARY STRATEGY ASSSISTANCE TEAM	5
In response to a discussion between the Assistant Secretary	6
of Defense (ISA) and the J-5, the following changes are requested.	7
D1. <u>Page 6, paragraph 5, line 23. Change as follows:</u>	8
<u>Assistant Planning/Operations Officer</u>	9
REASON: Accuracy. There is only one Planning/Operations	10
Officer.	11
D2. <u>Page 8, paragraph 11e, line 27. Add the following:</u>	12
<u>... return to Washington. Simultaneously, copies of the</u>	13
<u>report will be provided to OSD/ISA, OJCS/J5, and Service</u>	14
<u>Operations Deputies for information.</u>	15
REASON: Timeliness. Due to urgency of mission OSD, OJCS,	16
and the Services should receive copies of the report at same	17
time as USCINCSO.	18
D3. <u>Page 9, paragraph 11g, line 6. Change as follows:</u>	19
<u>...with his comments to OSD/ISA for information and to</u>	20
<u>the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (J-5) for review and subsequent</u>	21
<u>delivery....</u>	22
	23
	24
	25
	26
1-1-2	27
	28

UNCLASSIFIED

FIELD TRIPS

UNIT	CITY	DEPARTMENT
✓ 1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE	SAN SALVADOR	SAN SALVADOR
✓ ^{INDEPENDENT} 2 SPTS 1ST BRIGADE BATTALION	SAN SALVADOR	SAN SALVADOR
2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE	SANTA ANA	SANTA ANA
✓ 1ST BATTALION	SANTA ANA	SANTA ANA
✓ 3RD INFANTRY BRIGADE	SAN MIGUEL	SAN MIGUEL
✓ 1ST BATTALION	SAN MIGUEL	SAN MIGUEL
✓ 2ND BATTALION	LA UNION	LA UNION
4TH INFANTRY BRIGADE	EL PARAISO	CHALATENANGO
5TH INFANTRY BRIGADE	SAN VICENTE	SAN VICENTE
COMMANDO BATTALION	SAN FRANCISCO GOTERA	MORAZAN
QUICK REACTION BATTALION, ATACATL	SITIO DEL NINO	LA LIBERTAD
CAVALRY REGIMENT	SITIO DEL NINO	LA LIBERTAD
AIRBORNE SQUADRONS	ILOPANGO	SAN SALVADOR
ARTILLERY BRIGADE	SAN JUAN OPICO	LA LIBERTAD
MILITARY DETACHMENT - 1	CHALATENANGO	CHALATENANGO
MILITARY DETACHMENT - 2	SENSUNTEPEQUE	CABANAS
MILITARY DETACHMENT - 3	LA UNION	LA UNION
MILITARY DETACHMENT - 4	USULUTAN	USULUTAN
MILITARY DETACHMENT - 5	COJUTEPEQUE	CUSCATLAN
MILITARY DETACHMENT - 6	SONSONATE	SONSONATE
MILITARY DETACHMENT - 7	AHUACHAPAN	AHUACHAPAN
ORDNANCE CENTER	SAN SALVADOR	SAN SALVADOR

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>DEPARTMENT</u>
SIGNAL ^{TRAINING} INSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE CENTER	SAN SALVADOR	SAN SALVADOR
QUARTERMASTER DEPOT	SAN SALVADOR	SAN SALVADOR
ENGINEER TRAINING CENTER	ZACATECOLUCA	LA PAZ
MILITARY SCHOOL	SAN SALVADOR	SAN SALVADOR
MILITARY HOSPITAL	SAN SALVADOR	SAN SALVADOR
NAVY	LA UNION	LA UNION
AIR FORCE	ILOPANGO	SAN SALVADOR
NATIONAL GUARD	SAN SALVADOR	SAN SALVADOR
TREASURY POLICE	SAN SALVADOR	SAN SALVADOR
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADMINISTRATION	SAN SALVADOR	SAN SALVADOR
NATIONAL POLICE	SAN SALVADOR	SAN SALVADOR

~~SECRET~~


SUMMARY OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGY

1. (S) General Objective. A peaceful political solution to the Salvadoran social conflict which will establish a democratic society.
2. (S) Strategy. Employ all available national and international resources to achieve the general objective.
3. (S) Specific Political Objectives. Create credible internal and external democratic conditions favoring the electoral process.
 - a. (S) Gremial Sector (private, church, professional, cooperatives, etc.). Create a common economic, social, and political platform to consolidate democratic power.
 - b. (S) Inter-party Dialogue. Obtain the participation of all legally recognized political parties in the electoral process.
 - (1) (S) The electoral process will not be conditioned on the participation of any particular party or groups.
 - (2) (S) If the Left refuses to participate and then tries to block the process, it will be clear they wish to gain power by force of arms.
 - c. (S) Make clear to foreign countries that El Salvador is determined to arrive at democratic elections.
 - (1) (S) The first step of discussing electoral matters has been taken.
 - (2) (S) International observers. Requests will be sent to the Organization of American States (OAS) and foreign governments to send observers to witness the electoral process.
4. (U) General Annex.

3-1

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SITUACION ACTUAL DE LAS UNIDADES



CURRENT AIR FORCE SITUATION

1. (C) General. Evaluation of the operational capabilities of the FAS projects a discouraging picture of aging aircraft, inadequate weapons systems, poorly equipped maintenance facilities, an absence of a tactical command control system, and a shortage of skilled personnel. In spite of these shortcomings, the FAS has been able to provide fair support to the ground force. However, without new aircraft and a tactical command control system, the FAS will be unable to support the new strategy.

2. (U) FAS Aircraft.

a. (C) The FAS possesses ten types of aircraft which currently are manned by a total of 43 pilots. With the exception of the UH-1H helicopters, furnished by the US Government during FY 81, and the Hughes 500 helicopters, purchased from a third country, its operational fleet is old and practically impossible to maintain. The primary fighter-attack aircraft is the Ouragan, manufactured by the French in the early 1950's, initially sold to Israel, and finally delivered to El Salvador in 1973 along with a very limited spare parts package. Spares have not been available for a number of years and consequently, the FAS has been forced to take parts from one aircraft to repair another. Of the 20 original Ouragans, only 4 or 5 are operational on any given day. If the FAS were required to utilize these aircraft at a higher rate, the Ouragans would be grounded within two weeks. Similarly, the Fougas, Rallieys, and Lama and Alouette helicopters were all built by the French and, presently, spare parts are not available.

b. (C) The FAS has attempted to improvise wherever possible. The Fouga was built as a trainer, but the FAS uses it in a close air support role; a bomb rack has been installed on the Lama helicopters for delivery of 500 lbs. and 750 lbs. bombs; and some spare parts are fabricated in the FAS' machine shops. The transport fleet consists of two DC-6's, three C-47's and three Aravas. The Arava is built in Israel, and spare parts have not been available. The DC-6's and C-47's have long outlived their operational usefulness, and, although the US initiated a program in FY 81 to provide limited spare parts for these aircraft, it will take a tremendous effort to maintain them.

3. (C) Weapons Systems. The FAS has a limited quantity of standard air-to-ground type weapons. Both 500 lbs. and 750 lbs. bombs were delivered by the US in FY 81. The FAS also has a few 70 kilogram bombs sold to it by Israel several years ago along with 68mm and 80mm air-to-ground rockets. The FAS utilizes 20mm, .50 caliber, and 7.62 caliber ammunition, and it has a few cans (less than 50) of aging napalm. The FAS has mounted .50 caliber machine guns on the Arava and C-47 transports to provide a limited close air support capability; it uses Fouga trainers to deliver air-to-ground rockets but only in the most critical situations. Although there is an adequate supply of general purpose bombs, the available delivery systems preclude effective utilization. The Ouragan is the only fixed wing aircraft in El Salvador that can carry bombs, and it can carry only two 500 pounders at a time. This fact, and the low availability rate of the Ouragan, result in a very limited delivery capability. The FAS also has placed the M-60 (7.62mm) machine gun system on the UH-1H.

AVIONICS

<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>A/C UTILIZATION</u>	<u>RADIO SETS (PER A/C)</u>
T-41	3	Air/Ground Comm. Link (ABN Relay)	1 ea. ARC-164, UHF/AM 1 ea. ARC-300, UHF/NAV-AM 1 ea. ARC-131, VHF/FM
French Fugas	3	Armed Trainers	2 ea. Comm. 120 NARCO, VHF
Israel Fugas	3	Armed Trainers	2 ea. UHF/TRAP-21, French Radios
Ouragan	11	Fighter-Bomber	2 ea. UHF/TRAP-21, French Radios
C-47	4	Transport	1 ea. ARC-27, VHF Radio 1 ea. ARC-3, VHF Radio
ARVA	3	Transport	2 ea. VHF-20, Collins Radios (AM)
DC-6	2	Foreign Travel	1 ea. VHF (AM) ARC-73, Radio 1 ea. VHF (AM) Collins Radio
Rally	14	Basic Training	1 ea. VHF-AM, Comm 120, NARCO Radio
LLAMA	4	Utility Helicopter	1 ea. VHF-AM, R-241, Bendix Radio 1 ea. KY-195, Comm/Nav, VHF/VOR Radio (1 A/C only)
Allyette	5	Utility Helicopter	1 ea. Comm/Nav KY-95, VHF/VOR Radio (first 4 A/C only) 1 ea. RT-241 Radio (1 A/C only)
Hughes 500	4	Training/ Observation	1 ea. KY-95, Comm/Nav, VHF/VOR Radio

AVIONICS

APP I

UH-1H	14	Airmobiles, gun support	1 ea. FM, ARC-131, (1st 13 A/C only) 1 ea. VHF, ARC-115, (1st 12 A/C only) 1 ea. VHF, ARC-134, (2 A/C only) 1 ea. OHF, ARC-51BX, 1-FM, ARC-53
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
FAS OPERATIONS CENTER RADIO LISTING

<u>TYPE RADIO</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>UTILIZATION</u>
VRC-240	1	Local Aircraft control
VRC-24	1	Local Aircraft control
VRC-46	1	Link with ground troops and UH-1H
SKY-115	1	Local aircraft control UHF radios only
TEK CEL RADIO	1	Link to Electricity Company Security Forces at the two hydroelectric dams.

COLLINS KWM 2

TRITON MARINE BAND 55/75 VHF

(PROJECTED)




NAVY RADIO EQUIPMENT LISTING

<u>TYPE RADIO</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>UTILIZATION</u>
KWM-2	10	Primary communications link with boats
TRITON 66/75	6	Alternate VHF communications link
VRC-240	3	Communications link between ships
PRC-41	2	Air to ground communications link
PRC-77	6	Foot patrolling on small islands

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NATIONAL GUARD TELETYPE NETWORK



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NATIONAL GUARD RADIO LISTING


<u>TYPE RADIO</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>UTILIZATION</u>
Motorola HT-55 Handie-Talkie	24	Inner city patrolling
Motorola Console, Base Station	88	Main communications system. Each police station throughout the country has one.
AN/PRC-77	17	Patrolling outside of the city.
Stoner SSB-100A	19	Backup net to the Motorola system.
Stoner PMC-12	13	Backup system.
RF-301 HF radio	2	Access to the Armed Force National radio net.
Radio Teletype	7	Link to major subordinate commands.
Motorola Console, Mobile	5	Mobile inner city patrols.

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NATIONAL POLICE MOBILE RADIO NET

MOTOROLA RADIO & MT-500

ALTERNATE FREQUENCY



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COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONIC REQUIREMENTS

1. (U) General. A review was conducted of the communications-electronics systems of the Armed Force for the purpose of identifying communications-electronics requirements to support the National Military Strategy. The review considered missions and operating procedures of the Armed Force.

2. (U) Requirements Parameters.

a. (U) Tactical unit radio requirements are based upon the Table of Organization and Allowances (TOE) of a Salvadoran infantry rifle company.

b. (U) Public Security Forces requirements are based upon a study of the mission and internal operating procedures.

3. (C) Public Security Forces. The security forces require a mobile, operationally flexible radio system to provide rapid and reliable communications access to subordinate elements operating throughout the country. The basic communications-electronics equipment requirements for the National Guard, National Police and the Treasury Police are listed at Inclosures 8-1 thru 8-5.

4. (U) Tactical Communications-Electronics Equipment.

a. (C) Recommend that the infantry rifle company radio authorization be increased from five AN/PRC-77 radio sets to nine. The nine radio sets should be allocated as follows: two per company headquarters; one per each of three rifle platoon headquarters; and four per weapons platoon headquarters (Inclosure 8-6). The increase of four AN/PRC-77 radios would give the company the means to establish an internal fire direction capability. The additional radios would also offer a degree of communications flexibility to the company for patrolling

operations. Analysis of command control problems and the fluidity of internal defense operations has also indicated a need for a squad level radio. The PRC-77 is not recommended for this role because the logistics support role requirements would be beyond the capability of the Armed Force. At current force levels, the density of AN/PRC-77's would expand to approximately 1600 (26 AN/PRC-77's per company X 57 companies). It is estimated that this level of increase would triple repair parts requirements and exceed battery resupply capability.

b. (C) Each company TOE should include one RC-292, Antenna. The RC-292 would be used to extend the limited range of the AN/PRC-77. Since all radio assets are stored and maintained for issue at the battalion, the RC-292 would also be available for other extended range radio communications requirements. Units frequently require the ability to communicate to elements which are part of its command control system but are outside of the normal AN/PRC-77 transmitting range.

c. (C) The Retransmission Cable Kit, MK-456, should be authorized on the basis of two per battalion and three per brigade headquarters. The MK-456 would enable the battalion and brigade headquarters to overcome line of sight communications masking problems caused by mountainous terrain and built-up areas.

d. (C) A High Frequency/Amplitude Modulated, (HF/AM), manpack radio set is required to cover critical command control communications links which can not be supported by organic VHF/FM radios due to terrain and unit separation problems. The only HF/AM radios available are designed for fixed or semi-fixed

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installations and are dedicated to the national HF/AM radio net. The HF/AM manpack radio set would resolve these shortcomings by providing command links from special operations areas to the controlling headquarters, supporting battalion and brigade offensive operations where command control communications are not possible with organic equipment, and by providing a backup to the national HF communications system. Fifteen manpack, HF/AM radio sets would be issued to the ✓ forward operations company of the Armed Force ^{SIGNAL} ~~Communications~~ ^{TRAINING} Instruction Center (CITFA). CITFA would be responsible for the storage and maintenance of the radios and for providing trained operators who could be deployed to support specified communication-electronics requirements (Inclosure 8-7).

e. (C) Brigade, battalion, and company TOE's were reviewed. The company is the only element with a fixed allocation of radios; authorizations vary among the infantry battalions; and the battalion is tasked to support brigade headquarters radio requirements. In theory, allocations are first made to the company level, according to TOE, with the remaining radios provided to battalion and brigade headquarters. In practice, however, radios are consolidated at battalion headquarters and issued to the companies on a mission requirement basis. Thus, AN/PRC-77 radios are available to support battalion and brigade headquarters. In addition, some battalions have up to six AN/VRC 46/47 radios. Typical deployment of battalion radios is shown at Inclosure 8-8. Recommended radio allocations for the battalion's combat support company is at Inclosure 8-9.

5. (C) National Radio Net. The national HF/AM radio net requires modernization. The variety of HF radios now used should be replaced by a standard, state of the art radio system.

a. (C) The net is currently configured with the Collins KWM-2A, the RCA ✓ SSB-^A~~A~~, the RF-301 and the RACAL, TRA 922. These radios are in various states of disrepair, and repair parts are becoming increasingly more difficult and costly to acquire. The RCA and RF-301 radios can be repaired only through cannibalization. All the RACAL radios are deadlined and have been recommended for disposal.

b. (C) Standardization with a quality HF radio will assist in efforts to develop an efficient, cost effective maintenance program. Radio communications reliability concomitantly will be improved (Inclosure 8-10).

6. (U) Radio Teletype Requirements

a. (C) Vulnerability. The backbone of the national communications network is the point to point teletype circuits provided by the National Telecommunications Administration (ANTEL). Interdiction of the Joint Operations Center of the Armed Force or ANTEL facilities would totally eliminate this point to point system which has no alternate routing capability. The Motorola microwave system being installed, operates with non-changing crystal frequencies; therefore the system can be exploited by the enemy for intelligence or neutralized through electronic warfare.

b. (C) Requirement. The Joint Operations Center of the Armed Force requires a high frequency (HF), single side band (SSB), radio teletypewriter (RATT) network to achieve effective command control. At the tactical level, major subordinate commands similarly must have the capability to communicate with their maneuver elements as well as provide a reliable means for requesting administrative, logistical, and operation support. To this end, the RATT would

be an important force multiplier.

c. (C) Equipment Description: The proposed RATT set is vehicular mounted and is used primarily to transmit and receive record copy messages (a printed page) between headquarters. The system is also capable of using Amplitude Modulation (AM) single side band (SSB) voice and continuous wave operations. The set is available in three configurations for deployment with infantry, airborne infantry and armored/mechanized units. It is capable of long range communications, 80-6,000 kilometers, using ground or skywave propagation. The equipment can be powered optionally by a 115 volt alternate current, commercial power source; a 115 volt alternate current mobile generator; or by 28 volt direct current, 100 amps vehicle power source.

d. (C) Utilization. The RATT set would be deployed at the Joint Operations Center of the Armed Force, military zone tactical operations center (TOC), and the TOC's major subordinate elements within each of the six military zones. The RATT could be used to disseminate operational orders in record copy to headquarters deployed outside fixed sites such as the cuartel. The mobility and versatility of the system will support imaginative tactical military and security force operations. For example, the RATT set could be deployed in support of an operation in any region of El Salvador and used to transmit record message traffic (or voice traffic) to and from the command control headquarters.

e. (U) RATT Advantages.

(1) (C) Although radio communication is generally the most vulnerable to electronic warfare, it does provide the best uninterrupted mobile transmission mode.

(2) (C) The digital frequency tuning capability permits the operator, at the discretion of the net control station, to change operating frequency. This can reduce significantly the electronic warfare threat.

(3) (C) The mobility of the system allows it to displace with the headquarters that it supports. This mobility makes it more survivable in terms of physical security.

(4) (C) RATT communications are not limited by line of sight and is, therefore, ideally suited to an operational environment characterized by mountainous terrain and unit dispersion.

(5) (C) Strategically, the RATT system would provide the Joint Operations Center of the Armed Force the capability to communicate with its tactically deployed forces. This capability currently does not exist.

f. (U) Logistics Considerations.

(1) (C) The cost of the RATT set is estimated at \$90,000 each. This does not include the prime mover, mobile power supply or communications support package. The RATT set is more sophisticated than any equipment currently organic to the Armed Force. Operators and technicians would require additional training to operate and maintain the set. Consideration must be given to the requirement to develop a repair parts support system.

(2) (C) Introduction of the Armed Force RATT system. If the RATT system is identified as a requirement by the Armed Force General Staff, it should be introduced incrementally to insure effective integration. The RATT links from the Joint Operations Center of the Armed Force to the brigade TOC's should be the first step. This would give the Armed Force an experience factor

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in using the RATT and would assist subsequent expansion of the system to the battalion level.

8-7

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ELECTRONICS

✓
NATIONAL GUARD COMMUNICATIONS-EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>USE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Motorola Console	Commo link with 93 outposts	44
MT-500	Inner city patrol	75
MRC-100	Vehicular patrol	50
Motorola Console type antennas	Use with Motorola consoles	22

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NATIONAL POLICE COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS REQUIREMENTS
(MOBILE RADIO CONSOLE)

<u>DEPARTMENT</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BASIS OF ALLOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Sonsonate	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	15
San Miguel	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	15
Santa Ana	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5
Department Section #1	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5
Department Section #2	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5
Department Section #3	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5
Department Section #4	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5
Department Section #5	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5
Department Section #6	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5
Department Section #7	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5
Department Section #8	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5
Department Section #9	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5
Department Section #10	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5
Zone 1	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5

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Zone 2	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	5
Border Delegation #1	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	1
Border Delegation #2	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	1
Border Delegation #3	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	1
Border Delegation #4	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	1
Border Delegation #5	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	1
Border Delegation #6	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	1
National Police HQ	Motorola Mobile radio console	1 Per Vehicle	80
TOTAL:			191

Required accessories for vehicle mounting:

1. Control Head (4 frequency) "Private Line"
2. Microphone
3. Speaker
4. 17 foot, control cable
5. 450 - 470 MHZ Antenna

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NATIONAL POLICE COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS REQUIREMENTS
(MOTOROLA - MT-500)

<u>DEPARTMENT</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BASIS OF ALLOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
13 Companies of 100 Man Departmental Company	MT-500	1 per every 10 men	130
Border Delegation 30 men	MT-500	1 per every 10 men	18
Security Battalion 600 men	MT-500	1 per every 10 men	60
Police Academy 500 men	MT-500	1 per every 10 men	60
1,000 man Company from Headquarters	MT-500	1 per every 10 men	100
TOTAL:			368
R/MT-500 Required:			368
R/MT-500 on hand:			25
Required:			343

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NATIONAL POLICE COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS REQUIREMENTS

D-II ONLY

<u>DEPARTMENT</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BASIS OF ALLOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
CAI	Motorola base station	7 each	7
DC	Motorola base station	1 each	1
CIDS	Motorola base station	6 each	6
DCS	Motorola base station	1 each	1
CAI	MT-500	24 each	24
DC	MT-500	32 each	32
CIDS	MT-500	28 each	28
DCS	MT-500	5 each	5
CAI	Chargers	24 each	24
DC	Chargers	32 each	32
CIDS	Chargers	28 each	28
CAI	Hidden radios	12 each	12
CAI	Motorola vehicular consoles	15 each	15
DC	Motorola vehicular consoles	32 each	32
CIDS	Motorola vehicular consoles	16 each	16
CAI	Mirror antennas	15 each	15

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DC	Mirror antennas	32 each	32
CIDS	Mirror antennas	16 each	16
CAI	Hidden microphones	10 each	10
DC	Hidden microphones	10 each	10

CAI = Center of Analysis of Information

DC = Detective Company

CIDS = Criminal Investigation Departmental Section

DCS = Drug Control Section

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TREASURY POLICE COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS REQUIREMENTS

<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>USE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Teletypes	Link with police zones--	5
MT-500	Inner city patrols	25

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- RECOMMENDED RADIO ALLOCATION FOR AN INFANTRY COMPANY
(AN/PRC-77)

<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>TOE AUTH</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>	<u>INCREASE</u>
1. Co Cmd Gp RTO	1	2	1
2. Infantry Sections RTO	3	3	0
3. Combat Support Sections RTO	1	1	0
4. 60mm Mortar Squad	0	3	3

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TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS






<u>DEPARTMENT</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BASIS OF ALLOCATION</u>	<u>ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT</u>
Infantry Company	Antenna RC-292	1 per-company	116
Infantry Battalion	Retransmission cable kit, MK-456	4 per battalion	58
CITFA	HF/AM manpack radio set	15 to CITFA	15
Treasury Police	Radio set AN/PRC-77	1 to Police Academy 24 to Police outposts	25
Treasury Police	Battery charger for BA-1386	5 each	5

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Typical Radio Net Requirement
for Battalion And Brigade Hq's

Enter Other Nets as Required
(Monitor Only w/Auxiliary Receiver)



1. The Third Brigade is used as an example
2. The Brigade is authorized two VRC-46's and three VRC-47's.

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RECOMMENDED RADIO ALLOCATION FOR A COMBAT SUPPORT COMPANY
(AN/PRC-77)

<u>ELEMENT</u>	<u>TOE AUTH</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>	<u>INCREASE</u>
Co Cmd Gp RTO.	1	1	0
81mm Mortar Section RTO	1	1	0
Mortar Group RTO	1	1	0
Crew Chief 1 AN/PRC-77 per Crew Chief	0	4	4
Fire Direction Center	2	2	0
Security Group RTO	0	1	1
Infantry Squad	0	2	2
50 cal. Machinegun Command Group	1	1	0
Machinegun Teams 2 radios per team	0	2	2
90mm AR Section Command Group	1	1	0
90mm Team Crew Chief	0	4	4

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RECOMMENDED ALLOCATION OF HF RADIOSETS

[(C) Recommended allocation of HF radio sets is as follows:]

Chief of Staff	1
COCFA	1
Brigades	6
Artillery	1
Quick Reaction Battalion	2
Calvary Battalion	1
Other Battalions/Detachments	14
Air Force	4
Navy	10
CITFA	4
National Police	1
National Guard	1
Treasury Police	1
Cinco De Noviembre Hydro-electric Dam	1
Cerron Grande Hydro-electric Dam	1
Float	<u>6</u>
TOTAL	55

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THIRD COUNTRY TRAINING (1 NOV 81)

	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>	<u>SCHOOL</u>
ARGENTINA:	Strategic Intelligence	2 Officers	National Intelligence School
CHILE:	Police Course	3 Officers	Carabinero School
	Police Officer Candidate	2 Enl men	Carabinero School
	Faculty Development	1 Officer	War Academy
	*Intelligence	3 Enlisted men	National Intelligence Center
	*2 Officers will attend intelligence training in 1982.		
GUATEMALA:	Officer Candidate	4 Cadets	Military Academy
	Police Officer Candidate	1 Enlisted man	National Police Academy
MEXICO:	Command and General Staff	2 Officers	Superior War College
	Engineer	1 Officer	Military Engineer School
PARAGUAY:	Officer Candidate	3 Cadets	Military Academy
	Command and General Staff	3 Officers	War Academy
PERU:	Officer Candidate	1 Officer	Air Force Academy
VENEZUELA:	Officer Candidate	1 Cadet	Naval Academy

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PANAMA CANAL AREA MILITARY SCHOOLS

<u>SCHOOL</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>LENGTH</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>
ARMY (USARSA)	Cadet Basic Orientation	12 weeks	73 Cadets
	Operations Training	3 weeks	10 Officers 198 EM
	NCO Leadership	14 weeks	20 EM
	Commando	6 weeks	70 Cadets
	Officer Development	4 weeks	26 EM
	Armorer On Job Training	4 weeks	10 EM
NAVY (SCIATT)	Patrol Boat Commanders	8 weeks	5 Officers
	Basic Engine Maintenance/ Electrical Systems	8 weeks	7 EM
	Patrol Boat Electrical System	8 weeks	5 EM
	Patrol Boat Engine Propulsion	8 weeks	6 EM
	Hull Maintenance	8 weeks	2 EM
AIR FORCE (IAAFA)	Technical Training	16 weeks	71 EM
	Fundamentals of Electronics	16 weeks	12 EM

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TRAINING IN US

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>COURSE</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>
ARMY	None	
NAVY	US Navy Staff College	1 Officer
	English Language ..	5 Officers
	Coast Guard Officer Candidate School	5 Officers
	Environmental Protection	5 Officers
	Search and Rescue	5 Officers
	On-the-Job Training on US Coast Guard Vessel	5 Officers
AIR FORCE	UH-1H Transition	3 Officers
	UH-1H Instructor	2 Officers
	Aircraft Maintenance Officer	1 Officer
	Flight Safety Officer	1 Officer
	Squadron Officer Course	2 Officers
US MILITARY ACADEMIES (Not Security Assistance Funded)	Commissioning Program	1 Cadet
	Commissioning Program	2 Midshipmen
	Commissioning Program	1 Cadet

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CURRENT TRAINING SITUATION: MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS (MTT)

REQUIREMENT	FY81	FY82 (TO DATE)
LEADERSHIP		
COMMAND CONTROL	OPS NATL PLANNING ASST TM 60 DA, 5 MBRs	
	NLT OPS & PLAN ASST TM 179 DA, 5 MBRs	
	ZONAL OPS & PLAN ASST TM 179 DA, 5 MBRs	
INTELLIGENCE	INTEL SCHOOL 42 DA 3 MBRs	TAC INTEL SCHOOL 76 DA 3 MBRs
TACTICAL PROFICIENCY	SMALL UNIT TNG 179 DA 15 MBRs	SMALL UNIT TNG 65 DA 10 MBRs

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CONT'
REQUIREMENTS

FY81

FY 82 (TO DATE)

MOBILITY

UH-1H PILOT TRANSITION	179 DA	2 MBRs
UH-1H MAINTENANCE	179 DA	12 MBRs
NAVY SML BOAT MAINT	74 DA	6 MBRs
NAVY SML BOAT MAINT	60 DA	3 MBRs
UH-1H PRODUCTION CONTROL	60 DA	1 MBR
UH-1H CREW CHIEF	39 DA	1 MBR
UH-1H STANDARDIZATION/TI TAFT	40 DA	2 MBRs
UH-1H 200 HR PH INSP	30 DA	5 MBRs

UH-1H ENG PWR TRAIN
60 DA 2 MBRs

UH-1H CREW CH
20 DAY 1 MBR

UH-1H STANDARDIZATION/TI TAFT
325 DA 2 MBRs

COMBAT SUPPORT

LOG & MAINTENANCE	40 DA	3 MBRs
ORDNANCE SAFETY SURVEY	17 DA	2 MBRs
ADMIN/LOG SPT	179 DA	5 MBRs
AF BOMB ASSEMBLY	11 DA	1 MBR
AF C-47 REPAIR PARTS SUPPLY	7 DA	2 MBR
LOG MAINT SPT TAFT	126 DA	3 MBRs
MEDICAL (HOSP PH)	61 DA	4 MBRs

A
PTROL BT RADAR/WPNS
A 60 DA 2 MBRs

LOG/MAINT/COMMO
179 DA 3 MBRs

LOG/MAINT SPT TAFT
239 DA 3 MBRs

MED (FLD PH)

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The following listed pages have been deleted and release denied in their entirety

Pages:

13-1 through 13-3;

14-1-1;

15-1;

16-1 through 16-5;

17-1;

18-1;

19-1 through 19-3;

20-1 through 20-2;

21-1 through 21-2;

22-1;

23-1 through 23-5;

24-1 through 24-12;

25-1 through 25-4;

26-1;

27-1;

28-1 through 28-17;

29-1;

30-1 through 30-2;

31-1 through 31-2;