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[redacted]

[redacted] JOINT AO [redacted]

RETURN TO SOD, 2C840

ACTION OFFICER: COL [redacted]

TELEPHONE: EXT 55805 **SECURE** 2817

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(CLASSIFICATION)

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~SECRET~~

5 August 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF AND SERVICE OPSDEPS

Subject: SNOWBIRD Training and Preparation Program (S) (U)

(S)

1. (~~TS~~) General: Operation SNOWBIRD, the planning and preparation of a joint task force to accomplish the rescue of the American hostages in Iran was tasked to the undersigned by competent civil authority on 26 April, 1980. In order to provide the best chance of securing operational security, a [redacted] involving [redacted] was approved on 23 May 80 and briefed to JCS on 3 June. Training and preparation for SNOWBIRD was placed under the [redacted] Since definitive intelligence has not been available, it was necessary for the Joint Task Force to design a number of possible options and train a wide spectrum of forces. To date, these forces include 2,477 personnel and 136 various aircraft. Most of these forces were incorporated into a July 80 training program that was briefed to the Service OPSDEPS on 2 July. This document recapitulates the major training events, lessons learned, costs and future needs to provide a reasonable assurance of future SNOWBIRD success. The HONEY BADGER exercises incorporated many of the training and validation tasks that had to be accomplished to prepare the Joint Task Force to execute SNOWBIRD Options One through Eight. ICE BOX activity was to evaluate the feasibility of Option Nine. Before and during the July training, a number of increased aviation and communications capabilities were attained, a number of techniques were developed and a number of force deficiencies identified. These deficiences are incorporated into the overall future training program. An additional, separate activity was the coordination and planning for Option VII and VIII, the use of [redacted] Finally, this document includes conclusions and recommendations concerning future actions for SNOWBIRD and Special Operations in general.

(S)

2. (~~TS~~) HONEY BADGER:

(S)

A. (~~TS~~) Training Program Description:

General: The Honey Badger Training Program was developed by dissecting the major SNOWBIRD Option I-IX training tasks. These tasks were then

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assigned to specific mission units, training areas identified and dates assigned. Initial training was for individual elements and then time was provided for necessary joint training. Throughout the period, feedback was provided to the Commander through observation and unit backbriefs. (See Inclosure 1)

B. (~~TS~~) Forces Involved:

(1) Dugway, Utah

[redacted] HQ Element
158th AVN (+)
Blackhawk Helos
CH-47Cs
1st SOW
Pave Low Helos
HH-53s
HC-130s
Delta Liaison

(2) White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico/Ft. Bliss, TX

[redacted] HQ Element
[redacted] Rangers
1st SOW
MC-130s
AC-130s
EC-130s
Delta Liaison

C. (~~TS~~) Additional Forces: The [redacted] elements, though not an official part of HONEY BADGER, conducted simultaneous training at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona (ICE BOX).

D. (~~TS~~) TRAINEX PHOENIX

(1) (~~TS~~) (U) General. TRAINEX PHOENIX was designed to provide a vehicle to consolidate all HONEY BADGER tasks. It did not attempt to depict a given scenario. Rather, it served to bring the entire force together to exercise joint tasks and concepts. The major lessons learned served as the planning basis for OPORD ICEBOX, the assault of and operation from Reese AFB, TX. The evaluations of BLACKHAWK and HH53 performance are discussed in Inclosures 10 and 11.

(2) (TS) Specific Concept. The scenario required the seizure of two airfields (Fallon NAS, Tonopah Test Site) by elements [redacted] Rangers utilizing First SOW fixed wing assets. Once seized, Pave Lows, HH-53's, and Blackhawks would conduct extraction of personnel from a remote site, backhaul them to the extraction airfields and then return to base. Once the personnel were safely landed, they would be flown out and the Rangers would then extract. A C-141B also participated. (See Inclosure 2)

(a) Two launch bases were utilized. Helos departed from and returned to Dugway, Utah [redacted] and First SOW fixed wing assets utilized White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. This geographical dispersion provided realistic distances and climatic conditions comparable to Iranian/Mideast conditions. (See Inclosure 3)

(b) Several important sub-tasks were exercised within the overall program. Among them were:

Helos low level long distance navigation
Fixed wing low level penetration
[redacted]
Joint command/control
Air-Ground communications
Airfield extraction

3. (TS) Operation ICE BOX: SNOWBIRD Option Nine [redacted] the landing of an extraction force composed of light helicopters, hostage evacuation and finally, force extraction. The concept was first conceived by the Joint Task Force Commander in June. At that time, the techniques for [redacted] were well-developed. Thus, the majority of effort was directed at acquiring and training a [redacted] unit.

a. [redacted] Planning: The [redacted] option was planned during the third week of June 1980. The major considerations were: aircraft availability, individual active Army aviator qualification, logistics support, unit and joint training tasks to be accomplished. An alternative, the OH58 was considered, tested and rejected. (See Inclosure 13)

b. Aircraft availability: Seventeen [redacted] helicopters were received from the [redacted] National Guard and three from [redacted] National Guard. These aircraft were not reconfigured except for the installation of the [redacted] aircraft [redacted] to make them compatable with the [redacted]

c. [redacted]logistical support: Eight NG instructor pilots, three officer and nineteen enlisted members of the [redacted]tional Guard [redacted] Their purpose was threefold: train and qualify 25 active Army aviators for the [redacted] train 18 [redacted] crew chiefs on the [redacted] and provide organizational maintenance support during the individual and follow-on phase of the initial training cycle.

d. [redacted] aviator qualifications: The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was tasked to provide twenty [redacted] qualified aviators, preferably graduates of the USAAVNS [redacted] Training Program. Five other aviators possessing needed skills, were requested from other units. The initial qualification phase was conducted at [redacted] National Guard Training Site, [redacted]. The training was conducted in accordance with appropriate Army regulations and no problems were encountered. Special emphasis was placed on maximum gross operations and maximum performance of the aircraft. The initial qualification was completed on 9 July 1980.

(C)

e. [redacted] unit and joint training: Conducted at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona and referred to as Phase II, from 10-19 July, utilizing Post and range facilities at Fort Huachuca. The training concentrated on developing individual skills in night flying and maximum performance operations. The First SOW, other USAF elements, and Delta provided CCT and Pathfinder support to standarize procedures and develop techniques. This proved worthwhile as evidenced by Operation ICE BOX which was conducted 20-21 July 1980. No shortcomings in regard to [redacted] in-flight operations were noted in those areas where unit training had been completed.

(C)

f. Force preparation: As the [redacted] capability began to emerge, attention turned to the rest of the force. MAC had been tasked in early July by JCS to train six to eight C-141B crews in [redacted] and [redacted] operations. Since these crews would not be ready until 1 August, a comprehensive exercise could not test this aspect. Thus, [redacted] C-141B landings had to be planned. The operational concept was conceived on 10 July. Tasking was established on 14 July and permission granted to use Reese AFB, TX on 15 July. A reconnaissance was conducted on 16 July and the Operations Order was published on 18 July.

g. Operation ICE BOX 20-21 July: Since the [redacted] option had never been integrated with the SNOWBIRD Task Force, the initial operation was a concept evaluation. The operation at Reese did not include full Delta participation, [redacted] fighter support, hostage pick up, substantial OPFOR representation or full abort procedures. Additionally, realistic, long flight legs and full force weight representations to include ammunition were not tested. Future trials of Option Nine must incorporate these aspects.

The operation was witnessed by [redacted] The overall conclusion reached after the operation was that the Option Nine concept was valid and could be executed in less time than the planned [redacted] A large number of deficiencies and improvements were identified (See Inclosure 5)

(U) 4. (~~S~~) Operational Requirements: As a result of the July training program, a significant amount of new operational techniques are required to assist in SNOWBIRD success. These techniques are translated into both training and resource requirements. Inclosure Six covers future training/ operational requirements.

(U) 5. (~~S~~) Material Requirements: The training program uncovered a number of significant gaps in resources that must be covered to permit the SNOWBIRD options to be fully exercised. Primary areas are:

Communications for aircraft
Ground mobility assets
Weapons systems
Avionics

These items are discussed in Inclosure Seven.

6. (~~S~~) SNOWBIRD VII and VIII: SNOWBIRD VII and VIII envision [redacted] NOWBIRD VIII). [redacted] would be transloaded to the [redacted] several days prior to launch. Once the ships were in position, [redacted] Exfiltration would be to a friendly or neutral country [redacted] or back to the ships. (Details are discussed in Inclosure Nine).

7. (TS) Future Training: August and September will be used to:

Recover perishable skills
Exercise new equipment
Exercise new operational techniques
Refine Option VIII and IX scenarios
Gain helo proficiency

Special tasks and key dates are included in Inclosure Eight.

8. (S) Costs. (See Inclosure 13) At the outset of the JTF mission in November of 1979, it was decided not to provide a budget for the tasks of force preparation and mission execution. The rationale for this decision was founded on reasons of operational security and the fact that at that time, Service budgets were sufficiently ample to absorb this unprogrammed activity. After the first attempt to rescue the hostages, the JTF realized that it would be unlikely to achieve the degree of operational security for force preparation that had been previously attained. DOD and Congressional press releases has made public several JTF personalities as well as a number of operational factors, [redacted] Additionally, the JTF, wholly dependent on Service funding, realized that Service budgets would diminish as the end of the fiscal year approached, making it imperative for the Services to become more cognizant of JTF costs. Therefore, in May, an attempt was made to estimate JTF costs despite the fact that the lack of intelligence made it impossible to define a precise appropriate force structure or execution date. The estimate totaled $25 million, evenly split between the Air Force and the Army. This sum did not include funds to support intelligence activities since they had been provided by DOD.

On 3 June, the JCS was briefed on JTF concepts and force preparation. The decision was made to substantially increase JTF capabilities by the addition of a long range Army helicopter force composed of 30 UH60s and 12 to 16 CH47s. The essential modification of these aircraft substantially added to SNOWBIRD costs. On 2 July, the OPSDEPS were briefed on the July training program, another costly activity.

Being without a comptroller, the JTF is entirely dependent on Service input to determine what costs should actually be charged to SNOWBIRD. As of 2 August, informal coordination with the Services indicated that the Army had incurred $23.1 million and the Air Force had incurred $10.8 million in SNOWBIRD costs. $1.4 million had been allocated to fund SNOWBIRD intelligence activities by DOD.

In order to maintain proficiency in perishable skills, conduct remedial training and further develop a JTF capability to deal with multiple targets, it is essential to continue training both in August and in September. Additionally, it is necessary to procure equipment for the JTF in order to enhance the probability of SNOWBIRD success. Training costs through 30 September 80 are estimated at $4.37 million. Future procurement costs are currently estimated to be $20.2 million. Additional intelligence costs are believed to total $1.1 million. In order to pay back the Army for its funding beyond the original SNOWBIRD estimate of $12.5 million, it is necessary to allocate some $8.9 million. Therefore, a total of $34.4 million is required to continue SNOWBIRD preparation through 30 September 80. The JTF has been notified informally that these funds cannot be made available from the Service budgets. Assuming an inability to cancel activity and procurement of a lesser priority, it is essential to request the Secretary of Defense to provide the necessary funding. Should these funds be denied, force proficiency will deteriorate, essential procurement will be delayed or cancelled and force capability development will be halted resulting in protraction of mission execution once the requisite intelligence and authority is granted. It is estimated that if the August remedial training is cancelled, the JTF readiness capability will deteriorate from a three week mission preparation period to a five week preparation period. No estimate of the penalty of September training cancellation is currently available.

9. [redacted] Conclusions: (See Inclosure 14). Due to the lack of [redacted] approval for the use of launch bases, the absence of an existing means to infiltrate the release force and the lack of total force proficiency, it is not possible to execute the SNOWBIRD mission at this time. Progress will be paced by [redacted] but is also dependent on procurement and training. It is believed that launch bases can be obtained, given approval to seek the necessary authority. Force proficiency must be maintained and improved or a substantial delay in mission execution will occur should it be ordered. Currently it is believed that the mission could be executed within three weeks given [redacted] Although compromise of the mission through continued training and procurement activity is possible, there is no known disabling compromise to date.

The JTF staff of 32 personnel is inadequate to handle a number of administrative tasks such as budgeting, since operational functions must have the priority. Should additional administrative requirements be levied, an augmentation of both personnel and working space would be required.

The current relationship with [redacted] is unsatisfactory but a practical solution has been reached to support the mission. Currently, SNOWBIRD IX, the [redacted] is considered to be the most probable and is thus being used as a model for force structure and equipment decisions. Option X, designed for multiple, dispersed targets may be more appropriate and is currently under consideration as a model.

There have been a number of significant JTF achievements since November of 1979. The most important achievement has been the preparation of a joint force capable of performing a variety of missions on a world-wide basis. A heretofore unavailable capability has been developed and tested: a [redacted] The Army has benefited significantly in that the self-deployed status and communications of both CH47s and UH60s has been increased. Additionally, these helicopters are now capable of deep, low level nighttime penetrations using the JTF developed technique of PAVE LOW leads. The Air Force has benefited in that the JTF has developed a technique of hatch mounted SATCOM antennas for both C130s and C141s, it has equipped a number of aircraft with modern, secure voice communications sets and has provided an organized, special operations helicopter unit for long range extraction, a capability that has clearly been needed since the Son Tay Raid in 1971. The JTF has also increased the ranges of the Pave Low and MC-130 from [redacted] respectively. Finally, all Services have at hand a new capability developed by the JTF from a commercial line of sight radio, the PT 250, a secure voice, man-portable SATCOM.

(S) The JTF experience indicates that the future [redacted] should include the [redacted] be able to quickly call for the aid of the enhanced capability UH60/CH47 elements from the 101st Airborne Division as well as the [redacted] crews and aircraft. It is also believed that the [redacted] must have rapid, unfettered access to the highest echelons of the Armed Forces and the national [redacted] should have a contingency fund equal to about 40% of its annual budget [redacted] has experienced since November of 1979.

In the final analysis, it must be concluded that the United States is ill-prepared to conduct any sort of Special Operation. The Army has subjected its Special Operations forces to a 70% reduction from their pre-Vietnam level. A further cut of 10% is forecasted for FY 81. The Air Force

(S) has cut its Special Operations forces by 75% during the same period. [redacted] Special Operations has been an unhealed casualty of the Vietnam war. The events of the last year have clearly indicated that immediate remedial action is essential. The JTF has accomplished much but the continued lack of an adequate national Special Operations capability may well plague the United States in the future.

10. (TS) Recommendations: (See Inclosure 15). It is recommended that the JTF be provided with $4.3 million to fund SNOWBIRD activities through 30 Sep 80. It is also requested that JCS press the Intelligence Community to use all available resources to fulfill outstanding SNOWBIRD requirements. In order to secure authority and essential information concerning a launch base, it is recommended that the JCS approve a JTF approach to the [redacted] and the dispatch of a site survey team to [redacted] It is [redacted]

In order to further define the JTF relationship with other organizations, it is requested that the OPSDEPS consider providing guidance in the continuation or revision of JTF coordination with both the Department of State and the J-5 of the OJCS. Heretofore, the JTF has only been permitted to represent itself [redacted] to the Department of State. Additionally, the JTF has been restricted in its coordination with J-5.

Finally, it is recommended that the OPSDEPS consider actions to improve the national capability to conduct Special Operations. The DJS could be requested to task OJCS to identify specific deficiencies in the [redacted] to support the armed forces in clandestine operations and make specific remedial recommendations. This action could be forwarded to the NSC by the JCS on or before 1 November 1980. The OJCS might also be tasked to identify

[redacted]

the necessary actions to expand and improve our mi
Special Operations capabilities by 1 October 1980.
action could be presented to the Secretary of Defe
the JCS by 30 October 1980.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

Inclosures:
(1) HB Training Tasks
(2) PHOENIX OPORD
(3) PHOENIX Lessons Learned
(4) ICEBOX OPORD
(5) ICEBOX Hot Wash Up
(6) Operational Requirements
(7) Material Requirements
(8) Future Training Program
(9) Option VIII
(10) BLACKHAWK Evaluation
(11) PAVE LOW/HH53 Evaluation
(12) OH-58 Test
(13) Cost Data
(14) Conclusions
(15) Recommendations

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(U)

Subject: (U) After-Action Report, Army Aviation Participation in JTX Honey Badger, June-July 1980

(U)

1. (U) This is an interim after-action report, consisting of all internal and external reports which will contribute to a final report to be completed at a later date. It is not intended for general dissemination, but for the use of agencies, directorates, and commands supporting the creation of Army aviation forces and units for conduct of Special Missions.

2. (U) The report is organized as follows:

TAB A - Executive Summay of Army Aviation participation in JTX Honey Badger, extracted from a report to the Operations Deputies of the Services.

TAB B - JTD Honey Badger/Army Aviation evaluations. Conducted and reports prepared by US Army Aviation Board, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

TAB C - 101 Aviation Group After Action Report, JTX Honey Badger.

TAB D - Outline of Operation POTENT CHARGE, joint helicopter special missions doctrinal and procedural training and exercising.

[redacted] G

4 Enclosures
a/s

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(U)

Subject: JTX Honey Badger After Action Report

(U)

1. Attached is the Executive Summary of Army Aviation participation in JTX HONEY BADGER, prepared as part of the JTX After Action Report to the Operations Deputies of the Services.

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB A

(U)

INCLOSURE ONE: HONEY BADGER TRAINING TASKS

INCLOSURE ONE lists principle training tasks by unit, date and location during HONEY BADGER. [redacted]

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INCLOSURE ONE: HONEY BADGER TRAINING TASKS

Training Plan

FT BLISS	DUGWAY
5 JULY DEPLOY - SET UP (ALL)	5 JULY DEPLOY - SET UP (ALL)
6 JULY NIGHT FIRING [redacted] NIGHT DRIVING POW HANDLING DZ MARKING CONVOY MOVEMENT DZ LOCATION (MC) SUPPORT OF [redacted] (AC) TAC FORMATION/NAV (AC/MC)	6 JULY LOW LEVEL NAV (BH/PL/HC-130) LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT)
7 JULY NIGHT FIRING [redacted] NIGHT DRIVING POW HANDLING DZ MARKING CONVOY MOVEMENT DZ LOCATION (MC) SUPPORT OF [redacted] (AC) TAC FORMATION/NAV (AC/MC)	7 JULY LOW LEVEL NAV (BH/PL/HC-130) LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT) POL TECHNIQUES (BH/PL) (R-9 SIMULATION) IP INSTRUCTION ON TACTICS (BH/PL)
8 JULY NIGHT FIRING [redacted] NIGHT DRIVING POW HANDLING DZ MARKING CONVOY MOVEMENT DZ LOCATION (MC) SUPPORT OF [redacted] (AC) TAC FORMATION/NAV (AC/MC)	8 JULY LOW LEVEL NAV (BH/PL/HC-130) LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT) CAMY/CONCEAL (BH/PL) POL TECHNIQUES (MC) HC

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[redacted]

FT BLISS	DUGWAY
9 JULY DRY RUN [redacted] LONG RANGE PENETRATION (AC/MC) FORMATION FLYING	9 JULY INTEGRATED OPS (BH/PL/HC-130) TRANSLOADING CAMY/CONCEAL
10 JULY [redacted] LONG RANGE PENETRATION (AC/MC)	10 JULY INTEGRATED OPS (BH/PL/HC-130) TRANSLOADING CAMY CONCEAL
11 JULY FULL REHEARSAL [redacted] [redacted] SOW)	11 JULY INTEGRATED OPS (BH/PL/HC-130) LONG RANGE POL OPS LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT) CAMY/CONCEAL
(C) 12 JULY REVIEW AS ROE [redacted] SOW) AIRCRAFT DESTRUCTION (AC) DELTA ARRIVES	12 JULY INTEGRATED OPS (BH/PL/HC-130) LONG RANGE (TO OG) POL OPS (HC/MC) LZ MARKING/BEACONING (CCT)
13 JULY BH/PL FAM [redacted] (DELTA) [redacted] (PL/BH/MC) CONVOY PICKUP (DELTA) EMBASSY ASLT (DELTA) EMBASSY PICKUP (DELTA) POL TECHNIQUES (HC/MC/BH/PL) LZ ORGANIZATION (CCT) AIRCRAFT DESTRUCTION (AC)	13 JULY HELO (-) INTERNAL TNG
14 JULY INTEGRATED OPS [redacted] LONG RANGE (TO DUGWAY) AIRFIELD SEIZURE [redacted] DZ MARKING (CCT) LZ MARKING (CCT) NIGHT POL OPS (BH/PL/HC-130) POL OPS (MC)	14 JULY HELO MAINTENANCE STANDDOWN

[redacted]

[redacted] SECRET

FORMAT

(U) HONEY BADGER OT& E ACTIVITY REPORT

1. Concept, equipment, and or technique tested: Determine the capability of the AC-130 t[redacted]

2. Desired Goal: Show that an AC-130 can effectively [redacted]

3. Applicable conditions: e.g., lighting, density, altitude, temperature, etc.
Lighting - Night

4. Results: Mission was considered very successful. However, [redacted]

5. Recommendations: a) [redacted]

6. Additional remarks: Wearing night vision goggles (NVGs), [redacted]

[redacted] SECRET

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FLIGHT REPORT:

EL PASO [redacted] 9 Jul 80 AC-130H Mission.

The purpose of this mission was to determine how well the [redacted]

The rendezvous point was a preplanned intersection in El Paso. The AC-130H contacted the ground team on secure UHF about ten miles from the rendezvous point. The ground party had earlier displayed [redacted]

The vehicles were told to rendezvous at a certain location in the city and then proceeded north out of El Paso. During this time, [redacted] to the west about ten miles to determine how easily th[redacted]

[redacted] The exercise was terminated through contact on secure UHF.

The mission was very successful. The following problems with recommendations are attached:

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PROBLEM 1: [redacted]

The [redacted] on [redacted] was two inches wide and about four feet long.

PROBLEM 2: [redacted] This would be about 45° on opposite sides of the orbit. [redacted] would consist of about 30 seconds of the two minute orbit.

RECOMMENDATION: [redacted]

PROBLEM 3: Separation [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION [redacted]

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INCLOSURE TWO: Phoenix OPORD

OPORD PHOENIX

(~~TS~~) Operations Concept

TM Grab	North Blackhawks
TM Run	South PL/BH
TM Stopper	North AC-130
TM Snuff	South AC-130
TM Cleancut	North [redacted]MC-130
TM Slash	South [redacted]MC-130
TM Pathfinder	North CCT
TM Leap	South CCT
TM Logroll	CH 47 POL TM
TM Freedom	North C141
TM Liberty	South C141
TM Snatch	Delta

Situation:



b. Friendly: Friendly assets have located Ambassador and are presently observing objective areas. The nation of Furd has authorized use of its Territory for launch and overflight.

Mission:

[redacted] exfiltrates to launch base.

Concept of Operation:

[redacted] supports as required.

Execution:

(1) TM Cleancut conducts [redacted] commencing at P-Hour to 1:20, [redacted] Return [redacted]

(2) TM Slash [redacted]

[redacted]

(7) TM Logroll provides needed support to Teams Grab and Run.

(8) TM Pathfinder and TM Leap support as required.

(9) TN [redacted]

Fire Support

Teams Stopper and Snuff support as required.

Coordinating Instructions:

(1) P Hour 160740Z July 80

(2) Teams [redacted] will report status and number of pax [redacted]

(3) Units will report key times per OPSKED.

(4) Northern Operation

[redacted]

MC-130 airdrop [redacted] at Fallon 16/0740Z.

AC-130 must arrive on station at Fallon 16/0740Z.

MC-130 airdrop personnel at Fallon 16/0745Z.

Team Grab be in position to make extraction at Range 17 at 16/0830Z.

MC-130 airland first assault team at [redacted] 16/0835Z.

MC-130 airland second assault team at [redacted] 16/0838Z.

MC-130 airland third assault team at [redacted] 16/0841Z.

MC-130 airland at Fallon 16/0844Z.

C-141 airland at Fallon 16/0900Z.

Team Grab first aircraft should arrive NET 160905Z at Fallon NAS.

C-141 departs with precious cargo as soon as all personnel are accounted for.

Team Grab depart Fallon for Michael AAF when released by CCT.

MC-130's will depart all Ranger assault personnel for Condron as soon as possible.

C-141 will return to Fallon after departure of MC-130's.

Onload jeeps and motorcycles used in the assault and recover at Biggs AAF.

CCT will control Fallon airfield for all exercise arrivals and departures.

(5) Southern Operations:

CH-47 or HH-53 [redacted] 16/0330Z.

Team Run be in position [redacted] 16/0700Z.

MC-130 will [redacted]

AC-130 must arrive overhead [redacted]

MC-130 will airland first assault team at Tonopah 16/0835Z.

MC-130 will airland second assault team at Tonopah 16/0838Z.

C-141 will airland at Tonopah 16/0900Z.

Team Run first aircraft should arrive NET 16/0915Z at Tonopah.

C-141 departs Tonopah with precious cargo as soon as personnel are accounted for.

Team Run depart [redacted] when released by [redacted]

MC-130's will depart with all [redacted] personnel for Condron as soon as practicable.

C-141 will return to Tonopah after departure of MC-130's.

[redacted] and depart for Biggs AAF.

CCT will control Tonopah airfield for all exercise arrivals and departures.

Logistics:
As required

Command and Signal:
Commander will be airborne.
Annex K in effect.

INCLOSURE THREE: LESSONS LEARNED - TRAINEX PHOENIX

1. (S) Planning

a. Unit planning staffs are inexperienced in joint planning.

b. Planning at multiple locations demands that continuous liaison and coordination begin during the staff estimate phase and continue to the final mission brief.

c. Subordinate units require concept briefs at least 24 hours prior to execution.

2. (S) Communications

a. The CEOI OPSKED must be chopped and amended by all element staffs early in the planning process.

b. The Services are not using the same NSA-generated callsign/suffix system. A standarized joint special missions system must be developed, and all elements must commence training using that system.

c. Satellite communications systems, in particular those installed in special mission aircraft, need additional test and evaluation under type mission conditions.

3. (S) Execution

a. Helicopter and fixed wing crews require considerable additional training on integrated joint ops.

b. Air Force and Army helicopter crews need additional work on holding area coordination and link-ups. Joint doctrine needs development and dissemination.

c. CCT and helicopter crews require additional training in air-ground communications, recognition signals, and terminal area coordination.

d. Helo crews must be aware of passenger count and status and relay to CCT.

e. Helicopter and fixed wing route deconfliction requires increased attention.

f. Helicopter crews need additional training in blackout terminal ops.

g. Immediate attention to acquisition of improved IR terminal lighting systems is required.

h. Red lights in aircraft and on runways are counter-productive to NVG use.

i. C-130/C-141 ramps require modification to provide for rapid unloading.

[redacted] needs better mobility for rapid airfield seizure.

k. Blackout rapid ground refueling of helicopters requires additional work.

(C) [redacted] to coordinate inbound aircraft and initial ground forces is significant, and should be considered in planning.

m. All air and key ground units require secure comms. C&C elements require redundant SATCOM.

(S) [redacted] though excellent for its purpose, is slow in moving. Modification and purchase of additional [redacted] are required.

[redacted]

INCLOSURE FOUR: ICEBOX OPORD

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OPORD ICEBOX

REF: JTD ORO GRANDE/[redacted] MSG DTD 171515Z JUL 80

SUBJ: TEST OPORD FOR ICE BOX

1. This is a revised OPORD for ICEBOX. Some times have been revised. AC/MC-130 take off times have been added. Commanders should review this revision carefully and destroy referenced OPORD.

2. Revised OPORD follows:

Task Organization

[redacted]

1 SOW
0141 ELEMENT (OPCON)
CCT
AIR CAV DET.
RECON FORCE

1. Situation

A. Enemy Forces

1) Situation: Enemy currently holding area vicinity Reese AFB with light forces.

[redacted] Two enemy F-4 on strip alert at Reese. [redacted] Artillery fire can be expected after four hours.

3) Weather: High of 100 degrees F during day, low of 75 degrees at night. LIGHT WINDS, CLEAR NIGHT TIME SKIES.

4) Terrain: Flat, relatively populated area with little obstructions to vehicle or foot traffic.

2. [redacted] beginning at 210400Z and extends defensive elements [redacted]

SECRET

3. Execution:

A. Concept of operation: [redacted] 51445Z JULY 80.

B. SOW:

Deliver ground force [redacted]
Provide gun ship support [redacted]
Prevent enemy reinforcements [redacted]
Extract all forces.

[redacted]

Priority of defense: [redacted]
Provide coordinated aircraft loading and parking plans at Reese NLT 172000Z July. Assist [redacted] in assembly and [redacted] exercise positive control of aircraft at Reese AFB.

[redacted]
Provide early warning [redacted] in radius of 40 KM.

From Reese AFB

[redacted] Conduct interdiction and denial OPNS in coordination with [redacted]

F. Operations schedule:

TIME	EVENT	CODE WORD
ALL TIMES ZULU		
210140	1ST AC-130 TAKE OFF	HAWAII
210145	2ND AC-130 TAKE OFF	CALIFORNIA
210150	3RD AC-130 TAKE OFF	ARIZONA
210210	1ST MC-130 TAKE OFF	TEXAS
210215	2ND MC-130 TAKE OFF	UTAH
210222	3RD MC-130 TAKE OFF	MONTANA
210228	4TH MC-130 TAKE OFF	NEVADA
210234	5TH MC-130 TAKE OFF	OREGON
210240	6TH MC-130 TAKE OFF	UTAH
210246	7TH MC-130 TAKE OFF	COLORADO
210400	1ST AC-130 CONTACTS [redacted]	NANCY
210400	1ST MC-130 LANDS	JANICE
210405	2ND AC-130 OVER REESE	KAREN
210405	IR LIGHTING INSTALLED	

(S)

	[redacted]	SARAH
210407	2ND MC-130 LANDS	VICKI
210408	3RD MC-130 LANDS	[redacted]INDA
210413	4TH MC-130 LANDS	COOKIE
210415	5TH MC-130 LANDS	BETTY
210418	1ST EC-130 LANDS	DEANIE
210421	2ND EC-130 LANDS	LESLIE
210430	1ST C-141 LANDS	KITTY
210433	2ND C-141 LANDS	JOE
210440	3RD C-141 LANDS	PATTY
210440	[redacted]	BUBBEES
210443	4TH C-141 LANDS	CAROL
210445	[redacted]	GAIL
210450	5TH C-141 LANDS	BOBBY
210453	6TH C-141 LANDS	ALICE
210513	LAST [redacted] LAUNCHES	BURNET
210551	1ST [redacted]	BERTRAM
210605	3RD [redacted]	MARBLE FALLS
210623	LAST [redacted]	LIBERTY HILL
	DECISION POINT	
	1ST C-141 SIMULATED TAKE OFF	VIRGINIA
210626	2ND C-141 SIMULATED TAKE OFF	
	PERIMETER SHRINK BEGINS	MASON
210656	LAST C-130 LOADED	MONTERREY
ENDEX		

(S) G. Coordination instructions: OPCON of all elements minus [redacted] passes to Cdr [redacted] on landing in AO Sherman. OPCON of C141 element passes to [redacted] upon arrival at [redacted]. All personnel to be briefed on MISSISSIPPI KITE.

(U) 4. Service support: Crash and medical svc at Reese (actual) provided. Logistics as required.

5. Command and Communications:

A. Command:

1) MG HAMMER
2) MG STONE
3) [redacted]
4) [redacted]

Initial OP location: ORO GRANDE. JTD WASH maintains communications with JTD ORO GRANDE 202200Z until 211300Z.

B. Command net structure (also see CEOI)
Primary: ~~SATCOM~~ Radio (secure)
Back up: HF Radio (secure)
[redacted] Commander-Fullback
Deputy Commander-Cutlass
Base (ORO GRANDE) - Rustic
BABN COMD Post - Buckjkin
Forward OP (Reese) - Sundial
Huskey
Bullet
Drummer
Whip Cord
Stake Out
element-Custom
Gum Tree
Guide book

C. Code words in the operational schedule will not be reported unless there is an event that occurs plus of minus of fifteen minutes from the planned schedule.

The Air Cav element will not have secure comm.

6. Loading Plan:

The loading plan for the MC/EC-130 aircraft is as follows:

VCSL SLOTH 11 SLOTH 12 SLOTH 13 SLOTH 14 SLOTH 15 SLOTH 26
CALL SIGN
TRAINEX
LOAD [redacted] PAX PAX PAX [redacted] MEDICS
LOAD
TIME 0100Z 0100Z 0100Z 0100Z [redacted] 0100Z
BACK-
HAUL 33 PAX [redacted] PAX JEEPS [redacted] PAX
1 2 1/2 TON
1 2 1/2 TON
3 MEDICS

Sloth 27

Load [redacted]
19 PAX
LOH

Load/Time

[redacted]0100Z
Rangers BPQPPZ

Backhaul

35 PAX
1 2 1/2 TON

BT
#0328

[redacted]

INCLOSURE FIVE: Hot Wash Up

Subj: Concept Evaluation ICE BOX Hot-Wash Up

Ref: a. JTD ORO GRANDE MSG (TS) 191750Z JUL 80 Subj: (C) OPORD ICEBOX
b. CEOI for ICEBOX (S) published 18/2300Z JUL 80

1. (C) An ICE BOX Hot Wash Up was conducted from 1100 hrs. to 1400 hrs. on 21 July 1980. Representatives from all elements were present. All aspects of the operation were debriefed in detail.

2. (TS) The basic concept of Option Nine is considered to be validated. However, there are a number of aspects that were untested and a number of artificialities:

a. (S) Intelligence inputs were light, did not challenge the force.

[redacted] was required which greatly simplified [redacted] activities.

c. (S) No fighter coordination/participation was geared in the exercise.

d. (S) The end task and most difficult situation was not addressed and, as such, the exercise was a simple concept validation.

3. (S) Errors - Communications:

a. No FM net for ground to ground communications existed between [redacted] forward and ground mission commander. Need to collocate [redacted] fwd with [redacted] OP indicated.

b. A lack of experience at the [redacted] radio console was noted, operators were not adequately familiar with the operation and/or terms or reference.

c. (S) Commanders were not the prime users of the command net. Unauthorized users entered the net.

4. (S) Errors - Operations:

a. Allowance for adequate weapons/ammo was not made. Allowance for long range fuel requirements were not made. More airplanes are mandatory.

b. Improvements in [redacted] coordination are required.

(S) c. Concurrent entry of [redacted] in AO needs to be re-thought.

d. Adequate contingency for the Number Two MC-130 go-around did not exist. The aircraft was critical for provision of maximum force on the ground soonest. Better cross-loading/loading of an aircraft indicated.

(S) e. The [redacted] force lacked an internal command net. The airborne mission commander was not able to adequately control his assets.

f. Aircraft commanders were not able to monitor SATCOM adequately. SATCOM is clearly the best system and should be aVAILABLE to pilots at all times.

(S) [redacted]

h. Permanent overt and covert lighting systems need to be provided for the 130's.

i. Navigation systems need to be improved in all aircraft. A dual INS system that will initialize earlier is required.

(C) [redacted] needs to be developed and employed.

k. Rangers need the new 60 mm mortar system.

l. Early decisions on ground refueling requirements and methods need to be provided.

m. Need a better comm link between air mission commander on the ground and CCT.

n. AC-130's need to be provided with automatic switching between upper and lower antennas in order to insure uninterrupted communications at high angles of bank.

o. An inflight refueling capability is required in the full Special Operations fleet.

p. A dedicated communications net is required on the control ships. Pilots comm should not be broken for the purpose of passing command and control traffic.

[redacted]

q. Better light suppression/attenuation systems are needed for the [redacted] are needed [redacted] An improved NVG system should be developed specifically for [redacted] operations in a mixed black light/white light environment.

r. More NVGs are needed for MAC crew members.

s. MAC comm capability is geared toward a peacetime environment. The systems need a complete upgrade to be up to tactical standards. A minimum of sixteen MAC aircraft must be upgraded with secure communications and at least sixteen full crews identified and trained in the Special Operations mission.

t. A better inter-team CCT communications needs to be developed. Portable radios units/headsets specifically tailored to the CCT role must be acquired.

u. The CCT needs a better form of ground transportation. Motorcycles are indicated.

5. (TS) Training Requirements:

a. First SOW:

(1) Improved go-around procedures need to be incorporated. Better interface between pilot and navigation during go-arounds needs to occur.

(2) The capability for significantly compressed landings/off loading of 130's needs to be developed.

(3) Night, low level capability needs improvement. More training needs to be accomplished in the western United States.

(4) [redacted] Gunships need bigger ranges in which to train so that they can exercise in more realistic profiles.

(5) C-130 and C-141 training needs to be integrated. MAC and TAC crews need more interface.

(6) A system for [redacted] of MC-130 should be developed and crews trained. Such vectoring could significantly improve MC-130 landing accuracy.

(7) SOW/MAC CCT interface needs to be expanded for better flexibility and improved availability of controllers.

b. Rangers:

(C) (1) More training in loading/unloading operations is required. Rangers need a C-141 hulk [redacted] training aid dedicated to their training.

(2) Integrated Ranger [redacted] training is required to improve interface and to provide the capability for faster and safer operations.

(3) Rangers need more PT-25 training from Delta.

c. [redacted]

(1) Further Phase I (Basic Pilot Skills) training is needed. It is estimated that an additional two weeks training in fundamental airmanship is required.

(2) Coordination with the aviation center for clearance/.waivers required for specialized training is necessary.

(3) Increased integration with Delta is required for an improved basis of understanding of procedures, marshalling and safety is required.

(4) More initial checkouts/increased personnel are required to provide increased depth within the organization.

(5) PPS-5 night vision goggles have little value when operating low level (200-500 ft) over built-up areas that are illuminated with normal city lights.

[redacted] Dead reckoning [redacted] is the best means of navigation in a city environment.

(7) Operating in the urban environment is very fatiguing. Pilot proficiency is reduced significantly after about one hour.

d. MAC: MAC needs to increase the emphasis on individual crew training in the Special Operations role. Nine crews will take part in specialized training at Michael AAF on 5-7 August. First SOW interface should be established.

[redacted]

[redacted]

e. CCT: The Combat Controllers Unit must be fleshed out. MAC CCTs are thirty six percent manned. First SOW CCTs are forty per cent manned. This critical shortage of personnel greatly limits flexibility and degrades operational capability. Additionally, increased emphasis should be placed on actual aircraft handling operations.

f. JCSE: JCSE Team training needs improvement. Communicators must be trained to [redacted]

g. [redacted] Command and Staff: In subsequent exercises the [redacted] function should:

(1) Expand intelligence inputs and play into the system.

(2) Increase the administrative staff and capability so as not to have to draw on subordinate capability.

(3) Avoid split staff whenever possible.

(4) Provide mission equipment for [redacted] personnel.

(5) Conduct CPX or command and control for command net subscribers.

(6) (U) (TS) Commanders to take necessary actions to provide leave opportunity to personnel, conduct necessary maintenance and component training so as to be prepared for joint training on 25 August.

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INCLOSURE SIX: Operational Requirements

Operational Requirements

1. [redacted]

2. Develop a complete Option IX training plan utilizing real time/distance factors.

3. Develop a fighter exercise program to be integrated into Option IX training.

4. Develop improved fix wing go-around procedures.

5. Develop AC130 live fire training to include [redacted] procedures for initial targets.

6. Develop a technique to allow [redacted] MC-130's during landing.

7. Gain clearances & waivers for Special Operations techniques involving Blackhawks, [redacted] Pave Lows & HH-53's.

8. Expand Special Operations combat controllers.

9. Expedite training of MAC Special Operations crews.

10. Develop ground refueling program for Option IX.

11. Develop a ground transportation system for the CCT.

12. Develop a more efficient communications net for SNOWBIRD (TS) units.

13. Develop a more efficient JCSE organization/capability.

14. Increased [redacted] proficiency in night operations with minimum light, pick up operations and procedures in hastily selected PZ's, and refine aircraft unloading and preparation in flight techniques.

15. Develop, coordinate & test the SNOWBIRD (TS) VIII Option [redacted]

[redacted]

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INCLOSURE SEVEN: Material Requirements

(U)

Below listed are the tentative costs/requirements connected with the SNOWBIRD (TS) Program.

(U)

ARMY

Items to be purchased

Motor bikes	$21K
WPNS (9 mm, 22 cal.)	20K
MT-1 Parachute System	49K
Desert Uniform	44K
Chem lites/IR Filters	2K
	136K

Costs not already incurred

Armored Vehicles (2 ea.)	$68K
[redacted]	90K
Refuel Equip/Air Drop/Land	TBD
Medical/Personal Gear	20K
Portable Aux Power Units	TBD

(U)

STD Military Equip - issue over TOE

Gun Jeeps	$207K	
WPNS	225K	
Night vision equip for Army	368K	
Night vision equip for AF	70K	(excludes KC-135 rqmt 268K)
Parachutes/Assorted equip	123K	
Munitions/Demo	250K (est)	TOTAL 1.77M

USAF

Items to be purchased

Motor bikes	28K
NVG's from Army Stocks	70K

Costs not already incurred

Vertical Gyro mod	$152K
H-130 Mods	TBD
C-141B Mods	TBD

Communications TOTAL 225K

Army Procurement: Costs $3.4 million

(Purchase or provide from existing assets)

[redacted]

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(5)

SATCOM Terminals	ARC-164/MX-850 or WSC-3
10 OH-60s	$1800K
12 CH-47s	720K
[redacted]	240K
10 HF Radios PRC-104s	160K
30 FM Radios for [redacted]	180K
85 FM Radios for PRC-77s	in stock
2 HF Broadcast Receivers (Collins 51S1 or equivalent)	1K
	4K
10 HF Broadcast Receivers (Battery Operated Portables)	250K
50 MX-360 Radios	

Air Force Procurement: Costs $2.4 million

(U) (Purchase or provide from existing assets)

SATCOM Terminals	(ARC-164/MX-850 or WSC-3)
10 for MAC C-141Bs	600K
10 for SAC/KC-135s	600K
14 for HH-53s	840K
2 for AWACS	120K
4 HF Radios (Sunaire 900 DX or equivalent)	2K
10 sets of "Y" connectors for PARKHILLS (in aircraft and fixed sites) w/headsets and push to talk switches	TBD
4 Nestor Secure Voice Pallets	168K

[redacted] [redacted]

INCLOSURE EIGHT: Future Training Program

Future Training

1. (S) Key Dates

11-15 August	RECON of training sites
18 August	Planning conference
2-5 September	ADVON deploy
5-18 September	Startex

2. (S) Key Training Tasks

a. [redacted]



b. C141B

(S) [redacted]

Mid-Air refueling
On-load/off-load training
Air-ground control

c. MC-130

Blackout landing
On-load/off-load training
Parking/extraction

d. AC-130

Air-ground OPS

e. BLACKHAWK

Blackout landings
Low level flight with Pave Low
(S) Refuel OPS
Air-ground comm w/CCT & [redacted]
Field maintenance

f. Pave Low/HH-53

Blackout landings
(S) Low level flight w/Blackhawks
Air-ground comm w/CCT & [redacted]
Field maintenance

g. [redacted]

Secure comm exercise
On-load/off-load training
[redacted] assembly
Air-ground control
Low level NAV
Blackout landing

h. CCT

Air-ground comm/OPS
Fixed wing parking
Helo Pax accountability

i. JTF

Airfield seizure (simultaneous)
Long range penetration/C&C
Extraction
Options IX & X

FUTURE TRAINING PROGRAM

(Through 18 Sep)

DATE	UNIT	TRAINING
1 Aug-30 Sep	[redacted]	MISSION
2-9 Aug	[redacted] DELTA	PATHFINDER OPS
5-7 Aug	C141B	NITE LANDINGS
6-8 Aug	[redacted] HQ	SITE RECON
[redacted] 9-20 Aug	[redacted]	NITE OPS
11-23 Aug	101st [redacted]	INSTRUCTOR TNG
12-13 Aug	USN/USAF	AIR SUPERIORITY
2-18 Sep	JTF TRAINEX	JOINT TRAINING REHEARSAL

INCLOSURE NINE: SNOWBIRD OPTION VII AND VIII (TS)

1. Actions To Date

[redacted]

U. S. Navy ships identified are:

1. LPH
2. LHA
3. CV/CVN

It has been determined that on all vessels, movement of the HH-53H helicopter below decks requires removal of main rotor blades. Re-installation and tracking of the blades requires a prohibitive amount of time. As a result, unless the HH-53H is equipped with a folding rotor head, it will not be tested on ships. The UH-60A [redacted] for conduct of flight operations.

b. Testing. TRADOC, in conjunction with MTMC has been directed to conduct a feasibility test of the UH-60A aircraft on Navy ships. Costs for the tests aboard USN ships are estimated at $10,000. Tests should be completed by 15 August.

[redacted]

2. Future Actions

A decision to test the [redacted] has been made. Costs are estimated at $20,000 to $50,000 per day depending upon the impact [redacted]

After completion of feasibility testing, a decision on [redacted] type will follow. If the [redacted] will cost approximately $1 million. One week of unit training will require about [redacted] $200,000 for unit expenses. Unit training costs [redacted] are estimated at $.5 million but will also adversely affect the [redacted] primary mission.

INCLOSURE TEN: BLACKHAWK/CH-47C EVALUATION (U)

1. (U) Objectives

a. Create Army aviation capability to support SNOWBIRD (TS).

b. Create doctrinally sound, logistically sustainable long-term capability to successfully conduct special operations.

2. (U) Background

a. Past efforts in the area of Army aviation support of special operations have been limited by equipment shortcomings, organizational decisions, and resource limitations.

b. Special operations support is normally characterized by the requirement for deep penetration, surprise, and complex tasks in the objective area. Until recently, the only assets available which were capable of the ranges and flight profiles meeting those criteria have been fixed-wing aircraft and a few air-refuelable heavy lift helicopters. The special operations aviation capability of the Army has been reduced to an aviation platoon in the Fifth Special Forces Group.

c. Army aviation exists for the stated purpose of supporting the land battle with maneuver, combat support, and combat service support vertical-lift units, and limited fixed-wing special support. Special operations on land are normally conducted by Army ground forces. The only identifiable reason the considerable resources of Army aviation have not been fully integrated into joint air support of those operations in the past was that the helicopters did not exist in the inventory which could penetrate deep, with surprise, and conduct close combat operations in the objective area. Notably, the capability to conduct those operations with vertical-lift aircraft in any significant numbers has been virtually non-existent in any service.

d. The key objective of the HONEY BADGER/Army Aviation effort was to create the basis for presenting the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a viable Army aviation contribution to joint air special missions in support of special operations This was to include both modification of aircraft and conduct of individual and unit training which would yield a trained special missions-capable rotary-wing force. The secondary objective, as yet unfulfilled, is to integrate that force into a joint force consisting of Army and Air Force air and ground elements.

3. Concept

a. In early June, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, directed that the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) be designated the major Army organization which would provide special missions crews and aircraft to JCS.

b. A survey of all aircraft in the Army inventory, directed by the JTF Commander and conducted by the JTF staff in coordination with the Army staff, indicated that the UH-60A and the CH-47C-plus were the Army helicopters with the greatest immediate potential for special missions.

(1) The UH-60 is a highly survivable, fast helicopter with an unusually good power-to-weight ratio and excellent high-density-altitude performance.

(2) The CH-47C-plus has the highest useful load in the inventory, and has an exceptionally large cargo area with the longest center-of-gravity travel of any helicopter in the world. This makes it particularly suitable for long-range logistics haul.

c. Both the UH-60A and CH-47C-plus were found wanting in several areas when profiled against SNOWBIRD (TS) concepts In coordination with ODCSOPS, DA; ODCSLOG, DA; and DARCOM, necessary modifications were identified and a program to conduct those modifications initiated. The decision was made to conduct the majority of the work at Norton AFB, in order that

(1) Individual and unit training could be ongoing in the desert/mountain environment, and

(2) For OPSEC purposes, the work could be advertised as part of the Honey Badger test and evaluation.

d. Terminal Training Objectives were extrapolated from the SNOWBIRD (TS) Concepts, then refined to reflect a set of capabilities which would allow considerable flexibility in future planning. Fundamentally, they yielded the following objectives.

(1) UH-60. Full night vision qualification, night long-range flight in excess of [redacted] unrefueled, at low level. Coordinated operations with HH-53C, H and CH-47C. Terminal operations blacked out and with IR searchlight.

(2) CH-47C. Full night vision qualification, night long-range flight in excess of [redacted] unrefueled, at low level. Coordinated operations. Fuel [redacted]

[redacted]

(3) Pathfinders. Integrated operations with CCT, secure rapid refueling points, conduct fuel transfer ops, set up remote navaids.

3. Execution.

a. Training. See attachment one.
c. Evaluation. See attachment two.

4. Future Training.

a. Joint training will be conducted at Hunter AAF during the period 4 to 14 August for the purpose of addressing deficiencies identified during Phase II in the areas of planning, coordination, and execution. Lead crews and IP's from 101 ABD, 1 SOW, USAAVNS, and USMC will conduct seminars and flight training to develop special operations joint doctrine. They will then return to train organizations to prepare them for Phase III, beginning 2 September.

ATTACHMENT ONE: TRAINING

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INITIAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

	PERSONNEL					
SUBJECT	IP/P	CP	N	CE	PF	OBS
NVG						
QUALIFICATION	X					
FAMILIARIZATION		X	X	X		X
NAVIGATION						
OMEGA	X	X	X			X
DOPPLER	X	X	X			X
NAVIGATOR			X			
EXT RG FUEL SYS	X	X	X	X		
REFUELING	X	X		X		
HF COMMO	X	X	X	X	X	
A/C WEAPONS	X	X	X	X		
WEIGHT & BAL	X	X	X	X		
FLIGHT TNG						
NEAR GW/HI DA	X	X				
NVG	X	X	X	X		
NVG FORMATION	X	X				
NVG TO NIGHT HAWK	X	X				
EXT LOADS	X	X		X		
MOUNTAIN	X	X		X		

LEGEND: IP/P - Instructor Pilot/Pilot
CP - Copilot
N - Navigator
CE - Crewchief
PF - Pathfinder

~~SECRET~~

ADDITIONAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

SUBJECT	PERSONNEL					
	IP/P	CP	N	CE	PF	OBS
A/C LOADING	X	X		X		
SURVIVAL						
WATER	X	X	X	X		
DESERT	X	X	X	X		
E & E	X	X	X	X		
NBC FLIGHT	X	X	X	X		
CEDI	X	X	X	X		
OXYGEN	X	X	X	X		
NVG PRE/POST FLT	X	X		X		
DOWN A/C & CREW REC	X	X	X	X	X	
EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION	X	X	X	X		
MSN ABORT PROC	X	X	X			
EXT RG FUEL SYS						
EMERG REMOVAL			X	X		
EMERG REPAIR			X	X		
ASE EQUIP 1/	X	X	X			

LEGEND:
- IP/P - Instructor Pilot/Pilot
- CP - Copilot
- N - Navigator
- CE - Crewchief
- PF - Pathfinder

1/ To be defined

ATTACHMENT TWO: EVALUATION ~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~[illegible]~~

2 Jul 80

TO: Task Force Commander, JTD Honey Badger (C)

INFO: Test Director, JTD Honey Badger (C)

FROM: USAAVNBD Project Analyst

SUBJ: Emerging Results, UH-60A Aircrew Mission Effectiveness (U)

1. (U) The information contained herein constitutes emerging results found from analyzing fifteen (15) randomly selected UH-60A aircrews by USAAVNC observers with regard to the following measures of effectiveness (MOE) as related to mission effectiveness:

a. Maximum enroute longitudinal course deviation: ±3 minutes (based upon estimated course leg times).

b. Maximum latteral course deviation: ±1500 meters

c. Course Altitude: 300-500 feet above ground level (AGL) and below 300 feet AGL where possible.

2. The information is provided in tabular format for the purpose of identifying collective mission effectiveness parameters assessed to date based upon the random selection of the 15 aircrews observed.

3. The observer's mission effectiveness data collection form from which this data was recorded and reduced is found at inclosure 1.

4. (U) Although these objective findings may provide insight as to the unit's overall mission readiness at this time, it is paramount to consider the following comments based upon sound military judgment and experience:

a. The average aircrew had negotiated route black at least one other time and at least five of the aircrews twice thus establishing a learning curve.

b. Ambient light conditions, both moon phase and azimuth, were generally considered optimal; however, two observations were conducted under reduced visibility due to thunderstorms, rain showers and haze.

c. Aircrews were not found to be standardized as to what percentage of the time they collectively or any one member thereof employed night vision goggles (i.e., aircrew deviation of [illegible] NVGs worn estimated from 2-4 hours).

d. Spacing of individual aircraft (sorties) was not necessarily optimal in as much as several aircraft caught up to each other during the conduct of the flight, in some cases reducing navigation to a "follow the leader" situation.

e. The number of observations for anyone aircrew varied significantly due to any of the below reasons:

(1) Mission aborts - maintenance

(2) Mission aborts - operations

(3) Mission aborts - weather

(4) Aircrew workload between short course segments too rigorous for data aggregation.

(5) Partial lack of standardization in observer instructions.

5. Considering the aforementioned constraints, the objective data pertaining to the MOE found in paragraph 1 is tabulated at inclosure 2 using simple statistical procedures identifying central tendancy.

6. The number of times that any given aircrew exceeded any given parameter found in the MOE is found below.

AIRCREW UH-60A	LONGITUDINAL DEVIATIONS 1 ETA-ACTUAL/±3.0 MINS.	LATTERAL DEVIATIONS 1 LEFT/EIGHT OF CRS ON CRS/21.5 KM	VERTICAL DEVIATIONS 500 FT AGL
1	0	1	2
2	0	0	2
3	1	2	3
4	0	0	0
5	0	0	0
6	1	1	2
7	0	2	1
8	7	0	0
9	0	2	*NA
10	1	1	1
11	0	0	*NA
12	0	0	0
13	0	0	1
14	0	0	**8
15	1	0	**12
SUMMARY			
TOTALS	11	9	**12

*Excluded, measured MSL in lieu of AGL.

7. It is anticipated that certain correlations may exist between the evaluated individual aircrew's effectiveness as related to the constraints previously discussed and the defined MOE. Hence, further covariance techniques could be applied to investigate a possible relation between two primary variables as deemed appropriate. The two variable of immediate interest would be (1) the number of times the particular aircrew previously negotiated the route and (2) the aircrew's prior aviation experience. Because of the manual effort involved and on site personnel constraints, a more detailed analysis will be provided upon request.

[redacted]
Project Analyst

~~SECRET~~

OBSERVER'S MISSION EFFECTIVENESS

DATA COLLECTION FORM

POINT	TIME ETE / ACTUAL	COURSE 1/ L ON R	ALTITUDE (AGL) 2/	REMARKS
SP				
MIDPOINT				
CP 1				
MIDPOINT				
CP 2				
MIDPOINT				
CP 3				
MIDPOINT				
CP 4				
MIDPOINT				
CP 5				
MIDPOINT				
CP 6				
MIDPOINT				
CP 7				
MIDPOINT				
CP 8				
MIDPOINT				
CP 9				
MIDPOINT				
CP 10				
MIDPOINT				
CP 11				

~~SECRET~~

POINT	TIME ETE / ACTUAL	COURSE 1/ L ON R	ALTITUDE (AGL) 2/	REMARKS
MIDPOINT				
CP 12				
MIDPOINT				
CP 13				
MIDPOINT				
CP 14				
MIDPOINT				
CP 15				
MIDPOINT				
RP				

COMMENTS:

1/ If on course, check "On", if off course indicate left (L) or right (R) in kilometers.
2/ Average altitude (AGL) estimated using radar altimeter.

OBSERVER: _____

PILOT: _____

COPILOT: _____

NAVIGATOR: _____

CREW CHIEF: _____

DATE: _____

CREW INTEGRITY

How many times has this crew flown together as a mission crew?

Of these how many were under: NVG daylight _____

NVG night _____

-A, B-

[illegible]	*LONGITUDINAL COURSE DEVIATIONS DELTA TIME (MINUTES) [ACTUAL-ESTIMATED]				*LATTERAL COURSE DEVIATIONS DELTA DISTANCE OFF COURSE				VERTICLE (ALTITUDE) COURSE DEVIATIONS (FEET ACL)			
	NO. OF OBVS	AVG Δ TIME	S.D. Δ TIME	RANGE (MIN-MAX)	NO. OF OBVS	AVG Δ DIST	S.D. DIST Δ TIME	RANGE (MIN-MAX)	NO. OF OBVS	AVG ALT	S.D. ALT	RANGE (MIN-MAX)
1	25	.604	.736	0-2.5	26	.377	.631	0-3.0	31	626	1283	100-3000
2	11	.891	.976	0-2.4	15	.067	.168	0- .6	17	444	327	100-1500
3	15	1.240	.998	0-3.0	14	.629	1.059	0-4.0	23	443	352	150-1500
4	15	1.171	.827	3-2.9	18	.111	.232	0- .8	20	350	89	200- 500
5	8	.250	.378	0-1.0	21	.157	.293	0-1.1	15	190	82	75- 400
[illegible]	15	1.253	1.336	0-4.9	20	.445	.704	0-3.0	14	482	114	245- 700
[illegible]	[illegible]	.213	.418	0-1.6	11	.518	.783	0-2.0	16	464	686	200-3000
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1.846	.1-5.5	23	.287	.333	0- .8	25	312	98	100- 500
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	.510	0-2.5	30	.360	.481	0-1.9	30	**1403	**67	**750-4000
[illegible]	11	1.073	1.250	0-4.3	10	.320	.597	0-1.9	15	244	374	40-1500
[illegible]	6	.833	.408	0-1.0	9	.200	.300	0- .9	8	**1050	**626	**500-2000
[illegible]	14	.486	.483	0-1.0	14	.264	.436	0-1.3	14	450	65	300- 500
[illegible]	7	1.000	.816	0-2.0	9	.100	.141	0- .4	9	889	285	500-1500
[illegible]	30	.167	.235	0- .8	28	.057	.079	0- .2	30	289	131	150- 750
[illegible]	14	.686	1.122	0-3.6	18	.206	.304	0- .8	17	289	502	200-1600
[illegible]MARY												
[illegible]	15	15	NA	15	15	15	NA	15	15	**13	NA	**13
[illegible]	15	.934	NA	.03-2.60	16	.269	NA	0-1.5	19	359	NA	182-1142
[illegible]	7.40	.753	NA	NA	7.35	.169	NA	NA	7.16	143	NA	NA

[illegible] ARE ALL ABSOLUTE VALUES FROM ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL (ETA) OR FROM DOPPLER INDICATED TIME COURSE LINE.

****
* [redacted] *
****

[redacted]

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

OTTSZYUW RUCLEUA6950 2072230--RUEADWD.
IMMEDIATE
O 252130Z JUL 80
FM PRESIDENT AVN BD FT RUCKER AL //ATZQ-OT-AU//
TO HQ DA WASH DC //DAMO-ROD//
BT

[redacted]
SECTION 01 OF 02
[redacted] PASS TO [redacted]
SUBJ: HONEY BADGER
1. THIS MESSAGE IS A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS WHICH RESULTED DURING EVALUATION OF THE FINAL EXERCISE CONDUCTED DURING PHASE II.
2. PILOT MISSION BRIEFINGS
A. NORTH ROUTE
(1) CONDUCTED BY 158 AVN BN
(2) ADEQUATE WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS
B. SOUTH ROUTE
(1) CONDUCTED BY USAF
(2) UNSATISFACTORY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF WEATHER AND CH-47 RAPID REFUEL CPNS. SITUATION, MISSION AND EXECUTION WERE PRESENTED IN A CONFUSED, UNCLEAR MANNER. NO LOGICAL FORMAT SUCH AS THE 5 PARA FIELD ORDER WAS USED. NUMEROUS CHANGES WERE MADE DURING THE BRIEFING; VISUAL AIDS WERE POOR.
(3) EXTEMPORANEOUS BRIEFINGS BY PIC'S OF FLIGHT LEADS MADE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT POSSIBLE.
C. GENERAL COMMENTS CONSOLIDATED BY EVALUATORS PRESENT AT BOTH PILOT MISSION BRIEFINGS:
(1) NUMEROUS FREQUENCIES AND CALLSIGNS UNKNOWN; SOME CHANGED DURING BRIEFING.
(2) SOME VISUAL AIDS WERE INADEQUATE.
(3) OCCUPATION OF LZ'S WAS NOT PROPERLY BRIEFED.
(4) LINK UP OF UH-60 AND CH-53 AT LZI SOUTH WAS POORLY PLANNED; CHANGED DURING THE BRIEFING.
(5) FRIENDLY/ENEMY SITUATION WAS NOT BRIEFED.

ACTION DAMO(12) (U,F)
INFO SAPA(3) DALO(6) DAMI(6) DAPE(3) DAAC(6)
AOC-DAMI WATCH(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 37

[redacted]

MCN=80207/24141 TOR=80207/2249Z TAD=80207/2249Z COSN=PR9552

ARMY SECTIONAL MSG **********
* [redacted] *
****

(6) NO CH-47 RRP TERMINATION TIME OR SECURITY PLAN WAS BRIEFED.
(7) LZ SECURITY PLAN WAS NOT BRIEFED.
(8) LZ STATUS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WERE NOT BRIEFED.
(9) AUTHENTICATION TABLES WERE NOT BRIEFED/USED.
(10) THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES WERE NOT ADDRESSED:
(A) EVASIVE MANEUVERS
(B) INSTRUCTIONS FOR PASSENGER DEBOARDING AT AIRFIELDS
(C) INSTRUCTIONS IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF LEAD AIRCRAFT
(D) INSTRUCTIONS FOR LOST COMMS
(E) DOWNED CREW RECOVERY PROCEDURES
(F) SIGNALS FOR FORMATION CHANGE
(11) JOINT OPERATING PROCEDURES. STANDARDIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION ARE ESSENTIAL TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.
3. PREMISSION PLANNING WAS POOR DUE TO THE FOLLOWING:
A. NAVIGATORS BRIEFED SEPARATELY AND PRIOR TO PILOTS: NUMEROUS CHANGES OCCURRED DURING PILOT BRIEFINGS.
B. 1:500,000 SCALE MAPS ARE INADEQUATE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAIL.
C. HAZARDS INFORMATION WAS NOT AVAILABLE.
D. COMPLETE, DETAILED CREW BRIEFINGS WERE NOT CONDUCTED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT TIME.
E. NUMEROUS INADEQUATE AIR NAVIGATION CHECKPOINTS WERE PROVIDED. (PLANNERS SHOULD UTILIZE AN NVG SIP DURING SELECTION OF CHECKPOINTS.)
4. MISSION EXECUTION
A. UH-60/CH-53 INGRESS TO HOLDING LZ'S
(1) THIS PHASE WAS GENERALLY WELL EXECUTED; ENROUTE NAVIGATION/PILOTAGE GOOD.
(2) SOUTH LZ WAS INADEQUATE: 1 INCH POWDERED DUST; SMALL; UH-60'S MADE GO AROUND.
(3) UH-60 CALL FORWARD PLAN WAS UNCLEAR.
(4) UH-60/CH-53 LINK UP PLAN WAS POORLY PLANNED AND EXECUTED.
B. CH-53 INGRESS TO PZ
(1) GENERALLY GOOD
(2) ONE AIRCRAFT MADE A GO AROUND
C. MOVEMENT TO AIRFIELDS
(1) LACK OF A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND EXPERIENCE RESULTED IN MUCH CONFUSION AND DISORGANIZATION WHICH RESULTED IN RELIANCE ON RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.

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(2) NUMEROUS AIRCRAFT IN THE VICINITY OF AIRFIELDS WERE FLYING IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS WITH NO CONTROL AGENCY RESULTING IN NUMEROUS OVERFLIGHTS. NOT ALL PASSENGERS EXITED HELICOPTERS AT APPROPRIATE POINTS ON AIRFIELDS DUE TO LACK OF PROPER PLANNING. BT

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OTTSZYUW RUCLEUA6951 2072230--RUEADWD.
IMMEDIATE
O 252130Z JUL 80
FM PRESIDENT AVN BD FT RUCKER AL //ATZC-OT-AU//
TO HQ DA WASH DC //DAMO-RCD//
BT

~~S E C R E T~~
FINAL SECTION OF 02
(3) MUCH OF FLYING WAS CONDUCTED IN EXCESS OF 1500 FT AGL.
(4) CONFUSION AND DISORGANIZATION RESULTED IN PILOTS USING POSITION LIGHTS, UNFILTERED LANDING LIGHTS AND EXCESSIVE RADIO TRAFFIC.
(5) AIRCRAFT OFTEN LOST SIGHT OF EACH OTHER DURING FORMATION FLYING UNDER NVG'S RESULTING IN STROBE LIGHTS BEING USED TO REGAIN CONTACT BETWEEN AIRCRAFT.
D. REFUELING AT CH-47 RRP'S
(1) ENROUTE PILOTAGE AND NAVIGATION WAS EXCELLENT.
(2) NORTH FLIGHT OVERFLEW THE RRP SITE AND CIRCLED THE AREA FOR APPROX 15 MINUTES TO LOCATE THE PROPER AREA.
(3) ONE CH-47 AT THE SOUTH RRP HAD TO BE REPOSITIONED APPROX 200 METERS DUE TO POORLY SELECTED TERRAIN.
(4) RRP SET UP WAS COMPLETED IN 15 MINUTES.
(5) REFUELING UH-60 WITH 500 LBS OF JP-4 TOOK BETWEEN 6 AND 11 MINUTES. ONE AIRCRAFT TOOK 19 MINUTES DUE TO CREWCHIEF BEING UNFAMILIAR WITH THE CCR NOZZLE.
(6) NUMEROUS PILOTS RECOMMENDED THAT UH-60 LANDINGS BE ACCOMPLISHED AT RIGHT ANGLES TO AND BEHIND CH-47'S FOR SAFETY IN THE EVENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR GO AROUNDS.
(7) ONE CH-53 EXPERIENCED FAILURE OF THE NOSE GEAR AND UTILIZED WHITE LIGHT FOR 11 MINUTES TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.
(8) ONE RRP PUMP FAILED; CREW MUST RELEASE PRESSURE IN LINES PRIOR TO CHANGING PUMPS; TIME DELAY WAS NEGLIGABLE.
5. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS
A. NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT ONBOARD AIRCRAFT OCCUPIED BY OBSERVERS WORKED WELL; GENERALLY NAVIGATION ERRORS WERE LESS THAN 0.6 MILES.
B. JOINT OPERATING PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED FOR STANDARDIZATION

AND MISSION EFFECTIVENESS IN THE EVENT OF UNEXPECTED OCCURRENCES.

C. AS AMBIENT LIGHT CONDITIONS DEGRADE, FLIGHT ALTITUDES INCREASE IN EXCESS OF 1500 FT AGL.

D. MORE PRACTICE IN FORMATION FLYING WHILE WEARING NVG'S IS REQUIRED.

E. SOME CREW MEMBERS ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH CCR NOZZLE REFUELING.

F. CREW COORDINATION AND STANDARDIZATION SHOULD BE IMPROVED.

G. ALL CREW MEMBERS SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH NVG'S; NOT ALL CH-47 ENLISTED CREW MEMBERS AND NAVIGATORS HAD NVG'S.

H. EXTENDED RANGE FUEL SYSTEMS WORKED WELL. (PREVIOUS COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MODIFICATION STILL APPLY.)

I. A BLACKOUT CURTAIN BETWEEN THE COCKPIT AND NAVIGATOR AND A COVER OVER THE DOPPLER WERE TESTED; CREW ACCEPTANCE WAS GOOD. [redacted] HAS MATERIALS TO MAKE ADDITIONAL CURTAINS/ COVERS.

J. COMPLETE TACTICAL MISSION BRIEFINGS TO INCLUDE GROUND SECURITY PLANS ARE ESSENTIAL.

(C) K. ADEQUATE TIME MUST BE PROVIDED BETWEEN BRIEFINGS AND MISSIONS TO ALLOW FOR THOROUGH CREW PLANNING AND COORDINATION.

L. [redacted] SHOULD BE INSERTED INT[redacted] AT LEAST [redacted] MINUTES PRIOR TO CH-47 ARRIVAL.

M. NOT ALL UH-60'S REFUELED AT THE RRP. CREWS SHOULD COMPLETE ALL REQUIRED TRAINING TASKS DURING EVERY MISSION TO INCREASE PROFICIENCY AND CONFIDENCE.

(C) 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. UH-60 HYDROMECHANICAL UNIT (HMU) AND APU PROBLEMS SHOULD BE DIAGNOSED AND RESOLVED (RESULTED IN ENGINE FAILURES AND APU FIRES/FAILURES, RESPECTIVELY).

B. LANDING LIGHTS FITTED WITH LIGHT DIFFUSERS BE MODIFIED BY ADDITION OF A LIMITER SWITCH TO PRECLUDE INADVERTENT OPERATION AND DAMAGE/MOTOR BURN OUT.

C. ADDITIONAL MISSION TRAINING OVER SHORTER ROUTES TO PERFECT MISSION EXECUTION.

D. DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT OPERATIONS.

E. ALL UH-60 AND CH-47 ACFT BE FITTED WITH CURTAINS BETWEEN NAVIGATORS AND COCKPITS.

F. PROVIDE 48 HOURS OR MORE BETWEEN MISSION NOTIFICATION AND EXECUTION.

7. TEST AND EVALUATION POC IS [redacted]

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: Test Director, JCS Honeybadger 27 Jun 80

FROM: Test Project Officer

SUBJ: UH-60A Human Factors

The following human factors considerations concerning UH-60A have emerged from discussions with operational pilots:

1. Pilot/Copilot Seat

a. Becomes uncomfortable after 2 hours flight. A sheep skin pad would probably be beneficial if added to the seat cushion.

b. Adjustable kidney pads on P/CP seats are too soft and lose resilience, thus becoming ineffective.

2. Navigator seat is too low and navigator must unbuckle seat belt to see/operate Doppler, change radio frequencies, etc. Use of a crew chief/gunner seat and harness assembly or a monkey harness is recommended.

3. Some pilots are counter-balancing helmets by placing weight on the aft portion of their helmets to compensate for weight of NVG. Some are attaching elastic bands between the aft portion of their helmets and their pants belts to reduce neck strain. The formerly mentioned method is hazardous in the event of a crash.

4. Load bearing gear, pencils carried in sleeve pockets on Nomex uniforms, and other items catch on components of extended range fuel systems as crewmembers attempt to move front to rear of aircraft.

5. Cockpit ventilation is inadequate which causes added fatigue to crewmembers during hot weather operations. Additionally, pilots report that numerous P/CP door vent windows do not operate properly.

6. Night operations at high altitudes will require keeping cargo doors closed for crew comfort.

7. Milk should not be placed in box lunches as it sours in hot weather prior to consumption.

8. Relief tubes would be extremely useful. Crewmembers are currently limiting fluid intake before/during extended flights to preclude necessity for urination.

9. Red navigation light does not provide adequate lighting for NVG operations; green does.

[redacted]r

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCLOSURE ELEVEN: PAVE LOW/HH53 EVALUATION

STAFF SUMMARY

(U) H53 Participation in HONEY BADGER

(S) Objectives:

1. Create a capability to support SNOWBIRD.

2. Establish joint operating procedures.

3. Train crews in the operation of the HH-53H and complete their basic training in the aircraft.

4. Evaluate the ability of the HH-53C and HH-53H to carry on sustained desert operations.

5. Establish logistic requirements for the aircraft.

6. Establish a sound, long-term capability to successfully conduct special operations.

(S) Background:

As we enter the 1980s, the face of aggression and conflict is changing. Small nations and groups who are incapable of confronting the major powers militarily or economically have resorted to terrorist activities. Bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and the taking of hostages, are ways that small or weak organizations try to influence others. In response to this increase in unconventional activities, we must develop and sustain forces that are capable of performing at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. These forces must be capable of immediate response to crisis situations with a surgical application of power to accomplish a specific objective.

These missions, normally categorized as special operations missions, are characterized by a crisis environment, short warning times, deep penetrations, and complex, time-critical tasks requiring surprise. They are generally high risk, high cost, high payoff missions.

The forces needed to execute this type mission must be highly disciplined, dedicated, and skilled in the unique tasks required by special operations missions.

Concept:

When the decision was made by President Carter to develop a sustained Special Operations capability, the JTF began building a force structure to support this objective.

In May 1980, the Air Force Chief of Staff directed that the 1st SOW be given the responsibility of developing the needed H-53 resources. The Air Force inventory was examined and the newly designed and operational HH-53H, PAVE LOW helicopter assigned to MAC, was identified as the resource. The PAVE LOW III's ability to penetrate hostile airspace, at night, low level, in adverse weather, coupled with its air refueling capability and cargo capability make it ideal for the special operations mission.

The H-53 airframe is ideally suited for the wide range of capabilities needed in the SO flight profiles. Unfortunately, the H-53 special ops experienced crew force has been diluted. In 1974, when the 21st SOS and later, in 1978, the H-53 squadron at Bergstrom AFB, were decommissioned, the aircraft were reassigned to other tasks and personnel were reassigned to other units in other aircraft.

(U) HONEY BADGER:

The primary objectives of HONEY BADGER were to reconstruct the H-53 special operations capability and create a force that could be used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in joint air operations in support of special operations. The reconstruction had two main goals: The training of crews in the basic crew duties; and the modification and evaluation of the aircraft to function in austere environments. The operational objective was to integrate the helicopter resources into a joint force consisting of multiple service air and ground elements.

(U) (TS) Several deficiencies in the weapon system and crew qualification were identified when they were profiled against SNOWBIRD concepts. Modifications to the aircraft and crew requirements were identified.

Modifications

(U) The following modifications have been completed:

1) ALR-69, Radar warning receiver
2) ALE-40, CHAFF/FLARE dispenser
3) Internal fuel tanks
4) SUAR - ALTITUDE REFERENCE SWITCHING UNIT

(U) The following modifications are in progress:

1) Night vision qualify the H-53 cockpit - under study
2) Nose gear stress problems - under study
3) Folding rotor-head - under study
4) Medical configuration of HH-53C (SLICK) - basic requirement is met. Looking at additional capabilities.

Aircrew

Crew problems developed as a result of the rapid transfer of the HH-53H from MAC to the 1st SOW. The rapid transfer was contrary to the system that had been established to equip, maintain, and man the HH-53H. Individuals were brought in TDY from 14 different locations to participate in the new organization. The 1st SOW is now in the process of assigning the people PCS to fulfill the manning requirement and continuing training to fully qualify the aircrews and bring the crew compliment up to 12 crews.

Crew Force Factors:	NVG Qual
1. Assigned Pilots (PCS)	15
2. Assigned Pilots (TDY)	14
3. Qualified Pave Low Aircraft Commanders	
4. Qualified Pave Low Co-pilots	
5. Pave Low Qualified Flight Engineers	17
6. Total PL Qualified Crews	
7. Pilots in Training	
8. Co-pilots in Training	
9. Engineers in Training	
10. Volunteers available but not yet assigned	1

Accompanying the challenge of upgrading Pave Low crews is the problem of interservice operations. The different techniques, procedures, and habits developed by the Services adds to the complexity of training. Radio procedures, formation tactics, terminal area procedures and operations are all different for the participating Services. The unique tactics and procedures required by special operations need to be developed from the basics.

To help resolve some of the crew training problems, a Special Test Group made up of components from 101st AVN BN, 1st SOW, MAC and experienced Marine aviators whose task it will be to establish the joint procedures necessary to expedite the development of Special Ops helicopter forces, establish upgrade and continuation training programs, and provide a knowledge base for future development of principles and tactics is being convened in Washington on 6 Aug 1980.

(TS) Observation:

The evaluation of the exercise as a viable concept was successful. I attribute the success to the professionalism and skill of the individual aircrews and maintenance support people. Their response to unplanned and unbriefed events was the primary factor leading to the safe completion of the mission.

There are still several areas needing work both with the weapon systems and the crews. For the short term, the important thing to concentrate on is the qualification of a sufficient number of joint operations and trained crews to meet the special operations requirement.

(U)

(S) 1. Create a capability to support SNOWBIRD. In progress, crew training is continuing possible fruition in mid-September.

(U)

(S) 2. Establish joint operating procedures - Conference scheduled 7-8-9 August to establish procedures. The following week, 11-23 August, the procedures will be flight tested (POTENT CHARGE).

3. Train crews in the operation of HH-53H. In progress, the 1st SOW has nine crews qualified and has an ongoing training program.

(S) 4. Evaluate the ability of HH-53C and HH-53H to carry on sustained desert operations. Completed. Evaluation by 1st SOW pending completion of after action report.

(S) 5. Establish logistical requirements for the aircraft - in progress. Plan to establish a preventative maintenance plan and identify parts with low MTTF underway.

(U)

(S) 6. Establish a sound, long-term capability to successfully conduct special operations - in progress. POTENT CHARGE, unit training, and a training exercise beginning in September are all training exercises designed to enhance the SO capability and develop a force trained and structured to meet the special ops needs of the future.

(U) Attachments:
1) Evaluation - HONEY BADGER H-53 Participation w/Atchs
2) Aircraft Scheduling/Aircrew Training

INCLOSURE TWELVE: OH58 TEST

The OH58 helo was initially examined as an available on-line small helo for JTF use. The principal value of the aircraft was its potential [redacted] and [redacted] Accordingly, the OH58 was tested with a view of determining its transportability and usage for the JTF mission. Inclosed are the results of that test.

It was concluded that the OH58, though relatively easy to load on a C141, was deficient compared to the [redacted] for several reasons:

a. More [redacted] could be loaded.

b. [redacted] was easier to maintain.

c. [redacted] was more survivable.

d. [redacted] was more maneuverable.

THE JOINT STAFF

7 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT TEST DIRECTORATE

Subject: Test and Evaluation of Combat Loading OH-58A Helicopter with Short Skids on C-130 Aircraft

1. (U) Introduction and Test Objectives:

a. On 18 June 1980; an OH-58A helicopter equipped with modified skids was test loaded aboard a C-130 aircraft. The skids of the OH-58A were specially designed and fabricated by Bell Helicopter Inc. at Amarillo, Texas. The skids were designed to reduce the height of the OH-58 sufficiently to permit loading aboard a C-130 without removing the main rotor blades and mast. The operational height of the OH-58A was reduced with these shortened skids from 115.3 inches to 107.0 inches.

b. The objectives of the test were: (1) to determine minimum essential assembly and disassembly required to load the OH-58, (2) to determine the problems encountered in load and off-load, (3) to make recommendations for further skid modification , and (4) to determine the time required to off-load the OH-58 and place it in operational configuration.

2. (U) Preparation of the OH-58:

a. The assembled modified skids were mounted on the OH-58A in 30 minutes. This operation required the use of a five ton wrecker to lift the helicopter since the standard aircraft jacks will not fit under the OH-58 once the modified skids are installed.

b. The FM radio antenna connectors were removed from the vertical fin, three of the four vertical fin retaining bolts were removed and the fin was rotated 90 degrees to maximize tail boom ground clearance (see Figures 2 and 3). The tail rotor was aligned parallel to the tail boom and the main rotor was secured with the blade tie down. These procedures required four and a half minutes to accomplish.

NOTE: It was later determined that the vertical fin should be removed completely as it was very fragile when secure by only one bolt.

3. (U) Loading Procedure:

a. A towing bridle was formed by securing a chain to each rear skid cross member (See Figures 4 and 5) and then to the C-130 winch cable. Ground handling wheels were placed on the skids and the aircraft was winched tail first to the top of the C-130 ramp. CAUTION: The main rotor must be controlled to preclude hitting the cargo compartment ceiling. Similarly, tail boom clearance at first the cargo compartment floor (See Figures 7 and 8) and then the ceiling (as the OH-58 is winched up the ramp) must be controlled to preclude damage.

NOTE: It was determined that the UHF antenna mounted on the OH-58 chin would not clear the pavement as the aircraft moved up the ramp, so it was removed (See Figure 6).

b. The OH-58 was winched into the cargo compartment until the forward rotor blade was behind the upper cargo compartment door of the C-130 (See Figure 12). The ground handling wheels were removed, the forward rotor blade was secured depressed six inches with a second rotor tie down and then the helicopter was secured in the cargo compartment of the C-130 with standard chains and a strap (See Figures 14 and 15).

3. (U) Off Loading Procedure:

The aircraft tie downs were removed and the ground handling wheels reinstalled on the OH-58 skids. The helicopter was then pushed down the C-130 ramp and clear of the C-130. The vertical fin was attached, the FM radio antenna was reconnected, the UHF antenna was remounted, and the aircraft was flown. The entire procedure required seven minutes and could be further reduced by three minutes if the UHF antenna were relocated to preclude the necessity for removal and reinstallation.

5. (U) Problems Encountered and Recommended Solutions:

a. Securing the towing chains to the aft skid cross member is hazardous. The chains could slip up the cross member and damage the aircraft fusilage. Addition of tow rings at the rear of the skids is recommended.

b. The shortened skids reduces UHF antenna ground clearance to four and a quarter inches which creates a flight safety hazard and dictates that it be removed prior to loading. Relocation of the antenna further forward on the chin or nose of the OH-58 is recommended as a solution to both problems.

c. The break-under angle between the C-130 ramp extensions and the runway (See Figures 19 and 21) creates a problem during off-load. As the skids negotiate this angle, the ground handling wheels loose contact with the ramp and for fourteen inches of travel, the aircraft weight rests on the forward and rear ends of the skids (See Figures 19, 20 and 21). The resulting high drag can only be overcome by gathering considerable momentum when pushing the helicopter down the ramp to preclude it becoming stuck at the bottom (See Figure 22). This problem could be reduced by either tapering the rear fourteen inches of the modified skids or by bending them up in a manner similar to the forward end. Longer ramp extensions for the C-130 would also alleviate the problem by decreasing the break-under angle.

d. The rear anti-collision light on the OH-58 cleared the pavement during load and off-load by only one half inch. It is recommended that it be relocated higher on the aft fuselage to preclude damage to it.

e. The ceiling lights on the C-130 cargo compartment are located along the aircraft centerline and represent the height restriction on the compartment. Loading the OH-58 off-center by about five inches increases masthead to ceiling clearance by about two inches which adds a significant safety margin. It is recommended that the OH-58 be loaded off-center to minimize the hazard to the ceiling lights on the C-130 and the masthead on the OH-58.

f. As previously mentioned, the OH-58 vertical fin is very fragile when secured by one retaining bolt and rotated ninety degrees. Removal of the fin reduces potential damage and adds only seconds to helicopter disassembly/reassembly.

(U)

6. Operational Evaluation. The following comments concerning the operational impacts of the modified skids are based upon a very limited number of flying hours (approximately four) but are nonetheless intuitively valid:

a. The low ground clearance (four and one quarter inches) on the UHF antenna is a hazard. Operating from soft or irregular surfaces would be dangerous. The antenna should be relocated from the underside of the aircraft.

b. The low ground clearance for the rear anti-collision light poses a similar problem to the UHF antenna. It too should be relocated.

(U)

c. Operation of aircraft is limited to hard, smooth surfaces. Since ground clearance is about four inches, small stones or sticks could puncture the fuel cell on landing.

d. The skids flex on hard landings. Flex beyond three or four inches results in damage to the underside of the OH-58. As a result, auto-rotations could b e very dangerous and there is no margin of error for initial pitch pull.

e. The shortened skids permit operations closer to the ground, tree tops, etc., presenting a lower silhouette to the enemy.

f. The unfamiliar height presents an initial safety hazard to individuals accustomed to working around "normal" OH-58 helicopters.

g. The skids themselves present no new maintenance problems but the reduced aircraft height induces problems.

h. Fuel samples are very difficult to collect. A short baby food jar is about the only collection vessel that will fit under the aircraft.

i. The jacks for the aircraft wil not fit under it with the shortened skids. A wrecker or crane must be used to lift the aircraft by the masthead eye. Alternatively, lower jacks could be built.

j. The engine and transmission are easier to reach and work on with the reduced height.

(U)

7. Summary:

a. The modified skids represent a milestone development in terms of OH-58 deployability. The addition of short skids, a process which requires one half hour, permits loading one OH-58 aboard a C-130 aircraft. The OH-58 can be unloaded and flown within five minutes after the C-130 stops. Previously, loading aboard the C-130 was possible only after the main rotor and masthead were removed - a four hour operation. After off-loading, another four and a half hours are required to reassemble the helicopter. The short skids introduce some potentially severe hazards and operational constraints

(U) on the aircraft. These must be carefully weighed against the mobility gains. A compromise would be to deploy the aircraft with the short skids and send the normal skids in a follow-on support package. The aircraft would thus be more immediately available for missions, with some constraints on landing surfaces, but could be rapidly converted to normal skids. The net saving in maintenance time would be about eight hours and a true air rapid deployment capability would be gained.

b. While this test was conducted on a C-130 aircraft, the same height restrictions exist on C-141A aircraft and thus the increased OH-58 rapid deployment capability applies to it as well.

[redacted]
Major, USA

INCLOSURE THIRTEEN: COSTS

Background:

The JTF program was formalized by a memorandum from [redacted] dated 6 June 1980 utilizing the [redacted]. Within the memo, the Army and USAF costing data was fixed at 12.5M per service.

The overall program was to be supported by each service as service-specified requirements arose. The JTF has heretofore been denied a budget and has been wholly dependent on Service funding.

General Cost Summary:

Cost to Date	35.3M
Future Costs (1 Oct 80)	21.7M
TOTAL	57.0M

Specific Data is Inclosed

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SNOWBIRD COSTS
(Through 30 Oct)

COSTS TO DATE

ARMY	23.1M
USAF	10.8M
INTELLIGENCE	1.4M

FUTURE COSTS

ARMY	3.7M
USAF	16.8M
NAVY	.2M
INTELLIGENCE	1.0M
TOTAL	57.0M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COST PROGRAM

6 June 1980 Memorandum [redacted] G

USAF	12.5M
ARMY	12.5M
	25.0M

COSTS TO DATE

USAF	10.8M
ARMY	23.1M
	33.9M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

TOTAL JTF TRAINING/PROCUREMENT COSTS
(as of 30 July)

ARMY

Training	6.3M*
Procurement/Related Costs	16.8M
TOTAL	23.1M

* Includes 4.73M MAC ASIF Costs

USAF

Training	2.1M
Procurement/Related Costs	8.7M
TOTAL	10.8M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JTF WESTERN TRAINEX

5-31 July

ARMY	5.5M*
USAF	2.1M
	7.9M

* Includes 4.73M MAC ASIF Costs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TAB OMMIT~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SNOWBIRD PROCUREMENT
(as of 30 July)

	TO DATE
ARMY	16.8M
USAF	8.7M

REQUIRED PROCUREMENT
(Additive)

ARMY	3.6M
USAF	16.5M*

* Includes Acft Mods

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

JTF FY 81 TRAINING COSTS
(Estimated)

Assumptions:

1. Force structure (full time)

JTF HQ
1st SOW
[redacted] Ranger Bn
ELEMENT DELTA
158 AVN BN (+)
[redacted]
JCSE DET

(As required)

E3-A
F-14 ELE
C141B ELE
RORO

2. Exercise Program

JTF exercise each quarter (5 days)

Sustainment at home station

No Cost to JTF

3. Procurement funding completed 1 Oct 80
4. Sustainment costs within normal unit training.
5. JTF Training Costs:
   - 30% of sustainment
   - 50% of Army blade hours
6. MAC ASIF rates remain unchanged.
7. JTF Training is within CONUS.
8. No new forces added.
9. No JTF overhead included.

KEY POINTS

1. JTF not staffed to monitor costs.
2. JTF was denied a budget.
3. Costs are scenario dependent.

[redacted] TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

SNOWBIRD FUNDING THROUGH 30 SEP

TRAINING	4.3M
[redacted]	1.1M
COST OVERRUN TO SERVICES	8.8M
PROCUREMENT/MOD	20.1M
TOTAL	34.4M

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

FUTURE JTF TRAINING COSTS FY 80 (U)

DATES	UNIT	TRAINING	COST (APPROX)
1 Aug-30 Sep	[redacted]	MISSION	0
2-9 Aug	[redacted] DELTA	PATHFINDER OPS	10,000
5-7 Aug	C141B	[redacted]	0
6-8 Aug	[redacted] HQ	SITE RECON	0
9-20 Aug	[redacted]	NIGHT OPS	10,000
11-23 Aug	101st/SOW	JOINT INSTRUCTOR TNG	10,000
12-13 Aug	USN PKG	AIR SUPERIORITY	740,000*
2-18 Sep	JTF TRAINEX	JOINT TRAINING REHEARSAL	3,600,000**
		TOTAL	4,370,000

* Assumes 100% above line costs.
** 2.1M ASIF
.6M Air Superiority
2.7M

[redacted]

(U)

INTELLIGENCE ACTION COSTS

	Cost	Status
(C) Technical fabrication and tests of infiltration vehicles	$400K	Approved
Training of [redacted]	$500K	Approved
[redacted]	$550K	In Process
In-Country support	$500K	Approved
[redacted]	$250K	In Process
[redacted] Procurement (Army)	$211K	In Process
TOTAL	$2.41M	

[redacted]

INCLOSURE FOURTEEN: CONCLUSIONS

1. JTF not prepared to execute SNOWBIRD

   a. Lack of definitive intelligence

   b. Lack of launch bases

   c. Lack of Delta infiltration means

   d. Lack of force proficiency

2. JTF readiness is paced by intelligence action initiatives which are thus far projected to cost $2.415 million ($1.4 million already approved).

3. Launch base availability, while not certain, is believed to be obtainable.

4. Delay in intelligence actions, [redacted]aining or JTF training will delay mission achievement if the [redacted]

5. Force proficiency hinges on perishable skills and requires periodic training.

   a. If 1, 2 & 3 are met, 4 can be attained in three weeks (as of 4 Aug).

   b. If 1, 2 & 3 are met, 4 can be attained in four weeks if the scheduled training program is slipped to 18 Aug.

   c. If 1, 2, & 3 are met, 4 can be attained in five weeks if the scheduled training program is slipped to 1 Sep.

6. No known disabling compromise of SNOWBIRD to date. Situation tenuous.

7. JTF staff inadequate to provide definitive cost data, R&D monitoring and other administrative type functions. Additional requirements will require substantial staff and working space augmentation. (2 additional spaces in J-4 complex ($26K), 7 officers and one clerk typist).

8. Current DOD/CIA relationship for SNOWBIRD is unsatisfactory but practical in view of existing conditions.

9. SNOWBIRD IX is the most probable option and is currently being used as the target for force readiness, procurement and force structure. This can quickly change with new intelligence input.

10. Non-SNOWBIRD Achievements:

a. Preparation of a Joint Task Force capable of executing world-wide counter-terrorist missions.

b. Development of [redacted]

c. Development of a joint helo [redacted]

d. Development of a man-packed SATCOM terminal from a commercial, LOS radio.

e. Raised the UH60/CH47 NATO self deploy status from 2/4 to 30/16, two to five years ahead of schedule.

f. Enhanced RDJTF capability by qualifying two UH60 companies and one CH47 company in night/desert/mnt. Opns one year ahead of schedule.

g. Provided a long range helo extraction means to special operations forces.

h. Produced hatch mounted SATCOM antennas for C130/C141 A/C.

i. Enhanced special opns secure voice capability on a variety of A/C.

j. Installed secure HF radios on CH47, UH60 Army A/C.

k. Equipped 6 secure UHF packages for C141B A/C.

(S) l. Added a hand-held, reliable privacy net for Rangers.

(C) m. Extended the ranges of Pave Low and MC-130 from [redacted] and [redacted] NM to [redacted] and [redacted]

For Future Consideration:

(S) A [redacted] should probably include:

[redacted] (approx 70 persons)

DELTA
1SOW
[redacted] Rangers
[redacted]

As required:

[redacted]

[redacted]

- A mission support fund

  60% yearly force sustainment
  40% contingency

- Unconstrained access to JCS, DIA, [redacted], Nat'l WX Svc, [redacted] etc.

- The nature of RICE BOWL, SNOWBIRD and any future such activity is to attempt the recreation of a [redacted] action capability for the United States, a capability that has been defunct since the Vietnam War.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

INCLOSURE FIFTEEN: RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPSDEPS Recommendations to JCS:

a. JTF to be provided with $34.3 million by 11 Aug to fund SNOWBIRD activities through 30 Sep 80.

b. Press intelligence community to use all available resources to fulfill SNOWBIRD requirements.

c. Grant of authority to approach [redacted] regarding [redacted] Survey Team to [redacted] to select [redacted]

d. JTF 1-79 to be dissolved between 1 and 15 Nov 80.

[redacted] phased in beginning 15 Aug 80, SNOWBIRD mission passed to [redacted] on 1 Nov 80.

2. OPSDEPS Considerations:

a. Require OJCS to identify specific deficiencies in the [redacted] ability to support the US Armed Forces in the special operations field and specific remedial recommendations to be approved by the JCS and presented at an NSC meeting prior to 1 Nov 80.

b. Require OJCS to identify necessary actions to expand and improve US Armed Forces capabilities to conduct special operations. Actions to be presented for OPSDEPS approval by 1 Oct, presentation to JCS by 15 Oct, SECDEF by 30 Oct.

c. Provide guidance on advisability of closer JTF contact with Dept of State regarding press releases and JTF actions (previously denied).

d. Provide guidance on advisability of closer JTF contact with J-5 (previously restricted).

~~SECRET~~

B-02


BATTLE GROUP ALFA (TG 70.1)
MIDWAY (CARRIER)*
LEAHY (CRUISER)*
PARSONS (DESTROYER)
HAMMOND (FRIGATE)
KIRK (FRIGATE)*
PEARY (FRIGATE)
MPHIBIOUS READY GROUP ALFA
NEW ORLEANS (HELICOPTER CARRIER)
VANCOUVER (TRANSPORT DOCK)
FREDERICK (TANK LANDING SHIP)
RACINE (TANK LANDING SHIP)
GISTICS SHIPS SUPPORTING TF 70
AMAZOO (OILER)
ASOTA (OILER)
LIFT PACIFIC (OILER)
HITA (OILER)
X (AUX)
RS (AUX)
EL (AUX)
ERICAN CHAMPION (CARGO)
ERICAN COURIER (CARGO)
ITOR (CARGO)
RCURY (CARGO)
TEOR (CARGO)
ATA PATRIOT (CARGO)
#534
BATTLE GROUP GOLF (TG 70.9)
EISENHOWER (CARRIER)*
SOUTH CAROLINA (CRUISER)*
VIRGINIA (CRUISER)
SAMPLE (FRIGATE)
MIDEASTFOR (TF 109)
LA SALLE (FLAGSHIP)*
CONOLLY (DESTROYER)
LAWRENCE (DESTROYER)
HART (FRIGATE)
VOGE (FRIGATE)
CAP 2
PIRAZ
AAW PICKET
AEW STATION
CAP 3
24 SEP 80
20°
60°
OMAN
IRAN
CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DOE/NMCC
DECL DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON
DERIVED FROM

INDIAN OCEAN/PERSIAN GULF DEPLOYMENTS

TASK FORCE 70

24 SEP 80

EISENHOWER TG 70.9
AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

24 F-14	4 E-2C
21 A-7E	4 EA-6B
10 A-6E	10 S-3A
4 KA-6D	6 SH-3H
	1 US-3A

SCHEDULE

ON STATION ARABIAN SEA

MIDWAY TG 70.1
AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

18 F-4	4 EA-6B
16 A-7	3 RF-4B
8 A-6	4 SH-3
3 KA-6	1 C-2
4 E-2B	

SCHEDULE

PORT VISIT MOMBASA

MILITARY OPTIONS — AIRCRAFT LOCATIONS

[redacted]		[redacted]	EUROPE	[redacted]	
4 P-3C	1 US-3A	4 B-52H	4 MC-130 (NOT AAR)	9 AC-130 (4 NOT AAR)	
2 P-3B	4 S3A	6 KC-135		4 MC-130 (2 NOT AAR)	
4 EA-3B	4 KC-135			3 MC-130 (AAR)*	
1 EP-3E				*PAC AF A/C	

LANDING FORCE SIXTH FLEET (1,725 USMC PERSONNEL)

SHIPS	AIRCRAFT	TROOPS EMBARKED
GUADALCANAL (LPH-7)	4 CH-53D	32ND MAU
NASHVILLE (LPD-13)	12 CH-46E	1,725 TROOPS
PENSACOLA (LSD-38)	4 AH-1T	
LAMOURE CTY (LST-1194)	2 UH-1N	
BARNSTABLE CTY (LST-1197)		

SCHEDULE

17-28 SEP UPKEEP TOULON

30 SEP-10 OCT TRAINING ANCHORAGE, ASINARA BAY, ITALY

FLEET MARINE FORCE SEVENTH FLEET (2,915 USMC PERSONNEL)

SHIPS	AIRCRAFT	TROOPS EMBARKED
ARG ALFA		
NEW ORLEANS (LPH-11)	4 CH-53D	31ST MAU (ARG ALFA)
VANCOUVER (LPD-2)	12 CH-46F	1,718 TROOPS
FREDERICK (LST-1184)	4 AH-1T	BLT (ARG BRAVO)
RACINE (LST-1191)	1 UH-1N	1,197 TROOPS
ARG BRAVO		
DUBUQUE (LPD-8)		
FRESNO (LST-1182)		

ARG ALFA SCHEDULE

19-26 SEP ENROUTE AUSTRALIA

27 SEP-1 OCT VISIT AUSTRALIAN PORTS



WEAPONS TRAINING
INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY
13 F4E
PROUD PHANTOM
CAIRO WEST 12 F4E
LA SALLE
LAWRENCE
HART
VOGE
EISENHOWER
SOUTH CAROLINA
VIRGINIA
SAMPLE
KIRK
SUBIC BAY
CONSTELLATION
MOMBASA
MIDWAY
LEAHY
PARSONS
DIEGO GARCIA
HAMMOND
PEARY
MED MAU
KENNEDY
(AUGUSTA BAY)
CONOLLY
PAC MAU
Soviet Union
Mongolia
China
Japan
Iran
Iraq
Turkey
Saudi Arabia
India
Pakistan
Burma
Malaysia
Indonesia
Australia
New Zealand
Ethiopia
Zaire
Angola
Zambia
South Africa
Madagascar
Mauritius
Ocean
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Poland
France
Italy
Romania
Bulgaria
Morocco
Algeria
Libya
Egypt
Nigeria
Cameroon
Kenya
Tanzania
Uganda
Namibia
Botswana
Mozambique
Southern Rhodesia (U.K.)
Malawi
Burundi
Somalia
Oman
Yemen (Aden)
Syria
Jordan
Nepal
Bhutan
Thailand
Cambodia
Papua New Guinea
Western Samoa
24 SEP 80
C.A.E. —Central African Empire
F.R.G. —Federal Republic of Germany
F.T.A.I. —French Territory of the Afars and Issas
G.D.R. —German Democratic Republic
U.A.E. —United Arab Emirates


LAWRENCE (DDG-4)
LA SALLE (AGF-3)
VOGE (FF-1047)
HART (FF-1092)
RIGEL (TAF-58)
TASK GROUP 70.9
EISENHOWER (CVN-69)
SO. CAROLINA (CGN-37)
VIRGINIA (CGN-38)
SAMPLE (FF-1048)
NAVASOTA (TAO-106)
WICHITA (AOR-1)
NOLLY (DD-979)
KIRK (FF-1087)
TASK GROUP 70.1
MIDWAY (CV-41)
LEAHY (CG-16)
PARSONS (DDG-33)
KALAMAZOO (AOR-6)
OF; 240800 EDT SEP 80
EASTFOR / INDIAN
EAN DISPOSITION
PEARY (FF-1073)
HAMMOND (FF-1067)
AJAX (AR-6)
METEOR (TAKR-9)
MERCURY (TAKR-10)
JUPITER (TAKR-11)
SEALIFT PACIFIC (TAOT-168)
RACINE (LST-1191)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

B-4

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted] DDO/NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

Subject: Iran Situation Report as of 0500 24 September 1980

(U) Significant Events:

--(U) Iraq has publicly announced its objectives in undertaking hostilities against Iran. It seeks the restoration of the border along the Shat al Arab waterway prior to the 1975 Algiers Accord. This would give it complete control of the channel up to the Iranian shore. Baghdad also demands the return of the three Gulf islands (Greater and Lesser Tunbs, Abu Musa) to its Arab claimants, Ras al Khaimah and Sharjah, two small sheikhdoms of the United Arab Emirates. The islands were seized by the Shah in 1971.

(S) --(SNF) The city of Abadan Iran's principal source of refined petroelum products, is reported in Iraqi news bulletins to be surrounded by Iraqi troops who have also severed the highway leading north to Ahwaz. [redacted] other unconfirmed press reports indicate that oil storage tanks at the Abadan refinery are burning and that the refinery has been shut down. Radio Iran counters these reports claiming that its 92d Armored Division has driven off the Iraqis.

[redacted] Significant [redacted]

[redacted] Ground

[redacted] Iraqi Armed Forces announced on 23 September [redacted]

[redacted] Air

[redacted] Iraqi airstrikes has been confirm[redacted] the north runway has been [redacted] and [redacted] aircraft were destroyed. [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~Classified By: DIA~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

--(U) The Iran-Iraq conflict has apparently halted further consideration of the hostage issue by the Majlis for an indefinite period. Yesterday Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani said the Iraqi attacks were part of "a large US plot and" will have an impact on the destiny of the hostages.". Tehran Radio announced the Majlis had decided that the problem " of the hostages spies has been frozen idefinitely." Also yesterday the militants holding the hostages announced that hostages in six cities were being transferred.

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 5 - 17 AUGUST 1980

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

5 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

6 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

7 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

8 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

9 Aug - [redacted]

9 Aug - (U) An Iranian-sponsored conference to protest Israel's declaration of all of Jerusalem as its official capital was convened in Tehran. In a speech to the conference, Ayatollah Khomeini criticized the Soviet Union for its intervention in Afghanistan and for supplying arms to Iraq. Khomeini also called for the export of the Iranian revolution to "all Islamic countries."

10 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

11 Aug - [redacted]

12 Aug - (U) Former Education Minister Mohammad Ali Raja'i was appointed Prime Minister of Iran.

13 Aug - [redacted]

13 Aug - [redacted]

14 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

15 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

16 Aug - (U) No Significant Activity

17 Aug - (U) The British Embassy in Tehran temporarily suspended operations and withdrew most of its staff and their dependents.

TOP SECRET [redacted]

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 18-21 AUGUST 1980

C

18-21 Aug - [redacted]

18 Aug - (U) Unconfirmed reports claim that LTG Hassan Yazdi, Chief of Communications under the Shah, committed suicide. Yazdi was being sought by Iranian authorities for alleged participation in last month's coup attempt.

21 Aug - (U) According to Iranian state radio, Ayatollah Khomeini's doctors have appealed to the public to refrain from making unscheduled calls on the Iranian leader in order to safeguard his health. Khomeini has been quite active lately, and his increased involvement in governmental affairs may have aggravated his cardiac ailment.

21 Aug - (U) The Soviet Union has agreed to an Iranian demand to close one of its consulates in Iran. Moscow announced that it was closing its consulate in Esfahan.

TOP SECRET [redacted]

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 22-28 AUGUST 1980

C 22-28 AUG - [redacted]

22 AUG - (U) The revolutionary courts in Khuzistan, Iran banned all activities by the Tudeh Party, the Fedayeen, the Mujahedin, and the Paybar in two of the provinces larger cities, Abadan and Khorramshahr.

C 25 AUG - [redacted]

25 AUG - (U) The militants threatened to kill the American hostages if the US attempts another rescue, and claimed that the Americans have again been relocated in order to prevent a second attempt.

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 30 AUGUST-11 SEPTEMBER 1980

30 AUG - (U) The Iranian Army and Revolutionary Guards launched attacks upon Kurdish positions in and around the city of Mahabad in an attempt to regain control of the city from Kurdish insurgents.

30 AUG - [redacted]

31 AUG - (U) Prime Minister Rajai presented his cabinet for Majlis approval; however, Bani Sadr announced he had not approved the cabinet as required by the constitution.

2 SEP - (U) Iran's Revolutionary Prosecutor-General ordered officials of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party to report within 48 hours for questioning on the party daily Mardom, and the government closed one of the party's publishing offices in Tehran.

3-4 SEP - (U) No significant activity.

6-11 SEP - [redacted]

7 SEP - [redacted]

10 SEP - (U) The United Kingdom closed its embassy in Tehran. British interests in Iran will be represented by Sweden.

11 SEP - [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 12-22 September 1980

12 SEP -(U) Ayatollah Khomeini stated the hostages could be released if the US returned to Iran the property of the late Shah, cancelled all financial claims against Iran, promised not to intervene politically or militarily in Iran, and unblocked Iranian assets presently frozen in the US.

12-22 SEP- (U) Border clashes continue along much of the central and southern border regions. Iraqi forces reportedly seize several Iranian border positions and Iranian forces reportedly attempted to retake some of the disputed territory.

17 SEP- (U) Baghdad abrogated the 1975 Algiers Accord and claimed sovereignty over the entire Shatt al-Arab river which forms the southernmost portion of the border.

21 SEP -(U) Iranian gunboats fired on a merchant ship in the Shatt al-Arab. Iraq reportedly attacked and drove off one Iranian gunboat and destroyed the other.

22 SEP- [redacted]

B #27

OVERVIEW

- Intelligence

  -- [redacted]

  -- [redacted]

  -- [redacted]

- Operations

  -- Deployments today:

  1. 2 C-141 deliver DELTA [redacted] and return [redacted]
  2. 1 C-141 [redacted] and return
  3. 1 C-130 [redacted]
  4. 2 C-141 [redacted]
  5. 1 C-141 [redacted]

  -- Employment today:

  1. 3 EC-130 transport fuel to Refuel Site
  2. 3 MC-130 transport DELTA
  3. 8 RH-53

  -- Operational Readiness:

1. DELTA	Inplace [redacted]
2. Rangers	Inplace [redacted]
3. [redacted]	Inplace [redacted]
4. EC-130	3 FMC [redacted]
5. MC-130	4 FMC [redacted]
	1 NMC for brakes
6. AC-130	3 OR [redacted]/1 PMC autopilot ALR-46
7. RH-53	8 FMC NIMITZ
8. C-141	1 FMC [redacted]/ 2 enroute [redacted]
9. KC-135	11 FMC [redacted]/ 7 FMC [redacted]

- Special Problem Areas: None

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

GENERAL

[redacted]

(U) The compound is located in downtown Tehran in the midst of a mixed business and residential area with fairly easy access from the north and east. Several high rise buildings in the area provide good vantage points for viewing the interior of the compound. A major sports complex with large stadium and several playing fields is located Northeast of the compound diagonal across Roosevelt Avenue.

(U) [redacted] the Embassy takeover is largely isolated with a two block radius [redacted] the compound even when demonstrations are on going.

(U) Weather at this time of year is in transition from cold wintry weather to the long hot summer period. Skies are generally clear to partly cloudy. Average low temperatures of 40°F increasing to 60°F and highs of 50°F increasing to 90°F. The chance of precipitation decreases from an average high of 7 day in March to 1 day in June. With this decrease in rainfall and increasing gusty surface winds, blowing dust or sand reduces visibility 1-2 days during the month.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO/NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO CONF
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: DIA
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

#832

24 APR 1980

~~APR 23 1980~~

~~22 April 1980~~

SUSPECTED HOSTAGE LOCATIONS

Although all hostages were reportedly seen in the Chancery by the IRC team on 14 April 1980, it would be dangerous to presume all hostages are being permanently held in this location.

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
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☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: DJSOA
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

B 90

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

IRANIAN AIR DEFENSE SUMMARY

1. [redacted] Air Defense - General:

a. [redacted] The primary air defense system in Iran is the HAWK, [redacted] Other SAM systems known to be in the Iranian inventory are the British Rapier, the US Tigercat (land-version of the Seacat) and the SA-7.

b. (S/NOFORN) Other ADA systems are primarily the 23-mm Soviet built ADA gun and the 35-mm Swiss Oerlikon ADA [redacted]

c. [redacted]

Classified by Multiple Sources
Declassify on
Review on 29 Nov 92

2. (TS) I-HAWK SAM System:

a. (S/NOFORN) The improved HAWK is a dual thrust, single chamber, solid-propellant, surface-to-air missile capable of delivering high explosive, blast fragmentation warhead [redacted] about [redacted] kilometers at altitudes from [redacted]

b. (S/NOFORN) The HAWK system's Track-on-Jam and Home-on-Jam capabilities make it even more effective against electronic jammers.

c. [redacted]

d. (TS) Iran's HAWK systems were only in the initial stages of deployment at the time of the change in governments, and an integrated command and control capability is unlikely. Furthermore, they were extremely dependent upon the US for spare parts and for maintenance technicians to maintain the apparatus. [redacted] Since mid-February 1979, the required maintenance probably has not been performed and spare parts are probably in short supply. [redacted]

3. [redacted] Rapier SAM System:

a. (S/NOFORN) Rapier is a fair-weather, mobile, surface-to-air missile system designed for point defense of airfields and battlefields against high-speed low-flying tactical aircraft.

b. (S/NOFORN) A Blindfire radar guidance system for poor weather operation has been developed and is offered as an optional add-on unit to the Rapier system.

c. (S/NOFORN) There are currently 250 Rapier missiles and 52 [redacted] missile launchers in Iran [redacted] The Rapier is designed for point defense of airfields. It has a maximum intercept range of [redacted] kilometers and a maximum intercept altitude of [redacted] The maximum acquisition range for the Blindfire radar is [redacted] kilometers. It has a visual target system which is radar assisted.

[redacted]

d. [redacted]

e. [redacted]

(U)

4. [redacted] Tigercat SAM System:

a. (S/NOFORN) Tigercat is a missile designed for close-range defense of small tactical targets, such as airfields, against low-level airborne attacks. The missile also has a limited capability against surface targets. Tigercat is principally a surface-to-air missile with an integral, two stage rocket motor. It delivers a [redacted] HE warhead to a maximum slant range of [redacted] kilometers and a maximum intercept altitude of [redacted] kilometers.

B, D

(U)

b. (S/NOFORN) The Tigercat missile is identical to Seacat. It has a cylindrical body flared to a square cross section at the wing roots. The forward half of the missile body is built up from sections of light alloy castings. The welded high-tensile-strength steel of the integral two-stage, solid propellant rocket motor forms the structure of the aft part of the missile body.

c. [redacted]

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

(C) 5. SA-7 (GRAIL) SAM System:

a. (U) This man-portable, shoulder-launched, surface-to-air missile system exists in the basic SA-7a version and a slightly modified version designated SA-7b.

The operator aims the missile in its launch tube at the target and fires when the heat-seeking missile locks on to the infrared radiation from the target. The SA-7 is effective against helicopters and slow-flying aircraft at low altitudes, but the limitations of the uncooled infrared detector and low missile velocity prevent it from being effective against high speed targets.

b. [redacted]

(C) 6. (TS[redacted] Antiaircraft Guns:

(S/NOFORN) The Iranian SAM system is based pri..cipally on I-HAWK, but also includes Rapier, Tigercat and SA-7, is supplemented by Swiss Oerlikon 35-mm radar- or visually-controlled ADA guns as well as ZU-23-2 and ZSU-23-4 Soviet-supplied ADA guns.

[redacted]

a. (U) The Swiss twin 35-mm antiaircraft gun, 1 ZLA/353 (Oerlikon-Contraves), is a gas-operated, automatic weapon with a cyclic rate of fire of 550 rounds per minute per gun -- a total cyclic rate of 1,100 rounds per minute for the weapon, Each gun has a hopper which accommodates 56 rounds. A "ready-round" container with 63 rounds is positioned behind each hopper. The total of 238 is assembled in 34 clips of 7 rounds each. The HE projectile has a self-destruction fuze which operates after the round is inflight from 8 to 10 seconds.

(1) (U) Electronic fire control with a Superfledermaus radar is provided for fully automatic elevation and traverse. Furthermore, the weapon can be either power operated or manually controlled by one man, independent of the fire control system.

(2) (U) By means of an electro-hydraulic mechanism, a feature of this weapon, it is possible to go from the traveling position to the firing position in approximately three minutes, or from firing position to the traveling position in approximately four minutes.

(3) [redacted] The 35-mm Oerlikon AA gun has a maximum vertical range of [redacted] and a maximum horizontal range of [redacted]. The tactical AA range is [redacted] when the "Superfledermaus" fire control radar system is being utilized. The tactical AA range is defined as the range at which an aircraft could expect to receive AA fire with a reasonable probability of hit. If only the back up optical-mechanical fire control system is being utilized, then the range is [redacted] The "Superfledermaus" can be employed with [redacted] The system is all weather capable and has a maximum detection range o[redacted]

b. (U) The Soviet twin AA gun ZU-23, first shown in 1964, is a dual purpose weapon suitable for employment in both an AA role (as its "ZU" designation implies) and in an equally formidable direct-fire ground role against personnel and light armor. It is mounted on a towed light two-wheel chassis with disc-type wheels which tilt outward at the top when the weapon is emplaced, thus providing freedom of movement around the gun as well as removing the weight of the gun from the wheels when firing. AA fire-control is by means of an optical-mechanical computing sight.

c. [redacted] The Soviet self-propelled antiaircraft weapon system, ZSU-23/4 is mounted on a full-tracked chassis. The weapon system consists of quad-mounted 23-mm automatic guns with a radar as part of the on-carriage fire control. The weapons are similar to those of the towed ZU-23, with modified (liquid cooled) barrels and different flash hiders. The entire turret is enclosed except for a cutaway portion on the forward end of the turret for gun elevation. The chassis is basically a modified ASU-85 using a flat track torsion bar suspension system, with six single road wheels on each side. The vehicle is not amphibious.

(1) [redacted]

d. [redacted]

[redacted] ne
weap[redacted] estimated [redacted] ility comparable to that of a medium tank. The twin guns have an optical mechanical computing antiaircraft sight with manual [redacted] and electro-hydraulic tracking systems. The computi[redacted] of establishing the proper lead for [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

~~SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON/WNINTEL~~

B118

22 NOV 1979

WORKING PAPAR FOR J-3

SUBJ: Qasr Prison (Rqmt no. 302)

(U) - ~~(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACR/ORCON/WNINTEL)~~ Qasr Prison is located north of the US Embassy as indicated on the accompanying map. It is the National Police Prison, and can house at least 2500 prisoners. After the revolution in mid-February, the prison was used to encarcerate, try, and in most cases execute many of the senior civilian and military officials of the Shah's regime. Around June 1979, there were complaints about the poor administration of the prison by the revolutionary committee in charge, and most of the prisoners were reportedly transferred to Evin Prison. Qasr was subsequently left in the hands of the police.

- (U) Evin prison is a former SAVAK (secret police) prison located in northern Tehran approximately one mile west of the Royal Tehran Hilton Hotel (exact location unknown).

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: DIA
Declassified ON: OADR

TOP SECRET

17 January 1980

BB-96

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW OF
DERIVED

Working Paper for J-3

[redacted]

1. [redacted]

- Qom Ammo Depot, Manzarieh - 34-53-52N [redacted]
  Forces: Infantry type security force [redacted] plus streng[redacted]
  Reaction: 10-15 minutes depending [redacted] status.

- Manzariyeh Afld - 34-58-39N 050-48-12E [redacted]
  Forces: Infantry type security [redacted] plus streng[redacted]
  Reaction: Immediately.

- Manzariyeh Artillery Fire Range - [redacted]
  Forces: Occasional use by [redacted] from [redacted]
  Reaction: [redacted] Troops in trucks [redacted] to 1 hour. Tracked vehicles 1-2 hours.

- ALIBAD camp/fort

- Kaushk-[redacted] Post - 35-07-00N 050-54-00E [redacted]
  Forces: [redacted] Gendarmerie
  Reaction: [redacted] Troops in trucks [redacted] minutes.

- Qom-Rood Post - 34-44-00N 051-04-00E
  Forces: 6-10 Gendarmerie
  Reaction: [redacted] Troops in trucks could probably react in 30-60 minutes.

- Qom Regiment - 34-39-00N 050-52-00E
  Forces: About 150 Gendarmerie, 2,000 Revolutionary Guards.
  Reaction: [redacted] Troops in trucks could probably react in 30-60 minutes.

- Taf Rood Post - 34-44-00N 050-30-00E
  Forces: 6-10 Gendarmerie
  Reaction: [redacted] Troops in trucks could probably react in 30-60 minutes.

- Saveh Post - 35-01-00N 050-21-00E
  Forces: 6-10 Gendarmerie
  Reaction: [redacted] Troops in trucks could probably react in 30-60 minutes.

- Zarand Post - 35-16-00N 050 26-00E
  Forces: 6-10 Gendarmerie
  Reaction: [redacted] Troops in trucks could probably react in 20-30 minutes.

Classified by Multiple Sources

Declassify on

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1. - Jafar-Abad Post - 34-47-00N 050-34-00E -
Forces: 6-10 Gendarmerie
Reaction: Located approximately 30 [redacted] troops in trucks could probably react in 30-60 [redacted]

2. - Manzarjyeh Air Traffic Control Radar [redacted] SI-46E -
Forces: 4-8 personnel manning the [redacted]
Reaction: Located approximately 20 [redacted] troops in trucks could probably react in 15-30 [redacted]

2. [redacted]

3. [redacted]

1. - Tehran/Mehrabad -
Forces: [redacted]
Reaction [redacted] could arrive in 2 hours.

2. - Tehran/Ghale [redacted]
Forces: [redacted]
Reaction: [redacted] and UH-1 would probably take [redacted] hours to respond.

[redacted]

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

B#99

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

Date 5 Dec

To: General Dyke

Subject: I - Hawk in Iran

attached is a copy of the report I mentioned this A.M. is "first cut" summary preceding the report.

[redacted]

G

Thanks, Gen Shutler has seen. cwe 5 Dec 79

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY ~~DIA~~ Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON AADA
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

B-79

TAB A

[redacted]

-- In-place, operational, tactical I-HAWK sites:

+ Bushehr - 3 ea.
+ Vahdati - 3 ea.
+ Tehran -- 2 ea.

-- In-place, operational training sites:

[redacted]

+ Behbeham ----- 3 ea.
+ *Hashimabad -- 3 ea.
+ Aemnan Range - 1 ea.

-- Sites near completion:

+ Kharg Island --- 1 ea.
+ *Bandar Mashur - 1 ea.
+ Avhaz ---------- 3 ea.
+ Tehran --------- 2 ea.

[redacted]

-- Sites requiring little preparation:

+ Chah Bahar ----- 2 ea.
+ Bandar Abbas ---- 1 ea.
+ *Children AB ---- 3 ea.
+ *Bandar Mashur - 1 ea.
+ *Shahroki AB --- 2 ea.
+ *Isfahan ------- 2 ea.

[redacted]

* Data not previously known to DIA.

[redacted]

[redacted] evaluates HAWK crew ability as poor and indicates that the Raytheon Training Program was never completed. [redacted] suggests that at best, Iran could probably man 8 batteries, but more probably, no batteries are operational.

[redacted] also provided airfield, AAA gun, and EW radar information which is being evaluated.

Prepared by: DIA (JS)

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ INCOMING

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PAGE 01 OF 02 MSS # 6518
PRIORITY -- SECRET -- GENSER MESSAGE -- 8362 CHARACTERS
REFERENCE FROM AIRTEVRON FOUR, SSN 6833=AT 03 1749Z DEC79
ROUTING ASSIGNED BY MSS:
SAIR CCF3 RCWD MEAF SGWD SMIS DUNI
PRINTER ASSIGNED BY MSS:
AB12 (1), AB35 (1), AB17 (1), B012 (1), B008 (1),
B009 (1), C014 (1), D518 (1),
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY MSS:
AIR, USSR, IRAN, IRAQ, RECCE, ISRAEL, BADX, JORDAN,
IRAN TF, MISSILE, ECONOMIC, SOVIET AIR, ELECTRONIC,
MIDDLE EAST, SOVIET GROUND, SOVIET COMMAND,
DICTIONARY: GS, PROFILE:
36 80 98 111 163 164 228 258 316 318 358 362
366 368 385
MMIC-AUTODIN MSG NUMBER:
56-057326
ZCZCDIC859 S E C R E T ZYUW
MMIC 33936
SECT 01 OF 33936

ACTION
MMIC
DISTR
CJCS: (02) CJCS DJS (02) JS (02) J3: (03) J3:NMCC SECDEF:
OPSECDEF (01) USDP: (02)
- CNO CC WASHINGTON DC
- CSAF WASHINGTON DC
- CNO WASHINGTON DC
- CSA WASHINGTON DC
FILE
(012)
TRANSIT/3371749/3383218/888:29TCR3383202
EZ01:
DE RUWDSGG #6833 3371749
ZNY SSSSS
EZ02:
P 031749Z DEC 79
FM AIRTEVRON FOUR
C TO AUEAJCS/
INFO RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUHGNOA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHMHBBA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RUDORRA/USCINCEUR SHAPE BE
RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUVFAAB/COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA
ZEN/COMFITAEWWINGPAC SAN DIEGO CA
RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RULYOJO/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFRSAA/COMIDEASTFOR
RUHGPBA/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUHGPBA/CTF SEVEN ZERO
RUHGPNA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT ONE
RUHGPBA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT TWO
RUEBARA/COMNAVINTCOM WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAR/NPOIO FT GEO G MEADE MD
RUEGAJA/NOSIC SUITLAND MD
RUCBSAA/COMOPTEVFOR NORFOLK VA
BT
S E C R E T NOFORN //N03821//
EZ03:
EZ04:
EZ05:
SECTION 01 OF 02 //N03821//
IR NO. 5 376 4475 79
1. (U) COUNTRY: IR
PAGE 1 S E C R E T 33931169
PAGE 2 S E C R E T 33936
2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: 5 376 4475 79
3. (C) TITLE: [redacted]

C (U) [redacted]
4. (U) OMITTED
5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 791130-791202
6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 791202
7. (C) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: [redacted]
C [redacted]
8. (U) REFERENCES: A. Z-013-18268
B. Y-DIRM-9-013
9. (C) ASSESSMENT: SOURCE A, INFORMATION 2
10. (U) ORIGINATOR: AIRTEVRON FOUR
11. (U) REQUEST EVALUATION: NO
G 12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: [redacted]
13. (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY: CAPT GEORGE W. WHITE, USN (C.O, AIRTEVRON FOUR)
G 14. (C) SOURCE: [redacted]
15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NON-DIFC
16. (C) SUMMARY: THIS DIR ADDRESSES IRANIAN I-HAWK SAM SITES, PROPOSED SITES AND CAPABILITIES AND OTHER GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AS OF 18 FEB 79.
C,G [redacted]
17. (U) THRU 21. (U) OMITTED
22. (C) DETAILS: FOLLOWING AR[redacted] BASE BY BASE:
U A. CHAH BAHAR: OPERATIONAL AIRFIELD AT 25-28.6N3 60-26.5E3. NAVAL BASE ON END OF PENINSULA ON WEST SIDE OF KHALIJ CHAH BAHAR BAY. PROPOSED I-HAWK SITES NOT YET UNDER CONSTRUCTION, AT (1) 25-19.8N3 58-25.9E2, (2) 25-25.9N8 58-29.3E8, AND (3) 25-33.4N4 58-24.8E8. THE CONTRACTORS WERE READY TO BEGIN BUILDING THE SITES. AIRFIELD HAD EST 10,000-FT RUNWAY, IN-PLACE DEFENSES INCLUDED OERLIKON 23MM AAA AND RAPIER SAMS.
U B. JASK: SMALL OPERATIONAL AIRFIELD COULD HANDLE C-130'S AND F-27S. OPERATIONAL FPS-100 EW RADAR (RANGE 200 NMI) LOCATED AT 25-39.4N3 57-47.0E3, WITH ONLY OERLIKON PROTECTION. NO I-HAWK SITES WERE PROPOSED, PLANNED OR SURVEYED. ALL FPS-100 SITES ARE GCI SITES.
U C. BANDAR ABBAS: UNPROTECTED, OPERATIONAL FPS-100 AT 27-11.1N2-56-13.3E3. I-HAWK SITES SURVEYED WITH CONSTRUCTION ABOUT TO BEGIN, AT (1) 27-18.0N2 56-18.8E2 (NEEDED ROAD CONSTRUCTED TO SITE),
C,G PAGE 2 ~~SECRET~~ 33931169
PAGE 3 ~~SECRET~~ 33936
(2) 27-17.8N7 56-14.2E8 (NEEDED ROAD CONSTRUCTED TO SITE), AND (3) 27-16.4N8 56-28.4E8 (COULD BE INSTALLED WITH VERY LITTLE SITE PREP). IN-PLACE AIRBASE PROTECTION WAS RAPIER AND OERLIKON. FPS-100 HAD DUCTING PROBLEMS, WAS EASY TO JAM. AN-4 EW RADAR INSTALLED ON RIDGE AT 27-22.2N5 56-12.5E8 TO TEST DUCTING PROBLEM, WAS NOT OPERATIONAL. MICROWAVE CENTER FOR COMMS WITH TEHRAN, TABRIZ AND BUSHEHR AT 27-13.8N3 56-05.8E6.
V D. BUSHEHR: OPERATIONAL I-HAWK BATTERIES IN WELL PREPARED SITES AT (1) 28-51.8N4 50-53.2E5, (2) 28-54.5N8 50-51.3E8, (3) 28-55.9N9 50-48.4E8. THESE WERE SOME OF THE FIRST I-HAWKS IN OPERATION, BUT HAD MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS. OPERATIONAL FPS-100 AT 28-53.8N8 50-52.6E8. WHEN BAD WEATHER COMES TO BUSHEHR AIRBASE, ITS IRI F-4'S MOVE TO SHIRAZ AIRBASE. SOUTHEAST OF BUSHEHR, THE KUHE MOUNTAINS MASK THE LONG VALLEY TO THEIR EAST FROM ALL BUSHEHR RADARS.
V E. KHARG ISLAND: IN THE PERSIAN GULF, HAD OPERATIONAL, D-100-CAPABLE AIRFIELD AND ONE COMPLETED I-HAWK SITE. ONE I-HAWK BATTERY WAS LOCATED IN STORAGE AT BUSHEHR, DESTINED FOR KHARG ISLAND. ON THE ISLAND WAS A SURFACE SEARCH NAV RADAR.
V F. BEHBEHAN: THREE I-HAWK BATTERIES, IN TRAINING SITES NOT CONSIDERED TACTICAL, ON A AIRFIELD AT 30-38 0N1 50-14.2E8. ALL WERE EXPECTED TO BE MOVED TO UNKNOWN HORMOZ + PEACE; WHEN BETTER SITES WERE COMPLETED.
V G. OMIDIYE AIRBASE: THOUGH UNDER CONSTRUCTION, HAD COMPLETED RUNWAYS, TAXIWAYS AND COVERED REVETMENTS FOR CLAIMED F-15'S. CON-

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PAGE 02 OF 02 MSS = 8518

STRUCTION WAS ABOUT TO BEGIN ON SURVEYED I-HAWK SITES AT (1) 30-43.6N8 49-37.3E6, (2) 30-45.7N9 49-29.7E1, AND (3) 30-55.8N1 49-27.8E0. I-HAWK BATTERIES COULD BE INSTALLED AT ALL PROPOSED SITES AROUND OMIDYE AB, BANDAR-E-MASHUR AND ABADAN WITH LITTLE SITE PREP DUE TO FLAT TERREIN, BUT IRANIANS WERE MORE INCLINED TO EXPENSIVE, BY-THE-BOOK SITE PREP.

H. (C) BANDAR-E-MASHUR: TWO I-HAWK SITES WERE PROPOSED (TO PROTECT THE REFINERY, TANK FARM AND PIPELINES), AT (1) 30-32.3N1 49-03.0E6 (CONSTRUCTION WAS 85 PERCENT COMPLETED), AND (2) 30-32.[illegible] 49-13-0E7 (CONSTRUCTION WAS ABOUT TO BEGIN). ALONGSIDE PIPELINES FROM PORT AREA WERE GREAT PILES OF INCOMING CARGO. NO KNOWN DEFENSIVE WEAPONS IN PORT AREA AND NO NAVAL SHIPS SEEN IN PORT. I-HAWK SITES WERE TO BE SUPPORTED FROM OMIDYE AB OR AHVAZ AB.

I. (S/NOFORN) ABADAN: HUNDREDS OF OIL STORAGE TANKS AND MANY SHIPS/DOCKS LINE BOTH SIDES OF RIVER. RUSSIAN FLAG SHIPS SEEN ON IRAQI SIDE. VERY LARGE REFINERY LOCATED AT 30-21.4N8 48-15.9E7. [redacted] IRANIAN CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR IRAQI AGGRESSION [illegible] I-HAWK SITES SURVEYED AT: (1) [illegible] 48-22.0E6,

PAGE 3 [illegible] 00001100

PAGE 4 [illegible] 23336

(3) 30-18.6N8 48-19.1E3, AND AT NORTH [illegible] AIRPORT, AT (4) 30-22.6N3 48-12.9E4.

J. (C) AHVAZ: THREE I-HAWK SITES, 85 PERCENT COMPLETE, LACKED WATER AND ELECTRICITY HOOK-UP, AT (1) 31.24.2N2 48-32.5E2, (2) 31-25.2N3 48-52.3E2, AND (3) 31-12.3N8 48-42.0E8. CONTINGENCY SITE PROPOSED AND SURVEYED AT 31-12.0N7 48-25.9E8 WOULD REQUIRE LITTLE SITE PREP. ARMOR DIV IN CITY CENTER ON WEST BANK OF RIVER. AIR DEFENSE BATTALION NO AT 31-23.9N8 48-38.9E2 WAS 75 PERCENT COMPLETED, WOULD CONTROL DEFENSES OF OIL FIELDS, REFINERY, ARMORED DIV AND PORT, AND POSSIBLY, THE I-HAWK SITES AT BANDAR-E-MASHUR AND ABADAN.

K. (C) DEZFUL AREA: MAJOR AGRICULTURAL AREA, ALL IRRIGATED FROM HYDROELECTRIC DAM AT 32-36.7N1 48-27.8E9. VANDATI AIR BASE HAD F-5'S SELDON PARKED IN REVETMENTS AND DUMMY F-5'S AT NORTHWEST END OF RUNWAYS. TWO I-HAWK BATTERIES WERE IN STORAGE ON AB, WITHDRAWN FROM COMPLETED SITES AT 32-16.2N4 47-51.0E7 AND 32-22.5N4 47-41.4E0 DUE TO VULNERABILITY TO IRAQI ARTILLERY. ASSOCIATED WITH THOSE SITES AND WITH VANDATI AB WAS AN FPS-100, OPERATIONAL AT 32-28.2N9 47-46.7E8. PROTECTING AB WERE THREE I-HAWK BATTERIES, OPERATIONAL AT (1) 32-25.8N0 48-28.7E9, (2) 32-20.7N4 [illegible] AND (3) 32-23.7N7 48-13.2E8. THESE WERE THE BEST -LED AND -MANNED BATTERIES IN IRAN, BUT NONE WOULD HAVE TIME TO ACQUIRE, LOCK-ON AND FIRE AGAINST LOW-LEVEL TGTS APPROACHING FROM NORTHWEST, DOWN VALLEY TO AND POPPING UP OVER THE DAM. THAT APPROACH IS MASKED BY KUHE TANGEVAN MTS WITH SHEAR SIDES TO NORTH [redacted]

L. (C) ESFAHAN: I-HAWK SITES PROPOSED, SURVEYED WITH CONSTRUCTION ABOUT TO BEGIN, AT (1) 32-45.7N1 52-01.7E5, (2) 32-51.6N7 51-44.0E4

BT

EZ06:

#6033

ANNOTES

WM 661 [redacted] 00001100

PAGE 4

NNNN

EZ07:

ABC

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INCOMING

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PAGE 01 OF 02 MSS = 0570
PRIORITY -- SECRET -- GENDER MESSAGE -- 7389 CHARACTERS
REFERENCE FROM AIRTEVRON FOUR, SSN 6052 AT 03 1749Z DEC79
ROUTING ASSIGNED BY MSS:
SAIR CCF3 RCWO MEAF SGWO SNIS DUBI
PRINTER ASSIGNED BY MSS:
A012(1), A035(1), A017(1), B012(1), B088(1),
B089(1), C814(1), D518(1),
SUBJECT ASSIGNED BY MSS:
AIR, USSR, IRAN, RECCE, BADF, IRAN TF, ECONOMIC,
SOVIET AIR, ELECTRONIC, MIDDLE EAST, SOVIET GROUND,
SOVIET COMMAND,
DICTIONARY: 69, PROFILE:
36 88 98 164 220 258 358 362 366 368 385
DMIC-AUTODIN MSG NUMBER:
S6-057346
ZCZCDIC868 ~~SECRET~~ ZYUW
DMIC 33935
SECT 01 OF 33936
ACTION
DIA: DMIC
DISTR:
CJCS: (02) CJCS DJS (02) JS (02) J3: (02) J3: DMCC SECDEF:
DPSECDEF (01) OSDP: (02)
CNO CC WASHINGTON DC
CSAF WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSA WASHINGTON DC
FILE
(012)
TRANSIT/3371749/3380219/088:38TOR3380281
EZ01:
DE RUWOSGG #6852 3371749
ZNY SSSSS
EZ02:
P 031749Z DEC 79
FM AIRTEVRON FOUR
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC
RUWOMQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RHMMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RUDORRA/USCINCEUR SHAPE BE
RUDOMBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUWFAAB/COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA
ZEN/COMFITAEWWINGPAC SAN DIEGO CA
RUNGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RULYOJO/COMSIXTHFLT
RUFRBAA/COMIDEASTFOR
RUNGPBA/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUNGPBA/CTF SEVEN ZERO
RUNGPNA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT ONE
RUNGPBA/CTG SEVEN ZERO PT TWO
RUEBAAA/COMNAVINTCOM WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAA/NFOIO FT GEO G MEADE MD
RUEGAJA/NOSIC SUITLAND MD
RUCBSAA/COMOPTEVFOR NORFOLK VA
BT
~~SECRET~~ NOFORN
EZ03:
EZ04:
EZ05:
FINAL SECTION OF 02 //RH0362//
(THESE FIRST TWO SITES COULD BE INSTALLED WITH LITTLE SITE PREP),
(C) 32-44.5N3 51-29.6E3 (LOCK SOUTH OF LARGE OIL REFINERY), (4)

32-38.3N3 51-17.6E8 (TO PROTECT VERY LARGE RUSSIAN-BUILT AND MANNED STEEL MILL AT 32-27.5N8 51-43.2E5, WHICH DREW ITS POWER FROM DAM AT 32-44N3 50-44E3, THIS I-HAWK SITE WAS REQUIRED BY SHAH DESPITE EST 125M COST), (5) 32-22.0N7 51-19.7E3, AND (6) 32-22.6N6 51-43.0N9. FOLLOWING APPROACH WAS UNPROTECTED EXCEPT BY AB GERLIKON: SOUTHWEST TO QAR, SOUTHWEST TO JUST SOUTH OF STEEL MILL, THEN NORTHWEST PAST SOUTH OF CITY TO NEW ESFAHAN AB, NOW NAMED KHADARI AB. APPROX 2000 RUSSIAN WORKERS, TECHNICIANS AND DEPENDENTS WERE IN AREA, WITH HOUSING AT 32-32.2N2 51-18.6E3 AND CLUB AT 32-23.7N7 51-16.7E8. MANY COBRA (AH-1G) AND CHINOOK (CH-47) HELOS AT OLD ESFAHAN AIRFIELD AT 32-37.3N8 51-[illegible]. OVER 400 HUEY (BELL 214) HELOS AT 32-35.8N3 51-39.8E6. [illegible] HELOS TRAINED AT STAGING AREAS AT 32-31.5N4 51-51.2E5, [illegible] 30.8N4 51-55.8E4, AND 32-43.0N2 52-11.8E9. POSS PHOENIX AND OTHER AA MSLS LOCATED AT 32-46.4N9 51-53.6E8 IN UNDERGROUND [illegible] ON KHADARI AB.

(V) H. [illegible] (SHAHMARAD): C-130-CAPABLE AIRFIELD COMPLETED AND OPERATIONAL AT 32-[illegible].8N4 52-40.5E6, WITH HARD SURFACE RUNWAY, ONE SMALL BLDG AND [illegible] PROTECTION. THREE NEW, OPERATIONAL I-HAWK BATTERIES FOR TRAINING PURPOSES IN A NON-TACTICAL SITE AT (APPROX) 32-44.0N3 52-[illegible].8E4 NAMED NASHEMABAD AIRBASE, WITH DIRECT SUPPORT UNIT (DSU) COLOCATED.

(V) I. [illegible] SHAHROKHI AB: I-HAWK SITES UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT (1) 35-[illegible].7N8 48-41.8E5, (2) 35-15.2N8 48-31.4E8, AND (3) 35-14.5N3 48-36.8E3. LATTER TWO SITES NEEDED LITTLE PREP. OP'L FPS-16B WITH [illegible] AND MICROWAVE RELAY TO TEHRAN AND KHADARI, AT 35-09.3N2 [illegible].8E7. NO I-HAWK EQUIP OR SUPPORT ON SHAHROKHI AB, WHICH WAS [illegible] BY RAPIER AND OERLIKON.

(V) J. [illegible] TEHRAN: OP'L I-HAWK BATTERIES AT 35-29.8N7 51-21.8E8 AND 35-34.6N3 51-32.7E8. ALSO LOCATED AT THESE SITES WERE TWO NON-I-HAWK BATTERIES, USED FOR TRAINING SOON TO BE MOVED TO SITES NEARING COMPLETION AT 35-42.7N1 51-34.6E8 AND 35-33.8N2 51-11.8E9. AT MEHRABAD INT'L AIRPORT AND AIRBASE, MOST I-HAWK SPARE PARTS WERE LOCATED JUST DUE WEST OF THE IIAF TANKER AND C-130 PARKING AREAS: THE MAJOR END ITEMS (RADARS, LAUNCHERS, LOADERS) OUTSIDE [illegible] TRAVEL MODE; AND INSIDE THE LARGEST OF SEVERAL WAREHOUSE BUILDINGS, THE HIGH-DOLLAR SPARES. EXPENDABLE ELECTRONICS WERE STORED AT [illegible] DEFENSE HQ (35-43.6N2 51-30.3E8), [illegible] FERDOWSI, 2-3 [illegible] DOWN ROAD FROM DOSHEH TAPI AIRFIELD. OP'L AX-4 EW RADAR ON MT. TOP AT 35-48.2N2 51-25.3E4, COULD TRACK AIRCRAFT IN LANDING PATTERN AT ESFAHAN, CONTROLLED GCI FOR F-4'S AT TEHRAN AND WAS NAMED KARAJ RADAR.

(C) P. (U) KHOFORN) SEMNAN RANGE (TRAINING ONLY): 35-22.2N4 53-43.5E8, WAS ONLY LOCATION OF LIVE I-HAWK FIRINGS IN IRAN. ALL FIRINGS

STEREOTYPED DEPOT VERSION: VARIABLE SPEED TRAINING TARGETS, (VSTT, BEECHCRAFT MODEL 1088 JET DRONES TOWING 6-FOOT, RADAR-ENHANCED TOTS APPROX 1,000 FEET [illegible] TO [illegible] SITE ON COURSES APPROX 030 AND 250 DEGREES, ALT 10,000 FEET, SPD 250 KTS, FROM 65 NM OUT. AT 45 NM, HI-POWER GUIDANCE ACQUISITION. AT 35 NM, LOCK-ON REPORTED TO CONTROLLING TOWER, WHICH DECLARED TGT HOSTILE AND GAVE PERMISSION TO FIRE AT 30 NM. MSL LAUNCHED AT AVE RANGE OF 22 KM (40KM MAX, 10 KM MIN), AND INTERCEPT AT 18-16 KM. [illegible] I-HAWK MSLS STORED ONSITE WITH ACL SHOP SETS TO SUPPORT 4 BATTERIES. RAPIER FIRINGS ALSO CONDUCTED ON THIS RANGE AT PROB NORTHROP MODEL RECIP-POWERED DRONES, AT 2KM RANGE, TRACKING TGT, ALT APPROX 1,000 FEET [illegible] NEW SEMNAN AIRFIELD AT 35-34.0N4 53-42.5E7 WAS OPERATIONAL WITHOUT LIGHTS OR TOWER. SECRET IRANIAN OPERATION AND C-130'S DOING FULL STOP TOUCH-AND-GOES ON VERY DARK NIGHTS WITH NO LANDING LIGHTS ON AIRCRAFT AND ONLY 5 "BEAN BAG" LIGHTS EACH SIDE OF APPROACH END OF RUNWAY, WHICH HAD BEEN WIDENED FOR THAT PURPOSE. U.S. PORTABLE [illegible] RADAR AT 35-24.5N9 53-44.2E5 USED FOR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL.

Q. (C) IN SUMMARY, AS OF 18 FEB 79:
(1) (U) IN-PLACE, OPERATIONAL, TACTICAL I-HAWK SITES:
(A) (C) KHUSHEHR - THREE
(B) (C) KHADARI - THREE
(C) (C) TEHRAN - TWO
(2) (U) IN-PLACE, OPERATIONAL TRAINING SITES:
(A) (C) SHAHROKHI - THREE
(B) (C) AL MASHMABAD - THREE

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INCOMING

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PAGE 02 OF 02 MSG = 8520

(C) (C) SEMIAUTHORANCE - ONE

(D) (C) SITES NEAR COMPLETION:

(A) (C) KHARG ISLAND - ONE

(B) (C) BANDAR MASHUR - ONE

(C) (C) AYHAZ - THREE

(D) (C) TEHRAN - TWO

(E) (C) SITES REQUIRING LITTLE PREP:

(A) (C) CHAH BAHAR - TWO

(B) (C) BANDAR ABBAS - ONE

(C) (C) OMIDYE AB - THREE

(D) (C) BANDAR MASHUR - ONE

(E) (C) SHAHROMBAB - TWO

(F) (C) ISFAHAN - TWO

(S) (C) GENERAL COMMENTS:

(A) (C) TRAINING: RAYTHEON TRAINING PROGRAM NEVER COMPLETED. CREW ABILITY LEVEL CONSIDERED POOR. EQUIP VERY [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] AND BISTRO DIRECTED BY NIC-03.

REVW: 31 DEC 85

BT

EZ06:

06052

ANNOTES

WH 661

PAGE 4 ~~SECRET~~ 00001100

EZ07:

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Item Number: B100

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

SUBJECT: Mehrabad Layout and Defenses

TIMEFRAME: July 1980 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (U) In late June 1980, JTD considered use of Mehrabad to be a prime option for force insertion.

2. (U) [redacted] was detached from Air Staff to be the J2 focal point for Mehrabad intelligence and air defense.

3. ( ) J2 obtained [redacted]

4. ( ) J2 mapped Mehrabad defenses and passed information to all prime using agencies (101st, JSOW, DELTA, [redacted] AWACS).

5. ( ) A complete-scale model of Mehrabad was built for study by possible attacking forces. J2 created grid maps and identified threat positions and weak points.

6. ( ) J2 obtained collateral material from [redacted] J2 provided [redacted] recommendations to the J-3 planners and all prime users.

7. (C) J2 provided suggested ground routing from Mehrabad to the Embassy and MFA, time schedules and possible reacting forces analysis to the J-3 planners.

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

8. (S) J2 maintained daily files [redacted] and capability estimates (DIA and [redacted]

COMMENTS:

1. (S) Despite heavy concentration of AA, Mehrabads night defensive capability was not insurmountable. Prior to the war, Iranian AAA reaction times and general reaction capabilities as a whole would probably have allowed a successful assault on Mehrabad.

2. (U) After the onset of the war, Mehrabads reaction capabilities were considerably improved. As a result, the risk level to an assault on Mehrabad was correspondingly higher.

3. (S) With the higher risk and the reported hostage moves, ~~an assault on~~ use of Mehrabad was essentially discarded. The concept [redacted] was replaced with a plan utilizing AC-130's and Cobras to [redacted] With the [redacted] removed, the environment over Mehrabad was operable [redacted]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (S) J2 request an update analysis from DIA and [redacted] at least once a month.

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: [redacted]

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Mehrabad Grid with Threats (old)
2. New Mehrabad Grid (night readable)
3. Sample Intel Report on Mehrabad
4. Tehran Airfield Facility Report

[redacted]

25 July 1980

SUBJECT: Tehran/Mehrabad Reaction Study

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

1. (TOP SECRET) The enclosed study provides an analysis of the probable Iranian reaction to a US attack on Tehran/Mehrabad Airfield. The following assumptions are made:

- The attack occurs between 0001 and 0400 hours.
- The attack occurs on a Friday.
- Iranian communications remain intact.
- Iranian electric power system is not disrupted.
- The attacking force is not detected prior to D minus 15 minutes.
- There are no disruptive environmental factors such as rain, snow, high winds, dust storms, etc.

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) The enclosed overlay is keyed to the Tehran and Vicinity (Special) 1:50,000 map sheet and depicts the probable route(s) from installations in Tehran from which Iranians may send reinforcements to Mehrabad.

3. (CONFIDENTIAL) The detailed Tehran city study, with photos and overlays provided previously, supports this Tehran/Mehrabad Reaction Study.

[redacted]
COL, USA
Chief, Middle East Branch
Western Division
Directorate for Research

2 Incl

as

WORKING PAPER

[redacted]

GROUND DEFENSE

[redacted] using the following forces:

- Revolutionary Guards - est 50 men
- Airbase Guard Force - est 50 men
- [redacted] - est 100 men
- Air Defense Forces - est 125 men

These forces could be directed by the [redacted] or his designated representative [redacted]. While the Revolutionary Guards would technically come under his control, they are likely to respond in an independent, spontaneous manner to an attack on Mehrabad.

The expected actions taken by these forces against an attacking force are described below.

- Revolutionary Guards: The first armed force to react to an assault on Tehran/Mehrabad Airfield would be the Revolutionary Guards assigned to the facility. They would react almost instantly with vigor and spontaneous uncoordinated action. While we are uncertain of their number, we would expect the estimated fifty Revolutionary Guards to be armed with UZI sub-machine guns and G-3 semi-automatic rifles. Their force would likely be scattered in and around the airfield. Their reaction would likely be offensive in nature and serve to bring them in contact with the attacking force. If the first wave of Revolutionary Guards is beaten back decisively, any succeeding attacks are likely to be less determined. It is pointed out that, while the Revolutionary Guards at Mehrabad are imbued with revolutionary zeal and dedication to the revolution, their experience lies mostly in conducting administrative and security checks at Mehrabad against unarmed civilians. They have little, if any, actual combat experience against an organized military force.

- Airport Guard: [redacted] At the time of attack, their numbers would probably be approximately fifty. Airport guard individual responses, while at their posts, would probably be to report to the guard commander and remain at their posts for further orders. The response of the guard force commander to a significant US presence at the airfield would probably be to have his personnel assume defensive positions and wait for guidance from the airbase commander. The chief effect of airport guard actions would be to serve as a "tripwire" for alerting the military chain of command. Both in the short-term and long-term, military impact of these guards on US force activities would probably be negligible.

WARNING NOTICE

[redacted]

- Air Defense Forces [redacted] estimated 125 men, are bivouacked in tents near their gun positions. These forces could be brought to bear rapidly (2 minutes) against ground targets, providing the targets were illuminated.

[redacted] probably has a small guard force (less than 25 men) deployed at night which would probably assume defensive positions around the facility and await further orders, rather than join in repelling an attack on Mehrabad. It is possible a contingency plan for reinforcing the strike force at Mehrabad includes [redacted] however, their combat effectiveness as infantry is considered low. If such a plan does exist, arrival of these troops (estimated 50 - 100 men) at the Mehrabad main terminal area is estimated to take 45 - 60 minutes after the force is notified. These artillerymen would be armed with G-1 and G-3 rifles, .50 calibre machineguns, 90 mm rocket launchers, M-79 grenade launchers, and 57 mm recoilless rifles. We do not believe that Iranian plans to defend Mehrabad include the use of pre-planned artillery fires from areas around the airport. Positioning of field artillery pieces [redacted] would probably exceed 120 minutes and adjusting fire would be nearly impossible.

POTENTIAL REACTIONS

US actions at Mehrabad not only would prompt Iranian military reaction but also would initiate immediate Iranian reporting to higher echelons requesting reinforcements. While there is some chance that delay in notification might result, because of confusion or lack of clear guidelines in an emergency, the increased awareness of potential US actions leads us to believe that, under all but extreme conditions, reporting by Iranian forces would be fairly effective. Within the capital district, [redacted]

We would expect potential reinforcements to arrive at Mehrabad using the existing city streets, converging on the airfield at the critical Shahyad Monument interchange. Also, its likely that all available reinforcements will not be focusing attention solely on the Mehrabad complex. Diversionary tactics could cause potential reinforcements to be dispersed elsewhere.

PRINCIPAL REINFORCEMENTS

The main elements capable of swiftly responding to a hostile threat at Mehrabad Airport are [redacted]. The Gendarmes are certain to have at least one company (100 men) on standby alert and up to two more companies (200 men) capable of reinforcing the airport security forces. Their mode of transportation to the airfield would be by truck. Gendarme elements would be armed with G-3 semi-automatic rifles and between 5 and 10 .50 calibre machineguns. Special Forces personnel would be [redacted] and G-3 rifles, UZI sub-machine guns, [redacted] machine guns, RPG-7 and M-79 grenade launchers. The [redacted] reinforcements after notification is [redacted] elements of two other understrength [redacted] also respond within about d + 90 minutes from time of notification.

[redacted] Revolutionary Guards "Strike Forces" are reportedly garrisoned [redacted]. These strike forces, numbering approximately 500 men, are likely to react to a raid on Mehrabad. Assuming 30 minutes to form up and load after notification and 45 minutes travel time to the airport, lead elements of this force (100 men) could probably close on Mehrabad about 75 minutes after notification.

Ground forces [redacted] could play a role in reinforcement activities; however, location of the division units in east Tehran would serve to hamper their ability to move to reinforce the airport. It appears likely that at least one company from each [redacted] (about 300 men each) would be maintained [redacted]. Their movements to the airport would take considerably longer [redacted] forces closer to the facility, but lead elements of the companies [redacted] probably begin losing use about 90 minutes after ordered to depart. These units would possess anti-tank missiles (RPG-7) and rocket launchers, and larger calibre automatic weapons (.50 calibre machine guns).

Other military installations in Tehran [redacted] would contribute significant military force to repel any attack on Mehrabad. Also, personnel manning police stations and gendarme posts (3 - 5 men) are not expected to respond to an attack on Mehrabad; they will defend their own areas and await further orders. They would not be a military threat to any attacking force at Mehrabad.

[redacted] PAPER

REACTION OF THE POPULATION

Certainly the largest, and perhaps the most significant, external consideration of an attack against Mehrabad is the local civilian population and their reaction to the military activity there. Within 15 minutes after the first exchanges of fire, curious Iranians will arrive outside the airfield and will cluster around the Shahyad Monument, immediately east of the airport entrance. Within one hour, their number could likely swell to 50,000 people. They would not attack US forces unless provoked; however, inadvertant, careless, or deliberate shots fired into the crowd would provide martyrs and this aggressive action would turn the curious passive throng into a mob with aggressive intentions against the US force without regard to its personal safety. The outpouring of civilians into the streets near the airfield would make vehicular movement extremely difficult, especially in the area of the Shahyad Monument. The probable effect of the crowds around the airport would be to slow the response times given for those units arriving at the airport any later than 30 minutes after the initial exchange of fire and possibly to block any movement around the Shahyad Monument after one hour.

AIR DEFENSE - IIAF Aircraft

[redacted] Under normal combat [redacted] could not reac[redacted] without [redacted] assuming a range of 250 NM with ground [redacted] and 450 [redacted] air to air munitions. [redacted] configured [redacted] NM range.

[redacted]

Therefore, in response to a mission requirement at Mehrabad, between 30 and 40 F-4 aircraft, configured for ground attack or a mix of air and ground munitions, could be available from Shahroki, Tabriz, and Vahdati. In addition, unless neutralized, about 20 additional F-4's could be available from Mehrabad, including laser designator aircraft. However, it is unlikely that all of the available aircraft from the western bases would be sent to Mehrabad and leave the Iraqi border essentially undefended. It is more likely that the aircraft at Tabriz and Vahdati would be left in place for the defense of the border while Shahroki's F-4's respond to Mehrabad. Bushehr aircraft would probably respond with about 15 F-4's configured for air intercept. If the Bushehr aircraft were configured with ground munitions, they would require either aerial refueling or an inter[redacted] probably at Khat[redacted] [redacted]ical, because all [redacted] Abbas, configured [redacted] ground [redacted] impractical because of the range.

Assuming that the Air Warning Communications System (AWCS) is intact, [redacted] could arrive at Mehrabad Airbase within [redacted] the alert. An additional 17 to 18 aircraft [redacted] respond between D + 1 and D + 6 hours. Loss of communications and/or delay in passing the alert through the AWCS could significantly extend this response time. This response time assumes a flight speed of 600 mph and aircraft alert status of 5 minutes and 10 minutes. These aircraft, unless configured for a preplanned ground support mission, would probably be configured for an air intercept role. With 2 AIM-9 and 4 AIM-7 missiles and possibly with external fuel tanks, these loads could probably be changed to ground munitions in about 1 to 1 and 1/2 hours for alert aircraft. (US crews estimate that it takes between 30 and 45 minutes.) Uploading cold non-alert aircraft would take considerably longer. IIAF F-4E's are all modified for target identification for TISEO and can carry AGM-65A/Maverick, and M-117 and Mk-81 through Mk-84 GP bombs, BLU-1B antipersonnel/material bombs, and LAU-3/A launchers, [redacted] HE ammunition.

The decision to upload ground munitions has traditionally been very highly centralized in the IIAF. In view of two previous [redacted] the recent coup plot at Shahroki, it can be expected that the decision to upload ground munitions to respond to an attack at Mehrabad would be delayed until the situation were clarified. An additional problem involving delivery of ground ordnance in the Tehran area would be the lack of [redacted] to direct the attack against specific ground targets. Loss of ground-to-air communications would further exacerbate the direction of attack aircraft. The IIAF pilots would probably have no aversion to delivering ground ordnance against hostile elements at Mehrabad Airbase.

The F-14, while principally an air interceptor in the IIAF and not capable of delivery of ground munitions, would be employed at Mehrabad using 20 mm cannon. [redacted] the [redacted] makes this possibility unlikely; but, it cannot be completely discounted. As many as four F-14's could probably respond to Mehrabad [redacted] with probably an additional six aircraft arriving within D + 4 hours.

WORKING PAPER

[redacted]

The I-HAWK SAM system provides a good all weather ADA capability. The I-HAWK acquisition radar range extends to 100 km and the maximum engagement range of the system is approximately 40 km. The quality of the Iranian crewmen against high performance aircraft, especially in an ECM environment, is poor; but could be expected to be better against low slow flying aircraft. The I-HAWK system can be fired from a "cold start" by using power overrides, within 15 minutes from receipt of an alert.

RAPIER

[redacted]

The Rapier system, if augmented by the Blindfire radar, is an all weather, short range, point defense missile system. The [redacted] Each Rapier fire unit [redacted] loaded. The maximum engagement range is [redacted] range, if the Blindfire were present, is about [redacted] The system cannot fire at targets within [redacted] The system could be [redacted] less than [redacted] from the first alert, if [redacted] on the launchers.

SA-7

While Iran has 1,500 SA-7 SAM's in the inventory, no data is available to indicate SA-7 deployment locations. However, these man-portable, infrared-seeking missiles are used in point defense of vital areas such as airfields. Their presence at Mehrabad Airbase cannot be completely discounted.

OERLIKON, twin 35 mm AAA Guns

[redacted] This gun system is an all weather, short range, point defense weapon that can also be used against ground targets. The maximum AAA range with radar is [redacted] without radar) and the maximum horizontal range is [redacted] The 3-man crew of this system could be expected to engage hostile aircraft or ground targets and could react with [redacted] from a non-alert status.

ZU-23-2 twin AAA guns

[redacted] This gun is a short range, point defense AAA weapon that can also be used in direct fire roles against ground targets. The maximum AAA range is 2.5 km and the maximum horizontal range is 7 km. The gun is sighted optically and is operated by a 5-man crew. The crew could be expected to engage hostile aircraft or ground targets within [redacted] minutes of the first alert, if the crew were not on the gun.

Command and control of the Rapier and AAA assets at Mehrabad [redacted] probably will be exercised by the [redacted] The I-HAWK [redacted] Operations Center [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] to various uncertainties [redacted] predicting the Iranian [redacted] aircraft [redacted] at Mehrabad (D), is nearly impossible. The nature of the crowd is likely to change from passive observer to aggressive mob, as the operation progresses. The number of troops which could be brought to the airport could vary dramatically, depending on such uncertainties as crowd control, trafficability of the roads, weather, and effectiveness of the Iranian C^3 system. [redacted] the confrontation were to continue beyond [redacted] hours [redacted] as far away as [redacted] could be airlifted to Mehrabad to engage the [redacted]

10
WORKING PAPER
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS
OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS
ORCON
[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

8-103

Item Number: ____

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO ____
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Recurring Intelligence Reports

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY: [redacted]

1. (C) J2 developed several intelligence report formats to be used by DI[redacted] to provide intelligence that was focused specifically [redacted] The formats were developed over a period of time in cooperation with DI[redacted]

[redacted]

b. [redacted]

Classified By: DJSOA
Declassified ON: OADR

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(3) (C) [redacted]

(4) (C) [redacted]

(5) (C) [redacted]

(6) (C) [redacted]

(7) (C) [redacted]

2. (U) J2 also received several reports from DIA and Department of State (DOS) in originators' formats:

a. (U) DIA Iran Situation Report, Daily (Attachment 6): DIA provided this report to J3, OJCS. The report summarized significant military and political activities in Iran for the previous 24 hours.

b. (U) DIA Soviet Activity in the Indian Ocean, Daily (Attachment 7): DIA provided this report to J3, OJCS. The report included:

(1) [redacted]

(2) [redacted]

(3) [redacted]

c. [redacted]

d. (U) DOS Iran Working Group SITREP, Daily (Attachment 9): DOS provided this report to DOD and other federal agencies. The report included significant political, economic, and military activities in Iran for the previous 24 hours.

3. (U) JTF/J2 began issuing a Daily Intell Summary (on _____) to all assigned/supporting forces. THE CONTENT OF THIS REPORT CHANGED AS THE SITUATION

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And tactical [illegible] on different emphasis. It [illegible] info. from DIA, DOS, [redacted] and press and formated it for JTF elements.

COMMENTS:

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: [redacted] (USAF); SOD, J3, OJCS

POINTS OF CONTACT:

ATTACHMENTS:

1. [redacted]
2. [redacted]
3. [redacted]
4. [redacted]
5. [redacted]
6. DIA Iran Situation Report
7. DIA Soviet Activity in the Indian Ocean Report
8. [redacted]
9. DOS Iran Working Group SITREP
10. JTF Daily Intell Summaries.

a.

b.

c.

d.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

ODE FIELD HOUSE

7 JAN 81

JCS SNOWBIRD

FM: ODE FIELD OFFICE

TO: JCS SNOWBIRD RC-J2

TOP SECRET SNOWBIRD 233

[redacted]

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[redacted]

SECRET/SENSITIVE

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

Subject: Iran Situation Report as of 0500ZT March 1980

(U) Significant Events:

--(U) Early returns in the first round of Iran's national assembly election held on Friday indicate that the clergy-backed Islamic Republican Party is headed for control of the [redacted] legislature. IRP candidates have apparently secured 9 of the 20 seats filled so far on the first ballot. So far Bani Sadr supporters have won only 1 seats. The Interior Ministry has announced that if two-thirds of the seats are filled by the first ballot, the Majles can begin its duties "immediately". Amid reports of election irregularities, President Bani Sadr declared that the election results would be set aside if widespread and serious misconduct had occured. Final results are to be released on Thursday, with a run-off election scheduled for the first week in April.

--(U) In Kurdistan, the Kurdish Democratic Party has called for a general strike, sit-ins, and demonstrations in the wake of the Interior Ministry order closing polling stations in three Kurdish towns. A KDP representative reportedly won the election in Mahabad, although it is not yet clear whether the authorities will validate the Mahabad returns. In addition, the KDP has reportedly signed a pact with the Komala Party, the peoples Sacrifice Guerrillas, and the followers of Sunni Leader Sheik Hosseini for coordinating "military and political action" against the central government.

--(U) In an interview with Newsweek magazine, Iran's Budget and Planning Minister, Ezzatollah Sahabi claims to have visited recently with each of the American hostages being held at the US Embassy. Sahabi, a member of the Revolutionary Council, stated that the hostages are in good physical condition, but that many are "suffering from psychological pressures or depression." Some of the hostages--those considered "disruptive" by the militants, and individuals accused of espionage--are kept in solitary confinement Sahabi admitted.

(U) Significant Military Activity:

--(U) Tehran radic broadcast reports that a new commander of the Iranian Gendarmerie has been appointed. The report claims that Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, the Interior Ministry supervisor, appointed BG Qasem Ali Zahirnezhad to head the Islamic Republic Gendarmerie.

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(U) Significant Political, Economic and Diplomatic Activity:

[redacted]

—(U) According to PARS, the office of Ayatollah Shariat-Madari has denied a Reuters claim that the Ayatollah had left Iran for Pakistan. Reuters had reported that Shariat-Madari was in Islamabad to attend an international Islamic conference. His office, however, maintained that the Ayatollah was at his residence in Qom.

cc:

JOD (3)
SOD
VADM Hanson
LTG Shutler
LTG Lawson

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US NAVY SHIPS IN INDIAN OCEAN, PERSIAN GULF, & RED SEA



AS OF 22 0700 EST NOV 80

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IRAN WORKING GROUP

SITREP NO. 551

Situation in Iran as of 0500 EST, January 9, 1981

(U) Major Demonstration in Mashad Supports Bani-Sadr

Islamic Revolution, the newspaper which supports President Bani-Sadr, reported on January 8 a major demonstration in his favor by thousands of people in the holy city of Mashad, following news of Iran's reportedly successful Gulf war offensive against Iraqi forces launched last Monday. The demonstration followed a speech at the city's army barracks by Supreme Court President Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, which praised the offensive but did not mention Bani-Sadr by name, the paper said. A soldier at the barracks who reportedly shouted "Bani-Sadr be blessed" was purportedly ordered to keep quiet. However, when the audience left the barracks, the soldier reportedly took to the streets where they were joined by the citizenry.

(U) Shah Reza II Seeks Aid of Iranian Women in Overthrowing the Khomeini Regime

In his first message to Iran since coming of age last October, the 20-year-old self-proclaimed Shah Reza II has called for the assistance of Iranian women in overthrowing the Islamic government of Ayatollah Khomeini. In a message released on the anniversary of Iranian Women's Emancipation Day (January 7), the son of the late Shah contrasted "the chains of slavery imposed on women by fanatical reactionaries" with the equality guaranteed by his father's constitution. The message urged the women of Iran to "shake off their yokes, unmask the diabolical plots (of the reactionaries) and set an example of resistance to those people."

(U) President-Elect Reagan Scorned by Tehran Radio

A January 8 Tehran radio commentary has strongly criticized what it has termed the tough policies of President-elect Reagan, saying that Mr. Reagan's "slogan of militarism" meant he was "doomed to meet the same ignominious fate" as Presidents Nixon and Carter. This would happen because U.S. imperialism, faced with growing liberation movements, was in the throes of decline, said the state-owned radio, which does not necessarily reflect government views. (Recent commentaries have focused upon Mr. Reagan's charge that the captors of the hostages were "barbarians".)

Reagan on the Hostage Negotiations: Meanwhile, the President-elect told reporters on January 8 that he was quite sure that he could carry out any accord that President Carter reached with Iran on the hostage crisis. However, he added that he did not want to "sign a blank check" by agreeing to honor a settlement before its terms were known. Reagan said: "I'm

quite sure that any agreement would be one that, yes, I could carry out. On the other hand, I don't think anyone should be asked to sign a blank check. So I can't give you an unequivocal 'yes.'"

[redacted]

[redacted] Senior Officer [redacted] Watch Officer
Iran Working Group

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CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

MSG NBR 246
O 151936Z JAN 81
FM [redacted]
TO [redacted]

~~T O P S E C R E T~~

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY (U)

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY PRESENTS THE VIEW OF A SUBORDINATE INTELLIGENCE SECTION WHICH DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO ALL ACTIVITIES OF THE [redacted] AND [redacted]S PERCEPTIONS DEVELOPED UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS.

[redacted] INTRODUCTION:

MANY SUPERLATIVE COMMENTS CAN BE MADE CONCERNING ALL FACETS OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DURING BOTH THE RICE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURES WOULD THEN BE LOST IN THESE SELF-LAUDATORY EFFORTS. THE TWO CRITICAL INTER-RELATED FAILURES WERE: [redacted]

(TS) MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS:

A. (TS) DELTA REPEATEDLY AND CONTINUALLY STATED THAT THE TWO MOST ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION WERE [redacted] ALL OTHER REQUIREMENTS WERE SECONDARY TO THESE TWO. UNFORTUNATELY, BOTH REQUIREMENTS WERE, AT BEST, ONLY PARTIALLY ANSWERED.

B. (S) NUMEROUS OTHER INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS EXISTED TO SUPPORT ALL PHASES OF THE RESCUE OPTIONS. THESE WERE FULFILLED MOST ADEQUATELY AND IN A TIMELY FASHION. [redacted] AND [redacted] WERE EXCELLENT.

C. (TS) DELTA IS FULLY AWARE OF THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES OF INCORPORATING THE DETAILED REQUIREMENTS OF A SURGICAL GROUND FORCE INTO THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS OF A MASSIVE NATIONAL EFFORT. DELTA EEI/OIR WERE FAR TOO NUMEROUS AND DETAILED TO EXPECT COMPLETE ANSWERS TO ALL. THE ASSAULT ELEMENTS HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO EXPECT THESE QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED AND ANSWERED. THE PASSAGE OF TIME GENERATED MORE AND MORE REQUIREMENTS FROM THE ASSAULT FORCE. AS INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE CAME IN, IT GENERATED MORE REQUIREMENTS FROM ALMOST EACH INDIVIDUAL ASSAULTER. AS DIFFERENT OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS BECAME INVOLVED, REQUIREMENTS COMPOUNDED THEMSELVES AND WERE BEING PASSED [redacted] DELTA AND 101ST CHANNELS DURING SNOWBIRD. THE [redacted] EFFORTS TO COPE WITH THIS FRAGMENTATION WERE COMMENDABLE.

(TS) ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE

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PERSONNEL DEVOTED TO INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DURING BOTH THE RICE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. THE JOB SKILLS REFLECTED BY THESE PERSONNEL INCLUDED TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE, ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS, AND SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE.

B. (S) DELTA INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE AUGMENTED BY A NUMBER OF ASSETS PLACED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF OR ATTACHED TO THE ORGANIZATION. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND THE AMOUNT OF EFFORT VARIED WITH THE IMMEDIACY OF PENDING OPERATIONS.

AND

4. (S) SECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS:

A. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: A VARIETY OF SECURE COMMUNICATIONS WAS REQUIRED FOR BOTH INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC. DELTA UTILIZED KY-3 AND KY-70 SECURE TELEPHONES, SECURE TELETYPE, AND SECURE SATCOM TO PASS TRAFFIC.

IT SHOULD BE NOTE THAT THESE LATTER ARRANGEMENTS WERE TEMPORARY...DELTA HAD BEEN, AND STILL IS, SEEKING SUCH COMMUNICATIONS ON A PERMANENT BASIS ALONG WITH A "GRAY" TELEPHONE. EQUALLY IMPORTANT WAS THE FACT THAT DELTA DID NOT HAVE DIRECT INTERFACE WITH THE DCS SYSTEM AND THEREFORE COULD NOT ALWAYS COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE JTF. COURIER RUNS WERE NOT WELL ESTABLISHED AND THE LACK OF SECURE FACIMILE EQUIPMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTED TO UNTIMELY RECEIPT OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.

B. (U) (S) SECURITY:

(1) (TS) (U) THE BEST THING THAT CAN BE SAID ABOUT OVERALL SECURITY AND OPSEC MEASURES WAS THAT IS ALWAYS WEIGHED ON THE SIDE OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT RATHER THAN STRINGENT SECURITY. HOWEVER, DELTA ALWAYS FELT THAT THERE WAS A GREAT AMOUNT OF LUCK INVOLVED WITH THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO MAJOR COMPROMISES OF SECURITY OR OPSEC. MANY PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN CIRCUMVENTED WITH PROPER PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY AND OPSEC MEASURES.

(U)(2) (S) RATHER THAN DWELL ON THE NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF POOR SECURITY, DELTA BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

(A) (U) EARLY ASSIGNMENT AND UTILIZATION OF AN OPSEC AND SECURITY CELL RESIDING WITHIN THE J3 OR J2.

(B) (U) (S) FORMULATION OF AN OPSEC PLAN FOR EACH FACET OR PHASE OF THE OPERATION, WHETHER THAT BE A TRAINING PHASE, A LOGISTICS PHASE, OR THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION.

(C) (S) (U) APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF THAT PUNISHMENT TO ALL COMPONENETS OF THE JTF WHEN SECURITY VIOLATIONS OCCURRED.

(D) (S) FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF STANDARD SECURITY PRACTICES SUCH AS PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE ACTIONS, PUBLICATION OF A CLASSIFICATION GUIDE, USE OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL FOR SECURITY MONITORING ALONG WITH ASSETS, ETC.

(E) (U) APPROPRIATE EDUCATION FOR PERSONNEL AND ELEMENTS THAT ARE NOT SECURITY CONSCIOUS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO WORKING WITH ACTUAL CONTINGENCIES.

(3) (S) ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS (SNOWBIRD), DELTA WAS FACED WITH PROVIDING ALL OPSEC COVER FOR FORT BRAGG BASED REHEARSALS ON EXTREMELY SHORT NOTICE. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN AN OPERATIONAL NECESSITY, BUT OPSEC COVER WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE WITH OUR LIMITED CI ASSETS. OTHER PROBLEMS STEMMED FROM HAVING TO BRIEF APPROXIMATELY FIFTY PILOTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN, DIVERTING THE ATTENTION OF THE FORT BRAGG COMMUNITY AND LOCAL PRESS AWAY FROM THE PRESENCE OF UH-60S, ETC. AROUND DELTA, SECURING ALL ON EXTREMELY SHORT

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UNDERSTOOD THAT CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WERE NO LONGER SPEAKING FOR DELTA. THE INCIDENT IN BROWNSVILLE TEXAS LED TO MANY CALLS AND QUERIES TO DELTA ABOUT OUR PROPOSED ACTIVITIES AND BROUGHT ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON DELTA'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT SPECIAL OPERATIONS. WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME THESE PROBLEMS APPEARED TO DIMINISH. HOWEVER, THE PERCEPTION OF THE ASSAULT ELEMENTS ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE OPERATION AND SPECULATION HEARD FROM FRIENDS AND OTHER SOURCES ON POST WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIVITIES IN NEVADA WERE NOT LIKELY TO HAVE INCREASED THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE CHANCES FOR MISSION SUCCESS. THE HOLLOWAY REPORT MAY HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF OVER EMPHASIS ON OPSEC. THAT MAY BE A VERY VALID COMMENTARY ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL ACTIVITIES AND ATTENDANT INTERFACE. IT WAS NOT OVER EMPHASIZED AT DELTA. THE OPSEC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELTA AND [redacted] RANGERS WAS IN OUR OPINION, EXCELLENT. THE SAME WAS NOT TRUE WITH RESPECT TO OTHER ARMY UNITS.

5. (U) REQUIREMENTS AND PRODUCTION:

A. (U) INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WERE ADDRESSED TO THE JTF FORMALLY THROUGH MESSAGE TRAFFIC OR WRITTEN DOCUMENTS AND INFORMALLY THROUGH MEETINGS AND TELEPHONE CALLS (SECURE). DELTA EEI/OIR LISTS WERE PERIODICALLY REVIEWED FOR FULFILLMENT.

B. (U) DELTA HAD NO REQUIREMENT TO PRODUCE ANY FORMAL DOCUMENTS BUT INSTEAD CONCENTRATED ITS PRODUCTION ON THE USE OF ESTIMATES AND BRIEFINGS TO THE TROOP ELEMENTS, AND OTHER INVOLVED IN SUPPORT OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN.

C. (U) IT WAS LEARNED THAT DELTA HAD TO BE REPRESENTED AT MOST DEBRIEFINGS AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS CONFERENCS TO INSURE THAT THEIR NEEDS WERE BOTH UNDERSTOOD AND MET. IT WAS ALSO CRITICAL THAT DELTA PRODUCE ITS OWN ESTIMATE OF THE INTELLIGENCE SITUATION BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS AND IDIOSYNCRACIES OF THE UNIT. ALTHOUGH THE JTF J2 DID EXTREMELY WELL AT PREPARING ESTIMATES, DELTA PERSONNEL WERE ABLE TO ADD TO THESE ESTIMATES AND TO FORMULATE ALTERNATE POSITIONS WHICH BETTER MET THE NEEDS OF THE DELTA FORCE.

6. (U) INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE: NORMAL UNIT SOP WAS FOLLOWED.

7. (U) EXTERNAL/LATERAL INTERFACE:

A. (U) EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE WAS KEPT TO A MINIMUM BY DELTA DURING THE RICE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. THIS UNDOUBTEDLY HAS HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON DELTA'S PROGRESS IN ITS NORMAL MISSION, BUT IT WAS UNDERTAKEN FOR REASONS OF OPSEC AND THE UNIT WILL RECOVER FROM THIS PROTRACTED DECREASE IN INTELLIGENCE LIAISON AND COORDINATION. DELTA RECEIVED ADVERSE FEEDBACK FROM SEVERAL AGENCIES WHO WERE CONFUSED BY PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE JTF THAT IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE REPPESENTING THIS UNITS OP IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE ACTING ON DELTA'S BEHALF. THESE PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN RECTIFIED WITH MORE COORDINATION AND PLANNING AMONG ALL CONCERNED UNITS.

B. (U) LATERAL INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE WAS MINIMAL DURING RICE BOWL DUE TO THE LACK OF SMALL SIZE OF DEDICATED INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS AMONG THE OTHER UNITS SUBORDINATE TO THE JTF. SUCH INTERFACE DID OCCUR DURING RICE BOWL ALBEIT ON AN INFREQUENT BASIS. DURING SNOWBIRD, INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ASSIGNED TO SUBORDINATE UNITS INCREASED AND THERE WAS A CONSEQUENT RISE IN THE AMOUNT COORDINATION BETWEEN DELTA AND THESE UNITS. HOWEVER, THIS COORDINATION WAS STILL OF A RATHER SPORADIC NATURE AND COULD HAVE BEEN MADE BETTER THROUGH PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCES CONVENED BY THE JTF.

8. (U) UNIT/J-STAFF INTERFACE:

A. (U) DURING RICE BOWL, THE INTERFACE BETWEEN DELTA AND J2 ELEMENT WAS MUCH BETTER THAN DURING SNOWBIRD. DELTA STATIONED A FULL-TIME INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE WASHINGTON, DC AREA DURING THE FIRST TWO MONTHS OF RICE BOWL AND THERE WAS A DELTA REPRESENTATIVE ALMOST IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE JTF AFTER THAT WHO ALSO LOOKED AFTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

B. (U) DURING SNOWBIRD, MUCH LESS CONTACT AND INTERFACE OCCUR- BETWEEN THE DELTA INTELLIGENCE SECTION AND THE J2 ELEMENT

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[redacted] DURING CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SNOWBIRD, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE [redacted] REPEATEDLY CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF DELTA. REPORTS FROM JFK CENTER FILLED THE RUMOR MILL CONCERNING "DELTA" RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE. THE ASSIGNMENT OF FORMER DELTA PERSONNEL TO THE

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THIS MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE COMPARATIVE LACK OF URGENCY ASSOCIATED WITH DIMINISHED CHANCES OF ATTEMPTING ANOTHER RESCUE. THERE WAS LESS

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FREE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN FOR REASONS OF OPSEC, BUT IT IS DELTA'S OPINION [illegible]T THERE WAS A GREATER NEE[illegible] FOR A FREER EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND TO KEEP DELTA APPRISED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

9. (TS) ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS:

A. (TS) THAT THE MOST CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WERE NEVER SATISFACTORILY ANSWERED.

B. [redacted] THAT THE [redacted] DISCIPLINES FUNCTIONED EXCELLENTLY AND FULFILLED ALMOST ALL REQUIRMENTS LEVIED ON THEM [redacted] ARE THE PRINCIPAL VEHICLE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION FOR A RESCUE OPERATION. [redacted]

C. (S) THAT ONLY AN ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE SECTION OR ONE THAT WORKS ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS WITH A UNIT CAN PROVIDE IT WITH ITS MOST CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYTICAL SUPPORT.

D. (S) THAT A DEDICATED SECURITY AND OPSEC ELEMENT MUST BE INTEGRAL TO THE JOINT STAFF FROM THE ONSET OF ITS PLANNING.

E. (S) THAT FREQUENT COORDINATION AND INTERFACE BETWEEN ALL CONCERNED INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS MUST OCCUR FOR ALL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY MATTERS.

F. (TS) THE [redacted] WAS FORMED TOO LATE DURING SNOWBIRD. [redacted] WERE HOPEFULLY ADVANCED BY THEIR [illegible] OUR INTENTION WAS NOT TO ANTAGONIZE THEM OR BE[illegible] TO DATE.

G. (TS) THE BEST HISTORY OF [redacted] AND DELTA 52 INTERFACE IS PERHAPS REFLECTED ON THE VOLUME OF MESSAGE TRAFFIC ON RECORD. THEY SHOW A TREMENDOUS EFFORT ON THE PART OF MANY DEDICATED PERSONNEL INVOLVED. THIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HOLDS THE UTMOST RESPECT FOR THE J2 AND HIS EFFORTS. HE ASSUMED A TASK WHICH WOULD HAVE OVERWHELMED MANY LESSER MEN. HE ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL WITH LIMITED RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL. DELTA ONLY SAW A SMALL PART OF THE BIG PICTURE. MANY OF THE ABOVE POINTS MAY PROVE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED DUE TO OUR LIMITED PERSPECTIVE. THEY ARE NOT MEANT TO BE CRITICAL OF ANY PERSON OR ACTIVITY, RATHER TO EXPRESS OUR OPINIONS CANDIDLY.

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[redacted]

DIA

WARNING INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

USSR:
A MILITARY OPTION(U)

5 FEBRUARY 1980

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☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO ____
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: DIA
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

Warning Intelligence Appraisal

USSR:
A MILITARY OPTION (U)

PREPARED BY

G [redacted]

This is a Department of Defense Publication
Produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency

USSR: A MILITARY OPTION (U)

Summary

Recent Soviet military activity in [redacted] indicates Soviet Armed Forces in that area are in the early stages of preparation to take action in Iran. DIA believes these activities reflect intent to be prepared to intervene militarily in Iran, should the Soviet leadership elect that course of action.

Background

[redacted]

Discussion of [redacted] ilitary Activity

[redacted]

Mobilizations and deployments to initial staging or defensive locations occur regularly throughout the year for purposes of realistic training and operations readiness. However, Soviet activities

[redacted] must be viewed in the context of the Iranian situation. If viewed separately, the factors discussed are not conclusive [redacted] combined with [redacted] war or offensive preparation difficult to differentiate from training exercises. [redacted] We conclude these events represent an "exercise" only in the sense of conducting such exercises with masking -- to allow undetected transition to an improved level of readiness for military operations. [redacted] Therefore, we believe readiness for threat of war or for intervention could be reached in well under thirty days.

Outlook

[redacted] Assuming continued preparations, DIA believes Soviet forces will reach readiness for threat of war within the next few weeks, but will need to [redacted] and take other detectable measures before reaching full readiness. DIA will keep the close attention necessary to assure tasking [redacted] for Soviet activities opposite Iran.

[redacted] Recent Afghanistan experience suggests that the US intelligence community [redacted]

As of: 25 November 1979

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

SUBJECT: Iranian Air/Air Defense Summary

[redacted] Airfields and radar sites are commonly protected by a variety of these air defense weapons. These air defense weapons are primarily deployed along the Iraq-Iran border and the Persian Gulf. Similarly, the air force is arrayed to protect against a threat from Iraq or the Persian Gulf.

2. [redacted] Air Force:

a. [redacted] The current air force inventory includes 190 F-4, 135 F-5 and 77 F-14 fighter aircraft. [redacted] Generally speaking, aircraft can deploy from normal base areas to any other base in the country, including civilian airfields and dispersal bases.

b. [redacted] F-4 Capability: The Iranian F-4s are the most versatile aircraft in the Iranian air force. Pilots are well trained and competent; however, training has been very limited since the revolution. This has undoubtedly degraded pilot proficiency. [redacted] Heat seeker Sidewinder AAM as well as electro-optical and laser guided bombs are available. Ability to employ the electro-optical and laser guided bombs is estimated to be very limited. The F-4 can be aerially refueled. OR rate for the F-4 is estimated at 40 percent.

Weapons: Laser Guided Bombs (10 F-4Ds)

KMU-351 B/B (MK-84, 909 kg)
KMU-388A/B (MK-82, 227 kg)
Electro-optical Bomb-AGM-65A
General Purpose Bombs
M-117
MK-81-84

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Review on 25 Nov 99

Anti-Personnel Bomb - BLU-1B

Rockets

LAU-3/A Launcher
69-mm Rocket

20-mm Cannon (M-61A1)

Air-to-Air Missiles

4 Aim-7E Sparrow
4 A-m 9E Sidewinder

c. [redacted] F-5 Capability: The F-5 has the best availability of Iranian [redacted] OR [redacted] The F-5 cannot be aerially refueled.

Weapon Systems:

General Purpose Bombs

M-117
MK-81-84

Anti-Personnel Bomb BLU-1B

Rockets

LAU-3/A
69-mm
127-mm Zuni

20-mm Cannon

Air-to-Air Missiles

2 Aim-9E Sidewinder

d. [redacted] F-14 Capability: The cutoff of spare parts from the US and the collapse of the Iranian logistic system has led to cannibalizing F-14s and support equipment to keep some of Iran's 77 F-14s flying. [redacted] that some of the electronic [redacted] functioning. DIA estimates 5-10 percent of the F-14 fleet is operationally ready.

(U)

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Another factor limiting the use of Iran's F-14s is that only a few Iranians have received extensive training on the plane. When the Shah was overthrown, less than 100 pilots and instructor-pilots had been trained to fly the F-14. Of these, reportedly some 20 instructor-pilots had completed intercept training, and only three had finished the complete air defense/air superiority course and were operationally qualified. Only some 15 other instructors had completed the initial training as weapon systems officers, and none of these had advanced beyond the first phase, which covered only simple intercepts, i.e., firing one missile at a time against a single target.

[redacted] we estimate that the already limited skills of pilots and weapons officers have atrophied [redacted]

[redacted] The Iranian Air Force may have a limited capability to engage opposing aircraft with Phoenix missiles. We estimate some Phoenix missiles are operational [redacted] Iranians conducted only two live firings of Phoenix missiles before the revolution -- both during 1977 in the US. [redacted] On the other hand, US [redacted] experts estimate that as many as 200 could be operational.

S/NF

[redacted] The F-14, however, contains electrical circuits permitting the flight crew to check the missile from the cockpit. Presumably Iranian crews could determine if they had a malfunctioning missiles before they entered combat.

Weapons Systems:

6 Aim 54A Phoenix
20-mm Cannon

[redacted] TOP SECRET

[redacted] Air Defense - General:

a. [redacted] The primary air defense system in Iran is the HAWK, [redacted] Other SAM systems known to be in the Iranian inventory are the British Rapier and the US Tigercat (land-version of the Seacat).

b. (S/NOFORN) Other ADA systems are primarily the 23-mm Soviet built ADA gun and the 35-mm Oerlikon ADA gun. Capability to operate these systems is probably fair, but given command and control problems, they are probably not much of a threat.

c. [redacted] Air Defense Radar Network - Many of the radars in the Air Defense Radar Network probably are partially or completely inoperative, [redacted] The Iranians probably have comprehensive coverage at all altitudes of the Soviet border area [redacted] but the mountains mask some radars at low altitudes; levels at which aircraft are difficult to fly in mountainous terrain. [redacted] temperature inversions over the Gulf and coastal areas (called ducting) causes multiple targets or false targets to appear on radar screens. This problem is severe (a 95 percent probability of occurrence) below 2,000 feet and serious (a 60 percent probability of occurrence) above 2,000 feet. These conditions will worsen over the next month as temperature inversions increase. [redacted]

5. [redacted] I HAWK SAM System:

a. (S/NOFORN) The improved HAWK is a dual thrust, single chamber, solid-propellant, surface-to-air missile capable of delivering high explosive, blast fragmentation warhead to a maximum intercept range of abou[redacted]

[redacted]

routine adjustments and calibration. Since mid-February 1979, the required maintenance probably has not been performed and spare parts are probably in short supply. [redacted]

b. (TS [redacted]) Rapier SAM System:

a. (S/NOFORN) Rapier is a fair-weather, mobile, surface-to-air missile system designed for point defense of airfields and battlefields against high-speed low-flying tactical aircraft.

b. (S/NOFORN) A Blindfire radar guidance system for poor weather operation has been developed and is offered as an optional add-on unit to the Rapier system.

c. (S/NOFORN) There are currently 250 Rapier missiles and 52 missile launchers in Iran. [redacted] The Rapier is designed for point defense of airfields. It has a maximum intercept range [redacted] and a maximum intercept altitude [redacted] The maximum acquisition range for the Blindfire radar is [redacted] It has a visual target system which is radar assisted.

[redacted]

e. [redacted]

f. (T [redacted]) Tigercat SAM System:

a. (S/NOFORN) Tigercat is a missile designed for close-range defense of small tactical targets, such as airfields, against low-level airborne attacks. The missile also has a limited capability against surface targets. Tigercat is principally a surface-to-air missile with an integral, two stage rocket motor. It delivers a 18.1 kg HE warhead to a maximum slant range of [redacted] and a maximum intercept altitude [redacted]

b. (S/NOFORN) The Tigercat missile is identical to Seacat. It has a cylindrical body flared to a square cross section at the wing roots. The forward half of the missile body is built up from sections of light alloy castings. The welded high-tensile-strength steel of the integral two-stage, solid propellant rocket motor forms the structure of the aft part of the missile body.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

9. Anti Aircraft Guns

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The Iranian SAM system based principally on I-Hawk, but also including Rapier, Tigercat and SA-7, is supplemented by Swiss Oerlikon 35-mm radar- or visually-controlled ADA guns, as well as ZU-23-2 and ZSU-23-4 Soviet-supplied ADA guns. These ADA guns are normally deployed around IIAF bases, I-HAWK and radar sites, and key government installations.

[redacted]

a. (U) The Swiss twin 35-mm antiaircraft gun, 1 ZLA/353 (Oerlikon-Contraves), is a gas-operated, automatic weapon with a cyclic rate of fire of 550 rounds per minute per gun -- a total cyclic rate of 1,100 rounds per minute for the weapon. Each gun has a hopper which accommodates 56 rounds. A "ready-round" container with 63 rounds is positioned behind each hopper. The total of 238 is assembled in 34 clips of 7 rounds each. The HE projectile has a self-destruction fuze which operates after the round is inflight from 8 to 10 seconds.

(1) (U) Electronic fire control with a Super-fledermaus radar is provided for fully automatic elevation and traverse. Furthermore, the weapon can be either power operated or maunually controlled by one man, independent of the fire control system.

(2) (U) By means of an electro-hydraulic mechanism, a feature of this weapon, it is possible to go from the traveling position to the firing position in approximately 3 minutes, or from firing position to the traveling position in approximately 4 minutes.

[redacted]



b. (U) The Soviet twin AA gun ZU-23, first shown in 1964, is a dual-purpose weapon suitable for employment in both an AA role (as its "ZU" designation implies) and in an equally formidable direct-fire ground role against personnel and light armor. It is mounted on a towed light two-wheel chassis with disc-type wheels which tilt outward at the top when the weapon is emplaced, thus providing freedom of movement around the gun as well as removing the weight of the gun from the wheels when firing. AA fire-control is by means of an optical-mechanical computing sight.

(1) (U) (S) Characteristics and Performance:

Calibre	34-mm
Maximum range (horizontal)	7,000m
Tactical AA range	2,500m
Projectile weights (HEI-T)	188 grams
(API-T)	190 grams
Fuze type	Point detonating
Armor penetration (est)	
0 degrees obliquity (API-T)	24mm@ 500m/19mm @ 1,000m
Air transportable	Yes
Fire control (AA)	
Off-carriage	None
On-carriage	Optical-mechanical computing sight
Fire control (ground)	Telescope
Crew	5

(2)



c. The Soviet self-propelled antiaircraft weapon system, ZSU-23-4, was first observed in the 7 November 1965 Moscow Parade. Since that time the weapon has undergone several modifications. Mounted on a full-tracked chassis, the weapon system consists of quad-mounted 23-mm automatic guns with a radar as part of the on-carriage fire control. The weapons are similar to those of the towed ZU-23, with modified (liquid cooled) barrels and different flash hiders. The entire turret is enclosed except for a cutaway portion on the forward end of the turret for gun elevation. The chassis is basically a modified ASU-85 using a flat track torsion bar suspension system, with six single road wheels on each side. The vehicle is not amphibious.

(2) ~~TOP SECRET~~

(1) ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Characteristics and Performance:

Vehicle (modified ASU-85 chassis):	
Length overall (w/gun)	6.5 m
Weight	20.5 mt
Height overall (radar up)	3.75 m
Speed	50km/hr
Cruising range	450 km
Maximum gradeability	30 degrees
Fording depth	1 m
Armor thickness - (turrent)	8.3 mm
(hull)	9.2 mm
Engine	6 Cyl - 260 hp - diesel
Armament (quad 23-mm gun):	
Elevation/traverse	-8 degrees to + 87/360 degrees
Rate of fire (cyclic)	800 to 1,000 rds/min/barrel
Muzzle velocity	930 m/s
Maximum range (horizontal)	7,000 m
Designed max self-destroying range	3,500 m
Tactical AA range (radar/optical)	3,000/500 m
Weight of projectile (HEI-T/API-T	188 grams/190 grams
Fuze type	Point detonating
Armor penetration 0 degrees obliquity (API-T)	24 mm @ 500 m/19 @ 1,000 m
Onboard ammo load	2,000 rds
Fire control radar (GUN DISH):	
Range (acquisition/tracking)	12-15 km 10-13 km
Accuracy (range/angle)	10 meters/4-6 mils
Resolution	75 meters
Optics:	
System tracking rate (horizontal/vertical)	70 degrees per sec/60 degrees per s
System target speed capability	450 m/s
Land navigation system	Yes
Air transportable	Yes
Crew	4

(2) [redacted]

DDC

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

[redacted] twin 57-mm self-propelled AA gun, [redacted] observed in 1957. A comparatively lightly armored open [redacted] dual 57-mm S-68 guns is mounted on a modified [redacted]s. The weapon is estimated to have mobility comparable to that of a medium tank. The twin guns have an [redacted] mechanical computing antiaircraft sight with manual inputs and manual and electro-hydraulic tracking systems. East [redacted]ermany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Vietnam, Egypt, Iran, Finland, Iraq, and Syria have the ZSU-57-2.

The computing sight mechanism is capable of establishing the proper lead for targets within the limits of 0 to 5,500 meters range, 0 to 90 degrees dive to 70 degrees climb angle, and with speeds of 0 to 680 knots (780 mp). The sight is designed to include target course angles of up to 360 degrees. Initial range information is obtained by use of an off-carriage hand-held 1-meter base steroscopic range-finder, or by estimation.

(1) (U) (S/NOFORN) Characteristics and Performance:

Vehicle (modified T-54 Chassis):	
Length overall (w/gun)	8.5 m
Weight	28 mt
Height	2.75 m
Speed	50 km/hr
Cruising range	420 km (main tanks)
Maximum gradeability	30 degrees
Fording depth	1.4 m
Engine	12 cylinder, 512 hp, diesel
Armament:	
Gun	Dual (57-mm gun (Model S-68)
Elevation	-5 degrees to + 85 degrees
Traverse	360 degrees
Rate of fire(cyclic)	105-120 rd/min/barrel
Muzzle velocity (AP-T)(HE-T)	1,000 m/s
Maximum range(horizontal)	12,000 m
Designed maximum self-destroying range	7,400 m
Tactical AA range	4,000 m
Weight of projectile (HE-T) (AP-T)	2.8 kg.
Fuze type	Point detonating; proximity possibly available

[redacted]

Armor penetration 0 dedegrees obliquity (AP-T)	102 mm @ 500 m/96 mm @ 1,000 m
Onboard ammunition load	316 rds
Air transportable	Yes
Fire control (AA):	
Off-carriage	Hand-held rangefinder
On-carriage	Optical-mechanical computing sight
Tracking rate (horizontal)	0.2 to 30 degrees per second
(vertical)	0.3 to 20 degrees per second
Fire control (ground)	Reflex sight
Crew	6

[redacted] (2)

10. (U) Air traffic control, EW, GCI, and Air Defense Radar Systems. Attached is an enclosure is a synopsis of land-based radar activity and location in Iran.

[redacted]

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CONDUCTED ON 12NOV92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

B-70

Item Number: ___

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

SUBJECT: Airfield Data

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - December 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (U) Airfield and Seadrome Stations of the World (AASSOTW) data was the basic source for Iranian airfield studies.

2. (U) An index of selected countries in the Middle East containing basic data for immediate reference.

3. (U) J2 requested complete AASSOTW data on specific airfields as required in the form of DIA Installation Support Packages.

4. (U) Additional photographs and special project analysis was requested as required.

COMMENTS:

1. (U) DIA could provide AASSOTW data folders in a relatively short time (within one day) if necessary.

C 2. (S) [redacted]

C 3. (S) Search by coordinate of AASSOTW identified airfields not depicted on maps.

RECOMMENDATION:

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

G J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: ~~OADR~~

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DIA [redacted]

ATTACHMENTS:

[redacted]

SECRET

SECRET

VOLUME NUMBER: 16

PAGE NUMBER 2



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SECRET

SEMNAN NEW AIRFIELD

BE Number: 0420008805

Geog coords: 35 24 00N 053 40 37E

Graphic reference: [illegible]

Location and landmarks: 12 miles SE of Semnan, 112 miles east of Tehran, 196 miles NE of Esfahan

Runway length: 11,500'

Runway width: 148'

Runway surface: concrete

100

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

#B171 B

VAYQAN AIRFIELD

BE Number: 0340008818

Geog coords: 38 04 20N 045 40 30E
Graphic references: ONC G-4, JOG NJ 38-07

Location and landmarks: 4 miles S of Vayqan village, 7 miles E of Lake Rezaiyeh, 29 miles W of Tabriz, 43 miles NE of Rezaiyeh

Runway length: 3,100'
Runway width: 150'
Runway surface: graded earth

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CONDUCTED ON 12 N0092
~~DERIVATIVE~~ CL BY [redacted]
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REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: DJSOA
Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

Intelligence Dist[illegible]

[illegible] Multiple Sources

Secret

(S) [redacted]

TIMEFRAME: November 1979 - Decembe[illegible]

SUMMARY:

1. [redacted] J2 targeted the [redacted] DIA [redacted] DB5A to satisfy intelligence requi[illegible] was also accomplished [illegible] of Parity.

(U) 2. (TS) Justification was supplied [illegible] on to subsequent changes due to natur[illegible] priority.

(U) 3. (TS) J2 did not supply justifica[illegible] subsequent change in targeting or exploitation.

[redacted] J2 problem set for [redacted] collection was created for management of collection initially [illegible] and later

(S) priority 2 with the ability to have DB5[illegible] targets (push) for special reasons.

[redacted] Other community personnel [illegible] not allowed to add targets or change priorities of the J2 problem set without J2 approval.

COMMENTS:

[redacted] J2 maintained constant liaison [illegible] the [redacted] to remain abreast of developments.

(U) 2. [redacted] One J2 person was primarily responsible for monitoring and managing collection.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. ([illegible]) That DIA DB5A be tasked to identify an individual to manage collection and targeting for special operations.

TOP SECRET [redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

3. [redacted]

OTHER RELATED [redacted]

J2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: [redacted]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

DIA - [redacted]

[redacted] DB5A [redacted] 2598

ATTACHMENTS: None

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

B-174 JOINT MESSAGEFORM SECRET

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE ACT	PRECEDENCE INFO	LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY
01 OF 02		PP			TT	[redacted]	NOV 7

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

BOOK NO

272227Z

C

FROM: SSO DIA

TO: [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] 55, 924

[redacted]

SUBJ: STANDBY DECOMPARTMENTATION AUTHORITY (U)

REF: [redacted]

1. [redacted] CURRENT SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST AREA PRESENTS POSSIBILITY THAT [redacted] WILL BE REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF ANY U.S. MILITARY ACTION IN THAT REGION.

2. [redacted] IN VIEW OF THE AFOREMENTIONED, DIRECTOR DIA HAS EXERCISED THIS PREROGATIVE AND ADDITIONALLY, SUB-DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO THE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR

DISTR: [redacted]

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE: [redacted]

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: [redacted]

[redacted]

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DD FORM 1 OCT 75 173 OCR REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 JUL 68, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

SECRET

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECRET

C [redacted]

PAGE	DATE-TIME OF RELEASE	PRECEDENCE ACT	PRECEDENCE INFO	LMF	CLASS	[redacted]	COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY DATE-TIME	MONTH	YR
02 OF 02					TT		[redacted]		

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

BOOK

SIO'S OF COMMANDER TASK GROUP 70.1 AND COMMANDER TASK GROUP 70.2

PERMITTING [redacted] CTG 70.1 AND CTG 70.2. THIS AUTHORITY IS LIMITED TO [redacted]

REVW 27 NOV 99

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

DISTR:

0

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS [redacted]

C [redacted]

CONTROL SYMBOL ONLY

RELEASE

TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

SIGNATURE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DATE TIME GROUP

SECRET

B-183

03 OCT 79

~~SECRET~~

AOB

WNINTEL

[redacted]

INVENTORY

TER
NE PISTON COMMENTS

C TOTAL OF 80 DLVD, [redacted], ONE IN CONUS.

C TOTAL OF 177 F-4E'S ORDERED/DLVD [redacted]
C MODIFIED WITH LEADING-EDGE SLAT, [redacted]
C MOD AS LASER-DESIGNATOR ACFT. [redacted]

C TOTAL OF 141 ORDERED/DLVD [redacted]

C WILL ULTIMATELY REPLACE RF-5A'S. 16 DLVD [redacted]
C 13 ORIGINALLY PROGRAM[redacted] TO BE
C REPLACED B[redacted] RF-4E'S, [redacted]
C [redacted]

C [redacted]
C [redacted]

C TANK[redacted] (NOT KC-135). 2 MORE KC-[redacted] ORDERED.
C [redacted]
C [redacted]
U ADVANCED CARGO/TANKER AIRCRAFT.

WNINTEL

~~SECRET~~

IR[redacted]

INVENTORY TOTAL

BASIC TYPE / EQUIPMENT NAME	FIXED WING / JET TURBOPROP	HEL / PROP T
MULTI-ROLE COMBAT AIRCRAFT		
DBAIR00069/AQBAP/ACFT, F-14A TOMCAT	[redacted]	
SUBTOTAL	[redacted]	
ALL-WEATHER FIGHTER		
DBAIR00018/ADPEP/ACFT, F-4E PHANTOM II	[redacted]	
DBAIR00017/ADPDP/ACFT, F-4D PHANTOM II	[redacted]	
SUBTOTAL	[redacted]	
FIGHTER-BOMBER		
DBAIR00029/AGANP/ACFT, F-5E TIGER II	[redacted]	
SUBTOTAL	[redacted]	
RECONNAISSANCE		
DBAIR00006/ADPSK/ACFT, RF-4E PHANTOM II	[redacted]	
DBAIR00015/AGAGK/ACFT, RF-5A FREEDOM FTR	[redacted]	
DBAIR00004/AMGFK/ACFT, RT33A SHOOTING STAR	[redacted]	
SUBTOTAL	[redacted]	
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE		
DBAIR00039/AIBFM/ACFT, P-3F ORION	[redacted]	
SUBTOTAL	[redacted]	
TANKER		
DBAIR00041/AKMNN/ACFT, BOEING KC-707	[redacted]	
DBAIR00098/AKNKN/ACFT, BOEING KC-747	[redacted]	

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE INFO PACKAGE
DOI - AS OF JAN 1980

B-188

GENERAL

- BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE "STUDENTS" HAVE STATED THEY PLAN TO PUT THE REMAINING HOSTAGES ON TRIAL FOR ESPIONAGE. ALTHOUGH THE LABEL "STUDENTS" IS USED IN THE MEDIA AND IN THIS REPORT WHEN REFERRING TO THE PRINCIPAL CAPTORS, THE LABEL IS NOT CORRECT. THE "STUDENT CAPTORS" FORCE CONSISTS OF A GROUP OF SENIOR MEDICAL, ENGINEERING AND RELIGIOUS [illegible] TO A MOJAHEDIN FACTION [illegible] SEVERAL LEFTIST INSTRUCTORS [illegible] TEHRAN [illegible] OF THE [illegible] PARTY MAY HAVE [illegible] THESE GROUPS [illegible]

[illegible] HAS NOW CRYSTALLIZED [illegible] GOVERNMENT AS A POLITICAL ENTITY MUST BEAR [illegible] PROTRACTED AND UNCOMPROMISING NATURE [illegible] SITUATION APPEARS TO BE A POLITICAL [illegible] POLITICAL [illegible] FOR EITHER THE GOVERNMENT [illegible]

- THE COMPOUND IS [illegible] IN THE MIDST OF A MIXED BUSINESS AND RESIDENTIAL [illegible] RELATIVELY EASY ROAD ACCESS FROM THE NORTH AND EAST [illegible] BUILDINGS IN THE [illegible] PROVIDE [illegible] INTERIOR OF [illegible] SE[illegible] [illegible] LOCAL [illegible] BLOCK [illegible] OF THE COMPOUND [illegible] STRATIONS ARE ON GOING.

- WEATHER AT THIS TIME OF YEAR IS COMPARABLE TO NW UNITED STATES/ DENVER COLORADO WITH CLEAR CRISP DAYS, OCCASSIONAL MIST/RAIN IN THE CITY AND SNOW IN THE NEARBY MOUNTAINS. WINTER TEMPERATURES ORDINARILY RANGE BETWEEN 20 AND 40 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT AT NIGHT RAISING TO THE MID FIFTIES DURING THE DAY.

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REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

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~~Classified By~~ ~~Declassified On~~ ~~OADR~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

E.I P/W-DOI JAN 80

WHF



- EXTERNAL REACTION FORCES. REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE STUDENT GUARDS AND PASDARAN ARE AVAILABLE FROM SEVERAL LOCATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS. PRINCIPAL FORCES AND THEIR ESTIMATED REACTION TIMES ONCE THEY HAVE RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OR HEARD A MAJOR DISTURBANCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE COMPOUND ARE SHOWN BELOW.

-- WITHIN 5-7 MIN-FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND WEAPONS POSITIONED IN SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.

-- WITHIN 10-15 MINUTES REINFORCEMENTS FROM STUDENT HQS AND PASDARAN KOMITEH STRENGTH 75-100 FROM NEARBY KOMITEH STATIONS.

-- WITHIN 15-20 MINUTES 100-300 PASDARAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL CROWDS.

-- WITHIN 20-30 MINUTES PASDARAN REINFORCEMENTS OF AN ADDITIONAL 200-300 PLUS.

-- WITHIN 30-40 MINUTES PASDARAN BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.

-- WITHIN 45-60 MINUTES IRG RESIDUAL FORCES AND MOBS OF 2,000-3,000.

-- WITHIN 60 MINUTES, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT [redacted] COULD REACT AND ATTEMPT A LAUNCH AGAINST ANY ORBITTING AIRCRAFT.

-- WITHIN ONE HOUR IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HELICOPTERS FROM [redacted] OR FIGHTERS FROM [redacted] COULD LAUNCH AND ATTEMPT TO INTERDICT THE FORCE.

ROUTING		
NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

MARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

B203

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. _____

(EYES ONLY
BG/ JOHNSON)

Handle Via

[redacted]

Channels

(C)

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

ADM TUTTLE

J31
19 Aug 80

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Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 19, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Johnson, J-5 [redacted]

FROM: Michael Berta

SUBJECT: Damage Assessment

Attached is a final of the Iranian Damage Assessment. Please provide your clearance to me by COB TODAY, 19 May. (TS)

Attachment

[redacted] (CODEWORD ATTACHMENT)

[redacted]

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT (TS)

Summary and Conclusions

I. This assessment addresses four areas of potential compromise and damage to U.S. operational and intelligence capabilities:

-- Operational Plans

-- Photographic Systems

-- Cryptological Systems

-- Clandestine Assets and Methods [redacted] (U)

II. Operational Plans

Summary: According to a Joint Staff assessment, the Iranians obtained a set of documents containing call signs, staging areas, in-country land and air routes, briefing codes, and satellite photography, from which they could reconstruct the major elements of the in-country rescue plan. To determine the potential for compromise, a copy of documents and photography containing the information that most likely fell into Iranian hands was provided to a DIA analyst and a military planner who knew nothing of the operation. With access to limited press reporting, they were able to piece together the general in-country operational concept and the following specific factors:

-- Identification of [redacted] as a refueling point

-- Identification and coordinates of warehouse (staging area)

-- Location of main Joint Task Force [redacted]

-- Identification of [redacted] as alternate JTF, HQ

-- Tactical Air Support was provided for

-- Identification of SFOD-DELTA and Ranger Forces

-- DELTA reception party--tied to the hideout area and warehouse [redacted] (C)

Portions of the plan that probably cannot be determined from the lost documents are:

-- The role of the C-141 aircraft, where they are located, or if they had an in-country role.

[redacted] (U)

[redacted]

-- Although [redacted] were identified on codeword cards, the role they were to plan cannot be determined.

-- Identity and number of reception personnel.

-- The exfiltration route from the extraction base or destination bases.

-- Techniques of assault on the Embassy/Ministry of Foreign Affairs or extent of knowledge on hostage locations and references.

-- How supporting TACAIR was to be employed.

Conclusion: This compromise severely reduces the chances of a successful subsequent rescue attempt with the same or analogous scheme of operations.

III. [redacted]

IV. Cryptological Systems

Summary: One of the helicopters left on the ground intact contained a [redacted] tactical secure voice encryption equipment along with some other U.S. cryptosystems [redacted] Most probably, they were all destroyed along with the helicopter.

TOP SECRET

(U) Conclusion: [redacted]

V. Clandestine Assets and Methods

Summary: Based on the documents left behind in the helicopters and the reports appearing in the news media, the concepts and mechanisms designed to support the operation are in the public domain. Disclosures of the fact that [redacted] The collection capability previously used in Iran has had to be restructured, and certain of the formerly successful methods and assets have been discontinued. Thus far, however, no specific officers, agents, or other support personnel or equipment have been compromised by name or precise location. [redacted]

Conclusion: None of the primary assets or personnel could be used again. In addition, significant restructuring of support mechanisms and new personnel with markedly different backgrounds and profiles would be required for any future operation. [redacted] mechanisms will probably be less inclined in general to cooperate in U.S. intelligence operations in Iran. [redacted]

(C)

[redacted]

(C)

[redacted]

B-07

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

SUBJECT: Damage Assessment - Operation RICE BOWL

1. Purpose. To conduct a detailed analysis of the equipments and information that were available at Desert Track One after U. S. forces departed and make a damage assessment.

2. Background.

a. Items of all classified documents/equipment were available in the undamaged helicopters (numbers 7 and 8), except the classified communications equipment, PARKHILL, the unclassified backpack UHF satellite ground terminal (PSC-1) and the AN/WSC-3, UHF satellite terminal, that were located only in helicopter Number One. This helicopter was destroyed by Iranian aircraft. Classified documents, equipment and sensitive information left at Desert Track One are depicted in TAB A.

b. Documents contained navigational data, call signs, frequencies, units, landing zones, satellite photography, annotated maps and listed foreign countries and facilities in foreign countries.

CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 94
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

3. Discussion. The following is a damage assessment of those classified and sensitive documents/equipments that are, or could be, in the possession of the Iranian government:

A, B

a. Operational Security. The compromise of these documents has a major impact on our ability to conduct another similar rescue mission [redacted] Analysis of captured documents readily reveals staging bases, navigation routes, hide out site, primary and secondary landing zones, approximate time of departure from helicopter security area, route to warehouse, that a rescue attempt was to be made at the Embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and primary and secondary exfiltration airfields.

E

[redacted] were identified by country and assigned code words on the knee board cards. Other specific locations identified were: [redacted] Furthermore, [redacted] identified as the primary site for the JTF and [redacted] as the alternate JTF site.

C

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

29A06

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

- Virtually all of the major elements of the plan after Desert Track One could be deduced from the documents. TAB B lists the information that the Iranians can be expected to know. The significant information that they probably do not know about the mission after Desert Track Number One is as follows:

  - The Assault Plan or its details/techniques.

  - The role played, if any, by [redacted]

  - The mission or location of the C-141 aircraft, specifically if they were to have an in-country role.

  - The route to be flown or destination of aircraft upon departing exfiltration base.

  - The details of Escape and Evasion Plan, although some facilities and units are identified.

  - The size, composition or identity of the reception committee or other support elements in-country (inflitrated/indigenous).

  - The arrangements, methods or cover used to secure ground transportation and the warehouse.

b. Communications Security. [redacted]

c. Satellite Photography. Minimal security damage is assessed from the compromise [redacted]. The Iranians do not have the technical capability to make an accurate assessment of the photography. [redacted] Such confirmation would be useful to the Soviets, but would not provide them a new or significant advantage.

d. Potential International Political Ramifications. Specific locations in some countries were compromised and their role in the operation identified. [redacted] was identified as the primary CJTF site and [redacted] as the alternate JTF. [redacted] were identified but their purpose not directly revealed. However, analysts unfamiliar with the operation have concluded from available compromised documents and press coverage that [redacted] was used for refueling.

- Other countries, without specific locations, that were identified as being possibly associated with the rescue operation were; [redacted] No positive conclusion can be [redacted] from the compromised documents, what purpose, if any, these countries or facilities in these countries, were to serve.

- The Iranians have reported that they found [redacted] money at Desert Track One, which could implicate the [redacted] This money undoubtedly resulted from participants being permitted five hours liberty at [redacted]

- The primary political impact will be determined by how the Iranians choose to reveal and exploit this information. It will be necessary to determine what actions if any, should be taken to notify these countries to defuse any action the Iranian government may take.

Unit	Classified or Sensitive Equipment/Data
C-130	Unknown. Inventory is being taken, but because this aircraft was totally destroyed, no analysis of documents/ equipment is necessary.
Helicopters	Secure Voice Communication Equipment * - PARKHILL (Helicopter #1 only) - NESTOR Other Commo Equipment * - AN/WSC-3 UHF Satellite (Helo #1 only) - PT-25 UHF - Unsecure radio * - PSC-1 UHF - Backpack Satellite radio (Helo #1 only) - Motorola 350 - Hand-held radio - PRC-90 - Survival-radio "BLUE BINDER" - EMERG LZs Location [redacted] - Tehran maps TACAIR Information Sheet (Call Signs/ Frequencies, CAP reference pts; TACAIR ACFT, including C-130's ,nav pts; i.e. Helo Hide, Warehouse, Manzariyeh) Brevity Codes (Codewords for JASK, [redacted] FA, [redacted] (AC-130's, C-141's, EC-130 (ABCCC), etc.) Code Words for 24 April [redacted] Flight Route Maps CVW-8 Card of the Day
DELTA FORCE	Complete inventory is being taken. Preliminary inventory indicates that some night visual devices, [redacted] made weapons, and communications equipment were lost/destroyed in EC-130 fire.

*Assigned SFOD-DELTA

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

WHAT IRANIANS KNOW (CAN LEARN) FROM DOCUMENTS/EQUIPMENT IN THEIR POSSESSION*

Majority of the Aspects of Operations in Iran

All geographic locations -- hiding point, ground route into and in Tehran, warehouse, staging area, objectives (Embassy & MFA), primary and alternative LZ's, extraction bases (primary and alternate).

Duration of the Operation was over several days.

A reception committee was provided to escort assault team. Size of reception committee probably would not be known.

Approximate time of the assault -- After last guard watch ending at 2100Z -- helos would support extraction - at Delta's call.

A(S)

Rangers were planned for use at the refueling point and the extraction airfield -- navigational aids were provided for at these points.

Communications would be secure and satellite communications would be utilized.

TACAIR was to be provided by various types of aircraft -- Fire support net singled out Spector (AC-130) -- Coordinates of key geographic locations were reported on the TACAIR -- Info Sheets indicating US willingness to use force in rescue effort.

E&E was a feature of the operation, with the port of JASK possibly involved -- desert safe haven identified, but location was not revealed.

E/

Specific locations in other countries were identified -- [redacted]

E/

Specific countries, without locations, were identified, [redacted]

These countries were named on the TACAIR information, Brevity codes and code words for 24 April knee pad cards.

A/

Participants [redacted] SFOD-Delta, Rangers, CCT), aircraft types/roles/missions, movements, routes.

Location of potential Iranian air elements that could react were identified.

That the U. S. had the most confidence in the assault portion of the operation.

*Supplemented by initial press reports.

WHAT THE IRANIANS PROBABLY DO NOT KNOW

- The Assault Plan or its details/techniques.
- The role played, if any, by [redacted]
- The mission or location of the C-141 aircraft, specifically if they were to have an in-country role.
- The route to be flown or destination of aircraft upon departing exfiltration base.
- The details of Escape and Evasion Plan, although some facilities and units are identified.
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ WASH FAX TO ODOM 1845 LOCAL 16 MAY 80

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF B 212

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (J-3)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DATE 16 May 80

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr Hamilton

Peter

(U) attached will be sent back to Bill ODom to complete his report if you see no objection.

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

V.R.

Phil Shuttler

CLASSIFICATI
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Concur Gal

HAND CARRY

G

CONCUR - P.B. HAMILTON

call ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

78863 for pickup

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

PHILIP SHUTTLER
Lieutenant General USMC
Director for Operations

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

15 May

MEMO TO: Glen Jones

(U) Bill Adams draft is on left side ... our attempt to amend for accuracy & balance are reflected on right side in memo to Bill.

Do you want to add or delete anything?

___ See emendations

_V_ Release memo but be sure OJD knows what we are doing & Cal Adams is

___ Discuss.

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

J. S. PUSTAY, Lt Gen, USAF
Assistant to the Chairman

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. _____

Handle Via

[redacted]

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

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_____ _____ _____ _____

Warning Notice

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~TOP SECRET~~ TOP SECRET C 13 MAY 1980 13

MESSAGE NO. 403 CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET NO. PAGES 6

FROM [redacted] (Name) (Extension) (Room Number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Dept/Room No.	Extension
[redacted] C	BG. J.H. JOHNSON JCS-J3	2C867	72608
	[redacted]		8-[redacted]
			15381

SENSITIVE - CONTAINS CODEWORD - EYES ONLY

REMARKS: PLEASE HOLD IN YOUR RESPECTIVE OPS CENTERS, RECIPIENTS HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND WILL PICK UP.

HANDLE VIA [redacted] CHANNELS

[redacted] PLEASE NOTIFY [redacted] C

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. ____



Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

SECRET

HANDLE VIA [redacted] CONTROL SYSTEM

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY (CODEWORD ATTACHED)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 13, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Johnson, J-3

[redacted]

FROM: Michael Berta

SUBJECT: Damage Assessment

Attached is a draft of the Iranian damage assessment. Please review the draft and send your line-in/line-out comments to Bill Odom by COB, 15 May.

Attachment

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY (CODEWORD ATTACHED)

HANDLE VIA [redacted] CONTROL SYSTEM

SECRET

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE RESCUE ATTEMPT (TS)

Summary and Conclusions

I. This assessment addresses four areas of potential compromise and damage to U.S. operational and intelligence capabilities:

-- Operational Plans

-- Photographic Systems

-- Cryptological Systems

-- Clandestine Assets and Methods [redacted]

II. Operational Plans

Summary: According to the JCS assessment, the Iranians obtained captured a complete set of plans, landing zone photographs, brevity codes, ~~messages~~, call signs, etc., which would reveal the total operational plan and command and control locations, staging points, etc. To determine the damage, JCS gave a "blue binder" containing the information that most likely fell into Iranian hands to a DIA analyst and a military planner who knew nothing of the operation. Within five hours, they were able to piece together the entire operation concept and phasing including:

-- Identification of [redacted]

-- Identification and coordinates of warehouse (staging area)

-- Location of main Joint Task Force (Comm and port [redacted]

-- Location of alternate JTF CP [redacted]

-- Involvement of [redacted]

-- DELTA reception party -- tied to the warehouse and hideout area.

In addition, media stories and security leaks also compromised the operational plan; however, only the parties that obtain access to

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]
Review on May 12, 2000
Derivative Classification by Director [redacted]

HANDLE VIA [redacted]
CONTROL SYSTEM

SECRET

the "blue binder" would be able to confirm the accuracy of the media reports. [redacted]

Conclusion: This compromise severely reduces the chances of a successful subsequent rescue attempt with the same or analogous scheme of operations. [redacted]

III. [redacted]

[redacted]

IV. Cryptological Systems

Summary: One of the helicopters left on the ground intact contained two secure voice encryptors, the Nestor and the Parkhill.

[redacted]

This helicopter was available for entry for twelve hours. It was subsequently destroyed by the Iranian Air Force. [redacted] Most probably both the Nestor and Parkhill were destroyed along with the helicopter. Both encryptors are for tactical application. The Nestor is older and was probably compromised during the Vietnam era. The Parkhill is newer and has not been previously compromised. [redacted]

V. Clandestine Assets and Methods

Summary: [redacted]

SECRET

[redacted]

[redacted]

Conclusion: Any of the previous assets or personnel could not be used again. In addition, significant restructuring of support mechanisms and personnel profiles would be required in any future operation. [redacted] would probably be less inclined to cooperate with any future U.S. rescue plan. [redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Chief, Office of Policy

6 May 1980

JCS-J 33

Attn: RGEN Johnson

(U)

-Jim

1. Thought I would try my hand at a reformatted damage assessment along the lines of our discussion yesterday.

2. My hope is that we can meet for purposes of discussion in order to bring focus and that our final output would put stress on conclusions and contain less substance - particularly as in para. 5.

3. Bill Odom has a copy.

Regards.

Jane Gaston

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMSEC Damage Assessment

(U) 1. There were a number of classified U.S. cryptosystems subject to compromise in connection with Operation RICE BOWL. [redacted] Compromised [redacted] security is not [redacted]

(U) 2. There remains one area of [redacted] A PARKHILL equipment was carried on helicopter #1. [redacted] for it is unrecoverable [redacted] however, though there is no evidence [redacted]

(U) 3. PARKHILL is a speech security device designed specifically to support the secure communications needs of tactical commanders. It is among the newest crypto-equipments entering the U.S. inventory [redacted]

(U) 4. Since the security of all U.S. [redacted] the integrity of the [redacted] designed for tactical use [redacted] on that losses may ultimately occur.

(U) 6. CONCLUSIONS

a. If the PARKHILL were acquired by the Iranians, they are judged to be unable to capitalize on this high technology equipment either to improve their own communications security or for communications intelligence purposes against U.S. targets.

b. If the PARKHILL equipment is acquired by the Soviet Union or any other technologically advanced hostile government, the loss is considered more serious.

c. Potential exploitation of PARKHILL by the Soviet Union or other advanced [illegible] probably concentrate in the area of [illegible] to offset against U.S. efforts in this endeavor. [illegible] time consuming and technically very difficult. [illegible] if the [illegible] PARKHILL cryptographic logic were to have been [illegible] this possibility is considered to represent a worst case situation.

(U) 7. In summary, the potential for significant damage to U.S. communications security is confined to the loss of PARKHILL and then only if it falls into sophisticated hands. Maximum immediate damage from all [illegible] is confined to those messages transmitted on [illegible] in support of the 24 April operation. There is no current [illegible] any other U.S. cryptographic systems operating anywhere in the world.

(U) 8. The portion of this damage assessment addressing the PARKHILL system is extremely sensitive and must be treated accordingly. There has been no public acknowledgement or discussion of a possible PARKHILL compromise. Any revelation of this fact can be expected to trigger hostile intelligence efforts to acquire this equipment or its [illegible] in the likely event that acquisition has not already been accomplished.

REQUEST/RECEIPT FOR TRANSMISSION

16 MAY 1988 18 43	SITE **D**	1902 C 2
ATE AND TIME TRANSMITTED	362 SSN NBR	DATE AND TIME RECEIVED

TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTER

OM Col W HARRIS OFFICE DESK OPG / OJCS PHONE NBR 695-2791

BJECT NSC'S DAMAGE ASSESMENT (U)

ASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET CODEWORD SENSITIVE~~ EYES ONLY PAGES TWO (2)

(U)

DELIVERY ☐ HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS

STRUCTIONS ☑ IMMEDIATELY

NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR EACH ADDEE REQUIRING AFTER HOUR DELIVERY

TRANSMIT TO

ENCY	INDIVIDUALS NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
ITE NSC	Col WILLIAM ODOM, N	NSC		

MARKS:

SD FORM 005

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT STAFF

[redacted]/128/DI

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM ODOM, NSC

SUBJECT: NSC's Damage Assessment (U)

[redacted] The following comments are offered with regard to the NSC's Summary and Conclusions of the damage assessment of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt:

a. Para II: Change to read:

"According to a Joint Staff assessment, the Iranians obtained a set of documents containing call signs, staging areas, in-country land and air routes, briefing codes, and [redacted] from which they could reconstruct the major elements of the in-country rescue plan. To determine the potential for compromise, a copy of documents and [redacted] containing the information that most likely fell into Iranian hands was provided to a DIA analyst and a military planner who knew nothing of the operation. With access to limited press reporting, they were able to piece together the general in-country operational concept and the following specific factors:

-- Identification of [redacted] as a refueling point

-- Identification and coordinates of warehouse (staging area)

-- Location of main Joint Task Force [redacted]

-- Identification of [redacted] JTF, HQ

-- Tactical Air Support was provided for

-- Identification of SFOD-DELTA and Ranger Forces

-- DELTA reception party -- tied to the hideout area and warehouse

~~EYES ONLY~~

3A30

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA [redacted]
CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b. Add the following before conclusion of Para II:

"Portions of the Plan that probably cannot be determined from the lost documents are:

— The role of the C-141 aircraft, where they were located, or if they had an in-country role.

— Although [redacted] were identified on codeword cards, the role they were to play cannot be determined.

— Identity and number of reception personnel.

— The exfiltration route from the extraction base or destination bases.

— Techniques of assault on the Embassy/Ministry of Foreign Affairs or extent of knowledge on hostage locations and references

— How supporting TACAIR was to be employed

(U) c. Para IV: Delete "probably" - sentence to read "The Nestor is older and [redacted]

Very respectfully,

Philip D. Shutler

Classified by DOD Dir TS-50001.2(M1)
Review on 15 May 2000

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

THE JOINT STAFF

[redacted]128/DI

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM ODOM, NSC

SUBJECT: NSC's Damage Assessment (U)

[redacted] The following comments are offered with regard to the NSC's Summary and Conclusions of the damage assessment of the Iranian hostage rescue attempt:

a. Para II: Change to read:

"According to a Joint Staff assessment, the Iranians obtained a set of documents containing call signs, staging areas, in-country land and air routes, briefing codes, and satellite photography, from which they could reconstruct the major elements of the in-country rescue plan. To determine the potential for compromise, a copy of documents and photography containing the information that most likely fell into Iranian hands was provided to a DIA analyst and a military planner who knew nothing of the operation. With access to limited press reporting, they were able to piece together the general in-country operational concept and the following specific factors:

- Identification of [redacted] as a refueling point
- Identification and coordinates of warehouse (staging area)
- Location of main [redacted]
- Identification of [redacted] as alternate JTF, HQ
- Tactical Air Support was provided for
- Identification of SFOD-DELTA and Ranger Forces
- DELTA reception party -- tied to the hideout area and warehouse

~~EYES ONLY~~

3A30

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b. Add the following before conclusion of Para II:

"Portions of the Plan that probably cannot be determined from the lost documents are:

— The role of the C-141 aircraft, where they were located, or if they had an in-country role.

— Although [redacted] were identified on codeword cards, the role they were to play cannot be determined.

— Identity and number of reception personnel.

— The extraction route from the extraction base or destination base.

— Techniques of assault on the Embassy/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, extent of knowledge on hostage location and references.

— How supporting TACAIR was to be employed

c. Para IV: Delete "probably" - sentence to read "The Nestor is older [redacted] compromised during the Vietnam [redacted]

Very respectfully,

Philip D. Shutler

Classified by DOD Dir TS-50001.2(M1)
Review on 15 May 2000

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted] CONF
DECL & DOWNGRADED
REVIEW ON [redacted] OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

[redacted]

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington D.C. 20505

B 215

20 NOV 1979

SECDEF HAS SEEN 11/20

Pass copies of all these to CJCS USDP ASD-ISA Bob Murray Dir Jt Staff SpAsst to CJCS

20 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
NSC ADVISOR

Attached is a think piece on Iranian reaction to the possibility of the Shah's leaving the United States for a destination other than Iran.

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 4 June 92
CL REVIEW BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGR TO [illegible]
REVW ON OADR
CITATION 1.3(a)(4)

Classified By: CIA
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

19 November 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: IF THE SHAH LEAVES THE US

1. The following is a preliminary evaluation of the reaction in Tehran if the Shah decides to leave the US in the near future. We are in the process of contacting our sources in order to solicit their views.

2. We believe that the Iranians are likely to attempt to increase pressure on the US whether the Shah leaves or stays. But his departure is likely to lead to immediate, adverse consequences for the hostages--and possibly other Americans in Tehran. So long as the Shah stays, the possibility will remain that the Iranians might be willing to release some additional hostages in hopes of gaining their ultimate goal, the extradition of the Shah, or some other significant concessions from the US. Moreover, the continued presence of the Shah might leave the door open for some future negotiations to secure the release of all the hostages or at least their transfer to Iranian government control.

3. The Shah's departure would introduce a new and dangerous uncertainty into the situation, fueling Iranian paranoia and anger over what they would regard as a US attempt to circumvent their expected victory. Moreover, an important issue in the current crisis is the Iranians' fear that somehow the US is seeking to undermine their revolution; they could very well interpret his departure from the US as the first step in a new US-backed plot to overturn the Iranian revolution. If a third country agrees to receive the Shah, the Iranians would assume that country was acting at the US' behest and was subject to US influence.

4. In the immediate aftermath of the seizure of the US Embassy both the "students" and the Khomeini regime might have interpreted the Shah's departure from the US as an act of good faith on our part. Now, his departure to a third country would increase their frustration and probably lead to an early decision to try some or all of the remaining

hostages. The "students" have already said that if the Shah leaves the US, they will put some of the hostages on trial for spying. Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council--even if they wanted to prevent the trials--seem to be powerless to stop them.

5. If the hostages are subject to trial for espionage, our concern must turn to the possible sentences that will be imposed on them. While there is an outside chance that some of the hostages will be found innocent or guilty of only minor offenses, we believe that those put on trial would already have been designated as "guilty of serious crimes against the Iranian people." We do not know what penalty is imposed by "Islamic Justice" for spying. Moreover, we have no reporting that addresses the circumstances under which any trials would be held or likely sentences.

6. We believe, however, that the following break-down covers the most likely possibilities.

A. The Khomeini regime orders the hostages removed from the Embassy compound for trial elsewhere under official auspices:

--"students" agree.

--"students" refuse and a stand-off occurs.

--"students" refuse and the regime uses force to gain its way. The hostages may be caught in cross-fire or shot by the "students" captors.

--"students" refuse and open trials under their control. (See II)

B. "Student" controlled trials held on Embassy Compound:

--they try publicly to humiliate in some fashion after lengthy media exploitation, and

a. sentence the hostages, but release them to the government for expulsion. A possible face-saving arrangement, but it assumes that the regime can control the captors and that publicity and any gestures the US is willing to make will be satisfactory.

[redacted]

b. sentence and present the regime with a fait accompli requiring it to implement the sentences or take responsibility for a less revolutionary attitude. Also a face-saver--primarily for the "students"--with the same assumptions.

c. sentence and announce that those found guilty will be imprisoned by the "students" on the Compound for the length of their sentences or until the Shah is returned.

d. sentence and execute some or all of the hostages before any outside force (regime or US) could intervene.

C. Results of trial under Khomeini regime auspices:

--trial, lengthy media exploitation, public humiliation of hostages and

a. expulsion. Again assumes that publicity and US gestures will be enough.

b. sentence to physical punishment/imprisonment/execution but delay while giving the US a final chance to return the Shah.

c. sentence to physical punishment/imprisonment/execution and implement some or all sentences without allowing the US a final opportunity to bend.

D. Possible venue of government imprisonment:

--internment on Embassy compound with

a. "students" allowed to maintain control.

b. other forces providing guards.

--internment in another private location, perhaps outside of Tehran (i.e., Qom)

--incarceration in special area of an Iranian prison or jail.

[redacted]

--imprisonment among other political prisoners, leaving US personnel fully vulnerable to the privations and harassment inflicted on Iranian detainees.

[redacted]

Iran: Central Government Budget [1]

	Actual FY 1976		Actual FY 1977		Budgeted FY 1978		Budget FY 1979	
	Billion US $	Percent Share	Billion US $	Percent Share	Billion US $	Percent Share	Billion US $	Percent Share
Total expenditures	25.8	100	31.8	100	43.3	100	34.9	100
By sector:								
General services	1.9	7	2.0	6	1.7	4	NA	NA
National defense and security	8.8	35	8.6	27	11.0	26	5.3	15
Social services	5.5	22	7.8	24	9.8	23	NA	NA
Economic services	7.7	31	11.5	36	17.1	40	NA	NA
Other	1.3	5	2.2	7	2.7	7	NA	NA
By type:								
Current	15.5	62	18.3	57	24.8	59	22.1	64
Capital	9.7	38	13.6	43	17.5	41	12.5	36
Total revenues	28.8	100	29.8	100	34.0	100	29.9	100
Oil and gas	20.2	75	21.2	71	21.9	64	21.1	71
Taxes	5.0	19	6.4	22	8.8	26	5.1	17
Income taxes	2.6	10	3.2	11	3.8	11	NA	NA
Customs duties	1.8	7	2.4	8	3.8	11	NA	NA
Consumption tax	0.5	2	0.7	2	1.0	3	NA	NA
Other	0.1	0	0.1	1	0.2	1	NA	NA
Other	0.9	3	1.2	4	1.3	4	2.5	8
Special	0.7	3	1.0	3	2.0	6	1.2	4

[1] Data converted at 70.535 rials = US $1 in 1976, 70.579 rials = US $ in 1977, and 70.475 rials = US $1 in 1978 and in 1979. The fiscal year starts on 21 March of the designated year.

[redacted]

[redacted]

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE

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(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. B-3

Handle Via

[redacted]

Channels

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92

DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources

☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO ~~Secret~~

REVIEW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Warning Notice.

Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified By: DIA

Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

(Security Classification)

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~SECRET~~

2 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Damage Assessment - Operation RICE BOWL

1. Purpose. To conduct a detailed analysis of the equipment and information that was available at Desert Track One after U.S. forces departed the scene and make a damage assessment.

2. Background.

a. TAB A depicts the units left at Desert Track One that contained classified or possibly sensitive equipment/information.

b. TAB B lists the individual units and addresses the likelihood of accessibility of classified or sensitive equipment. THis TAB also addresses helicopter #6 which remains in the desert, south of Desert Track One. All classified and sensitive information has been reported to have been removed from the helicopter.

c. TAB C depicts only those units which contained classified information/ equipment or sensitive information that possibly could have been compromised.

d. TAB D lists the documents and equipment which possibly were compromised and briefly states the damage assessed as a result.

3. Discussion. The following is a damage assessment of those classified or sensitive documents/equipments contained in TAB D:

a. JTF-79 CEOI extracts consisting of pilot's personal knee board cards containing call signs, frequencies, types of radios, location of mission sites in Iran and identifies participating units such as SFOD-D and Rangers.

(S) [redacted]

- Politically sensitive is the identification of stations/locations in foreign countries, which, in the hands of the Iranians, could be used to allege cooperation by these countries with the United States. Foreign countries identified include [redacted]

- Operational security has been seriously compromised because primary landing zones, staging bases, and other facilities needed to support the rescue operation have been identified.

ssified by: DoD Dir 5001.2(M-1)
iew: 2 May 2000

[redacted]

b. TACAIR Information consisted of aircraft call signs and frequencies plus geographic coordinates of reference points in Iran.

- Although no classification is noted on the document entitled "TACAIR INFORMATION", compromise of this document is extremely damaging to national interests as it identifies the location - geographical coordinates of numerous sites, to include the warehouse, which the raiding party was scheduled to utilize, and it indicates the possible intent to accomplish air raids by tactical aircraft.

c. CVW-8 Card of the Day, classified CONFIDENTIAL, details the call signs and frequencies in use by ships assigned to the U.S. for the period 0400, 24 April 1980 to 0400, 25 April 1980. Compromise of this document is not considered damaging to national security as the information reflected is changed daily and thus was overtaken by events.

d. Navigation Card, which details coordinates and navigational data for the route to Tehran and Manzariyeh is considered classified. The card contains no information of a politically sensitive nature. Compromise of this item would not endanger national security or interests.

e. The document identified as "Watch Schedule for Hideout Security" contains the guard watch schedule to be utilized by the team at the hideout location. Although the document is unclassified and contains no information of a politically sensitive nature, it does provide the last names of the U.S. team members involved in the watch.

f. Document entitled "Codewords for 24 April 1980" details codewords in use on day indicated which could be used to identify such things as Soviet aircraft, USAF aircraft, and specific countries such a[redacted] This information is politically sensitive as it links the above countries, although indirectly to the operation.

g. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] He can be expected to be curious but, we believe, not to the extent that he would seek Soviet assistance. Additionally, his possession of the photographs will confirm the suspicions he has expressed many times regarding the "overwhelming imaginative U.S. capability to take photographs any where in the world at any time."

[redacted]

h. Two types of classified secure voice equipment were accessible, PARKHILL and NESTOR.

- PARKHILL equipment was installed only in helicopter #1. While not permanently installed, its inconspicuous appearance amongst all the other equipment in the helicopter may have precluded its removal during the approximately twelve hours helicopter #1 was accessible.

- If it was recovered from the helicopter, [redacted]

- The loss of NESTOR equipment, carried by all of the helicopters, is considered minimal because it was compromised many times in Southeast Asia.

- Compromise of PARKHILL and NESTOR message traffic [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

- The secure IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) authentication equipment, of which at least one piece of equipment was compromised, is of minimal consequence. This equipment was compromised many times in Southeast Asia. Acquisition of the key used in this operation would not affect security of past or future transmissions.

- Two unused "one-time" crypto pads were subject to compromise [redacted]

i. USS NIMITZ communications frequency codes were carried by all the helicopters. The security compromise is minimal because the codes can be easily changed.

4. Summary. Damage resulting from equipment and information probably now in Iranian hands, with the exception of PARKHILL, is assessed as minimal.

C [redacted]

- Identification of the location in Tehran of the warehouse is damaging from an OPSEC viewpoint because it revealed the method of operation for approach to the embassy. In addition, although the immediate members of the Tehran team are now accounted for, continued investigation could lead to the "business activities" that procured the trucks and warehouse and possibly to the individuals who participated in country.

E - The identification of foreign countries [redacted] in U.S. communication codes could be used by Iran to embarrass some of the countries in the region by allegations of cooperation with the U.S.

[redacted]

-- PARKHILL was removed from helicopter #1 before it was straffed and burned and Iran chooses to give it to the Soviets.

-- PARKHILL was not removed and Iran gives Soviet technicians access to the remains [redacted]

4 Enclosures a/s

[redacted]

Unit	Classified or Sensitive Equipment/Data
C-130	Unknown. Inventory is being taken, but because this aircraft was totally destroyed, no analysis of documents/equipment is necessary.
Helicopters	Secure Voice Communication Equipment - PARKHILL (Helicopter #1 only) - NESTOR "BLUE BINDER" - EMERG LZs Location - [redacted] - Tehran maps Call Signs/Frequencies TACAIR Information Sheet Mission Plans Communications Electronics Operating Instructions (Brevity Code) USS NIMITZ Frequency Codes Flight Route Maps Other Commo Equipment - Whiskey-3 - PT-25 UHF - Unsecure radio - PSC-1 UHF - backpack radio - Motorola 350 - hand-held radio - PRC-90 - survival-radio
DELTA FORCE	Communication Equipment Special Equipment, i.e., night visual devices Weapons, i.e., [redacted] Inventory is being taken and will be available in approximately one week.

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB B

Unit	Likelihood of Accessibility of Classified or Sensitive Equipment
C-130	None - destroyed by fire.
Helos #1, 2, 4	Destroyed by IAF - accessible during the twelve hours between departure of last C-130 and the arrival of IAF aircraft.
Helo #3	None - destroyed by fire.
Helo #6	None - crew removed classified data after forced landing.
Helos #7, 8	Probably intact and accessible.
DELTA FORCE	Unknown but assumption made that some equipment left behind at desert site. Inventory of equipment lost will be available later.



~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

TAB C

Unit	Classified or Sensitive Data Likely Accessible
Helos #1, 2, 4 (About 12 hours)	Secure Voice Equipment - PARKHILL - NESTOR "BLUE BINDER" (contained photographs) Call Signs/Frequencies Mission Plans
Helos #7, 8 (Intact)	"BLUE BINDER" Call Signs/Frequencies Mission Plans
DELTA FORCE	Unknown: Preliminary inventory indicates the loss of the following communication equipment: (all unclassified).

Item	Quanity
AN/PRC-77	1
AN/PRC-66	2
PSC-1 (prototype satellite terminal)	1
PT-25	3
AN/PRC-74	6
AN/WSC-3	1
KOI-18	1

(c) [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

TAB D

ASSESSED DAMAGE

	Classified Compromise	Sensitive
- Secure Voice Equipment		
-- PARKHILL	[redacted]	N/A
-- NESTOR	[redacted]	N/A
- "BLUE BINDER"	[redacted]	[redacted]
-- [redacted]		
-- [redacted]		
- JTF-79 CEOI Extract	Minimal	Foreign Sites (Includes foreign stations)
- Brevity Codes	Minimal	N/A
- Route Books with Maps	Minimal	N/A
- CVW-8 "Card of the Day"	Minimal	N/A
- Call Sign Extracts	Minimal	Identifies locatic [redacted] other countries.
- Watch Schedule/Hideout	Minimal	Last names of so helo crews. (Ident fication of perso
- USS NIMITZ Frequencies	Minimal	N/A
- TACAIR Info	Major OPSEC	Identifies wareh exact location. Re veals "business activity" could l to people involve
- Pilot Mission Briefing Notes	Minimal	N/A

[redacted]

ROUTING			
	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
	President Carter		
3			
4			

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

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(Security Classification)

B 216

CONTROL NO. TCS 4277-79

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C

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
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REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassified ON: OADR

COPY NO. 1E

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

20 November 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CHAIRMAN, JCS
NSC ADVISOR

Attached are our latest evaluations of the readiness of each of the Iranian armed services.

STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

[redacted] 1E

11/20

HTB

17 November 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Status of Iranian Navy

The operational capability of Iran's Navy* has declined steadily during 1979 because of poor maintenance and a lack of military discipline. The Iranians appear incapable of maintaining the ships on their own and [redacted] general shortage of parts has adversely affected the operational readiness of the ships. In addition, political interference, and the attendant confusion in lines of authority [redacted] bases, has hampered the Navy's effectiveness [redacted]

The Navy has held two exercises since the summer, but they were not large scale. In September, the exercise was a meager show, with fewer than 10 ships--mostly patrol craft--participating. [redacted]

This past week, the Navy held another exercise [redacted]

*An attachment is a map showing the Iranian Naval Bases and our estimate of the ships based there.

[redacted]

The Iranian Navy's nine guided-missile patrol boats, which were purchased from France, probably are in the best condition of all Iranian ships. We believe that the French continue to assist in maintaining these boats at their home port of Bushehr. The Iranians successfully fired a Harpoon missile from one of these boats in October 1978 and probably could fire others now. [redacted] last summer [redacted] only one of the these ships was armed with missiles--the missiles were said to be stored at Bandar Abbas. [redacted]

The Navy also has three destroyers, [redacted] Two destroyers are of US origin and one is a former British destroyer. These ships are equipped with Standard surface-to-surface missiles purchased from the US. Each ship has four launchers and carries one reload for each launcher. Maintainance of these missiles is difficult, however, and the systems probably have deteriorated since the advisors were withdrawn in early-1979. [redacted]

The Iranian Navy has a very limited mine-clearing capability which is comprised to two coastal minesweepers and two smaller inshore minesweepers. They are based at Khorramshahr--a facility near the Shatt al Arab--the river which forms part of the border between Iran and Iraq--primarily to counter possible mining of the river by Iraq. [redacted] would rate the mine-sweeping capability of these ships as poor because they receive the lowest priority in the Navy for personnel and training. The Navy also has six RH-53D minesweeping helicopters which are based at Bushehr. All of these helicopters have been grounded, however because of poor maintenance and a shortage of spare parts. We do not believe that the Navy has any mines or mine-laying capability of its own. [redacted]

*A fifth minesweeper is based in the Caspian Sea and is used primarily as a training ship.

1E

Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
16 November 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Status of Iranian Fighter Aircraft and Air Defense Systems

The Iranian Air Force has remained intact since the fall of the Shah, but its ability to operate effectively has been severely impaired. Maintenance and supply problems have reduced the number of serviceable aircraft and curtailed pilot training. Although flying squadrons have remained fully manned and pilots report for duty [redacted]

Revolutionary committe[redacted] control most Air Force units. [redacted]

[redacted] F-14 fighters would be less of a threat to hostile aircraft than its F-4 and F-5 aircraft, which are more numerous, in better condition, and more familiar to Air Force personnel. Most of Iran's surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs) probably are not operational [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Even though the F-4s and F-5s have been in Iran's inventory for about 10 years, we are uncertain how many the Air Force could effectively put in the air in an emergency situation. The Iranians apparently are experiencing shortages of spare parts for and maintenance difficulties with both aircraft. [redacted]

F-14 Fighter Aircraft and Phoenix Missiles. The cutoff of spare parts from the US and the collapse of the Iranian logistic system has led to cannibalizing F-14s and support equipment to keep some of Iran's F-14s flying.[2] [redacted]

1. *These aircraft are generally equipped with the same electronic and armament subsystems as are comparable US aircraft.* [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Another factor limiting the use of Iran's F-14s is that only a few Iranians have received extensive training on the plane. When the Shah was overthrown, less than 100 pilots and instructor-pilots had been trained to fly the F-14. Of these, reportedly some 20 instructor-pilots had completed intercept training, and only three had finished the complete air defense/air superiority course and were operationally qualified. Only some 15 other instructors had completed the initial training as weapon systems officers, and none of these had advanced beyond the first phase, which covered only simple intercepts, i.e., firing one missile at a time against a single target. [redacted]

Because little training has been conducted since the revolution, we estimate that the already limited skills of pilots and weapons officers have atrophied. [redacted]

The Iranian Air Force has only marginal capability to destroy opposing aircraft with Phoenix missiles. [redacted] (TSU NF)

[redacted] questioned the reliability of the missile. Other sources have noted that, because the ground-based test equipment for the missiles has not been functioning properly, maintenance checks have not been performed that would attest to their reliability. The F-14, however, contains electrical circuits permitting the flight crew to check the missile from the cockpit. Presumably Iranian crews could determine if they had a malfunctioning missile before they entered combat. [redacted]

[redacted]

Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (SAMs). [redacted] The Iranians may be able to fire a few missiles in an emergency situation, but they were having difficulty mastering the I-HAWK even before the revolution. The status of Iran's British-made Rapier low-altitude SAM system for airfield defense is not known. [redacted]

Air Defense Radar Network. Many of Iran's radars probably are partially or completely inoperative, but coverage is still active in some areas. [redacted]



[redacted]

[redacted]

ITEM NO. 1 F

11/20 KB

19 November 1979

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Status of Iranian Ground Forces

[redacted]

[redacted] Ground force capabilities remain limited despite some improvement in discipline and operational readiness in recent months. Army units [redacted] and are experiencing maintenance and supply problems. Several units, particularly those fighting against the Kurds, suffer from low morale. [redacted]

The military would be hard pressed to defend against a full-scale Iraqi or Soviet attack. In the northwest, the Army's position would deteriorate quickly should the Kurds press their attacks. The ground forces appear capable of suppressing Arab opposition in the southwest oil fields as long as Iraq does not increase its aid to the dissidents. (S/NF)

Ground Forces

The regular Army numbers about 150,000 men, down from approximately 300,000 prior to the revolution. The bulk of the Army's combat strength is garrisoned along Iran's border with Iraq and the Soviet Union [redacted] Many artillery and support units are near the larger towns in the interior. Except for numerous small units dispatched to fight the Kurds, no major ground force redeployments or exercises have occurred since the revolution. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Although the Army is well equipped [redacted] as of late October, the Army had been severely weakened by poor maintenance and a lack of spare parts. We expect this situation to deteriorate further with the cut off of US supplies. [redacted]

Morale is low among many Army units [redacted] particularly true for those units fighting in the northwest against the Kurds. Units generally seem slow to carry out directives from Tehran and small numbers of officers and troops have been executed for refusing to obey orders. Although the Revolutionary Committees have assumed a lower profile within the ground forces, they continue to interfere with the military chain of command. [redacted]

Dismal as the Army's current situation is, it does represent a slight improvement over the chaotic conditions prevailing earlier this year. The Army has demonstrated the capability to deploy and support units in Kurdish areas despite severe logistic problems; units continue to fight despite low morale. These improvements are probably only temporary. Capabilities likely will begin to decline again as logistic and supply problems become more serious. [redacted]

Two paramilitary forces, the Gendarmerie and the Revolutionary Guards, supplement the Army. Both groups are lightly armed. The Gendarmerie, approximately 75,000 strong before the revolution, are responsible mainly for border and rural security. Their ranks have been reduced by desertions, however, particularly in Kurdish areas. The Revolutionary Guard is composed mainly of ethnic Persians fiercely loyal to Khomeini. The Guard reportedly has about 20,000 full-time members and has assumed the bulk of the security duties in Tehran, in Kurdish provinces, and in the southwest. The Guards have caused considerable resentment throughout Iran against the government because of their brutal treatment of the citizenry.

Ground Forces in Selected Areas

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

The Revolutionary Guards are the most active security force in the city. [redacted] there were 4,000 Revolutionary Guards garrisoned in Tehran with some 3,000 additional Guards undergoing training at military installations in the city. The Guards provide security for many important installations and are the regime's quick reaction force for disturbances in Tehran. (S/NF)

Northwest Iran. The position of the ground forces is p[redacted] troops [redacted] stationed in the area are completely occupied in suppressing the Kurds. An additional [redacted] troops and [redacted] Revolutionary Guards have been brought in as reinforcements. Kurdish rebel forces [redacted] and remain largely intact despite the government's offensive early this fall. The Kurds are engaged in interdicting roads, ambushing convoys, and [redacted] military outposts.

[redacted]

Southwest Oil Fields. The ground forces are capable of suppressing Arab opposition in the southwest oil producing areas as long as Iraq does not increase its assistance to the dissidents. An armored division [redacted] is the main government force in the province. It was reinforced by [redacted] Revolutionary Guards during the summer. The Guards have concentrated on controlling the local population and protecting oil facilities while the armored division concentrates on securing the border with Iraq. [redacted]

Arab opposition in the southwest is much less developed than the Kurdish rebellion further north. Small groups of Arab guerrillas are mining roads and sabotaging oil facilities. Occasionally they ambush small groups of Revolutionary Guards. Iraq is supplying arms to the guerrillas and began providing guerrilla training to Iranian Arabs this summer. Iraq has used militia and special forces units from its armed forces to support Palestinians in Lebanon and could decide to introduce similar forces into Iran in support of the Arabs. Iranian forces would be hard pressed to control the situation if the Arab guerrillas were reinforced by Iraqi "volunteers."

[redacted]

Regular Iraqi ground forces have not assumed a threatening posture toward Iran. Were they to do so, the Iranians could not successfully defend the oil fields against a full-scale Iraqi attack. Iraqi forces could achieve a four to one advantage in men and equipment over Iranian units defending the oil fields and still have sufficient forces to hold the rest of the border with Iran. In the past, Iran counted on its superior Air Force to offset Iraq's edge on the ground, but the Air Force is likely to be little help in its current weakened condition. Moreover, Iranian armored units have no mobile surface-to-air missile system like the Iraqi SA-6, leaving them vulnerable to Iraqi air strikes. The Iranians do have sufficient air power to inflict serious damage on Iraqi oil facilities. [redacted]

Attachments

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Iran's Oil Revenue Needs

In a just-released Congressional Research Service study, [redacted] concludes that "3.3 million b/d appear likely to become over time more a floor than a ceiling" for the Iranian oil production. We believe the study (a) understates Iran's oil income and the potential for further oil price increases, (b) overstates Iran's hard currency needs, and (c) does not take into account other steps the Tehran government can take to cut revenue requirements, such as devaluation of the rial.

Oil Revenue Needs: With anticipated expenditures of $28 billion at most and non-oil income of $5 billion, the Iranian Government will need to export about 2.5 million b/d of crude (at today's prices) to satisfy budgetary requirements. This export requirement would be cut further by any future oil price increases, as seems likely. Besides cutting expenditures further, a budget shortfall could also be filled by some combination of (a) local borrowing achieved by increased commercial bank reserve requirements, (b) devaluation, which increases the rial revenue derived from oil, (c) drawdown of foreign exchange reserves, which total about $12 billion, and (d) the outright printing of rials.

These factors, particularly the likelihood of continued real oil price increases, lead us to believe that the Iranians can get by with substantially less than 3.3 million b/d in crude and product exports. Through some combination of an austere budget, the drawdown of some reserves, the printing of some rials, and the continued increase in oil prices, it is possible to envision revenue needs requiring less than 2 million b/d in petroleum exports in the next year or so.

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

Government Budget: In August, Iran's Revolutionary Council added $312 million to the Bazargan government budget request, bringing the proposed budget to $34.9 billion in fiscal 1979 (21 March to 20 March 1980). This budget, however, is in effect a paper exercise, with little likelihood that the projected expenditure level will be reached. Half the fiscal year had already passed when the budget came out, and by then almost all development projects had ceased and were under review. Settlements of past claims, renewals or cancellations of old contracts, and negotiations of new agreements will probably take another three to six months at least. Thus, much of the $12.8 billion slated for capital expenditures is unlikely to be spent. Current expenditures are set at $22.1 billion. The bulk of these payments would be in rials and hence that would not require hard currency income in a crisis situation. The government, for instance, could print rials, although it would then have to cope with potentially severe inflationary pressures. In sum, we believe that government expenditures not exceeding $28 billion a year are highly probable.

Direct Hard Currency Needs: Hard currency needs for financing merchandise and service imports are going to be considerably smaller than government revenue requirements for budget purposes. Merchandise imports for 1979 are likely to be on the order of $7-$8 billion, down from around $16 billion in 1978. Net services may total $1 billion, while hidden capital outflows may add another $5 billion at most to hard currency needs. Overall, Iran will need less than $15 billion, while oil revenue should amount to more than $21 billion this year.

(S) Oil Revenue: Current Iranian oil prices average $20.95 per barrel on term contracts. Spot oil prices now run as high as $45 per barrel. With its mix of spot, term, and product sales, Iran is earning an estimated $80 million a day in revenue. This assumes 500,000 b/d spot sales, 2.7 million b/d term crude sales, and 200,000 b/d in product sales. Yearly revenue at these levels would total over $29 billion. A further oil price increase in December or next year would, of course, increase oil revenue. [redacted] a 1 million b/d drop in Iranian oil exports--other things being equal--would cause at least an average $5 per barrel oil price increase. Thus, if term crude exports dropped by 1 million b/d, Iran would still be able to earn around $70 million a day, or $25 billion a year.

Non-Oil Income: Given the present state of the economy, non-oil income from tax collections, tariffs, and government agency profits should be considerably lower than in past years. The Bazargan government estimated this income at $8.8 billion, about the same as in fiscal year 1977. Non-oil income may, however, be as small as $5 billion.

[redacted]

[redacted]

B21

AC-130 STRIKE

AGAINST

SEPAH SQ PTT ANTENNA

OBJECTIVE: Render Sepah Sq. PTT antenna inoperable.

CONCEPT: One AC-130H gunship ingresses low level to target from the east using Doshan Tappeh airdrome and Bamavand Rd. to assist navigation in locating pinpoint target. Once over target, gunship establishes left orbit and commences attack with 20mm guns (2). Two orbits expected to render antenna system inoperable.

(C) TACTICS:

A

Ingress Altitude: [redacted] ft. AGL
Attack Altitude: [redacted] ft. AGL
Firing Zone: 40 degree fan maximum north and south
Bank Angle: 30 degrees
Rate of Fire: 2500 rds. per min.
Firing Time: 10 seconds per burst 1/
Orbits/Time on Target: 2/4 minutes
Rounds Employed: 3,000 (20mm)

1/ Aim point is base of tower. Pilot walks burst in pattern up then down antenna slightly to ensure total burst coverage (antenna 70-75 ft high)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 NOV 97
DERIVATIVE FM BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☑ DOWNGRADED TO [redacted]
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

ACCURACY:

Burst Pattern: 5 mils (30 ft cone)
PK: 0.956 ea. 750 rd. burst

EXPECTED DAMAGE:

Collateral: Minimal
Antenna: Inoperable

RATIONALE: Antenna dish orientation requires two attack fans (tab) to minimize collateral damage. 20mm guns are area weapons. Firing tests against QH-50 drones resulted in their complete destruction after single burst. No weapon reloading required enabling continuous fire each fan while minimizing on-target time. 20mm projectiles also minimize collateral damage to roofs of commercial/residential area in portion of south fan. High probability of destruction expected against any electrical cabling associated with antenna, antenna dishes and horns rendering system inoperable. Secondary munition is 40mm misch metal if required.

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

[redacted] 2 MINUTES PER ORBIT [redacted]



- NORTH FAN = PARKING AREA & STREET
- SOUTH FAN = COMMERCIAL & SOME RESIDENTIAL
- FIRES APPROX. 800 RDS. EACH BURST USING VERTICAL WALK (20MM)
- FOUR BURSTS EXPENDS AMMUNITION
- 20MM MINIMIZES COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO ROOF TOPS
- USE 40 MM MISCH METAL AGAINST ANY UNDAMAGED PORTIONS IF REQUIRED
- 15-20 RDS. EACH FAN BURST

1 mil = 1 FT per 1000 FT

(U)

(U) Table 1. 20MM Probability of Kill (U)

	Empty Truck		Truck with Combustable Load (POL)	
	ROUNDS	PK	ROUNDS	PK
Center of burst 5 mils from target with 6,000 foot slant range	50	.037	50	.635
	100	.120	100	.872
	750	.956	750	1.000
Center of burst 5 mils from target with 11,000 foot slant range	50	.005	50	.243
	100	.016	100	.445
	750	.397	750	.990
			1500	1.000

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	SOD CONTROL NUMBER
CJCS	[redacted]	B-228

SUBJECT:	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
Iran Reintroduction of Media				X

REMARKS

The attached memorandum provides recommendations regarding the reintroduction of American news personnel into Iran. The recommendations are listed in three paragraphs. The first recommends against the reintroduction, the second provides a list of possible concessions to be sort from the Irans in exchange for allowing the reintroduction; the third provides suggestions regarding the status of the three Americans held in the Iranian Ministry of Affairs.

ACTION OFFICER	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
[redacted]	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
LTC, USAF	J- P						
SOD, J-3	EXEC						
EXT 55078	TNJ CHF						
	VCCPB						
	CCPB						
DATE OF PREPARATION							
29 FEB 80							

~~TOP SECRET~~

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

B-228

29 February 1980

Jim - I discussed with Sec Def. He agrees you have some good points. We will consider if any further movement towards reengaging Iran recognizing how difficult it will be.

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Iran, Reintroduction of Media (~~TS~~) (U)

1. (U) (~~TS~~) The reintroduction of selected American media into Iran will complicate any future rescue operations by increasing the number of potential "replacement" hostages available. I recommend against it.

2. (U) (~~TS~~) However if the decision is made to reintroduce American media recommend all or most of the following conditions be posed to the Government of Iran prior to reintroduction.

a. Guarantee of personnel safety.

b. Guarantee of freedom of movement.

c. Guarantee of unrestricted departure.

d. Guarantee of no-press censorship.

e. Guarantee of immediate access to all American hostages by media reps and American medical team.

f. Guarantee of scheduled weekly access to all hostages and USG personnel being held in MFA.

g. Recognition of Mr. Laingen, and party as official USG representatives with full diplomatic immunity including freedom of movement and freedom of private communication and continuing access to the compound hostages.

h. Recognition of the fact that the failure to fulfill any and all of these guarantees is a purposeful abrogation of the civil and religious responsibilities of the Government of Iran.

3. (U) (~~TS~~) If the decision to allow American media to reenter Iran is made without extracting any of the above suggested or alternate concessions recommend that every effort be made to clarify the official position of the Iranian Government regarding the status of Mr. Laingen, Howland and Tomseth. It is readily apparent that the militants do not control the fate of these three gentlemen, but the civil government, particularly the foreign ministry, does. The return of Mr. Laingen, Howland, and Tomseth to the USA for "discussions" or their amalgamation with the compound hostages would substantially ease any future rescue operations.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
LTGEN USA

~~TOP SECRET~~

J-257 (U)

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

SUBJECT: Iran Situation Report as of 1800 25 Nov 79 (U)

(S/NOFORN) Significant Events:

[redacted] In a melange of statements given in press interviews, Bani-Sadr indicated:

--- Iranian-US relations have not only been severed but have also become hostile.

--- He does not believe that the US will attempt to free the hostages by military action.

--- The US must return the Shah, as it is "too late" now for any plan to send him to a third country.

--- A US declaration condemning the Shah's alleged crimes would give Iranian authorities "a good disposition for discussions."

- [redacted] Significant Military Activities:

[redacted]

[redacted]

Classified By: DIA
Declassified On: OADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO _____
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

It appears that some effort may have been made to disperse naval vessels from the vulnerable river area into the Persian Gulf coastal bases.

-- (U) Press reports indicate Sirjan Naval Support Base and the Iranian Air Force have been placed on full alert. Sirjan provides support services for the Iranian Navy.

[redacted]

-- (U) Iranian Oil Minister Moinfar threatened to cut off oil shipment to countries that permit the US to freeze Iranian assets in overseas branches of US banks.

-- (S/NOFORN) Iranian radio has been surfacing reports that the Kurdish Democratic Party has agreed to a 20-day cease-fire because it allegedly supports Khomeini's action of confronting the US. [redacted]

[redacted]

-(U) Significant Iranian Propaganda:

-- (U) Various Iranian spokesmen continue to harp on the alleged US-Israeli conspiracy involved in the takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca in an effort to inflame Moslem opinion against the US.

-- (U) Iranians are also claiming that they have the support of Iranian Kurds and Afghani dissidents for their actions against the US.

-(U) Late Item:

-- (U) A press report of Iraqi origin indicates that on 23 November a passenger aircraft loaded with Iranian pilgrims returning from the Haj was almost shot down by Iranian air defense forces as it tried to land at Bandar Abbas. The aircraft was reportedly engaged by Iranian ground and naval forces because it had not given advanced notice of its intent to

land. If true, this report suggests a considerable level of vigilance and nervousness among the Iranian air-defense elements.

Distribution:

DR
DD
CS
VP
JS
JSI
JSI-5
DDI
ITF
JOD
[redacted]
LTG Shutler
RADM Hanson
Director, J-5

[redacted]

15-296

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

SUBJECT: Iran Situation Report as of 0500, 26 November 1979 (U)

- [redacted] Significant Events:

[redacted] Iran's announcement on 23 November that it will not repay its foreign debt has caused widespread confusion among international banks holding letters of credit and among firms with contracts to export goods to Iran. [redacted]

- [redacted] Significant Military Activities:

[redacted]

-- (S) Carrier Task Force 70 reported an Iranian war ship was located in the Gulf of Oman, just south of the Hormuz Strait, on 25 November. [redacted]

- (U) Comments on Iranian Press:

-- (U) Oil Minister Moinfar today issued a threat saying that any country that opposes the Islamic Republic of Iran will be left without Iranian petroleum.

-- (U) The Arab People's Congress yesterday issued an appeal to all Arab countries to break off all political, diplomatic and economic relations with the US. (Note: The Congress was founded in Libya in 1977 by the Rejectionist Front composed of Arab states opposed to Egypt's peace moves with Israel. They include: Libya, Algeria, Syria, South Yemen and the PLO.)

[redacted]

Classified by Multiple Sources

Declassify on

Review on 26 Nov 89

Code word

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 NOV 92
BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

[redacted]

26 November 1979

WORKING PAPER FOR J-3

SUBJECT: Significant Military Activities (U)

[redacted]

Carrier Task Force 70 reported an Iranian war ship was located in the Gulf of Oman, just south of the Hormuz Straits, on 25 November.

[redacted]

Classified by Multiple Sources

Declassify on

Review on ~~26 Nov 89~~

[redacted]

Code word

~~SECRET~~ B-24

bject: [redacted] (SEAL Option) A

ncept: One Seal platoon paradrop into DZ located
djacent to [redacted] Platoon splits into two squads
d squads place demolition charges on critical [redacted]
mponents. Squads withdraw to DZ and are recovered
Helo from [redacted]

rces Required: 1 SEAL platoon (located [redacted])
1 MC-180 aircraft (located [redacted])
1 SH-3G (located on [redacted])

A,E

ces: [redacted] hours from notification until departure for target
[redacted] hours en route to objective
[redacted] hours on target

A

utes: [redacted]

A,E

Tankers will be required

ues/Problems: Tanker support would be required to operate from [redacted]

E

Unable to rehearse helo recovery with helo that will conduct actual operation.

Crew duty period will have to be extended. Augmented crew will be required.

~~SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 NOV 92
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Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

B-271

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REVIEW ON 04D2
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

[redacted]VZCZCDVA256
OO RUEAIIF RUEAIIJ
DE RUEIZJC #0122 1441545
ZNY TTTTT
O 231530Z MAY 80
FM JTF//SNOWBIRD/J2
TO RUEAIIF/[redacted]
RUEAIIJ//DELTA
BT
~~SECRET~~ S E C R E T CITE J3 0122

SUBJ: HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT UPDATE

1. ACCORDING TO VARIOUS MEDIA SOURCES, HOSTAGES ARE BEING DETAINED AT SEVENTEEN LOCATIONS. NEITHER THIS OFFICE, [redacted] DIA, NOR DOS HOLD INFORMATION TO SUPPORT SUCH A DISPERSION.

2. REVIEW OF ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION OF A CREDITABLE NATURE, EVEN WHEN STRETCHED TO THE LIMIT, [redacted]

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0122 [redacted]

4. ALL OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION, FRAGMENTARY AS IT IS, IS SUPPORTIVE OF HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FIVE MONTHS.

(A) THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF THE HOSTAGE SITUATION THE MILITANTS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO LOSE OR SHARE CONTROL OF THE HOSTAGES WITH ANY EXTERNAL ENTITY.

(B) IN THE PAST, THE MILITANTS, CLERICS, AND IRANIAN OFFICIALS HAVE [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

DIA, Support B-25 258

SUBJECT: Intelligence Collection and Reporting Support Plan for Iranian Military Contingency - Project RICE BOWL (TS)

1. The purpose of this plan is to provide a coherent flow of intelligence information to the JCS and operating forces involved in executing contingency operations regarding Iran. The plan is organized into four phases under the codename Project RICE BOWL.

2. Intelligence tasking and reporting associated with this operation will be keyed administratively to the codename RICE BOWL in order to maintain proper flow of the information and appropriate security control. Intelligence collection operations will be tasked in four time-relevant phases. These are:

PHASE I - Pre-Operation Buildup Monitoring

PHASE II - Pre-Operation Execution Monitoring

PHASE III - Execution of the Operation

PHASE IV - Post Operation Monitoring.

At Attachment 1 is a list of indicators to be monitored to detect Iranian or other hostile states' prior knowledge of U.S. military operations or options being considered against Iran. Appendices A, B and C contain detailed tasking instructions and requirements for [redacted] relating to this plan. Appendix D details the reporting procedures.

3. What follows is an outline of the [redacted] activities that would be in effect under each of the four time-sequenced phases of this plan.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 NOV 92
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REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

PHASE I - Pre-Operation Buildup

[redacted]

B. Fleet assets in Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean will be tasked for priority reporting on Soviet and other foreign reconnaissance activities in the vicinity of Diego Garcia.

C. Report indications of actual movement of U.S. hostages.

[redacted]



[redacted]

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CONTROL SYSTEMS ONLY

PHASE II - Pre-Operation Execution

[redacted]

B. Continue to report indications of actual movement of U.S. hostages.

C. Continue accelerated reporting from Fleet on Soviet monitoring and reconnaissance activities.

[redacted]

PHASE III - Execution of the Operation

A. Continue as in Phase I and II with foreign press reporting.

[redacted]

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of U.S. actions

[redacted]

PHASE IV - Post Operation

All sources will focus on reporting international reactions to U.S. operations in Iran with special emphasis on:

- Reaction of the Moslem world to U.S. operations with special concern for expanded acts of terrorism or internal political turmoil.
- Military and political reactions of the Soviet Union.

1 Attachment
Indicator List w/3
Appendices, A,B,C
to follow

[redacted] PAPER

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HANDLE VIA [redacted]

SUBJECT: Warning Indicator List - Project RICE BOWL

1. PURPOSE: To identify for intelligence collection and reporting purposes key indicators of Iranian or other "hostile states" to include USSR, Iraq, Afghanistan [redacted] having prior knowledge of U.S. military options and operations focused against Iran.

INDICATORS

SOURCES OF REPORTING

A. Ministry of Defense Indicators

1. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

3.

4. [redacted]

5. [redacted]

6. [redacted]

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APPENDIX A

Project RICE BOWL

HUMINT Tasking Plan

1. (U) ~~(S/NOFORN/LIMDIS)~~ HUMINT collectors to include CIA/FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Intercept Service), COMNAVINTCOM, CINCPACFLT, and Naval Ocean Surveillance Center (NOSIC) will be tasked as appropriate to provide information on worldwide reactions to U.S. operations. An Alert Message (Tab A) will be sent to advise the addressees of the purpose and activation of Project RICE BOWL at such time as approved by the Iran Task Force (ITF).

2. ~~(S/NOFORN/LIMDIS)~~ HUMINT tasking will be initiated only during the final or post-operations phase. It will be focused on assessing the political/military/economic reactions of the world community. Reporting will emphasize the following types of information.

a. Political/military reactions of the USSR, Iraq, Afghanistan and [redacted] And L-57A

b. Political reactions of U.S. allies.

c. Reactions of Third World to U.S. operations.

d. Threats and terrorist activities in other countries, particularly from Moslem countries, which could endanger U.S. personnel in those areas.

3. (U) Reporting procedures will be in accordance with guidance in Appendix D - Operational Intelligence Reporting Procedures.

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FROM: SSO DIA

TO: COMNAVINTCOM

CINCPAC

CINCPACFLT

CINCEUR

CINCUSAREUR

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN LIMDIS

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL BROADCAST

[redacted]

SUBJ: PROJECT RICE BOWL

1. (U) ~~(S/NOFORN~~/LIMDIS) PROJECT RICE BOWL IS ACTIVATED UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE FOR HUMINT COLLECTION REPORTING. THIS CODENAME APPLIES TO U.S. OPERATIONAL PLANS/INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE IRANIAN-U.S. SITUATION AND WILL BE USED FOR ALL COMMUNICATIONS, REPORTING OR REFERENCES TO THESE PLANS.

2. (U) ~~(S/NOFORN/LI~~MDIS) EACH HUMINT TASKING IN SUPPORT OF RICE BOWL WILL INCLUDE REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS, I.E., CONTINUOUS, PERIODIC OR ONE-TIME REPORTING OR NEGATIVE REPLIES. ALL RESPONSES TO TASKING

6532110

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BOOK

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

WILL BE BY MESSAGE IR, WITH AN OPS IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE, ADDRESSED TO DIA ATTN: ITF [IRAN TASK FORCE], [redacted]

ALL MESSAGE RESPONSES WILL CARRY AS THE SUBJECT: PROJECT RICE BOWL AND WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST SECRET/NOFORN/LIMDIS.

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01 OF 04								

BOOK

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: SSO DIA

[redacted]

INFO:

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS

SUBJECT: URGENT SPOER -79 - PROJECT RICE BOWL {TS}

1.A. ~~{TS}~~ JUSTIFICATION

IN VIEW OF THE DETERIORATING SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IRANIAN SEIZURE OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN AND ITS PERSONNEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF THE U.S. MILITARY ACTION MUST BE CONSIDERED.

ANY MOVEMENT OF U.S. FORCES INTO THE AREA MUST AVOID DETECTION [redacted] THE TACTICAL COMMANDERS MUST BE AWARE [redacted] FOR PLANNING TO AVOID ALLOWING ANY PRE-WARNING OR ALERTING INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN, AND TO AVOID THREAT SYSTEMS IN THE AREA.

B. {S} GEOGRAPHICAL AREA:

DISTR

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

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SIGNATURE

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DD FORM 1 DEC 70 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 JUL 53, WHICH WILL BE USED.

02 04

ALL OF IRAN, IRAQ, KUWAIT, AND THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE GULF OF OMAN. PRIORITY-1 IS ASSIGNED.

C. [redacted] WEAPONS [redacted] INTEREST:

LAND AREA: IRAN, AS LISTED BELOW AND OTHER [redacted]

B407Z, B391Z, N309Z, N314B, N325A, N325C, N325E,
N329A, N330Z, N331Z, N332Z, N337H, N343B, N367Z, N386Z,
N387Z, N402Z, N407Z, N442Z, N459Z, N467B, N476A, N476B,
N478A, N641Z, J301Z, J307Z, AND 0417Z

LAND AREA: IRAQ - B301Z, B301B, B316A, B318A, B321Z, B323Z,
B324B, B328A, B328B, B329A, B335Z, B336Y, B341B, B348Z, B374Z,
B381Z, B387Z, B392Z, B393Z, B417Z, B418Z, F308Z, AND J332Z

WATER AREA: [redacted]

[redacted]

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03 04

A374A, C311A, C314Y, C316Z, C318Z, E301Z, E302Z, F303A,
F311Y, F313D, F313E, F313F, F316A, F317A, F318A, G301Z,
G302Z, K301A, K308A, K308D, K310Z, K321Z, K338D, K338E,
K340Z, K343A, K350A, K350B, K386Z, N329C, N372Z, 0302Z,
0304Z, 0306A, 0306B, 0309B, 0310Z, 0317Z, 0318A, 0319Z,
0324Z, 0350Z, 0351Z, 0359Z, 0361Z, 0369Z, 0374Z, 0402Z,
0419Z, 0430Z, 0434B, 0436Z, 0440Z, 0441Z, 0442Z, 0451Z,
0453Z, 0490Z, 0502A, 0502B, 0504A, 0504B, 0520Z, 0524Z,
0536Z, 0539Z, 0540Z, 0548A, 0548B, 0548C, A324Z, A334Y,
A341Z, A377Z, A377B, C308Z, C315Z, C317Z, C325Z, C327Z,
C328Y, C345Z, C346Z, C352Z, F313A, F313G, F313H, F313J,
F319Z, T892Z, T893Z.

[redacted]

04 04

(U) I. DURATION OF SPOER: DURATION OF OPERATION, TO BE NOTIFIED LATER.

(C) J. USERS: REPORTING MAY BE IN [redacted] FORMAT UNLESS THAT WILL CAUSE A DELAY. PRIMARY REPORTING IS TO DIA IRANIAN TASK FORCE.

2. (~~S~~) REQUEST ADVISE PROJECT RICE BOWL COMMANDER, DIA IRANIAN TASK FORCE [redacted] OF CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO THIS SPOER.

APPENDIX D

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTING PROCEDURES

1. (U) ~~(TS/LIMDIS)~~ Operational intelligence reporting in support of the Iranian military operations will be in the same four phases as outlined for collectior For reporting purposes only, Phase I - Pre-operation Buildup is subdivided into two segments - the planning and the pre-positioning stages. All reportir will be transmitted via established security means under the codename RICE BO

2. ~~(TS/LIMDIS)~~ The planning stage of Phase I will continue until start of deployment of U.S. military force elements.

[redacted]

a. [redacted]

c. [redacted]

d. [redacted]

e. Commands will report to DIA for transmittal to the JCS Planning Staff.

f. JCS Planning Staff will relay essential data/material to force planning cells.

3. (~~TS/LIMBIS~~) The second segment - pre-positioning - of Phase [redacted]

[redacted] Reporting emphasis will be the same as above.

a. [redacted]

[redacted] will report by TTY to appropriate SSO or DIA for relay via [redacted] direct TTY to JTF Headquarters and principal force staging locations.

c. [redacted]

d. [redacted]

e. Commands will report to DIA for transmittal to the JCS Planning Staff.

f. JTF Headquarters will relay by broadcast mission essential data to all principal force staging locations.

4. (~~TS/LIMBIS~~) The Second Phase - Pre-Operation Execution - [redacted]

[redacted] Reporting will be the same as before with the exception that primary emphasis will be placed upon reporting of detection of U.S. launch force or its execution of operations. Reporting will be via the

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fastest reliable secure means to JTF Headquarters for conversion of mission essential data to a brevity code for broadcast transmission to operating elements. Priority for transmission will be placed on information indicating c tection of U.S. force launch activity and location of U.S. hostages.

a. [redacted]

[redacted] will report via direct [redacted] Headquarters and/or collocated [redacted]

c. [redacted]

d. [redacted]

e. Commands will report to DIA for transmittal to JCS Planning Staff.

f. JTF Headquarters wil[redacted]

5. (~~TS/LIMDIS~~) The Third Phase - Executio[redacted] Upon request from JTF Headquarters through JCS coordinating s[redacted]ff, [redacted] and [redacted]ll direct selective [redacted] to pass data direc[redacted] to JTF Headquarters for broadcast of mission essential data. Rep[redacted]ing will continue as in previous phases but with the exception that pr[redacted]rity will be given to the[redacted] and the status of U.S. operational support

sites. Reporting will be the same as described above (paragraph 4). Brevity codes will not be used if the rapid receipt of the data is critical to a successful extraction/survival rate.

6. (S) The total post-operations phase will extend for approximately six weeks. [redacted] Reporting will focus on [redacted] and will be provided to the JCS Planning Staff and JTF Headquarters in accordance with procedures followed in Phase I. Defense Attaches and Commands will report to DIA for transmittal to JCS Planning Staff.

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COME-BACK

SNOWBIRD B-278

B-278

MNNNVZCZCDVA683
OO RUEAIIF RUEAIIJ
DE RUEIZJC 0274 2221600
ZNY TTTTT
O 091555Z AUG 80
FM JCS/SNOWBIRD/J2
TO RUEAIIF/[redacted]
BT
[redacted]TIE J3 0274

SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION ASSESSMENT(S)

REF: [redacted] DTG 090037Z AUG 70 SAB
[redacted] DELTA AND JCS ONLY)

1. (U) ~~(FS)~~ THIS OFFICE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE CONTRADICTORY REPORTING ON HOSTAGE LOCATIONS, RUNNING THE EXTREME FROM 12-18 SITES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY TO A RECENT REPORT INDICATING THAT MOST HOSTAGES ARE BEING HELD IN ONE LOCATION IN TEHRAN, PENDING THE INITIATION OF TRIALS.

2. [redacted]

[redacted] IS SUBJECT TO REVISION UPON THE RECEIPT OF MORE CURRENT OR RELIABLE INFORMATION.

3. ~~(FS)~~ HOSTAGE DISPOSITION FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IS PROJECTED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) WITHIN TEHRAN
(1) MFA BUILDING (3)
(2) EMBASSY COMPOUND [redacted]

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

4. THIS ASSESSMENT IS BEING PROVIDED TO JTF UNITS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

REVD 11 AUG 80
BT
#0274

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

TRANSMITTED TO [redacted]

C - 131755Z

And [redacted] Aug 70 ϕ274

DTG 091555Z AUG 80
FM JCS/SHOWBIRD/J2
TO 1SOW
[redacted]
1 1ST
DELTA

~~TO SECRET~~

SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION ASSESSMENT(S)

REF: [redacted] DTG 090037Z AUG 70 SAB
(NOTAL- DELTA AND JCS ONLY)

1. (U) THIS OFFICE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE CONTRADICTORY REPORTING ON HOSTAGE LOCATIONS, RUNNING THE EXTREME FROM 12-18 SITES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY TO A RECENT REPORT INDICATING THAT MOST HOSTAGES ARE BEING HELD IN ONE LOCATION IN TEHRAN, PENDING THE INITIATION OF TRIALS.

[redacted]

3. (U) HOSTAGE DISPOSITION FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IS PROJECTED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) WITHIN TEHRAN
(1) MFA BUILDING (3)
(2) EMBASSY COMPOUND [redacted]

4. [redacted] THE FOLLOWING GENERIC DESCRIPTION APPLIES FOR PLANNING PURPOSES TO ALL TARGETS: TWO-THREE STORY MASONRY BUILDING WITHIN A WALLED COMPOUND; LOCATED IN A SUBURBAN ENVIRONMENT APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME FROM AN ADEQUATE FIXED WING OFFSET INSERTION SITE; AND 30 MINUTES DRIVING TIME (OR 12 MINUTES HELICOPTER FLIGHT TIME) FROM THE NEAREST POTENTIAL FIXED WING EXTRACTION SITE.

~~SECRET~~

5. DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEXT FEW WEEKS THIS OFFICE WORKING WITH DMA WILL INITIATE ACTION TO PRODUCE A TARGET PLANNING GRAPHIC ON EACH LOCATION AND ASSOCIATED AIRFIELDS/LANDING ZONES. COPIES WILL BE PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE.

[redacted]

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~~T O P S E C R E T~~ LIMDIS CITE JS 00394

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DELIVERED BY Multiple Sources
[redacted]
OADR
[redacted]

SUBJ: LOCATION ASSESSMENT UPDATE

1. (TS) THIS MSG PROVIDES LATEST [redacted] ESTIMATE OF HOSTAGE GROUPINGS AND POSSIBLE LOCATIONS. AS IN PAST ASSESSMENTS, [redacted]

2. (TS) [redacted]

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0394 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~ LIMDIS
[redacted]
A. MFA: (3) LAINGEN, TOMSETH, HOLLAND

B. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] RELIABLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS CONTENTION IS LIMITED.

[redacted]

(TS) BASED UPON THE FOREGOING AND THE FACT THAT THE MILITANTS [redacted] PLANNING SHOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING

LOCATIONS AS HOSTAGE DETENTION SITES.

A. MFA (3)

[redacted]

5. (TS) PLANNING ASSESSMENTS OF THIS TYPE WILL BE DISSEMINATED PERIODICALLY AS NEW DATA IS RECEIVED. COLLECTION EFFORTS ARE ONGOING AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL HOSTAGE RELEASE IS EFFECTED.

6 (TS) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES PARTIAL RESPONSE TO DELTA MSG 0158 , DTG 151430Z OCT 80, SUBJ: CONSOLIDATED EEI/OIR PARA FOUR.

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
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REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

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[redacted]S2
DELTA
[redacted]
AWACS/A2

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SUBJ: AIR DEFENSE UPDATE (U)

1. (S) TEHRAN'S DEFENSE SITUATION HAS IMPROVED GRADUALLY PARTICULARLY SINCE THE 22 SEP ONSET OF HOSTILITIES WITH IRAQ.

[redacted]

5. (U) WE WILL CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR OTHER INCREASES IN AIR DEFENSE THREATS.

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~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

UNITED

R-295

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FRO[redacted]

SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION

(S) 1. ~~(U)~~ THIS OFFICE CANNOT CONFIRM OR DENY MEDIA REPORTS THAT CONTROL OF THE HOSTAGES HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO GOI [redacted]

(S) 2. ~~(U)~~ [redacted] THIS IS ALSO THE DATE OF THE REPORTED GHOJBZADEH ATTEMPT TO SECURE THE RELEASE/TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES.

(U) 3. ~~(U)~~ [redacted] *

4. ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

5. [redacted]

[redacted] 26 NOV 00
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(S) VZ[illegible]
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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

~~[illegible]~~ LIMDIS CITE JS 00096 SECTION 1 OF 3

SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT NO. 7
REF: A JCS/SNOWBIRD/0145/DTG 301952Z MAY 80, SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT NBR. 06.
B. JCS/SNOWBIRD/0266/DTG 162020Z AUG 80, SUBJ: 60-90 DAY SITUATION PROJECTION
C. JCS/SNOWBIRD/0002/DTG 021215Z SEP 80, SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
D. JCS/SNOWBIRD/0142/DTG 171250Z SEP 80, SUBJ: LOCATION DESCRIPTIONS
E. JCS/SNOWBIRD/0094/DTG 211852Z OCT 80, SUBJ: LOCATION ASSESSMENT UPDATE.

PAGE TWO RUEIZJC 0096 [redacted]
1. BACKGROUND SUMMARY:
A. REF A PROVIDED INTIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICTING FORCES INTERACTING WITHIN THE HOSTAGE CRISIS.
B. REF B PROVIDED 60-90 DAY SITUATION PROJECTION LIKELIHOOD OF HOSTAGE RELEASE PRIOR TO 4 NOV 80.
C. REC C PROVIDED JTF ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL/MILITARY SITUATION, GENERIC TARGET ANALYSIS AND SOVIET REACTION POSSIBILITIES.
(S) D. REF D PROVIDED GENERAL DESCRIPTIVE DATA [redacted]
E. REF E PROVIDED MOST CURRENT JTF ASSESSMENT OF HOSTAGE LOCATIONS

[redacted] (U) 2. (TS) THIS MESSAGE REVIEWS AND COMBINES VARIOUS FACETS OF THE REFERENCES AND PROVIDES A 30-45 DAY SITUATION PROJECTION, RISK DETECTION ESTIMATE AND THREAT REACTION ASSESSMENT.

(S) 3. (TS) SHORTLY AFTER THE APRIL RESCUE EFFORT THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP [redacted]

[redacted]

4. [redacted]

5. [redacted]

[redacted]

PAGE FOUR RUEIZDC 0096 [redacted]

6. (U) ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP WOULD LIKE TO END THE CRISIS A READY SOLUTION IS NOT APPARENT. COMPLETE ACCEPTANCE OF IRANIAN DEMANDS BY THE USG IS NOT LIKELY UNLESS THERE ARE GUARANTEES THAT ALL HOSTAGES WILL BE RELEASED SIMULTANEOUSLY AND WITHOUT DELAY. ACCEPTANCE OF THIS DIRECT APPROACH BY THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARIES IS QUESTIONABLE-UNLESS IT INCLUDES A MAJOR POLITICAL FACESAVING DEVISE SUCH AS THE RESUMPTION OF A UN SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY. IF A QUICK RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS IS IN THE OFFING THEN A RAPID SEQUENCE OF EVENTS CAN BE EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT 10 DAYS. IF, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED BY THE 4-7 NOVEMBER TIME FRAME PRESSURE WILL AGAIN MOUNT WITHIN IRAN TO PROLONG THE SITUATION AND EXTRACT ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS FROM THE USG.

7. (U) THE BALANCE OF THIS MESSAGE RECOGNIZES THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF SOME OR ALL OF THE HOSTAGES AND REVIEWS: TIME/DISTANCE FACTORS BETWEEN VARIOUS POTENTIAL INSERTION ZONES,

[redacted]

PAGE FIVE RUEIZDC 0096 [redacted]

PROVIDES A DETECTION RISK ASSESSMENT FOR EACH POTENTIAL LZ, SUMMARIZES IRANIAN REACTION CAPABILITIES, REVIEWS TEHRAN AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT AND INCLUDES A THREAT SUMMARY FOR EACH HOSTAGE DETENTION SITE.

[illegible]	[redacted]	105 KM	115 KM	55 KM	50 KM	12 KM
DIST TO		15 KM	25 KM	5 KM	5 KM	0 KM
DIST TO		65 KM	65 KM	65 KM	65 KM	10 KM

[redacted]

5. (TS) THE FOLLOWING RISK ASSESSMENT BASED ON A FORCE SIZE OF [illegible] AND/OR [illegible] WITH A [illegible] HOUR ACTIVE TIME FRAME IS PROVIDED FOR COMPARATIVE PURPOSES.

	SUSAN	KATHY	PEGGY	MARY	PATTY
DETECTION	LOW	MOD	MOD	LOW	LOW-HIGH
REPORTING	LOW	MOD-HIGH	LOW-MOD	LOW	MOD-HIGH
PARA-MILITARY-	NIL	LOW	LOW	LOW	MOD

PAGE SIX RUEIZJC 2896 ~~TOP SECRET~~

REACTION REGULAR ARMY-	NIL	LOW	MOD	LOW	MOD-HIGH
REACTION AIR FORCE-	LOW	MOD	HIGH	LOW	MOD

16 (TS) THIS PARAGRAPH PROVIDES ESTIMATE OF IRANIAN REACTION CAPABILITIES KEYED TO EACH POTENTIAL LZ.

	SUSAN	KATHY	PEGGY	MARY	PATTY
15-20 MIN	NONE	LOCAL SECURITY FORCES	LOCAL SECURITY FORCES	NONE	NONE
30-45 MIN	NONE	[redacted]	[redacted]	NONE	CURIOUS CIVILIANS; OBS HELO FM [redacted]
45-60 MIN	NONE	ADD'L SECURITY FORCES: LEAD REV GD/GEND. ELEMENTS FROM	POSSIBLE PERS FROM AMMO DEPOT	NONE	SECURITY ELEMENT OR REV GD FROM MEHRABAD

REVW 22 OCT 88
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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

LIMDIS SITE JC 22697 SECTION 2 OF 3

(S) SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT NO. 7

(KATHY)

(52 PERS);

[redacted]

65-92 MIN	[redacted] POSS [redacted]	ADD'L [redacted] CO (-) REV GD/ GEND. FROM SEMNAN	REV GD/GEND ELEMENTS FROM [redacted]	POSS [redacted]	ADD'L F-4'S & REV GDS; POSS REG. ARMY UNIT
122 MIN	F-4'S CO (-) REV GD/	REGULAR ARMY ELEMENTS	REGULAR ARMY UNITS	GEND-ARMARIE ELEMENT/	REGULAR ARMY UNIT

PAGE TWO RUEIZJC 2697 [redacted]

GEND. FM SEMNAN CITY

F-4'S

(S) 10. (TS) TEHRAN AIR-DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTS IS DESCRIBED BELOW. THE PRIMARY FOCUS FOR ADA/SAM ACTIVITY IN TEHRAN IS [redacted] ITS EFFECTIVENESS, HOWEVER, IS UNKNOWN. TEHRAN [redacted] THE IRANIAN ABILITY TO DETECT AIRCRAFT APPROACHING AND PASSING OVER TEHRAN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE GOOD. THE ACTUAL THREAT TO AIRCRAFT FROM AAA/SAM'S, HOWEVER, IS PROBABLY LIMITED, WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS. IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF MEHRABAD, THE MERE DENSITY OF AAA WEAPONS MAKES THE AAA DANGER HIGH. THE INTRODUCTION OF [redacted]

SECRET

PAGE THREE RUEIZJC 0397 S E C R E T

[redacted] ALSO INCREASES THE POINT DEFENSE CAPABILITY IN THE AREA [redacted]

11. (S) THIS PARA PROVIDES THREAT ANALYSIS [redacted]

A. AMERICAN EMBASSY [redacted]

PAGE FOUR RUEIZJC 0397 [redacted]

[redacted]. THE FOLLOWING TABLE PRESENTS AN ESTIMATE OF ENEMEY REINFORCEMENT SIZE AND REACTION TIME.

-WITHIN 5-6 MIN: FIRE FROM THE CHANCERY AND WEAPONS POSITIONED IN/ON SURROUNDING BUILDINGS.

-WITHIN 10-15 MIN: REINFORCEMENTS FROM STUDENT HQ'S AND PASDARAN, STRENGTH 75-100.

-WITHIN 15-20 MIN: 100-200 PASDARAN.

-WITHIN 20-30 MIN: 200-300 (PLUS) PASDARAN AND THE BEGINNING OF LOCAL

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

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~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS CITE JS 3696 FINAL SECTION OF 3
SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT NO.7
COLLECTIVE ADDITIONAL STRENGTH OF 50-60.

-CROWDS BEGIN TO COLLECT WITHIN 30 MINUTES.

-[redacted] - PROBABLY 12-20 MILITANTS ARE INSIDE THE [redacted] GUARDS ARE PROBABLY ARMED WITH PISTOLS WHILE GUARDS AT THE WALLS AND TOWERS ARE ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. THE NUMBER OF GUARDS EXTERNAL [redacted] YET WITHIN THE PRISON COMPLEX PROBABLY NUMBER 40-60.

-WITHIN 10-15 MIN: OFF-DUTY GUARD PERSONNEL ESTIMATED AT 30-50 PERSONNEL.

-WITHIN 25-30 MIN: POSSIBILITY OF REVOLUTIONARY GUARD REACTION FORCES ESTIMATED AT AN ADDITIONAL 50-60 PERSONNEL.

-CROWDS BEGIN TO FORM WITHIN 35-45 MINUTES.
AVN 22 OCT 88
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[redacted]

-WITHIN 30-40 MIN: PASDARAN BACK-UP UNITS AND ADDITIONAL CROWDS.

-WITHIN 40-60 MIN: ADDITIONAL PASDARAN FORCES AND MOBS OF 2-3,000.

-WITHIN 60-90 MIN: ARRIVAL OF ELEMENTS OF THE REGULAR ARMY AND AIR FORCE

[redacted]. MFA:

A. GATE GUARD FORCE (4/NORTH GATE), PLUS (2/EAST GATE).

B. 1-2 GUARDS AR[redacted] INSIDE THE BUILDING AT STREET LEVEL AT BOTH WEST AND EAST ENDS. NO EXTERIOR SANDBAG POSITIONS OR MACHINE GUNS HAVE BEEN NOTED. THERE IS PROBABLY A ROVING GUARD FORCE OF 4-5 LIGHTLY ARMED SOLDIERS (CONSCRIPTS) WITHIN THE MFA GROUNDS.

C. [redacted] EXTERNAL REACTION/REINFORCEMENT POSSIBILITIES INCLUDE:

-WITHIN 8-10 MIN: SQUAD FROM POLICE HEADQUARTERS OR WAR MINISTRY

-WITHIN 12-15 MIN: LOCAL PASDARAN FORCES (12-15).

C -WITHIN 20-30 MIN: PASDARA[redacted].

-WITHIN 30-40 MIN: CROWDS BEGIN TO FORM, AND ARMY ELEMENTS MAY BEGIN TO ARRIVE.

C [redacted] - PROBABLY 12-16 GUARDS INSIDE [redacted] 2-4 MOVING WITHIN WALLS, 2-4 EXTERNAL, ARMED WITH PISTOLS AND RIFLES PLUS 2-3 OBSERVATION STAKEOUTS, HALF-BLOCK TO BLOCK DISTANT. NO SANDBAG POSITIONS OR MACHINE GUNS HAVE BEEN SEEN OR REPORTED. THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF EXTERNAL REACTION FORCE IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME, BUT ONE PROBABLY EXISTS. REACTION/REINFORCEMENT POSSIBILITIES INCLUDE

-WITHIN 15 MIN: PASDARAN REACTION FORCE ESTIMATED AT 30-50 PERSONNEL.

-WITHIN 20 MIN: OFF DUTY PASDARAN AND SUPPORTIVE MILITANTS REACT WITH

[redacted]

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SUBJ: HOSTAGE LOCATION ESTIMATE [redacted]

REF: [redacted] C

1. [redacted]

C

2. (S) (TS) [redacted] J2 ASSESSMENT FOLLOWS: A M [redacted] WE BELIEVE A MILITANT CADRE REMAINS IN DIRECT CONTROL OF THE HOSTAGES WITH PRINCIPAL SECURITY PROVIDED BY REVOLUTIONARY GUARD PERSONNEL [redacted]

C

3. (S) [redacted] THE FOLLOWING ESTIMATE OF HOSTAGE DISPOSITION ~~ESTIMATE OF HOSTAGE DISPOSITION~~ IS PROVIDED FOR PLANNING.

A. MFA BLDG - (3)

[redacted]

C

4. (TS) [redacted] OF POSSIBLE CHARLIE/DELTA TYPE FACILITIES IS ON-GOING AND RESULTS (IF POSITIVE) WILL BE PROVIDED AS OBTAINED.

REVW 1 DEC 00

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY Multiple Sources
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

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[redacted] SUCKERED IN BY "OBSERVATION REPORTS" B

SUBJ: LOCATIONAL ASSESSMENT

(S) [redacted]

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0468 ~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS
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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Nov 92
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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
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~~TOPSECRETLIMDIS~~ CITE JZ 0461 SEC 1 OF 2

SUBJ: HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT

REF: (A) TOP SECRET LIMDIS JTF CITE JZ 0460/DIS 161812Z DEC 80 (NOTAL)

1. (U) ~~(SEC)~~ THIS HOSTAGE LOCATION ASSESSMENT IS PROVIDED FOR INFORMATION AND PLANNING PURPOSES AND SUPPLEMENTS REF (A).

2. (U) BACKGROUND: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY BETWEEN PRESIDENT BANI-SADR WITH HIS MODERATE FOLLOWERS AND THE HARD-LINE MUSLIM CLERGY HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0461 ~~TOPSECRETLIMDIS~~
OPEN VERBAL CONFLICT AS WELL AS ARRESTS. THE MOST NOTICEABLE SUBJECTSFOR THIS INFIGHTING HAVE BEEN THE CONFIRMATION OF VARIOUS MINISTERS, THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, AND THE HOSTAGE ISSUE.

A. (U) ~~(SEC)~~ FOR THE PAST THREE MONTHS PRIME MINISTER RAJAI HAS CONTINUED TO SUBMIT LISTS OF NAMES FOR APPOINTMENT TO CABINET MINISTER POSITIONS. BANI-SADR HAS DISAPPROVED THE LARGE BULK OF THEM DECLARING THEM ANTI-[illegible] AND RADICAL.

B. (U) ~~(SEC)~~ REF. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THE CLERGY [illegible] CRITICIZED THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. THEY CLAIM TO HAVE LARGE GAINS IF IRAN FAILS TO DRIVE THE IRAQI FORCES, THE BLAME WILL RESTS O[illegible] SHOULDERS OF THE PRESIDENT.

C. (U) ~~(SEC)~~ THE HOSTAGE ISSUE IS PERHAPS THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE OF THE INFIGHTING. [illegible] BANI-SADR AND PRIME MINISTER RAJAI BOTH SUPPORT [illegible]

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[illegible] SECRET [illegible] LINDIS
[illegible] SETTLEMENT OF THE HOSTAGE ISSUE DURING [illegible]
[illegible]. THE [illegible], WHO MAINTAIN THE CLOSER RELATIONS
WITH THE [illegible] THE HOSTAGES AND A REASONABLE
[illegible] OF [illegible], [illegible] EQUALLY OUTSPOKEN IN
[illegible] OF
[illegible] PROPERTIES ACCOMPANIED BY A
[illegible] APOLOGY FROM THE U.S.

[illegible] (U) [illegible], AND THE WAR WITH IRAQ
[illegible] THE CLERGY [illegible] THEIR POSITION.
PRESENTLY THEY [illegible], [illegible] PRIME MINISTER RAJAI AND IRP
[illegible], [illegible] ISSUE DEAD, AND A WASTE
OF THEIR TIME.

[illegible] (U) THE [illegible] COLLECTIVE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT POSITION,
[illegible] BY RAJAI AND THE CLERGY, APPEARS TO BE ONE
DESIGNED TO SET THE STAGE FOR THE RELEASE OF AT LEAST SOME OF THE
HOSTAGES IN THE COMING WEEKS BY INFLUENCING THE IRANIAN PEOPLE
TO BELIEVE THAT TO CONTINUE HOLDING THE HOSTAGES
WOULD BE OF NO FURTHER BENEFIT, THAT THE U.S. "HAS BEEN

PAGE 4 RULIZUC [illegible] LINDIS
ADEQUATELY PUNISHED."

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~~T O P S E C R E T~~ LIMDIS CITE J2 00482 FINAL SECTION OF 2

SUBJ: HOSTAGE ASSESSMENT

4. (S) THE ABOVE ANALYSIS IS PRELIMINARY, BE[redacted]
IT WILL BE UPDATED/EXPANDED A[redacted]

5. (U) CONCLUSION:

A. (TS) [redacted]

PAGE 2 RUEIZJC 0482 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~ LIMDIS

[redacted]

B. (TS) IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT ALL HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN CONSOLIDATED IN ONE LOCATION FOR ANY PROTRACTED PERIOD SINCE THE RESCUE ATTEMPT. THE POTENTIAL FOR A SECOND RESCUE ATTEMPT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER MODERATE USE SUCH AS SUBSTANTIAL NOVEMBER EFFORT TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES THREATEN MILITANT AND CLERGY CONTROL AND NECESSITATE THAT THEY KEEP THE HOSTAGE POPULATION SPLIT [redacted] AT THE SAME TIME, THE POTENTIAL RESOLUTION OF HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE NECESSITATES THAT THE

MAINTAIN THE ABILITY [redacted]
HOSTAGES AT WILL. [redacted]

6. (U) (LS) OUTLOOK: ALTHOUGH DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS ARE APPARENTLY PROGRESSING THE PACE WILL CONTINUE TO BE EXTREMELY SLOW WITH NEITHER SIDE, PARTICULARLY THE IRANIAN PARTIES, FEELING PUSHED FOR TIME. THE QUESTION OF RELEASE OF IRANIAN FUNDS AND USG DECLAIMER OF FUTURE CLAIMS AGAINST THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT ARE AREAS WHERE THE IRANIANS ARE INCLINED TO HAGGLE AND SEEK ABSOLUTE GUARANTEES (OR POSITIVE ACTIONS) BEFORE ANY MAJOR RELEASE OCCURS. A SMALL SCALE NOMINAL RELEASE IS POSSIBLE BUT IT IS ALSO HIGHLY POSSIBLE THAT SOME IRANIAN HARDLINERS, ASIDE/SEPARATE FROM THE GOVERNMENT WILL SEEK TO DETAIN SOME OF THE HOSTAGES (POSSIBILY THE "SPIES, WAR CRIMINALS AND ACCUSSED FELONS) INDEFINITELY AS A GUARANTEE OF U.S. GOOD FAITH.

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B 335 *

EVIN PRISON-TEHRAN, IRAN, 354840N 0512300E

PRISON BUILDING-95X73 METERS
WALLED PRISON COMPOUND-116X88 METERS
WALL AROUND COMPOUND IS APRX 1 METER THICK AND IS VARYING IN HEIGHT.

A SECURITY BLDG IS ADJACENT TO THE SOUTHWEST PORTION OF WALLED COMPOUND.

AN ADMINISTRATION BLDG IS ADJACENT TO SOUTHWEST CORNER OF WALLED COMPOUND.

A SECONDARY 1 METER THICK WALL RUNS PARALLEL TO THE WESTERN SIDE OF WALLED COMPOUND AT DISTANCES FROM 15-20 METERS.

TERTIARY 1 METER THICK WALL SURROUNDS COMPLEX AT DISTANCES VARYING FROM 150-610 METERS.

ALL WALLS APPEAR TO BE OF CONCRETE BLOCK CONSTRUCTION.

NO GUARD TOWERS ARE VISIBLE ALONG ANY OF THE WALLS OR COMPOUND.

THERE IS ONLY ONE ENTRANCE TO THE PRISON AND IT IS THROUGH THE TERTIARY WALL IN THE SOUTHWEST QUADRANT.



CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 NOV 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [redacted]
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON OADR
[illegible] FROM [redacted]

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WORKING PAPERS

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 December 1979.

[redacted] DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

-- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE, USS AINSWORTH, USS MILLER, and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa, USS AYLWIN departing Persian Gulf enroute outchop to Mediterranean.

-- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA PVST Pusan, Korea until 13 December 1979.

-- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally [redacted] Three (1 ART) deployed to [redacted] four AC-130H at [redacted]

-- Fourteen B-52H aircraft from Ellsworth AFB, SD have deployed to Guam as a portion of a CINCSAC directed Operational Readiness Inspection. The first cell of three bombers was airborne at 092000 EST. The last cell will close at 111200 EST. (Fact Sheet at Tab I-3)

-- One of two E-3A aircraft deployed to Sigonella is flying today on an eight-hour mission in the [redacted] demonstrate E-3A system operability in a maritime role with USN aircraft as well as the USS FORRESTAL, USS NIMITZ, and USS ALBANY. (Tab B)

-- [redacted] warm-up is complete. Selected equipment and majority of personnel will be returned to [redacted] or [redacted] (Tab C)

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

-- Timelines depicting coordinated AC-130/carrier aircraft attacks and carrier air mining are shown in Tab A.

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 016 TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.

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[redacted]

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

-- An oiler, amphibious ship, and guided missile cruiser are near Socotra Island, while an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary remain near Aden.

[redacted]

-- In the Red Sea, an auxiliary is in the strait, a light frigate and three auxiliaries are in the south, and a frigate and auxiliary are transiting southerly in the central area.

[redacted]

- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- The situation at Tabriz remains extremely confused. Press reports indicate some local units have joined the dissidents.

-- Former Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr said Iran has lost its chance to bring the Shah to justice and should release the hostages.

[redacted]

(C) [redacted] missile patrol boats should not be underestimated.

Prepared by:
[redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 December 1979.

[redacted] DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

-- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE, USS AINSWORTH, USS MILLER, and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa. USS AYLWIN departing Persian Gulf enroute outchop to Mediterranean.

-- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA PVST Pusan, Korea until 13 December 1979.

-- USS FORRESTAL has inchopped to Sixth Fleet.

-- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to [redacted] Three (1 ART) deployed to [redacted] Four AC-130H at [redacted]

AF

-- Fourteen B-52H aircraft from Ellsworth AFB, SD have deployed to Guam as a portion of a CINCSAC directed Operational Readiness Inspection. The first cell of three bombers was airborne at 092000 EST. The last cell will close at 111530 EST. (Message at Tab I-4)

E

-- Two E-3A aircraft closed at Sigonella, Italy at 090313 EST. While deployed, they will conduct training missions with the Sixth Fleet, other U.S. forces, and with forces from NATO and other friendly countries. The first mission is scheduled for tomorrow, 11 December. (Tab B) (Execute and PA Guidance messages at Tab H)

E

[redacted] warm-up is complete. Ten C-141 loads of equipment and personnel have been delivered. Six of these were warm-up and four were pre-positioning E-3A support. Selected equipment and majority of personnel will be returned to [redacted] (Tab C)

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

-- Timelines depicting coordinated AC-130/carrier aircraft attacks and carrier air mining are shown in Tab A.

- MINING OPERATIONS: Summary and legal discussion at Tab C.

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 014 & 015, TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.

[redacted] SECRET

[redacted]

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

-- An auxillary and amphibious ship have left port in Aden and joined with a guided missile cruiser off the coast of Yemen.

[redacted]

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

[redacted]

-- [redacted] Relations between Iraq and Iran are expected to continue to deteriorate.

[redacted]

-- Revolutionary Guard forces in Kurdestan are also wrought with problems. [redacted] These problems will likely grow with Kurd successes and harsh mountain weather.

[redacted]

-- According to press reports, pro-Shariat-Madari forces sent five jet fighters screaming over Tabriz. This lends to support early reports that some air force elements had joined the disidents.

[redacted]

Prepared by [redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792
10 December 1979

[redacted] SECRET

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[redacted]

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa; USS AINSWORTH off Oman enroute Persian Gulf. USS AYLWIN and USS MILLER in port Bahrain. AYLWIN will remain in Persian Gulf until MILLER is repaired or AINSWORTH arrives.

  -- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

  -- USS CORAL SEA off Korea. ETA Subic Bay is 9 Dec 79.

  -- USS FORRESTAL has inchopped to Sixth Fleet.

  -- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to [redacted] Three (1 ART) deployed to [redacted] Four KC-130H at [redacted]

  -- Two E-3A at Langley AFB, Va awaiting direction to forward deploy to Mediterranean area or [redacted] In anticipation of E-3A deployment, two C-141's wi[redacted]oad E-3A direct support personnel and equipment at [redacted] Four C-141's have delivered E-3A comm, logistics, and base support to [redacted] Subsequent E-3A support aircraft will plan to transit [redacted] (Details at Tab B).

  -- The six missions fo[redacted] warm-up have closed at [redacted]

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

  -- Timelines depicting coordinated AC-130/carrier aircraft attacks and carrier air mining are shown in Tab A.

- MINING OPERATIONS: Summary and legal discussion at Tab C.

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 013, TAB H-1)

  -- USS SAN JOSE has delivered mines to USS MIDWAY and RH-53 tail rotor and extended range tanks to USS KITTY HAWK.

  -- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts. USS MILLER in port at Bahrain for repair to compass and fire control systems.

  -- USS MIDWAY starboard catapult repaired. Number two main engine should be repaired by 081300EST.

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAW and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper has moved toward the Strait of Hormuz and a cruiser has withdrawn toward the Gulf of Oman.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- DIA papers on Iraqi intentions toward Iran and Egypt/Libya relations are at Tabs H-4 and H-5.

-- At the moment, Tabriz appears to be quiet, however, tension is high.

Prepared by
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792
8 December 1979

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Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS:

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

-- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa; USS AINSWORTH off Oman enroute Persian Gulf. USS AYLWIN and USS MILLER in port Bahrain. AYLWIN will remain in Persian Gulf until MILLER is repaired or AINSWORTH arrives.

-- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA off Korea. ETA Subic Bay is 9 Dec 79.

-- USS FORRESTAL has inchopped to Sixth Fleet.

-- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to [redacted] Three (1 ART) deployed to [redacted] Four AC-130H at [redacted]

-- Two E-3A at Langley AFB, Va awaiting direction to forward deploy to Mediterranean area or [redacted] Details at TAB B)

-- The six missions for [redacted] warm-up have arrived [redacted] The first follow-on C-141 off-loaded [redacted] 6 Dec. Two C-141's are scheduled daily through 11 Dec. (Status report at Tab B)

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- MINING OPERATIONS: (Details at TAB C)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 012, TAB H-1)

-- USS SAN JOSE transporting mines to USS MIDWAY and RH-53 tail rotor and extended range tanks to USS KITTY HAWK. ETA is 071230EST.

-- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts. USS MILLER in port at Bahrain for repair to compass and fire control systems.

-- USS MIDWAY mechanical problems with starboard catapult and number two main engine should be repaired by 070800EST.

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[redacted]

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, CG, MSF, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups.

[redacted]

-- Other deployments have remained rather static for the past several days.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- CJCS and ACJCS questions on Iraqi intentions toward Iran and Egypt/Libya relations have been answered by DIA with papers at Tabs H-4 and H-5.

[redacted]

Regardless of the outcome of these internal squabbles, the current US/Iranian crisis will not benefit.

[redacted]

Prepared by [redacted]
OJCS/OPG Ext 51726/7 Dec 79

[redacted]

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS:

  -- KC-135 Tankers: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally deployed to [redacted] Three (1 ART) deployed to [redacted]

  -- The last two of the six [redacted] warm-up missions have departed CONUS. The final mission is scheduled to close [redacted] at 061100 EST. Status report at TAB B.

  -- Two E-3As have been directed to deploy from Tinker AFB to [redacted] They depart Langley today and arrive [redacted] 070300 EST. One supporting KC-135 will arrive [redacted] on 8 and 9 Dec. (2 total). Airlift support for the deployment is limited to two C-141 sorties per day and will close on 11 December. Deployment concept at TAB B.

  -- USS KITTY HAWK: (TG 70.2) on station in Arabian Sea.

  -- USS MIDWAY (TG 70.1) on station in Arabian Sea.

  -- USS CORAL SEA: Enroute Subic Bay. RP. ETA is 9 Dec 79.

  -- Pacific MAU: PVST Subic Bay.

- MINING OPERATIONS: (Details at TAB C-1)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 010, TAB H-1)

  -- USS MIDWAY starboard catapult estimated in commission time is now 060800 EST. MIDWAY airwing remains fully capable of executing Option ALPHA.

  -- USS SAN JOSE is transporting tail rotor and six extended range fuel tanks for RH-53.

  -- USS KNOX anchored at Diego Garcia awaiting arrival of parts and repair personnel aboard USS DIXIE. DIXIE ETA Diego Garcia is 15 Dec. Repairs will take additional 2-3 days.

  -- USS MILLER mechanical problems will prevent relief of USS AYLWIN as originally planned. AYLWIN will be retained in Persian Gulf until MILLER is repaired or USS AINSWORTH arrives.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 December 1979.

E

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2)

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK are on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- USS FLASHER arrived to relieve USS PINTADO.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER departed port Djibouti. USS LASALLE is in port Bahrain.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU departed Subic Bay enroute Hong Kong. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 024 TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.

-- USS STEIN limited to 15kts pending propeller inspection.

-- RH-53 status: 3 FMC, 1 MC, 2 non-mission capable (one for power supply and one for hydraulic).

-- E-3A Status: 1 FMC, 1 MC (Auxiliary Rotodome Drive).

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

[redacted]

-- A DDG, FFG, MSG, and AGOR and their supporting auxiliaries are in the vicinity of the USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups [redacted]

[redacted]

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(S) SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic) (Cont'd)

-- In the Red Sea, two auxiliar[redacted] Kuwait, an amphibious [redacted] at/near Aden, and a frig[redacted] near Dhalak Island [redacted] gulf.

(S) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- On 17 Dec meeting with Swiss Ambassador, Ghotbzadeh said question of trying the hostages was the most difficult he has had to discuss with Khomeini. Ghotbzadeh said he was unable to convince terrorists to forgo trials. Also "Student Statement 75" affirmed stance that if Shah is not delivered, "the least we can do will be to put the American spies on trial."

-- Swiss Ambassador was denied request to visit US charge. Problem stems from occupation of Foreign Ministry by Iranian vounteers for Lebanon. Ministry now guarded by a "new type of militia" numbering about 150.

-- Ethnic Arabs are [redacted] campaign. On 18 Dec a bomb [redacted] pipeline and starting a fire. Other bombs were disarmed.

-- Revolutionary [redacted] ing dissatisfaction [redacted] of the [redacted]

[redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted] Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 19 December 1979

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

E

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] One is scheduled to fly today (18 Dec). (Tab B)

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK are on station in Arabian Sea.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is in port Djibouti. USS MILLER is in port Bahrain.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU is in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is operating in the South China Sea. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.

-- Shore based aircraft

E

A

--- [redacted] 7 P-3; 3 KC-135.

--- [redacted] 4 AC-130.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 023 TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX is in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

C

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic) (Cont'd)

-- [redacted]

-- Two Soviet IL-38s surveilled the carrier battle groups during deployment [redacted]

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- Confusion as to the timing for hostage release and/or trials continues. Ghotbzadeh said he would "consult" with the students. Khomeini's statements have supported the students. Expect an "international team" will visit hostages over Christmas. This morning, press reports students saying Ghotbzadeh's statements were irresponsible.

-- [redacted]

-- Press reports a grenade exploded during a military training session with young girls, killing one and seriously wounding thirteen.

-- Yesterday USCINCSO reported leftist student activity protesting the Shah's arrival. There was no damage.

Prepared by: [redacted] Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 18 December 1979

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[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ AS OF: 0700 17 Dec 79

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (C) (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK are on station in Arabian Sea.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is operating in the Gulf of Aden.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU is in Subic Bay.

  -- USS CORAL SEA is operating in the South China Sea. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.

  -- JCS 151801Z Dec 79 (TAB H) directed the deployment of E-3A aircraft and necessary support elements to [redacted] Two E-3A aircraft closed [redacted] at 160745 EST and 160815 EST Dec.

  -- Shore based aircraft

  --- [redacted] 7 P-3; 3 KC-135; 1 US-3A.

  --- [redacted] 4 AC-130.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 022 TAB I-1)

  -- USS KNOX is in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.

  -- One US-3A aircraft at Diego Garcia is down for electrical problems. ETR unknown.

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(S) SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting auxiliaries continue operations in the vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups.

-- The Soviet minesweeper normally stationed in the Strait of Hormuz conducted refueling operations in the vicinity of the KITTY HAWK BG and operated near the MIDWAY BG on 16 Dec.

-- An amphibious ship, two guided missile cruisers, and an oiler are near Socotra Island.

-- In the Red Sea, three auxiliaries are in the the southern strait, an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary are at/near Aden, and a light frigate, a frigate, and an auxiliary are in the south.

[redacted]

-- Two Soviet IL-38S and two AN-12 CUBS operated in the vicinity of the carrier battle groups on 15-16 Dec.

(S) - CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab E)

Prepared by [redacted]
Commander, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

AS OF: 0700 15 Dec 79

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

  -- USS CORAL SEA is enroute Subic Bay. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.

  -- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to [redacted] Three (1 ART) deployed to [redacted] Four AC-130H at [redacted]

  -- The third E-3A demonstration mission is scheduled for today. Primary mission objective will be to operate with USS NIMITZ and USS ALBANY in an anti-airwarfare role (TAB B).

  -- JCS 142144Z Dec 79 (TAB H) was an alert order directing USCINCEUR to prepare to deploy 2 E-3A aircraft and support to [redacted] to conduct training, orientation, and demonstration operations. Anticipate unit will move tomorrow, 16 Dec 79. Detailed procedures for cover and deception, press guidance, communications, and mail forwarding were developed and are included at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 020 TAB I-1)

  -- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia. Repair parts arrived on the USS DAVIS. While repair has begun, exact in-commission date is not yet known.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AS OF: 0700 14 Dec 79

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is enroute Subic Bay. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.

-- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to [redacted] Three (1 ART) deployed to [redacted] Four AC-130H at [redacted]

-- The two E-3As deployed to Sigonella flew their second inter-operability demonstration yesterday. The next mission is planned for tomorrow, 15 Dec. Proposals to deploy the 2 E-3A to [redacted] are being staffed. (Tab B)

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 018 TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.

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[redacted]

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[redacted] SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting auxiliaries continue in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

-- An amphibious ship, two guided missile cruisers and an oiler are near Socotra Island.

-- In the Red Sea, three auxiliaries are in the the southern strait, an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary are at/near Aden, a light frigate, frigate, and auxiliary are in the south.

[redacted]

-- There have been no aerial surveillance flights since 14 Dec.

[redacted] CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab E)

[redacted]

-- Press reports that twelve western ambassadors met with Gotbzadeh yesterday to organize a committee to visit the hostages within 48 hours.

[redacted]

Prepared by [redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792

[redacted] SECRET

[redacted] TOP SECRET

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting auxiliaries continue in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

-- An amphibious ship and guided missile cruiser are near Socotra Island, while an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary remain near Aden.

-- In the Red Sea, three auxiliaries are in the vicinity of the southern strait, an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary are at/near Aden, a light frigate, frigate, and auxiliary are in the south.

[redacted]

- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab E)

--

[redacted]

-- Unrest in Tabriz continues with at least one-half million people, including hundreds of uniformed military, demonstrating their suppport for Shariat-Madari.

-- There was no significant military activity to report.

-- DIA prepared a special report on Libya's potential for military support to Iran (Tab I-2). While Qadhafi may wish to provide military aid and does possess vast quanities of Soviet supplied weapons, he lacks the logistical capacity to transport or support more than a token force.

Prepared by: [redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792

[redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~ AS OF: 0700 13 Dec 79

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14/15 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

-- MIDEASTFOR: ~~USS LASALLE, USS AINSWORTH, USS MILLER, and USS RICKETTS~~ on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa.

-- ~~Logistic support ships are as shown on graphic.~~

-- ~~USS WHITE PLAINS and USS DIXIE are inbound to Diego Garcia.~~

-- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is ~~departing Pusan, Korea today for operations in the East China Sea~~ enroute Subic Bay. ETA Subic is 19 Dec.

-- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally to [redacted] Three (1 ART) deployed [redacted] Four AC-130H at [redacted]

-- ~~The four AC-130's at [redacted] have been flying sorties to Korea~~ as well as in and around [redacted] ~~A summary of recent missions is contained at TAB 1-2.~~

-- The two E-3A's deployed to Sigonella ~~stood down yesterday.~~ The second mission is flying today in the Western Mediterranean basin. Mission objective is to again demonstrate E-3A system interoperability with USN aircraft and ships (TAB B).

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 018 TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.

- SPECIAL ITEM: The "ENERGY DETERMINATION" a US owned, Liberian registered, 320,000 ton tanker experienced an explosion while transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Reported conjecture is that the explosion was internal and tore a 60'X 60' hole in side. The Omani Navy has recovered 37 of 38 crewmembers (TAB I-3).

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SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting ~~oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be~~ auxiliaries continue in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

-- An amphibious ship and guided missile cruiser are near Socotra Island, while an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary remain near Aden.

-- In the Red Sea, three auxiliaries are in the vicinity of the southern strait, an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary are at/near Aden, a light frigate, frigate, and auxiliary are in the south.

[redacted]

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab B)

[redacted]

-- The story that the hostages will be released on Christmas eve is circulating diplomatic circles in Iran.

-- Rail shipments into Iran from Eastern and Western Europe and the Soviet Union have virtually ceased.

[redacted]

Prepared by [redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792

TOP SECRET [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK on station in Arabian Sea.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: USS LASALLE, USS AINSWORTH, USS MILLER, and USS RICKETTS on station in Persian Gulf; USS GLOVER returning from port visit in Mombassa. USS AYLWIN departing Persian Gulf enroute outchop to Mediterranean.

  -- USS PASSUMPSIC (Oiler) is departing Arabian Sea and will be be replaced by USS WHITE PLAINS. USS DIXIE is inbound to Diego Garcia.

  -- Pacific MAU in Subic Bay.

  -- USS CORAL SEA PVST Pusan, Korea until 13 December 1979.

  -- Aircraft: Four ARTs augmenting six KC-135s normally [redacted] Three (1 ART) deployed to [redacted] Four AC-130H a[redacted]

A, E

  -- Fourteen B-52H aircraft from Ellsworth AFB, SD have deployed to Guam as a portion of a CINCSAC directed Operational Readiness Inspection. The first cell of three bombers was airborne at 092000 EST. The last cell closed at 111121 EST. (Fact Sheet at Tab I-3)

  -- One of two E-3A aircraft deployed to Sigonella flew a maritime mission yesterday in [redacted] and demonstrated E-3A system interoperability with USN aircraft as well as with the USS FORRESTAL, USS NIMITZ, and USS ALBANY. (Tab B)

E

  -- [redacted] warm-up is complete. Repositioning of selected E-3A equipment and personnel is on hold pending discussions with the Government of [redacted] (Tab C)

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

  -- Timelines depicting coordinated AC-130/carrier aircraft attacks and carrier air mining are shown in Tab A.

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 017 TAB I-1)

  -- USS KNOX in port at Diego Garcia awaiting parts.

[redacted]

[redacted] SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Soviet DDG, FFG, and AGOR with supporting oiler and refrigerated stores ship continue to be in vicinity of USS KITTY HAWK and USS MIDWAY Task Groups. A minesweeper remains in the Strait of Hormuz.

-- An oiler, amphibious ship, and guided missile cruiser are near Socotra Island, while an amphibious landing ship and auxiliary remain near Aden.

[redacted]

-- In the Red Sea, a light frigate and four auxiliaries are in the south and a frigate and auxiliary are transiting southerly in the central area.

-- A guided missile cruiser has left the Sechelles and is transiting northward.

[redacted] URRENT INTELLIGENCE: (Tab D)

-- The situation in northwestern Iran remains unstable.

[redacted] unidentified military [redacted] and has been [redacted]

[redacted]

Prepared by Harold E. Watson
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792

[redacted]

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 December 1979.

(C) DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36)) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80. It will arrive Arabian Sea NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A and two KC-135 aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). One unilateral flight was conducted on 30 Dec. No flight activity scheduled for 31 Dec.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is inport Djibouti.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU is inport Singapore.

-- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.

(C) OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

(C) OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 036, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 021, TAB I-2)

-- 4 of 6 RH-53 FMC. One down for flight controls and one down for excessive low frequency vibrations.

-- JP-5 status [redacted] 17,123,400 gallons.

-- KITTY HAWK boiler causualty corrected.

[redacted]

~~TOP~~ SECRET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile destroyer and a minesweeper continue surveillance operations against USS MIDWAY while a guided missile frigate and an intelligence collector are surveiling KITTY HAWK. [redacted]

[redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

(S)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- Secretary General Waldheim is scheduled to leave for Iran today in an attempt to secure the release of the hostages. Both Khomeini and the militants at the embassy have flatly rejected the visit.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Prepared by: [redacted] CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 31 Dec 79

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AS OF: 0700 29 Dec 79

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36)) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80. It will arrive Arabian Sea NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A and two KC-135 aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). One unilateral flight was conducted on 28 De

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is operating in the Gulf of Aden.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU enroute to Singapore for port visit (ETA 31 Dec)

-- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 034, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 01 TAB I-2)

-- USS MIDWAY US-3 in down status at Diego Garcia. ETR 31 Dec.

-- 3 of 6 RH-53 FMC. One down for flight controls, one down for excessive low frequency vibrations, and one down for engine change. Replacement engine scheduled for transport from Diego Garcia via WHITE PLAINS (ETR 5 Jan).

-- JP-5 status [redacted] 17,257,600 gallons.

[redacted] COPY #___ OF 7

[redacted]

[redacted] SECRET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile destroyer, a minesweeper, a guided missile frigate, an intelligence collector, and two auxiliaries remain in the vicinity of TF-70.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic

-- Certain consumer items are in extremely short supply in Teheran and hoarding has become a problem. Rice and sugar are difficult to obtain and detergent soap sells at inflated prices.

Prepared by: [redacted] CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 29 Dec 79

[redacted]

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USCINCEUR has been directed to deploy one three-ship nuclear powered CVBG to the Indian Ocean to arrive NLT 23 Jan 80. NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80.

  -- Two E-3A and two KC-135 aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). An E-3A/TF 70 interface training mission was flown yesterday from [redacted] to the Indian Ocean. The E-3A spent nearly four hours on station with TF-70.

  -- Four KC-135's at Diego Garcia supported E-3A operation.

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is operating in the Gulf of Aden.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU enroute to Singapore for port visit (ETA 31 Dec)

  -- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

  -- CINCPAC has forwarded a Turnover and Logistic Support Plan for Battle Groups deployed in the Indian Ocean (Tab I-4).

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 033, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 018, TAB I-2)

  -- Boiler repairs to the USS LASALLE completed. Maximum speed is 17 kts.

  -- USS KITTY HAWK reports casualties to two boilers. Maximum speed is 28 kts. ETR unknown.

  -- USS MIDWAY US-3 in down status at Diego Garcia. ETR 28 Dec.

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-- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

[redacted]

-- The DDG joined with a minesweeper, guided missile frigate, and intelligence collector in the vicinity of the USS MIDWAY and KITTY HAWK Task Groups.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- The coup in Afghanistan has apparently been successful, probably with Soviet backing. Prime Minister Amin has been executed and replaced by Vice Prime Minister Babrak.

-- Statements regarding hostages, trials, and a grand jury are still confusing. Beheshti said hostages would be released after a trial designed to lay bare US involvement. Qotbzadeh said if US continues pressure, especially economic blockade, he would go ahead with spy trials. A coordinating [redacted] and Revolutionary Council has been [redacted]

-- There may have been an Iraq/Iran border skirmish yesterday. Iranian press reports Iraqis crossed the border and used heavy weapons.

[redacted]

-- The British Embassy reduced its diplomatic representation from twenty personnel to eight. The staff numbered 67 a year ago.

Prepared by: [redacted] Lt Colonel, USAF

[redacted]

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USCINCEUR has been directed to deploy one three-ship nuclear powered CVBG to the Indian Ocean to arrive NLT 23 Jan 80. NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80.

  -- Two E-3A and two KC-135 aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2) An E-3A/TF 70 interface training sortie is scheduled for 26/27 Dec; takeoff from Wadi Kena at 261700 EST. Plan for 3 hours on-station time and three refuelings.

  -- Four KC-135's at [redacted] to support E-3A operation.

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in port Djibouti.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic. San Jose departing Arabian Sea enroute Subic Bay.

  -- Pacific MAU deports Hong Kong tonight enroute Singapore for port visit. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay until 29 Dec then visit Dumaguet PI.

  -- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 031 TAB I-1, CINCEUR 016 TAB I-2)

  -- USS KNOX has been repaired and is enroute MODLOC. ETA 27 Dec 79.

  -- USS STEIN speed limited to 15kts for normal operations and 18-20kts in an emergency. Damaged propeller will be repaired at Diego Garcia when schedule permits.

  -- USS RAY limited to 28Kts due to problems with port engine main reduction gear. ETR 24 Jan 80.

  -- RH-53 Status: 5 FMC, 1 down for hydraulic system.

  -- E-3A status: 2 FMC.

  -- AC-130: 4 FMC.

-- There are 584,000 gal of [redacted] at [redacted]--enough for 8 [redacted] Fuel testing should be completed on 28 Dec 79.

(S)- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A MSF, AGI and FFG are continuing surveillance of TG 70. A DDG remains on barrier patrol in the Strait of Hormuz.

C (S) [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

[redacted]

-- Three American clergy who visited Embassy saw only 43 hostages. There is no explanation of the discrepancy between 50 reported by State and 43 sighted by the clergy.

-- Ayatollah Beheshti, General Secretary of the Revolutionary Council, said Iran could not negotiate under pressure and that hostages would not be released until after "Grand Jury" proceedings. Also said may have difficulty obtaining hostage release even when and if Khomeini orders it.

-- Armed Forces Chief of Staff was removed and Major General Hadi Shadmehr recalled from retirement to replace him.

[redacted]

-- Iran's Oil Minister has stated Iran does not intend to cause a crisis in the industrialized world. However, if revolution is threatened, the regime is prepared to suspend all oil exports.

G Prepared by: [redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 26 Dec 79

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[redacted]

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  — USCINCEUR has been directed to deploy one three-ship nuclear powered CVBG to the Indian Ocean to arrive NLT 23 Jan 80. NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80.

  — Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2) The third mission was flown yesterday with [redacted] accompanying flight. Planning continues for a joint US/[redacted] demonstration flight.

  — USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

  — MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in port ~~Djiboutí.~~ Djibouti.

  — Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic. San Jose departing Arabian Sea enroute Subic Bay.

  — Pacific MAU in port Hong Kong. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay. Options for port calls which would put MAU closer to Indian Ocean have been developed. (TAB I-3)

  — USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 027 TAB I-1)

  — USS KNOX in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.

  — USS STEIN speed limited to 15kts for normal operations and 18-20kts in an emergency. Damaged propeller will be repaired at Diego Garcia when schedule permits.

  — USS RAY air search radar inoperative. ETR 1 Jan 80.

  — RH-53 Status: 5 FMC, 1 limited by windshield distortion with night vision devices, OK for day operations.

  — E-3A status: 2 FMC.

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[redacted] SECRET

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A MSF, AGI and FFG are continuing surveillance of TG 70. A DDG remains on barrier patrol in the Strait of Hormuz.

[redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- Press reports that Gotbzadeh resigned yesterday.

-- Khomeini met with the Revolutionary Council on 20 & 21 Dec. While the hostage situation was discussed, there have been no public announcements of any meeting details.

-- Troubles continue in Iran's provinces. [redacted]

[redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 22 Dec 1979

[redacted]

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[redacted] [redacted] AS OF: 0700 21 Dec 79

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 December 1979.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USCINCEUR has been directed to deploy one three-ship nuclear powered CVBG to the Indian Ocean to arrive NLT 23 Jan 80. Dept of State has asked USMISSION NATO to advise DPC permanent representatives that US will temporarily deploy a Med CVBG to the IO. (Messages at TAB H)

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted]. (TAB B & I-2) A crew orientation mission was flown yesterday. Planning continues for a joint US/[redacted] demonstration flight.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Gulf of Aden.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in port Hong Kong. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay. Options for port calls which would put MAU closer to Indian Ocean have been developed. (TAB I-3)

-- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 026 TAB I-1)

-- USS KNOX in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.

-- USS STEIN speed limited to 15kts for normal operations and 18-20kts in an emergency. Damaged propeller will be repaired at Diego Garcia when schedule permits.

-- USS MIDWAY port catapult track seal has been repaired.

-- RH-53 status: 4 FMC, 2 non-mission capable (one for phase maintenance and one for hydraulics).

-- E-3A status: 2 FMC.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ COPY # 7 OF 7

TO [redacted]

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- Two IL-38 MAY aircraft operated in the vicinity of the KITTY HAWK and MIDWAY Task Groups yesterday.

-- A MSF and FFG are continuing surveillance of TG 70. The DDG has assumed a barrier patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. An AGI. [redacted]

-- Other Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean remain rather static. Locations are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- Several sources expect Ghotbzadeh to resign in the near future.

-- Terrorists occupied the Iranian Embassy in Stockholm following the arrest of Iranian Ambassador to Sweden.

-- Kuwaiti press reported Khomeini was to decide the fate of hostages after yesterday's hearing the Revolutionary Council' views.

[redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 21 Dec 1979

TO [redacted]

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 December 1979.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2) Orientation flight planned for [redacted] officials yesterday cancelled due to late arrival and disposition of VIPs.

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Gulf of Aden after port visit Djibouti.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU enroute Hong Kong. USS BRISTOL COUNTY will remain in Subic Bay.

  -- USS CORAL SEA is in port Subic Bay.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 025 TAB I-1)

  -- USS KNOX in port Diego Garcia undergoing repairs. ETR 31 Dec.

  -- USS STEIN speed limited to 15kts for normal operations and 18-20kts in an emergency. Damaged propeller will be repaired at Diego Garcia when schedule permits.

  -- USS MIDWAY port catapult down for track seal. ETR Z01300EST.

  -- RH-53 status: 4 FMC, 2 non-mission capable (one for phase maintenance and one for hydraulics).

  -- E-3A status: 1 FMC, 1 MC (auxiliary rotodome drive)

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- Two IL-38 MAY aircraft operated in vicinity of KITTY HAWK TG today.

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[redacted]

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic) (Cont'd)

-- A DDG, FFG, MSF, [redacted]

-- The amphibious ship and two guided missile cruisers near Socotra Island were joined by an FFL and aux.

-- In the Red Sea, two auxiliaries are in the southern straits, an amphibious landing ship, AGOR, and two auxiliaries are near Dehalak Island.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE:

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- Yesterday, a spokesman for a group of pro-Khomeini Iranians in Australia said his group had been briefed that eight hostages would be tried for espionage. The remainder would be released.

-- The Kurdish Democratic Party announced the termination of the cease fire agreement. A clash between Kurds and Revolutionary Guards in Sanandaj resulted in [redacted] killed and two others wounded.

[redacted]

-- [redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted]
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 20 Dec 1979

[redacted]

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force. [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

- [redacted]

-- Charge Laingen was contacted by State at the Foreign Ministry. There has been no further reporting on the alleged trial of LtCol Roeder.

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- In an American television interview, Secretary General Waldheim said his impression was that Khomeini was primarily a spiritual leader and not involved in day to day politics. Consequently, while Waldheim claimed the Revolutionary Committee was desirous of ending the crisis, he was less sanguine that the terrorists would agree in the near future.

-- A Jerusalem domestic television service reported yesterday that "Egypt has put a large airbase at the disposal of the United States." They also commented negatively that the US had refused Israeli offers of bases but had begun a buildup in Egypt without informing Jerusalem.

-- The Soviet Union continues to battle in Afghanistan having taken control of all major towns and cities but still receiving heavy resistance in many areas. [redacted] rumors persist that 1000 tanks will move into Afghanistan to end the opposition by the end of January.

Prepared by: [redacted] LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 7 Jan 80.

[redacted]

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Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 5 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.

  -- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). First [redacted] familiarization mission flown yesterday. [redacted] controllers did well controlling intercepts and [redacted] who also flew, was extremely pleased. A second [redacted] familiarization flight is being flown today. Planning continues for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 13 or 14 Jan.

  -- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft are enroute from Keflavik, Iceland to [redacted] ETA 7 Jan 80.

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU departed Singapore. ETA Subic Bay is 7 Jan 80.

  -- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 041, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 026, TAB I-2)

  -- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

  -- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.

  -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC, one has leak in main landing gear strut, one flight control rod must be repaired.

[redacted]

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force. [redacted]

[redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Soviet CUB aircraft transitting the Arabian Sea were again escorted by TG 70 aircraft.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- The militants have demanded that the Iranian Foreign Ministry hand over U.S. Charge Bruce Laingen for questioning. They also announced that LtCol Roeder will be tried based on his Vietnam service.

[redacted] However, it is doubtful that Khomeini can control the terrorists. They will probably insist on trials.

[redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted]
LTCOL, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 5 Jan 80.

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AS OF: 0700 4 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on [redacted] January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) departed Italian ports last night enroute Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.

  -- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted]. (TAB B & I-2). First [redacted] familiarization mission scheduled for today. Possible DV flight on 6 Jan. JCS 032341Z Jan 80 directed USCINCEUR to plan for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 13 or 14 Jan.

  -- JCSE personnel and satellite communications terminal have arrived [redacted]

  -- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft are enroute from Keflavik, Iceland to [redacted] ETA 7 Jan 80.

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU inport Singapore. JCS 032104Z Jan 80 released MAU to continue to outchop and requested JCS be informed of composition of inchopping MAU if MAU directed to IO.

  -- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 040, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 025, TAB I-2)

  -- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

  -- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.

  -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC, one has leak in main landing gear strut, one flight control rod must be repaired.

TOP SECRET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, auxiliary, and two oilers are in close vicinity of Task Force. [redacted]

[redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Soviet CUB aircraft transitting the Arabian Sea were escorted by TG 70 aircraft.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- The Soviet Embassy in Tehran was stormed for the second time in three days, but the crowd was turned back. The Soviet Ambassador in Tehran met with Khomeini yesterday to protest the first attack on the embassy. Press reports stated the Ambassador dropped broad hints concerning helping leftwing Fedayeen guerrillas and other rebels [redacted]

[redacted]

-- Tehran radio is appealing to other Muslims to unite behind Iranian foreign policy objectives.

Prepared by: [redacted]
LTCOL, USAF OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 4 Jan 80.

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[redacted] [redacted] AS OF: 0700 3 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 3 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36)) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80. It will arrive Arabian Sea NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted]. (TAB B & I-2). Two flights flown on 2 Jan. Next sortie scheduled for 4 Jan as first [redacted] familiarization mission.

-- AC-130 personnel (144) depart [redacted] oday returning to [redacted] after holidays at home station. ETA [redacted] is 040630 Jan 80.

-- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft are enroute from Keflavik, Iceland to [redacted]

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is inport Djibouti.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU is inport Singapore.

-- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 037, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 022, TAB I-2)

-- MIDWAY port catapult repaired.

-- RAY has one gas turbine down, max speed 19 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

-- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.

-- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC, one has leak in main landing gear strut, one flight control rod must be repaired.

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[redacted] COPY # 7 OF 7

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, auxiliary, and oiler are in close vicinity of Task Force. An oiler and [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Soviet IL-28 MAYs conducted thirteenth mission against TF 70.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

[redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted] LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 2 Jan 80.

[redacted]

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ (CVN 68), TEXAS (CGN 39), and CALIFORNIA (CGN 36)) will CHOP from Sixth Fleet on 5 Jan 80, sail via Cape of Good Hope, and CHOP to CINCPAC on 14 Jan 80. It will arrive Arabian Sea NLT 23 Jan 80.

  -- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). No flights on 1 Jan. Two flights scheduled for 2 Jan.

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER is inport Djibouti and USS LASALLE is inport Bahrain.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU is inport Singapore.

  -- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 036, TAB I-1, CINCEUR 021, TAB I-2)

  -- JP-5 status [redacted] 17,018,400 gallons.

  -- MIDWAY port catapult reported down for maintenance. ETR 2 Jan.

[redacted]

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- In the northern Arabian Sea, USS KITTY HAWK reported that a miscellaneous [redacted] A guided missile destroyer continues close surveillance of USS MIDWAY as the intelligence collector, which joined the destroyer 31 Dec, eventually faded from MIDWAY radar yesterday evening. A fleet minesweeper continues surveillance operations in the vicinity of the task groups.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted] CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 31 Dec 79

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~~TOP SECRET~~ AS OF: 0700 9 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). [redacted] are flying an orientation mission today. Planning continues for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 12/13 Jan.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for RM-16 (see RH-53 information below).

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 045, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 030, TAB I-2)

-- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

-- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.

-- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. Yesterday, during turn-up, one aircraft rotor head shifted with blades folded causing extensive damage, ETR is unknown. A second helo has a damaged main landing gear strut, ETR 12 Jan. Third helo has several discrepancies, ETR unknown. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs.

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[redacted]

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force. [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- [redacted] IL-38s flew a recce mission of TF-70 yesterday.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

[redacted]

-- The World Liberation Movements conference sponsored by the Embassy terrorists has elected Ayatollah Mousavi Khoeni, a spiritual leader of the terrorists, Chairman. Abu Jihad of the PLO was selected Deputy Chairman.

[redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted] LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 9 Jan 80.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ AS OF: 0700 8 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 January 1980.

(C) DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). The fourth [redacted] familiarization mission was flown yesterday with excellent results. Planning continues for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 12/(C) 13 Jan.

-- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft arrive [redacted] today.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU arrives Subic Bay today.

-- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 044, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 029, TAB I-2)

-- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

-- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.

-- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. During turn-up, one aircraft rotor head shifted with blades folded causing extensive damage; fourth aircraft can be repaired through cannibalization.

-- An F-4J crashed after launch from MIDWAY. Both crewmen recovered with no injuries.

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SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormuz. A DDG, MSF, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker, are in close vicinity of Task Force.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

IL-38s are flying a recce mission of TF-70 today.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Laingen remains at the Foreign Ministry. There is no further information concerning Lt Col Roeder.

-- Domestic violence continues throughout Iran.

eight Western journalists were expelled from the city and all three U.S. TV networks had satellite feeds from Tabriz interrupted.

Khomeini remains unperturbed by the disorder and retains belief that the nation can be distracted from internal problems by anti-U.S. hysteria. The hostage drama plays a central part. They also feel Khomeini is cut off from the realities of life and remains sure of his infallibility.

-- Khomeini announced he would take a vacation from 12-27 January.

pared by:
OJCS/OPG Ext 52792, 8 Jan 80.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ AS OF: 0700 7 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 January 1980.

E

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. Nimitz group chopped to CINCLANT at 051901Z Jan 80. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). A second [redacted] familiarization mission was flown Saturday but no fighter activity was conducted due to poor weather at fighter bases. A simulator tape demonstrated aircraft capabilities and procedures. The third familiarization flight flew yesterday and a fourth is flying today. Planning continues for a second TF 70/E-3A mission on 12 or 13 Jan.

-- Three HARPOON-capable P-3C aircraft are enroute from Keflavik, Iceland to [redacted] ETA 7 Jan 80.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU enroute Subic Bay. ETA is 8 Jan 80.

-- USS CORAL SEA is inport Subic Bay.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 043, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 028, TAB I-2)

-- RAY has effected temporary repairs to one gas turbine, max speed 22 kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

-- LASALLE has #1 boiler down, max speed 10 kts.

-- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC, one has leak in main landing gear strut, one flight control rod must be repaired.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] AS OF: 0700 31 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS in Red Sea enroute Suez.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU enroute Okinawa.

  -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.

  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea in the vicinity of Singapore.

  -- E-3A information at TAB B.

  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 067, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 050, TAB G-2)

  -- RAY returned for additional repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 1 Feb.

  -- RH-53: 7 of 8 FMC. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received. 2 of 8 HF comms in up status.

(C) SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- A CG and a FFL remain in the Strait of Hormuz. AGI/AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF. [redacted]

  -- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

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Classified By: DJS
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

[redacted]

The tracked vision of the Rapier was developed for the Iranian Army.

Prepared by: [redacted] CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 31 Jan 80

TOP SECRET [redacted] AS OF: 0700 31 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 31 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS in Red Sea enroute Suez.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU enroute Okinawa.

  -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.

  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea in the vicinity of Singapore.

  -- E-3A information at TAB B.

  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 067, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 050, TAB G-2)

  -- RAY returned for additional repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 1 Feb.

  -- RH-53: 7 of 8 FMC. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received. 2 of 8 HF comms in up status.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- A CG and a FFL remain in the Strait of Hormuz. AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF. A [redacted]

  -- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

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Classified By: DJS
Declassified ON: OADR

SECRET [redacted]

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

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The tracked vision of the Rapier was developed for the Iranian Army.

Prepared by: [redacted] CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 31 Jan 80

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INDIAN OCEAN PERSIAN GULF DEPLOYMENTS

TASK FORCE 70

KITTY HAWK TG 70.4

AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

23 F-14	12 A-7
9 A-6/3 KA-6	4 E-2C
3 EA-6	6 SH-3
1 RF-8	3 S-3
	1 EA-3B

SCHEDULE

24 JAN-02 FEB ENROUTE SUBIC
03-08 FEB INPORT SUBIC
09- FEB ENROUTE CONUS
KITTY HAWK (CARRIER)
JOUETT (CRUISER)
BERKLEY (DESTROYER)
STEIN (FRIGATE)
96 HOUR KOREAN CONTINGENCY
31 JAN-15 FEB

[redacted]
3 P-3C (HARPOON)
2 P-3B 1 S-3A
1 EP-3 4 KC-135

NIMITZ TG 70.2

AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

24 F-14	20 A-7
12 A-6/4 KA-6	4 S-3
3 EA-6	4 E-2B
6 SH-3	3 RF-8
8 RH-53	1 C-2
1 US-3	1 EA-3B

SCHEDULE

ON STATION ARABIAN SEA

MIDWAY TG 70.1

AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

17 F-4	18 A-7
7 A-6/4 KA-6	4 EA-6
3 RF-4	4 E-2B
4 SH-3	1 C-2

SCHEDULE

ON STATION ARABIAN SEA

CORAL SEA

AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED

22 F-4	16 A-7
9 A-6/3 KA-6	4 SH-3
2 RF-8	4 E-2B

SCHEDULE

31 JAN-7 FEB ENR GULF OF OMAN

CORAL SEA (CARRIER)
STANDLEY (CRUISER)
HALSEY (CRUISER)
JONES (DESTROYER)
SCHOFIELD (FRIGATE)

MILITARY OPTIONS—AIRCRAFT AND LOCATIONS

YUMA

6 CH-53
3 RH-53

[redacted]
4 B-52H
3 KC-135
4 AC-130 (1 IN KOREA)

[redacted]
6 AC-130 (3 NOT AAR)
7 MC-130 (2 NOT AAR)

EUROPE

4 MC-130 (NOT AAR) 6 KC-135

[redacted]
1 MC-130 (NOT AAR)

ADDITIONALLY

[redacted]
2 MC-130

LANDING FORCE SIXTH FLEET (2,039 USMC PERSONNEL)

SHIPS (ARG)	AIRCRAFT	TROOPS EMBARKED
IWO JIMA (LPH-2)	4 CH-53	
SHREVEPORT (LPD-12)	12 CH-46F	32ND MAU
HERMITAGE (LSD-34)	4 AH-1T	
SAGINAW (LST-1188)	2 UH-1N	
BOULDER (LST-1190)		

29-31 JAN ENROUTE MALAGA
1-5 FEB PORT VISIT MALAGA
6-7 FEB ENROUTE ROTA
8-14 FEB IN PORT ROTA

FLEET MARINE FORCE SEVENTH FLT (3,085 USMC PERSONNEL)

SHIPS	AIRCRAFT	TROOPS EMBARKED
ARG ALFA	4 CH-53D	
OKINAWA (LPH-3)	12 CH-46D	31ST MAU
MOBILE (LKA-115)	4 AH-1T	1,785 TROOPS
ALAMO (LSD-33)	2 UH-1N	
SAN BERNARDINO (LST-1189)		
ARG BRAVO		
CLEVELAND (LPD-7)		
ANCHORAGE (LSD-36)		

30 JAN-6 FEB ENROUTE OKINAWA
7-8 FEB IN PORT OKINAWA
9-11 FEB ENROUTE SUBIC

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS in Djibouti, ETD 30 Jan.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU enroute Okinawa.

  -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.

  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea in the vicinity of Singapore.

  -- One E-3A deployed to Ciampino, Italy conducted ground display for Italian Minister of Defense on 29 Jan 80 (TAB B).

  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 066, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 049, TAB G-2)

  -- RAY returned for additional repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 1 Feb.

  -- RH-53: 7 of 8 FMC. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received. 4 of 8 HF comms in up status.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- A CG and FFL anchored in the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF. A [redacted]

  -- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE (S) (TAB D)

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--

Iran has two inshore minesweepers.

--

Iran has two coastal minesweepers.

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--

Since the American Embassy takeover, Agusta Bell has been witholding delivery of CH-47 helicopters to Iran.

Prepared by: , CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 30 Jan 80

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AS OF: 0700 29 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS enroute Djibouti, ETA 30 Jan.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU in port Eniwetok for turnover today.

  -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.

  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea in the vicinity of Singapore.

  -- One E-3A deployed to Ciampino, Italy will conduct ground display for Italian Air Force Chief of Staff today. (TAB B)

  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 065, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 048, TAB G-2)

  -- RAY returned for additional repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 5 Feb.

  -- RH-53: 6 of 8 FMC. Seventh aborted flight check yesterday; ETR unknown. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- A CG and FFL anchored in the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF. A [redacted] Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

  -- [redacted]

2 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- Final results of Iran's Presidential Election reveal Bandi-Sadr received 75.7% of the votes cast. Sixty percent of the eligible voters participated. The next electorial step is to select the National Consultative Assembly in late Feb or early Mar.

-- A Mexican TV crew was attacked while filming a demonstration in front of the American Embassy when a rival group attacked. There was one slight injury.

[redacted]

-- Canada has closed its Embassy in Tehran and withdrawn its diplomats on [redacted] 6 hostages are freed.

[redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted], USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 29 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. RH-53 status below.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in [redacted] for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS enroute [redacted], ETA 30 Jan.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU in port [redacted] for turnover tomorrow.

  -- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.

  -- USS CORAL SEA port visit Singapore. ETD 28 Jan.

  -- Report of Air Force activities at TAB B.

  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 064, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 047, TAB G-2)

  -- RAY completed repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia and is enroute MODLOC. ETA 1 Feb.

  -- RH-53: 6 of 8 FMC. Expect seventh to be up today. Seven days will be required to effect extensive repairs on eighth aircraft after parts are received.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- A CG and FFL anchored in the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF. A [redacted]

  Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

  [redacted]

  -- Two IL-38 MAYs flew a reconnaissance mission against the NIMITZ and MIDWAY today. (TAB D)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB D)

-- Reports on Khomeini's health are extremely confused. Tehran radio reported he was improved and out of intensive care. [redacted]

-- Bandi-Sadr has received over two-thirds of the votes cast. He has promised to resolve the hostage crisis and has played down the importance of that crisis vis-a-vis the possible threat from the USSR. While the press reports he has taken a more militant position in the last day or so, it is believed that he wants to quickly resolve the crisis and rebuild the country.

-- [redacted] senior Afghan Army [redacted] Soviet military delegation led by two [redacted] the possibilities of attacks against Pakistan [redacted] attack does not appear to be imminent [redacted] pursuit." [redacted] Intelligen[redacted]

[redacted] Iraq had made a firm decision in October 1979 to seize the Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa and Tunbs and turn them over to the UAE. However, to avoid the appearance of collusion with the US [redacted]

-- Iranian press reports the conviction and execution of four Iranian Air Force personnel for stealing weapons and supplying them to the insurgents in Tabriz.

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted] Press reports six Afghan guerilla bands have agreed to have 150,000 dedicated to forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw.

Prepared by: [redacted] LtCol, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 28 Jan 80

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~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AS OF: 0700 26 Jan 80

WORKING PAPER
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Overview for use by the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options except certain RH-53 options; RH-53 status below.

-- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH in Bahrain for refueling. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. GLOVER in Red Sea. RICKETTS enroute Djibouti, ETA 30 Jan.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.

-- ARG/MAU information at TAB F.

-- USS CORAL SEA port visit Singapore. ETD 28 Jan.

-- One MC-130 (AAR capable) will arrive Hurlburt from [redacted] today.

-- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 062, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 047, TAB G-2)

-- RAY under repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.

-- RH-53: 5 of 8 FMC. Sixth aircraft scheduled for flight check on 27 Jan. Seventh is still undergoing extensive rotor repair. Eighth requires periodic inspection. Maximum effort is being dedicated to delivering parts and effecting repairs. ETRs for seventh and eighth are unknown.

~~TOP SECRET~~ COPY # 7 OF 7

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- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A CG and FFL on station in the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Although all of the votes are not in from Iran's first Presidential election, Bandi-Sadr has claimed victory after receiving approximately 80% of the votes in Tehran. He said his first priority would be the reconstitution of Iran's economy. Reportedly he would seek a solution to the US hostage problem.

-- Official Tehran press continues to report Khomeini's health is improving. [redacted]

-- [redacted] Iran Air seeking spare parts for commercial aircraft and JT9D engines. After being refused, they approached [redacted] were again refused. [redacted] reported Iranians as "almost frantic" in their request.

-- [redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted] LtCol, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 26 Jan 80

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~~TOP SECRET~~ AS OF: 0700 25 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 January 1980.

(C) - DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options except RH-16 options. See RH-53 status below.

-- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. GLOVER in Red Sea. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. RICKETTS enroute Djibouti, ETA 30 Jan.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- CINCPAC proposal to conduct MIDWAY/CORAL SEA turnover on 5 Feb two days early, has been approved. (Messages at TAB E).

-- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.

-- ARG/MAU exercise information has been revised. (TAB F)

-- USS CORAL SEA port visit Singapore. ETA 25 Jan.

E -- One MC-130 (AAR capable) is returning to Hurlburt from [redacted]

-- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 061, TAB G-1, CINCEUR SITREP 046, TAB G-2)

-- RAY under repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.

-- RH-53: 3 of 8 FMC. Of five down, two require engine turn-up, one has flight control vibrations, one is still underway extensive rotor repair, and one requires periodic inspection. Maximum effort is being dedicated to delivering parts and effecting repairs. ETRs are unknown.

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- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A CG and FFL are moving from the Task Force toward the Strait of Hormuz. An FFL, AGI, AUX and support ships are in the vicinity of the TF. [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- During the morning of 23 Jan, poor sea manners by Soviet AGI 477 required evasive maneuvers by JOUETT to avoid collision. This ship has displayed poor sea manners before; but this instance was considered dangerous.

- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Doctors treating Khomeini said his condition is satisfactory and improving and hope he can be transfered from intensive care to the ordinary heart treatment area today. However, intelligence reports indicate that Khomeini is in critical condition.

-- Today is election day for Iran. Bandi-Sadr is the leader, but no candidate is likely to achieve an overall majority. If necessary, a run-off election will be held on 8 February.

-- [redacted]

[redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted] LtCol, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 25 Jan 80

[redacted]

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 24 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ has relieved the USS KITTY HAWK and has been redesignated TASK FORCE BRAVO and TG 70.2. KITTY HAWK is enroute Subic Bay and has been redesignated TASK FORCE DELTA and TG 70.4.

  -- MIDWAY and NIMITZ continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options except RH-16 options. See RH-53 status below.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: MILLER and AINSWORTH on station in Persian Gulf. GLOVER in Red Sea. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep until 12 Feb. RICKETTS enroute Djibouti ETA 30 Jan.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.

  -- ARG/MAU exercise information has been revised. (TAB G)

  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea enroute Singapore. ETA 25 Jan.

  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 060, TAB H-1, CINCEUR SITREP 045, TAB H-2)

  -- RAY under repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.

  -- RH-53: 3 of 8 FMC. Six helos on KITTY HAWK crossed deck to NIMITZ. Of the three down helos from KITTY HAWK, two expected to be FMC today, the third was one which experienced rotor damage and requires extensive maintenance, ETR unknown. Two helos which were brought by NIMITZ require maintenance and inspections; ETR unknown. Maximum effort being made to return 6 to FMC as soon as possible.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- The AUX in the Strait of Hormuz joined the FFL, AGI, and support ships in the vicinity of the Task Force. The FFG is following the KITTY HAWK out of the Arabian Sea. [redacted]

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-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Major news out of Tehran concerns Khomeini's health. Press reports cancellation of all engagements until 9 February. [redacted] Khomeini was visited by 5 or 6 heart specialists on 18 Jan and has had a specialist with him since the 20th. Khomeini is reported [redacted] sclerosis of the brain, general heart weakness, and extreme fatigue. He also was treated for symptoms of Parkinson's disease.

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Prepared by: [redacted], LtCol, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 24 Jan 80

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[redacted]

[redacted] AS OF: 0700 23 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) will relieve USS KITTY HAWK at 2300 EST tonight. KITTY HAWK will depart station tomorrow.

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain for upkeep. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.

  -- ARG/MAU exercise information at TAB G.

  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea enroute Singapore ETA 25 Jan.

  -- Report of Facilities Technical Inspection Teams at TAB C.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 059, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 044, TAB I-2)

  -- RAY under repair by DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.

  -- RH-53: 5 of 8 FMC. Five transferred from KITTY HAWK to NIMITZ. Sixth will transfer when repairs and flight check complete. ETR 23 Jan. Two RH-53 on board NIMITZ are NMC. Parts on request. ETR unknown.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- A CG replaced the DDG and joined an FFG, FFL, and AGI in the vicinity of the Task Force [redacted]

[redacted] COPY # 7 OF 7

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

[redacted]

-- Winter weather and heavy [redacted] hampering military operations in the northeast. [redacted] vehicle, and resupply operations are restricted.

[redacted]

-- Bandi Sadr appears to be the front runner for Friday's presidential election. Habibi, however, has picked up endorsement by Khomeini's party and leading clergy. A likelihood for widespread boycotts confuses the issue.

[redacted]

-- Japan continues to have the economic/political dilemma over the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Project at Bandar-e-Khomeini.

[redacted] The total loss would bankrupt the Japanese firms and deplete the government's export insurance account.

Prepared by: [redacted] LtCol, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 23 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) arrived on station in Arabian Sea.

  -- MC-130 completes training at [redacted] and returns to [redacted] today (TAB C).

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU enroute Eniwetok for turnover on 29 Jan.

  -- ARG/MAU Employment information has been presented in a seperate folder.

  -- USS CORAL SEA at sea enroute [redacted].

  -- B-52 Indian Ocean Surveillance report at TAB I-3.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

  -- "Persian Gulf Carrier Aircraft Operations", [redacted] and "B-52H Sea Surveillance" options have been added to Options section.

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 058, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 043, TAB I-2)

  -- RAY undergoing repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.

  -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC. One has flight control vibrations. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board KITTY HAWK. ETR for both is 23 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ; both are NMC, ETR unknown.

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(S) SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, FFL, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

-- Two Soviet IL-38 reconnoitered the NIMITZ group yesterday.

(S) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- [redacted]

-- Bandi-Sadr has said if he is elected President, Iran will boycott the Moscow Olympics.

-- [redacted] an aircraft supply company there [redacted] has [redacted] supply tires and spare parts for Boeing transport aircraft.

-- Yesterday, Iranian students took over the Iranian Embassy in Ankara, Turkey as a protest of Turkey's arrest of 80 Iranians.

(S) -- Rumors that our hostages will be released soon after the election continue to circulate among diplomats in Tehran.

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted] LtCol, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 22 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

A -- This morning two B-52s flew a sea surveillance mission from [redacted] into Arabian Sea.

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan.

E -- One MC-130 at [redacted] conducting low level training. ETD 22 Jan.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.

-- USS FANNING departed Mombassa enroute MODLOC. ETA 232300EST.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU departed Subic Bay for turnover at Eniwetok on 29 Jan.

-- Papers on "Marine Amphibious Unit and Amphibious Lift" and "Sustained MAGTF Deployment Capability" at Tabs I-5 & I-6.

-- USS CORAL SEA at sea enroute Singapore.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 057, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 042, TAB I-2)

-- RAY undergoing repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia. ETD 28 Jan.

-- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board KITTY HAWK. ETR 23 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, FFL, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

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- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Japanese press reports there are 400 terrorists in AMEMBASSY complex. Terrorists claim all hostages are at embassy.

-- In a major concession, Khomeini has approved a plan to ammend the new constitution to allow the Sunni sect equal status with the majority Shiite sect. This may help heal the rift with Shariat-Madari.

-- [redacted]

-- Both Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh have attacked the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan. Khomeini has remained silent on the subject.

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

- SPECIAL ITEMS OF INTEREST: "Sixth Fleet Schedules" (TAB I-3), "USS SARATOGA Readiness Status" (TAB I-4), "Marine Amphibious Unit" and "US Amphibious Lift" (TAB I-5) and "Sustained MAGTF Deployment Capability" (TAB I-6).

Prepared by: [redacted] LtCol, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 21 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan.

  -- Deployment of E-3A detachment from [redacted] to [redacted] complete.

  -- Deployment of MC-130 to [redacted] 20-22 Jan. (TAB C)

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.

  -- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

  -- USS CORAL SEA in Phattaya for port visit (ETD 20 Jan 80).

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 055, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 040, TAB I-2)

  -- RAY undergoing repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

  -- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board KITTY HAWK. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force [redacted]

  -- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

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- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Great Britain has dispatched a hastily assembled task force to the Mediterranean to fill the gap created by the Nimitz task force departure. The British force consists of an amphibious warfare ship, three guided missile frigates and two support ships.

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- Iran has 55 ZSU-23/4's in its inventory. [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

- SPECIAL ITEMS OF INTEREST: "Sixth Fleet Schedules" (TAB I-3), "USS SARATOGA Readiness Status" (TAB I-4), and "Marine Amphibious Unit" and "US Amphibious Lift" (TAB I-5).

Prepared by: [redacted] CDR, USN
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 19 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan.

  -- Deployment of E-3A detachment from [redacted] to [redacted] complete.

  -- Deployment of MC-130 to [redacted] 20-22 Jan. (TAB C)

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.

  -- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

  -- USS CORAL SEA in Phattaya for port visit.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 054, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 039, TAB I-2)

  -- RAY undergoing repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

  -- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board WHITE PLAINS which will join KITTY HAWK today. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

- SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

  -- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force while the [redacted]

  -- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

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- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)



- SPECIAL ITEMS OF INTEREST: "Sixth Fleet Schedules" (TAB I-3), "USS SARATOGA Readiness Status" (TAB I-4), and "Marine Amphibious Unit" fact sheet (TAB I-5).

- Prepared by: [redacted] LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 18 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.

  -- The second [redacted] E-3A is enroute to [redacted]

  -- Deployment of MC-130 to [redacted] paper at TAB C.

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.

  -- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

  -- USS CORAL SEA is enroute Phattaya for port visit.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

  -- Naval quarantine of Straits of Hormuz option paper has been revised. (TAB OPTION-1)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 053, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 038, TAB I-2)

  -- RAY max speed 22kts. Enroute repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

  -- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board WHITE PLAINS enroute KITTY HAWK, ETA 18 Jan. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

[redacted]

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- [redacted] Without radar tracking, the ZSU 23-4 is assessed to have good effectiveness using optical sight during day given adequate warning. However, in the absence of warning and fire control radar, the ZSU 23-4 would be marginally effective against a surprise A-6 strike at dawn or AC-130 strike at night.

-- [redacted]



-- Iran will attend the Islamic Conference in Pakistan on 26 January. Libya, Algeria, and Syria have indicated they will not attend. Conference is to consider Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Prepared by: [redacted] LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 17 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 January 1980.

1. DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). E-3A from Tinker arrived [redacted] last night. First E-3A departs [redacted] for [redacted] today, second on Thursday. Two KC-135s returned to [redacted]

-- Deployment of MC-130 to [redacted] paper at TAB C. KC-135/ MC-130 aerial refueling training paper at TAB I-3.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.

-- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 052, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 037, TAB I-2)

-- RAY max speed 22kts. Enroute repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

-- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board WHITE PLAINS enroute KITTY HAWK, ETA 18 Jan. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITY: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- [redacted] A fact sheet on the ZSU 23-4 is at TAB E. An analysis of ZSU 23-4 effectiveness against A-6 and AC-130 aircraft is being prepared.

-- French press reports that more US hostages may have been moved to Tehran's Evin Prison.

-- Press also reports that Panama and Iran are negotiating the extradition of the Shah.

-- ABC/TV reports Khomeini has accepted SYG Waldheim as an acceptable mediator between the US and IRAN.

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- A recent article by a DIA research analyst on "Iran and the World's Oil Supply" is attached at TAB E.

Prepared by: [redacted] LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 16 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). Aircraft rotation begins today with an E-3A departing Tinker AFB at 1230EST. First E-3A departs [redacted] tomorrow, second on Thursday.

-- Deployment of MC-130 to [redacted] paper has been updated (TAB C) KC-135/MC-130 aerial refueling training paper at TAB I-3.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options. See RH-53 status below.

-- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 051, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 036, TAB I-2)

-- RAY max speed 22kts. Enroute repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

-- RH-53: 5 of 6 FMC. Material required to repair sixth aircraft is on board WHITE PLAINS enroute KITTY HAWK, ETA 18 Jan. Repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan. Two additional RH-53 on board NIMITZ.

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SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- The provincial scene is relatively quiet. The government seems to be in control in Tabriz and shops are open.

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- [redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted] LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 15 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. TG chopped to PACOM at 140200EST. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.

  -- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). The second TF 70/E-3A mission resulted in 17 successful intercepts. TADIL-A/LINK-11 interface was unsuccessful and HF or UHF secure comm could not be established between E-3A and TF-70 units.

  -- [redacted] reports that his [redacted] counterpart has no objection to MC-130 arrival on 20 Jan. No objection to night and low level flight training was expressed.

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for HM-16 (see RH-53 information below).

  -- USS FANNING port visit Mombassa, ETD 19 Jan 80.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

  -- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 050, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 035, TAB I-2)

  -- RAY max speed 22kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

  -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. The fifth aircraft was expected to be repaired last night. The sixth aircraft is awaiting parts which are expected to arrive on 18 Jan with repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan.

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SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- While the UN Security Council voted 10-2-2 to impose economic sanctions against Iran, the Soviet veto overturns the vote. Consequently, State has initiated an offensive to persuade friendly nations to carry out the UN sanction as if it had not been vetoed.

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[redacted]

-- However, the terrorists at the Embassy have reiterated their claim that the Shah must be returned to Iran before the hostages are released. [redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted] LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 14 Jan 80

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Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 13 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.

  -- Two E-3A aircraft are a[redacted] (TAB B & I-2). The second TF 70/E-3A mission flew last night. The final [redacted] familiarization flight was successfully flown yesterday.

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for HM-16 (see RH-53 information below).

  -- USS FANNING enroute port visit Mombassa, ETA 14 Jan 80.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

  -- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 049, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 034, TAB I-2)

  -- RAY max speed 22kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

  -- RH-53: 4 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. The fifth aircraft is expected to be repaired today. The sixth aircraft is awaiting parts which are expected to arrive on 18 Jan with repairs estimated to take three additional days, ETR 21 Jan.

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SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, and AGI are in the vicinity of the Task Force [redacted]

-- [redacted]

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- The UN vote on sanctions against Iran was delayed for the second time pending SYG Waldheim's action on the Iranian "proposal."

-- Iran has formally requested extradition of the Shah from Panama.

-- Press reports that 11 members of the Moslem People's Republican Party which supports Shariat-Madari were executed yesterday in Tabriz.

-- DIA reports US oil consumption dropped by approximately 1 million barrels per day in October and that world oil supplies were plentiful.

-- [redacted]

-- Press reports that 16 Jan 80, the anniversary day of the departure of the Shah, has been declared "Shah burning day" by the Islamic Republican Party.

-- [redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted] LTCOL, USAF
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 13 Jan 80

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~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AS OF: 0700 12 Jan 80

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 212300EST Jan 80.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). An [redacted] familiarization mission flew yesterday. The second TF 70/E-3A mission will be flown tonight.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for HM-16 (see RH-53 information below).

-- USS FANNING enroute port visit Mombassa, ETA 14 Jan 80.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 048, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 033, TAB I-2)

-- RAY max speed 22kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

-- STEIN completed repair at Diego Garcia and is returning to Arabian Sea, ETA 16 Jan.

-- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. Two aircraft ETR today. All parts to repair aircraft with damaged rotor system are enroute to Diego Garcia. WABASH will transport parts to KITTY HAWK, ETA is 18 Jan 80.

~~TOP SECRET~~ COPY # 7 OF 7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP SECRET

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- An FFG, DDG, AGI, and AUX are in the vicinity of the Task Force.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

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-- Press reports Iran will suspend oil deliveries to every country which applies sanctions against Iran.

Prepared by:
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 12 Jan 80

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WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 January 1980.

- DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

  -- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80. Message being prepared which directs NIMITZ to arrive Indian Ocean NLT 212300ESTJan 80.

  -- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). An [redacted] familiarization mission flew yesterday and one is flying today. A second TF 70/E-3A mission will be flown on 12/13 Jan.

  -- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for RM-16 (see RH-53 information below). This morning, MIDWAY, BAINBRIDGE, and PARSONS conducted a sprint northwest toward Gulf of Oman and flight operations upon arrival in entrance to Gulf.

  -- USS FANNING enroute port visit Mombassa, ETA 14 Jan 80.

  -- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

  -- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

  -- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

  -- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 047, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 032, TAB I-2)

  -- RAY max speed 22kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

  -- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. One aircraft in phase maintenance, ETR 12 Jan. One aircraft main landing gear being replaced, ETR 12 Jan. All parts to repair aircraft with damaged rotor system have been located and delivery is being expedited, ETR unknown. Most downing discrepancies are found as a result of turn-up or daily routine maintenance rather than incident to flight.

SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- The FFG that has been patrolling the Strait of Hormuz has joined with the DDG, AGI, and AUX in the vicinity of the Task Force.

[redacted]

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

[redacted] western journalists have learned that Iranian television is making technical preparations to cover a trial of one American hostage which is expected to take place in four or five days.

[redacted]



[redacted]

-- The USS RICKETTS reported an Iranian C-130 made two passes at 300 feet, 1000 yards offset, parallel to ship.

[redacted]

Prepared by: [redacted]
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 11 Jan 80

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WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

Overview for use by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 January 1980.

DEPLOYMENTS: (Overview Graphic)

-- USS NIMITZ Task Group (NIMITZ, TEXAS, and CALIFORNIA) is enroute to the Arabian Sea. ETA is NLT 23 Jan 80. Commander TG 20.3 an battle staff offloaded at Ascension Island where they will remai until TG chops to CINCPAC.

-- Two E-3A aircraft are at [redacted] (TAB B & I-2). Ambassador Atherton flew yesterday. An [redacted] familiarization mission is flying today. A second TF 70/E-3A mission will be flown on 12/13 Jan.

-- USS MIDWAY and USS KITTY HAWK continue on station in Arabian Sea and are ready to conduct all missions and options, except for RM-16 (see RH-53 information below).

-- USS FANNING enroute port visit Mombassa, ETA 14 Jan 80.

-- MIDEASTFOR: On station in Persian Gulf. LASALLE in Bahrain. USS GLOVER in Red Sea.

-- Logistics support ships are as shown on graphic.

-- Pacific MAU in port Subic Bay.

-- USS CORAL SEA is conducting refresher operations in the Subic Bay training area prior to deploying to Indian Ocean to replace the MIDWAY.

- OPTION PAPERS: (Option TABs)

-- Naval blockade/quarantine information has been updated. (TAB I-3

- OPERATIONAL READINESS: (CINCPAC SITREP 046, TAB I-1, CINCEUR SITREP 031, TAB I-2)

-- RAY max speed 22kts. Scheduled for repair with DIXIE at Diego Garcia, 18-25 Jan.

-- LASALLE #1 boiler repaired, max speed 15 kts.

-- RH-53: 3 of 6 FMC. Maximum attention is being devoted to effecting repairs. Most parts have been located and are enroute Squadron personnel can make all repairs when parts are available. Repairs must be completed prior to KITTY HAWK/NIMITZ cross deck.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

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SOVIET TATTLETAIL ACTIVITIES: (Overview Graphic)

-- A guided missile frigate continues patrol in the Strait of Hormu
A DDG, AGI, and auxiliary, supported by a Soviet merchant tanker
are in close vicinity of Task Force.

-- Locations of other Soviet ships are shown on Overview Graphic.

--

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: (TAB E)

-- Ayatollah Beheshti. Secretary of Iran's Revolutionary Council,
stated that there has been some movement in the hostage situatio
but results may be several weeks away.

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-- Terrorists at the US Embassy issued a statement condeming the Sau
family of Saudi Arabia as US "puppets" and called for Arab
Muslims to overthrow the Saud family.

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-- A DIA assessment of Iran's transportation system is at TAB I-4.

Prepared by:
OJCS/OPG Ext 52791, 10 Jan 80.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] (260)

Item Number: ___

E

Intelligence Historical Report
J2, JTF 1-79

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 May 1992
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO, NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
[redacted] JS [redacted]

SUBJECT: Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB)

TIMEFRAME: September 1980

SUMMARY:

1. (TS) J2 representatives conducted a site survey of the DITB at Echterdingen AAF, FRG and [redacted]

2. (S) (U) (TS) The DITB represents a capability to receive digital imagery at a location remote from fixed [redacted] installations.

3. (U) (TS) The DITB is moveable with a great amount of airlift and ground support.

4. (S) (U) (TS) The entire DITB is not necessary to receive and process [redacted]

5. (U) (TS) The DITB is in the test bed stage - not even a prototype.

6. (U) The DITB is due to be home-based at Ft. Bragg, NC.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON
DERIVATIVE CL BY
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADED TO
REVIEW ON
DERIVED FROM

COMMENTS:

1. (U) (S) Support requirements are extremely heavy.

2. (U) (S) While the DITB has never been completely broken, it is not always timely.

3. (U) Upon return from FRG, the DITB was to be completely refurbished by the manufactures and returned to Ft. Bragg, NC.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. (U) That Special Operations personnel contact the Army Space Programs Office (ASPO), NMCC to determine timetable for DITB to return to Ft. Bragg, NC.

2. (U) That Special Operations personnel become briefed and familiar with the capabilities and requirements of the DITB.

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Classified By JCS
Declassified By OADR

3. (U) That the DITB be included for utilization in long range planning if reliability is improved.

OTHER RELATED ITEMS:

J-2 PERSONNEL INVOLVED: Captain [redacted]

POINTS OF CONTACT:

1. ASPO: Col [redacted] /LTC [redacted] 274-9527/28

2. Engineer Topographic Lab, Ft. Belvoir, VA: Mr. [redacted] 664-3653/5819

3. DDPSOP: CPT [redacted] CPT [redacted] - AV 833-0676

ATTACHMENTS:

(1) JTF REQUEST memo - 11 AUG 80

(2) DIA Concurrence memo - 14 Aug 80

3. JTD memo for Director, DIA, Subj: DITB dated 22 Sep 80 (TSR)

4. JTD MFR; Subj: DITB; dated 15 Sep 80 (TSR)

SOD SUMMARY SHEET

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	SOD CONTROL NUMBER
DIR, DIA	TOP SECRET	

SUBJECT: Potential Use of JITB (U) (S)

ACTION			
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
XX	XX		

REMARKS

Facing memorandum requests Director, DIA concurrence on dispatch of Joint [redacted] DIA Team to Europe to assess the value of predeploying key elements of the DITB to North Africa, against the possibility of another [redacted] deployment.

ACTION OFFICER

[redacted]
LT COL, USAF
J3/JTD
55078

DATE OF PREPARATION
09 AUG 80

INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
J- P						
EXEC						
TIE CHF						
VCDPB						
COPB						

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

11 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Potential Use of DITB (U)

1. (U) ~~(TS)~~ This office has been informed by [redacted] that the DITB (Digital Imagery Test Bed) has been deployed to Europe to support the theater exercise program and will remain in Europe until October.

2. (U) ~~(TS)~~ As you may know, during the previous deployment an Imagery Readout Team was moved to Europe and subsequently to the forward staging base to update the force prior to launch. It is possible the DITB holds a potential to further improve the availability of photo intelligence to forward deployed forces, if the need arises.

3. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Recognizing this potential, we would like to suggest that a joint JCS/DIA imagery interpreter team visit the DITB site in Europe and assess the value of forward deploying key elements of the system to a secure US controlled location in North Africa "for climatic and operational testing." so that it would in fact be available to support another forward deployment if needed.

4. (U) ~~(TS)~~ This concept has been discussed with Mr. [redacted] (DC-5C) and Col [redacted] project manager. They recommend that the survey team visit the European site in mid-August to allow sufficient time to reprogram the projected October return of the DITB to the CONUS, without attracting undue attention.

5. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Request your concurrence in the visit of a survey team and identification of the DIA team member.

RICHARD V. SECORD
Major General, USAF

CLASSIFIED BY JCS, J-3, JTD
REVIEW ON 11 AUGUST 1980

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DITB
14 AUG 80

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

14 August 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL SECORD

SUBJECT: Joint JCS/DIA Visit to the DITB (U)

1. (U) I concur with your suggestion for a joint JCS/DIA image interpreter visit to the DITB. The system does offer a significant potential to support tactical forces, an assessment of a further deployment of the system to test its ability to support a contingency force from a forward base area in a desert environment appears to have considerable merit.

2. (U) I offer Major [redacted] USAF, as the DIA member of the team. Major [redacted] is the Chief of DIA's Priority Exploitation Branch and it was he and his organization that provided DIA image interpreter support to the forward deployed forces during the previous contingency operation. Major [redacted] can be reached on extension 56726.

JAMES L. BROWN
Major General, USAF
Assistant Director
for JCS Support

Classified by DIA, JSF
Declassify on 14 AUG 1986

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOD SUMMARY SHEET

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	SOD CONTROL NUMBER
DIR, DIA	~~TOP SECRET~~	

SUBJECT:

Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB)

ACTION			
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
		xx	

REMARKS

Inclosed memorandum provides JTD comments concerning possible use of DITB at a Forward Operating Base.

A/G

ACTION OFFICER

[redacted]
LTC, USAF
J3, SOD
X-58078

DATE OF PREPARATION

22 Sep 80

INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
J P						
EXEC						
VIS [illegible]						
VCOPG						
COPG						

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

22 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB) (U)

1. ~~(TS)~~ DIA and JTD representatives recently investigated the capability of the DITB to support the JTF during deployment to a desert Field Operating Base (FOB). The representatives inspected the equipment at Echterdingen, FRG, and conducted a detailed debriefing of the personnel operating the system. The team also traveled to [redacted] with DITB personnel for an on-site survey of a potential FOB.

2. (U) ~~(TS)~~ DITB support at an FOB could provide the JTF commander and operational forces with the most current imagery of operational areas prior to mission launch. This capability would be a substantial asset, if the DITB reliability could be assured.

3. (U) ~~(TS)~~ The following factors, however, militate against the DITB being able to perform reliably for an extended period at a desert site:

a. The primary components of the DITB consist of commercial test-bed components, not designed for extended use.

b. The system has not operated for an extended period, nor has it been tested in an extreme desert environment.

c. Malfunctions in the system hardware and software components occur on an almost daily basis significantly degrading its timeliness in processing imagery.

d. The ability to obtain and maintain the required electrical ground at the desert site is questionable.

e. Support for the DITB at the desert site would be extensive, i.e. one entire large aircraft bunker.

f. Per fonecon, 20 Sep 80, LTC [redacted] Cpt [redacted] LTC [redacted] provided the following additional information:

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(1) Software gaps cause the system to be yellow possibly as much as 70% of its operating time. These gaps in software are corrected by the contractors, but the effect of the correction on other software sub-routines is unknown until another gap develops.

(2) Only in the last few days has the system come up fully green; nevertheless, the system reporting time is still running in excess of 2 hours.

(3) Although the system has never been unable to perform its mission, it is not always timely, especially if it requires retransmission of data.

4. (U) ~~(TS)~~ Based on these factors, the DITB is not sufficiently reliable and timely to warrant the expenditure of funds and commitment of critical support assets to deploy and maintain it at a FOB. If the DITB's reliability is significantly improved as a result of its planned refurbishment program, we will re-evaluate its capability to support the JTF.

RICHARD V. SECORD
Major General, USAF

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO	DATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. _____

Handle Via

[redacted]

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

_____ _____ _____

_____ _____ _____

Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Security Classification)

SECRET [redacted]

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

THE JOINT STAFF

15 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Digital Imagery Test Bed (DITB) (U)

1. (U) Cpt [redacted] and Maj [redacted] conducted a site survey, received operational and capability briefings of the DITB as deployed to Echterdingen Airfield, FRG. (See Incl 1)

2. (S) The DITB has the capability to receive, manipulate, and process [redacted]

3. (U) Both soft and hard copy exploitation have advantages and disadvantages which are discussed at Inclosures 3 and 4.

4. (U) A breakout of minimum manning required for a 60-90 day operation of the DITB by equipment and possible personnel source is at Inclosure 5.

5. (U) Requirements in addition to normal personnel and logistic needs (e.g. latrines, messing, billeting, mail, etc) are listed at Inclosure 6. This list is not final but as comprehensive as possible.

6. (TS) The main cost for the operation of the DITB at [redacted] will be in transportation (at least 1 C-5 sortie), POL and contractor support to DRSEM and DEMONS. An itemized projection of possible 60-90 day cost is at Inclosure 7.

7. (U) Discussion:

a. (U) While the DITB does represent a tremendous technological capability, this capability must be viewed within the scope of its original design mission. The Digital Imagery Test Bed has certain inherent weaknesses as a Test Bed.

TOP SECRET [redacted]

WORKING PAPERS

HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEMS ONLY

b. (U) (TSR) The equipment in DEMONS and DRSEM is off the shelf commercial components that were installed in vans for one purpose - to put on the Oct 79 demonstration at the Engineer Topographic Lab (ETL) and show the technical feasibility of TACIES, an Army proposed system to provide national imagery to Army users. It has never been run for a period as long as 60-90 days.

c. (U) TSC-86 (MOD) is due for a complete refurbishment after the European deployment with a projected availability date of early Feb 81. The DITB OIC, LTC [redacted] was very cautious in giving any projection for how long the TSC-86 will continue to function. It is probably the weakest link.

d. (TS) The DRSEM is also scheduled for major contractor work (contract completion and modification) after the European deployment and is also scheduled to be available in Feb 81. The electrical equipment ground will be a problem. DRSEM was designed for a 0.1 ohm ground but has operated as high as 20 ohms. Grounding at [redacted] required extensive preparation and a ground resistance low enough for this equipment to operate may not be achievable even though other electrical and radio equipment does work.

e. (TS) The hangar/facility at [redacted] will require some engineer construction and modification which should be accomplished prior to the movement of any of the vans. Deployment will require the use of 1 entire large hangar and some surrounding area which will then become separately secured within the large compound. This hangar will also be the quarters for the DITB personnel.

f. (U) The hard copy system has no integral capability to provide enlargements.

g. (U) The DITB has never been operated in the desert environment and this is no guarantee the system will function.

h. (U) If deployed, it will set back the program development and homebasing at Ft. Bragg by 90 days.

i. (U) Both the TSC 80 and DRSEM are dependent on one air conditioning unit each for system cooling. Failure of either air conditioner will cause the system to be inoperative until repaired.

j. (U) The DEMONS LASERFAX was down when we visited, had been down for 3-4 days, but was brought up by the time we left. It was still not operating 100%.

[redacted]



[redacted]

k. (U) Both DRSEM and DEMONS require contractor support for maintenance and operation.

l. (U) Inclosure 8 is a summarized listing of advantages/ disadvantages.

8. (U) POCs:

DITB: LTC [redacted] Capt [redacted] KY3-2254 (Echterdingen)

ETL: Mr. [redacted] (DEMONS) 664-3653/5819

DDPSOP: CPT [redacted] CPT [redacted] AV 833-0676 (DRSEM)

ASPO: COL [redacted] /LTC [redacted] 274-9527/28

9. (U) REQUIREMENTS:

a. AN O-5 be site OIC

b. Contract manager

c. Money controller

d. Operations schedule (timetable for operation)

10. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. (U) That the DITB be deployed in view of the requirement for immediate imagery and the technical feasibility of the systems to provide this support to the JTD.

b. (U) (TSR) That the DITB configuration be limited to the minimum essential equipment (a soft copy package - TSC 80, DRSEM, DEMONS) to satisfy the intelligence requirement.

c. (U) That due to the severity of the environment for both personnel and equipment, a schedule projecting operational envelopes to allow for periods of initial set-up, system shut down and rest (2-3 duty Off/NCOs to monitor facility) and subsequent phase up to a limited period of operational capability.

d. (U) Investigate further the feasibility of creating a hard copy back up to the DEMONS utilizing the RS59 augmented by an Ad Hoc darkroom (projection printer and processor).

e. (U) That a DITB PM be designated as ground site OIC.

[redacted]

CPT, USA [redacted] MAJ, USAF

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Required [redacted] in Hard Copy exhibit

Soft Copy

Hard Copy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tab 1




AN/TSC-86(MOD)
RECEIVES LOW & VARIABLE HIGH DATA RATE
6 FOOT & 120 FOOT ANTENNAS
DRSEM
DECOMPRESSES, RECORDS & RECONSTITUTES DATA
PASSES DIGITAL DATA TO DEMONS
GENERATES "HARD COPY" ON LBR
DEMONS ELEC.
RECORDS & TRANSFERS DIGITAL DATA
SUPPORTS PROCESSING & MESSAGE GENERATION
ES-59A
DEVELOPS "HARD COPY"
DEMONS DISP.
"SOFT COPY" EXPLOITATION
TARGET POSITIONING
MESSAGE GENERATION
HARD COPY 'SNIPS'
MAGIS
"HARD COPY" EXPLOITATION
TARGET POSITIONING
DATA BASE
MESSAGE GENERATION FOR DEMONS
sanitized reports to corps
decompartmented images
reports (to DEMONS)
TOP SECRET

[redacted]

SOFT COPY (DEMONS)

ADVANTAGES:

1. NRT
2. Unlimited zoom (up to 1 pixel x 512)
3. Roam
4. Gray scale enhancement
5. Rotation
6. Accurate Locator
7. Can provide LASERFAX "SNIPS" of CRT display

DISADVANTAGES:

1. Environmental control (temperature & humidity)
2. LASERFAX reliability
3. Contractor support

Copy of LASERFAX Gray Scale attached

-6 Cl-5

[redacted]



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HARD COPY (DRSEM + ES-59 + MAGIIS)

ADVANTAGES:

1. Provides hard copy film (pos or neg)

2. Possibly better enlargements w/Ad Hoc darkroom (no inherent enlargement capability)

DISADVANTAGES:

1. Longer processing time and requires [redacted] ES-59 operators

2. Requires fabrication of an Ad Hoc darkroom to enlarge and reproduce selected areas

3. No enhancement

4. Requires consistent water supply

5. Requires effluect disposal

6. Requires large quantities consumable supplies for ES-59 and darkroom

7. If MAGIIS is used - a unique power source is needed 28 KW at 400 cycle - a non-standard virtually unavailable aircraft APU

8. Contractor Support

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Incl 4

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

	MIL/CIV
1. TSC-86 (MOD) (SATCOMA)	4/0
2. DRSEM	3/2
3. DEMONS*	3/2
4. SPARES VAN	0/1
5. ES-59	2/0
6. MAGIS requires 30 KW 400 cycle	3/0
7. Generator/air conditioning repairmen	3/0
8. Site Cdr/Admin NCO	2/0
	20/5

* Additional 2 ea contractors for set up

Incl 5

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ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

- Concertina wire
- Picketts
- Sodium cloride
- Copper sulfate
- TA 312's/WD-1
- Additional 8' dish
- 300 gal water trailer
- Secret cleared guards
- Solenoid lock
- Plastic - construction
- Plywood
- Air conditioner ducts
- Ground air conditioners
- Guns & Ammo
- [illegible] destruction devices
- [illegible]
- Data Base - (a copy of [illegible] in DDS)
  Special Data Base for [illegible] - Built by DCSC
- [illegible]
- [illegible] wheel tractor
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible] emergency supply power
  [illegible]
- [illegible]

COST

4 Contractors 60-90 days = 12K - 18K
+4 Contractors 7-124 days set up = 1.4 K - 2.8 K

Based on at least $50/hr/person
8 hr/day/60-90 days

20 mil TDY - quarters & rations avail 19.2K - 28.8 (20 pax)
1/2 std rate ($16.00/day)
60-90 days

POL

Diesel - consumption 40 gal/hr
24 hrs/day 960 gal/day
60-90 day 57,600-86,400 gal
@ $.80/gal

46.08K - 69.12K

AIRLIFT

Deployment/re-deployment
@ $95/hr

743.6K

MISCELLANEOUS - Fund Cite

Unk expenses - spares 100K
Consumable supplies
(unprojected)

TOTAL 922.38K - [illegible]

ADVANTAGES:

- Can provid[illegible] ground forces prior to launch

SUPPORT PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH UNITS WHICH CAN BE OVERCOME:

[illegible]

B269

SECRET B-269

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DATE	CLASS	GROUP	ENCLOSURES	CONTROL NUMBER
	01 OCT 81	[redacted]			

SUBJECT

UTF 1-79 INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

RECORD OF CHANGES

COPY NO.	TO	DATE	SIGNATURE	DATE RETD.	SIGNATURE	DISPOSITION
1 of 8	J-3/SOD					
2 of 8	DIA/JSJ-1					
3 of 8	[redacted] -	C	(X)			
4 of 8	CIA/DDO -	C				
5 of 8	[redacted] -	A	(X)			
6 of 8	JSOSE					
7 of 8	1ST SFOD DELTA -		(X)			
8 of 8	1 SOW/DOS		(X)			

JCS FORM NO. 74 (SEPT 68 REV. 4-66) DOCUMENT CONTROL AND DESTRUCTION RECORD

A C

SECRET

REVISED 23 SEP 87

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
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B-2(A

THE JOINT STAFF

1 OCT 1981

MEMO TO HOLDERS

Subject: Document Distribution and Releasability

1. (C) This document was produced to insure that the DOD intelligence experiences of the Iranian Hostage Crisis are available for review by properly cleared DOD officers with a valid NEED-TO-KNOW. In keeping with this philosophy, releasability has been divided into two major areas as outlined below.

a. Material related to events which transpired between 4 Nov 79 and 26 Apr 80 (Chapters 1-8, and 10-14) is considered appropriate for review, study, and retention (narrative/index portions only) by the Senior Intelligence Officers of the following organizations:

- OJCS/J-3/SOD cy #1
- DIA/JSJ-1 cy #2
- [redacted] cy #3
- CIA/DDO cy #4
- [redacted] cy #5
- [redacted] cy #6
- 1st SFOD DELTA cy #7
- [redacted] cy #8

b. Material related to events encompassing the time frame 27 Apr 80 through 20 Jan 81 is considered sensitive and distribution is restricted to:

- OJCS/J-3/SOD
- DIA/JSJ-1
- [redacted]
- CIA/DDO

2. (C) The following guidelines for classification review and regrading are provided IAW DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation, October 1980, para 1-600c.

a. Confidential and Secret material may be reviewed at the three year point for downgrading and cannot retain its original classification more than six years.

[redacted]

~~REGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~WHEN SEPARATED FROM BASIC~~
~~CLASSIFIED BY: Director, J-3~~
~~REVIEW ON: 8 October 2001~~
~~EXTENDED BY: Director, J-3~~
~~REASON: 2-301(c), 5 & 6~~

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~~SENSITIVE~~
~~TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING~~

b. Top Secret material may be reviewed at the six year point for possible downgrading and at four year intervals thereafter until twenty years. The Top Secret classification cannot be prolonged beyond twenty years.

c. Top Secret Sensitive material may be reviewed at a ten year point for deletion of the sensitive handling restriction. It will be reviewed at the twenty year point for downgrading to Secret and at five year intervals thereafter.

d. Top Secret Codeword material will remain classified Top Secret throughout the twenty year limitation unless specifically regraded by the originating agency, DIA, DMA and [redacted] Review and regrading at the twenty year point must be made by the originating agency.

3. (U) This document classified by Director, J-3, OJCS, Standard Review Date is 15 July 2001.

PHILIP C. GAST
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director for Operations

RICEBOWL/SNOWBIRD
INTELLIGENCE HISTORICAL REVIEW
JTF 79-1 (Nov 79 - Jan 81)

Preface

1. (U) The intent of this document is to capture the scope and depth of the intelligence effort that went into preparing for the American Military Rescue Attempt of 24 April 1980 and to document the extent and complexities of preparation for follow-on efforts.

2. (U) When the Joint Task Force (JTF 1-79) was formed in November 1979 and assigned the mission to be prepared to conduct a rescue mission, intelligence was recognized as a most important factor. This awareness continued throughout the lifespan of the JTF. Accordingly, operational planning was hindered or assisted by the availability or lack of reliable intelligence data.

3. (S) During the Nov 79 - Apr 80 time frame (OPERATION RICEBOWL), planners were able to concentrate on developing a specific scenario [redacted] The rescue operation was terminated solely due to mechanical problems which reduced the number of flyable helicopters below an acceptable level.

4. (S) On the other hand, during the May 80 - Jan 81 time frame (OPERATION SNOWBIRD), [redacted]

5. (S) Due to the extended period of time to be covered in this review and given the fact that two distinct sets of circumstances prevailed, the review has been divided into several Parts/Sections.

a. The review begins with an Executive Overview and a short historical survey of events leading up to the Embassy takeover; this is followed by a summary of the takeover and the fifteen months of captivity as reconstructed from the hostage debriefings.

[redacted]

b. The major portion of this history has been divided into two time segments (pre and post raid). These sections along with their supporting pictorial material trace, in capsule form, the ebb and flow of most of the intelligence events, actions, and initiatives which transpired during the entire fifteen months of the hostage situation.

c. Following the pictorial portion of each section, the reader will find an index to the supporting files which have been retained at OJCS/J-3/SOD to provide examples of the quality, divergence, and depth of the massive collection, analytical and production effort that went into supporting rescue preparations.

d. Other major sections of this document include copies of JTF component intelligence histories and summaries of DMA and [redacted] efforts during the hostage situation.

e. Introductory comments by the Commander of the Joint Task Force can be found immediately following this preface.

f. Observation and comments of the JTF/J-2 can be found in Section 12.

Eugene F. Tighe, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

[redacted]

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM TO READER

Subject: Commander's Comments

1. ~~(S)~~ After being tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 Nov 79 to develop a means for rescuing the hostages from Iran, I conducted a comprehensive review of capabilities available to accomplish such a mission. Those we had were adequate for conducting limited rescue operations in a friendly environment; however, they were totally inadequate for the mission that I had been assigned.

2. (S) In the ensuing months, we developed what we considered a small but competent force to meet these goals. Since we had general intelligence information with respect to hostage location, i.e., Embassy Compound, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), we were able to devote our efforts to a single mission scenario: a long-range helicopter infiltration into Tehran. In retrospect, I continue to believe that had it not been for the mechanical failure of three helicopters, we would have succeeded in our initial effort.

3. (S) Following the attempt in April 1980, the circumstances surrounding the hostages changed [redacted]

B, C

4. (S) The JTF had to assume that sufficient intelligence data would eventually become available and that, in order to be ready to properly execute the orders of the President, a force trained throughout the spectrum of potential mission scenarios had to be developed. This force would become proficient in a wide range of capabilities.

[redacted]

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5. (S) However, in spite of the best efforts by many dedicated intelligence personnel, the net product of the intelligence community [redacted] was dangerously unsatisfactory [redacted] Prompt corrective action must be taken [redacted] or future planning efforts will prove equally frustrating and future operations froth with the seeds of disaster.

B, C

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA
COMJTF

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INTELLIGENCE HISTORICAL REVIEW
JTF 79-1 (Nov 79 - Jan 81)

Executive Overview

1. ~~(TS)~~ (U) Shortly after the hostage seizure incident occurred, a small planning cell was convened (in OJCS spaces), augmented by two officers from the ground force, and began to formulate concepts for a series of rescue options. The planning group began receiving DIA intelligence support immediately, although the complete array of national intelligence capabilities was not fully integrated for several weeks.

2. ~~(S)~~ (U) During this early period, the organizational and planning framework of an existing JCS CONPLAN was employed. This included the coordination of intelligence, selection of the rescue forces, structure of the JTF, and concepts for operational planning, force deployment, mission execution, and supporting cover actions.

3. ~~(C)~~ (U) When COMJTF received his tasking on 12 November 1979, the rescue planning cell became the nucleus of the JTF staff. The immediate DOD objective in November was to field an emergency rescue capability quickly. The question of how to insert and subsequently recover the ground rescue force from a hostile environment arose immediately and became the most vexing difficulty COMJTF would face.

4. ~~(TS)~~ (U) Intelligence collection began immediately. However, significant planning and intelligence collection problems were created by the continuing changes in political perceptions surrounding the plight of the hostages. Concurrently, conceptual plans were developed by the JTF staff and reviewed by the CJCS. On 19 Nov 79, COMJTF recommended a helicopter option as having the greatest potential for success. By 27 Nov 79, a viable concept had been developed.

5. ~~(C)~~ (U) Each of the JTF force components--with the exception of the helicopter contingent--already had small intelligence sections who had worked several similar situations in conjunction with the members of the JTF/J-2 staff during the preceding 2 1/2 years. A USMC intelligence officer was assigned to support the combined USN/USMC helicopter contingent. He was provided intelligence support directly from the JTF. In the JTF headquarters itself, the intelligence section remained small throughout the period, beginning with one officer on 5 November and increasing to three in the course of planning for the first attempt, and five during follow-on efforts.

6. (U) Strict adherence to OPSEC criteria was maintained throughout. Only key individuals outside the JTF were aware planning was underway. Most of the intelligence officers from staffs and agencies outside the JTF were not briefed on the operational planning, although most individuals working JTF-related intelligence requirements on a continuing basis eventually were able to deduce for themselves the type of mission they were supporting.

7. (S) Most intelligence requirements were formulated by the JTF J-2 in anticipation of JTF needs. Requirements came in from the field components by message or hard copy courier delivery. [redacted]

8. (U) (TS) The following comments extracted from the JTF (operational) Capabilities Review provide a framework for the balance of the JTF Intelligence History.

EXTRACT:

(TS) Overall intelligence support for mission planning, training and execution was responsive, professional and generally adequate with one major limitation . . [redacted]

a. (TS) Throughout the entire period rescue planning was severely constrained by inadequate [redacted] These voids caused planners to make worst-case assumptions and extensively safe-sided plans. Prompt corrective action must be taken on both the [redacted] to correct this glaring deficiency.

b. (U) (C) DIA acted as broker for most general intelligence requirements, satisfying in excess of 700 specific requests, largely of an analytical nature.

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c. (U) DMA provided mapping, charting and geodetic support, producing no less than twenty-four special map and photo products designed to satisfy tactical requirements including data reduced coordinates for use in the navigation systems of all mission aircraft.

[redacted]

h. [redacted] All of these agencies, including CIA, provided specific points of contact or permanent liaison officers which greatly simplified coordination.

END EXTRACT

[redacted]

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (U)

1. (U) (C) In late 1977 and early 1978, a series of growing and frequently violent demonstrations erupted in Iran. These demonstrations, while widely separated geographically, had a single underlying motif: popular dissatisfaction with the rule of the Shah. By mid-1977, intelligence sources and analysts had begun reporting and evaluating the manifestations of discontent in Iran. These were repeatedly characterized as serious but by no means fatal for the monarchy. This line of reasoning persisted through the first six months of 1978.

2. (U) (SNFD) Following a disastrous fire at the Rex Cinema in Abadan in August 1978 which killed at least 377 people, government investigators promptly arrested five radical Islamic Marxists. The Iranian underground opposition spread the rumor that the blaze had been set by Savak with the intent being to blame the revolutionary elements. The opposition groups seized on the incident declaring the fire victims "martyrs" and [illegible] victims of the Shah's secret police. Thereafter stability went downhill and the momentum swung against the monarchy when Ayatollah Khomeini shifted the site of his exile from Iraq to Paris during October.

[redacted]

4. (U) In early December Iranian troops fired on hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Tehran who had taken to the streets for religious observances of Muharram, despite a government ban on such activities. Combined with a drastic strike-induced decrease in oil production, these actions served as further harbingers of the Shah's demise. On 16 January 1979 the Shah abdicated and departed Iran, leaving responsibility with a weak provisional government. Two weeks later Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile and the process of 'Islamification' began.

5. (U) (C) On the afternoon of 11 February 1979, Iranian troops began withdrawing from security positions around the US Embassy in Tehran. Within twenty-four hours their places

9. [redacted]

10. (SNFD) The February takeover was viewed by many only as a disturbing aberration. Since the situation was resolved with relatively little bloodshed and in rather rapid fashion, the Ambassador's decision on minimal resistance was seen as correct. It seemed that such armed hooliganism was simply a risk which the Embassy staff had to endure in a revolutionary environment. In the eight months which followed, the Embassy staff was aware that repetition of the February takeover was always a possibility.

11. [redacted]

12. (C) Although the Bazargan provisional government existed until two days after the hostage seizure, the locus of decision-making in Iran had become personalized in the brooding figure of Khomeini and his various politico-clerical-revolutionaries from early March onward. Meanwhile, the exiled Shah and his entourage moved from Egypt to Morocco to the Bahamas to Mexico. US-Iranian relations during the period were characterized by a continuing downslide.

13. (U) In May the US Senate formally condemned the ongoing wave of summary executions being meted out to former members of the imperial bureaucracy. In retaliation, Tehran spurned the US Ambassador-designate, cancelled a $9 billion arms deal, and repealed the 1947 Status-of-Forces Agreement with the US.

14. (SNFD) On 28 June 1979, the Director, DIA expressed his concern about serious gaps in collection capabilities in writing to the DCI. The Director, DIA perceived information gaps in five major areas:

- Opposition groups
- [redacted]abilities and attitudes
- [redacted]ternal support (USSR/PLO)
- [redacted] revolutionary leaders
- Leadership, composition, and capabi[redacted]al groups

15. (SNFD) [redacted] 1979, the DCI circulated an assessment of current collection capabilities which noted that despite continued priority [redacted]ation of available resources, collection with [redacted] to the emerging Iranian leadership and its various constituencies was "less than good". HUMINT was [redacted] collection but it was rated only "fair to good" [redacted] were seen as ineffective with the [redacted]

16. ~~(C)~~ The intelligence picture of radical groups within the fragmented post-Shah political picture was a blurred one. The Fedayeen-E-Islam (devotes of Islam) which flourished in the decade following World War II was a general prototype for a proliferation of religiously oriented terrorist organizations. Although the original Fedayeen movement was decimated by Savak during the mid-1950's, its successor--under the sponsorship of Ayatollah Khalkhali--provided a link with the past as well as legitimizing violence and torture as a political instrument of the Islamic revolution.

17. (SNFD/[redacted]INTEL/ORCON) The largest known leftist radical group, the Mujahedin, combined a [redacted] Islamic and Marxist rhe[redacted] popu[redacted] viewed as [redacted] and for the [redacted] also fragme[redacted] the "Peop[redacted] was more aligned [redacted] and provided [redacted] for both the revolutionary guard and Khomeini's "strugg[redacted] for the Islamic Revolution".

18. [redacted]

SECTION 4

RECONSTRUCTION OF EVENTS BASED ON HOSTAGE DEBRIEFINGS

1. (U) Chronology of Events

a. (U) At approximately 1025 hours on 4 November 1979, demonstrators were observed climbing over the main gate of the Embassy. They succeeded in opening the gate, allowing a large group of chador-clad females, carrying placards and banners, to enter the Embassy Compound. National police in the area did not move to stop the intruders. Part of the crowd collected in front of the chancery, others went directly toward the residences. One group broke off from the others and proceeded to the rear of the chancery and began a forced entry through the basement. Another group had gained entrance to the consulate and forced an entry through an unbarred, second story bathroom window.

b. (U) Word of the presence of demonstrators on the compound quickly spread among Embassy personnel, but there was no panic. The chancery and consulate buildings were secured. Off-duty Marines in the Bijon Apartments were called and told to remain where they were. They were subsequently captured. Telephone contact was established with the Charge' at the MFA where he had a 1000 hours appointment. Telephone contact was also made with the DOS Operations Center in Washington, D.C.

c. (U) The Regional Security Officer (RSO) instructed the on-duty Marines to initiate the established emergency defense plan. Upon learning that some of the crowd had penetrated the basement of the chancery, the RSO went down, had a discussion with the student leader, convincing him to withdraw the group. Meanwhile, all Embassy personnel in the chancery had moved to the second floor.

d. (U) The RSO departed the chancery with the group's leaders through the window the penetrators had used and went to investigate the situation at the consulate building. He found the building secure after an attempted penetration through a second floor unbarred bathroom window was thwarted by a Marine guard. The RSO then returned to the chancery with the student leader.

e. (U) Due to a lack of demonstrators near the consulate, most of its occupants were able to escape in small groups. The last group of five were subsequently captured a few blocks from the compound by a combination of students and Pasdaran. National police in the area did not interfere. This group of Americans was taken to the Ambassador's residence which apparently had been predesignated as a hostage assembly point.

f. (U) During this time the RSO, after entering the chancery, received permission from the Charge' to go back outside and attempt to diffuse the crowd in front of the building. He left his flak jacket and weapon with the Marine guard and again departed the chancery building. The RSO began a dialogue with the student leaders along the lines of allowing them to conduct a sit-in. During these discussions, two older individuals emerged from the crowd. The crowd now contained a number of males, some of whom were carrying clubs painted with "Down With America".

g. (U) The two older individuals ushered the student leader aside, took the RSO's radio and told him to have the door to the chancery opened. The RSO told his captors such a decision would have to come from the Charge'. The RSO then shouted to the Marine inside the building who had been covering him to call the Charge' and tell him it was just like February 14. This had no immediate result, and the RSO was led away to the building behind the Motor Pool, tied, and placed under armed guard.

h. (U) Approximately ten minutes later he was taken back into the basement of the chancery through the original penetration point. Inside the building the students had started a fire on the first floor to dispell the effects of a tear gas grenade which was accidentially discharged.

i. (U) The RSO was led to the second floor and used to communicate with the people in the secure area. After some delay, during which the situation was discussed via telephone between those in the secure area and the Charge', the Charge' made the decision to open the door. This order was passed and the door was opened. As portions of the chancery came under student control, they were ransacked and defaced. Attempts to coerce Americans to open safes, often at gun or knife point were common. The takeover was completed by 1500 hours.

j. (U) As the Americans were captured their hands were tied with pre-cut, pre-knotted nylon rope and they were blindfolded. During the initial capture of each group, particularly those who held out in the secure and vaulted areas, a certain degree of roughness was experienced after capture. Initially, all the Americans were confined to either the Ambassador's residence or one of the staff cottages. During the next three days, a general screening and identification process of the Americans was conducted by the Iranians. This sometimes included being brought back to a work area and being asked to open safes. It was not until the second day that Koob, who had been at the ICA offices off the Compound, was caught and taken to the Compound.

k. (U) Beginning on 6 November the militants relocated some of the Americans to one of two private residences in northern Tehran. Eventually more than twenty male Americans were rotated through these two buildings, with a normal off compound population averaging 8 to 9. All the Americans were returned to the Compound by mid-December.

l. (U) During the third week of November, thirteen of the original 63 compound hostages were released and it became evident that the MFA trio of Laingen, Howland, and Tomseth had lost their freedom of movement. Another six Americans assigned to Embassy were lucky enough to have been off the Compound at the time of the takeover and with the assistance of the Canadian Ambassador remained out of sight and eventually were able to leave the country undetected with Canadian assistance.

m. (U) During the period mid-December through mid-March, American hostages were held in the Ambassador's residence, the furniture warehouse, and the chancery, with a single staff cottage used once. By mid-March all the Americans were being held in the chancery, where they remained until the night of 25/26 April when all but five were relocated off the compound.

n. (U) Dispersions out of Tehran began that night with some 35 hostages moved by closed vans in small convoys to the cities of Tabriz, Hamadan, Qom, Esfahan, Shiraz, Yazd, and possibly Jahrom. Ten were held in Evin Prison in Tehran for a few days and then dispersed. Five were flown to Mashad, and the others moved to a small town a few hours from Tehran.

o. (U) Reconsolidation into Tehran began in early June and continued until late August. By 1 September all American hostages were in Tehran, with the majority (44) held in the Komiteh Prison, near the MFA. Five were held in the chancery and three at the MFA.

p. (U) During the last week of October 1980, approximately a dozen of the senior officers were relocated to the Evin Prison complex. By the end of the first week of November, the compound had been emptied of Americans with the former chancery detainees being relocated, the women to Evin and the men to Komiteh.

q. (U) Assembly of the hostages at the pre-release site, a complex in northern Tehran, began in mid-December and was concluded by 24 December with the exception of the MFA trio. The MFA hostages were taken to Komiteh prison on 3 January and remained there until 15/16 January when they were taken to the pre-release site.

r. (U) Beginning on 19 January, the Americans were told individually, they were candidates for release and their answers to questions about the conditions of their captivity would have an impact on their chance for release. They also were read an article from an English language edition of an 18 January Tehran newspaper which summarized the ongoing negotiations. Each was briefly interviewed by a female militant and answered with noncommittal responses. The interviews were filmed "for the student records". Following the interview, each American was given a general physical exam by the Algerian doctors and returned to their room.

s. (U) At approximately 1900 Tehran time (1030 EST) on 20 January, the Americans were told they had an hour to pack. Within 15 minutes, the guards came back and told them they were leaving. The Americans were blindfolded, placed on several buses and driven to Mehrabad Airport. One American, Metrinko, was pulled off the bus before it left the site and beaten because he replied to some profanities made by a militant. He was delivered to the airport separately in a sedan.

t. (U) The trip to the airport took approximately thirty-five minutes. The Americans waited on the buses between 15-45 minutes before being taken off one at a time and ushered through a human corridor of approximately fifty militants. None of the returnees claimed to have been hit or swung at during the movement to the aircraft, but the militants chanted fanatically "Down With America".

u. (U) Hostage treatment during captivity varied but included beatings, long periods of solitary confinement, extended periods of being tied or handcuffed, mock firing squads, in several cases denial of medical attention or medication, and threats of being thrown to the crowd or shot. Individuals receiving serious abuses appear to fall into three categories: those who were known or suspected to be associated with the CIA/intelligence; those who attempted escape; and those who antagonized their captors.

2. (U) Control, Direction and Support:

a. (U) The militants exercised direct physical control of the Americans from capture to release. The Americans were blindfolded and tied upon seizure and a no-talking rule was imposed. These restrictions remained in force for the first three months. Thereafter, the no-talking ban was lifted between roommates. However, the blindfold rule was applied on all movement out of a cell or room and the hands tied procedure was enforced on any out-of-building transfers. Physical security was high throughout, but varied with time, location and prisoner. During the

first few months it was not uncommon for Americans held in isolation to have an armed militant guard present. By March this procedure had been dropped, with unarmed guards in the hostage hallways and armed guards at key entry and control points and external perimeters. [redacted]

b. (C) All external moves, even trips from the chancery to Mushroom Inn and the Ambassador's residence for showers, were accomplished in cars or vans and under guard. All off-compound transfers were accomplished in vans with the windows blacked out. Circuitous routing was often used to confuse the Americans as to distance and direction. This practice continued until 24 December 1980 when several Americans were moved from one building within the pre-release compound to another. The Americans were blindfolded, hands tied, placed in a closed vehicle and driven around for approximately 20 minutes, then brought back to the building adjacent to their point of origin. Transfer from the pre-release site to the airport was done under blindfold and vehicle darkened conditions only. Hands were not tied.

c. (C) The militants were controlled and responded to direction from a hardline faction of the Islamic religious hierarchy. The continuing presence of Mullahs at the compound and various detention sites confirmed the extent of their involvement. The Mullahs in turn controlled revolutionary guard entities throughout the country. Rapid development, coordination and implementation of the [redacted] is clear evidence of this interface. Many of the dispersed detention sites were guarded by members of the revolutionary guard, and some are believed to have been Pasdaran training sites, others being Mullahs' homes. The extended use of Komiteh Prison, which is run under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, controlled by the clerics, is further evidence of their involvement.

d. (C) Although the militants accomplished much of their own housekeeping chores, they did receive support at least tacitly from secular segments of the Iranian Government structure. Such support included news coverage, radio and TV broadcast time and support (all key events were videotaped by technical teams from the Government-run TV), as well as telephone, water and power service. Revolutionary guards maintained security around the Compound, but allowed free movement to the militants. The militants were given small arms training either by the revolutionary guard or the conventional army. They were provided very sound security advice by knowledgeable

persons throughout and given the means and guidance to carry it through. They received support, at least indirectly, from the conventional military elements immediately after 25 April 1980, when measures were initiated to deter another rescue attempt. In addition the militants received substantial information, moral and psychological support from Iranian student groups in the United States.

e. (C) In summary, the events of the fifteen months of the Iranian hostage situation bear the hallmarks of an orchestrated campaign of psychological warfare designed to enhance the influence of the Islamic revolutionary hardliners, humiliate the United States, and purge American influence and values from Iranian society.

SECTION FIVE CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE TO READERS:

The following "Chronology of Events" is a running account of events as reported at the time. It was largely prepared from "open sources" or initial intelligence indications.

Since the intent of the listing was to capture the tenor of the prevailing atmosphere and document the complexity of the situation, no attempt has been made to go back and "correct the original listing."

For this reason some contradictions exist between what was "reported" and actual events; however, these "contradictions" are few.

(c) The most notable being a 4 Nov 80 claim that the militants transferred responsibility for the hostages to the Iranian Government on 3 Nov 80. [redacted] there was no physical relinquishing of the hostages to any government official at any time during the fifteen months of their captivity. The militants maintained custody throughout [redacted] period.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

NOV	Approximately 300 Iranian "students" swarmed over and seized the US Embassy Compound in TEHRAN and demanded return (extradition) of the Shah to IRAN. Hostage total estimated at 60-63 AMCITS and 20-30 FN.
7 NOV	Students/militants threaten to kill hostages if US takes armed action.
8 NOV	Iranian Red Cross doctor permitted to visit some of the hostages (no useful data obtained).
10 NOV	Four foreign diplomats (French, Swedish, Algerian, Syrian) visit compound and see most hostages. Diplomats are told that 4-5 hostages are being held outside of Compound and could not be seen during visit for security reasons. Hostages seen at Ambassador Residence, servants' quarters, Consulate, and staff cottages.
11 NOV	Papal Nuncio visits Compound and sees 11 hostages.
12 NOV	Militants claim to start a five day hunger strike. No further data obtained.
NOV	Militants reject conciliatory statements by Foreign Minister and vowed to hold hostages for two or three years, if necessary.
15 NOV	Militants reject Foreign Ministry statement that some of the hostages might be released, noting that no individual has the authority to do so.
16 NOV	Militants release three NBC film crewmen briefly held for filming the Compound.
16 NOV	Larger than normal crowds on this date, a Friday, starting a pattern noted throughout the hostage crisis.
16 NOV	KHOMEINI issued decree asking students to release blacks and women.
17 NOV	Spokesman for the militants reiterates earlier threat that hostages' situation would worsen if Shah leaves US.
18 NOV	LAINGEN believes 16 to be released.
19 NOV	Three hostages released (GROSS, QUARLES, MAPLES).
20 NOV	Ten hostages released (MONTAGNE, TEDFORD, WALSH, JOHNSON, WALKER, ROLLINS, WILLIAMS, ROBINSON, HUGHES, VINCENT).
NOV	Massive demonstrations at Embassy to commemorate beginning of Muharram, a major religious holiday.

22 NOV — Release of five non-Americans from Embassy announced.

25 NOV — Militants blame US/Zionists for attack on Grand Mosque in MECCA, SAUDI ARABIA.

25 NOV — Congressman HANSEN sees 19 hostages.

27 NOV — Militants claim that Embassy grounds and walls have been mined.

27 NOV — Indications of "staking" within Compound noted.

27 NOV — Rumors that some hostages have been moved to prison noted.

29-30 NOV — Massive marches on most holy days of Muharram. Marches take place on TAKHT-E-JAMSHJI AND ROOSEVELT. Remainder of Tehran normal.

1 DEC — Rumors through Canadian press that 12 hostages have been moved to prison on outskirts of TEHRAN. Denied by students.

1 DEC — Responding to statements by GOTBZADEH that US Charge' LAINGEN and his two colleagues could leave IRAN, the militants have said that they should be put on trial instead.

1 DEC — Rumors through TOKYO and BRUSSELS that one hostage was dead.

1 DEC — Militants produce document allegedly identifying two hostages as CIA spies (KALPE, DAUGHTERTY, [redacted] supposedly admitted that he was). Students also state that HOWLAND and TOMSETH should be tried.

2 DEC — Militants are vague on continuing reports that some of the hostages have been moved. Militants claim hostages are in the Compound. Canadian ambassador to visit LAINGEN, TOMSETH, and HOWLAND.

4 DEC — Spokesman for militants announces that eight of the fifty hostages have been singled out for intensive interrogation in preparation for possible espionage trials. West European source claims that all hostages are in the Compound.

7 DEC — Militants name another hostage as a spy.

8 DEC — Two University of Kansas faculty members meet with militants, but do not see hostages.

12 DEC — Militants deny announcement by GOTBZADEH that international observers could visit hostages.

13 DEC — KHOMEINI gives permission for neutral observers to visit hostages; militants agree.

14 DEC PLOTKIN makes statement calling for return of Shah.

14 DEC GALLEGOS interviewed by US media/Iranian TV. He mentions MUSHROOM location.

16 DEC Militants reject opinion of International Court calling for release of the hostages.

18 DEC Despite fact that Shah has moved to PANAMA, militants threaten to "at least" try hostages if US does not return the Shah.

21 DEC Militants accept order from KHOMEINI that US clergymen may visit hostages on Christmas.

24-25 DEC [redacted] US clergymen visit hostages and conduct services for them in three groups. Services conducted at three locations: Ambassador Residence [redacted] Consulate (staff cottages). Forty-three hostages seen and an additional two accounted for. Five hostages were not seen and did not provide messages for their families: AHERN, BELK, KALPE, METRINKO, DAUGHERTY.

25 DEC TEHRAN TIMES newspaper publishes list of 41 (40) hostages' names. UPI reprints list. Many errors noted in list.

25 DEC Iranian Foreign Ministry official states that three hostages, two women and one black male, will be released soon.

26 DEC Students to hold "Conference of Liberation Movements" in early January 1980.

27 DEC According to DOS, students state that they are holding 49 AMCITS.

27 DEC HONG KONG IIR: media source claims that five hostages have been moved to prison in northern TEHRAN.

4 JAN Conference of World Liberation Movements sponsored by militants begins.

4 JAN Militants demand that US Charge' LAINGEN be turned over to them for questioning.

4 JAN Militants announce that USAF LtCol ROEDER would be tried for crimes he allegedly committed while serving in VIET NAM.

5 JAN Foreign Minister GOTBZADEH refuses militants' demand that the US Charge' be turned over to them and seeks KHOMEINI's guidance on the situation.

6 JAN No decision by KHOMEINI on status of US Charge'.

8 JAN KHOMEINI cancels all appointments from 12-27 January.

9 JAN Massive Anti-American demonstrations during Islamic holy day.

10 JAN Student delegation visits KHOMEINI.

10 JAN Ayatollah BEHESTHI, Secretary of Iran's Revolutionary Council and confidant to KHOMEINI, stated that there was a change in attitude toward the hostages. He also announced that the US Charge' would not be transferred from the Foreign Ministry to the Embassy.

10 JAN Students admitted that ROBERT BLUCKER has been ill.

11 JAN Militants state that they know of no change in attitude regarding the hostages.

13 JAN JOHN THOMAS (AIM) visited Embassy Compound and obtained letters from some hostages for their families.

14 JAN First good data obtained on location of LAINGEN at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

16 JAN Three of four black US ministers may have visited the Embassy Compound.

17 JAN Tehran Radio broadcasts statement by GHOTBZADEH denying that KHOMEINI agreed with proposal for UN Secretary General WALDHEIM to mediate hostage issue.

18 JAN All US press personnel depart Iran based on orders of the Revolutionary Council.

18 JAN Team of heart specialists visit KHOMEINI in Qom. KHOMEINI's rest period which is due to expire on 27 Jan, is extended to 9 Feb.

18 JAN World Court in session at the Hague sets 18 Feb as deadline for release of the hostages.

18 JAN Letters from 17 hostages arrive in CONUS via international mail. [redacted]

21 JAN Japanese press reports that there are approximately 400 militants in US Embassy, and that decisions are made by a leadership council.

22 JAN [redacted] in Tehran reports that some personal effects of hostages are being seized and transferred to US Embassy Compound. Rumors continue to circulate that hostages will be released in early February following arrival of UN investigative commission.

23 JAN — Militants accuse press attache BARRY ROSEN of spying and claim his guilt will be clear once he is put on trial. In interview with AFP correspondent, "students" maintained their intent to hold all hostages until Shah is returned. "Students" indicated they no longer made any distinction among hostages as "all were guilty" of contributing to the system that kept the Shah in power.

24 JAN — [redacted] clerics are looking for a way out of the hostage situation. Majority of hostages would be released in 2-3 months, but 4-6 hostages who were identified as "spies" would be held indefinitely.

25 JAN — Initial reports of balloting in Presidential election give BANI-SADR approximately 80% of vote. KHOMEINI reportedly improving in Tehran hospital.

26 JAN — BANI-SADR announces he is not prepared to accept paralled government in form of militants at US Embassy.

28 JAN — Militants insist that one of the characteristics of the revolution is "that all decisions should not necessarily be made through government channels.

29 JAN — Canadians close embassy in Tehran. Six US citizens exfiltrate Iran using Canadian ID's and travel documents.

30 JAN — Militants reportedly increase number of guards around US Embassy, but state that escape of 6 AMCITS with Canadian staff will not affect treatment of hostages.

31 JAN — BANI-SADR states that criminality of Shah is the main issue vis-a-vis US and that hostages' situation could be settled even if Shah is not physically returned to Iran.

1 FEB — A western diplomat in Iran indicates that BANI-SADR will be in a strong position to free the hostages following legislative elections scheduled for 15 Feb. Militants, however, reiterate their position that they will not release the hostages without a direct order from KHOMEINI.

4 FEB — Revolutionary Council spokesman HABIBI states that an international commission will meet in Tehran to investigate the Shah's role. No date or composition of the commission was announced. Additionally, the militants announce that 50 Americans (unidentified) have been invited to Tehran to examine evidence of the former regime's crimes.

5 FEB — BANI-SADR endorsed by KHOMEINI as Iran's first president.

6 FEB — Fifty Americans leave US for Tehran. BANI-SADR appointed president of Revolutionary Council. [redacted]

14 APR ICRC visits all 50 U.S. hostages in U.S. Embassy.

14 APR Iran announces second round of Parliamentary elections will take place on 2 May.

15 APR Militants at the U.S. Embassy announce that Amnesty International and other human rights groups may be allowed to visit the hostages.

16 APR Revolutionary Council announces it is considering postponement of the second round of Parliamentary elections for an additional week.

16 APR Charge' LAINGEN informs DOS that MFA-3 have been moved to a new room in the MFA.

17 APR Further sanctions against Iran ordered by President CARTER. President announces that next step might be some sort of military action.

18 APR Iran grants visas to hostage Kevin HERMENING's parents, who plan to fly to Iran immediately.

19 APR Four relatives of hostages announce they will travel to Europe to gain support for release of hostages.

19 APR Serious clashes occurring on Iranian campuses in response to Revolutionary Council's call for purging of the educational system of U.S. influence and anti-revolutionaries..

20 APR Militants announce they will allow Mrs. TIMM to visit her hostage son (Kevin HERMENING).

21 APR Clashes between leftists and Islamic fundamentalists continuing on Tehran University campus.

22 APR Iranian campus unrest calms as leftist political groups close their offices.

22 APR EEC announces it would delay implementation of sanctions against Iran until after 17 May 80.

23 APR BANI SADR proclaims the first stage of an Islamic cultural revolution in Iran's universities.

24 APR U.S. ATTEMPTS TO RESCUE HOSTAGES.

25 APR Militants announce they will kill the hostages if U.S. attempts another rescue.

26 APR	Ayatollah KHALKALI visits "Desert One" to survey U.S. aircraft/equipment. BANI SADR states U.S. servicemen killed in the rescue attempt will be returned without pre-conditions.
26 APR	Militants at the U.S. Embassy announce they will move hostages to various locations within Iran.
27 APR (SUNDAY)	Iranians display remains of U.S. servicemen at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. First indications that return of the bodies to U.S. will not be a simple affair.
27 APR	Militants announce that some hostages have been moved to Tabriz.
27 APR	KHOMEINI orders BANI SADR to convene a conference in Tehran of international organizations and representatives of various countries to witness U.S. crimes against Iran.
28 APR	Militants announce that hostages in Tabriz are being held in the former U.S. Consulate. DOS again makes telephone contact with Charge' LAINGEN.
28 APR	Archbishop CAPUCCI enroute to Tehran to take custody of the bodies of the U.S. servicemen.
29 APR	Militants announce that three separate shooting incidents involving passing cars occurred at the Embassy in the morning.
29 APR	Iraqi intelligence agents fail in an attempt to assassinate foreign minister GHOTBZADEH in Kuwait.
30 APR	Reports continue to arrive stating hostages have been dispersed to various cities in Iran [redacted]
1 MAY	Several thousand Iranians demonstrate in front of former U.S. Consulate in Tabriz, where militants announced some hostages are being held.
4 MAY	Iranian foreign ministry reaffirms that Iranian Parliament will decide on the fate of the hostages.
4 MAY	The date of Iran's proposed conference of international representatives postponed until 15-17 May.
4 MAY	Archbishop CAPUCCI receives the remains of dead U.S. servicemen.

5 MAY — U.S. citizen, Cynthia DWYER, arrested in Tehran on spy charges.

6 MAY — British SAS attacks Iranian Embassy in London and frees hostages being held by Iranian arabs.

6 MAY — The bodies of the eight U.S. SERVICEMEN ARRIVE AT Dover AFB.

7 MAY — Militants claim hostages have been moved to thirteen cities in Iran.

8 MAY — Second round of Parliamentary elections commences.

9 MAY — KHOMEINI authorizes BANI SADR to name a prime minister.

9 MAY — Iran newspaper reported yesterday that the Iranian militants holding hostages intend to rotate them among a number of cities.

9 MAY — Voting yesterday in the runoff round of elections for new parliament reported to be low.

10 MAY — Intense fighting between government troops and Kurds continued in several cities in Iran's NW.

10 MAY — Italian journalist Orinana FALLACI quoted an U/I source as saying that one AMCIT hostage has attempted suicide three times and may be dead. U/I hostage reportedly one of those kept in strict confinement in basement of occupied Embassy. FALLACI is a highly respected journalist in Europe and U.S. and although report is unsubstantiated, she has been accurate in the past.

11 MAY — Swiss Embassy made approaches to Iranian authorities about Cynthia DWYER, an AMCIT held incommunicado - advised by foreign ministry that Mrs. DWYER was under arrest - NFI.

12 MAY [redacted]

12 MAY — GHOTBZADEH has claimed that more than 1200 U.S. firms have secretly offered to do business with Iran since CARTER severed economic ties.

12 MAY — BANI SADR's efforts to appoint a new prime minster appear to have hit a snag.

13 MAY — BANI SADR stripped Ayatollah KHALKHALI of his title as an Islamic Judge because of KHALKHALI's order to demolish the tomb of the deposed Shah's father.

13 MAY — Reuter reports that Cynthia DWYER is now being held in EVIN prison, transfered two days ago.

14 MAY — Revolutionary Council failed for the second consecutive time to form a Provisional Cabinet - setback for BANI SADR.

14 MAY — GHOTBZADEH to head the Iranian delegation at the Islamic Conference scheduled to begin 17 May in Islamabad.

14 MAY — BANI SADR claimed that "96 Americans have landed in various parts of Iran with the intention of carrying out acts of sabotage within the next two weeks.

14 MAY — Iran announced that an international conference "to investigate U.S. interventions" would be convened in Tehran on 2-5 June.

14 MAY — PARS reports the Revolutionary Council ratified a protocol for Iranian-USSR economic and technical cooperation.

16 MAY — Situation in NW Iran continues to deteriorate [redacted]

19 MAY — GHOTBZADEH speaking to delegates attending Islamic Conference in Islamabad had harsh words for both U.S. and USSR.

20 MAY — Australia's Foreign Minister announced yesterday an immediate embargo on all exports to Iran except food and medicine.

21 MAY — European economic sanctions announced.

23 MAY — Swiss embassy contact all AMCITs to urge them to leave the country within two weeks.

24 MAY — International Court of Justice judgement in favor of U.S., return of hostages and reparations ordered.

27 MAY — GHOTBZADEH met with ambassadors of twelve countries - offered no forecast for release - 1 to 3 months.

30 MAY — Free Voice of Iran calls for rebellion against KHOMEINI.

2 JUN — "Conference on U.S. Crimes" began in Tehran. Ramsey CLARK led ten man American Delegation.

4 JUN — Two members of American delegation reported to have visited the Compound to deliver letters to the hostages.

5 JUN — International conference on "America's Crimes" concluded with a strong condemnation of U.S. intervention and rescue attempt.

6 JUN — Press report release Re: BANI SADR's 3 point plan for release of hostages.

7 JUN — Swiss Embassy has sent two notes to Iranian authorities RE: Cynthia DWYER, no response to date. [redacted]

8 JUN [redacted]

10 JUN — Ayatollah KHOMEINI reported to be extremely ill.

10 JUN — QUASHQA'I tribesmen have gained the support of Pro-Bakhtiar tribes.

11 JUN — FM GHOTBZADEH arrived Oslo for meetings with European socialist leaders.

12 JUN — Rally by Moslem leftists in AMJADIEH Stadium ended in serious rioting with up to 300 casualties.

12 JUN — Iranian military stated it had smashed a plot by an army unit in Kurdistan to overthrow the government.

12 JUN — Press states 180 members of the MAJLIS have had their credentials approved - giving the legal quorum; now need six jurists appointed to the twelve man council to start.

16 JUN — Tehran radio reports that Ayatollah KHOMEINI has ordered a purge of all non-Moslems from Iran's State-run radio and TV networks.

18 JUN First report that the Revolutionary Council is working on a plan for submitting the hostage crisis to the National Assembly. The Revolutionary Council is dividing the hostages into categories based upon the person's position at the Embassy and the date of arrival in Iran.

20 JUN Nine hostages have been heard from since the rescue operation.

21 JUN BANI SADR's power struggle with the Islamic Fundamentalists has become a personal battle with Dr. Ayat, a prominent member of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP).

22 JUN Participating nations of the Venice Summit released a joint statement "vigorously condemning the taking of hostages and the seizure of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel in contravention of the basic norm of international law and practice."

22 JUN Two armed men, reportedly members of a previously unknown clandestine Iranian organization called "RED JUNE", entered the home of the ex-Shah's sister in New York. They were thwarted by security guards.

23 JUN Mrs. TIMM granted permission to visit her son in Iran. She is contemplating another visit.

26 JUN Mrs. TIMM is enroute to Tehran for her second visit.

29 JUN Former Shah gravely ill. Underwent surgery to drain fluids from his left lung.

4 JUL A group of militant Iranian students, "The Association of Iranian Islamic Students in France," occupied Iran's Paris Embassy in what was called a protest against the policies of FM GHOTBZADEH.

6 JUL Press reports from Cairo indicate the Shah slipped into an "intermittent coma." Shah's condition reported to be critical as a result of surgical complications and infection. Richard QUEEN moved to hospital in Tehran.

7 JUL Shah's conditions reported to be "satisfactory" and spokesman denied reports of coma.

10 JUL Richard QUEEN released for medical reasons.

11 JUL Major coup attempt in Iran stopped.

11 JUL QUEEN arrives Zurich.

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14 JUL QUEEN now in Air Force hospital.

14 JUL A Tehran newspaper, Azadegan, published what is said was an excert from the interrogations of a hostage about the operations of the CIA in Iran.

16 JUL Revolutionary Council imposed a 48 hour ban on all departures and arrivals through Iranian land, air, and sea frontiers.

18 JUL Richard QUEEN arrives Andrews AFB.

18 JUL Iranian borders reopened.

18 JUL According to DOS, letters have been received from approximately twenty hostages.

18 JUL An attempt was made on the life of former Iranian Prime Minister BAHKTIAR at his daughters home in Paris. He was not injured. A group calling itself "Guardsmen of Islam" has claimed credit for the assassination attempt.

23 JUL Reuter reports a "violent explosion" shook a shopping area in the center of Tehran killing five and injuring seventy-seven. Blamed on terrorists.

23 JUL BANI SADR offers Prime Minister post to Ahmad KHOMEINI, son of Ayatollah KHOMEINI. The Ayatollah rejected the offer.

23 JUL Former Iranian diplomat Ali TABATABAI shot and killed in Washington by unknown gunman. TABATABAI was the leader of the Iran Freedom Foundations, an anti-Khomeini group.

24 JUL Saudi newspaper reports the Iranian government will release the hostages at the end of Ramadan. Iranian government is reported to see the hostages as "a burden...although beneficial at the beginning.") Report apears to be wishful thinking, despite its widespread nature.

24 JUL Twenty soldiers and airmen were executed on charges of involvement in the attempted coup. This is the second group of plotters to be executed.

25 JUL (C) [redacted]

(C)

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CONFIDENTIAL

4 AUG — Reuter reports that in a perceived retaliation for the arrest of the student demonstrators in the U.S., Iran's Parliament has postponed a scheduled debate on the hostages. Additionally, Parliament President Rafsanjani states Parliament will also postpone discussions about the letter from the U.S. Congress.

5 AUG — Reuter reports 250,000 people demonstrate at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran to protest detention of the Iranian protestors in the U.S..

6 AUG — Ayatollah KHOMEINI in his "Jerusalem Day" message called for the Majlis to practice greater cooperation and castigated both Islamic hardliners and moderates for infighting and squabbling. He also addressed need for fence mending among Islamic nations, a revitalization of revolutionary fervor and a renewed dedication to Islam.

7 AUG — DOS receives first TELEX since January from Bruce Laingen, sent directly from the Foreign Ministry in Tehran.

E 10 AUG — [redacted] official expressed "profound concern" over the continued holding of U.S. hostages in Iran, warned that the strong [redacted] support thus far enjoyed by Iran could end if the hostage crisis is not resolved before September.

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11 AUG — DOS had a one-hour conversation with the group at the Foreign Ministry, the first since 22 July.

11 AUG — E,C [redacted]

11 AUG — The Iranian Ambassador in Moscow confirms press reports that Tehran plans to close the Iranian Consulate in Leningrad.

14 AUG — According to Pars, nine ambassadors of the non-EC European nations met with Parliament President Rafsanjani and presented him with a memorandum which expressed the deep concern of their governments over the continued detention of U.S. hostages. Rafsanjani replied that appeals based upon international law were groundless. He further stated that if the U.S. genuinely wished to resolve the crisis, it should return the Shah's wealth and treat Iran on a basis of full equality.

17 AUG — In a letter condemning the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh ordered the Soviet Union to reduce its diplomatic staff in Tehran and to close down its Consulate in either Rasht or Esfahan.

18 AUG — Iranian Parliament President Rafsanjani reportedly stated that the U.S. hostages "did not constitute an urgent problem" and that Parliament will deal with the issue "when it has nothing more to consider."

20 AUG — The Majlis voted to reply to the letter from 187 U.S. Congressmen that urged the deputies to give top priority to consideration of the hostage situation.

20 AUG — Pars reports Bani Sadr formally appointed Mohammed Ali Rajai as Iran's new Prime Minister.

21 AUG — Tehran press reports claim Soviet Union agreed to close its Consulate in Esfahan. Moscow reportedly is upgrading its Consulate in Rasht to a Consulate-General.

21 AUG — Prime Ministers of Italy and Denmark sent personal messages to Iranian Prime Minister Rajai appealing for a resolution to the hostage situation.

23 AUG — Rueter and CBS report a Soviet offer to sell arms to Iran after Iran complained about Soviet arms sales to Iraq. Iran turned down the Soviet offer.

23 AUG — DOS had a one and one-half hour conversation with the group at the Foreign Ministry, the first since 11 August.

25 AUG — Time magazine reports Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh wrote the Majlis urging that it not put American hostages on trial. Among remaining issues mentioned by Ghotbzadeh that exist between U.S. and Iran were the return of Iranian assets and a U.S. pledge of non-interference.

26 AUG — In statement #142, broadcast by Tehran radio, the militants repeated earlier threats that if the U.S. attempted another military operation to rescue the hostages, they would be killed.

C 26 AUG [redacted]

- In an interview on Tehran radio, Chief Iranian Hostage Negotiator Behzad Navbavi declared that Iran had "in general" accepted the latest US proposals, "what is left is agreement between US banks and the central Bank of Iran for the transfer (release) of Iran's frozen assets."

16 JAN According to White Press Secretary Jody Powell, the US sent a draft agreement to Algeria for relay to Iran. Powell stated, "if they agree with it, then we will have an agreement."

- Earlier, President Carter ordered 2.2 billion dollars in frozen Iranian assets transferred to London as a first step toward freeing the hostages.

- A senior Iranian official in Tehran said the hostages had been "prepared for departure" and could leave as soon as its assets were transferred to an escrow account in Algeria.

- Iran News Agency (PARS) reported that an Algerian airline had been asked to make an aircraft available to transfer the hostages from Iran if the release goes ahead.

17 JAN Secretary of State Muskie summoned Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to DOS to demand an end to the mounting Soviet propaganda campaign claiming a US invasion of Iran was imminent. DOS spokesman stated the campaign "appeared designed to affect the outcome of the hostage negotiations."

- In Tehran HASAN AYAT of the IRP claimed "an early release of the hostages is not possible."

- Tehran radio quoted an official source in Prime Minister Rajai's office in denying rumors on the release of the hostages during the current week.

- Chief Iran Negotiator Nabavi, according to PARS stated a settlement had not yet been reached and charged the US had transferred only part of the amount agreed to.

18 JAN A PARS news report stated that a team of Algerian doctors had been dispatched to Tehran to examine the hostages if they are to be freed.

C 19 JAN DOD debriefing team moved to Andrews AFB in anticipation of hostage release.

C 20 JAN [redacted] Team on board AF #3 at 1130 EST. President Reagan sworn in at 1200, watched on TV aircraft by JTF/J2, who was advise

[redacted] Actually departure was at 1233 and 1241 due to technical problems.

C [redacted] hostages were advised [redacted] and moved to Tehran Airport with only 10-15 minutes warning and arrived at aircraft between 1120-1140 EST.

SECTION 6

INTELLIGENCE HISTORY
EVENTS NARRATIVE
(4 Nov 79-25 Apr 80)

1. ~~(TS)~~ On 4 November 1979 as a result of the takeover of the US Embassy Compound Tehran, a JCS planning team was formed to assemble all available data about the compound and the situation and to review the possibilities and problems associated with conducting a rescue mission if the situation would warrant and the NCA so direct. This team initially consisted of four planners (Ground UW, Air Special Ops, Navy UW, and Intelligence) from the JCS Special Operations Division, who routinely worked problems of this type as a team. This group, along with Service special operations and special planner POCs, provided the cadre for the JTF Staff which was formally constituted on 12 November 1979.

2. (U) The planners faced many challenges including limited intelligence. Iran was surrounded by countries which were not likely to support US staging bases or troop concentrations. The mission objective was located approximately 350 nautical miles from the northern portion of the Persian Gulf, 700 miles from the Straits of Hormuz and 900 miles from the nearest carrier launch point. Anti-American sentiment prevailed throughout Iran and was particularly strong in the capital city of Tehran. The highways and streets of Tehran are poorly laid out and traffic congestion inhibits easy movement within the city.

3. (U) The Tehran Times heralded the Embassy takeover in its 5 Nov 79 issue with the headline, "Marines Fight 3-Hour Losing Battle With Moslem Students." The lead article summarized the events of the takeover and stated the takeover was accomplished by a group calling itself "Moslem students loyal to the Imam," and that the act was an expression of opposition to American domination. The article stated the takeover began around 1030 in the morning, when 400-500 students marching in the streets swarmed over the compound in a prearranged plan. The article said a student spokesman claimed the action was supported by a number of political organizations and that the "Assembly of Experts," a group of senior clerics, supported the action by a majority vote.

4. [redacted] and assemble copies of all available maps, charts and city plans as well as request blueprints of the Compound from the State Department. DIA was able to respond quickly to this request for basic data because the Tehran Embassy had been the subject of contingency planning several times during the preceding two years. In addition, [redacted]

6. (S) During this timeframe, DMA was responding to numerous requests for special products and off the shelf material.

This product was modeled after several DMA had made during the previous three years to support crisis reaction exercises and false alarms in other parts of the world. This product was to be the first of many that DMA was to produce. It was produced in both photo and paper (litho) form and delivered to the JCS and Ground Force planners on 10 November. At the same time DMA produced a 1:50,000 composite map reduction of four 1:25,000 sheets produced in May 1979 which provided the most accurate and current data on Tehran. These two products,

along with a composite 1:250,000 JOG--which underwent only one revision during the entire period--became the basic planning references for all forces and staffs.

[redacted]

8. (S) Soviet treatment of the incident ran a dual track. As of 14 November, TASS had only reprinted reports from Tehran and Washington. However, Soviet treatment on the radio, particularly their clandestine radio broadcasts such as the voice of the Turkish Communist Party and the National Voice of Iran, claimed the demands of the Iranian people were justified. Clandestine broadcasts [redacted] continued throughout the next fifteen months and often included numerous unfounded warnings of impending American military intervention.

9. (S) Since undetected closure of the rescue force was paramount to success, many ideas for the clandestine introduction of the force were discussed and examined during the first several weeks. Intelligence played a role in providing assessments of detection during most of these discussions; however, it was usually operational or logistic considerations and the lack of a specific execution window that negated many of these options.

10. (S) It is essential to the understanding of the reader to know that planning was not a straight line equation. The tempo of the crisis evolved from a two-three day short term outlook with a need to react immediately, to a mid-range outlook which necessitated a viable plan be developed which would allow for a near unilateral US action in a [redacted]

11. [redacted] Substantial attention was given during this time to an examination of ongoing US military actions with the

intent to determine what the Soviet perceptions might be at this time. [redacted]

12. (TS) By 14 November a secure teletype network had been established between the JTF (HQS) and the Ground Force planners. This link was used for both intelligence and operational traffic and eventually expanded to include other JTF elements as they were activated. This network was complemented by [redacted] the JTF and the Ground Force planners. In addition [redacted] installed equipment and activated a similar dedicated link between [redacted] team and the JTF HQS.

13. (~~TS~~) On 14 November 1979, the JTF dispatched its first intelligence summary. This summary was in fact the first of a series of intelligence assessments to be prepared and disseminated by the JTF. This first assessment concluded the situation was the result of detailed planning and although the students were the instruments, they had the active support of elements of the Iranian Government and the religious leadership. Shortly thereafter, the JTF

began transmitting a daily intelligence situation summary to all assigned forces and continued this procedure until 21 Jan 81. The last intelligence message disseminated to the JTF forces on this network went out on 3 Feb 81 and was a summary of the hostage debriefings. This message closed with the observation that the events of the past fifteen months bore the hallmarks of an orchestrated campaign of psychological warfare designed to enhance the influence of the Islamic revolutionary hardliners, humiliate the United States, and purge American influence and values from Iranian society.

14. (S) On 16 Nov 79, a select weather team from Air Weather Service (AWS), a component of the Military Airlift Command (MAC), began supporting the JTF Staff with climatological, solar/lunar, and forecasting information for planning. An Air Force weather officer was assigned to provide support to the JTF Staff under the staff direction of the JTF/J-2.

[redacted]



16. (~~TS~~) By mid to late November, it became apparent that the Iranians were using misinformation as a major defensive tool. Rumors of mining the compound walls and stories of the hostages being relocated to Evin Prison were fed to the population and media. The Iranian use of misinformation and security deception continued throughout the fifteen months even to the point of the hostages boarding the Algerian aircraft to the televised chanting of "large crowds" which actually consisted of less than 80 militants.

17. (TS) During this early period, CINCTF formed two small teams to examine the feasibility and requirements associated with a [redacted] of the rescue force or some of their essential equipment. One team was tasked with examining a [redacted] using [redacted] The other team was to examine how the force could move within the environs of [redacted] and [redacted] Both of these teams required and received extensive intelligence support. Both drew on the knowledge of military personnel that were familiar with the two environments. After an effort of approximately two-three weeks, work ceased on th[redacted] but was resurrected and reexamined several more times in the future, particularly after the April rescue attempt. Work was continued by th[redacted] environment movement team with two principal options under consideration: one using

military vehicles flown in from CONUS and the other using [redacted]

18. (TS) An extensive list of alternative operations was explored. ABC Paradrop on the first night of a two-night operation was considered along with the option of landing at an airstrip [redacted] and extracting the force and the hostages. Disadvantages of these options included risk of injury to personnel during the paradrop which would add liabilities to the force and the inability to locate a drop zone which was terrain suitable, operationally secure and close enough to the city to allow timely closure [redacted] used during both entry and exit.

ABC

20. (TS) After a review of the risks and difficulties associated with the various scenarios, COMJTF reported to CJCS that the

[redacted]

operational and security problems associated with these concepts could not be resolved to make the plans militarily feasible. He recommended that a helicopter option be pursued as it held the greatest potential, especially for a quick safe extraction out of the urban environment of Tehran.

21. (TS) CJCS subsequently approved the development of a concept utilizing helicopters and directed that an emergency plan be refined in the event a near term rescue attempt was required. Unfortunately, there was no single long range helicopter unit available with the operational expertise required for this mission. Therefore a composite unit had to be formed. On 20 Nov, the CJCS directed the formation of a combined USN/USMC helicopter detachment. A USMC intelligence officer was assigned and special procedures were initiated to provide the unit intelligence data.

22. (TS) Intelligence was heavily tasked to respond to a growing list of essential elements of information (EEI). A flat, firm, and isolated drop zone (DZ) had not yet been identified.

[redacted]

A, B, C

[redacted] A helicopter drop off point for the rescue force and a hideout site for the helicopters were also planning considerations that required extensive study and resolution [redacted]

A B C

24. (TS) During this same time (20-28 Nov), the first major [redacted] challenge was undertaken. This involved the movement of six RH-53D's to a carrier group in the Indian Ocean under the [redacted] The RH-53s were transported t[redacted] along with supporting personnel and equipment. This equipment included USMC range extension auxiliary fuel tanks for the helicopters. Four C-5s and five C-141s were used for the lift. The first C-5 arrived at [redacted] 36 hours after departure from Norfolk. All helicopters were test flown and declared mission ready eight days after the JCS ordered the deployment. Although

A, F

E

there was speculation by the press on the departure from Norfolk, the real purpose of the deployment was not revealed.

25. (S) The aircraft carrier USS KITTY HAWK took the helicopters on board at night on 28 Nov as she sailed within 100 nautical miles of [redacted] en route to her station in the Arabian Sea. Consideration was given to deploying the rescue force and the helicopter crews that would actually fly the rescue mission to [redacted] to board the KITTY HAWK along with the helicopters. However, planning, intelligence, and training were judged ~~insufficient~~ and it was determined that the crews should continue training in the United States and deploy at a later date.

26. (S) Another study effort that required intelligence support was an examination of th[redacted] with the intent to identify ways and means to [redacted] Much of this effort was accomplished through the efforts of an intelligence specialist fro[redacted] nd drawing support from DIA via the JTF.

28. (U) (S) The intelligence staff continued to serve as management point for staff interface with the Air Force weather officer who was tasked to support planning. In addition to weather forecasts and climatological studies, the weather

[redacted]

officer provided projected daily solar data defining hours of darkness and projected daily moon rise-moon/moon set tables

[redacted]

29. [redacted]

30. (TS) By [redacted] search had begun for an abandoned air [redacted] or unimproved landing zone (LZ) that could be used for refueling [redacted] helicopters. [redacted]

[redacted] Consultations also were conducted with US military personnel [redacted] geologists, and other people who were knowledgeable of Iran. The search started with the entire area within the helicopter range/time envelope and applying successively more stringent criteria to those sub-areas that might be suitable.

31. (S) The area for a refueling site was primarily defined by helicopter range capability. An area about 100-150 miles in diameter was identified approximately 500 nm inland.

[redacted]

There were other factors which limited the geographic area within which refueling could be conducted. The unrefueled flight time from an aircraft carrier to the Tehran area was computed to be about eight hours. [redacted] the requirement to avoid Iranian and Soviet detection at launch time, the helicopters would have to depart [redacted] than nightfall. This would not allow sufficient time to reconnoiter the target, rescue the hostages, fly to [redacted] airfield, and depart Iran in C-130s while still under the cover of darkness.

31. (S) During the week of 20 May, [redacted] detailed study and [redacted] the J-2 recommended to COMJTF that any existing but non-operational Iranian airfield be considered for use as the [redacted] airfield. The field was located about [redacted] of Tehran [redacted] commonly used by [redacted] The runway was more than [redacted] long with a parallel taxiway that could accommodate several parked aircraft. It was expected that only a minimum number of caretakers, if any, would be present and, although there were some armed forces [redacted]

32. (TS) COMJTF obtained approval from CJCS to plan for the use of the airfield and selected elements of a US Army Ranger

battalion were identified as the security force. The Ranger Commander and a small staff joined the JTF planning cell, and the JTF secure communication network was extended to include this unit as well as the ground surgical force and both the fixed wing aircraft and helicopter units.

33. (TS) Throughout this period the JTF staff continued to search for a suitable landing/refueling site. One possible airfield was found which supported an inactive Iranian Air Force Electronic Warfare training range [redacted] As a result of these consultations and continuing analysis of [redacted] the JTF determined that it would be feasible to secure the airfield and conduct refueling operations with little opposition.

35. [redacted]

36. [redacted] Intelligence indicated that even if the rescue forces could reach the Embassy Compound walls undetected, enter the compound, and release the hostages, there was a high probability that Iranian elements could react with force and fire

[redacted]

[redacted]

39. (TS) COMJTF requested that the feasibility of incorporating secure UHF into the helicopters be reexamined. This was discussed at length. The UHF secure voice system on the RH-53 left much to be desired, although identical to the system on board MC-130 aircraft. Transmissions were lengthy due to the keying period and considered by the helicopter crews difficult to understand. It was decided that the helicopters would continue with unsecure radios and make calls only when necessary for emergencies or when vital information had to be transmitted.

A,B,C [redacted]

C 41. (TS) However, beginning on 27 Nov, indications were noted on imagery that the Iranians were preparing anti-helicopter measures, [redacted]

A 42. (TS) [redacted] in order to support the operational concept of operations (which called for a long range helicopter penetration, mid-point ground refueling, [redacted]

A

[redacted] exfiltration), the J-2 section prepared a comprehensive basic intelligence package which would be the intelligence annex to the OPLAN/OPORD if one was to be executed. Copies of this document were provided to the SIO of the various JTF forces as a means of consolidating the fragmentary data provided previously and to insure a common reference point.

A, C

43. [redacted] Throughout the crisis, DIA and Army and Air Force [redacted] analysis teams supported the planning effort by satisfying [redacted] intelligence requirements. First and second phase analysis was accomplished by a DIA team in the Pentagon. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] SECRET

by Army or Air Force Imagery Interpretation teams located in the NPIC Building.

44. (TS) By 28 Nov 79, DIA had obtained sufficient current and historical [redacted] data from [redacted] and other collectors that they [redacted]

45. (S) By the end of November OPSEC [redacted] planning considerations had been addressed in the context of conceptual planning and several general and many specific procedures had been developed and documented for use. All JTF staff and force members were extremely conscious of the dangers of a compromise and there was total agreement on the need to maintain a strong OPSEC posture.

46. (U) During these early weeks, the intelligence staff interviewed numerous military personnel who possessed unique knowledge about Iranian military capabilities. The range of individuals included Army officers who had been advisors to various HAWK units, Air Force officers who assisted in training flying units, and members of OSI and other intelligence entities who had served in Iran.

[redacted]

[redacted]

49. [redacted]

50. (TS) On 12 Dec, after an analysis of all options and confirmation of Iranian [redacted] measures, the [redacted] the [redacted] from the [redacted] was selected as the primary LZ. This required new planning, coordination, and training on the part of the rescue force, the [redacted] and the [redacted]

51. (TS) On 14 Dec, unsure that [redacted] could be [redacted] in Iran, COMJTF requested and received CJCS permission to develop a concept which called for [redacted] to be flown [redacted] An airfield located approximately [redacted] was examined as a possible entry point. It was a support field for the IAF [redacted] Like the [redacted] complex, training had terminated and only a small security and caretaker force remained. It was estimated that [redacted] could land at this field under [redacted] and officials [redacted] were abundant in the Iranian Armed Forces and so it was determined that if this option was selected [redacted] would be [redacted] On 16 Dec, members of the Ground Force began training on [redacted] t the [redacted] while [redacted] of the airfield continued.

52. (TS) On 27 Dec, OSD formally requested [redacted] and authorized DOD to transfer [redacted] COMJTF also requested that [redacted] intensify [redacted] support efforts. At that time, only a limited number of [redacted] were [redacted] working on the [redacted] rescue requirements.

53. (S) On 29 Dec, the JTF disseminated intelligence assessment #4 which consolidated and superseded data previously provided in a number of messages covering the period 14 Nov through late Dec. [redacted] This assessment was periodically updated or superseded by future editions throughout the crisis. These numbered assessments were supplemented by special assessments usually relating to projections of events for the upcoming 30-45-60 days. A brief listing of the subjects covered provides an appreciation for the variety of analytical estimates prepared:

a. Hostage Assessment 29 Jan 80

b. Short Term Assessment 4 Feb 80

c. (Iranian) Media Analysis 5 Feb 80 [redacted] SECRET

d. Impending Change Indicators 9 Feb 80

e. Analysis of Student/Military Options 9 Feb 80

f. Hostage Location/Situation Projections 16 Feb 80

g. Contributing Factors Assessment 23 Feb 80

h. Operational Assessment 26 Feb 80

i. Political Forecast Message 19 Mar 80

[redacted]

l. (Hostage) Transfer Projection 03 Apr 80

[redacted]

n. Threat Review 22 Apr 80

o. Intelligence Analysis (Mission Critical Factors) 22 Apr 80

54. (C) Throughout the crisis there were many supportive actions provided by or through the efforts of DIA that normally do not come to mind in the normal course of intelligence which, however, warrant recognition. It was the DIA which provided multiple copies of the complete holdings of handheld photography that were on hand when the crisis began [redacted]

[redacted] Other valuable contributions included [redacted] key locations of concern to [redacted] updates/projections of historical dates, holidays and upcoming [redacted] have an impact on operational planning, intelligence collection or analysis [redacted]

55. (S) A major area of concern which was never completely solved was the problem of preparing the forces for possible [redacted] Although improvements were introduced throughout the fifteen months even up to January 1981 and many initiatives were taken, a comprehensive and viable [redacted] concept never was reached. [redacted]

[redacted]

56. (S) During late December as the concept of operations became refined and most planning, training, intelligence and support actions were well underway, the JTF prepared a mission OPLAN IAW JOPS. However, it contained far more detail than normally found in a plan and in fact the intent was to include virtually all information necessary to support execution if the National Command Authority directed a rescue mission be

launched. In essence the document was closer to an OPORD than an OPLAN. Accordingly, the Intelligence Annex was very extensive. During this same time frame DIA prepared a detailed plan for coordinating DOD intelligence support should the mission be directed. The DIA plan was not implemented as a single entity in April of 1980 because most of the actions called for had been implemented and were operative beginning in January, with refinement occurring as time passed.

5 [redacted] In late Jan, [redacted] published a series of memorandum/papers which provided [redacted] such as: Iran--The Captors; [redacted] Iranian Forces Occupying the US Embassy, Tehran; --The Iranian Revolutionary Guard [redacted] access [redacted] This [redacted] upward distribution [redacted]

58. (S) Periodically during the crisis the JTF intelligence staff provided executive information packages to senior DOD officials as companion documents to summaries of Operational Concepts and Deployment timetables. These were updated as the situation changed or the concern of senior officials peaked. Between January and March, this package underwent three major revisions.

59. ~~(S)~~ On 4-5 Jan, COMJTF conducted a planning conference to review operational details and intelligence requirements. Areas of special intelligence interest were: the refueling airfield, the extraction airhead, the continuing search for a desert landing/refueling site, reconnaissance of the ground force drop off point, helicopter hide location and updates on conditions [redacted]

[redacted] By [redacted], a tentative desert site had been isolated on photography and an intensive historical review of the [redacted] as well as a continuing analysis of th[redacted] historical review of the weather for the area was also initiated and weather data for the area was examined daily [redacted] This site was but one of three that were under study during this time. [redacted] The others were eventually eliminated [redacted] questions regarding soil stability and/or proximity to human habitation.

61. [redacted] Subsequently, the CJCS, with SECDEF concurrence, [redacted] NCA approval was sought but the mission was postponed due to concern that the mission, if detected, would upset negotiations for hostage release, which were at a delicate stage. Therefore, planning and training were to continue for the airfield seizure option.

62. (TS) In late Jan 80, COMJTF asked each staff section to prepare a capabilities/confidence factor assessment which would reflect the increasing capability to accomplish the mission as well as highlight areas which needed additional emphasis. The intelligence staff identified nine areas which could be assessed against the information needs. After reviewing the nine factors and assigning percentages to each, the most critical EEI for each was identified and restated to the appropriate intelligence agencies. The nine areas were as follows:

CONFIDENCE/COMPLETION PERCENTAGES



63. ~~(S)~~ As indicated above, the JTF periodically reviewed outstanding information needs and restated these to the appropriate agencies. This action continued throughout the crisis [redacted]



[redacted]

64. (TS)

During the week prior to Jan 80

had previously conducted planning using a model of the facility.

It was judged that the facility had no more than

The security force could take them by surprise, overrun the and completely secure the very quickly.

would be established in case of discovery to stop vehicles. Should anyone approach the

individuals would turn them away or hold them if they became suspicious. [redacted] and the force could be warned by secure voice if compromised.

66. (S) As the situation dragged on, it became apparent that part of the Iranian bag of tricks was fundamentally psychological warfare, and perhaps there was a way to assist or speed the release of the hostages through peaceful means by applying psychological as well as economic and diplomatic pressure. [redacted]

67. (S) Recognizing that precision navigation and landing was a crucial factor in mission accomplishment, DMA (DMAAC), through the DMA POC, was requested [redacted]

68. (S) Intelligence production encompassed a wide variety of efforts, most of which have been identified previously; however, a few somewhat unique endeavors warrant mention.

[redacted]

69. (S) [redacted] These individuals as well as the military personnel screened by the intelligence staff for use as driver/monitors during the mission were identified early on, briefed, trained and placed on call to assist in preparations as needed. They deployed to the forward launch site and would have been on the in-country evacuation aircraft to assist in identifying and handling the hostages.

70. (S) In early February, the JTF began with JCS concurrence, to plan for the extraction of the three US diplomats held hostage in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Since the entire surgical

force was already committed to the rescue of the hostages in the Embassy Compound, other forces had to be employed. DOD personnel chosen were skilled in special operations. Qualified individuals were identified and immediately commenced planning and training for the mission. On 6 Feb, a detailed model of the MFA complex was provided to assist in the planning phase.

[redacted]

71. (S) In mid-February, intelligence indicated that some of the hostages

[redacted]

72. (S) During this time frame, the JTF intelligence section researched and prepared, with photo support from DIA, three mission study books. These included:

- A target familiarization book for use by the gunship personnel (20 cys).

- An emergency HLZ and fixed wing LZ photo reference and study book for use by the helicopter and fixed wing extraction aircraft crews (16 cys).

[redacted] SECRET

[redacted]

73. (S) Periodically opportunities for intelligence collection or perception management were recognized and attempts were made to capitalize on these opportunities. [redacted]

[redacted]

74. (S) Other opportunities included providing suggestions to SECDEF concerning possible interface of political and military planning such as obtaining concessions from the Iranian Government prior to the reintroduction of any US media in early 1980. Others included inputs to strategic/political ploys to put the militants at ease. These included suggestions that various government spokespersons refrain from making statements to the media regarding the locations or conditions of hostages. Other functions performed by the intelligence staff in support of

the first rescue mission included providing study material and assistance to DOD and [redacted]

75. (TS) During the course of reviewing the various intelligence and media traffic, it became apparent that many incidents of false or fallacious reporting and speculation periodically occurred which could have an impact on mission decisions once the deployment decision had been made. In an effort to offset this danger, the intelligence section prepared a "CRY WOLF List" which catalogued eleven of these activities/reporting situations which, if taken out of context, could create undue concern and possibly cause a precipitous decision. A memorandum containing the list and amplifying data was provided to CJCS on 20 April and a copy sent to CONJTF affirming this action. The list proved to be a valuable tool during the deployment and mission [redacted] situations did occur.

76. (TS) [redacted]

viable look-down/shoot-down capability and the performance of the Iranian F-14s was considered poor and unreliable.

77. (TS) Except for one HAWK battery which was nominally operational but not within range of the planned flight route, none were believed to be operational. Only one or two radars were considered to pose a significant threat. These radars would not be a threat to the low flying helicopters as they approached Tehran from the southeast, but if operational could detect the as they began their climb from low altitude when approaching Tehran.

78. climb was timed to coincide with the initiation of the ground assault and it was decided to have a on board the lead who was familiar with air traffic control procedures. He would, if necessary, or to forestall alarming the until the mission was well underway. If necessary, the would take action

A, B, to neutralize the [redacted]

[redacted]

C 79. [redacted] However, the analysis stated the mission could be compromised if care was not taken during all phases. The judgment was that most events en route to Tehran would go undetected, or if detected, reporting would probably not reach the proper authorities quickly enough to allow for effective countermeasures to be taken.

A, C 80. [redacted]

82. [redacted] The DIA [redacted] replies were evaluated and considered in the final development of the JTF/J-2 Risk Assessment which was disseminated to the JTF components during the final planning conference.

83. (TS) On 12 Apr CJCS instructed COMJTF to begin planning for deployment. CJCS also requested that COMJTF recommend a planning date for mission execution. This date was not intended to be a firm date for execution but only a date on which to back plan deployment. COMJTF recommended Thursday, 24 Apr based on time needed for Desert One specific training, and the time required to deploy the force without jeopardizing OPSEC [redacted] the desire to conduct the mission during the Iranian week-end. The forces should be in place at the staging sites preferably three but no less than two days before mission launch to allow personnel to adjust themselves biologically and physiologically and time enough to ready the mission aircraft and other equipment. The CJCS also instructed that great effort be made to compartmentalize the planning in an attempt to minimize the people internally and externally who might assume or know that plans were underway to deploy.

84. (TS) [redacted] preparations were made to assemble the [redacted] and [redacted] had been selected and trained to [redacted] the rescue force from the drop

off point to the staging area and then on to [redacted]



85. (TS) On 16 Apr COMJTF notified all forces to prepare to move to a new training location in the desert and to be prepared to conduct an extended exercise. On the same day JCS notified SHAPE, EUCOM, MAC, REDCOM, and SAC that eleven C-130s would deploy t[redacted]



C

86. (TS) On 16 Apr an advance contingent of JTF personnel including JCS [redacted] communicators; the JTF communications officer; two weather officers; and a Ground Force advance party deployed to the principal staging site. Arriving on 17 Apr, this group activated the JTF HQ Command Center, coordinated JTF base support requirements, established weather/communication equipment/support procedures, and initiated a [redacted] pattern.

C,E

87. (TS) The JTF had with [redacted] and DIA support, previously evaluated friendly, Iranian and Soviet satellite monitoring. Movement plans had been formulated and were executed to spread aircraft movements and make them look routine, or exercise associated. [redacted] for example, had been identified early in the program (Dec 79) as a probable staging base and actions began to build up a [redacted]

A

88. (TS) Throughout the intervening months (Dec-Jan-Feb-Mar-Apr), a [redacted] established for tactical and strategic air operations in this area using E-3As, KC-135s, and MAC transports, including C-130, C-141, and occasional C-5s. The [redacted]

A,E

At one point, [redacted] C-130s were deployed to the area and worked training sorties with the [redacted] CONUS-based C-130s in-flight refueled across the North Atlantic non-stop to Rhein Main and then flew through Europe to the [redacted] site. A JTF planner deployed to Europe to

monitor the [redacted] C-130 unit to watch for signs that the [redacted] were routed across the mid-Atlantic and through the Mediterranean.

89. (TS) The [redacted] aircraft deployed on 15 Apr 80, one via CONUS and Europe, and another to [redacted] to conduct [redacted] training 17 and 18 Apr with [redacted] operating in the Arabian Sea, the activity was extended and, [redacted] missions actually were flown daily 19-24 Apr from a forward staging site to support the [redacted] SAC was directed to increase their tanker presence [redacted] to nine aircraft by 18 Apr to support Fr3A training and exercises in the Mediterranean Sea area. They were then to reduce their presence and build back up to support the mission.

90. (TS) On 18 Apr the MAC airlift began. It was carefully scheduled to maintain a two-way flow of aircraft and ground time was scheduled to minimize exposure to possible Soviet [redacted] and to minimize cause for [redacted] The helicopter crews were moved separately and subsequently flown aboard the Nimitz by Navy CH-46 helicopters, under the [redacted] for [redacted]

91. (TS) One of the JTF/J-3 members was in place at the staging base to monitor movements and to work with the US military mission in [redacted]. The Chief of the mission was informed that a build up at the site was in progress and it was of special importance. Short notice [redacted] were obtained without undue speculation through his good offices. COMJTF and staff deployed [redacted] on the 19th. The [redacted] because of their unique configuration, were flown non-stop using in-flight refueling from the CONUS [redacted] on 22/23 Apr 80. This schedule was designed to [redacted] and to enable at least 48 hours for crew rest and physiological adjustment. [redacted] were used to enable them to move without attention. They transited along flight information region boundaries to avoid the requirement for diplomatic clearance. [redacted]

92. (TS) The major [redacted] staff elements along with the weather support detachment and [redacted] liaison team became operational at the main [redacted]. [redacted]

93. (S) Intelligence regarding the status of the Iranian Armed Forces, gendarmerie, police and Pasdaran had not changed during the deployment. Analysis indicated that all or most of the hostages had been held

94. (S)

Even as the rescue force was preparing for their pre-dawn flight to the final staging base, these reports together with an independent J-2 evaluation were passed to the Ground Force S-2 who [illegible] going in with the rescue force.

95. (S) Debriefing of the hostages after their release revealed all had been consolidated in the Chancery during the first half of March and remained there until the day after the rescue attempt when most were moved off the Compound and out of Tehran.

96. (TS) Throughout the launch of the rescue force, the subsequent mishap at Desert One and follow-on recovery of the force and [illegible] support entities, the intelligence apparatus that had been created continued to operate

of its first requirements was to monitor Iranian reactions to the attempt. This included determining the disposition of [redacted] in country, degree of damage done due through [redacted] classified material that was compromised when the Iranians searched the abandoned helicopters, and [redacted] Regretably, as the next narrative section will show, [redacted] on 20 Jan 81.

97. (U) OPSEC Postcript. During the Nov 79 - Apr 80 time frame, the J-2 section often provided OPSEC and security advice to the Commander, the staff and field elements. Since each unit was highly attuned to the need for security as was virtually every member of the staff and supporting agencies/ offices, this effort involved alerting forces to potential risks, and advising of protective or preventive actions. "All Hands" OPSEC messages were disseminated to all elements of the JTF on a periodic basis usually keyed to an impending event or in reaction to an alleged violation, or spate of rumors circulating in the press or on a given installation. OPSEC was extremely effective during the Nov 79 - Apr 80 window, but was sorely tested from May 80 on and required the dedicated efforts of a newly created staff section, separate from the J-2.

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PICTORIAL REVIEW

(4 Nov 79 - 25 Apr 80)

REVOLUTIONARY BANNER	A
WALL MURAL - U.S. EMBASSY COMPOUND	B
WALL MURAL - U.S. EMBASSY COMPOUND	C
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U.S. EMBASSY PLANNING GRAPHIC	E
U.S. EMBASSY [redacted]	F
MFA [redacted]	G
MFA [redacted]	H
[redacted]	I
[redacted]	J
[redacted]	K
[redacted]	L
[redacted]	M
[redacted]	N
[redacted] GRAPHIC	O
PRE-MISSION [redacted]	P
[redacted]	Q
HELICOPTER ROUTE [redacted]	R
[redacted] GRAPHIC	S
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AIRFIELD [redacted]	U
[redacted]	V
ARTIST CONCEPTION - LAUNCH OF RESCUE MISSION	W
[redacted]	X
ACTUAL MISSION [redacted]	Y

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

1/ Wall - U.S. Embassy compound - location unknown

12 Oct 80



Wall - U.S. Embassy Compound -
location unknown

12 Oct 80

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[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

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SECTION 9

INTELLIGENCE ACTIONS
REVIEW
(26 Apr 80 - 20 Jan 81)

1. (TS) On 26 Apr 80 the NCA met with COMJTF and the DCI and directed the DCI to find the hostages and the COMJTF to prepare [redacted] It was from these two directives that all else followed.

2. (TS) Shortly after the rescue attempt (26 Apr 80), the militants stated that the hostages had been dispersed throughout Iran to prevent another rescue attempt [redacted]

3. (TS) On 2 May 80 COMJTF issued a Concept Paper which stated the mission, listed assumptions, directed priority of effort, and provided planning guidance. For planning purposes, COMJTF assumed dispersion of the hostages [redacted] This paper was followed on 4 May by a tasking document which, among other items, identified the principal responsibility of the J-2 [redacted]

[redacted]

4. (S) [redacted]

5. (TS) In early May COMJTF and key members of the JTF staff met with the CJCS to review the situation. Several subjects were discussed and COMJTF provided the CJCS a series of short background/option papers for his information and consideration. The subjects of these papers were:

a. Hostage Location Assessments

b. Civilian Offers of Assistance

c. Interim Non-violent Options

d. Prospective Timing Considerations

e. Infiltration Possibilities

f. Closure Options

g. Extraction Considerations.



[redacted]

A,C

[redacted]

C

[redacted] Another major tasking of COMJTF to the J-2 in early May was to develop a concep[redacted] intelligence [redacted] the ground [redacted] on 22/23 May 80 as follows:

QUOTE: Obviously the most essential action that must be accomplished before any viable rescue plan can be developed is to fulfill basic, critical EEI:

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A. Exactly where are the hostages being held?

B. What is the threat, size, composition, and capability of the forces which are securing the hostages, and forces which can react to our effort?

C. What active and passive measures are the Iranians employing which could interfere with infiltration and extraction?

D

[redacted]

UNQUOTE.

[redacted]



This face-to-face interaction was extremely beneficial and provided data and insights that would not have been available through an intermediary. It also allowed for much more rapid acquisition and analytical correlation of the data.

10. (S) Based on the assumption that dispersion had occurred and planning would have to proceed in accordance with this



ARTIST'S CONCEPTION

NIGHT OF THE RESCUE MISSION

assumption, the JTF/J-2 in conjunction with DIA and DMA began the assembly of information, assimilation of data and preparation of area orientation packages to support insertion and tactical planning. Key areas of interest were

addition, a major search effort was begun to locate remote undeveloped insertion zones close to the most likely hostage retention sites.

hostages. During June and July both [redacted] and the JTF devoted considerable time, energy, and initiative to develop, test and prepare to implement/deploy these systems/capabilities/strategies. Key ingredients to the implementation of these various strategies was [redacted] and in some cases authorization by the Department of State. [redacted]

12. [redacted] Working on the presumption that eventually [redacted] the JTF/J-2, with the active support of the DOD Intelligence Community, began a comprehensive planning and production effort. Some of these efforts included a detailed analysis of the [redacted] should the need arise for an emergency seizure of the facility in support of an emergency rescue effort. Specialized assistance was provided by the J-2 to the New Helicopter Force Element to assist in target training, area orientation, urban route and tactics planning. This latter included an extensive effort by DMA to provide a detailed Vertical Obstruction Analysis of the Tehran area similar to a DIA effort on the Persian Gulf.

[redacted] SECRET

13. (TS) A separate effort was initiated to locate and validate several remote landing areas within helicopter/vehicle striking distance of each suspected detention city. In all cases, a prepared, undefended site with reasonable access to the secondary road net was found very quickly [redacted] However, due to the terrain, population and radar constraints of the Tehran area and refueling needs of the helicopters, it was necessary to find an area remote enough from Tehran to avoid radar and population detection, yet close enough to allow rapid and undetected closure.

a. The search for such a site was begun on 2 May 81, and after reviewing six possible areas, several possibilities were identified and [redacted] One site in particular was more promising [redacted]

b. [redacted] was accomplished by three independent teams (2 DIA and 1 DMA). [redacted] that the area was probably suitable, but safety considerations dictated that [redacted] be obtained to determine the actual extent of usability of the area.

SECRET

c. In supporting the overall evaluation of the LZ, DMA also conducted a line of sight analysis to determine if activity at the LZ could be observed from the two nearest points of possible human presence. The analysis showed the candidate area could not be seen from either point.

[redacted]

14. (TS) Beginning in June 1980 and carrying through to December, the JTF/J-2 prepared for COMJTF signature a number of memorandums on a variety of intelligence and intelligence related subjects which were forwarded through the JCS/J-3; Director, Joint Staff; and the OpsDeps (acting as a Special Ops Review Group) to the CJCS and SECDEF. [redacted] One series provided the results of the Executive Intelligence review meetings which were initiated by COMJTF and held in JCS spaces on a monthly basis. Attendees routinely included COMJTF, DEPCOMJTF, JTF/J-2, [redacted] USA/ACSI, DIA General Officer and DIA POC [redacted]

[redacted] Other attendees included [redacted] JCS/J-3 rep, [redacted] CJCS senior military rep from NSC staff. The following brief listing of the subjects and dates and substance will provide the reader with a perspective on the dialogue.

[redacted]

[redacted] Mission Approval, 23 Jul 80 [redacted] ction was disapproved.

[redacted]

e. Intell Review (Meetings), 24 Jul 80.....First meeting little positive action.

[redacted] 28 Jul [redacted] was not approved for planning.

g. PAO Policy Guidance, 1 Aug 80.....COMJTF proposed a PAO policy of not discussing hostage locations. Proposal raised to DOD PAO's level. Died at that point.

[redacted] Asset Approval, 2 Sep 80 [redacted] Action suspended.

i. (2nd) Executive Level Intell Review Meeting, MFR, 4 Sep 80.....In-country support and reconnaissance effort deemed inadequate. [redacted] JTF [redacted]

j. Memo: In-Country Support Requirements, 12 Sep 80..... [redacted] Restated requirements for action.

k. (3rd) Intell Review Meeting, MFR, 9 Oct 80.....Status [redacted] planning of [redacted]

l. (4th) Intell Review Meeting, MFR, 12 Nov 80.....[redacted]

m. (5th) Intell Review Meeting, MFR, 9 Dec 80.....Near term termination of situation not envisioned; however, [redacted]

27. (TS) Beginning in July, employment of an AWACS platform was incorporated into follow-on rescue planning in a Combat Surveillance, Air Defense Suppression Command and Control role. The intelligence teletype network was expanded and an intelligence support cell was instituted at the AWAC base to support mission planning and exercise interface.

28. (TS) During the July through September 1980 time frame, the JTF/J-2, through the OSD Office of Research and Engineering worked with a DARPA civilian contractor [redacted] Although the effort was extensive, the product was marginal; however, [redacted] the product quality would increase substantially.

29. [redacted] While investigating the Digital Imagery Transformation Capability, JTF/J-2 reps were advised by DARPA reps of a separate project which using interactive videodiscs would allow an individual to "drive" a prefilmed route without ever having been to the location. JTF/J-2 did not pursue this capability since there was no possibility of driving through Tehran to

obtain the required film. However, this capability could be used to survey approach routes to key US overseas facilities, such as embassies, nuclear storage sites, etc. and establish a library on selected locations to be used in the event of a contingency.

30. (TS) During the July through December time frame, the JTF/J-2 was involved in a number of other excursions on a variety of subjects relating to intelligence. Some of these are summarized below.

a. [redacted]

b. On 30 July, COMJTF requested DIA provide an assessment of the [redacted] of military personnel who [redacted] associated with Iran. The DIA [redacted] no evidence of any organized [redacted] personnel in CONUS. As a follow on to this action DIA, at the request of COMJTF, coordinated with the FBI. The FBI assessment was the same as that of DIA.

[redacted] All information was provided freely. NOTE: Review of FBI [redacted] data in March 1981 indicated virtually all data was incorrect.

c. (C) A fallout of the FBI activity was the acquisition of Iranian propaganda and guerrilla warfare manuals that were circulating within the Iranian student community in the United States. At the request of the JTF [redacted] and DIA split the translation effort. One document contained a five-page highly stylized version of the rescue attempt as reconstituted by the Iranian authorities and the world media which did not contain any new or particularly revealing data.

d. (C) In Aug 80, the JTF debriefed [redacted] This debriefing provided valuable information not contained in DOS [redacted] initial debriefs. In addition, [redacted] a reserve Army officer, was brought on duty (at the request of the JTF) for two weeks with Army and DOS concurrence and made available to the intelligence analysts of DIA [redacted] and the JTF Ground Force planners for detailed discussions.

31. (S) On 11 Aug 80, the JTF requested Director, DIA authorize the visit of a JTF imagery specialist survey team to the DITB (Digital Imagery Test Bed) site in Europe to evaluate the feasibility of the DITB being used to support Snowbird(s) Intelligence Flow to deployed/deploying forces. The Director, DIA approved the survey which was conducted in mid-August. The survey team reported the reliability of the DITB (at the time) to be less than desirable and if deployed to a potential

staging/support base, could, given its long lead setup time, provide an indication of an impending mission. Consideration of its use was discounted at the time with the recommendation that it be based at Fort Bragg where it could provide support to contingency forces without risk of compromise.

3[redacted] to [redacted] possible need to have some Farsi-fluent [redacted] board [redacted]cue aircraft should a second mission [redacted] launched, JTF/[redacted] began in July/August with the assistance [redacted] USN and [redacted] PO[redacted] [redacted] aviator[redacted] pro[redacted] one or more [redacted]

[redacted]

33. (S) With the advent of the Iraq/Iran conflict, concern for the changes in the Tehran environment became paramount. Since media reporting was inadequate and no in-country assets were in a position to provide this data, two actions were initiated.

34. As noted in paragraph 11, the JTF had suggested several proposals to assis[redacted] On 24 Sep 80, the DIA Intelligence Policy Review Council provided a formal view on the proposals to the Director, Joint Staff for consideration by the OpsDeps. Three of the five proposals were recommended outright with the others recommended for action pending CIA agreement. Four days later, on 28 September, the OpsDeps recommended[redacted] Between 28 Sep and 6 Oct 80, the JTF prepared and forwarded a series of papers again summarizing the lack of positive movement during the preceding five months regarding the technical initiatives. These papers were not forwarded beyond JCS/J-3 due to the prevailing impression that [redacted]

35. (S) During September, the JTF/J-2 was advised of several affluent civilians outside of the government that wanted to help in some manner but did not want to initiate actions that would have a detrimental impact on hostages, the negotiations, intelligence actions or operational planning. During private meetings with the[redacted]uals it was determined that their assistance [redacted]o purely humanitarian actions such as the [redacted] material and recreational items. [redacted]

36. (TS) During the Nov 79-Apr 80 time frame, almost all training was mission-directed and based on actual conditions in the target area as provided through the JTF intelligence structure. During this period, virtually all training exercises were unit functional or integrated mission training/rehearsals. From May 80 through Sep 80, this was not the case [redacted]etailed operational plans did not exist, although a wide

variety of training exercises were conducted against generic target environments to develop or prove out operational concepts. The first fully integrated large scale exercise of a rehearsal nature working against the actual constraints of a real Iranian location was undertaken in Sep 80 and based fully on the results of a detailed intelligence analysis of the principal target environments. Two other major exercises were conducted in the fall of 1980. These were less realistic in terms of definitive intelligence on the training targets [redacted]

37. (S) JTF planners were always concerned about Soviet actions and perceptions regarding Iran and the impact these could have on rescue planning. Examples of J-2 involvement included providing analysis of possible Soviet reactions [redacted]

38. (S) During Nov 80, the J-2 drafted two papers on intelligence actions that could be taken prior to the initiation of an event (seizure of U.S. Embassy) which would simplify contingency planning should a hostile situation erupt. Both of the memorandums were formalized in December and forwarded by JCS/J-3 to the Director, DIA for consideration. The subjects and dates of the memorandums were:

a. Pre-Incident Intelligence Preparations, 8 Dec 80

b. Intelligence Capability [redacted] During Nov 80, the JTF again advised DIA of the need for the JTF to have representation on any hostage debriefing team. [redacted]

4 [redacted] In December the JTF, working with DIA, DOS and the USMC, identified a composite debriefing team and drafted a joint debriefing form which covered the main concerns of the agencies/departments represented. [redacted]

[redacted] On 20 Jan 81 (a few minutes after President Reagan took the oath of office) and the hostages left Tehran, the debriefing team departed Andrews AFB, reaching Weisbaden six hours before the hostages arrived. Intelligence debriefings began on the second day and each team consisted of a DOS and DOD representative with the rep of the hostages' parent department being lead debriefer. Summary of the debriefs were prepared on the same day and the full report completed within 7 days. The average debriefing time was approximately 2.45 hours per returnee and it was only through the use of

the prepared Joint Debriefing Form and some background briefings given by the JTF reps to the other debriefers that the fifteen months of captivity could be treated in such a short time frame.

42. (U) The results of these debriefings and a comparison of reported intelligence versus actual events was presented to the following DOD officials on the dates indicated.

a. OpsDeps	4 Mar 81
b. Dir, DIA	23 Mar 81
c. Service Intel Chiefs (MIB)	26 Mar 81
d. Service Chiefs and CJCS	15 Apr 81
e. DepSecDef	27 Apr 81
f. DIA/Dep Dir for Collection (ADM Tuttle)	5 May 81
[redacted]	8 May 81

43. (TS) The briefing resulted in an awareness that each of the intelligence collection means, technical and human, have weaknesses and limitations which must be recognized when using the output product. However, it was HUMINT that contained the greatest potential for danger as it was (is) highly susceptible to providing "wrong or misleading information". The subsequent paragraphs summarize the intelligence assessments produced between May 80 and Jan 81 and provide an appreciation of conflicting opinions and data.

44. (S) Beginning in late May 80 and continuing until Jan 81, the JTF/J-2 presented briefings to the OpsDeps, Service Chiefs

and CJCS as part of the COMJTF Periodic (Monthly) Updates. The briefing summarized both the situation in Iran and the status of various collection initiatives.

45. (S) On 30 May the intelligence staff disseminated Intelligence Assessment #6, the first comprehensive assessment since the April attempt. This message reviewed the nature of competing Iranian entities to include their suspicions and perceptions of the situation. The assessment closed by stating the most likely scenario for the next 60-90 days was that the Iranian Parliament would adjourn at the start of Ramadan on or about 14 July without having taken any definitive action on the hostage question, and that the basic problem remained the need to convince the hardline clerics including Khomeini and Behesti that it was in their best interest to release the hostages.

46. (TS) During the ensuing months, the J-2 periodically disseminated other assessments regarding the situation. Several of these are listed below:

a. Hostage Assessment Update 23 May 80

b. (Iranian) Coordination Assessment 11 Jun 80

c. Hostage Location Assessment 10 Jul 80

d. Addendum to Hostage Location Assessment 21 Jul 80

...The lead paragraph of this message stated that a review of previous assessments compared to data

[redacted] again pointed out that most of the previous assessments (since April), although essentially correct [redacted] The Addendum closed with the following revised estimate of hostage locations as of the third week in June.

[redacted]

[redacted]

49. (TS) In mid-August the JTF published a 60-90 day situation projection which closed with the statement that "No political breakthrough is likely prior to the U.S. Presidential elections [redacted] while extensive deception actions will continue to be employed." A companion message (Commanders Estimate) closed with the following statement, [redacted]

50. (TS) In early September, the JTF issued another 60-90 day situation projection which led off with the following statement:

> "... The American-Iranian hostage situation remains as it did in November (79) and during the intervening months, it is a political problem without a political solution. Political solutions are the product of compromises. In the current situation,

the positions of the opposing parties, the USG and the Iranian entities, are non-negotiable....Although a humanitarian solution is possible the political impasse is likely to continue past 4 November before a major change."

51. (TS) The Projection summarized the hostage situation as follows:

a. Dispersion outside of the Embassy Compound must be accepted as fact; planning must consider multiple targets.



[redacted]

52. (S) In late October the JTF/J-2 distributed Intelligence Assessment #7 which reviewed and combined various facets of the assessment/projections issued since Assessment #6 of 30 May 80. Assessment #7 provided a 30-45 day situation projection, [redacted] and threat reaction assessment. The lead paragraph began: "Shortly after the April Rescue effort the Iranian Revolutionary Leadership began an extensive deception program to forestall a follow on (rescue) attempt."

[redacted]

53. (TS) Subsequent to Assessment #7, the JTF/J-2 periodically prepared and disseminated supplemental estimates as follows:

a. (Hostage) Release Assessment 25 Oct 80

b. (Tehran) Air Defense Update 27 Oct 80

c. Special Assessment Seven Bravo 03 Nov 80

d. Critical Facilities Assessment 17 Nov 80

54. [redacted]



55. [redacted] indicated there had been no large concentration of hostages in the Compound since 25 April and the five that remained past that date had departed the Compound by early November. The bulk of the hostages had been held in Komiteh Prison in downtown Tehran from July through the first half of December. [redacted]

56. (TS) On 20/21 Nov 80 [redacted] in response to JTF request, provided their assessment of the likelihood of full or partial release of the hostages prior to 1 Dec, 1 Jan or 1 Feb.

a. DIA stated, "Release of all hostages prior to 1 February 1981 appears unlikely, the hostages remain under physical

control of the student militants, and would remain so until release at the departure airport."

[redacted]

On 28 November the JTF disseminated a hostage location message which stated [redacted]

[redacted] a maximum of five (5) hostages on the Compound during the time frames (a) and (b) [redacted] that as of 20 Nov 80, hostages were [redacted] Prison and Evin [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

PICTORIAL REVIEW

(26 Apr 80 - 20 Jan 81)

A,C

BLOCKED AIRFIELDS (21) AS OF JUN 80	AA
POSSIBLE HOSTAGE DETENTION SITES JUN/JUL 80	BB
PERSIAN GULF - OBSTACLE AND SHIP TRAFFIC ANALYSIS	CC
GENERAL CONCEPT FOR SECOND ATTEMPT IF NECESSARY	DD
MEHRABAD OVERVIEW	EE
MEHRABAD DETAILED PLANNING CHART	FF
MEHRABAD SAM SITE ENLARGEMENTS	GG
TABRIZ INSERTION - STUDY	HH
TABRIZ OVERVIEW PLANNING GRAPHIC	II
TABRIZ AIRFIELD APPROACH	JJ
TABRIZ CITY AIRFIELD/CONSULATE	KK
MASHAD CITY PL[illegible] POSSIBLE HOSTAGE DETENTION SITE	LL
YAZD AREA OVERVIEW	MM
YAZD - POSSIBLE HOSTAGE DETENTION SITE	NN
SHIRAZ OVERVIEW GRAPHIC	OO
SHIRAZ CITY/AIRFIELD - POSSIBLE HOSTAGE DETENTION SITE (S)4	PP
ARAK - POSSIBLE HOSTAGE DETENTION SITE	QQ
HAJAFABAD [illegible] POSSIBLE HOSTAGE DETENTION SITE	RR
KAHROM OVERVIEW GRAPHIC	SS
KERMAN AREA OVERVIEW	TT
QOM AREA OVERVIEW	UU
TEHRAN AREA [illegible] STUDY	VV
LANDING ZONE SUSAN HISTOR[illegible] STUDY AND ANALYSIS	WW

~~SECRET~~

LANDING ZONE SUSAN TERRAIN COMPARISON	XX
LANDING ZONE SUSAN TERRAIN ANALYSIS	YY
LANDING ZONE SUSAN PLANNING GRAPHIC (AREA)	ZZ
LANDING ZONE SUSAN, SEMNAN AIRFIELD, SEMNAN TOWN RELATIONSHIP (STUDY)	AAA
LANDING ZONE SUSAN - SEMNAN AIRFIELD LINE OF SIGHT ANALYSIS	BBB
LANDING ZONE SUSAN APPROACH GRAPHIC	CCC
LANDING ZONE SUSAN GROUND MOVEMENT GRAPHIC	DDD
LANDING ZONE SUSAN - TEHRAN RELATIONSHIP	EEE
LANDING ZONE SUSAN RECCE - PROPOSAL	FFF
LANDING ZONE SUSAN-TEHRAN-MANZARIYEH MISSION CONCEPT	GGG
LANDING ZONE SUSAN-TEHRAN-MANZARIYEH MISSION CONCEPT	HHH
TEHRAN AREA AIR DEFENSE STATUS	III
TEHRAN ENVIRONMENT - AD ANALYSIS / HELICOPTER FLIGHT ALTERNATE CORRIDORS	JJJ
TEHRAN AREA - POSSIBLE HLZ/LZ	KKK
TEHRAN - POSSIBLE HOSTAGE DETENTION SITES	LLL
CHRISTMAS DETENTION POSSIBILITIES	MMM
HOSTAGE GROUPING ANALYSIS WORK BOARD	NNN
[redacted] IMAGERY - (COLOR ORIGINAL USED TO CHECK WATER/ VEGETATION)	OOO

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ERTS IMAGERY - BLACK AND WHITE COPY

"ORIGINAL IS COLOR"

USED TO CHECK WATER/[illegible]

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
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
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SECTION 12
JTF J-2
COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS

NOTE: The comments and suggestions contained in the next few pages are based on the observations of the J-2 of JTF 79-1 and have been prepared in a form that would allow for the comments to be presented to students at the various intelligence and service schools in a quest lecture format.

1. (TS) Perhaps the best place to begin is with a quick review of the principal constraints that affected intelligence and in turn operational planning. Many of these restraints or similar ones are likely to occur in some form in future crises, whether it be a hostage situation or an unexpected third world brush fire contingency. The principal constraints were:

B, C

a. Extremely limited in-country HUMINT assets. The major control elemen[redacted] operations collapsed when the Embassy was taken over on 4 Nov 79. This problem persisted throughout the Nov-Apr time frame, although a small capability was eventually established. This lack of HUMINT capab[redacted] manifested in the following:

[redacted]

B, C

SECRET

B, C

[redacted]

e. Limited availability and extreme difficulty in locating qualified linguists.

f. Severe restrictions on coordinating hostage data and political strategies with DOS. In addition, DOS was extremely reluctant to cooperate or pass data to DOD.

g. Extreme conservatism [redacted]

h. Occasional competition with national requirements and the overriding need to insure that mission preparations were not compromised.

2. (U) It is essential to understand that the "Iran hostage problem" was not a single problem, but a series of "problems" with varying constraints contrasted against changing political

and operational perceptions. These perceptions underwent several major modifications during the planning months and had an impact on the degree of intelligence support required and rendered.

a. (C) Without exception, the DOD intelligence agencies (DIA, [redacted] DMA and Service intelligence elements all were "in harness" early on and provided highly useful data. However, given that the objective area was known to be hostile and its surrounding environment non-permissive, reliable data [redacted] and acquisition of an in-country support structure was difficult to obtain and long in forthcoming.

b. [redacted]

3. (U) Organizationally, there is little reason to deviate from the standard staff organization that makes the J-2 directly responsible to the commander and charges the J-2 with coordinating all intelligence support with staff, Service or unit points of contact or liaison officers from the supporting

intelligence agencies. Designation of these officers is essential, and a standing DIA Intelligence Task Force is mandatory.

a. LNO's should be accredited to the JTF and not to another intelligence agency. Accreditation (subordination) of one intelligence agency to another [illegible] extra layering effect and may rob the J-2 and the Commander of another comparative analysis on key subjects.

b. The JTF/J-2 and DIA Task Force must consist of knowledgeable professionals who can think creatively and whose collective experience includes an awareness of the mission/force needs as well as all facets of intelligence collection, analysis and production. The JTF/J-2 staff should be organized on a functionally integrated basis, not purely by discipline. It is essential that the J-2 staff have a clear understanding of the complementary overlapping of responsibilities and the need for centralized coordination. The basic need of the JTF J-2 is to have the cooperative support of the intelligence institutions, and the assignment or attachment of "creative, flexible, and highly qualified team" professionals who are dedicated to the mission, not to their personal aggrandizement or perpetuation of their parent organization.

c. This brings me to what I perceive to be the functions of the J-2 of a JTF, the intelligence officer of a crisis

tasking and final analysis must be highly centralized and integrated to be responsive both in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

- Regardless of the extent of decentralization of any of these functions, it is the responsibility of the SIO or J-2 to be the focal point for intelligence and to provide the quality control assurance that the principal and subordinate commanders deserve.

- The SIO has a responsibility to support the commander and mission planners and inherent in this responsibility is the requirement to do everything he can to enhance mission success and reduce the loss of life.

4. (TS) We can never be fully prepared for a specific crisis but we should be fully armed with an inventory of proven capabilities and imaginative and professional collectors, analysts, and managers to tackle the job. We may be critically limited in some of these areas.

a. DOD HUMINT has been allowed to wither on the vine, it needs to be re-thought and revitalized.

[redacted]

c. We have very few true multi-source analysts who actively seek to correlate the various intelligence disciplines.

d. We do not have a means to insure that the experiences, problems, and solutions of this task force and others are passed on and infused into the corporate body of upcoming intelligence officers.

5. (TS) Although we can never be fully prepared for a specific crisis and we have some weaknesses, there are some things that can be done. We can study the potential areas of operation, the geography, the climate, the LOC network, the enemy force composition and capabilities and his command and control. The single best way to do this is to use actual data in the development and play of all exercises. If political or security considerations dictate otherwise, then institute a regular program of having a planning team assemble and review the holdings on a given contingency area, examine the information against a given scenario, identify the deficiencies, then develop and test procedures to fill the voids. Prior preparation of this type will pay substantial dividends in terms of cutting reaction time when an incident occurs and greatly increase the ability to provide reliable quality control of crisis generated information.

6. (TS) Since the business of intelligence is to provide reliable and complete assessments in the face of incomplete data, the function of analytical correlation is extremely important. A key element in developing any analytical

correlation is to know the weaknesses of each type of data or collection means and know how to offset these by another means or discipline.

a. Photography: (C) The axiom one picture is worth a thousand words is true, but one picture can provide a very misleading impression. Never settle for a single photograph or analysis from a single photograph. Remember that any picture by itself is merely a momentary glimpse at a situation. However, in [redacted] can expand your perspectives and substantially increase the confidence factor regarding the nature of the activity or inactivity in the area under study. The warning here is that subtle changes can and do go unnoticed during daily reporting, but can be identified in the course of periodic comparative analysis. Sometimes going back several months, or in some cases several years, will allow you to learn things that have been obscured because of vegetation growth or conversely can point to a high degree of terrain stability or periodic (seasonal) instability indicating that the area may be highly suitable or only periodically of value as a fixed wing landing zone or vehicle avenue of approach/egress.

b. Hand Held Imagery: (C) Although the preceding comments relate to aerial or overhead photography, they are just as applicable to hand held imagery. Hand-helds have several advantages over aerial imagery that are not readily evident.

e. HUMINT: (S) Turning now to the subject of HUMINT reporting. Many cases can be made for and against HUMINT. However, it would be short-sighted and extremely lopsided to make a blanket statement that HUMINT has no value or conversely that it is always essential. Some degree of objective evaluation can be accomplished if the main functions of HUMINT are examined separately. Most of the functions of HUMINT can be divided into one of four areas: Support (i.e., acquisition of safe houses, vehicles, etc.); Surveillance (maintaining observation of a person or facility); Reconnaissance (conduct a route reconnaissance, survey a potential LZ/DZ, etc.); and fourth, Penetration of a target organization.

(1) Regretably, it is this last (penetration) which is the most difficult and the most susceptible to the vagaries of human nature. We can prepare and train reliable observers to accomplish the first three functions (reconnaissance, surveillance and support) prior to a crisis and launch these observers when necessary and expect a good return on the investment. However, the likelihood of developing a reliable network of penetration agents before an incident occurs is far less likely and the potential for developing a truly reliable informant network during a crisis is even less likely.

(2) Recent events ranging from Vietnam to the revolution in Iran have indicated that HUMINT (informant) reporting has often consisted of fabrications, assumptions, speculation and suppositions by foreign national sources and their untested/field-developed sub-sources. Even the best and most honest HUMINT sources can be of minimal value due to inadequate pre-mission preparation and inherent possibilities of misinterpretations due to the vagaries of different languages, and cultural mores.

(a) Although a source may be cited as untested or newly-developed and his information is caveated as raw and unconfirmed, there is a human tendency to accept, at least partially, the essence of the report if it appears creditable.

(b) It is essential that the development of any penetration be paralleled by the employment of a of independent non-human means to verify or refute the agent reporting. Without verification by some other means, it is extremely difficult in the short term to evaluate the accuracy of HUMINT reporting.

(c) Given that most analysis is intuitive and based upon fragments of data provided by the various intelligence disciplines, none of which can communicate a story like quite like HUMINT, many analysts and operators are apt to lend greater weight to selected HUMINT reports than they warrant simply because the

report "explains things". This is the single greatest danger to effective analysis. If the report is not provided by a reliable or neutral (non-involved) observer with natural access and the information is not supported by a non-HUMINT source, treat it with great skepticism.

BRIEF RESUME OF JTF-79 HELICOPTER DETACHMENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DURING DEPLOYMENT PHASE OF OPERATION ~~RICE~~ BOWL (17-27 APRIL 1980)

1. DEPLOYMENT OF INTEL SECTION. The intelligence officer deployed to NIMITZ with previously assembled briefing materials, charts, etc. from Andrews AFB on 17 April aboard MAC C-141 aircraft. Following enroute stops at MCAS Yuma (pick-up of flight crews) and Norton AFB, Hickham AFB, Anderson AFB, Clark AFB, and [redacted] mission personnel debarked at military terminal, [redacted] on 20 April. By 0800Z the Helo Detachment had been lifted to NIMITZ by Navy H-46 and was preparing to establish shipboard operations.

2. SHIPBOARD PREPARATIONS. The majority of 20 April was spent establishing liaison with Flag Intelligence [redacted] and preparing a secure area for the conduct of mission briefings. CO NIMITZ provided the ready room of VS-24 for the Detachment's working spaces and the ships Marine Detachment commenced 24 hour security on a 'pass only' access basis. No ship's personnel were authorized access to the spaces and Helo personnel were briefed by both the intelligence officer and Colonel PITMAN on the necessity of avoiding unwarranted conversations with members of ship's company. The ready room was set-up to display the maximum number of charts, graphics, and overhead views of various mission locales. Each crew was issued complete new sets of JOG A's, TPC's, ONC's; crew packets; Emergency LZ binders and briefed on the location of the incoming intelligence message files. The intelligence section published it first IntRep containing information gleaned from Flag Intel's 20 April Admiral's brief.

3. SHIPBOARD ACTIVITIES

a. 21 April 80 - I considered it important to establish a routine of briefing intelligence daily while aboard ship. In conjunction with the S-3 [redacted] a regular all hands meeting was organized for 1500Z. During this meeting all ops and intel information was briefed and discussed. On 21 April I went over the Iranian air defense picture in detail. IntRep 02 was messaged to Site ALFA concentrating on Soviet Naval Activity which might bear on RICE BOWL. It bears mention that NIMITZ and CTF 70 were exceptionally responsive to our concerns for the latest information [redacted]

b. 22 April 80 - Activities revolved around the preparation of detailed route studies. Each critical mission area was briefed for both ops and intell and inflight procedures (altitudes/formations) prescribed for those segments of the route which passed near inhabited areas and Gendarmerie

posts. Intel summaries for Desert Track, Helo Hide/Transfer Point, Staging Site, and approach and retirement lanes for both the Embassy and MFA were briefed. IntRep 03 was messaged to Site ALFA. Weather was briefed in detail, and checkpoints for possible Close Air Support or Fighter cover were developed in conjunction with [redacted]. PACOM LI NIMITZ continued to provide outstanding support regarding [redacted]

b. 23 April - Crew preparations were centered on maintenance but pilots continued to work mission routes. Evening briefing centered on Weather [redacted]

c. 24 April - Mission prebrief was scheduled for 1100Z to accomodate projected 1505Z mission launch. At 0930Z we were still awaiting mission weather. Consequently, I utilized previous contacts with Flag Metro and prepared to brief their forecast. We received JTF weather while brief was in progress (see separate paragraph on weather support which follows). Following mission brief, [redacted] Each aircraft commander checked his crew to ensure that all mission essential materials were inhand. Each flying officer and NCO signed hand receipt for [redacted] No important intel questions surfaced at final brief. Crews departed for aircraft in Hanger Bay #3 at approximately 1330Z. Aircraft were brought on deck at approximately 1420Z and launched, as planned, commencing at 1505Z. IntRep 06 messaged at 1150Z.

4. ACTIVITIES DURING MISSION. Intel Officer observed launch from O-10 level Flag Signal bridge. Marine Detachment patrolled ship to ensure no unauthorized photography of movement or departure of aircraft. Immediately following successful launch of all eight helos, residual staff officers ([redacted]) set watch in Flag spaces on 08 level provided by ComCTF 70. About 30 minutes after launch, I began briefing the Marine SAR pilots who had flown to NIMITZ the previous day. Their CH-53 (provided from the OKINAWA's Amphib Ready Group operating with CORAL SEA) was standing by to support any overland recovery which might not be accomplished by our helos.

[redacted]

Following brief and map issue to SAR crew, I returned to our Flag Bridge CP to monitor mission progress. Tracking of mission was by reference to a complete route map with projected time/distance ticks between Turn Points. Crew/plane assignments were grease penciled on a backlighted glass. Comms were being handled by CDR [redacted] with assistance being provided by one of NIMITZ's communications officer. Reception varied from fair to poor and many transmissions were pieced together by conversations between everyone in the room on a "what did you get out of that?" basis.

As problems developed inbound to Desert Track, we kept in touch with the SAR crew. Meanwhile Helo #5 aborted due to gyro failure and returned to the ship. Upon safe recovery, all classified material was removed, the aircraft was refueled, repaired, and stoodby to assume longrange SAR responsibility.

Immediately upon receiving the mission recall order, I began an initial assessment of what classified materials might be compromised at Desert Track. This preliminary assessment was first passed to [redacted] by secure voice and then by message to [redacted] Later in the day a more substantive assessment was developed and messaged; however, there was little real change in the type and quantity of what was presumed to be in enemy hands.

E

ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING THE MISSION

A, C, E

a. Crewmembers of #5 were debriefed [redacted]

b. Unused map products which had no identifiable connection with the mission were segregated and later given to Flag Intel for use aboard ship.

c. Representative intelligence materials and message traffic folders were sorted for retention.

d. All non-essential mission materials such as duplicate copies of graphics, excess photos, and the like were collected in large bags, taken to the ship's incinerator, and burned.

e. By late on 25 April all of these tasks had been accomplished and for all practical purposes the Intelligence Section was out of business aboard NIMITZ.

[redacted]

6. [redacted]IVITIES FOLLOWING DEPARTURE FROM NIMITZ. The intelligence officer and Deputy for Helo Opns (Colonel [redacted]) departed NIMITZ by COD E-2 on the morning of 26 April and arrived at [redacted]. A representative from the Defense Attache Office arranged for [redacted] for intel officer [redacted] Party departed [redacted] arrived London [redacted] transferred to Pan American and arrived Dulles at 1630 - all times local. Residual intelligence material was left aboard NIMITZ in locked guarded container for shipment with remainder of on-ship Helo Detachment equipment and aircrew personal effects. These arrived aboard MAC aircraft with escort on 29 April. On same date, I received those [redacted] turned-in by Helo personnel [redacted]. These [redacted] had been counted and inventoried by [redacted] I receipted for them and in turn delivered them to [redacted] the designated DA custodian.

7. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Intelligence Support to the Helo Detachment by the embarked [redacted] element was excellent. In particular, [redacted] provided every possible assistance. In any future operation of this type, a similar liaison element should be established.

b. Weather support was provided by JTF on a daily basis. Weather summaries were keyed to mission route segments and proved to be of high quality. Pilots made extensive use of the climatological data prepared in predeployment weather packets. Weather information was also made available by NIMITZ's metro officer although in a more generalized format. Daily intelligence briefings contained weather information in the following format:

(1) Brief description of overall weather patterns expected during next 24-48 hours

(2) Specific analysis of weather along flight routes including temperatures at critical locations, wind speeds and directions, visibility, cloud cover, and density altitudes.

(3) Pertinent astronomical data.

(4) Weather in immediate vicinity of NIMTZ.

In summary, weather support to the Helicopter Detachment was satisfactory; however, the inability to accurately predict dust storms along the inbound track contributed to the loss of timing during the mission.

[redacted]

c. Intelligence support from [redacted] and JCS was timely, accurate, and of considerable assistance to the Helo Detachment. The flow of current information was smooth and no problems were encountered. Prior planning provided a solid mechanism for such support.

d. Intelligence support by NIMITZ and embarked Flag Staff was of the same highly professional quality. No request was handled in less than an outstanding manner.

8. CONCLUSIONS

a. That all intelligence related products taken to NIMITZ and those subsequently received by message were accurate.

b. That intelligence support to the Helo Detachment from outside agencies was of uniformly high quality.

c. That classified material and mission-associated knowledgeability was protected during the period prior to launch and that no compromise of the mission to ship's company occurred.

d. That classified material fell into enemy hands at Desert Track #1. An assessment of the degree of compromise is appended.

e. That no amount of additional intelligence could have materially affected the conduct of the mission from launch to abort.

f.

[redacted]

[redacted]

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30 April 1980

AIDE MEMOIR (Personal for MGen VAUGHT)

SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF COMPROMISE (U)

1. The following assessment of the possible compromise of classified material at Desert Track #1 is based on my debriefing of the pilots and crewmembers of the JTF Helicopter Detachment conducted at Camp Upshur, Quantico, VA. on 29 April 1980.

2. (U) Background. Each aircraft carried an Emergency LZ mission binder which contained the below listed classified items:

a. Map of Tehran with emergency LZ's highlighted and identified by [redacted] photography and data reduced geo-ref coordinates. The photographs had been sanitized by removal of all classification and caveat markings.

b. Route segments for the helicopter approach to Tehran and egress to Manzariyah or Karaj airfields. These were degraded [redacted] mosaics overprinted with navigational information such as distance ticks and turn point headings. Classification of the products was SECRET and SECRET NOFORN.

c. Photo maps of Desert Track and the Transfer Point/ Helo Hide Site. These were similar to the route segment graphics mentioned above and were also classified SECRET NOFORN.

(U) 3. Discussion. In addition to the Emergency LZ binders, each pilot personally prepared a knee board checklist of information which he determined might be required during the mission. These knee board notes included extracts from the CEOI (call signs/ frequencies) and a listing, with coordinates, of critical areas where close air support might be required. These critical areas included Desert Track, the Helo Hide Area, the Delta Staging Site (Warehouse), the Embassy Compound, Manzariyeh, Semnan Airfield, Karaj, and several identifiable road junctions. The knee board notes carried no classification markings. No photographs were part of this package. Aircraft #1 ([redacted] and [redacted]) carried three radios: W-3 (with Parkhill); PSC-1; PT-25 and one day's keying material for 24 April 1980. Aircraft #5 ([redacted]) carried a PT-25. Of the eight aircraft launched, six landed at Desert Track. Number 6, ([redacted] went down enroute with bad rotor blade but crew and all classified material was retrieved by #8 and continued to Desert Track. Number 5 ([redacted]) aborted due to gyro failure and persistent vertigo in dust storm. Number 5 returned to NIMITZ and all classified material was recovered.

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[redacted]

At Desert Track, Number 2 was determined to be unflyable and was rigged for demolition by the ground force. Classified material was removed to #1. Following the crash between #3 and the EC-130, the crews of the remaining helos were instructed to shut down their aircraft and proceed to the MC-130s for exfiltration. All pilots indicated that they expected to be told whether their aircraft would be destroyed or if they should return and strip them of classified material, Night Vision goggles, etc. However, based on guidance from COMJTF, the fixed-wing aircraft were instructed to launch immediately in order to avoid damage from ammunition which was "cooking off" in the burning fuel bird. Consequently, when the force departed Desert Track, aircraft #'s 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, were intact. The next morning, Iranian F-4's strafed the area destroying #'s 1, 2, and 4 but leaving #7 and #8 apparently untouched.

4.-Conclusions.

a. That the radios and classified material in aircraft #'s 1, and 4 were destroyed during the stafing attack and not compromised.

b. That the material in #3 had already been removed and that, in any case, the aircraft was destroyed by the Iranian F-4s.

c. That all material in #3 was destroyed in the fire which consumed the aircraft following its collision with the refueler.

d. That #5 returned to NIMITZ with its radios and classified intact.

e. That #6 retrieved all classified material prior to the crew's pickup in #8.

f. That #7 and #8 remained intact on the LZ with atleast one Emergency LZ binder and probably with one or more sets of personal kneeboard notes. These materials have been compromised and are in enemy hands.

[redacted]

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HELO DET INTEL INVENTORY

LARGE METAL BOX

Photo Packet (24"X36")

[redacted]

Photo Strip: Various segments of total route (incomplete)

Nain Photo Grid (15)
Manzariyeh Photo Grid (15)
Embassy Photo Grid (25)
DIA Radar Coverage Graphic (1)
DIA AAA/SAM OB Graphics (1 set)
Caravansarai Photo Grid (25)
Tehran City Map, paper, (10)
Tehran City Map 1:25K (4 sheets, paper) (10)
Semnan Photo Grid (10)
Dasht Moutnain Photo Blow-up (5)
Tehran Hawk Site Overlay & Photo (1)
Gendarmarie Map, plotted for route, (1)
[redacted] (2)
Mehrabad Photo Grid (1)
Overlay, annotated, Compound (1)
WX Packet, updated (2)
Embassy and Vic, Misc Photos
Pointee-Talkie (50 paper)
Time Zone Conversion Sheets (25)
Data Reduced Coordinates, RP's, (3)
Tehran East Approach (10 spares)
Tehran-Karaj (10 spares)
Tehran-Manzariyeh (10 spares)

Miscellanous Admin Supplies

Intel Message Traffic (incomplete, needs updating)

[redacted]

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FOOT LOCKER #1 (6)

Route Books, Blue Binder (7): 1 each A/C + Master
Contents:
a. Strip Map by Route Segment, Flip
b. [redacted]
Tehran-Karaj
Tehran - Manzariyeh
c. Photo and Description: Namak A/F

Weather Binder (1)

Crew Working Packets (6)
Contents:
a. Total TPC Route Coverage
b. Total ONC Coverage
c. Manzariyeh Photo Grid
d. Nain Photo Grid
e. DOD Flight Info Pubs (4)
f. Tehran City Map, Special 1:50K
g. Tehran City Map, Street version

Spare Photo Strips and Maps for packets, Misc.

FOOT LOCKER #2 (6)

Complete Mission Map Set in Packets (1 per crew) (6)
Spare Working Maps as follows:

NI	NG	NJ	NH	NH
38-7	40-1	38-3	39-1	41-1
38-8	40-2	38-4	39-2	41-5
38-3	[illegible]	38-7	39-3	41-9
38-4	41-1	38-8	39-4	41-13
38-11	41-2	38-10	39-5	41-14
38-12	41-5	38-11	39-6	
38-16	41-6	38-12	39-7	
	41-9	38-13	39-8	
39-1	41-10	38-14	39-9	
39-5		38-15	39-10	
39-9		38-16	39-11	
39-13			39-12	
39-14		39-5	39-15	
		39-13	39-16	
40-3				
40-4		40-12	40-1	
40-5		40-14	40-4	
40-8		40-15	40-5	
40-16			40-6	
			40-7	
			40-9	
			40-13	

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[illegible] aggregated by Sheet in Packets

[redacted] JAN 81
FM CDR 1ST SFOD-C
[redacted]
BT
T O P S E C R E T
SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY (U)
THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY PRESENTS THE VIEW OF A SUBORDINATE INTELLIGENCE SECTION WHICH DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO ALL ACTIVITIES OF THE JTD JSOC AND REFLECTS PERCEPTIONS DEVELOPED UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS.
1. (TS) INTRODUCTION:
MANY SUPERLATIVE COMMENTS CAN BE MADE CONCERNING ALL FACETS OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DURING BOTH THE RICE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURES WOULD THEN BE LOST IN THESE SELF-LAUDATORY EFFORTS. THE TWO CRITICAL INTER-RELATED FAILURES WERE; THE LACK OF INTELLIGENCE NEEDED TO SUPPORT A VIABLE RESCUE OPTION, AND THE ABYSSMAL FAILURE OF THE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT) DISCIPLINE [redacted] THERE WAS INDEED ENOUGH INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT A RAID...WHICH IS CHARACTERIZED BY SHORT, VIOLENT ACTION AND WITH ONLY A POSSIBILITY (VERSUS PROBABILITY) OF SAVING HOSTAGES. HUMINT WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO [redacted] HAD THERE BEEN ASSETS TO CALL UPON, BUT THESE ASSETS WERE SORELY LACKING AND THERE WAS ALMOST A TOTAL VOID OF RELIABLE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AS OF 13 JAN 81.
2. (TS) MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS:
A. (TS) DELTA REPEATEDLY AND CONTINUALLY STATED THAT THE TWO MOST ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A HOSTAGE RESCUE MISSION WERE TO [redacted]
ALL OTHER REQUIREMENTS WERE SECONDARY TO THESE TWO. UNFORTUNATELY, BOTH REQUIREMENTS WERE, AT BEST, ONLY PARTIALLY ANSWERED.
B. [redacted] NUMEROUS OTHER INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS EXISTED TO SUPPORT ALL PHASES OF THE RESCUE OPTIONS. THESE WERE FULFILLED MOST ADEQUATELY AND IN A TIMELY FASHION. IMAGERY AND [redacted]
(TS) DELTA IS FULLY AWARE OF THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES OF INCORPORATING THE DETAILED REQUIREMENTS OF A SURGICAL GROUND FORCE INTO THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS OF A MASSIVE NATIONAL EFFORT. [redacted] WERE FAR TOO NUMEROUS AND DETAILED TO EXPECT COMPLETE ANSWERS TO ALL. THE ASSAULT ELEMENTS HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO EXPECT THESE QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED AND ANSWERED. THE PASSAGE OF TIME GENERATED MORE AND MORE REQUIREMENTS FROM THE ASSAULT FORCE. AS INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE CAME IN, IT GENERATED MORE REQUIREMENTS FROM ALMOST EACH INDIVIDUAL ASSAULTER. AS DIFFERENT OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS BECAME INVOLVED, REQUIREMENTS COMPOUNDED THEMSELVES AND WERE BEING PASSED [redacted] DELTA AND 101ST CHANNELS DURING SNOWBIRD [redacted] J2'S EFFORTS TO COPE WITH THIS FRAGMENTATION WERE COMMENDABLE.
[redacted]

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FOOTLOCK #3 (Continuation of Storage in #2)

Working Maps/Spares

Crew Working Maps, paste ups, entire route, by crew (6)

Spares as follows (10 copies each, segregated by sheet, in packets)

NI-39-2	NJ 39-10	ONC G-5
39-3	39-13	H-7
39-6	39-14	
39-7	39-15	
39-8	39-16	
39-10		
39-11	NH 40-2	TPC H-7A
39-12	40-3	H-7B
39-15	40-6	H-7BG
39-16	40-7	H-7D
	40-8	
40-1	40-10	G-5A
40-2	40-11	G-5B
40-5	40-12	G-5C
40-6	40-14	G-5D
40-9	40-15	
40-10	40-16	
40-11		
40-13	NG 40-3	
40-14	40-4	
40-15	40-8	
	40-7	
	40-11	
	40-12	

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3. [redacted] ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE

A. [redacted] COMMENSURATE WITH THE NEED, DELTA USED UP TO 9 FULL-TIME PERSONNEL DEVOTED TO INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DURING BOTH THE RICE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. THE JOB SKILLS REFLECTED BY THESE PERSONNEL INCLUDED TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE, IMAGERY INTERPRETATION, ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS, AND SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE.

B. (TS) DELTA INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE AUGMENTED BY A NUMBER OF ASSETS PLACED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF OR ATTACHED TO THE ORGANIZATION. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND THE AMOUNT OF EFFORT VARIED WITH THE IMMEDIACY OF PENDING OPERATIONS. INCLUDED IN THIS SUPPORT [redacted]

4. SECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS:

A. (TS) COMMUNICATIONS: A VARIETY OF SECURE COMMUNICATIONS WAS REQUIRED FOR BOTH INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC. DELTA UTILIZED KY-3 AND KY-70 SECURE TELEPHONES, SECURE TELETYPE, AND SECURE SATCOM TO PASS TRAFFIC. [redacted]

[redacted] IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THESE LATTER ARRANGEMENTS WERE TEMPORARY. DELTA HAD BEEN, AND STILL IS, SEEKING SUCH COMMUNICATIONS ON A PERMANENT BASIS ALONG WITH A "GRAY" TELEPHONE. EQUALLY IMPORTANT WAS THE FACT THAT DELTA DID NOT HAVE DIRECT INTERFACE WITH THE DCS SYSTEM AND THEREFORE COULD NOT ALWAYS COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE JTF. COURIER RUNS WERE NOT WELL ESTABLISHED AND THE LACK OF SECURE FACIMILE EQUIPMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTED TO UNTIMELY RECEIPT OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.

B. (TS) SECURITY:

(1) (TS) THE BEST THING THAT CAN BE SAID ABOUT OVERALL SECURITY AND OPSEC MEASURES WAS THAT IS ALWAYS WEIGHED ON THE SIDE OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT RATHER THAN STRINGENT SECURITY. HOWEVER, DELTA ALWAYS FELT THAT THERE WAS A GREAT AMOUNT OF LUCK INVOLVED WITH THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO MAJOR COMPROMISES OF SECURITY OR OPSEC. MANY PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN CIRCUMVENTED WITH PROPER PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY AND OPSEC MEASURES.

(2) (TS) RATHER THAN DWELL ON THE NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF POOR SECURITY, DELTA BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

(A) (U) EARLY ASSIGNMENT AND UTILIZATION OF AN OPSEC AND SECURITY CELL RESIDING WITHIN THE J3 OR J2.

(B) (S) FORMULATION OF AN OPSEC PLAN FOR EACH FACET OR PHASE OF THE OPERATION, WHETHER THAT BE A TRAINING PHASE, A LOGISTICS PHASE, OR THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION.

(C) (S) APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF THAT PUNISHMENT TO ALL COMPONENTS OF THE JTF WHEN SECURITY VIOLATIONS OCCURRED.

(D) (S) FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF STANDARD SECURITY PRACTICES SUCH AS PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE ACTIONS, PUBLICATION OF A CLASSIFICATION GUIDE, [redacted]

(E) (U) APPROPRIATE EDUCATION FOR PERSONNEL AND ELEMENTS THAT

[redacted]

ARE NOT SECURITY CONSCIOUS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO WORKING WITH ACTUAL CONTINGENCIES.

(C)(S) ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS (SNOWBIRD), DELTA WAS FACED WITH PROVIDING ALL OPSEC COVER FOR FORT BRAGG BASED REHEARSALS ON EXTREMELY SHORT NOTICE. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN AN OPERATIONAL NECESSITY, BUT OPSEC COVER WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE WITH OUR LIMITED CI ASSETS. OTHER PROBLEMS STEMMED FROM HAVING TO BRIEF APPROXIMATELY FIFTY PILOTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN, DIVERTING THE ATTENTION OF THE FORT BRAGG COMMUNITY AND LOCAL PRESS AWAY FROM THE PRESENCE [redacted] RANGERS, ETC. AROUND DELTA, SECURING [redacted] ALL ON EXTREMELY SHORT NOTICE.

A

(TS) 4. (TS) DURING CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SNOWBIRD, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE [redacted] REPEATEDLY CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF DELTA. REPORTS FROM JFK CENTER FUELED THE RUMOR MILL CONCERNING "DELTA" RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE. THE ASSIGNMENT OF FORMER DELTA PERSONNEL TO THE [redacted] HAVE CAUSED CONFUSION AT VARIOUS DELTA POINTS OF CONTACT DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE VARIOUS AGENCIES IN QUESTION MAY NOT HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WERE NO LONGER SPEAKING FOR DELTA. THE INCIDENT IN BROWNSVILLE TEXAS LED TO MANY CALLS AND QUERIES TO DELTA ABOUT OUR PROPOSED ACTIVITIES AND BROUGHT ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON DELTA'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT SPECIAL OPERATIONS. WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME THESE PROBLEMS APPEARED TO DIMINISH. HOWEVER, THE PERCEPTION OF THE ASSOCIATED ELEMENTS ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THE WHOLE OPERATION AND SPECIFICALLY [redacted] AND OTHER SOURCES ON POST WITH RESPECT TO [redacted] WERE MORE LIKELY TO HAVE INCREASED THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE CHANCES FOR MISSION SUCCESS. THE HOLLOWAY REPORT [redacted] CRITICAL OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF OVER EMPHASIS ON OPSEC, THAT MAY BE A VERY VALID COMMENTARY ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL ACTIVITIES AND ATTENDANT INTERFACE. IT WAS NOT OVER EMPHASIZED AT DELTA. THE OPSEC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELTA AND [redacted] RANGERS WAS IN OUR OPINION, EXCELLENT. THE SAME WAS NOT TRUE WITH RESPECT TO OTHER ARMY UNITS.

5. (S) REQUIREMENTS AND PRODUCTION:

A. (U) (S) INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WERE ADDRESSED TO THE JTF FORMALLY THROUGH MESSAGE TRAFFIC OR WRITTEN DOCUMENTS AND INFORMALLY THROUGH MEETINGS AND TELEPHONE CALLS (SECURE). DELTA EEI/OIR LISTS WERE PERIODICALLY REVIEWED FOR FULFILLMENT.

B. (U) (S) DELTA HAD NO REQUIREMENT TO PRODUCE ANY FORMAL DOCUMENTS BUT INSTEAD CONCENTRATED ITS PRODUCTION ON THE USE OF ESTIMATES AND BRIEFINGS TO THE TROOP ELEMENTS, AND OTHER INVOLVED IN SUPPORT OF THE GROUND TACTICAL PLAN.

C. (U) (S) IT WAS LEARNED THAT DELTA HAD TO BE REPRESENTED AT MOST DEBRIEFINGS AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS CONFERENCS TO INSURE THAT THEIR NEEDS WERE BOTH UNDERSTOOD AND MET. IT WAS ALSO CRITICAL THAT DELTA PRODUCE ITS OWN ESTIMATE OF THE INTELLIGENCE SITUATION BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS AND IDIOSYNCRACIES OF THE UNIT. ALTHOUGH THE JTF J2 DID EXTREMELY WELL AT PREPARING ESTIMATES, DELTA PERSONNEL WERE ABLE TO ADD TO THESE ESTIMATES AND TO FORMULATE ALTERNATE POSITIONS WHICH BETTER MET THE NEEDS OF THE DELTA FORCE.

6. (U) INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE: NORMAL UNIT SOP WAS FOLLOWED.

7. (S) (TS) EXTERNAL/LATERAL INTERFACE:

A. (TS) EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE WAS KEPT TO A MINIMUM BY DELTA DURING THE RICE BOWL AND SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. THIS UNDOUBTEDLY HAS HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON DELTA'S PROGRESS IN ITS NORMAL MISSION, BUT IT WAS UNDERTAKEN FOR REASONS OF OPSEC AND THE UNIT WILL RECOVER FROM THIS PROTRACTED DECREASE IN INTELLIGENCE LIAISON AND COORDINATION. DELTA RECEIVED ADVERSE FEEDBACK FROM SEVERAL AGENCIES WHO WERE CONFUSED BY PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE JTF THAT IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE REPRESENTING THIS UNITS OR IMPLIED THAT THEY WERE ACTING ON DELTA'S BEHALF. THESE PROBLEMS COULD HAVE BEEN RECTIFIED WITH MORE COORDINATION AND PLANNING AMONG ALL CONCERNED UNITS.

B. (TS) LATERAL INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE WAS MINIMAL DURING RICE BOWL DUE TO THE LACK OR SMALL SIZE OF DEDICATED INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS AMONG THE OTHER UNITS SUBORDINATE TO THE JTF. SUCH INTERFACE DID OCCUR DURING RICE BOWL ALBEIT ON AN INFREQUENT BASIS. DURING SNOWBIRD, INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ASSIGNED TO SUBORDINATE UNITS INCREASED AND THERE WAS A CONSEQUENT RISE IN THE AMOUNT COORDINATION BETWEEN DELTA AND THESE UNITS. HOWEVER, THIS COORDINATION WAS STILL OF A RATHER SPORADIC NATURE AND COULD HAVE BEEN MADE BETTER THROUGH PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCES CONVENED BY THE JTF.

6. (TS) UNIT/J-STAFF INTERFACE:

A. (TS) DURING RICE BOWL, THE INTERFACE BETWEEN DELTA AND J2 ELEMENT WAS MUCH BETTER THAN DURING SNOWBIRD. DELTA STATIONED A FULL-TIME INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE WASHINGTON, DC AREA DURING THE FIRST TWO MONTHS OF RICE BOWL AND THERE WAS A DELTA REPRESENTATIVE ALMOST IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH THE JTF AFTER THAT WHO ALSO LOOKED AFTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

B. (TS) DURING SNOWBIRD, MUCH LESS CONTACT AND INTERFACE OCCURRED BETWEEN THE DELTA INTELLIGENCE SECTION AND THE J2 ELEMENT. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE COMPARATIVE LACK OF URGENCY ASSOCIATED WITH DIMINISHED CHANCES OF ATTEMPTING ANOTHER RESCUE. THERE WAS LESS FREE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN FOR REASONS OF OPSEC, BUT IT IS DELTA'S OPINION THAT THERE WAS A GREATER NEED FOR A FREER EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND TO KEEP DELTA APPRISED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

9. (TS) ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS:

A. (TS) THAT THE MOST CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS WERE NEVER SATISFACTORILY ANSWERED.

B. (S) THAT THE [redacted] FUNCTIONED EXCELLENTLY AND FULFILLED ALMOST ALL REQUIRMENTS LEVIED ON THEM BUT THAT HUMINT OPERATIONS DID NOT FULFILL [redacted]

[redacted]

C. (S) THAT ONLY AN ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE SECTION OR ONE THAT WORKS ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS WITH A UNIT CAN PROVIDE IT WITH ITS MOST CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYTICAL SUPPORT.

D. (S) THAT A DEDICATED SECURITY AND OPSEC ELEMENT MUST BE INTEGRAL TO THE JOINT STAFF FROM THE ONSET OF ITS PLANNING.

E. (S) THAT FREQUENT COORDINATION AND INTERFACE BETWEEN ALL CONCERNED INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS MUST OCCUR FOR ALL INTELLIGENCE AND

SECURITY MATTERS.

[redacted]

G. (TS) THE BEST HISTORY OF [redacted] J2 AND [DELTA] [S2] INTERFACE IS PERHAPS REFLECTED ON THE VOLUME OF MESSAGE TRAFFIC ON RECORD. THEY SHOW A TREMENDOUS EFFORT ON THE PART OF MANY DEDICATED PERSONNEL INVOLVED. THIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HOLDS THE UTMOST RESPECT FOR THE J2 AND HIS EFFORTS. HE ASSUMED A TASK WHICH WOULD HAVE OVERWHELMED MANY LESSER MEN. HE ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL WITH LIMITED RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL. [DELTA] ONLY SAW A SMALL PART OF THE BIG PICTURE. MANY OF THE ABOVE POINTS MAY PROVE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED DUE TO OUR LIMITED PERSPECTIVE. THEY ARE NOT MEANT TO BE CRITICAL OF ANY PERSON OR ACTIVITY, RATHER TO EXPRESS OUR OPINIONS CANDIDLY.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

DTG 231622Z JAN 81

FM COR [redacted] S2
TO [redacted] J2
INFO [redacted] ISI SOW

[redacted] SEC 1 OF 2

A. [redacted] MSG 011610Z NOV 80 SUBJ: NONE

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

(U) 1. (S) INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
THE [redacted] WAS INVOLVED AT THE OUTSET IN PREPARING, PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF RESCUING THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN. THIS ENVOLVEMENT COMPRISED BOTH THE RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD PLANS FOR THE POTENTIAL RESCUE OF THE HOSTAGES. THIS PARTICULAR MISSION, SO CLOSELY GUARDED, CREATED NEW AND COMPLEX ISSUE FOR THIS UNIT. PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES, ADEQUATE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS AND PROPERLY SECURE FACILITIES WERE BUT A FEW OF THE IMMEDIATE AND PRESSING PROBLEMS THAT HAD TO BE OVERCOME IN AN EXTREMELY SHORT AMOUNT OF TIME. INITIALLY THIS UNIQUE SITUATION CAUSED THE SERVICING SSO A GREAT DEAL OF CONSTERNATION. MOREOVER, THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL OF DISCLOSING TO FORSCOM HEADQUARTERS AND OTHER HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AS WELL, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE RANGER BATTALION WAS INVOLVED IN A "SUPER SECRET MISSION" WHICH AT THAT TIME COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN WHAT IT TRULY WAS - PLANNING A RESCUE ATTEMPT OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN. THUS, FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OPERATIONS SECURITY BECAME A WAY OF LIFE FOR THE RANGER BATTALION. LIVING UNDER THIS NEW ENVIORMENT CREATED MORE UNIQUE AND COMPLEX ISSUES THAT WERE FOREIGN TO PREVIOUS METHODS OF OPERATIONS. [redacted] AND STRICT ABSOLUTE "NEED-TO-KNOW" WERE RIDGELY ENFORCED. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF OFFICERS IN THE BATTALION WITH INITIALLY, RICEBOWL AND SUBSEQUENILY, SNOWBIRD ACCESS WAS RESTRICTED TO THE BARE MINIMUM. CONSEQUENTLY INTERNAL BATTALION OPERATIONS, BOTH DAY TO DAY AND LONG RANGE, SUFFERED FROM OFFICERS AND NCO'S RESPONDING ONLY TO ORDERS AND NOT FULLY UNDERSTANDING THE SCOPE, HOWEVER SMALL OR LARGE, OF WHAT WAS BEING ASK OF THEM TO ACCOMPLISH. RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE HOWEVER, ALL HURDLES WERE SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED, ALTHOUGH AT TIMES THE PREMIUM PRICE WAS PAID IN TERMS OF PERSONAL SACRIFICES.

(S) 2. (S) MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS.
AS ONE OF THE GROUND ELEMENTS THIS UNIT'S PRIMARY CONCERN WAS WITH SECURITY OF AIRFIELDS. AIRFIELDS BOTH IN TERMS OF THE GENERIC SENSE AND ALSO LANDING STRIPS DESIGNATED BY [redacted] THEREFORE, OUR INTEREST FELL INTO THE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AREA, THAT WAS: TERRAIN, WEATHER, AND IRANIAN FORCES. OF THE THREE, IRANIAN FORCES WAS THE MOST DIFFICULT AND ILLUSIVE. SIMPLY STATED INSUFFICIENT DATA ON ENEMY FORCES WAS COMMONPLACE. FOR WHATEVER REASONS, NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE [redacted] PROVIDE DETAIL ANALYSIS OF NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ALL TYPES [redacted] FORCES. THE MORE COMPLEX THE AIRFIELD THE LESS LIKELY YOU WERE [redacted] THE NECESSARY EEI OTHER THAN INFORMATION PROVIDED FROM [redacted] THE INFORMATION WAS SLOW, CONFLICTING AND SOMETIMES JUST NOT AVAILABLE. FRANKLY, THE

[redacted]

REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THAT OUR NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AGENCY COULD NOT OR WAS RESTRICTED FROM FUNCTIONING IN A MANNER THAT BENEFITED ALL CONCERNED.

[redacted]

(U) ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE.

[redacted] WAS THE RANGER BATTALION'S INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON RECEIPT OF THE MISSION. [redacted] SERVED IN THIS CAPACITY UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 20 MARCH 1980 AND WAS THE ONLY INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WITH RICEBOWL ACCESS IN THE BATTALION. [redacted] WAS THE BATTALION INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. [redacted] ASSIGNED TO THE OPERATIONS SECTION AND CONTINUED TO BE A PLANNER FOR RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD. LIKE [redacted] WAS THE ONLY OFFICER IN THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION WITH SNOWBIRD AND RICEBOWL ACCESS. THE ASSITANT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND INTELLIGENCE NCO SIMPLY RESPONDED TO INSTRUCTIONS AND GUIDANCE FROM THE SIO.

4. (TS) SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS

A. PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.

THE EXTREMELY HIGH CLASSIFICATION OF RICEBOWL AND THE SCI ASSOCIATED MATERIAL WAS DIFFICULT TO ADJUST TOO PRIMARILY DUE TO LACK OF A PROPER PHYSICAL STRUCTURE (SEE PARA B) AND PROPERLY (SI CLEARED) INDIVIDUALS. THE COMPANY COMMANDER SELECTED FOR THE RICEBOWL MISSION DID NOT HAVE A [redacted] CLEARANCE AT THE OUTSET OF THE MISSION. NOT HAVING PREVIOUSLY OPERATED ON MISSIONS SUCH AS THIS ONE, NO PREVIOUS REQUIREMENT EXISTED TO HAVE ALL KEY MEMBERS OF THE BATTALION CLEARED. THIS SITUATION WAS CORRECTED BY OBTAINING [redacted] BILLETS FOR ALL KEY MEMBERS. THERE WAS HOWEVER THE NORMAL DELAY ASSOCIATED WITH OBTAINING [redacted] CLEARANCES.

B. PHYSICAL SECURITY.

[redacted] INSPITE OF THE NOTED PROBLEMS THIS UNIT INSURED THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF SECURITY AWARENESS THROUGH THE PERSONAL EFFORTS OF ALL PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS.

C. OPERATIONS SECURITY.

MORE TIME WAS CONSUMED BY THIS INTELLIGENCE OFFICER ON THIS SUBJECT THAN ALL THE OTHERS COMBINED. DURING RICEBOWL PLANNING EVERY PERSONAL DEPARTURE AND EVERY TROOP MOVEMENT FROM [redacted] AIRFIELD WAS SUPPORTED BY A [redacted] THIS WAS DIFFICULT AND AS NOTED, TIME CONSUMING. WHERE AS THE [redacted] SHOULD HAVE ORIGINATED FROM THE CONTROLLING HEADQUARTERS AND PASSED TO SUBORDINATE UNITS

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IT WAS LEFT UP TO EACH UNIT TO DO AS EACH UNIT SAW FIT. IT WAS NOT UNTIL LATE INTO THE [SNOWBIRD] PLANNING THAT THE COORDINATION BETWEEN HEADQUARTERS IMPROVED. ALTHOUGH THE OPTIMUM WAS NOT ACHIEVED ALL UNITS BECAME MORE AWARE OF THE NEED FOR A CONSOLIDATED [redacted] THIS WAS A DIFFICULT AREA AND ALL SERVICES WERE HAMPERED BY LACK OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE IN WORKING WITH [redacted] AND IN SOME CASES THE RAPID CHANGING DEVELOPMENTS PRECLUDED ADEQUATE TIME TO PLAN FOR [redacted]

[redacted]

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4.D. COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS.
LACKING ADEQUATE COMUNICATIONS TO DEAL WITH A CRISIS OF THIS PROPORTION THE JCSE WAS TASKED TO PROVIDE A COMMO-LINK BETWEEN ALL STATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH RICEBOWL/SNOWBIRD. THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS PROVIDED BY JCSE PROVED ADEQUATE FOR THE MISSION (PARKHILL, WSC3, AN/UGC-129). IT SHOULD BE NOTED AGAIN HOWEVER, THAT THIS EQUIPMENT IS NOT ORGANIC AND UNLESS THIS EQUIPMENT IS RETAINED AT THIS LOCATION THIS HEADQUARTERS IS NOT ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH A [redacted] OUT OF WASHINGTON OR [redacted] HEADQUARTERS IN ANY FUTURE MATTERS. THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM THAT IS NOW ESTABLISHED MUST REMAIN IN PLACE FOR THIS UNIT TO BE RESPONSIVE IN CRISIS SITUATIONS. THE JCSE ELEMENT WAS COLOCATED IN THE ROOMS OBTAINED FROM THE [redacted] THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS SATISFACTORY AND PROVIDED FOR EASY TWO WAY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE OPERATORS AND RANGER PERSONNEL.

5. (~~TS~~) REQUIREMENT AND PRODUCTION.
TO ASSIST IN PLANNING [redacted] AND TACTICAL MAPS WERE THE PRIMARY REQUIREMENTS OF THIS UNIT. IN ADDITION TERRAIN MODELS WERE OF EXTREME VALUE. THE AVAILABILITY OF MAPS WAS NOT AS PROMPT AS THIS UNIT WOULD HAVE LIKED, HOWEVER, AS PREVIOUSLY STATED [redacted] COMPENSATED IN MOST EVERY RESPECT. AS FOR MAINTAINING CURRENT ON THE SITUATIONS THE TRAFFIC PROVIDED BY [redacted] HEADQUARTERS WAS ADEQUATE. A POINT OF CRITICISM-THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF MATERIAL SIMPLY REPRINTED FROM PRESS RELEASES. THIS DID NOT ADD TO THE OVERALL VALUE OF THE INTELLIGENCE DATA PROVIDED THIS UNIT. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS DATA THAT HAD BEEN ANALYZED AND PROVEN TO BE TO THE BEST OF THE ANALYST ABILITY, FACTUAL INFORMATION. MOREOVER, THIS WOULD HAVE PROVIDED A MORE CONDENSED INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. PRODUCTION BY THIS UNIT RELIED COMPLETELY ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY [redacted] BRIEFINGS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION, AS IT DEVELOPED IN BOTH RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD WERE DERIVED FROM INFORMATION PROVIDED BY [redacted] DURING FTX'S THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF THIS UNIT PROVIDED SCENARIOS, CONSTRUCTED TARGET CITES AND SUPERVISED THE OPFOR IN PREPARATION FOR MISSION PLANNING.

6. (U) (~~TS~~) INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE.
STAFF INTERFACE, WITH RESPECT TO RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD, WAS LIMITED TO INITIALLY THE CO, XO, S2 AND S3. FOLLOWING THE FIRST RESCUE ATTEMPT THIS WAS EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE S1 AND S4. THE SMALL NUMBER OF STAFF OFFICERS WITH ACCESS LIMITED THE PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING AND CREATED A MANAGEMENT PROBLEM IN THAT, STAFF OFFICERS WITH ACCESS WERE PERFORMING THEIR NORMAL DUTIES IN ADDITION TO ALL THE NECESSARY PLANNING FOR RICEBOWL AND SNOWBIRD.

7. (S) (~~TS~~) EXTERNAL LATERAL INTERFACE.
FOR THE MOST PART, FOR WHATEVER REASON, LATERAL INTELLIGENCE STAFF COORDINATION WAS ALMOST NON-EXISTANT. THE ONLY EXCEPTION BEING GOOD COORDINATION WITH THE [redacted] DURING SNOWBIRD [redacted]

PLANNING. IN MY OPINION THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IF THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF AT [redacted] HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE AND HELD A PERIODIC INTELL UPDATE OR WHATEVER AT WASHINGTON. THIS WOULD HAVE PROVIDED A MEDIUM FOR EXCHANGE AND PERMITTED DETAIL DISCUSSIONS OF PROBLEM AREAS AND WHAT WE AS INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS NEEDED FROM THE J2. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, THE CO AND S3 KNEW OF NEW INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER DID. THIS WAS A FUNCTION OF THEIR MORE FREQUENT VISITS TO [redacted] HEADQUARTERS FOR PLANNING.

8. (TS) UNIT/JTF INTERFACE:
THE [redacted] J2 ON OPERATIONAL PLANNING REQUIREMENT DID ALL THAT WAS POSSIBLE OR WITHIN HIS POWER TO ACCOMPLISH. THE ASSISTANCE WAS ALWAYS THERE IF ONE NEEDED IT. ON THE OTHER HAND, DURING TRAINNING EXERCISES THE J2 WAS CONSPICUOUS BY HIS ABSENCE. THIS CREATES A VOID IN STAFF PLANNING AND PLACE THE RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN ALMOST UNTENABLE SITUATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING/ REHEARSALS ARE, INDEED, CRUCIAL. THE LACK OF SCENARIOS, MAPS, AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS FOR THESE EXERCISES WERE [redacted] VERY LATE INTO SNOWBIRD PLANNING THE SITUATION STARTED TO IMPROVE. THIS WAS A GREAT RELIEF FOR UNIT INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. PROGRESS WAS MADE AND THIS CRUCIAL POINT OF INTELLIGENCE TRAINING SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN.

9. (TS) ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS:
THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE CRUCIAL ITEMS LEARNED FROM THE MONTHS EXPERIENCE AND SHOULD BE STRONGLY CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

A. FOR THIS UNIT TO REMAIN RESPONSIVE THE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS MUST REMAIN WITH THIS HEADQUARTERS.
B. THE INTELLIGENCE FLOW SHOULD CONTINUE OVER THESE SAME COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS.
C. THERE SHOULD BE A [redacted] MEETING OF INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICERS WITH THE [redacted]
D. EACH STAFF SHOULD HAVE A MINIMUM OF ONE ANALYST, THE J2 SHOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT ANALYST FOR 24 HOUR OPERATIONS.
E. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING MUST BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF MISSION PLANNING.

SECRET

[redacted]

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE HISTORY

REFERENCE: YOUR MSG 280, DTG [redacted]

1. THE FOLLOWING IS A INTELLIGENCE HISTORY OF OUR ROLE IN MISSION PLANNING FOR PROJECT SNOWBIRD:

A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW:

(1) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF OF THE 101ST AVIATION GROUP WAS FIRST INTRODUCED TO THE SNOWBIRD PROJECTION 29 JULY 1980. AT THE INSTRUCTION OF [redacted] THE REQUIREMENT WAS TWO OFFICERS, TWO PHOTO INTERPRETERS (PI) AND A COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER. THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ATTENDED THE SNOWBIRD BRIEFING AT THE PENTAGON [redacted] ON 29 JULY 80:

RANK/NAME	DUTY ASSIGNMENT	ASSIGNED UNIT
[redacted]	COMMD OFFICER	101ST AVN GP
	S-2	TF 160
	S-2	101ST AVN GP
	NCOIC/PI	101ST MI CO
	PI	101ST MI CO

BASED UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE J-2 AN ADDITIONAL PERSON WAS READ ON FOR THE PROJECT. [redacted] SERVED AS THE SECURITY ADVISOR FOR HANDLING [redacted] MATERIAL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR OUR FACILITY. [redacted] WOULD JOIN THE ORGANIZATION AT A LATER DATE AS THE S-2 OF [redacted]

(2) UPON RETURN TO FT CAMPBELL THE FIVE PERSONNEL WERE TO ESTABLISH A SECURE WORK AREA TO HANDLE SNOWBIRD INFORMATION, PLUS A COMMUNICATION CENTER. THE AREA WAS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE (SSO) OF THE 101ST ABN DIV (AASLT). THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MATERIAL [redacted] AND THE ACTUAL MISSION REQUIRED STRINGENT SECURITY AS TO PREVENT COMPROMISE. BECAUSE OF THE WORK AREA LOCATION (SSO FACILITY) IT WAS DETERMINED THAT A COMPELLING NEED REQUEST WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR THOSE PERSONNEL, WHO REQUIRED ACCESS TO SNOWBIRD MATERIAL, WHO DID NOT HAVE A [redacted]

(3) AFTER ESTABLISHING THE WORK AREA, [redacted] RETURNED TO [redacted] DURING THE WEEK OF 4-8 AUG 80 TO ACCOMPLISH BACKGROUND RESEARCH ON [redacted] OPERATIONS. THE WEEK WAS DEVOTED TO READING THE EVENTS THAT LEAD UP TO THE EAGLE CLAW OPERATION AND THE INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTED THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN. LATER HE RECEIVED BRIEFINGS ON THE SEPARATE SNOWBIRD OPTIONS TO GAIN KNOWLEDGE OF LOCATIONS, TARGETS, AND ROUTES OF MOVEMENT.

SECRET

(4) IN AN EFFORT TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE EXERCISES, REAL WORLD MISSION, PERSONNEL OF THE 101ST AVIATION GROUP, S-2 SPENT SEVERAL DAYS AT HURLBURT FIELD WORKING WITH THE 1ST DETACHMENT, 1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING, A-2. THIS MONTH PROVED TO BE INVALUABLE SINCE THIS UNIT HAD PLANNED AND EXECUTED THE RICEBOWL OPERATION. DURING THIS PERIOD WE PLANNED AND EXECUTED TWO MAJOR EXERCISES, POTENT CHARGE, AND POISON DART WHICH PROVIDED "WALK-THRU" PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF SNOWBIRD OPTIONS. ALSO DURING THIS PERIOD IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE A-2 OFFICE OF 1 SOW HAD THE MOST UP TO DATE DATA BASE AVAILABLE, BOTH BECAUSE OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT WITH RICEBOWL AND CONTINUATION WITH SNOWBIRD. THIS DATA BASE WAS LATER COPIED AND SENT TO S-2, 101ST AVN GP.

(5) FROM 9-16 OCTOBER [redacted] TRAVELED TO FT BRAGG, NC TO WORK WITH FLIGHT CREWS AND MEMBERS OF DELTA. DELTA HAD [redacted] APPROVAL TO BRIEF IF 158 CREW MEMBERS ON THE EMBASSY COMPOUND ASSAULT. AFTER WORKING WITH THE FLIGHT CREWS [redacted] WORKED WITH THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF FROM D[redacted] TO UNDERSTAND THEIR NEEDS AND PROCEDURES FOR PLANNING A MISSION. HE ALSO DISCUSSED THE ESCAPE AND [redacted] PLAN THAT WAS DEVISED FOR THE RICEBOWL OPTION.

A,G

(6) DURING NOVEMBER [redacted] ATTENDED AN E&E CONFERENCE HOSTED BY [redacted]. THIS CONFERENCE DISCUSSED THE E&E OPTIONS FOR EACH SNOWBIRD PLAN. E&E KITS WERE DISCUSSED AT THIS CONFERENCE, THE FORMAL E&E PLAN IS STILL BEING DRAFTED.

A,G

B. MISSION (INTELLIGENCE) REQUIREMENTS:

(1) THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION IS TO SUPPORT THE TASK FORCES OF THE 101ST IN OPERATION SNOWBIRD. WE PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS MAPS, PHOTO PRODUCTS, CLIMATE INFORMATION AND TERRAIN ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATION.

(2) THE INTELLIGENCE IS DEVELOPED FROM DAILY REPORTS FROM [redacted] SUCH AS SIT REPS, [redacted] ETC. THE 1 SOW AS MENTIONED ABOVE PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR OUR INTELLIGENCE DATA BASE WHICH WE UPDATED AND SUBMITTED ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) TO FILL THE GAPS. IF EITHER OF THE ELEMENTS S-2'S HAD QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MISSION OR IRANIAN CAPABILITIES THEY WERE SUBMITTED TO THE S-2 LOCATED AT THE SSO FACILITY FOR ANSWERS. IF RESEARCHING OUR DATA BASE FAILED TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION AN EEI REQUEST WAS CREATED AND FORWARDED TO [redacted] J-2. ON ALL OCCASIONS [redacted] J-2 WAS VERY RESPONSIVE IN FINDING THE ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS. MOST EEI'S TO DATE RELATED TO THE TEHRAN AREA SPECIFICALLY THE MFA COMPOUND AND THE U.S. EMBASSY.

A,C

C. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL STRUCTURE:

(1) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF FOR SNOWBIRD CONSIST OF FIVE

A,C

MEMBERS. THREE ARE [redacted] MEMBERS OF THE AVIATION GROUP AND THE REMAINING TWO ARE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE TASK FORCE.

G [redacted]

CIC S-2	AVIATION GROUP
NCOIC S-2 / PI	AVIATION GROUP
PI	AVIATION GROUP
S-2	TF 158TH
S-2	TF 229TH

(2) THE AVIATION GROUP S-2 STAFF RECIEVES THE INTELLIGENCE MESSAGES, TAKES THIS INFORMATION AND DEVELOPES AND UPDATES THE DATA BASE. THE GROUP S-2 ALSO SERVES AS A FOCAL POINT FOR THE TASK FORCE PERSONNEL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, PRESENT BRIEFINGS, AND DEVELOPE EEI'S TO SATISFY MISSION REQUIREMENTS. THE SECTION ALSO REQUESTS AND DISTRIBUTES MAPS AND PHOTO PRODUCTS FOR REAL WORLD AS WELL AS EXERCISE PLANNING.

D. SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS:

A, C [redacted]

(1) DUE TO THE ACTUAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE INFORMATION WE RECIEVE FROM [redacted] WE DECIDED TO ESTABLISH OUR SECURE WORKING AREA IN THE 101ST SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICE (SSO). BY DOING THIS WE PREVENTED THE NEED OF GUARDS SINCE THE SSO MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS FOR [redacted] STORAGE.

G [redacted]

(2) [redacted] ESTABLISHED OUR "POINT TO POINT" SECURE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, THE SAFES FOR STORAGE, AND MAPS WERE ALL LOCATED IN THE ROOM PROVIDED BY THE SSO. THE SSO PROVIDED A SINGLE ROOM FOR OUR USE AND RESTRICTED ACCESS TO OUR PERSONNEL.

C S [redacted]

(3) ALL PERSONNEL WHO WORKED WITH THE INTELLIGENCE POSSESSED [redacted] CLEARANCE. COMPELLING NEED REQUESTS WERE SUBMITTED TO CCF AT FT MEADE TO ENABLE PERSONNEL TO BE CLEARED. [redacted] WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN OBTAINING THE CLEARANCES FROM CCF.

(4) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF HAD TO LEARN HOW TO OPERATE THE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT SINCE UNLIKE OTHER UNITS, WE WERE NOT PROVIDED ANY PERSONNEL TO OPERATE THE EQUIPMENT.

E. REQUIREMENTS AND PRODUCTION:

(1) THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF HAD FEW PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS. EXCLUDING THE SECURE AREA IN THE SSO, THE SECTION REQUIRED TWO SAFES TO SECURE MESSAGE TRAFFIC, MAPS AND CHARTS, AND CRYPTO MATERIALS. NO MATERIAL WAS UNSECURED EVEN THOUGH WE SECURED THE ENTRANCE TO OUR WORK AREA.

(A [redacted]

(2) AS A SEPARATE ENTITY, WE DID NOT PREPARE SPECIAL PRODUCTS. THE SSO FURNISHED A COPY OF THEIR DATA BASE ON WHICH WE WERE TO BUILD AND CONTINUALLY UPDATE. WE DID PREPARE WEEKLY SUMMARIES TAKING KEY ELEMENTS FROM [redacted] SITUATION REPORTS, [redacted], AND ASSESSMENTS TO PROVIDE THE COMMANDER AND KEY PLANNERS AN UP TO DATE REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN IRAN.

(X) SINCE THIS ORGANIZATION DID NOT HAVE ANY DEDICATED COMMO FRO[redacted] OFTEN THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE DEVOTED FULL TIME TO RECEIVING AND SENDING TRAFFIC.

F. INTERNAL STAFF INTERFACE:

(1) PRIMARY STAFF INTERFACE WAS BETWEEN THE OPERATIONS AND [redacted] INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. THE LOGISTICAL OFFICER PLAYED A SUBSTANCIAL ROLE IN MISSION PLANNING; HOWEVER, HE DID NOT HAVE A[redacted] CLEARANCE AND DIDN'T HAVE A NEED TO KNOW ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION.

(2) [redacted] ATTENDED ALL MAJOR CONFERENCES AND EXERCISES. AT FT CAMPBELL WHERE THE FLIGHT CREWS COULD NOT ENTER THE SSO, WE ESTABLISHED A SECURE WORKING AREA WHERE THE FLIGHT CREWS COULD ACCOMPLISH MISSION PLANNING AND BRIEFINGS. SNOWBIRD MATERIALS WERE CARRIED TO THE AREA WHEN THE BRIEFINGS WERE CONDUCTED. AT THE COMPLETION OF THE BRIEFINGS, THE MATERIAL WAS COURIED BACK TO THE SSO FOR STORAGE.

G. EXTERNAL LATERAL INTERFACE:

(1) 1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING OUR INTERFACE WITH THE 1ST SOW WAS EXTENSIVE. ON 26 AUG[redacted] WENT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. AND MET [redacted] THE A2 OR MY COUNTERPART FROM THIS ORGANIZATION. AFTER MEETING WITH [redacted] ON THE 27TH WE TRAVELED TO HURLBURT FIELD, FLA. HE WAS TO SPEND THE NEXT MONTH RESEARCHING THIS UNITS DATA BASE (WHICH WAS LATER TO BECOME THE BASIS FOR THE 101ST DATA BASE) AND THEIR EXPERIENCE DURING THE RICEBOWL OPERATION.

(2) WE WORKED FOR DAYS EXCHANGING THOUGHTS AND IDEAS ON PROCEDURES AND ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE STAFFS. WE DECIDED UPON THE USE OF THE SINGLE DATA BASE, SINCE DURING THE CURRENT SNOWBIRD OPTION OUR HELICOPTERS WOULD FLY TOGETHER. [redacted] SENT A MESSAGE BACK TO FT CAMPBELL ESTABLISHING A FILE SYSTEM THAT WAS IDENTICAL TO 1ST SOW'S. THE IDEA WAS THAT IF WE DEPLOYED TO SEVERAL FORWARD OPERATING BASES WE WOULD BRIEF TOGETHER UTILIZING PERSONNEL FROM BOTH ORGANIZATIONS AT EACH LOCATION. SIMULAR FILES WOULD FACILATE RESEARCH INTO THE DATA BASE.

(3) WE ALSO DEVELOPED AN UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MAP REQUIREMENTS FOR EXERCISE AS WELL AS FOR DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS. THE EXERCISE REQUIRED THOUSANDS OF CHARTS WHICH MEANT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MAP DEPOT. THIS DEPOT WAS MANNED BY BOTH AIR FORCE AND ARMY PERSONNEL WHO HANDLED ONC, TPC, JOG, AND SMALLER SCALE MAPS.

(4) DURING THE MONTH [redacted] SPENT AT HURLBURT, HE PARTICIPATED IN THREE TRAINING EXERCISES. THIS PARTICIPATION INCLUDED WRITING SENARIOS, DEVELOPING THREAT, AND FORMAL BRIEFINGS.

(5) SFOD-D: OUR PARTICIPATION WITH DELTA CONSISIED OF ONE WEEK 9-16 OCT 80 WHICH UH-60 FLIGHT CREWS WERE BRIEFED ON

THEIR PORTION OF THE COMPOUND ASSAULT. AFTER SATISFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FLIGHT CREWS, [redacted] WORKED WITH THE DELTA INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL AND THEIR ACTIONS IN THE FIRST ATTEMPT AND THEIR SYSTEM OF COLLECTION, ANALYZATION, AND STORAGE OF SNOWBIRD INFORMATION.

H. [redacted] UNIT, [redacted] INTERFACE:

(1) INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE BEGAN WITH THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING THE STAFF RECIEVED ON AUG 1980. AN EXTENSIVE BRIEFING WAS PROVIDED TO BRING US UP TO DATE ON THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE FIRST RESCUE ATTEMPT AND THE EVENTS FOLLOWING. WE WERE AMAZED AT THE LACK OF [redacted] BRIEFED THE EXTENSIVE EFFORTS THAT WERE BEING UNDER TAKEN TO [redacted] THEM.

(2) THE MAIN EXTENT OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE 101ST AND THE [redacted] WAS BETWEEN [redacted] AND [redacted]

(3) [redacted] WAS THE FOCAL POINT FOR WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT, RADAR COVERAGE, MILITARY FLIGHTS, AND ESCAPE AND EVASIONS PLANS.

(4) PERHAPS OUR GREATEST INTERACTION INVOLVED THE INTELLIGENCE PORTIONS OF TRAINING EXERCISES. WHILE OTHER [redacted] MEMBERS SUPPORTED FROM THE PENTAGON, [redacted] WAS AT THE FIELD SITE COORDINATING BRIEFINGS AND INSURING PHOTOGRAFIC SUPPORT. [redacted] BEING AN AVIATOR, PROVIDED DETAILED INFORMATION ON AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT AND RADAR COVERAGE THAT WOULD AFFECT FLIGHTS INTO AND OUT OF IRAN.

(5) [redacted] WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF IMAGERY, MAPS, AND SPECIAL REQUESTS REQUIRING THE WORK OF DIA PHOTO INTERPRETATERS. HE PROVIDED COVERAGE OF LANDING ZONES, BOTH LOCATIONS AND DEMENTIONS, AND TARGETS FOR HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS. WHILE OUR PRIMARY CONTACT WAS WITH THESE INDIVIDUALS, ALL MEMBERS OF THE J-2 STAFF SHOULD BE COMMENDED FOR THEIR EFFORTS PROVIDED IN THE SNOWBIRD MISSION.

I. ANALYTICAL OBSERVATIONS:

(1) PROBLEM: SECURITY CLEARANCE

(A) DISCUSSION: ARMY AVIATORS POSSESS A SECRET SECURITY CLEARANCE WHICH WOULD SUFFICE FOR NORMAL DUTIES. HOWEVER, THOSE AVIATORS CHOSEN TO WORK ON THIS PROJECT REQUIRED ACCESS TO TOP SECRET MATERIAL TO SUCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION. WE BEGAN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS TO INITIATE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS. BUT FOUND THAT THIS WAS DRAWING MORE ATTENTION THAN WE DESIRED. DUE TO THIS ATTENTION, I RECOMMENDED TO [redacted] THAT WE STOP THIS PROCESS AND GRANT A "ONE TIME ACCESS" TO THE AVIATORS. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY [redacted] ON 17 OCT 80.

(B) RECOMMENDATION: THAT THOSE AVIATORS CHOSEN TO CONTINUE IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING HAVE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS AND MAINTAIN A SECRET CLEARANCE. THIS COULD BE UPGRADED TO TOP SECRET SHOULD THE NEED OCCUR. THE COMMANDER AND OPERATIONS OFFICER WOULD [redacted]

(2) PROBLEM: TRAINING - INTELLIGENCE INTERFACE

(A) DISCUSSION: DURING THE TRAINING FOR SNOWBIRD OPTIONS, INTELLIGENCE SEEMED TO TAKE A "BACK SEAT" TO OTHER REQUIREMENTS. AFTER ROUTES WERE PLANNED FOR AN EXERCISE IE., THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WERE ASKED TO DEVELOP A "THREAT" WHICH DEPICTED THE ESTABLISHED ROUTE. LATER WHEN THE THREAT WAS ESTABLISHED FIRST, THE "THREAT" HAD TO BE CHANGED TO ENABLE MISSION PLANNERS TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TRAINING. THIS THREAT WAS AS REALISTIC TO THE REAL WORLD THREAT IN IRAN AS WE CHANGE THIS THREAT NEGATED THE ACCOMPLISHEMENT OF THE TRAINING SINCE THE THREAT IN IRAN WOULD NOT CHANGE.

(B) RECOMMENDATION: INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THOSE THAT ARE OBTAINED DURING TRAINING EXERCISES.

(3)(S) PROBLEM: INTELLIGENCE - TRAINING SUPPORT

(A) DISCUSSION: DUE TO THE MINIMAL STAFFING OF THE J-2, AND THEIR TOTAL DEDICATION TO LOCATING THE HOSTAGES, SUPPORT OF TRAINING EXERCISES WAS OFTEN LACKING. IF THE 1 SOW HAD NOT ESTABLISHED ITS OWN MAP DEPOT, WE WOULD HAD WAITED UNTIL THE ELEVENTH HOUR TO RECIEVE MOST MAPS AND CHARTS. SITE SURVEYS TO DETERMINE TRAINING LOCATIONS WHICH ARE ALMOST ALWAYS ACCOMPLISHED AT THE LAST MINUTE REQUIRING "EMERGENCY" SMALL SCALE MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHY REQUESTS. THIS CERTAINLY CREATED AN UNFAVORABLE OPSEC SIGNATURE. BY WAITING UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MINUTE, WEATHERD OUT, AND SOMETIMES FLOWN OVER THE WRONG TARGET.

(B) RECOMMENDATIONS: ESTABLISH PERSONNEL TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR REALISTIC SENARIOS AND THREAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH MISSION TRAINING. [redacted] SHOULD ESTABLISH A MAP DEPOT FOR SUPPORT OF [redacted] WORLD AND EXERCISE PLANNING. [redacted] SHOULD ALSO DEVELOPE A "FILE" OF FIELD SITE PHOTOS TO PREVENT LAST MINUTE COORDINATION FOR PHOTOGRAPHY.

(4) PROBLEM: COMMUNICATION CENTER

(A) DISCUSSION: DURING THE SNOWBIRD MISSION, THE 101ST S-2 WAS NOT PROVIDED ANY COMM CENTER PERSONNEL, UNLIKE OTHER UNITS, TO MAN THE EQUIPMENT. THE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL HAD TO LEARN HOW TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THE COMM CENTER EQUIPMENT. OFTEN OVER FIFTY PERCENT OF THIS INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL'S TIME WAS SPENT PREPAR-

ING AND RECIEVING MESSAGE TRAFFIC. DURING EXERCISES WHEN SOME PERSONNEL WERE DEPLOYED TO FIELD SITES, THIS INCREASED TO ONE HUNDRED PERCENT. NO COMM CENTER PERSONNEL, EXCEPT [redacted] PERSONNEL HAD [redacted] CLEARANCES WHICH PROHIBITED UTILIZATION OF SOME UNIT PERSONNEL.

(B) RECOMMENDATION: HIGHER HEADQUARTERS SHOULD PROVIDE THE EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO ACCOMPLISH OUR ASSIGNED MISSION.

(C) PROBLEM: COMPARTMENTATION

(A) DISCUSSION- DURING THE SNOWEIRD MISSION, MUCH OF THE OPERATIONS WERE COMPARTMENTED WHICH WAS RIGHTFULLY SO, HOWEVER, I DEVELOPED THROUGH EXCHANGES WITH MY COUNTERPARTS, A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF MY MISSION AND NEW IDEAS/TECHNIQUES FOR ACCOMPLISHING THEM.

(B) RECOMMENDATION: DURING THE PLANNING FOR EXECUTION OF AN OPTION, CONFERENCES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED PERIODICALLY TO UPDATE, REFINE, AND DEVELOP NEW IDEAS. THE CONFERENCES I ATTENDED AT [redacted] SEEM TO HAVE "NEW" PERSONNEL AT EACH MEETING RATHER THAN DEVELOPING SOME CONTINUITY.

2. POC THIS HQ IS [redacted] AUTOVON [redacted]





DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS [illegible] OPERATIONS WING (TAC)
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA 32544

[redacted]

30 JAN 1981

REPLY TO ATTN OF CC

SUBJECT Intelligence History (U)

TO JTF/J-2

1. (U) Attached is the intelligence history requested in your 011610Z Nov 80 message.

2. (U) The comments and recommendations contained in this history are valid and serve to illustrate both positive and negative areas. Many of the problem areas could be alleviated or the impact reduced by the earlier involvement of intelligence personnel.

3. (U) Higher headquarters assistance will be required to implement some of the recommendations outlined in the history.

4. (S) (U) Although some paragraphs and subparagraphs in this history are unclassified, care must be taken if such paragraphs and subparagraphs are separately extracted. Any implication or reference to Ricebowl/ Snowbird (S) will probably make the extracted information classified.

5. (U) This cover letter is downgraded to SECRET upon removal from attachment.

[redacted]
Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Atch
1 SOW/A-2 Intelligence History (TS)

Classified by J-3, OJCS
Review on 30 January 2001
Extended by J-3, OJCS
Reason: Para 2-301 (c) 6

This document has 44 total pages including this cover letter.

81-DOS-014

COPY 2 OF 2

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

Readiness is our Profession

CONTENT OUTLINE

I. Introduction and Overview (Page I-1)

II. Mission (Intelligence) Requirements (Pages II-1 thru II-7)

A. [redacted]
B. Hurlburt AFSOB
C. [redacted]
D. [redacted]

III. Organizational and Personnel Structure (Pages III-1 thru III-4)

A. [redacted]
B. Hurlburt AFSOB
C. [redacted]
D. [redacted]

IV. Security and Communications (Pages IV-1 thru IV-3)

A. Security
B. Communications

V. Requirements and Productions (Pages V-1 thru V-17)

A. [redacted]
B. [redacted] Hurlburt Field AFSOB

1. Rehearsals/Exercises
2. Ricebowl

C. [redacted]

1. Introduction
2. Requirements

a. Maps and Charts

(1) Snowbird (S) Contingency Operations
(2) Exercises and Rehearsals (Honey Badger/Elite Guard)

b. Photo and Photo Paper Products

(1) Snowbird (S) Contingency Operations
(2) Exercises/Rehearsals

c. Point Positioning Data Base (PPDB) and Projected Map Displays (PMDs)
d. Intelligence Data Base
e. Order of Battle Status Boards
f. [redacted]
g. [redacted]
h. Mobility Boxes/Equipment

Classified by J-3, OJ
Review on 30 January
Extended by J-3, OJCS
Reason: Para 2-301(c

VI. Internal Staff Interface (Pages VI-1 thru VI-2)

A. AESOB
B. [redacted]
C. Det 1
D. Lesson Learned

VII. External-Lateral Interface (Pages VII-1 thru VII-5)

A. Organization Listing
B. [redacted]
C. [redacted]
D. 101 ABN Div
E. AWACS
F. 41 RWRW
G. 437 MAW
H. 1550 ATTW
I. [redacted]
J. [redacted]
K. Delta
L. Defense Mapping Agency
M. U.S. Geological Survey
N. Lessons Learned

VIII. 1 SOW/JTF Interface (Page VIII-1)

IX. Analytical Observations (Page IX-1)

I. (U) Introduction and Overview

A. (U) (TS) This Intelligence Historical Report is a consolidation of data provided by all 1st Special Operations Wing (1 SOW) intelligence personnel who participated in Ricebowl, Snowbird (S) and Honey Badger/Elite Guard activities. Although we attempted to follow the suggested report outline, at times we deviated to assure historical accuracy or to assure significant information was not omitted to preserve report format integrity. For these same reasons there is, at times, some redundancy of information. In each instance where a major problem area was identified, a recommendation and/or possible solution was included.

B. (U) The report was written from a component perspective and includes an evaluation of both positive and negative factors which contributed to overall intelligence activities. In no way should any part of this report be construed as a criticism of any organization or individual. The sole intent of this candid appraisal is to provide a baseline which intelligence personnel can use at some future time.

C. (U) (TS) Comments in each section of this report are divided into the four major phases of 1 SOW intelligence involvement covering the period between 13 November 1979 and 15 December 1980. A brief summary of each phase follows:

1. [redacted] Initial 1 SOW intelligence involvement in contingency planning for possible missions into Iran began approximately two weeks after the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized. On 13 November 79, the [redacted] Although four [redacted] intelligence personnel were [redacted], only one [redacted] was in-briefed on potential [redacted] missions. Initially, the first missions being planned at [redacted] were punitive strikes against Iranian military installations and oilfields. [redacted] concept crystallized, the [redacted] element began planning to support Ricebowl. In February 80, [redacted] (1-SOW/IN) who had been in-briefed at the Hurlburt Field Air Force Special Operations Base (AFSOB). [redacted] who returned in early Mar 80, were subsequently assigned to the AFSOB.

2. (U) (TS) [redacted] AFSOB. On 9 January, [redacted] (1 SOW/IN) was tasked by the Joint Task Force (JTF)/J-2 to establish an intelligence operation to support all AC-130 and MC-130 aircraft assigned to the JTF. [redacted] (1 SOW/IN) was assigned [redacted] and effective 14 January 1980, an [redacted] was functioning at the Hurlburt AFSOB. In late January, [redacted] (1 SOW/IN) was assigned to assist at the Hurlburt AFSOB for two weeks of mission indoctrination. Capt [redacted] was added to the A2 staff to facilitate crew coordination with the four assigned [redacted] MC-130 crews.

3. (S) Deployment to [redacted] and [redacted] In Mid-April A-2 Personnel prepared for deployment to [redacted] and [redacted] All A-2 Personnel deployed with their respective forces; i.e., [redacted] with [redacted] to [redacted] and [redacted] personnel to [redacted] Upon arrival at [redacted] communications were established with [redacted] advised that he had deployed his intelligence NCO, [redacted] was sent forward to support Nite One operations along with [redacted] and [redacted]

A, E, G

4. (S) [redacted] upon return to home station after the aborted rescue attempt, A-2 duties primarily involved monitoring message traffic and writing inputs to after-action reports until late May. At that time, the intelligence function was reorganized to support project Honey Badger operations and Snowbird (S) contingency planning.

I-1 continued

II. (U) Mission (Intelligence) Requirements.

A. [redacted]

1. (S) Initially, intelligence personnel provided support for [redacted] missions flown by AC-130 Gunships. It was not until several days after deployment that any 1 SOW intelligence personnel [redacted] only) were tasked to support possible AC-130 missions into Iran. Prior to [redacted] involvement, [redacted] (SOS) navigator (Nav) planner [redacted] was both flight planning and assessing all threats. After [redacted] in-brief [redacted] assisted [redacted] with mission planning to insure the flight routes were adjusted to consider threats on both deployment to an FOL and employment into Iran. From his in-brief until returning to Hurlburt Field on 20 Feb 80, [redacted] mission planned with [redacted] and later, [redacted] and [redacted] 16 SOS/DO, on [redacted] AC-130 options in Iran. On 15 Feb, [redacted] SOW/IN) who [redacted] been in-briefed by [redacted] SOW/IN) at Hurlburt Field, replaced [redacted] and [redacted] were assigned to the A-2 upon their return to [redacted]

2. (U) Problem Areas and Lessons Learned.

a. (U) (S) Problem: Late participation of air component intelligence. As stated in the para above, intelligence personnel were not briefed on the Iranian missions until several days after the operations planners. Prior to intelligence augmentation, a Nav planner not only had to flight plan, but also analyze and assess all threats and intelligence estimates. Through no fault of his own, the Nav planner was not properly trained in assessing or analyzing intelligence information. As a result, numerous changes were made in the flight routes after [redacted] assessed Iranian air defenses. If the mission would have been executed without intelligence augmentation, serious problems could have surfaced. In addition, an operational readiness suspense for mission execution was levied on operations planners several days prior to [redacted] augmentation. As a result, valuable time which could have been utilized for research, analysis, and threat assessment was lost. Recommendation: Initial personnel tasking for possible contingency operations should always include air component intelligence representation.

b. [redacted] updated intelligence information. [redacted] intelligence personnel [redacted] was [redacted] The only updated threat information [redacted] intelligence periodically transported from the Pentagon [redacted] and secure telephone transmissions. [redacted] provided daily message traffic. [redacted] Iranian threats could be found in the traffic. Consequently, it was used primarily to give [redacted] situation [redacted] commanders. Recommendation: Suggest all future contingency operations be provided with [redacted] augmentation if at all possible.

B. (U) ~~Hurlburt Air Force~~ Special Operations Base (AFSOB)

1. (U) (S) From 9 Jan to 19 April 80, the primary functions per-

formed by the A-2 were:

a. (U) Mission Planning

(~~S~~) AFSOB intelligence personnel (A-2) provided AC-130 and MC-130 planners with detailed penetration analysis, threat assessments, and flight route evaluations for all phases of the mission. It was vital that Joint Task Force (JTF) forces penetrate Iranian airspace and proceed to the objective areas without being detected. Therefore, not only were conventional Iranian military forces and equipment considered in the penetration analysis, but also paramilitary/gendarmerie posts, civilian population centers, and lines of communication.

(2) (~~S~~) C-141 planners were TDY to Hurlburt for approximately two weeks of interface and mission planning during the pre-deployment phase. A-2 provided threat assessments, capabilities and estimates, but flight route analysis was not provided since the C-141 mission planners did not develop a finalized flight route prior to deployment to [redacted]

b. (U) Presenting daily briefings to the COMAFSOB and staff to include current intelligence, estimates, threat analysis, and intelligence product status.

c. (~~S~~) Requisitioning aeronautical maps and charts, order of battle charts, and other intelligence products from JTF/J-2 for mission planning and execution.

d. (U) Assembling 150 Evasion and Escape (E&E) kits for AC-130 and MC-130 aircrews.

e. (~~S~~) Tailoring, annotating, and tabbing 16 Redbooks (Iranian Facilities of Critical Concern) for the AC-130's.

f. (U) Providing exercise and rehearsal maps and charts for AC-130 and MC-130 crews. Although not specifically tasked to participate in exercises/rehearsals, A-2 requisitioned all available maps, charts and photo products required for 1 SOW assets.

2. (~~S~~) Special Support to Desert One Site Survey Mission.

a. (~~S~~) In late March [redacted] was directed to provide intelligence support to [redacted] crews. The [redacted] was tasked to provide a Search and Rescue (SAR) force with a Fulton recovery capability for emergency [redacted] at the Desert One Site.

b. (~~S~~) JTF/J-2 pre-packed the required intelligence data to support this mission. Upon arrival in Europe [redacted] boarded a [redacted] Combat Talon departing for [redacted] which was to be the forward support base. Upon arrival at [redacted] initiated point to point intelligence message service from JTF/J-2 through the JCSE element, to assure [redacted] crews had the most current intelligence to support the mission. He also supported all normal mission planning and briefing

requirements. At no time were any [redacted] personnel advised of any information concerning Ricebowl or the actual activities of the [redacted] sonnel. The [redacted] crew then forward deployed to [redacted] They were provided [redacted] point of contact [redacted]

c. (TS) After the [redacted] redeployment to [redacted] all mission maps and charts, intelligence data, and other planning materials were either burned or returned to [redacted] who then returned all remaining materials to JTF/J-2. No mentionable problems were encountered.

3. (U) Problem Areas and Lessons Learned.

a. (S) Problem: Late participation of air component intelligence personnel. The tasking for the organization of an A-2 staff came approximately seven weeks after operational tasking. As a result, the A-2 was initially behind the power-curve. For example, JTF/J-2 was not aware of the large numbers of maps, charts, [redacted] other intelligence products required to support AC-130 and MC-130 aircrews during all phases of mission planning and mission execution. As a result, initial J-2 procurement and production requirements had to be altered. Although all 1 SOW requirements were met, this intelligence logistics problem could have been alleviated, if air personnel had interfaced with the J-2 during the early stages of planning. Earlier tasking for air component intelligence would have also resulted in more effective initial interface with operations planners and staff. Recommendation: Earlier involvement of air intelligence personnel.

b. (U) Problem: Lack of established courier schedules.

(1) (U) Due to the extremely sensitive nature of the intelligence materials and later the risks of transporting classified by commercial air, most classified material was transported on military air. Normally this meant T-39 support between Andrews AFB and Hurlburt/Eglin AFB or 1 SOW MC-130/AC-130 support. This system did meet the needs, but it did have inherent shortcomings.

(a) (U) If 1 SOW was tasked with providing the airlift, it required the use of mission tasked aircraft for administrative flights. This impacted on both operations and maintenance.

(b) (U) T-39 support was on an as required basis. Fortunately, there was a high enough priority available to get this support when it was really needed. However, the increased priorities meant deviating from normal activities and attracted further attention to Hurlburt Field.

(c) (U) Due to lack of scheduled military airlift, materials that needed to be transported but were not "mission essential" were held until an aircraft was scheduled. While this delay was not critical, it could have been avoided.

(2) (U) Recommendation: Establish scheduled military airlift as soon as practicable. Suggest that the controlling headquarters establish a courier schedule using dedicated, non-mission aircraft. This schedule should include each major unit on a weekly or bi-weekly basis, and be

available to support emergency requirements. The routine nature of such a schedule would also negate highly visibly, unscheduled flights which can create OPSEC problems.

C. (TS) Deployment to [redacted]

1. (TS) In mid-April, A-2 personnel prepared for deployment to [redacted] Nine mobility boxes were needed to support the large numbers of maps, charts, and other intelligence projects required for the mission. Although A-2 personnel deployed with their respective forces; [redacted], the required intelligence products to support the [redacted] MC-130s were requisitioned, packaged, and transported by the A-2.

2. (TS) Intelligence activities [redacted] which impacted directly on mission accomplishment included:

a. (U) Final mission planning with operations personnel.

b. (U) Presenting briefings to COMAFSOB, staff, and mission planners on current intelligence, estimates, and threat assessments.

c. (U) Providing required maps, charts, photos, and target products to mission planners and aircrews.

d. (TS) Conducting aircrew study sessions with AC-130 crews. The study sessions included detailed concept of operations, target priorities, and responsibilities for AC-130's tasked with fire support at [redacted] and [redacted] Every AC-130 had a primary area of responsibility; however, they were also tasked with being prepared to support any area of operation in the event of changes in target priorities, air aborts, or other unforeseen problems.

e. (U) Coordinating a SERE/SAR plan to include briefings, aircrew Evasion Plans of Action (EPA's) and providing individual E&E kits.

f. (U) (TS) Presenting pre-mission briefings to AC-130, MC-130, C-141, and KC-135 aircrews and passengers.

g. (U) (TS) Providing liaison to JTF.

3. (U) Problem Areas and Lessons Learned.

a. (TS) Problem: A copy of a draft E&E annex was provided to the A-2 the night prior to forward deployment from [redacted] This did not allow adequate time for crew study. In addition, only one copy of the annex was available; it had to be deployed to [redacted] and also briefed to the aircrews at [redacted] Since the required E&E portion of the pre-mission briefing was the only portion of the briefing that could not be completed before leaving the US, the late receipt of the annex proved to be a problem.

Recommendation: Although this handicap was resolved as well as possible, the A-2 believes that this important annex should be provided, even if in draft form, prior to deployment to facilitate coordinated Evasion Plans of Action and associated crew study time.

b. (TS) Problem: The lack of hard copy message traffic for A-2 at [redacted]. Although message traffic was available for review at J-2, the heavy volume of traffic to be screened, the inordinate amount of time required to hand copy pertinent intelligence data, and the difficulty in securing transportation made intelligence updating a most difficult task and wasted valuable man-hours. Recommendation: During future contingencies, the communications center use 6-ply paper or possibly use a tape from on-line reperforation of selected copies of incoming message traffic, thus allowing for additional copies to be made.

c. (U) Lesson Learned: All A-2 intelligence personnel were designated classified couriers for deployment and redeployment. This proved to be a very effective measure during a deployment stopover at Ramstein AB. There were no security police available to guard the aircraft, so a classified courier had to stand guard over the classified material in the aircraft. Since all intelligence personnel were couriers, shifts could be scheduled, thus allowing all personnel to get a shower and/or some sleep.

D. (U) OSD/Det 1

1. (TS) The primary mission requirements levied on A-2 after the hostage rescue attempt included all functions and duties performed by the A-2 prior to the aborted mission. However, when the hostages were dispersed to several locations and the [redacted] the options became more complex. The size and operational requirements of the rescue force had to be expanded to meet these new mission demands. Consequently, additional intelligence requirements were levied on A-2. These included:

a. (U)(TS) Providing support to HH-53 helicopters. In May 80, HH-53s (both modified Pave Low and Slick) arrived at Hurlburt Field. Several Snowbird (S) options called for utilization of these air force assets. A-2 was tasked to provide the HH-53's all intelligence support necessary for mission execution.

b. (U)(TS) Providing intelligence support to KC-135 and C-141 mission planners and crews. A-2 was tasked to provide all required maps, charts, photos, and other intelligence products to KC-135 and C-141 mission planners and crews during planning conferences held at Hurlburt Field. This included both "real world" rehearsals and Honey Badger/Elite Guard directed exercises. Additionally, the A-2 provided intelligence information for mission planning to include threat assessments, estimates, and capabilities, since these assets did not have indoctrinated, organic intelligence support.

d. (U) (TS) Providing majority of maps, charts, photos, and other intelligence products to the 101 Airborne Division (ABN Div) for Snowbird (S) operations, rehearsals, and exercises. A-2 assisted the 101 ABN Div S-2 in providing intelligence support to 101 ABN Div crews as required during joint helicopter operations and planning conferences. Additionally, A-2's data base was reproduced and disseminated to the 101 ABN Div S-2 to insure both units were working with identical background information. In addition, the S-2 received explicit instructions on procedures to update the data base.

(U) (TS) Providing maps, charts, photos and intelligence products required during planning conferences and exercises for the 552 AWACS and 39 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) mission planners. A-2 support also included threat assessments, analysis, and estimates used in mission planning.

e. (U) (TS) Providing maps, charts, photos and other intelligence products requested by the [redacted] (Rangers) [redacted] Rangers), [redacted] and Delta when required.

2. (U) (TS) As a result of numerous Snowbird (S) options and Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises, A-2 was tasked to identify and provide the majority of maps, charts, photos, and related products to not only 1 SOW, but all air assets involved. This included both "real world" and exercise requirements. Essentially, all intelligence information required by units participating in planning conferences held at Hurlburt Field were supplied by the A-2 with the assistance of J-2.

3. (U) Problem Areas during Exercises and Rehearsals and Lessons Learned.

a. (U) (TS) Problem: Late J-2 participation in Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises. Prior to September 80, J-2 did not actively participate in exercise planning due to other "real world" requirements. As a result, A-2 was often tasked with identifying, ordering, and disseminating the vast majority of aeronautical charts, photos, and other related products for all air assets (excluding naval) participating in exercises and rehearsals. This entailed requisitioning and maintaining over 100,000 charts and approximately 5000 locally produced photo prints or photo mosaic products. In addition to the inherent problems associated with this tasking (maintenance of stock levels, storage, keeping current inventories, etc.), other related problems areas were:

(1) (U) Short suspense for requisitioning requirements. Many exercise locations were not identified to 1 SOW by the Joint Test Directorate (JTD) until a short time prior to the exercise start date. As a result, A-2 had to increase the priority of the map requests, and in several cases, the suspense could not be met.

(2) (U) Changes/cancellations of exercises. In several instances, late changes in exercise locations, the number and type of participating forces, lateral units altering needs or actual exercise cancellation resulted in thousands of charts and photos being requisitioned,

but not used. For example, A-2 requisitioned over 100,000 charts after unit requirements had been determined; however, only about 30,000 were used.

(3) (S) Operations Security (OPSEC). The requisitioning of extremely large numbers of charts, the priority of the telephonic order requests to United States Geological Survey (USGS) (no secure telephone capability) and the lack of an OSD/Det 1 map and chart account (1 SOW/IN's account was used) exposed potential/possible OPSEC problems.

b. (U)(S) Recommendation: Future exercise/rehearsals of the Honey Badger magnitude should include more higher headquarters intelligence involvement. JTD was in a better position to be the focal point in providing maps and charts to all participants. This would also eliminate most of the potential OPSEC problems and possibly some of the waste inherent in Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises. It should be noted that in September 80, J-2 involvement [primarily by [redacted]] did help to alleviate some of these problems.

G

III. (U) Organizational and Personnel Structure.

A. (U) [redacted]

1. (S) Four 1 SOW intelligence personnel deployed to [redacted] on 13 Nov 80 reportedly to support AC-130 Gunship [redacted] missions in [redacted] These personnel were:

a. [redacted] - CIC

b. [redacted] - NCOIC

c. [redacted] - Intelligence Specialist

d. [redacted] - Intelligence Specialist

[redacted] was the only individual briefed on the Iranian mission(s) due to stringent OPSEC measures. Since the [redacted] missions were used primarily as [redacted] it was determined that only two intelligence personnel were required. [redacted] remained at [redacted] with [redacted] and [redacted] returned to Hurlburt Field in late November 79. [redacted] and [redacted] remained at [redacted] until 24 Dec 79. At that time, all 1 SOW personnel with the exception of ferrying crews and a minimum number of maintenance personnel returned to Hurlburt Field. On 3 Jan 80 [redacted] returned to [redacted] to provide intelligence support for the Iranian missions and the [redacted] missions (as required). [redacted] was replaced by [redacted] who had been indoctrinated at Hurlburt Field on 15 Feb 80. [redacted] returned to Hurlburt Field on 3 March 80.

B. (U) Hurlburt AFSOB.

1. (TS) [redacted] 1 SOW/IN) was directed to report to JCS/SOD on 8 Jan 80 for further instructions. On 9 Jan, he was directed to establish an intelligence operation to support AC-130 and MC-130 aircraft tasked to support a contingency operation in Iran. [redacted] directed [redacted] 1 SOW/IN) to report to the Pentagon on 10 Jan. With [redacted] assistance, all available intelligence information, photos, maps, charts, and other intelligence products were transported back to Hurlburt Field. Effective 14 Jan an AFSOB intelligence function (A-2) was operational at Hurlburt Field. A-2 immediately started analyzing, assessing, and disseminating necessary intelligence information to operations planners.

2. (TS) In late January, [redacted] arrived at Hurlburt Field for two weeks of mission indoctrination. [redacted] was added to the A-2 staff to facilitate crew coordination with the four [redacted] crews. This insured that [redacted] MC-130's would have organic intelligence support if they separately deployed to a forward operating location (FOL). Although [redacted] did not have JTF dedicated communications, all necessary maps, charts, photos and other intelligence products for the [redacted] MC-130s were requisitioned and maintained by A-2.

3. (S) Upon his return from Guam on 20 Feb 80, [redacted] was assigned to the A-2 staff. [redacted] who replaced [redacted] was also added to the A-2 staff when the AC-130's redeployed to Hurlburt in early March.

4. (U) (TS) The final A-2 staff prior to deployment included:

[redacted] Chief

[redacted] - AC-130 and Security

[redacted] - AC-130 and Targets

[redacted] - MC-130 and Requirements

e. (U) Although A-2 personnel did have primary areas of responsibility, all intelligence personnel had the expertise to support any of the aircraft.

5. (U) The A-2 staff was augmented prior to deployment by the following individuals:

a. (U) (S) [redacted] also MC-130 during employment phase.

(S) [redacted] SOW/DORI [redacted] support. [redacted] signed an EC-79 statement in early April 80, however, she was not fully in-briefed into Ricebowl [redacted] was used to find exact coordinates for some of the initial coast-in points. She did not deploy to an FOL.

C. (G) (TS) Deployment to [redacted] and [redacted]

1. (C) (TS) All intelligence personnel deployed with their respective forces, ie. [redacted] to [redacted] and 1 SOW on scheduled airlift to [redacted] Upon arrival at [redacted] secure communications were established with [redacted] advised that he had also deployed [redacted] his intelligence NCO. [redacted] was sent forward with 1 SOW MC-130's to support Nite One operations. Thus, the A-2 staff was evenly split with three personnel at each location to support Nite One and Nite Two operations respectively. The decision to evenly split the forces was also based on the fact that the A-2 was tasked after deployment with providing air intelligence liaison to the JTF, mission planning assistance and presenting pre-mission intelligence briefings to C-141 and KC-135 crews at [redacted] as well as final mission planning and pre-mission briefings for AC-130 and MC-130 crews. The A-2 decided to remain at [redacted] instead of deploying to [redacted] for the following reasons: The complexity and large numbers of aircraft involved in Nite Two operations, the confidence he had in the capabilities of the intelligence personnel at [redacted] the completed pre-mission intelligence preparation for Nite One, and finally being able to influence and advise JTF/J-2 (no JTF air intelligence personnel deployed to [redacted] personnel on air intelligence required at [redacted] The final organization of the A-2 in support of Nite One and Nite Two operations is as follows:

(c)

a. (TS) Nite One [redacted]

(1) (U) [redacted]

(2) (U) [redacted]

(3) (U) [redacted] SOS)

E,G

b. (TS) Nite Two [redacted]

(1) (U) [redacted] (1 SOW)

(2) (U) [redacted] (1 SOW)

(3) (U) [redacted] (1 SOW)

(4) (U) [redacted] (1 SOW) - upon return from [redacted]

2. (TS) Since some of the MC-130s were required to fly both Nite One and Nite Two missions, [redacted] would have redeployed back to [redacted] to assist in Nite Two operations.

D. (U) OSD/Det 1

1. (U) After the assignment of HH-53s to Hurlburt, and when tasking was received to establish a function to support Projects Honey Badger and Snowbird (S), additional intelligence augmentation was needed to meet the new intelligence requirements.

a. (U) Since the HH-53s were new to special operations, and their requirements unique, the decision was made in July to indoctrinate [redacted] an intelligence NCO deployed with the HH-53s, into both Honey Badger and Snowbird (S) compartments. In the interim, [redacted] departed PCS, but was not replaced.

b. (S) Numerous Honey Badger exercises required additional A-2 support; specifically, numerous maps and charts had to be ordered, and, on occasion, intelligence scenarios had to be written. As a result, two additional 1 SOW intelligence NCO's were Honey Badger indoctrinated primarily to support increasingly heavy map and chart requirements. They were MSgt [redacted] - both previously deployed to [redacted] n Nov 79.

E,G

c. (U) (S) As additional Snowbird (S) options surfaced and were somewhat integrated into Honey Badger exercises, it became increasingly difficult to maintain compartmental separation from an intelligence standpoint. In addition, as Snowbird (S) options became increasingly complex, additional intelligence requirements were levied on the A-2. Therefore, it was determined that [redacted] would also be indoctrinated on Snowbird (S) operations. (It should be noted that compartmental integrity concerning restricted or limited distribution data was maintained).

2. (TS) On certain occasions, special A-2 augmentation was required to provide adequate support of mission operations. When the [redacted] MC-130 aircraft returned TDY to the CONUS [redacted] their new intelligence officer, accompanied them to Hurlburt Field for

(G)

approximately three months of mission indoctrination and enhanced intelligence interface. [redacted] was integrated into the A-2 staff during this period.

3. (U) The A-2 staff as of 15 Dec 1980 consisted of:



- Chief

Augmentee, when required.

IV. (U) Security and Communications:

A. (U) Security:

(S)

a. (TS) Security measures/precautions used for the [redacted] deployment were extremely effective. First, only a very limited number of personnel were knowledgeable of the Iranian option(s). Second, a planned [redacted] was used for the deployment; the AC-130s were to fly [redacted] missions off the [redacted] in search of [redacted] boats.

b. (TS) All planning for the Iranian missions was accomplished in a restricted area with only personnel cleared for the project having access.

2. (U) Hurlburt Field AFSOB:

a. (S) Security measures/precautions used at the AFSOB were again effective. The number of in-briefed personnel were restricted to mission essential only. Secondly, further restrictions were imposed for access to intelligence traffic.

b. (TS) The only major problem in security was the lack of a totally secure facility; however, twenty-four hour manning was established to provide additional protection.

3. (TS) [redacted]

a. (TS) The security of [redacted] was good due to it's isolated location. 1 SOW crews were physically separated from the rest of the base population at [redacted] Physical security was provided at the AFSOB hangar (location of all mission materials) initially by the four intelligence personnel and later by security police patrolling outside. Access to the AFSOB hangar was controlled on a need-to-know basis.

b. (TS) The security at [redacted] was, again, good due to it's physical location. The mission crews and support personnel were isolated next to the inactive runway. The only security problems at [redacted] were the curious local natives who would at times cross the perimeter fence to look at the equipment and talk to the people. They were easily, but tactfully escorted back outside the perimeter fence.

4. (U) OSD/Det 1:

a. (U) With the establishment of Det 1, another location was used for operations planning. This facility was considerably more secure than the previous facility. Twenty-four hour manning was also continued.

b. (U) The primary OPSEC problem was speculation due to large numbers of army forces, helicopters, and equipment deployed to Hurlburt Field on several occasions. Although army forces have participated in exercises at Hurlburt Field, they were always announced. In addition, Hurlburt Field was naturally suspect after the aborted attempt. Another problem involved Honey Badger planning conferences held at Hurlburt. On more than one occasion, "real world" references were made during these conferences, thus some personnel cleared for Honey Badger only were inadvertantly exposed to Snowbird (S) information. When A-2 personnel were aware of these compromises, personnel involved were directed to sign inadvertant disclosure statements or indoctrinated into the Snowbird (S) compartment if a need-to-know was established.

B. (U) Communications:

1. (S) Due to the sensitive nature and the level of classification of intelligence and operational data needed to support Ricebowl, a dedicated secure communications net was needed to interface all the different service organizations. JSCE of the U.S. Readiness Command (REDCOM) was tasked with providing a communications network and personnel to support JTF.

2. [redacted] There was no dedicated or tactical communications supporting the [redacted] deployment. The only secure method available to exchange information was AUTOSEVOCOM.

3. (S) Hurlburt AFSOB. The AFSOB terminal for the communications net was manned by four JCSE personnel - three communications specialists and one crypto maintenance specialist. They provided all direct hard copy message traffic support between JTF and lateral support to other involved units. Additionally, they provided and maintained the Parkhill encryption system which allowed secure voice communications to involved agencies.

4. [redacted]

a. (TS) The A-2 staff deployed to [redacted] on 19 April 1980 and set up operations in a dedicated hangar on the operations end of the airfield. The only communications available at the AFSOB were one direct line (field phone) to JTF (Forward) and two "base phones" (rotary dial). All telephones were installed by deployed communications personnel. All incoming and outgoing communications went through JTF located at the opposite end of the base. The AFSOB personnel were required to go to JTF to read all message traffic.

b. (TS) There was a JCSE element forward deployed to [redacted] which received message traffic forwarded from [redacted]. This message traffic was invaluable to forward deployed A-2 personnel. Equipment used at [redacted] was basically the same as at Hurlburt AFSOB with the addition of a UHF satellite radio (WSC-3) and associated gear to provide secure long range voice communications.





5. (S) Det 1 Operations: The establishment of [redacted] in Washington D.C. and the involvement of several new units required expanded communications. The communications equipment remained the same as at Hurlburt AFSOB with the addition of the WSC-3 radio and associated crypto gear to provide secure voice SATCOM capability. There was always at least one WSC-3 at Hurlburt Field, but during exercises this number would increase to meet the demands for required communication nets.

6. (U) Problem Area/Lessons Learned:

a. (S) Problem: While deployed to [redacted] the A-2 received no hard copy message traffic. Recommendation: Enough copies of incoming traffic be made to provide them to component units. This can be done by using six-ply paper, making additional copies of selected traffic from paper tape obtained from on-line reperforation or a photo copy capability.

b. (S) Problem: No dedicated record communications available to the [redacted] deployed AC-130s. Comment: When the Gunships initially deployed to [redacted] they were not a part of the JTF force package. Recommendation: As soon as a unit is tasked for a special project, dedicated tactical secure record communications, possibly via UHF satellite links, should be established.

c. (S) Lesson Learned: Perhaps the most valuable lesson learned was the need for a dedicated voice and record communications system (such as [redacted]) separate from normal service communications channels. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of most special operations missions, we urge that a similar communications network be established for future operations of this scope and nature. Recommendation: One possible improvement that could be added would be a secure portable facsimile capability similar to DACOM. This added capability would have been very useful to transmit flight routes, Nav Logs, diagrams, photos, etc.

d. (C) Comment: The JCSE personnel TDY to Hurlburt Field from MacDill AFB were invaluable to the AFSOB and Det 1 staffs. The vast majority of all their people performed well beyond their assigned duties. Because of their willingness to "pitch in" to get the job done, they took much of the routine work load off the limited AFSOB/Det 1 staffs.

V. (U) Requirements & Production

A. [redacted]

1. (S) All maps, charts, photos and other supplemental intelligence products were transported by operations planners from the Pentagon. Since the operations planners signed for the products, they maintained overall control. Initial products included [redacted] OB charts, and aeronautical maps and charts for deployment from [redacted] and employment into Iran. As the mission options changed from punitive strikes to a rescue operation, additional charts and photography were couriered from the Pentagon by the [redacted] C and DO. These products included photos of Mehrabad and the Embassy in Tehran, and maps and charts for employment to Tehran.

2. (TS) Since 1 SOW/IN personnel were not briefed on the Iranian mission(s) prior to deployment, they did not deploy with any specific intelligence information or products of Iran. However, 1 SOW/IN always deploys with a worldwide microfiche force package. This proved to be invaluable due to the lack of current intelligence information and message traffic from JCS. In addition, the operations planners did not transport any intelligence information for deployment from [redacted] to an FOL.

B. (U) Hurlburt Field AFSOB

1. (U) Rehearsals/Exercise

a. (U) Maps and charts for exercises and rehearsals were provided by A-2. This included appropriate numbers and scales required for deployment from Hurlburt to the exercise objective area.

b. (S) Photo products of objective areas were also provided to AC-130 and MC-130 crews when made available by JTF/J-2.

2. (U) Ricebowl

a. (U) Aeronautical Charts

(1) (TS) The A-2 provided the AFSOB staff, MC-130, and AC-130 chart requirements to JTF/J-2. The following critieria was used in identifying the required number and scale of charts needed:

(a) (U) JOG's (1:250,000)

1. (U) AC-130 - Four per crew

2. (U) MC-130 - Three per crew

3. (U) Ten additional copies of each JOG

4. (U) Number of sheets requisitioned: 120

(b) (U) TPC's (1:500,000) & ONC's (1:1,000,000)

1. (U) AC-130 - Two per crew

2. (U) MC-130 - Two per crew

3. (U) 25 additional copies of each TPC & ONC

4. (U) Number of sheets requisitioned: TPC-20; ONC-13

(c) (U) JNC's (1:2,000,000)

1. (U) AC-130 - One per crew

2. (U) MC-130 - One per crew

3. (U) 15 additional copies of each JNC

4. (U) Number of sheets requisitioned: Four

(d) (U) GNC's, GLC's & GLLC's. (1:5,000,000)

1. (U) AC-130 - One per crew

2. (U) MC-130 - One per crew

3. (U) 25 additional copies of each GNC, GLC & GLLC

4. (U) Number of sheets requisitioned: GNC-two; GLC-one; GLLC-one.

(e) (U) Some of the "additional" charts were used in mission planning, while other extras were given to KC-135 and C-141 crews.

b. (U) Photos, OB charts, and other intelligence products requisitioned by A-2 and provided by JTF/J-2 included:

(1) (U) Four Bluebooks (Extraction Sites). One Bluebook was provided to each AC-130 crew.

(2) (U) 17 Redbooks (Iranian Facilities of Critical Concern). One Redbook was used as a master by the A-2 staff. The AC-130's required four per crew. Distribution per crew follows:

(a) (U) Fire Control Officer (FCO)

(b) (U) Navigator (NAV)

(c) (U) IR Sensor Operator (IR)

(d) (U) LLL TV Sensor Operator (TV)

(3) (S) 150 E&E kits. All products contained in the E&E kits (except TPC's) were provided by JTF/J-2; however, assembly of the kits was accomplished by A-2.

(S)(a) (U) E&E kits for AC-130 aircrews contained the following:

annotations)

1. (TS) [redacted]
2. (U) [redacted]
3. (U) [redacted]
4. (TS) [redacted]
5. (TS) [redacted]
6. (TS) [redacted]
7. (U) [redacted]

A, C

(S)(b) (U) [redacted] MC-130 aircrews contained the following:

annotations)

1. (S) (TS) [redacted]
2. (U) [redacted]
3. (U) [redacted]
4. (TS) [redacted]
5. (TS) [redacted]
6. (U) [redacted]
7. [redacted]

A, C

(S)(4) (TS) Photos, photo paper products, photo maps, and special charts provided by JTF/J-2 included:

(a) (TS) Embassy (photos and photo paper products w/grids)

(b) (TS) [redacted] (photos)

(c) (TS) Order of Battle charts (Iran)

(d) (TS) Radar Detection Range charts (Persian Gulf)

(e) (TS) Acquisition and Tracking Radar Range charts (Persian Gulf)

A, C

(f) (TS) [redacted] (photo strip maps)

(g) (TS) [redacted] (photos & photo paper products w/grids)

(h) (TS) [redacted] (photos)

C

(i) [redacted] (photos)

(j) [redacted] (photos)

(k) [redacted] (photos)

(l) [redacted] (photos)

(m) [redacted] (photos and photo paper products w/grids)

(n) [redacted] (photos and photo paper products)

(o) (TS) Tehran and vicinity (special) 1:50,000

(p) [redacted] (photos)

(q) [redacted] (photos)

(r) [redacted] (photos)

(s) [redacted] (photos)

(t) [redacted] (photos)

(u) [redacted] (photos)

(v) [redacted]

(w) (TS) Tehran to Manzariyeh photo strip charts

(x) [redacted]

(y) (TS) Tehran city map (Centre & North)

(z) [redacted]

(aa) (TS) Tehran and Vicinity sheet 1 (1:25,000)

(bb) (TS) Tehran and Vicinity sheet 2 (1:25,000)

(cc) (TS) Tehran and Vicinity sheet 3 (1:25,000)

(dd) (TS) Tehran and Vicinity sheet 4 (1:25,000)

(ee) [redacted] (photos)

(ff) [redacted] (photo products paper w/grids)

(gg) [redacted] (photo paper product w/grids)

(5) (U) Message Traffic

(a) (TS) Intelligence message traffic provided by JTF/J-2 was timely, informative and invaluable. This information was essential for the success of any contingency operation. The following reports were received by A-2 on a daily or as available basis:

[redacted]

2. (TS) Iranian Military Activity Report (Probably single most important message.)

3. (TS) Imagery Analysis Report

4. (TS) Iranian Situation Report

5. (TS) SATRAN Report

(b) (TS) Other pertinent information was received (threats assessments, [illegible] locations, weather, etc.) as it became available.

c. (TS) Comment: Overall, intelligence support received from JTF/J-2 was superior in every respect.

C. (S) OSD/Det 1

1. (TS) After the aborted rescue attempt, the decision was made to destroy most of the classified mission material at [redacted] however, the A-2 determined that at least one copy of every map, chart, photo and other intelligence product would be maintained. As numerous Snowbird (S) options surfaced, this proved to be an effective decision.

2. (TS) After the initiation of Project Honey Badger and as several different Snowbird (S) options surfaced, addtional intelligence products were required to support all of the possible contingencies. The following requirements and products were requisitioned or produced to support mission demands:

a. (S) Maps and Charts

(1) (S) Snowbird (S) Contingency Operations

(a) (U) Aeronautical Maps and Charts

1. (U) During May 80, a decision to maintain selected worldwide contingency charts for planning and operational purposes for tasked 1 SOW assets was implemented. The initial stock consisted of the following:

NR SHEETS	TYPE CHART (CODE)	QUANTITY MAINTAINED
10	Global Loran (GLC)	150
26	Global Navigation (GNC)	390
105	Jet Navigation (JNC)	1575
111	Operational Navigation (ONC)	3150
108	Tactical Pilotage (TPC)	3125

2. (S) As a result of the additional map requirements, the [redacted] Carpenter Shop built specially designed map storage racks which provided adequate storage. Initial requirements were based on 1 SOW augmented forces only. As mission requirements increased, a decision was made to maintain contingency maps at this location for other air assets (101 ABN Div, MAC, SAC, etc.) supporting Snowbird (S). This resulted in five additional major chart requisitions through 8 Oct 80. Additional charts were ordered to establish the following inventory:

TYPE CHART (CODE)	NEW QUANTITY MAINTAINED
Global Loran (GLC)	150
Global Navigation (GNC)	350
Jet Navigation (JNC)	2100
Operational Navigation (ONC)	5400
Tactical Pilotage (TPC)	6450

3. (S) Coordination with JTF was made to store specific Joint Operations Graphics Series 1501 Air (JOG-A) and special purpose charts at the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) for rapid deployment to Hurlburt should the need arise. This was necessary because of the large numbers and storage space requirements.

4. (U) The total number of charts on hand and being maintained for worldwide contingencies was approximately 18,000. Maintenance consisted of maintaining an adequate stock level, ensuring new editions of required charts are ordered, and disposing of obsolete charts. Periodic inventories were also necessary to insure all required numbers of charts were maintained.

(b) (U) Special Produced JNC's.

1. (S) On 2 Jun 80, [redacted] reported to JTF/J-2 for instructions and liaison with DMA personnel prior to departing for DMAAC in St. Louis. He was tasked with producing a special map and chart product depicting the Iranian radar threat on a 1:2,000,000 scale product. Radar overlays (at different altitudes) aligned to the 1:2,500,000 Iranian road map were provided by [redacted].

2. (U) The senior POC at Defense Mapping Agency Aeronautical Center (DMAAC) [redacted] of DMAAC Crisis Management Team. [redacted] was identified as the [redacted] map project officer for the center and provided all necessary interface with production personnel, cartographers, administration, etc. [redacted] was totally knowledgeable of all facets of the center's activities and was instrumental in the successful

completion of this project.

3. (TS) Although numerous minor production problems occurred, ie., combining four JNC's into one chart, producing radar overlays for a newly active radar [redacted] color selection, aeronautical update data; sufficient prorities had been established to overcome all problems. In essense, a new chart, printed on both sides of the paper, was produced. The exceptional professionalism displayed by all-DMAAC personnel, especially [redacted] is most noteworthy. It should be noted that although all the work was done in St. Louis, the actual chart printing was accomplished at DMA facilities in Maryland.

4. (S) DMAAC personnel were not overly inquisitive, and other than the fact they they were working on a classified Iranian chart, there was no danger to operational security.

5. (U) These charts were very useful to the A-2 personnel; however, it soon became apparent that they would have to have more radars depicted. The basic low-level chart only showed EW coverage. The majority of the options called for 1 SOW aircraft to pass in close proximity to other radars (ATC, ASR, etc.)

[redacted]

7. (C) Since the predictions were done by self taught individuals, selected electronic warfare officers (EWO) assigned to 1 SOW evaluated the updated predictions for accuracy. The initial predictions were done on a 1:1,000,000 (ONC), then reduced to the 1:2,000,000 scale (special JNC). Once the prediction was drawn on the special JNC, an acetate overlay was made, and finally the prediction was transfered to the special radar map.

8. (U) The assumptions used to do the radar predictions follow:

a. (U) The radar [redacted] received the benefit of doubt when resolving conflicts.

b. (U) The antenna height was always higher in the predictions than was the case for the actual radar. This built in a "pad" for the predictions to compensate for inaccuracies or incomplete data.

c. (U) The 1:2,000,000 scale final product would be used only to identify areas of possible exploitations. All final route evaluations would be done in conjunction with assigned EWO's.

(c) C

9. (U) Since there was only one modified radar map initially produced, it could be controlled. Because of the inherent errors in the final product, anything other than rough, initial planning could have resulted in serious errors. For that reason, intelligence personnel always were present when mission planning was being done.

(c) C

10. (U) Recommendation: Future operations of this type should have similar maps produced as soon as possible. They are extremely helpful in initial mission planning.

(c) C (S) There were also JTF specially produced maps that were requisioned by A-2. These maps were tailored to meet the demands of various Snowbird (S) mission requirements. The following special maps and charts were acquired from JTF; initial requisitions were for mission planning only:

(c) C

[redacted]

(S) C

2. (TS) Environs of Tehran - a 1:100,000 scale topographical map of Tehran and vicinity. Used primarily for E&E planning.

(c) C

3. (TS) Special JOG of Tehran and vicinity to include Manzariyeh and Semnan New Aflds. This special produced chart was extremely useful for mission planning. A-2 requisioned 100 copies of this chart to be used for mission planning and execution.

(C)

4. ([redacted] Special JOG A/Photo Paper Product [redacted] EZ Susan, dated 7 Nov 80. This [redacted] with photos was extremely useful in mission planning for contingencies involving EZ Susan.

(C) S

5. (TS) Planning Map West consisting of a Tehran city map and photo paper product with grids (approx. scale - 1:50,000).

(2) (U) Exercises and Rehearsals (Honey Badger/Elite Guard)

C

(a) (S) As a result of numerous exercises and rehearsals which tested the operational capabilities of tasked units as well as the feasibility of contingency options, A-2 was required to requision and maintain a total of approximately 108,000 maps and charts from both the DMA and USGS. It should be noted that the A-2 usually supported all participating units. The following lists show the number and type of maps and charts requisioned by A-2 for support of scheduled exercises and rehearsals:

1. (U) USGS

NR SHEETS	SCALE	TOTAL QUANTITY
63	1:250,000	18,900
80	1:62,500	16,000
210	1:24,000	21,000

2. (U) DMA

NR SHEETS	TYPE (CODE)	TOTAL QUANTITY
1	Global Navigation (GNC)	100
4	Jet Navigation (JNC)	200
9	Operational Navigation (ONC)	2500
175	Joint Operation Graphics-Air(JOG-A)	36,000
111	1:50,000(AMS)	13,00
20	Sectional Aeronautical Chart (1:500,000)	1000

(b) (S) (U) A-2 was the focal point in providing exercise maps and charts for all air component assets. This entailed querying other units for their requirements, ordering, maintaining, and distributing the maps and charts accordingly. However, due to last minute changes in exercise locations, exercise cancellations and changes in number and type of forces involved, only 30,000 of 108,700 charts were used.

b. (U) Photos and Photo Paper Products

(1) (U) (S) Snowbird (S) Contingency Operations

(a) (U) (TS) As previously stated A-2 retained one copy of every photo/photo-paper product used in the aborted attempt to rescue the hostages. However, as new developments occurred resulting in several different Snowbird (S) options, new photos/photo paper products were requisitioned or forwarded from JTF/J-2. The following products were provided by JTF/J-2:

(S) 1. [redacted] (photos)

2. (TS) [redacted] (photos)

3. (TS) [redacted] (photos)

4. (TS) [redacted] (photos)

5. (TS) [redacted] (photos)

6. (TS) [redacted] (photos)

7. (TS) [redacted] (photos)

8. (TS) [redacted] (photos)

9. [redacted] photos)

10. [redacted] (photo paper products)

11. [redacted] (photo paper produc

12. [redacted] (photo paper products printed

13. Embassy (colored ground hand-held photos)

14. Target folders with photo, chart, and area description:

(U) a. [redacted]

b. [redacted]

c. [redacted]

d. [redacted]

(2) (U) Exercise/Rehearsal Photos and Photo Paper Products.

(a) (U) Special photo paper products were requisitioned from JTF/J-2 specifically for planned exercises and rehearsals. These products were extremely effective and valuable for ~~mission~~ Exercise planning and ~~execution~~ Training. Listing follows:

1. (U) Reese AFB
2. (U) Kirtland Aux
3. (U) Condron AAF
4. (U) Cannon AFB
5. (U) Michael AAF
6. (U) Nuclear Range Test Site (NRTS)
7. (U) Indian Springs Afld

(b) (U) Although the special photo paper products provided by JTF/J-2 were extremely useful, they were not produced for every exercise or exercise location, particularly the initial exercises that JTF/J-2 did not participate or provide support. As a result, A-2 requested tactical aerial photography and the required number of prints for most exercise objective areas. In most cases, the request was not fully satisfied, particularly the number of prints requested. Thus, 1 SOW/DOR was tasked with providing last minute support, which resulted in extremely long duty days for the individuals cleared for Honey Badger/Elite Guard.

(C) A total of approximately 5,000 prints were reproduced by 1 SOW/DOR of the following exercises operating areas:

1. (U) Terry Aux mosaic prints
2. (U) Terry Aux mosaic
3. (U) Terry Aux 9X9 prints
4. (U) Reese to Parasail mosaic prints
5. (U) Reese to Parasail 9X9 (1-4)
6. (U) Reese to Parasail 18X20
7. (U) Reese to Parasail mosaic
8. (U) Reese mosaic prints
9. (U) Reese mosaic 1:15,000
10. (U) Reese mosaic
11. (U) Parasail mosaic
12. (U) Parasail mosaic prints
13. (U) Melrose range
14. (U) Dugway Dirt Strip (5X7) (ground and air)
    a. (U) Ground North
    b. (U) Air West
    c. (U) Air East
    d. (U) Air North
15. (U) Dugway intersection 1:1700
16. (U) Marrion DZ NS
17. (U) NAS Fallon - 1:20,500 - 1:14,000
18. (U) B-70
19. (U) Field 1 1:17,500
20. (U) Terry Aux 1:14,000

21. (U) Terry Aux 1:4300

22. (U) Roswell Wet Site 1:3800

23. (U) Roswell Wetsite 1:6400

24. (U) Dugway Dirt Strip 1:20,000

25. (U) Dugway Dirt Strip 1:10,000

26. (U) Cannon AFB 1:18,000

27. (U) German Village 1:5700

28. (U) German Village 1:3050

29. (U) Ft Hood 1:12,000

30. (U) Ft Hood 1:5000

31. (U) Field 6 1:17,500

[redacted] (U) C-61A 1:17,500

[redacted] (U) LZ East 1:17,500

34. (U) Field 10 1:17,500

[redacted] (U) B-12 1:17,500

[redacted] (U) Field 4 1:17,500

37. (U) Field 5 1:11,500

[redacted] Holley 1:7200

[redacted] (U) B-5 1:17,500

40. (U) Hurlburt mosaic 1:20,000

Problem: When tactical photography was scheduled by [redacted] in some instances not enough prints were made available to the 1 SOW. When we tried to reprint enough copies from a print, there was a 40 to 60 per cent loss in resolution. Recommendation: After all participants have identified their photographic requirements and the tasked reconnaissance (Recce) has been identified, suggest direct liasion between 1 SOW and tasked Recce unit be authorized, if we are to be responsible for final photo products. We would prefer to have the Recce aircraft recover at Hurlburt for film down loading, debriefing, and subsequent film processing at 1 SOW/DORI. By using this approach we can control or modify photo scales and numbers of products. If it is not feasible for the Recce aircraft to recover at Hurlburt, tasked Recce units should be advised to forward original negative, pilot's log and mission maps to Hurlburt.

c. (U) Point Positioning Data Bases (PPDBs) and Projected Map Displays (PMDs).

(1) (U) With the assignment of Pave Low (HH-53) helicopters to the 1 SOW, the A-2 section immediately identified and then established new intelligence requirements needed to support the Pave Lows. In addition to changing the numbers of maps and charts required, especially large scale charts, the primary new requirements involved PPDBs and PMDs. These new requirements posed no major problems. Actions taken are outlined below:

(a) (U) The PPDBs were a product with which we were familar. To assure proper support the following actions were taken:

1. (U) (TS) For various Snowbird (S) options, we continually reviewed the PPDB inventory already maintained at the wing imagery intrepretation shop (1 SOW/DORI). The wing was already on distribution for all Mideast PPDBs in conjunction with our Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) contingency requirements. Since we had previously used the few available Iranian PPDBs to evaluate coverage of the AC-130 and MC-130 routes planned for Ricebowl, the only new action we took was to review coverage of adjacent countries which could be used to support a forward launch base for the Pave Low and army helicopters.

2. (U) Several additional US PPDBs were ordered to support Pave Low participation in various Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises.

(b) (U) PMD requirements were a completely new concept to A-2 personnel. However, as a result of this requirement, all assigned A-2 personnel became familiar with many of the unique Pave Low intelligence/mission planning factors. To assure proper PMD support, the following actions were taken:

1. (U) (TS) With the assistance of JTD [redacted] we acquired 36 Iranian PMDs for OT&E. The filmstrips were checked out on the Pave Low platform utilizing the onboard computer readout, and subsequently validated. For OPSEC reasons, all Iranian PMDs were stored in the A-2 area with other Snowbird (S) intelligence data.

2. (U) Required US PMDs coverage to support Pave Low participation in Honey Badger/Elite Guard exercises was initially supplied by the TDY intelligence NCO deployed with the Pave Low aircrews. As these PMDs became unusable due to prolonged use, and new exercise areas were identified, required PMDs were ordered and maintained by 1 SOW/DORI.

d. (U) Intelligence Data Base.

(1) (U) (TS) Due to the lack of an Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) and the amount of pertinent intelligence information derived from all available sources, the requirement for the construction and maintenance of an Intelligence Data Base File surfaced. This Data Base proved to be an invaluable asset that became the standard resource

used not only by A-2, but other units including JTF personnel during planning conferences held at Hurlburt Field.

(2) (S) (TS) The Data Base consisted of all-source intelligence information, although JTF/J-2 message traffic was its primary source. The Base was organized into the following categories:

(a) (U) Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAAOB)

(b) (U) Air Order of Battle (AOB)

(c) (U) Electronic Order of Battle EOB & Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

(d) (U) Naval Order of Battle (NOB)

(e) (U) Ground Order of Battle (GOB)

(f) (U) Surface to Air Missile Order of Battle (SAMOB)

(g) (U) Airfield

(h) (U) Air Traffic Control (ATC) Radars

[redacted] (EW/GCI) Radars

[redacted]

(m) (U) Installations

(n) (U) Hostages

(o) (U) Soviet Union

(p) (U) Other Mideast analysis

(q) (U) Essential Elements of Information (EEIs)

(3) (U) As stated in para above, the Data Base became the standard resource utilized by both air and ground assets during planning conferences. It would have also been the standard resource for all air component assets deployed to FOLs. Since A-2 was tasked with providing support and/or supervision of intelligence personnel for most air components involved, use of this data base would have insured that all of these assets were being provided with not only standardized, but also updated intelligence.

e. (U) Order of Battle (OB) Status Boards.

(1) (U) In addition to the Intelligence Data Base File, A-2 also produced intelligence OB status boards. These boards proved to be extremely useful during staff briefings and mission planning. It allowed the intelligence briefer to immediately answer most questions concerning OB or airfield status.

(2) (U) The status board was divided into two parts: Airfields and EOB.

(a) (U) Airfields consisted of NAME/AOB/STATUS/AAAOB/ SAMOB/[redacted]

(b) (U) The EOB consisted of NAME/TYPE/LAST DATE ACTIVE.

f. (TS) Gendarmerie Post Overlays. To facilitate pre-mission planning, a master map was prepared for all gendarmerie posts. Each post was plotted and numbered on a 1:2,000,000 special using the lists provided by J-2. This proved to be very helpful and saved time for all mission planners. During the initial route selection process, the proposed route was compared with the gendarmerie map. If the proposed flight route was close to any plotted post, the number of the post was checked for exact coordinates, then checked on the larger scale flight planning map. Any required changes were made before the Nav logs were filled out.

g. (U) Fighter/Transport Aircraft Analysis.

(4) (S) (TS) The graphs and charts described in this section were compiled in response to requests by the commander and staff at Hurlburt. Although initially time consuming, the graphic portrayal of data contained in the IMFA and IMA had several advantages. It facilitated very rapid responses by the A-2 staff to questions from commanders, mission planners, and operations personnel. They also enhanced the routine intelligence update briefings which were initially presented on a daily basis, then on an as needed/by request basis (2-3 times a week). Additionally, the charts allowed the A-2 staff to identify flight patterns, trends, and predict near term activity levels. In summary, the benefits derived from the use of the graphs were well worth the time expanded to prepare them.

h. (U) Mobility Boxes/Equipment

(1) (S) (TS) (C) The following comments and observations concerning mobility equipment are a consolidation of the lessons learned by A-2 personnel. They evolved over the total time of involvement by A-2 and cover the intelligence operations at the AFSOB/[redacted] and exercises.

(2) (S) (TS) (C) The Directorate of Intelligence at Hurlburt Field was tasked with providing A-2 personnel required mobility equipment, if it was in the directorate's inventory. Items borrowed for the A-2 staff included Ni-Cad battery powered microfiche readers, two drawer safes, mobility (nesting) boxes, and other intelligence mobility supplies. While packing for deployment [redacted] the A-2 staff used all available nesting boxes from the Director[redacted] Intelligence.

(3) (U) While nesting boxes provided enough cubic feet to mobilize the required amount of materials, they were not well suited for operational use or forward staging to [redacted] For example, all required intelligence supplies, documents, etc. were packed into one container. It was very difficult to find, issue, or control any given item when everything was packed into one box. In addition to the problems with the nesting boxes, the A-2 staff did not deploy with any field tables or desks, since they are normally not part of the wing's intelligence mobility package.

(4) (U) As a result of the problems in mobilizing the A-2 and problems encountered during the various exercises, the A-2 staff designed mobility boxes to support 1 SOW airframes. A total of 24 boxes in three different styles were produced. There were 20 airframe support boxes, three general supply/support boxes, and one box for rolled/oversized photo products and acetate overlays.

(5) (U) It was decided that it would be virtually impossible to attempt to design boxes to support an unknown number of operating locations. For that reason the philosophy used to develop the support boxes was to tie the design to the airframes. For example, one aircraft support box has enough compartments and space to transport the required materials (maps, charts, mission books, E&E kits, target folders, etc.) for 2-3 (1 SOW) airframes. All of the boxes are heavy duty and should withstand bare base operations well. Recommendation: Intelligence personnel assigned to units with potential tasking address the aforementioned problems now.

VI. Internal Staff Interface:

A. (U) AFSOB:

1. (S) Interface between the intelligence personnel and the rest of the Hurlburt AFSOB staff was excellent after the initial late involvement problems were overcome. Once the A-2 function became operational, it was fully integrated into all aspects of the Ricebowl operation. The operational planners actively sought intelligence participation when evaluating proposed missions. The resulting procedures developed for mission planning for both the MC and AC-130s were to have a navigator, an intelligence representative, and an electronic warfare officer develop flight routes in a joint effort. This "team" approach allowed a more rapid finished product to be produced. Before intelligence involvement numerous changes to the flight plans and Nav logs were required as each route was adjusted to avoid threats.

2. (S) One of the largest contributing factors to smooth and efficient internal staff interface was the extremely small number of individuals at the AFSOB. Initially, there were less than 15 "fulltime" people for all systems making coordination and planning fairly straightforward, thus allowing the procedures for close interface to be established. However, the small number of people was also one of the most difficult problems at the AFSOB. Many of the traditional staff functions could not be filled. Administrative, plans, and supply support was done on an ad hoc basis by the individual that was best suited and/or had time to work the problem. This became a problem area when interfacing was required with other Hurlburt Field base agencies. Establishing the A-2 function is one example of this type of problem. The A-2 personnel were normally assigned to the ~~1 SOW Directorate of~~ Intelligence. They used the directorate for all supplies and general intelligence support. [redacted] The Directorate of Intelligence, as well as all other base staff agencies, were extremely supportive in helping the AFSOB staff solve these problems.

B. (TS) [redacted] - The close working relationship that was established during the pre-deployment phase continued at both [redacted]

C (U)(S) Det 1 - When Project Honey Badger was initiated, the limited AFSOB staff was rapidly overwhelmed. In order to support the large number of personnel (both PCS and TDY to Hurlburt Field) and aircraft involved in the exercises, the AFSOB staff was augmented by base staff agencies. Augmented staff personnel were indoctrinated on exercise information only. Initially, the A-2 staff had little involvement in exercises other than ordering maps and charts. Because of the limited A-2 exercise participation, little, if any, interface with the augmentated staff was required. The interface with the Snowbird (S) mission planners remained.

(U) Lesson Learned: In order to preserve OPSEC, the A-2 personnel had to obtain many intelligence and support documents so as not to compromise the true nature of Ricebowl/Snowbird (S). This same type problem occurred in all other AFSOB/Det 1 staffs. To preclude these types of problems in future exercises/operations, a Special Operations Mission Planning Division (DOS) was established. Included in this division are two intelligence personnel (with augmentation as required) to provide intelligence support to mission planners and key wing staff.

VII. (U) External-Lateral Interface:

A. (U) In general, external-lateral interface was good to excellent once the initial contacts were established.

1. (S) (U) Military units that the A-2 staff had regular interface with were:

a. [redacted]

b. [redacted] Rangers.

c. (U) 101st ABN Div.

d. [redacted] AWACS.

e. (U) 41 Reconnaissance Weather Rescue Wing (RWRW).

f. (U) 437 Military Airlift Wing (MAW).

g. (U) 1550 ATTW.

h. (U) 39 ARRW.

i. [redacted]

j. (TS) Delta.

2. (S) (U) Other organizations regularly contacted by A-2 personnel include:

a. (U) Defense Mapping Agency and subordinate elements.

b. (U) United States Geological Survey, Denver, CO.

3. (S) All other organizations and agencies were contacted through [redacted] JTF.

B. (S) Interface with the [redacted] began in late Jan 80, with the arrival of [redacted] replacement, [redacted] came TDY to 1 SOW for indoctrination and was integrated into the A-2 staff. His assistance was invaluable to the A-2. We strongly recommend that in future operations of this type, involved intelligence personnel for like systems [redacted] Combat Talons and 1 SOW Combat Talons) work together as much as possible.

C. (S) Interface with [redacted] was good. Due to the difference in the tasked mission between the Rangers and 1 SOW, interface usually occurred only during exercises. A-2 personnel attempted to respond to all requests from [redacted] (large scale maps and 1 SOW produced photography). Likewise, he was very willing to answer any questions concerning [redacted] operations to help the A-2 Staff. Face-to-face

contact and working together during exercises was essential in establishing this relationship.

D. (S) (U) With the exception of the sister Combat Talon unit in the Pacific, the A-2 personnel had more interface with the 101 ABN Div/S-2 personnel than any other unit. The S-2 for the 101 ABN Div, [redacted] became the point of contact between army aviation intelligence and the A-2.

1. (S) (C) Initial contacts with [redacted] During the meeting at [redacted] it was mutually agreed that much closer interface was required between army aviation intelligence and A-2 personnel. In response to an A-2 invitation, [redacted] made the first of numerous liaison visits in late Aug 80. During the initial visit, countless details were agreed upon and preliminary arrangements made to combine the intelligence support for both army and air force components. During subsequent visits, the joint requirements were further refined. Due to the magnitude of intelligence support and materials required for joint army/air force helicopter operations, and the need for additional army intelligence participation, [redacted] deployed TDY to Hurlburt in Sep 80 to augment the A-2 staff. During the second week of Oct 80, [redacted] arrived TDY for additional support. They both received orientation into air force intelligence operations and provided A-2 personnel with an introduction to army helicopter operations. The final intelligence augmentee from the 101 ABN Div was [redacted] the S-2 for [redacted]

2. (S) (U) During the initial intelligence planning for joint operations, it became apparent that both services were not "speaking the same language." (This problem also surfaced in the A-3/S-3 operations). Because of this and other problems inherent in joint operations, the USA/USAF Joint Helicopter Operations Directive was developed. One section of this directive was the intelligence briefing outline that was used for briefing all army/air force helicopter crewmembers. All joint pre-mission intelligence briefings were prepared and given by a team of air force and army intelligence officers.

3. (U) (C) (S) Additional support provided to the 101 ABN Div/S-2 was in three primary areas: training, data base familiarization, and maps and charts.

a. (U) Since all intelligence personnel that came TDY as augmentation to the A-2 staff were fully trained with operational experience, the term "training" is perhaps misleading. The term is used in this report meaning that individuals had to learn the unique or specialized procedures developed in support of this mission. For example, A-2 personnel had prepared a detailed data base and wall charts from available intelligence documents and message traffic. Because these data bases were the primary source of intelligence used during mission planning, all intelligence personnel had to be thoroughly familiar with the system and how the data was extracted.

b. (U) (S) The 101 ABN Div/S-2 was not involved in the Snowbird (S) programs for nearly the amount of time as the A-2 and was virtually starting from scratch. Therefore, A-2 personnel duplicated much of the data base for subsequent transporting back to Ft Campbell.

c. (U) (S) We were directed to order both "real world" and exercise maps and charts for army aviation. It was also agreed that we would provide temporary storage of "real world" maps and charts until they could provide proper storage for them. Additionally, 1 SOW provided exercise photographic support to the army aviation units when requested.

d. (S) (U) Problem: One of the problem areas that was identified soon after the interface began was SAR and E&E training. Due to the mission of 101 ABN Div, very little SAR or E&E training was given to crewmembers. It was necessary to give some basic, fundamental training to army personnel, because they were being tasked to operate much farther away from friendly support than normal. A-2 personnel tailored several of their aircrew training briefings to include DD Form 1833 (Personal Authentication Card) accomplishment. These briefings were presented on request to army aircrews by 1 SOW personnel. This problem could surface again in future long range joint operations. Recommendation: Train selected army aviation units likely to be tasked for joint, long range missions in appropriate E&E/SAR subjects.

4. (U) (S) In summary, the interface and rapport developed between the personnel of 1 SOW/A-2 and 101 ABN Div/S-2 was outstanding.

E. (U) (S) AWACS intelligence interface started in Oct 80 with the orientation visit by [redacted] (AWACS intelligence) to the 1 SOW. Prior to [redacted] visit, the A-2 staff at Hurlburt Field provided support to AWACS planners on an [redacted] needed basis during their involvement in exercise mission planning. Prior to [redacted] visit, AWACS mission planners usually deployed with one AWACS intelligence officer [redacted] to provide intelligence support to their planners. She was given an in-depth orientation in the operation and function of the A-2. Additional support given to AWACS intelligence personnel included selected data base holdings and copies of locally generated intelligence products.

F. (U) (S) [redacted] for the 41 RWRW at McClellan AFB, CA arrived at 1 SOW for his initial in-briefing and orientation in Mid-Oct 80. [redacted] became the intel point of contact for all HC-130 assets and was tasked to support them during real-world operations. During subsequent update visits [redacted] became an extremely dependable intelligence asset who was also qualified to provide limited support to our Pave Low helicopters.

G. (U) (S) Intelligence interface with MAC C-141 A/B and C-5A airframes was through [redacted] for the 437 MAW. [redacted] received his indoctrination into Snowbird (S), orientation, and extensive training during early Oct 80. During a subsequent TDY, [redacted] worked closely with the A-2 staff in developing required support for tasked MAC airframes.

H. (U) The primary HH-53 Pave Low intelligence representative was [redacted] originally from the 1550 ATTW. [redacted] provided exercise intelligence support only from 5 May 80 to the first week of Jul 80. Due to the lack of HH-53 expertise on the A-2 staff, [redacted] was in-briefed into Snowbird (S) in early July 80. During his entire time TDY to the 1 SOW and subsequent PCS to the wing, [redacted] been fully integrated into the A-2 staff. His experience and expertise in providing intelligence support to the HH-53 was invaluable.

I. (U) Liaison between the 39 ARRW, Eglin AFB, FL was through [redacted] 39 ARRW/[redacted] In order to maintain sufficient OPSEC and to lower the signature of the number and frequency of incoming intelligence personnel, [redacted] requested staff support by [redacted] to his unit. Support provided t[redacted] included updated briefings and maps and charts support for exercises involving 39 ARRW HC-130's.

J. (TS) Intelligence interface with [redacted] personnel was very limited. However, we did provide limited numbers of maps and charts and some locally produced photography to [redacted] planners during exercise planning sessions. The only actual mission planning interface took place at the [redacted] sponsored E&E conference.

K. (S) Interface with Delta/S-2 personnel was also somewhat limited. For the most part, 1 SOW/A-2 personnel interfaced with the Delta's JTF liaison officer and/or operational personnel. Although this limited contact (mostly at [redacted] sponsored E&E conferences) could not be construed as a problem, more face-to-face would have been beneficial.

L. (U) (TS) Because of numerous difficulties in rapidly obtaining sufficient quantities of maps and charts, A-2 requested JTF/J-2 (Lt Col [redacted] to authorize direct liaison in ordering these products. The previously established procedure where JTF acted as the "cut out" for ordering maps and charts was not responsive enough to meet exercise requirements. Additionally, due to the large number of maps involved, storage, and transportation would have compounded this problem.

1. (U) [redacted] arranged the initial contact between [redacted] and [redacted] of DMA. [redacted] arranged the necessary DMA contacts and procedures allowing A-2 personnel to get the map orders into the system with sufficient priority to meet short deadlines. The primary POC for DMA, [redacted] provided outstanding support in meeting these requirements.

2. (U) Normal requisition channels were used when enough lead time was available for exercises. These channels were also used to build up the maps and charts required for mission execution and planning for most air elements to include army aviation units.

M. (U) (S) The primary point of contact at USGS for maps and charts was [redacted] at Denver, CO. [redacted] gave superlative support everytime we needed the services of USGS. USGS products were used for large scale coverage of exercise areas due to a lack of DMA produced 1:50,000 scale maps. [redacted] normally had very short deadlines, because the exact

location of a site usually was not determined until after a site survey was done. This did not leave much time (24-72 hours) in which to identify, order, and receive the required maps and charts. USGS and [redacted] always came through when needed.

N. (U) Experience during this project has shown the necessity for all intelligence personnel to fully understand each others requirements and methods of operations. This type relationship can be established only through face-to-face contact. The lateral unit interface should begin as soon as the units are identified and staffs selected. Lessons learned include:

1. (U) Virtually all the options supported by 1 SOW had a Joint Service Force Package (i.e.: ranger, army aviation, 1 SOW, MAC, TAC, etc.). It is critical that all intelligence personnel from all units use the same intelligence and intelligence assessments to support their units. Periodic meetings by lateral component intelligence personnel will enhance the probability that all intelligence players are "singing off the same sheet of music." This is particularly vital to those units with similar roles or flight routes.

2. (U) The number of intelligence personnel involved in operations of this nature are normally kept to absolute minimum numbers. Many of the options developed during Ricebowl/Snowbird (S) had a force mixture operating from a main base and numerous forward bases. Because of the limited number of intelligence personnel dedicated to any one weapon system and the diversity of operating locations, the A-2 staff realized that intelligence support would truly have to be a joint effort. For example, the 101 ABN Div/S-2 and his staff could fully support their rotary wing aircraft operating from a single location. However, when tasked to operate from two or more locations, they relied on supporting augmentation from collocated A-2 personnel supporting Pave Low helicopters. The same concept was used by 1 SOW intelligence personnel when tasked to operate from multiple locations. While the 101 ABN Div and 1 SOW intelligence were used as an example, this concept was and can be applied to all air component intelligence personnel.

VIII (U) ~~(TS)~~ 1 SOW/ JTF Interface

A (C) ~~(TS)~~ [redacted] Deployment. Although the deployment to [redacted] was JCS directed, the AC-130's initial Iranian mission was to prepare for punitive strike operations. Therefore, JTF/J-2 (Ricebowl) did not have direct intelligence interface. When the AC-130's were tasked to support the rescue mission, intelligence requirements were handled by 1 SOW/A-2 personnel at Hurlburt.

B. (U) (C) ~~(TS)~~ [redacted] SOW/A-2. After initial contact was established in Jan 80, there were no interface problems with J-2. In every instance, all J-2 personnel immediately responded to any and all A-2 requests. As previously mentioned throughout this report, the timeliness and quality of support was outstanding. All JTF/J-2 personnel were apparently directed to provide guidance, be helpful and supportive, without being overbearing, toward subordinate units during Ricebowl and Snowbird (S) activities. The professionalism exhibited by all J-2 personnel from 9 Jan 80 to 15 Dec 80 was exceptional.

IX. (U) Analytical Observations:

A. (U) The following observations are not to be construed as an in-depth analysis of intelligence activities supporting the numerous missions covered in this history. It should also be noted that no attempt was made to prioritize the following observations:

1. (U) Overall, all 1 SOW/A-2 requests were responded to in a detailed and exceptionally timely fashion. However, I believe that one minor area which can be improved in the future concerns performance data, types, model numbers, etc. of U.S. equipment sold to foreign countries. Perhaps US intelligence organizations should make a more concerted effort to include this data in standard intelligence publications, once a system is sold to a foreign country. From my perspective, it appeared that performance data, etc. on US produced equipment was the most difficult information to obtain. In some instances, contractors had to be interviewed, R&D elements queried, or foreign military sales (FMS) organizations questioned. Suggest this type of data be included in regular intelligence publications in a more detailed manner.

2. (U) In addition to the excellent support from higher headquarters, this intelligence organization received outstanding support from all air component commanders. This support established a baseline for all air intelligence activities. As a result, the operations/intelligence interface during all operations or exercises was the best I have observed.

3. (U) Although OPSEC considerations for operations like Ricebowl and Snowbird (S) require that indoctrinated personnel be kept to a minimum, we must be flexible enough to augment if required. As the operations changed from one to maybe two FOLs, or as in the case of some Snowbird (S) options, multiple FOLs; personnel requirements must increase to assure high quality intelligence support to operational elements. Although a required flexibility was built into Ricebowl intelligence planning, in retrospect I believe that the A-2 should have had at least two more intelligence personnel assigned. I also believe J-2 forward at [redacted] and [redacted] did a superb job) exceeded their maximum capacity. If the operation had been delayed or extended for any period of time, the physical and mental capacity of all intelligence participants would probably have been over-taxed. In the future, if a large operation is envisioned, we must carefully plan intelligence personnel augmentation.

4. (U) A "cadre" of talented people have been either exposed to or trained to support very unique operational requirements. Hopefully, some of these people would be used in some future operation, rather than re-orienting totally new personnel.

B. (U) However, the most significant intelligence accomplishment was the fact that photo products and other intelligence data were made available to mission crewmen and not just commanders, missions planners and intelligence personnel. By bringing intelligence data out from behind the "green door", we were able to provide quality support and enhance the probability of mission success.

B. DISCUSSION AND LESSONS LEARNED:

(S)

2. [redacted] Early in the planning efforts, direct liaison was established between DMA and the Special Operations Division (SOD), J-3, OJCS. The SOD was the tasking element within OJCS. A lesson learned early in the process was that close coordination in the selection of [redacted] is essential during the planning [redacted] The planners traditionally are working with intelligence analysts who are examining [redacted] for their own needs. They are most familiar with the inventory and the specific [redacted] that will best serve their needs. [redacted]

3. [redacted] Several requirements were identified for special products.

[redacted] This process usually took four or five days.

[redacted]

5. [redacted] During the course of the hostage situation, [SOD] requirements often developed for precise point positioning data. DMA's St. Louis facility produced the data. [redacted]

[redacted] This was acceptable and the project was completed.

8. [redacted] DMA was asked to perform an analysis of a specified open clear area with a view to answering the question, "Can C-130 aircraft land here?" A DMA terrain analyst [redacted] was tasked and completed the analysis in about two days. The DMA analysis was used as an independent means of comparison to the work of another organization (identity unknown). The analyses were reported to be compatible.

9. [redacted] The matter of technical security and decompartmentation was of prime concern to DMA throughout the hostage situation. [redacted] the end product, in order to be most useful, should be classified as low as possible. Close coordination with all concerned must be constantly maintained in order to reach the best balance between security and operational usefulness of products. [redacted]

(S) Unclass Atch "DMA Support"

[redacted]

ating on the morning of 22 April with the helicopter pick-up of a product at DMA's Washington production facility. This product had been in work around the clock throughout the previous weekend.

DMA support to the hostage situation resumed during May 1980 on much the same basis. Some existing products were revised and reprinted and numerous new projects were initiated. The intensity was not as great as earlier, but again DMA had one or more projects underway nearly all the time. Requirements for procurement and distribution of domestic mapping were more extensive.

LESSONS LEARNED

DMA has a wide range of capabilities to support the planning efforts inherent to such situations:

a. The full range of standard DMA products.

b. Extensive library holdings of non-DMA products. These can be xerographically reproduced in black and white if only a few copies are required. They can be lithographed in black and white if many copies are needed. If full color copies are needed, a few can be provided in the form of photographic color prints. If several hundred full color copies are needed, DMA has the capability to color scan,

Within DMA, there is a "crisis support" organization including selected personnel with necessary management and technical skills to respond as required. This proved advantageous for two reasons: (1) When tasked for a project, there was no question of priority or urgency, and (2) From an operational security viewpoint only the minimum essential number of people became involved.

COST

During the period from November 1979 to January 1981, DMA generated approximately 70 products along with Special Data in support of the hostage situation. Resource expenditure was 24 man years and material at a cost of $609,600.

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