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DOCTRINE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS



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
Joint Test Pub 2-0
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1. This test publication contains proposed joint doctrine to guide the intelligence support for activities and employment of the Armed Forces of the United States when operating as or in support of a joint force.
2. Joint test publications are developed and issued in accordance with Joint Pub 1-01. This test publication has been staffed with the Services and combatant commands. It is now ready to undergo evaluation in the field. After a thorough evaluation is accomplished, and feedback from the field and the evaluation process is considered, the publication will be implemented under the provisions of CJCS Mop 9.
3. The lead agent for this publication is the Defense Intelligence Agency.
4. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is J-7.

Enclosure


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DOCTRINE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS

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1. The long title of this document is Joint Publication 2-0, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations." The short title is Joint Pub 2-0.
2. This document contains no classified information and is judged to be UNCLASSIFIED in accordance with guidance provided by DOD Regulation 5200.1-R with Change 1, 27 June 1988.

DOCTRINE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS

RECORD OF CHANGES

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DOCTRINE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO JOINT OPERATIONS
PREFACE

1. Purpose. This publication is the keystone document of the joint intelligence doctrine series and contains the fundamental principles for intelligence support for unified and joint* operations.
2. Scope. The principles presented in this publication are relevant in all forms of conflict at all levels of command. This publication primarily provides fundamental principles and doctrine but also contains selected techniques and procedures (when appropriate) for intelligence support to joint operations.
3. Applicability. Intelligence doctrine and principles of this publication apply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Staff, commanders and staffs of combatant commands, commands subordinate to combatant commands, joint task forces, and defense intelligence organizations capable of involvement in joint operations. The doctrine and principles also apply when significant elements of one Service are attached to or provide direct support to forces of another Service.
4. Basis. The laws, directives, policies, and procedures that provide the basis for development of this publication are:
 - a. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (10 USC 161 et. seq. PL 99-433), which made the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, solely responsible for "developing doctrine for the joint employment of [US] armed forces."

* Throughout this publication, the term "joint operations" will also refer to "unified operations" unless otherwise noted. "Unified operations" is a generic term that describes the wide scope of operations (including subordinate joint operations) taking place within unified commands under the overall direction of the commander of a unified command. When guidance in this publication applies uniquely to a unified force (or operation) or the commander of a unified command, it will be specifically stated; otherwise, the guidance applies equally to unified and joint forces or operations.

- b. DOD Directive 5100.1, 25 September 1987, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components," reiterated the responsibility of the Chairman for joint doctrine and further charged him with promulgating Joint publications to provide guidance for joint activities of the Armed Forces.
- c. Joint Pub 0-2, December 1986, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," tasks the Chairman with overall responsibility for joint doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP), coordinating joint doctrine with the Services and unified and specified commands, and approving and publishing all joint doctrine and JTTP as a distinct family of joint publications separate from administrative publications.
- d. MJCS-51-88, 13 April 1988, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," directed DIA to initiate action on drafting Joint Pub 2-0. It also provided guidance for developing the doctrine for intelligence support and established DIA as lead agent for the Joint Staff.
- e. Joint Pub 1-01, 15 April 1988, "Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures Development Program," delineates general responsibilities for joint doctrine development.
- f. Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, "United States Intelligence Activities," is the basic Presidential Directive allocating responsibilities for US intelligence activities and establishing rules for the conduct of intelligence activities.
- g. DOD Directive 5240.1, "DOD Intelligence Activities," implements EO 12333 within the Department of Defense.

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war should be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?

As it is unquestionably of the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility, and this is one of the chief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practice of war."

- Jomini

1. General. This publication is one of the five keystone doctrine publications designated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. This chapter discusses the relationship of this publication with other doctrine efforts. It highlights the methodology that is the basis for the document's development and discusses sources and applications of intelligence doctrine.

a. The joint intelligence doctrine offers two perspectives. The first is the J-2 and intelligence organizations' perspective of the purposes of intelligence, i.e., the ends toward which intelligence must work. Second is the commander's perspective of the uses of intelligence information and the responsibilities and capabilities of the J-2 and supporting intelligence organizations.

b. From the moment joint operations are contemplated, the joint force commander launches a continuing, interactive process to develop and continuously refine the Commander's Estimate of the Situation. The J-2 and his staff have pivotal responsibilities in this process, both in direct support of the commander and in interactions with the other joint staff sections. At all stages, the J-2 and his staff must contribute not only relevant information but also a sophisticated understanding of how the adversary thinks.

c. Intelligence information requirements flow from the commander's mission, his Estimate of the Situation, and his objectives. The commander's requirements must be the principal driver of intelligence system components, organization, services, and products. Ultimately, satisfying these requirements will depend on the ability of J-2s at all levels of command to (1) employ the joint force's organic resources, (2) identify and, when assigned, smoothly integrate additional intelligence-related resources, and (3) effectively apply national intelligence capabilities.

d. The J-2 must integrate efforts to develop and refine warfighting intelligence support capabilities into the commander's operations and contingency plans. The joint force commander's J-2 must work with other affected J-2s to develop a concept of intelligence operations tailored to each of the commander's operations and concept plans. The intelligence annex must provide other players enough specific information for them to begin doing what is expected without an extensive exchange of message traffic.

2. Supporting Doctrine. This document states fundamental intelligence doctrine for joint operations. More detailed implementing methodology are currently under development as provided in Joint Pub 1-01, "Joint Publication System, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Techniques and Procedures (JTTP)".

3. Purpose of Intelligence Doctrine. Intelligence doctrine states principles of intelligence for effective support of joint force commanders and their forces. A common doctrine, shared by all elements of a unified or joint force and organizations supporting it, increases the probability that responsive intelligence systems will provide joint force commanders with accurate, timely, relevant, and adequate intelligence for the best possible understanding of the enemy and the situation. Although this doctrine is authoritative, it is not directive. Doctrine states what must be considered

and what generally should be done. Its application requires an understanding of the situation and judgment. Doctrine provides a framework within which intelligence information should be developed and used to support the commander's determination and conduct of military operations.

4. Sources and Methodology

- a. The Principles of War, stated in Joint Pub 3-0, provide the rationale for the principles of intelligence for joint operations. The principles of intelligence were developed from joint and Service doctrines, theory, history, and the lessons learned from the successes and failures of war and operations. The research shows that such lessons and doctrine are enduring. Significant and well-known operations, such as the Battle of Midway (1942) and the deception to protect the Allied invasion of Europe at Normandy (1944), illustrate the essential utility of proper development and use of intelligence.
- b. Another basis of principles is the history of failed missions where the misdirection, misapplication, or absence of adequate intelligence contributed to unmet, irrelevant, or unobtainable objectives. Adherence to the intelligence principles will not ensure successful strategies and operations, but an inability to understand and apply them will probably result in inadequate intelligence information that could contribute to failure.
- c. In keeping with the accepted Joint Pub 1-02 definition of doctrine, principles of intelligence are stated so that they transcend individual command, Service, and theater perspectives. The principles are presented in terms of military operations to avoid the error of addressing either operations or intelligence as having distinctly separate wartime and peacetime concepts. These principles apply across the operational continuum.

5. Application of Intelligence Doctrine

- a. The doctrine presented here offers general and specific ways by which intelligence can substantially increase the probability of successful military operations. It points the way for intelligence support that applies to all levels of command in formulating objectives and plans of action; in determining, planning and conducting operations; and in evaluating the effects of operations with respect to their objectives. Commanders and their staffs should understand how using these principles can enhance their effectiveness.

b. The principles, described in Chapter II and used in other chapters, are concepts for applying theory and lessons learned. The principles can:

- (1) Identify and describe the concept of intelligence for joint operations and the concepts associated with producing intelligence jointly.
- (2) Enhance intelligence support through their use as intelligence quality standards.
- (3) Provide a common ground among commanders, staffs and intelligence personnel for understanding the purposes and uses of intelligence.
- (4) Show how intelligence can be used to contribute to the orientation, quality, and effectiveness of operations.

c. Areas where doctrine can be applied and institutionalized to enhance the effectiveness of joint operations include:

- (1) Determining objectives, strategy, operations, and tactics.
- (2) Developing and evaluating operations planning guidance and plans.
- (3) Targeting.
- (4) Conducting operations.
- (5) Evaluating effectiveness of ongoing and completed operations against stated objectives.
- (6) Identifying intelligence information requirements.
- (7) Providing intelligence services and products.
- (8) Structuring intelligence systems.
- (9) Rehearsing, exercising, demonstrating, testing, and evaluating intelligence and operating concepts, plans, structures, and practice.

6. Joint Interoperability. The Services and agencies responsible for fielding intelligence personnel and systems must provide the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

warfighting CINCs, and subordinate commanders as much flexibility as possible in assembling their intelligence support structures. Joint Force Commanders should be able to assemble an optimum mix of intelligence capabilities (people, procedures, and C3I systems), regardless of the source, and still receive adequate intelligence support. In order to do this, intelligence systems should be interoperable and compatible with each other and with supported command and control systems at all echelons. The basis of interoperability must be the development of information exchange standards applicable to all levels of command and to all Services and supporting agencies. The development of these standards is the responsibility of the Joint Staff and supporting Defense agencies. The Services and agencies are responsible for fielding intelligence systems based upon these standards. Combatant command requirements should be met by Service and agency efforts which focus on interoperability.

a. The combatant command J-2s should:

- (1) Use the intelligence annex of the CINCs operations and concept plans to identify potentially useful intelligence-related systems and personnel, regardless of prior location or subordination, and to develop a concept of intelligence operations for their employment.
- (2) Devise exercises and simulations approximating wartime conditions to evaluate the readiness and feasibility of the mix of resources identified in the intelligence annex of the CINC's OPLAN.
- (3) Use requirements statements and the Theater Intelligence Architecture Program to identify critical deficiencies in existing C3I support capabilities. Determine the requirements for intelligence capabilities and the interoperability needs between and among the new intelligence-related system(s) and existing systems, and between and among intelligence-related systems and command, control, and communications systems.

b. The DIA/Joint Staff J-2 should:

- (1) Develop, implement, and (through defense intelligence functional managers) manage the configuration of information, data, and communications standards, in coordination with the Services, the Joint Staff, other agencies, and OSD.

(2) Establish defense-wide intelligence priorities for attaining interoperability between and among intelligence- and command and control-related systems at the tactical, theater, and national levels.

(3) Coordinate (through defense intelligence functional managers) programmatic actions (regardless of funding source) consistent with the CINCs' interoperability requirements.

(4) Coordinate with the J-6 to identify communication requirements and obtain an assessment of communications needed to support the wartime intelligence requirements necessary to support the Joint Force Commander and his component forces.

Chapter II PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

"By 'intelligence' we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country -- the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations."

- Clausewitz

SECTION A INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate intelligence theory, reasoning, concepts, and combat experience into principles that will contribute to effective and successful joint operations. The principles are offered as guidelines for developing intelligence and for using it in determining, planning, and conducting campaigns and operations. The principles also have implications for the preparation and readiness for combat. ,

2. Scope. The intelligence principles include concepts of helping to identify relevant military objectives and means, supporting the planning and conduct of operations, and evaluating the effects of operations. When principles are seen as standards of intelligence purposes and of the nature or quality of intelligence information, they can reveal critical linkages between intelligence products and services, and the structure and operation of intelligence systems.

3. The Central Principle--Know the Enemy

a. The fundamental responsibility of intelligence is to help decisionmakers at all levels of command by providing the fullest possible understanding of the enemy and the situation. This understanding includes a sophisticated knowledge of the adversary, including his goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, methods of operation, vulnerabilities, and sense of value and loss. We must understand his character, culture, social mores, customs and traditions, language, and history. We must know and understand his ideas and his methods. Understanding how an adversary will conceptualize his situation and ours, what options he will consider, and how he will react to our actions needs to be an inextricable part of a continuing interaction of intelligence staffs with decisionmakers and with other staff elements. These comprehensive understandings are essential to (1) recognizing challenges to our national

interest, (2) establishing policy, (3) formulating relevant and attainable military objectives and strategy (when appropriate), and (4) determining, planning, and conducting operations that will help attain US policy objectives.

b. The J-2 and his staff must develop and continuously refine their ability to think like the enemy. They must offer this particular expertise for the maximum benefit of the commander and the joint staff elements. The joint force commander should require his J-2 to assess all proposed actions from this perspective, asking, "Does this make sense when viewed through the enemy's eyes?" Carrying out these intelligence responsibilities calls for judgment and tact as well as expertise--the J-2 and his staff must meet this obligation, even if they believe their assessments may not always be welcome.

c. The principle of "Know the Enemy" is illustrated at a critical point in World War II, during the Battle of Britain, 1940, when Germany's decisionmakers did not know their adversary. The Luftwaffe commanders did not understand that shifting their attack from Britain's air defense system to population centers would let the RAF fighters survive to defeat the bomber force in the air, and at the same time harden the resolve of the British people. The Battle of Britain did not demoralize the British people, it effectively ended the threat of a German cross-channel invasion, and it brought the US closer to entry into the war.

4. Intelligence is the Basis of Operations. Intelligence is the foundation on which the operational effort is built*. The origins of military objectives are national interests and goals and national security policy objectives. When an adversary threatens national interests and objectives, intelligence of the adversary and the situation is used in determining whether military operations will be selected as one way to bring about or assist in achieving national security policy objectives. Thus the intelligence contribution must begin even before operational planning starts. Intelligence then further helps by identifying and nominating relevant and attainable military objectives through assessments of enemy capabilities, intent, and exploitable vulnerabilities. Once specific military objectives are determined, they become the guidelines for

* US Marine Corps, Intelligence, FMFM 2-1, 30 September 1980, page 1-1.

defining intelligence requirements to support subsequent operational decisionmaking.

5. Principles of Intelligence. The principles are presented under four headings, covering: Purposes and Applications, Principles of Intelligence Quality, Supporting Principles, and Principles of Jointness. Chapter VI offers principles for combined intelligence. The principles presented are the axioms and essence of intelligence. The "Purposes" principles are the reasons for or objectives of intelligence; the "Applications" principles are the uses of intelligence. Purposes and Applications are the two sides of the same coin and define the push-pull relationship between intelligence organizations and users. The "Principles of Intelligence Quality" describe the nature of intelligence information. "Supporting Principles" describe the tenets which help attain intelligence quality and serve intelligence purposes and applications. "Principles of Jointness" address issues which effect intelligence in a joint environment.

SECTION B
PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES AND APPLICATIONS

1. Introduction to Intelligence Purposes and Applications

a. Purposes. "Purposes" of intelligence are the objectives or end points that help intelligence officers understand the rationale for the intelligence services and products they develop and provide. "Purposes" are the reasons for intelligence. The intelligence officer can use the "Purposes" as fundamentals for providing the commander and his staff with the right intelligence information to determine and achieve military objectives. "Purposes" are also the starting points for conceptualization of intelligence--they should be the first in thought or intention even though they are attained last. The "Purposes" additionally provide a framework for understanding and using the "Principles of Intelligence Quality" (see Section C in this chapter) as guidelines and standards.

b. Applications. "Applications" are the guidelines for command and staff use of the intelligence services and products. "Applications" are also the commander's expectations of intelligence.

c. The "Purposes and Applications" describe relationships of ideas for a unity of effort between command, intelligence, and operations. A "Purpose" tells intelligence generally what it must provide. An "Application" tells the user what they may be able to achieve with intelligence.

2. Purposes and Applications. (See Figure II-1)

a. Identifying and Determining Objectives. Intelligence must assist commanders in identifying military objectives at all command levels that will serve to attain national security policy objectives. "Objective" is the first principle of war to be supported by intelligence for command decision. All other aspects of military operations depend on the determination of relevant, clear, and attainable objectives. In support of the commander's process of identifying and nominating military objectives, the J-2 should understand the command's responsibilities, the commander's mission and intent, the means available, the weather, and the characteristics of the operating area. Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES AND APPLICATIONS

The J-2 and intelligence organizations should be guided by fundamental intelligence purposes.

IDENTIFYING AND DETERMINING OBJECTIVES: The J-2 should advise and provide intelligence information to commanders that will help them determine objectives and operations that will attain or assist national security policy objectives, and the derived and supporting military objectives.

SUPPORTING THE COMMANDER: The J-2 should directly support commanders with complete and objective views of situations so that commanders can make decisions that are relevant to their responsibilities, missions, and to the situations as it is best understood. This intelligence function is coincident with J-2 responsibilities to support the commander's staff, forces and other commands.

TARGETING: The J-2 should evaluate an adversary's situation, objectives, intentions, and capabilities with respect to friendly intentions and capabilities. Based on this the J-2 should nominate as targets those enemy vulnerabilities and capabilities that are critical to friendly or enemy vulnerabilities and capabilities that are critical to friendly or enemy objectives, that can be exploited by friendly operations, or that can be turned into critical weaknesses.

PLANNING AND CONDUCTING OPERATIONS: The J-2 should provide intelligence information needed in developing, planning and executing the operations as determined by the commander.

SECURITY OF OPERATIONS-DECEPTION OF ENEMY: Concurrent with determining and planning operations, the J-2 should provide the commander an understanding of the adversary's command and control and intelligence systems so deception and denial measures can be used against the adversary.

SECURITY OF OPERATIONS-AVOIDING DECEPTION AND SURPRISE: Intelligence systems should be structured and operated to reduce the chance of being deceived or surprised. They should be flexible and able to recover if surprise does occur.

INDICATIONS AND WARNING: The J-2 should provide commanders with advance indications and warning of threats or impending attacks in sufficient time to preempt, counter or avoid them.

REORIENTING FORCES, TERMINATING OPERATIONS: The J-2 should assist the commander and staff in evaluating operational results and determining when objectives have been attained so forces may be reoriented or operations terminated.

DETERRENCE: Deterrence is both a derivative benefit and a purpose of intelligence systems that are structured and functioning to avoid deception and surprise and ready to support operations.

Figure II-1.

should provide the commander with an understanding of the enemy in terms of enemy goals, objectives, strengths, weaknesses, values, and critical vulnerabilities. The J-2 then nominates as military objectives those enemy capabilities which are critical to their likely course(s) of action and those critical enemy vulnerabilities that could be exploited to achieve the commander's ends and intent. Once objectives are determined, intelligence must continuously review them with respect to the enemy and the changing situation to see whether they remain relevant to the commander's intent. The crucial importance of using intelligence to identify relevant and attainable objectives is well illustrated in history.

b. Supporting the Commander. The J-2 directly supports the commander's responsibilities for determining and directing operations against an enemy and for evaluating the effects of operations. These J-2 responsibilities are coincident with, but separate from, responsibilities to support the mission planning and direction functions of the commander's staff and J-2 responsibilities to lateral and subordinate commands. The J-2 should develop objective views of the enemy and situation. He should help the commander understand the enemy's intent, concept of the situation, and his decisionmaking process. The J-2 analyzes the situation and provides assessments of friendly opportunities and the enemy threat. "Identification of Objectives" may also be seen as an element of "Supporting the Commander."

c. Targeting. The intelligence function of "Targeting" is the analysis of the enemy and situation in order to identify and nominate to the commander those critical enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited to attain objectives and those situations and enemy characteristics that can be turned into critical weaknesses. The intelligence, operations, and plans staffs all have contributions to make; the J-2, J-3, and J-5 must be proactive and help the commander bring together their expertise in an iterative and interactive process. "Targeting" can also identify or suggest the nature of operations against enemy vulnerabilities and key capabilities to most effectively achieve a specified objective, within an established purpose, strategy, and capability. "Targeting" should be based on command goals, intent, guidance and military objectives, and a thorough understanding of the adversary and the whole of the situation. "Targeting" should be an analysis of the enemy, and recommendation of critical vulnerabilities and key capabilities associated with the strategic or

operational centers of gravity that will allow the commander to integrate the elements of the threat, enemy and environmental characteristics with the available forces, operations and tactics, in order to determine what should be done to accomplish his purpose. The purpose may be achieved through delaying, disrupting, debilitating, destroying, or otherwise dissuading or coercing an enemy. The commander's selection of targets is the heart of the "Maneuver" principle of war; it is the exploitation of relative strengths over an adversary. An application of the "Targeting" intelligence principle for the "Security" and "Maneuver" principles of war can be seen where mobile land, maritime, or air forces identify and interdict advancing enemy forces before they can be effectively employed at their objective. An example of "Targeting" for special operations is the identification of relatively small or "soft" critical objects or functions essential to an enemy force such as a bridge, fuel supply, command center, or communications node.

d. Planning and Conducting Operations. Intelligence should provide intelligence at all levels of command for planning, directing, and conducting operations once the objects, nature, and scope of military operations have been determined by the commander. Intelligence is used by commanders and staffs in identifying and selecting specific objectives and targets, and in determining the means, operations, and tactics to be used. The J-2 then supports the execution of the plan with the combat intelligence needed to sustain the operations, attain their objectives, and achieve the security of forces and operations. The J-2 may provide intelligence directly to users or may coordinate the intelligence efforts of external intelligence organizations and the components' organic intelligence resources.

e. Security of Operations through Deception of the Enemy

(1) Attacking the mind of the enemy to mislead, delude, or create uncertainty helps achieve the "Security" and "Surprise" principles of war. Intelligence provides the basis for effective deception for operations security and surprise of the enemy. An effective approach is for the commander to decide what he would like the adversary to perceive (and for how long) as an integral part of identifying objectives and developing the operational plan to attain them. The process of identifying deception objectives to complement the commander's objectives

should be an iterative, interactive process with the commander in a central role, orchestrating the efforts of the operations, intelligence, and counterintelligence resources. In this process, the J-2 should help the commander and staff gain insights into how the enemy processes, filters, ascribes meaning to, and uses information about both the friendly and enemy situations, to include:

(a) The information sources at the enemy's disposal (potential communication routes to the deception targets).

(b) How the enemy will process and evaluate information. (Who will see it? What will it be compared with? How long will it take? What will be considered relevant? What analytical models will be used? What is the enemy predisposed to believe? What organizational or cultural biases will influence the process?)

(c) What the enemy will do with the information, assuming it is received and accorded significance. (Who will be informed? What channels will be used? How long will it take?)

(2) Counterintelligence doctrine must include concepts and procedures for (a) providing counterintelligence expertise to help the joint force commander identify deception objectives to complement the operational objectives, (b) integrating counterintelligence expertise into the joint force commander's battle staff, and (c) exercising the procedures developed for (a) and (b). If successful, coordinated operations, operations security, logistics, plans, communications, communications security, intelligence, and counterintelligence deception and denial measures will help the targeted enemy mind reach a believable, coherent, but inaccurate understanding of the situation. The measures selected should influence enemy understandings of both the friendly and enemy situations in ways that will help affect the friendly intent. The pivotal battle of Midway, in 1942, demonstrates the integrated use of intelligence and operations for effective deception. Both active and passive denial and deception measures were used to provide security of operations and to achieve surprise against the Japanese Navy task force.

(3) Uncoordinated measures, though of sound independent concept, may have only local or short-term effect. They may even compromise broader scope deception objectives. An alternate, though generally less effective approach, is to identify the friendly situations and activities that are vulnerable to hostile intelligence collections, and to nominate denial measures to reduce the effectiveness of hostile HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT collections.

f. Security of Operations--Avoiding Deception and Surprise. The way that J-2's and supporting intelligence organizations approach collection, analysis, and dissemination will determine, to a large extent, friendly force vulnerability to enemy deception efforts. A focused, all-source collection effort (e.g., what should be happening? How can we determine if it is/is not?) can provide the basis for testing the viability of competing analytical hypotheses. Despite apparent weight of evidence and decisionmaker predispositions, analysts should strive to keep alive any hypothesis which could prove viable. Similarly, analytical approaches that attend to negative intelligence (e.g., activity that should be taking place, but apparently is not) can be particularly valuable. Intelligence users deserve an up-front dialogue in which uncertainties are acknowledged and possible alternative explanations are discussed, along with a feel for currently assigned probabilities.

g. Evaluating the Effects of Operations and Reorienting Forces or Terminating Operations. Intelligence should assist commanders in determining when objectives have been attained so that forces may be reoriented or operations terminated. Intelligence evaluates military operations by assessing their effects on the enemy and his situation with respect to the commander's intent and objectives, and with respect to the enemy's objectives and intent.

SECTION C PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE QUALITY

1. Introduction to Principles of Intelligence Quality.
These fundamental principles (see Figure II-2) describe the attributes of intelligence that should be the characteristics of intelligence for operations. They offer qualitative objectives for the intelligence used for operations and standards against which intelligence activities and products are evaluated. For intelligence to be suitable and adequate for its purposes, it must meet the criteria of the qualitative principles. A failure to achieve any one of these fundamental principles is an intelligence shortfall that may contribute to a failure of operations.

PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE QUALITY

TIMELINESS: Intelligence must be available and accessible in time to effectively use it.

OBJECTIVITY: Intelligence must be unbiased, undistorted, and free from political influence or constraint.

USABILITY: The form in which intelligence is provided to the user must be suitable for application upon receipt without additional analysis.

READINESS: Intelligence systems must anticipate and be ready to respond to the existing and contingent intelligence requirements of commanders, staffs, and forces at all levels of command.

COMPLETENESS: Commanders, staffs, and forces must receive all the intelligence information they need to meet their responsibilities and accomplish their missions.

ACCURACY: Intelligence must be factually correct and convey the situation as it actually exists.

RELEVANCE: Intelligence must contribute to an understanding of the situation, to determining objectives that will accomplish the commander's purposes and intents, and to planning, conducting, and evaluating operations.

Figure II-2

2. Relationships Among Principles. The relationships among the principles are complex and overlapping. Likewise, many of the Supporting Principles of Section D apply to more than one of the principles of "Intelligence Quality" in this section and of the principles of "Purposes and Applications" in Section B.

3. The Principle of Timeliness. Intelligence must be available in time to use it effectively. Timely intelligence is essential in preventing surprise, conducting defense, seizing the initiative, and using forces effectively to attain objectives. Intelligence must be available in time for commanders to assess what needs to be done and to take appropriate action. The principle of timeliness applies to the intelligence process of developing EEIs, identifying and stating requirements, and collecting and producing intelligence. Dissemination must be prompt and continuous within the limits of essential security. Timely intelligence is essential for the tactical commander's directing and cueing his own collection resources and sensors to meet threats and engage an enemy.

a. Corollaries of the principle are the commander's responsibility to promptly inform the J-2 of his intent and the J-2's responsibility to identify intelligence requirements to supporting intelligence organizations.

b. Timeliness can depend on (1) the attention the commander and his J-2 give to identifying and prioritizing requirements and (2) the supporting intelligence organizations' use of imaginative and innovative approaches to the products and services needed to satisfy those requirements. For example, if the commander and his J-2 recognize significant shortfalls in their ability to understand how their adversary thinks, it may be more appropriate to augment the J-2's staff with well-grounded analysts than to prepare "products."

c. A pivotal consequence of timely intelligence is the fact that the more timely the data is, the less likely it has been analyzed for its significance and accuracy. A J-2 must balance his requirement to report significant intelligence changes with his requirement for accuracy. Each requirement is conflicting in its relationship to timely intelligence reporting. Inaccurate reporting wastes resources and weakens the J-2's credibility. Accuracy demands additional time, but if too much time is used, the information may be too late to be applied. The J-2 must develop a close working relationship with the commander so that the J-2 is aware of the lead time required.

d. Where there are immediate threats, or where intelligence must assist forces in identifying and exploiting fleeting targets and targets of opportunity, the intelligence system may need structure and methodology to provide near-real-time information. Other principles may help attain real-time intelligence, e.g., Single Intelligence Structure, Commanders' Requirements Are Assumed Valid, and Skip-Echelon Support.

e. In 1941, US intelligence was not oriented to operations. Although a threat of attack against Hawaii was understood, intelligence for defense or counterattack was not conveyed in time for effective operations. Later in World War II, although timely intelligence was routinely provided to operational commanders, problems were still encountered. At Normandy, June 1944, there was accurate HUMINT to the effect that coastal defense guns had not yet been emplaced over the Allies' landing beaches. However, the information was not made available in time to change the costly assault on the still empty gun batteries at Pointe du Hoc.

4. The Principle of Objectivity

a. Commanders should receive objective intelligence. Commanders must have the best possible view of the enemy and the situation for the identification, consideration, and determination of military objectives and for the planning and direction of operations. Intelligence must present the actual situation, as best understood, at all times. A complete and accurate understanding of the enemy is predicated on objective intelligence.

b. For intelligence to be objective, it should be truthful. It must be unbiased, undistorted, and free from political or other constraints. The methodology, product, and use of intelligence must not be directed or manipulated to conform to a desired result, preconceptions of a situation or enemy, an institutional position, or a predetermined objective, operation, or method of operations.

c. Support of political positions through unobjective reporting of military intelligence must be avoided. Intelligence concerning a situation is one of the factors in determining policy, but policy must not determine the intelligence.

d. Institutionalization of intelligence threatens the objectivity and integrity of intelligence products, the

command decisions based on intelligence, and the operations that are dependent on the intelligence. When we seek to resolve institutional views, we should not use members of institutions that have already determined their positions; instead, a new and unbiased group of persons should make the new evaluation or determination.

e. Intelligence that is not objective also fails the principles of "Accurate," "Relevant," and "Complete" intelligence. Because intelligence is a basis for determining and conducting operations, intelligence that is not objective may cause the orientation of operations to be misdirected. Policy, strategies, campaigns, operations, and battles may fail because of suppressed, directed, or institutionalized intelligence. Although sound and objective intelligence may conflict with a current position, perception, or policy, it must nevertheless be presented as best understood by the intelligence officer. This fundamental principle is too often not attained.

5. The Principle of Usability.

a. The form in which intelligence is provided to the user should be tailored for particular applications or suitable for general use without additional analysis or manipulation. As much as practicable, intelligence must be in a form suitable for application when it is received. Intelligence production and the tailoring of particular materials must be done in the perspective of the user's need for timely application of information. Dissemination must be direct and concise with the user and the intelligence purpose in mind. The user should be able to quickly identify and apply relevant information. Common and adequate terminology and media must be employed in the communication of information so that it is understandable and useful given the capabilities and time constraints of the user. Attaining this principle requires intelligence producers to understand the circumstances for use of their products and implies the user's responsibility to communicate his intent or situation and any particular requirements of content, form, medium, or presentation.

b. Recurring problems illustrate this principle: Units with nautical charts have received locations in UTM coordinates and vice versa, tactical planners have received target location and information by only Basic Encyclopedia number, and special operations forces have received imagery with annotations covering critical installation detail.

6. The Principle of Readiness. Intelligence structures, data bases, and products must be responsive to the existing and contingent requirements of commanders, staffs, and forces. Intelligence assets and resources that are oriented to areas where there is a high probability of operations must be maintained in a high state of readiness. In the past, intelligence has often been unprepared to support initial employment of forces at the beginning of operations. For this reason, intelligence personnel should be oriented to the probable areas where operations can occur, to understand potential enemies, and to be capable of producing intelligence information that is usable by all elements of a joint force.

7. The Principle of Completeness. Although "Complete" intelligence is not possible, the principle of complete intelligence has meaning in relation to the principles that intelligence should be relevant, that intelligence should be accessible, that the commander's requirements are assumed valid, and that intelligence priorities should be determined relative to the situation and commander's responsibilities and his objectives. Commanders, staffs, and forces should receive all the intelligence they need to accomplish their missions and for the security of their forces and operations. Supporting intelligence organizations should provide all available relevant and essential information to those who need it, and concentrate collection and production efforts on unsatisfied critical requirements. Intelligence requirements must be prioritized, and intelligence collection and production should reflect the commander and J-2s' prioritization of their intelligence needs. Complete intelligence allows commanders to take best advantage of a situation. Without it, initiative, flexibility, and the advantage of surprise may be yielded to the enemy.*

8. The Principle of Accuracy

a. Intelligence must be factually correct, convey an appreciation for facts and the situation as they exist, and estimate future situations and courses of enemy action based on those facts and sound judgment. Several

* Although these examples are also known by other features, even ultimate success, a lack of complete or adequate intelligence was a significant element in each: The attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Battle of the Ardennes (Battle of the Bulge) in 1944, the SS MAYAGUEZ rescue attempt in 1975, and the Grenada Operations in 1983.

contexts of accuracy and other fundamental principles should be considered in attaining accurate intelligence.

b. It is not enough that intelligence is true; to be accurate, it should identify and describe what must be known of the situation. The principles of "Complete," "Timely," and "Relevant" intelligence bear on accuracy and they should be applied in identifying and stating intelligence requirements. If requirements are not accurately developed, intelligence products will probably be unsuitable for the operation.

c. Objectivity of intelligence also bears on accuracy. If the intelligence product is skewed by bias in collection, analysis, or dissemination, the resulting erroneous or incomplete portrayals of situations may foster erroneous operational decisions. Although the intelligence presented may be true or accurate in an absolute factual sense, it may fail the principle of "Accuracy" by the omission of information and perspectives necessary for a realistic or complete understanding of the situation.

9. The Principle of Relevance

a. Intelligence information should be relevant to determining, planning, conducting, and evaluating operations. It must contribute to the decisionmaker's understanding of the enemy and his own situation relative to the enemy. The intelligence must be appropriate to the purposes for which it is needed and how it will be applied for the operation. The intelligence system must provide understanding and insights into the situation through information that is directly applicable to the responsibilities of each echelon of supported commands, and should bear on the command's potential, planned, and underway courses of action.

b. For intelligence to be truly relevant, it must also meet the qualitative criteria of being "Complete," "Accurate," "Timely," "Objective," and "Usable." From this, one can see some of the interrelationships of the fundamental principles.

SECTION D SUPPORTING PRINCIPLES

1. Introduction to Supporting Principles. The Supporting Principles (see Figure II-3) help attain principles of Intelligence Quality and principles of Purposes and Applications. For example, if the commander is to have "Complete Intelligence" to ascertain the situation, the intelligence must be accessible. If the supporting principle of "Accessibility" is not attained, then the fundamental principle of "Completeness" is not attained.
2. Ensure that J-2 Participates from the Outset. J-2's should participate from the initial point when operations are contemplated or directed. Effective intelligence support requires a two way flow of essential information. The J-2 should be collocated with the supported commander and needs to function as a full member of the staff. As a full member of the staff, the J-2 participates in the decision and planning processes to provide the commander with the best possible view of the situation and enemy, and to identify, develop, and disseminate the intelligence needed to support determined and potential operations. The J-2 should apprise the commander whether adequate intelligence can be available for the campaigns, operations, tactics, and courses of action being considered. The commander should consider the capabilities and limitations of intelligence. When the J-2 and intelligence staff are fully integrated in the decision, planning, and preparation processes, confusion during operations is minimized, casualties are reduced, and chances of success are enhanced.
3. Prioritize by Objectives. Prioritizing intelligence information through allocation of intelligence resources, collection and production tasking, and use of communications should be determined according to the threat and to the commander's intent and priority objectives. As a practical matter, complete intelligence for all possible operations may be impossible. The commander and the J-2 will have to determine what intelligence is essential or most important and if that intelligence will be sufficient considering the nature and timing of operations.
4. Form Intelligence Infrastructure Before Assembly of Forces
 - a. Intelligence infrastructures must be constituted as soon as possible to allow for the preparation of intelligence for commanders and forces. Intelligence for

SUPPORTING PRINCIPLES

Ensure that J-2 Participates from the Outset

Prioritize by Objectives

Form Intelligence Infrastructure Before Assembly of Forces

Ensure Commanders and J-2s are Responsible for Intelligence Support to Operations

Assume Commanders' Requirements are Valid

Use Skip Echelon Support

Encourage Analyst-to-Analyst Exchange

Orient for Continuous Operations

Use the Same Approach for Both Peace and Warfighting Support

Maintain Flexibility

Develop Survivable Intelligence Systems

Use National and Theater Intelligence Organizations to Support Operations

Keep Intelligence Current

Establish Intelligence Capabilities Early

Ensure Accessibility of Intelligence

Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort

Use an All-Source Approach

Retain Objectivity in All-Source Intelligence

Encourage Different Views

Distinguish Between Knowledge and Deductive or Inductive Conclusions

Use Liaison

Use Operating Forces for Combat Reporting

Analyze Intelligence in Context of Operations

Use Intelligence Lessons

Figure II-3.

decisionmaking, operational and tactical planning, and conducting operations may not be adequate if intelligence activities are delayed until organic intelligence resources are available to fully constituted commands and forces.

b. When missions and objectives are contemplated for joint commands and forces yet to be constituted or still assembling, ad hoc intelligence staffs should be formed to coordinate the identification and fulfillment of the longer lead-time intelligence requirements as well as the intelligence needed for initial planning. The staffs should ensure that intelligence is available when needed and that organic intelligence organizations can effectively assume their responsibilities. Examples of support to be initiated are nominations of objectives, imagery for strike planning and battle damage assessment, multidiscipline intelligence collection, target and landing zone graphics, maps and charts, orders of battle, and national capabilities for direct support. The Joint Staff and theater J-2 should orchestrate the efforts of existing intelligence organizations to provide minimum essential support while the newly constituted joint command assembles an ad hoc intelligence staff. Deliberate planning can facilitate a smooth transfer of responsibilities. In developing the "concept of intelligence operations" for each of the CINC's operations and concept plans, the combatant command J-2 should address in detail the support desired during the initial stages of a crisis from national, theater, and supporting intelligence organizations. The intelligence annex for these plans should also identify specific criteria which should be met before ad hoc intelligence staffs assume responsibility for intelligence support initially provided by other organizations.

5. Ensure Commanders and J-2s are Responsible for Intelligence Support to Operations. Acquiring intelligence for operating commands and forces that are developing, planning, and conducting operations is ultimately a responsibility of senior commanders and the J-2s. Lower level commanders and force elements may not have the lead-time, perspective, or authority to identify and obtain necessary intelligence. Commanders, J-2s, and their staffs developing strategy and operations and assigning mission responsibilities have the earliest view of intelligence requirements and the intelligence efforts that must commence at the inception of operations and missions. The determinations of strategy and operations become the beginning points for all levels of intelligence needed to

attain military objectives. It is at these earliest determinations that senior intelligence staffs must understand the combat intelligence requirements, identify the commands' and forces organic intelligence potentials and shortfalls, and ensure that needed intelligence is provided or available to those who need it.

6. Assume Commanders' Requirements are Valid. It is incumbent upon the J-2 to resolve discrepancies between the commander's requirements and intelligence capabilities. Complete understanding of the requirement is the first step. If the J-2 does not fully understand how a stated requirement relates to the commander's objectives, intent, or plans, the J-2 should ask the commander for clarification.

a. Mission-related intelligence requirements expressed by commanders to support pending, assigned, and ongoing operations should be assumed valid by their statement and should be honored. A commander's on-scene judgment of intelligence needs should be accepted and supported to ensure the availability of timely and complete intelligence considered necessary for operations.

b. In combat and other critical situations, the intelligence needs as seen by the commander should outweigh otherwise valid management objectives of intelligence efficiency. Although it may later be found that an operation received duplicate or more intelligence than was needed, for an operation to receive less than is needed, when available, is an intelligence failure. If it is not possible to meet a commander's stated requirements, he must be notified immediately so he can develop alternative intelligence or assess the risks to operations of not having pertinent information.

7. Use Skip-Echelon Support

a. Senior commanders should authorize skip-echelon direct intelligence support when necessary to provide timely critical intelligence for operating forces being constituted, in transit, or engaged. The communications and processing time used in chain-of-command routing and procedures may delay otherwise timely intelligence that is vital to imminent or ongoing operations. The utility of intelligence and the success of operations may depend on abbreviated and rapid development and statement of intelligence requirements, closely tailored products, and rapid intelligence dissemination. These in turn may depend on direct communication between the user commands and the supporting intelligence organizations. Direct

contact with nonorganic intelligence organizations should be considered when:

- (1) It allows necessary support for determining and planning operations.
- (2) Requirements are unusual or intelligence potential is uncertain.
- (3) Forces are to be employed with minimal time for preparation.
- (4) Forces are doing mission preparation in transit.
- (5) Commands and forces are without adequate organic intelligence.
- (6) Commands and forces commence operations immediately on being constituted.
- (7) Intelligence and analysis from other intelligence organizations can contribute to indications for warnings.
- (8) External intelligence can identify fleeting targets and opportunities.
- (9) Narrow dissemination of intelligence requirements and products is necessary for security of operations.
- (10) Directed to do so by the commander.

b. Relevant intelligence should still be provided to intermediate commands through the chain of command and to supporting commands and organizations.

8. Encourage Analyst-to-Analyst Exchange. Analyst-to-analyst exchange is a means by which accurate and complete requirements and intelligence products may be rapidly communicated and clarified. It is a form of skip-echelon support. It may be a requisite for near-real-time intelligence for decisions and operations. Intelligence analysts at all levels can contribute important perspectives to other intelligence organizations collecting and producing supporting intelligence. However, such communications are informal and the validity of the information obtained is dependent on the abilities and experience of the analysts involved.

9. Orient for Continuous Operations. Intelligence should be oriented for continuous day-night and all-weather operations. All joint force commanders need this support to rapidly determine and exploit enemy vulnerabilities, to apply coherent and unrelenting force, and for security of operations and forces. Therefore, the J-2 and the J-3 should help the joint force commander establish an around-the-clock all-source team with appropriate intelligence and operations skills. This team helps the commander and his staff stay abreast of the combat situation so the commander can effectively exercise command. The team should orchestrate all forms of reconnaissance and surveillance of the enemy which are necessary to understand the situation, identify objectives and opportune targets, and provide warning to forces. The J-2's concept of intelligence operations should provide for continuity of support even if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost. The J-2 should: (1) develop concept(s) of intelligence operations for remote terminal access which incorporate(s) prepositioned standard graphic data base; (2) designate backups for forward deployed command elements and fusion centers, which should include procedures and means for the backup to monitor transactions, to ensure the backup understands the supported commander's objectives, and to be prepared to provide support when continuity is lost. Supporting intelligence organizations responsible for managing collections, exploiting sensor data, and analyzing intelligence must also be postured to provide 24-hour-a-day services. Near-continuous surveillance may be effected by coordinating the integrated use of different and complimentary national, theater, and organic collection assets. Overlapping coverage by different collection resources and sensor types can militate against hostile denial and deception measures.

10. Use the Same Approach for Both Peace and Warfighting Support. Military intelligence systems should be single structures for warfighting support and be able to provide intelligence support for any military operation. Warfighting intelligence structures of resources, methodologies, and products should be established, viable, and operational in peacetime to be available in any type of conflict and for any form of operation. The concept of dual peacetime and wartime structures does not support the Principle of Readiness for all potential operations. Dual intelligence structures for peace and war require difficult and time-consuming transitions in critical situations. Intelligence systems capable of wartime support to operations can be adapted for peacetime operations, but not the converse.

11. Maintain Flexibility

a. Intelligence structures, methodologies, data bases, and products ought to be flexible to meet the changing situations, needs, priorities, and opportunities. They should serve all strategies and tactics. Warfare tends to produce unexpected conditions, making it difficult to tightly order and plan organizations, methods of collection, analysis, product types, and dissemination that can be constant over time.

b. Commanders need timely intelligence response in situations of fast-breaking events to identify, influence, and exploit opportunities. An objective of intelligence organizations should be an ability to improvise and adapt to unforeseen circumstances. There is no guarantee that intelligence will not at times be deceived. If decisions have been based on flawed or incorrect assessment, then the intelligence system's ability to make corrections in order to provide adequate intelligence support will depend on its flexibility.

12. Develop Survivable Intelligence Systems. Intelligence systems should be survivable. Intelligence resources, activities, and communications must be structured and operated to be sufficiently survivable and enduring to ensure required intelligence support is available to the commands and forces. This applies to forces' organic intelligence organizations and to external supporting intelligence agencies and organizations. An important component of survivability is redundancy in critical intelligence and communications capabilities. At the same time, J-2's at all levels of command must develop concepts of intelligence operations which provide support for continuity of support even if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost.

13. Use National and Theater Intelligence Organizations to Support Operations

a. National and theater intelligence organizations should support operations. Their intelligence contributions can be essential to objectives. They may make operations feasible that could not be accomplished without their capability, capacity, or expertise. They must be responsive to military requirements by providing rapid and certain access to pertinent data bases, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, and analysis and products.

b. National and theater organizations should be prepared to commit sufficient and appropriate resources to ensure the timely, complete, and accurate development and dissemination of required intelligence. They should be prepared to place the resources or liaison well forward, commensurate with requirements for security, to assist in the identification and development of intelligence requirements and the use of intelligence products.

14. Keep Intelligence Current. The currency of intelligence needs to be maintained for all mission responsibilities including ongoing, planned, and contingency operations. New information must be correlated with what is already known. The currency of intelligence information must be maintained for all mission responsibilities. The nature, purposes, content, location, and availability of intelligence data bases must be systematically evaluated for currency. EEIs and other statements of intelligence requirements must be continually reviewed and evaluated against mission responsibilities. Because requirements statements tend to be tempered by perceived limits to the ability to collect against that requirement, currency of statements must also be compared against mission responsibilities and the full potential of collection capabilities.

15. Establish Intelligence Capabilities Early. Intelligence capabilities should be established in peacetime to be available for contingencies. This applies to all intelligence disciplines, but is especially true for HUMINT. HUMINT is not surged easily or with certainty. Relatively long lead-times are required to establish human intelligence resources and systems. If HUMINT access to denied areas is to be available when needed, then the resources should be developed and operated in advance of anticipated operations.

16. Ensure Accessibility of Intelligence

a. Intelligence information must be readily accessible by those who need it, while still adhering to security standards of need-to-know and protection of classified information and intelligence sources and methods.

b. Whenever possible, the types of intelligence needed must be anticipated and arrangements made for the personnel involved to have the appropriate clearances and access. This should be done as a matter of routine before operations begin. Although some intelligence will require extraordinary protection (e.g., to protect sensitive sources and methods or the fact that certain knowledge is held), security considerations must not

routinely preclude access to required information. Also, intelligence should always be produced at the lowest possible classification consistent with security to ensure the widest possible dissemination and use.

c. The intelligence should be sanitized when personnel who need a particular category of intelligence for their mission cannot be cleared for knowledge of its sources and methods, cannot meet the security requirements for that category of intelligence material, or the timeliness for application of the information is jeopardized. Security by sanitizing is attained by effectively separating information from its sources and methods.

d. The policy and guidelines for sanitizing intelligence must be sufficient and flexible to ensure timely access and application of intelligence for operations. The interpretation of policy and guidelines should be done by commanders with their J-2. Ultimately, it is the joint force commander and his J-2 who have the best appreciation of the criticality, utility, and time sensitivity of intelligence.

e. The reasoning used in developing and applying the policies and guidelines for intelligence security and accessibility should include consideration of the value of intended and potential uses of the intelligence, the future value of intelligence sources and methods in light of military strategy and objectives, and situations of threat and opportunity.

f. Where the sources and methods of critical information cannot be protected (i.e., the information cannot be sanitized), the commander assigning the military objective or mission and his J-2 should be so apprised. When the protection of the information sources and methods is paramount, the commander can then make a reevaluation of objectives in light of the probable outcome of operations without the intelligence information.

17. Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort

a. For a theater of war or operations, or for a particular joint operations area, there should be a unity of intelligence effort to ensure complete, accurate, and current intelligence, and to develop the best possible understanding of the enemy and situation. J-2s at all levels should prioritize the mission's intelligence requirements, including those of higher, lateral, and subordinate headquarters.

b. All joint force commanders, with their J-2s, have the responsibility and authority to determine, direct, and coordinate all mission-related collection and analysis through centralized or delegated collection management efforts. When liaison personnel are provided by the State Department or the various intelligence agencies (CIA, DIA, NSA), the J-2 should work toward achieving an effective integration of their efforts with those of the joint force. These key individuals can provide invaluable access to the entire range of capabilities resident in their agency and can focus those capabilities on the commander's intelligence requirements. In the counternarcotics arena, law enforcement agencies are normally represented at subordinate joint activities, such as Joint Task Forces; the DLEA Liaison Officers are critical for timely exchange of information and intelligence support of counternarcotics operations. All intelligence organizations operating in the joint operations area, including theater and national assets collecting against the joint operations area, should be coordinated to ensure unity of effort. Access to intelligence capabilities to support mission responsibilities must be without regard to organization or command configurations. This approach will allow the commander and the J-2 to orchestrate all pertinent intelligence activity to meet the sum of joint intelligence requirements.

c. The joint force commander should have assured access to all necessary nonorganic intelligence capabilities. National and theater intelligence requirements may have precedence for national systems' collection, but intelligence requirements of nationally significant military objectives or nationally directed operations should receive due consideration. If a nonorganic intelligence organization is unable to support a joint force commander, that commander and the senior commander assigning the mission or operational responsibility must be so informed so that they may make timely and alternative provision for intelligence or assess the effects of gaps in intelligence to the operation.

d. Commanders employ their organic intelligence capabilities to support their assigned mission. At the same time, those capabilities must be available to assist the joint effort under the J-2's concept of integrating and prioritizing all forces' intelligence requirements.

e. The keys to "Unity of Intelligence Effort" for joint operations are assured access to any needed

mission-related intelligence capability and coordination of all intelligence efforts in or about the joint operations area. Cooperation of intelligence organizations is important, but it is neither enough nor a substitute for a unified and coordinated effort.

18. Use an All-Source Approach

a. Information from any and all sources of intelligence must be evaluated, compared, correlated, and integrated into products that present the most complete, accurate, and objective views possible of the situation. Joint operations in particular require complete and composite views of the situation and an adversary's land, sea, air, and space forces.

b. Using and having access to all sources of information is essential to understanding the actual situation. Compartmentation is the antithesis of All-source and Complete Intelligence. Single-source intelligence analysis may lead to incomplete intelligence. Use of the all-source concept and methodology will reduce the risks of deception. Without all-source intelligence analysis, decisionmaking and operations may become vulnerable to hostile deception effected through denial and deception measures taken against one or more elements of the intelligence system. All-source collection and analysis will help to identify deception and denial attempts and greatly complicate an enemy's task. It will also become the basis for the nomination and development of countermeasures against hostile intelligence and operations. Thus, multiple sources should be employed for broad, in-depth, and comparative views of situations through coordination and correlation of different and independent sources. An effective all-source intelligence system will minimize the risks of hostile enemy deception and denial measures.

c. The most complete and reliable intelligence is developed through fusion of information from several sources and perspectives. All-source intelligence fusion must begin with intelligence collection and production planning. Each source can provide useful information and cues for collection and exploitation through other sources. Direction and management of intelligence processes by separate collection disciplines does not facilitate all-source products. A consequence of single-discipline processes is the inclination of an intelligence system to defer or shift the all-source integration function to the user's intelligence

organization, which defeats the principle of Usability. The intelligence system should strive to provide for holistic views, not intelligence discipline views.

19. Retain Objectivity in All-Source Intelligence.

Information from any and all sources should be available for evaluation, comparison, and correlation. Bringing all intelligence together at a single point is a cornerstone of analysis in developing an objective and complete understanding of the situation, and in identifying enemy deception efforts. The recent explosion of near-real-time information by the public media offers new opportunities and challenges to the all-source analyst. At the same time, analysts, J-2s, and commanders must recognize that gathering intelligence for analysis and fusion at one place presents a potential for error--the prejudices of the moment's perspective, the single viewpoint, or predominant views. Where possible then, conclusions, estimates, and selections of intelligence to be used should be subject to consideration and comparison with the widest range of understanding and opinion. In Eisenhower's analysis of the errors in the Battle at the Kasserine Pass, 1943, he said that, "Staffs were too prone to take one isolated piece of intelligence in which they implicitly believed and to shut their eyes to any contrary possibility."*

20. Encourage Different Views

a. Commanders must have access to significant dissenting views and positions. The principle of objective intelligence is not served by developing or presenting a unified position. The J-2 is responsible for presenting the full range of responsible opinion developed by the intelligence staff and supporting intelligence organizations.

b. Intelligence is rarely absolute or finite, but it is not enough that different views be allowed. There must be organizational incentives for analysts to identify and explore alternate hypotheses, and there must be systematic provision for the commander to hear dissenting views. When critical decisions must be made quickly and without time to resolve all differences of intelligence opinion, or the differences are not resolvable, the commander must be given an opportunity to hear and consider the range of opinion.

* Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, (Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1948), page 147.

21. Distinguish Between Knowledge and Deductive or Inductive Conclusions. The J-2 should distinguish between what is offered as understanding or knowledge of the situation and enemy that is developed from fact, and what is hypothesis, opinion, or probability. Intelligence can be facts that have been observed, or it can be a conclusion based on facts of such certainty that it is considered to be knowledge. Intelligence can also be conclusions and estimates deduced from incomplete sets of facts or induced from potentially related facts. Where intelligence is to be used for operations, these distinctions should be maintained. The key points of an intelligence product should be identified as "fact," "knowledge," "hypothesis," "opinion," or "probability." The commander's determination of appropriate objectives and operations may rest on knowing whether intelligence is "fact" or "knowledge," knowing the particular logic used to develop an intelligence estimate, as well as knowing the various hypotheses that embrace a set of facts. The J-2 must recognize those situations where he should apprise the commander and staff of the full range of opinions, possibilities, working hypotheses, interpretations and valid conclusions. In the example of the Battle at the Kasserine Pass, 1943, the US force in Tunisia suffered losses because singular and flawed intelligence opinion was offered and used to the exclusion of available and accurate combat and reconnaissance reporting.*

* "Although...frequent and...very accurate reports were submitted by the American troops...concerning the strength and direction of the German attack...these reports were discounted by the Army and AFHQ Intelligence divisions as exaggeration(s)...The belief that the main attack was still to come through Fondouk persisted, both at AFHQ and...in the G-2 Division....The G-2 error was serious. After the battle I replaced the head of my Intelligence organization at AFHQ. The result of this misconception was that the (German) penetration gained a tremendous headway before General Anderson could understand what was actually taking place...Staffs were too prone to take one isolated piece of intelligence in which they implicitly believed and to shut their eyes to any contrary possibility. They decided the attack was to come through Fondouk, and although we had reconnaissance units...near Fondouk, who insisted the German(s) (were) not concentrating in that area, the Intelligence section blindly persisted in its conviction. This caused the army commander to make faulty dispositions." Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Doubleday & Co., 1948, pages 143, 147.

22. Use Liaison. Intelligence liaison should be employed on a basis designed to acquaint each force or element of the joint command with the intelligence requirements, responsibilities, capabilities, and operations of the other, and to exchange or share fully all significant intelligence.

23. Use Operating Forces for Combat Reporting. Integrate information from force reconnaissance units and elements in contact with the enemy. Forward and engaged combat forces must be tasked to collect and report intelligence. Operating and combat units are key intelligence collectors. They have unique opportunities to collect significant intelligence. These units are essential intelligence collection and reporting resources. As they contact or observe the enemy, operational forces' collection capabilities must be fully recognized and integrated into the intelligence collection structure and methodology. The lack of contact may be just as significant as positive intelligence.

24. Analyze Intelligence in Context of Operations. Intelligence analysis is best done in a context of understanding the relative friendly-enemy situation. The commander and J-2 must provide the intelligence staff, all-source teams, and supporting intelligence organizations a clear understanding of (1) the commander's intent, objectives, and plans, and (2) the unfolding situation and conduct of operations. This clear understanding must be imparted to participating analysts throughout the supporting intelligence infrastructure. With these insights and an understanding of how the enemy will conceptualize the situation, what options he will consider, and how he will react to our actions, the intelligence staffs and the supporting intelligence organizations can produce the full range of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence needed for the operations at hand and for the evolving situation. The exchange of information between commanders, watch teams, intelligence staffs, and supporting intelligence organizations must be continuous.

25. Use Intelligence Lessons. Intelligence and operations doctrines, structures, and activities need to ensure a systematic identification, evaluation, and application of intelligence lessons learned. An important function of all intelligence echelons is to benefit from significant operations and intelligence experience.

SECTION E
PRINCIPLES FOR JOINT INTELLIGENCE

1. Introduction to Principles for Joint Intelligence. This entire publication addresses intelligence support for joint operations, however, the principles that follow (see Figure II-4) are particularly relevant in helping joint force commanders get the most out of their own force and supporting intelligence capabilities. Joint force commanders can enhance or degrade "jointness" through their actions in determining intelligence objectives and in setting the direction of the intelligence effort. These "Principles for Joint Intelligence" highlight the importance of interoperability, among and between essential intelligence and command and control systems, in both procedures and information. Joint operations demand composite views of ongoing activity in or on land, sea, air, and space. To help commanders build and maintain this common picture,

PRINCIPLES FOR JOINT INTELLIGENCE

Joint Force Commander Determines Direction of Intelligence

View the Enemy as Joint or Unified

Constitute a Joint Intelligence Staff

Ensure Mutual Support and Sharing

Make Organic Intelligence Capabilities Available to the Joint Force Commander

Pursue Interoperability

Figure II-4.

intelligence organizations and systems must provide mutual support, operating on a shared information basis. No echelon of command has sufficient assets to collect information and produce intelligence to meet all needs. Accordingly, within the limits imposed by security, intelligence must be distributed up, down, and across echelons. Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) provide a focal point for much of this activity. In the JIC, the Joint Staff, theater, and subordinate joint force J-2s and J-3s bring together expertise from all relevant intelligence disciplines and warfare specialties; a JIC's joint and all-source analysis is the key to operational intelligence that is timely, relevant, and complete.

2. Joint Force Commander Determines Direction of Intelligence. Commanders, with their J-2s, should determine intelligence objectives and the direction of the intelligence effort. The intelligence effort is critical to the mission. Its nature, orientation, and scope depend on the commander's understanding of the relative importance of intelligence in accomplishing the mission. The J-2 should refine his concept of intelligence operations to reflect changes in the commander's mission, his estimate of the situation, and his objectives. The commanders, with their J-2s, must ensure that their intelligence objectives are correct, adequately stated and understood, prioritized, and translated into actions that will provide the intelligence needed to accomplish the mission.

3. View the Enemy as Joint or Unified. A joint force is potentially faced with enemy capabilities and operations of a joint nature. It is therefore essential that intelligence of the enemy be jointly constructed and considered in its entirety, and not separately in its air, naval, and ground force aspects. Only by complete integration of information and analysis can an intelligence organization determine or estimate the whole of the enemy situation.

4. Constitute a Joint Intelligence Staff. The joint intelligence staff should have intelligence experts from each of the Services or components. Only by integration of information and analysis can the J-2 determine or estimate the enemy situation in its entirety. The joint staff must provide the commander and J-2 an understanding of each component's intelligence capabilities, limitations, and needs.

5. Ensure Mutual Support and Sharing

a. The commander with his J-2 needs to ensure that each subordinate command assists the others in collecting and

evaluating intelligence information they need to the maximum extent, compatible with the requirements of their respective commands and the joint force commander. This includes sharing intelligence sources, collection assets and operations, collection management, data bases, intelligence analysis and production, and communications. Individual commands, components, or force elements may not have sufficient resources or opportunity to collect and produce intelligence to meet all their requirements. Additionally, intelligence needed by one element may best be obtained by some other element of the force in the course of its operations. Therefore, each subordinate element needs to be aware of the intelligence requirements and capabilities of the other force elements, and the J-2 through close liaison with operations and plans staffs, needs to monitor overall intelligence requirements and identify the potential of operating elements to render mutual intelligence support.

b. All joint command elements should be mutually supportive and share intelligence information, resources, and capabilities in furtherance of their overall effort. Likewise, this principle applies to other forces and to intelligence organizations that support the joint force. Sharing is an affirmative responsibility of commands and organizations that have the ability to support joint operations. Sharing and mutual support are essential to integrating all resources and capabilities into a unified system that will best fulfill the prioritized intelligence needs for joint operations.

6. Make Organic Intelligence Capabilities Available to the Joint Force Commander. Intelligence collection and production capabilities of the components and elements of the joint force all being organic to the joint command should be employable for any requirement of either the joint force commander or any force component or element determined by the J-2. However, when using intelligence resources in this manner, the J-2 must balance the needs of the joint force with the component commander's requirement to retain the ability to employ sufficient intelligence capabilities for their particular missions and responsibilities.

7. Pursue Interoperability. Intelligence systems, communications, concepts, products, and language must be interoperable for the effective exchange and use of information among intelligence organizations and operating commands and forces.

a. Aspects of Interoperability. Interoperability problems as they relate to joint intelligence doctrine are presented in three areas: (1) interoperability of systems, (2) interoperability of intelligence information and products, and (3) language. Ultimately, each of these relate to the ability of organizations to communicate with one another.

b. System Interoperability. The J-2 should ensure that command elements and supporting organizations' intelligence and communications systems are compatible not only for exchange of data, information, and intelligence products but also are based on compatible intelligence concepts. If components' intelligence systems cannot receive or exchange intelligence information, the systems are not interoperable. Interoperability of systems can also relate to intelligence data processing and related equipment. Intelligence production organizations should provide intelligence data and information in a form acceptable for processing by the equipment of the recipient.

c. Intelligence Product Interoperability. Intelligence organizations producing joint intelligence should ensure that the data and intelligence products are in form, content, and language that is usable by all Services performing similar and related functions. For example, if one component requires maps with UTM coordinates while another cooperating component uses charts with geographic coordinates, location information should be expressed with both UTM and geographic coordinates.

d. Common Language. Intelligence organizations of a joint force should understand and use concepts, language, terminology, names, and symbols that are common to all cooperating components of the joint command and force.

e. Standards. Factors that promote interoperability can be expressed in standards. Standards should be sets of guidelines and criteria for continuity and similarity of data, formats, terminology, equipment, signals, etc., that will promote the exchange, understanding, and application of intelligence requirements and intelligence products among intelligence organizations and the users of intelligence information. Standards for interoperability, such as the National Imagery Transmission Format (NITF), should be developed and incorporated into intelligence systems, equipment, and procedures providing intelligence for joint operations.

Standards need to be enforced in peacetime to facilitate transition to crisis or combat operations.

f. Exercises. Intelligence interoperability problems reduce a joint force's ability to attain and sustain unity of effort. Thus an important concept is to use exercises and rehearsals of operations to demonstrate, test, and evaluate the joint interoperability of intelligence systems and intelligence information under conditions which approximate wartime stress. Where there are actual and potential interoperability problems, they can be found through exercises and addressed.

CHAPTER III INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

Responsibilities are based on capabilities to meet intelligence requirements. Whoever has needed capabilities has inherent related responsibilities, and may be tasked to provide the services of those capabilities, without regard to organization structures, ownership of resources, or their location.

1. Introduction. This chapter presents intelligence organizations' and agencies' responsibilities for joint operations. The responsibilities for tasking or requesting, as appropriate, and providing intelligence may not parallel chains-of-command. The structure to provide intelligence may not exist or may not even have been planned before the inception of operations and task forces. Therefore, firm commitment to cooperation and shared purpose among intelligence organizations supporting commanders and operations is the key to doing whatever is required to make intelligence support the need. The cooperation and shared purpose must be based on requirements and capabilities, with the objective of ensuring quality intelligence support (see Figure II-2). This chapter states intelligence responsibilities for assisting commanders in identifying and determining objectives, assisting staffs and forces in planning operations, supporting the conduct of operations, and evaluating the effects of operations. The intelligence responsibilities of various groups are addressed in turn by the following categories:

- a. All intelligence organizations.
- b. National-level organizations.
- c. Combatant and Joint commands.
- d. Service component intelligence organizations.

2. All Intelligence Organizations. Within the context of the J-2's concept of operations, all intelligence organizations involved in support of operations have certain common responsibilities. They should each have the responsibility to:

- a. Provide intelligence to assist all joint force commander's J-2s in the identification and nomination of

military objectives, and the achievement of those objectives determined by the commander. The objectives and the combatant commander's strategy to achieve these objectives give the perspective for intelligence information requirements and the intelligence operations and activities necessary to provide the intelligence products and sources to the users.

b. Identify at each echelon intelligence requirements that cannot be met by their organic capability.

c. Task any intelligence organization capable of providing needed information. Intelligence support responsibilities should be determined according to commands' and forces' intelligence requirements and the abilities of organizations to fulfill them. Support responsibility should not depend on organizational relationships, "ownership" of assets and resources, or a chain of command. When an organic intelligence organization or other organization of primary responsibility is unable to fulfill intelligence requirements, then any other intelligence organization capable of providing the needed support may be tasked to do so. The J-2 should monitor this tasking to ensure that duplicative streams of support are not established which hamper the flow of quality intelligence to operational commanders.

d. Operate on the basis of sharing intelligence resources, expertise, and intelligence products. Rarely will a command or intelligence organization be able to depend entirely on its own capabilities to collect and produce all the necessary intelligence. Thus, the whole community of intelligence organizations should share their capabilities and products in a manner allowing them to mutually support joint operations.

3. National-Level Intelligence Organizations.

National-level intelligence agencies and organizations include DIA, NSA, CIA, DMA, and the intelligence divisions of the Department of State and the Military Services. National-level intelligence agencies and organizations that can support military operations need to make that support available. A part of the "national" responsibility of a national agency is the support of those military instruments of policy that are being applied for national purposes. Additionally, they should assist in identifying other potential intelligence requirements that may be addressable through their capabilities.

a. Defense Intelligence Agency (Joint Staff J-2)

(1) DIA (Joint Staff J-2) should be the channel through which the joint force commander's needs for intelligence support are tasked to appropriate national agencies. Those needs for intelligence support from national agencies are normally routed through the combatant commanders. DIA (Joint Staff J-2) is responsible for working with the other national-level organizations to obtain intelligence information available through those agencies that is required for joint operations. This DIA intelligence support is in addition to whatever arrangements may be established for direct support by those national agencies to the commands.

(2) DIA (Joint Staff J-2) should:

(a) Keep the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff apprised of foreign situations that are relevant to current and potential national security policy, objectives, and strategy.

(b) Identify and nominate attainable national military objectives to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff that will help attain national security objectives.

(c) Assist in providing information required to fill intelligence voids for operating forces, especially during the initial phase of operations.

(d) Assess the effectiveness of operations with respect to an adversary's capability and intent and for achieving the assigned national security objectives.

(e) Tailor all-source intelligence support, including:

1. Collection requirements management: Validating and prioritizing the commands' intelligence information requirements.

2. Production and exploitation management: Focuses on intelligence to be produced by DIA and other national intelligence organizations.

3. Intelligence processing, analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence, including order of battle, scientific and technical, estimative, threat, targeting, target and mission planning, counterintelligence, and strategic warning.

(f) Provide the following support to CINCs in both supported and supporting roles:

1. Review combatant command operations and concept plans from a cross-Service, cross-program, and cross-command perspective to optimize intelligence for joint operations.

2. Review requirements statements, TIAPs, Service planning and programming documents, and Service and agency POMs from a cross-Service, cross-program, and cross-command perspective for enhancement of joint intelligence.

3. Identify and support procedural and programmatic initiatives that optimize the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff's ability to deploy intelligence support capabilities where needed.

4. Deploy National Military Intelligence Support Teams (NMIST) to facilitate the flow of quality intelligence to the operational commander.

(g) Coordinate with the J-6 to obtain an assessment of communications supportability.

b. National Security Agency. NSA is responsible for providing (1) signals intelligence (SIGINT) and (2) advisory assistance in the use of SIGINT for decisionmaking, planning, and conducting operations. NSA should affirmatively assist in the identification and fulfillment of the intelligence information requirement joint force commanders derive from their mission, their estimate of the situation, and their objectives. NSA should identify and provide necessary SIGINT resources (personnel and systems), methodology, data, and connectivity to joint force commands and their components for direct and tailored support of operations. NSA should provide advisory and practical assistance in

coordinating and integrating SIGINT with intelligence from other sources.

c. Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence. CIA can contribute significant support for joint operations including intelligence used in (1) developing strategy, (2) determining objectives, (3) determining deception objectives, (4) planning operations, (5) conducting operations, and (6) evaluating the effects of operations. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has capabilities that are particularly relevant in supporting joint operations. The DCI directs major technical intelligence collection systems which service both national and defense intelligence requirements. He also has responsibility for coordinating all US intelligence sharing arrangements with foreign governments, human intelligence (HUMINT) activities, and counterintelligence operations outside the United States. Commanders should request intelligence support through CIA Joint Intelligence Liaison Elements (JILE) assigned to combatant commands and joint task forces. CIA intelligence support may also be requested through the DIA (Joint Staff J-2).

d. Defense Mapping Agency. DMA is responsible for providing maps, charts, and geodesy for operations. DMA can provide specialized and tailored MC&G products in time of crisis especially for geographic areas where standard product coverage is unavailable or inadequate.

e. Department of State. The Department of State and the American Foreign Service overtly collect information relevant to US foreign policy concerns. Senior Foreign Service Officers are assigned to each of the combatant commands, where they serve as political advisers to the CINC. Through its Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the Department of State can support joint military operations with political and economic intelligence.

4. Combatant and Joint Commands

a. The commander assigning missions and responsibilities, with the J-2, is ultimately responsible for ensuring the necessary intelligence support to forces within the assigned area of responsibility. This command responsibility may include acquiring intelligence for tactical commands and forces that are developing, planning, and conducting operations. Tactical commanders and force elements may not have the lead-time, perspective, or authority to identify and obtain

necessary tactical or combat intelligence. The joint force commander with the J-2, at all levels, is responsible for:

- (1) Identifying Essential Elements of Information (EEIs).
 - (2) Providing the intelligence staff, all-source watch teams, and supporting intelligence organizations with a clear understanding of friendly objectives, intent and plans and of the unfolding conduct of joint operations.
 - (3) Prioritizing intelligence information requirements.
 - (4) Assigning intelligence resources.
 - (5) Tasking collection and production.
- b. The J-2 is responsible for:
- (1) Overall direction of the command's intelligence staff and the joint intelligence center.
 - (2) Apprising the commander of intelligence capabilities and limitations, and the potential effects on operations.
 - (3) Helping the joint force commander develop and refine his estimate of the situation, and, concurrently, developing and refining the intelligence estimate.
 - (4) Helping the joint force commander identify relevant and attainable objectives.
 - (5) Helping the joint force commander identify deception objectives.
 - (6) Identifying enemy essential elements of friendly information (EEFIs).
 - (7) Prescribing security of intelligence information.
 - (8) Helping the joint force commander provide the intelligence staff, all-source watch teams, and supporting intelligence organizations with a clear understanding of friendly objectives, intent, plans and the unfolding conduct of joint operations.

(9) Helping the joint force commander translate his mission, estimate of the situation, and objectives into intelligence information requirements.

(10) Keeping his own staff and the intelligence staffs of supporting and subordinate commands informed of the joint force commander's mission, his estimate of the situation and his objectives.

(11) Validating intelligence information requirements of subordinate and supporting commands.

(12) Helping the joint force commander prioritize intelligence information requirements

(13) Developing intelligence plans. With respect to the commander's operation and contingency plans, the J-2 should:

(a) Develop and refine the threat assessment.

(b) Lay out a game plan (in the intelligence annex, see Appendix B) detailing how he plans to provide the intelligence support needed to: determine operating objectives; identify deception objectives; conduct operations; and analyze the effects of operations. This concept of intelligence operations should:

1. Identify potentially useful intelligence-related systems and personnel, regardless of prior location or subordination. Identify required interoperability.

2. Spell out command relationships, tasking authorities, and reporting responsibilities.

3. Detail procedures for:

a. Developing intelligence for subordinate commands and forces.

b. Obtaining intelligence from national organizations through DIA (Joint Staff J-2).

c. Obtaining maps, charts, and other geodetic and geographic intelligence support.

d. Obtaining intelligence-related communications support and developing concept(s) of intelligence operations which provide for continuity of support if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost.

(c) Devise, for the mix of intelligence personnel, systems, concepts, and procedures identified in the intelligence annex of each of the CINC's operations and concept plans, an exercise-gaming, simulation and modeling plan to evaluate readiness and executability under conditions approximating wartime stress.

(d) Evaluate other parts of the operations and concept plans i.e., assumptions; planned air, ground, naval, and space operations; planned psychological operations; planned special operations; and deception plan. Review everything in light of what we know about the enemy's cognitive model (e.g., does this make sense when viewed through the enemy's eyes?).

(e) Provide feedback to other joint staff elements.

(14) Ensure the intelligence communications requirements are fully reflected in the command's communications architecture. Coordinate the intelligence communication architecture with the J-6 for an assessment of its capacity and connective supportability.

(15) Use the Theater Intelligence Architecture Program, Service planning and programming documents, and requirements statements to identify critical deficiencies in existing intelligence support capabilities. Validate the need for an intelligence capability and the necessity (or lack thereof) for interoperability between the new intelligence-related system(s) and existing systems and between intelligence-related systems and C3 systems.

c. The intelligence support responsibilities of supported and supporting CINCs are outlined below:

(1) The supported CINC's J-2 should:

- (a) Validate the supporting CINC's specific intelligence support requirements under operations and concept plans maintained by the supported CINC.
- (b) In conjunction with the J-2 of the supporting CINC, assess national and theater capabilities to satisfy the supporting CINC's intelligence support requirements.
- (c) In conjunction with the J-2 of the supporting CINC, develop a concept of intelligence operations.
- (d) Modify Intelligence Annexes of supported CINC operations and concept plans to reflect the concept of intelligence operations.
- (e) Modify the supported CINC's Theater Intelligence Architecture Program (TIAP) to reflect the concept of intelligence operations.
- (f) Modify program(s) to implement the revised TIAP.
- (g) In conjunction with the J-2 of the supporting CINC, identify appropriate means (e.g., exercises, gaming, simulation, modeling) to evaluate the viability of the concept of intelligence operations.
- (h) Coordinate with the J-6 to obtain an assessment of communications supportability.

(2) The supporting CINC's J-2 should:

- (a) Identify specific intelligence support requirements under operations and concept plans maintained by the supported CINC.
- (b) In conjunction with the J-2 of the supported CINC, assess national and theater capabilities to satisfy the supporting CINC's intelligence support requirements.
- (c) In conjunction with the J-2 of the supported CINC, develop a concept of intelligence operations.

(d) Modify the supporting CINC's Theater Intelligence Architecture Program (TIAP) to reflect the concept of intelligence operations.

(e) Modify program(s) to implement the revised TIAP.

(f) In conjunction with the J-2 of the supported CINC, identify appropriate mechanisms (e.g., exercises, gaming, simulation, modeling) to evaluate the viability of the concept of intelligence operations.

5. Component Command Intelligence Organizations. The intelligence responsibilities of the Service component commands' intelligence organizations include the following:

a. Aiding commanders in identifying and nominating the Service components' objectives.

b. Sharing resources and capabilities with all joint force elements as needed in furtherance of the joint mission. Resources and capabilities include data bases, intelligence collection, and production.

c. Requesting required intelligence from other organizations and agencies through the J-2.

d. Assigning organic intelligence resources to optimally meet the Service component's intelligence needs and at the same time support other elements involved in the joint operation.

CHAPTER IV
THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE

SECTION A
Aspects of Intelligence Support

1. Introduction. This chapter begins with definitions of intelligence and sources of intelligence and then describes the processes of the intelligence cycle, the problems and uses it has, and the individual activities involved. Guidelines and principles associated with each step of the intelligence cycle are also developed.
2. Intelligence. Intelligence is information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.
3. Strategic, Tactical, and Operational Intelligence.
 - a. The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1-02) defines these types of intelligence as follows:
 - (1) Strategic Intelligence is "intelligence that is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail."
 - (2) Tactical Intelligence is "intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail."
 - (3) Operational intelligence is intelligence required for determining, planning, executing, and evaluating the effects of all types of operations." (Note: modifies the current Joint Pub 1-02 definition.)
 - b. The definitions of strategic and tactical intelligence are essentially associated with a level of command. However, changes in usage and practice have modified some of the level of command distinctions once associated with the terms. For example, strategic intelligence was almost exclusively associated with the

DIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the National Command Authorities. Now the combatant command CINCs play a greater role at the strategic level of command and have a greater need for strategic intelligence. Tactical intelligence was considered the province of deployed (or deployable) forces. However, changes in recent years have eroded much of that distinction and expediency borne of necessity has resulted in an acknowledgement that "tactical intelligence is where you find it." Ad hoc arrangements for tactical intelligence support have directly involved so-called "national" intelligence producers (like CIA, DIA, and NSA) and "skip-echelon" support from Service intelligence organizations. In contrast to strategic and tactical intelligence, operational intelligence applies not to a particular level of command, but rather to the function of supporting operations at any level.

4. Sources of Intelligence. Intelligence sources are the origins and means or systems used to observe, sense, and record or convey information of conditions, situations, and events. There are four source types: imagery intelligence (IMINT), human resources intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT). Figure IV-1 provides the components of these basic sources of intelligence.

5. All-Source Intelligence. All-source intelligence is information developed and integrated from all available sources, including open sources. The concept of all-source intelligence applies to intelligence collection, analysis, and intelligence production. In some situations, all-source intelligence can confirm or corroborate a hypothesis; in others, all-source intelligence may point out uncertainties or ambiguities about the enemy. Still, any number of circumstances could require only a single source of information. For example, SIGINT may provide indications of an enemy force presence or movement, or information that an enemy commander has communicated an attack order. In World War II, the ULTRA system provided timely and relevant single-source intelligence of this nature. Even without all-source corroboration or analysis and evaluation, the fact of an attack order may be the criterion for a warning.

6. The Intelligence Cycle. The intelligence cycle is the process by which intelligence is obtained, produced, and made available to users. DOD users include the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, CINCs, and all other commanders and

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

IMINT	- Imagery Intelligence
PHOTINT	- Photographic Intelligence
SIGINT	- Signals Intelligence
COMINT	- Communications Intelligence
ELINT	- Electronic Intelligence
FIS	- Foreign Instrumentation SIGINT
HUMINT	- Human Resources Intelligence
MASINT	- Measurement and Signature Intelligence
ACINT	- Acoustical Intelligence
OPINT	- Optical Intelligence
IRINT	- Infra-red Intelligence
LASINT	- Laser Intelligence
NUCINT	- Nuclear Intelligence
RINT	- Unintentional Radiation Intelligence
RADINT	- Radar Intelligence

Figure IV-1.

forces. The US intelligence cycle has five steps: (a) planning and direction; (b) collection; (c) processing; (d) production; and (e) dissemination.* The intelligence cycle is a highly simplified model of intelligence operation in terms of processes. However, the intelligence cycle has some utility in that it presents intelligence activities as a structure for the discussion of intelligence doctrine. It is useful to see intelligence by two categories that relate to the steps of the intelligence cycle: "raw intelligence" and "finished intelligence." Raw intelligence is information that has been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other intelligence. Finished intelligence is information that has been analyzed, integrated, interpreted, and evaluated.

a. Planning and Direction. The first step of the intelligence cycle is planning and direction. It concerns identifying, prioritizing, and validating intelligence requirements, translating requirements into observables, preparing a collection plan, issuing requests for information collection, production, and dissemination and continuously monitoring the availability of collected data.

b. Collection. Collection includes both "the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing and/or production elements." (Joint Pub 1-02).

(1) Collection Management Policy and Principles

(a) Few commands have the organic collection assets to satisfy all information needs. Thus, joint force collection management must be able to task any collection capability of the joint force and be able to obtain the aid of external resources in acquiring all needed intelligence.

* NATO combines the processing and production steps into one step which is called processing. Some agencies have suggested that the evaluation of information processes be recognized as the sixth step of the intelligence cycle. It would be placed between the "Dissemination" and "Planning and Direction" steps and would complete the cycle by evaluating previous steps. The information would then be used to enhance future cycle activities.

(b) Economies realized from centralization must not diminish the collection management element's responsiveness to the requirements of the individual elements of the joint force.

(2) Collection Guidelines

(a) Intelligence Collection and Processing Activities. Collection resources supporting military operations should be allocated or tasked to satisfy anticipated and potential intelligence requirements of all command levels and elements of the joint force. Different types of collection capabilities may be needed so that information from one source type can be tested or confirmed by others, and so that the full range of enemy activity is subjected to observation. The collection system also needs redundancy so the loss or failure of one collection asset is compensated by duplicate or different assets capable of answering the intelligence need. To function effectively at the start of joint operations, agency and organizational responsibilities and procedures to optimize intelligence collection must be in existence and practiced during peacetime.

(b) Essential Elements of Information and Intelligence Requirements. The commander, with the J-2, is responsible for identifying and determining the EEIs for the mission and operations. In turn, the J-2 is responsible for identifying the information that is not held, stating this in terms of intelligence requirements and observables and then for obtaining the information.

(c) Intelligence Requirements. At all command levels, collection managers must be aware of their command's intelligence requirements as well as those of their next higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands because the collection or production abilities of one component of a joint force may well be able to satisfy another's requirements. The J-2 (collection management) can then task resources to collect and process the information to fulfill the most important requirements of the joint force.

(d) J-2 Must be Knowledgeable of Available Collection Resources. A corollary to the above is that the J-2 must be aware of the abilities, limitations, and lead time required for tasking intelligence collection and production.

(e) Coordination of Collection Sources. Collection operations (including data exchange) of all collection sources should be coordinated to allow the cross-cueing and tip-off exchanges between collectors. This will require interoperability of component, combatant command, and national intelligence systems and procedures. The data collected should be integrated and correlated in all-source analysis. Resulting overlapping, multisource collection capabilities should be used to reduce the effects of enemy denial and deception measures for surprise and security of his operations and to improve the accuracy and completeness of intelligence information.

(f) Collection Opportunity and Countermeasure Tradeoffs. When determining intelligence operations, the J-2, with the J-3 and J-5, should identify and compare the longer-term value of continued intelligence collection against enemy elements, with the immediate tactical value of destroying or countering a source of intelligence. For example, an enemy communications site may offer greater tactical advantage to friendly forces if its signals are subjected to continuing collection and exploitation, rather than the site being targeted for immediate attack. The expected immediate tactical advantages must be weighed against the potential loss of intelligence for operations.

(g) Communications. Secure, rapid, reliable, redundant, and interoperable communications between intelligence activities and users are essential for the availability of intelligence.

(3) Collection Management Responsibilities. Collection managers are responsible for translating user's needs for intelligence into specific collection objectives and activities.

(a) Collection Requirements Management. CRM registers, validates, and prioritizes collection, exploitation, and dissemination requirements to meet the information needs of joint force and subordinate commanders. Through the development of a comprehensive collection plan or strategy, CRM tasks requirements to appropriate organic, joint forces, and external organizations and agencies. CRM monitors the satisfaction of requirements and assesses the effectiveness of the collection strategy, to satisfy the original and evolving intelligence information needs.

(b) Collection Operations Management. COM activities are driven by collection requirements. COM provides authoritative and coordinated direction and control (tasking) of the broad array of technical sensor operations and human source intelligence collection operations, and the processing and dissemination resources associated with them.

c. Processing. Processing is the "conversion of collected information into a form suitable to the production of intelligence." (Joint Pub 1-02). It is the action of converting the form of incoming information to formats that can be readily used by intelligence personnel in the analysis and production of intelligence. It includes graphics, art work, photographic processing, video production, printing, etc.

d. Production. Production is the process of analyzing, evaluating, interpreting, and integrating raw data and information into finished intelligence products for known or anticipated purposes and applications. The product may be developed from single- or all-source collections and data bases.

(1) Production Guidelines

(a) Focus on Purpose and Use of Intelligence. The producer needs to know who will use the intelligence, his mission and responsibilities, and the purpose of the intelligence.

(b) Be Objective. Producers must be objective and unbiased and avoid any tendency toward preconceived ideas. When conflicting information exists, efforts should be made to

resolve the difference. If time is inadequate to provide unambiguous intelligence, the users should be made aware of the ambiguity or uncertainty. Commanders need all the available pertinent intelligence, including "conflicting" or contradicting information and opinion. Commanders may not be able to immediately use or resolve conflicting intelligence, but it must be available for potential applicability as operations evolve and the actual situation becomes more apparent.

(c) Provide Integrated Products. Intelligence analysts should use information available from multiple sources, integrate it, and provide the decisionmaker with a clear picture that is tailored and focused to his needs.

(d) Coordinate Production Among Echelons. Intelligence production should be coordinated from national through tactical levels.

1. Intelligence production for joint operations is accomplished by units and organizations at every echelon. It includes Service-unique products at the component commands and operating forces. These production activities should be coordinated and, as appropriate, directed by the J-2 so they are mutually supporting.

2. Intelligence produced at higher echelons is derived from both collection assets organic to that echelon or higher and a refinement and compilation of intelligence received from subordinate units and external organizations. Subordinate units in turn use the intelligence products sent to them by the senior command to better determine or adjust their mission and/or strategy. Hence, the intelligence production accomplished by different levels and units should be complementary. The J-2 should coordinate all production efforts of the command and external agencies and organizations supporting the command to prevent intelligence gaps and unnecessary duplication.

(e) Provide Timely Intelligence. To be useful, intelligence must reach commanders in time for decisions, planning, and mission execution. When timeliness necessitates a product based on incomplete information, the intelligence officer may have to provide conclusions based on the best information available while indicating the nature of uncertainties. Intelligence should be sent by the most expeditious and reliable means to its users. The information should be in a form that makes it usable by any component of the joint force, and at a classification that permits access and its prompt application. When information classification or compartmentation would otherwise preclude its accessibility and use, the information should be sanitized through its effective separation from the intelligence sources and methods.

(2) Production Responsibilities. Higher echelons are responsible for providing subordinates any required intelligence exceeding the subordinate's organic capability to produce. Toward this end, higher echelon commanders and J-2s should identify any and all organizations able to contribute, and take necessary actions to provide joint force commanders and forces the products and services they need. Intelligence production considerations:

(a) Tactical Forces. A tactical unit produces intelligence on its commander's area of intelligence responsibility (AOIR) and relies on higher and adjacent units for intelligence on the remainder of its area of interest (AOI).

(b) Components. Components of joint commands may rely on supporting intelligence organizations or its subordinate units' organic resources for intelligence on their respective AOIRs and find some means, including the use of its own resources, to produce intelligence on areas not specifically covered by subordinates. Components are also responsible for providing their products to other components and higher headquarters as needed.

(c) Joint Task Forces. A joint task force may use its forces' resources to provide intelligence on their AOIRs. It may also rely on adjacent forces and capabilities of the

theater command and of national organizations to provide required intelligence on the AOIR and AOI. The joint task force is responsible for providing subordinates any intelligence that they are unable to provide by their organic intelligence capabilities.

(d) J-2 and Joint Intelligence Center. The J-2, with the intelligence center staff, has primary responsibility for providing or producing the intelligence required to support the joint force commander, his staff, components, task forces, and elements.

(e) Functional Combatant Commands. Functional combatant commands without a geographical area of responsibility (AOR) and their components are generally responsible for producing or obtaining mission-unique intelligence, but they rely on national agencies and combatant commands with AORs for intelligence of those AORs. Supported combatant commands should provide necessary intelligence support or validate intelligence requirements for the functional combatant commands. This responsibility may be further assigned to a component. For example, the Air Force component of the supported combatant command may provide mission intelligence to a unit of SAC aircraft coming into a theater. Enroute intelligence should be supplied directly by Air Force, Army, and Naval components, depending on the mission. Supporting combatant commands and their subordinates who are responsible for preparing and training forces for deployment have an inherent responsibility to produce intelligence to support this mission. This intelligence must be coordinated with the supported CINC during its development process.

(3) Production Management. Production management is a critical element in ensuring effective and efficient military intelligence production in support of joint operations. The production manager employs the production principles previously stated. The functions of the production manager are to receive, review, validate, prioritize, and coordinate production requirements and to determine the producer, schedule, task, and edit intelligence products. One of the newest functions of the

production manager is controlling ADP on-line updates. It is essential that strict controls be applied to changing information in ADP systems that can be accessed by other organizations. There must be a designated approving authority for such transactions. Routinely, only one organization will have the authority to change a specific item (i.e., a data field in a record in an official data base). Responsibilities must be clearly delineated and safeguards built into the system to prohibit unauthorized changes.

(4) Intelligence Production--Summary. The preparation of an intelligence product by a single analyst or team using the principles provided above is an important part of the intelligence function. It is a relatively simple process to describe but complex in its actual performance, regardless of the degree of automated support available.

(a) Filtering. Before the preparation of a finished product, erroneous, inapplicable and redundant material must be eliminated from incoming information to reduce the volume with which the analysts must deal. While some filtering can be performed by setting criteria in the automated systems, this should not replace the good judgment of seasoned and knowledgeable intelligence analysts.

(b) Understanding the Requirement. The analyst must thoroughly understand what the user is requesting. This understanding is imperative in developing the intelligence that provides the user the needed information in a timely manner.

(c) Researching Available Material. Once the analyst is sure he knows the question, he turns to the material in the files, both automated and manual, to obtain the data to perform an analysis. The pertinent data are aggregated for study. In doing this, gaps may be identified.

(d) New Information Requirements. The information required to fill any gaps in the basic data required for analysis is passed to the collection management element, which converts it into collection tasks. Information received from this additional collection is aggregated with that previously identified.

(e) Analysis. Pertinent information is assessed based on the intelligence information required and the use for the information. Just what information is "pertinent" depends upon the analytical model the analyst is using, e.g., an hypothesis. The analyst draws conclusions based upon his analytical model and facts at hand, and then prepares the finished product. Intelligence production is the development of conclusions, understanding, knowledge, and opinion.

e. Dissemination. Dissemination is "conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form." (Joint Pub 1-02). Intelligence is disseminated in many forms, using a variety of means. Intelligence can take the form of verbal reports (face-to-face and/or telephone or video exchanges), documents (reports, studies, analyses, estimates, and assessments), graphic products (maps, charts, hard-copy imagery, videotape, motion picture film, 35mm slides, digital images, and viewgraphs), and the information in intelligence data bases. Dissemination means include physical transfer of hard-copy textual and graphic materials, digital and analog media (magnetic tape and optical disks); videoteleconference; telephones; messages; briefings; facsimile transmissions; remote terminal access to computer data bases; and direct data transfers. In addition, tactical intelligence can be disseminated via intercom, tactical data systems, tactical radio circuits, and satellite broadcasts. Each of these methods of disseminating intelligence can be further categorized as to whether it is secure or nonsecure, over dedicated or common-user communications, or whether it involves dissemination of raw or finished intelligence. The diversity of forms and dissemination paths reinforces the need for interoperability among and between critical defense intelligence and C3 systems.

SECTION B

Integration of Intelligence in Support of Joint Operations

1. Intelligence Functions for Joint Forces. Eight primary intelligence functions normally need to be performed to meet the strategic and operational requirements of joint force commanders. They are:

a. Indications and Warning. I&W involves the integration and analysis of operations and intelligence data to evaluate and assess the possibility of an attack by hostile forces against US or allied assets and interests. The I&W process anticipates hostile operations and provides sufficient warning to enable US or allied efforts to preempt, counter, or moderate their actions. Each node of the I&W system supports the commander at that echelon as well as the total DOD I&W system. Warning notification is made to local commanders, US and allied military authorities at all levels, and the National Command Authorities. The system's nodes have a common structure and use a common methodology to monitor various warning indicators on a worldwide basis.

b. Current Intelligence. Current intelligence monitors crises in which US interests are involved and supports and updates ongoing operations throughout the operational continuum, peace through war. It involves the integration of current, all-source information into concise, objective reporting on the current situation in a particular area. It usually contains judgments on how the situation will develop and what the implications are for US and allied planning and decisionmaking. Current intelligence and I&W are closely linked and are frequently treated as a single function.

c. Military Capabilities Assessment. The commander needs an assessment of an enemy's capabilities to use military forces. The MCA includes five major components:

(1) Leadership and C2. Assessment of how enemy commanders direct their forces to accomplish a designated mission.

(2) Order of Battle. Identification of force components and assessment of the strength, structure,

and disposition of the personnel and equipment of an enemy military force.

(3) Force Readiness and Mission. Assessment of the readiness and anticipated actions of a force to achieve its objectives. Force readiness includes the interrelationships among units in a single force and in combined-arms operations.

(4) Force Sustainability. Assessment of the ability of a force to maintain the level and duration of combat activity necessary to achieve objectives.

(5) Technical Intelligence. Assessment of the technical sophistication of forces, units, and weapon systems, as well as their capabilities, constraints, and countermeasures.

d. Enemy Courses of Action Estimate. Intelligence for all levels of command must attempt to probe the mind of the enemy commander. It must see the situation through his eyes, visualize which courses of action are open to him, and estimate which he is most likely to adopt. This estimate of the enemy's intentions and his possible courses of action is where the J-2 and his staff earn their keep. By helping the commander and his staff better understand how the adversary will conceptualize the situation, what options he will consider, and how he will react to our actions, the J-2 and his staff provide an essential complement to the "facts" contained in the Military Capabilities Assessment.

e. Military-Related Intelligence Assessment. MRI assessments result from the analysis and production of intelligence on any foreign military-related situation or activity significant to military policymaking or to planning and conducting military operations and activities. Subjects associated with military-related intelligence are listed below.

(1) C3 Systems. Assessment of C3 systems availability and connectivity.

(2) Defense Industries. Assessment of military and industrial production capacity, stockpiles of goods and raw materials, natural resources, and reconstitution capability.

(3) Energy. Location and assessment of power sources' capacity and distribution network.

(4) Military Geography. Assessment of natural and man-made physical features relevant to determining, planning, and conducting military operations.

(5) Demography. Assessment of population factors, including locations, composition, size, and ability to support or continue warfare. Includes continuing assessment of socio-political-economic factors which may cause or contribute to the development of low intensity conflict or other destabilizing influences.

(6) Transportation. Assessment of the lines of communication and equipment required by military-related activities.

(7) Environmental Considerations. Assessment of weather and other environmental factors that could impact on military operations.

(8) Medical. Assessment of availability of medical facilities, equipment, supplies, and policies, as well as ability of professional medical personnel to treat casualties.

f. Target Intelligence Support. After the commander approves targets, i.e., critical enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited to attain objectives (see discussion of "Targeting" on page II-6) target intelligence support (1) locates and portrays the components of a target or target complex and (2) details the information required to effectively apply friendly capabilities to delay, disrupt, debilitate, destroy, or otherwise dissuade or coerce the enemy, whichever suits the commander's intent.

g. Collection Management. The management of activities that collect, process, exploit, and disseminate information collected in response to requests from commanders at various echelons.

h. Operational Intelligence is the information about the adversary and the environment required for (1) determining the commander's objectives, (2) selecting options, (3) planning operations, (4) conducting operations, and (5) analyzing the effects of operations. To effectively develop and refine intelligence support for combat operations, the commander must guide the efforts of his operations and intelligence staffs in an iterative and interactive process.

2. Supporting Intelligence Functions. There are a number of supporting intelligence functions that require the direct involvement or participation of the J-2 staff to plan and conduct joint operations. Two of these supporting functions are described below.

a. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Support. Maps and charts are intelligence. They are intelligence products of geodetic, geomagnetic, hydrographic, bathymetric, cultural, and topographic information. Maps and charts also provide a medium for graphic correlation, summary and presentation of intelligence, and assessment of the relative positions and situations of friendly and enemy forces. Joint activities should understand that the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) can provide specialized or tailored MC&G products during crisis situations, but must be tasked to do so during the earliest stages of determining and planning operations. The J-2 should have responsibility for MC&G planning, requirements, and coordination. DMA may have a liaison officer assigned to the joint command to assist the J-2 staff in obtaining required support from DMA.

b. Intelligence Data Bases and Automated Systems. Data bases and automated information systems should be used to enhance rather than replace human ingenuity in analyzing and producing intelligence. Intelligence data bases are used by analysts to assess a situation and reach conclusions, often in support of dynamic, near-real-time events. Data bases consist of information on orders of battle, characteristics of equipment, installations and facilities, personalities (biographies), and military geography. In order to be useful, these data bases need to be accurate, current, tailored or adaptable to the mission, accessible, interconnected, and standardized for interoperability. Because data bases directly support the operations of headquarters, they need to be protected to a greater extent than other force components so that the headquarters functions can continue through attrition and reinforcement of forces.

3. Summary. Chapter IV discussed joint intelligence doctrine by focusing on the individual activities involved in the intelligence cycle. Afterwards, guidelines for collection and integration were presented and discussed.

CHAPTER V

INTELLIGENCE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

1. Introduction. This chapter deals with how intelligence activities are integrated so that the commander and others are given the strongest possible support. Guidelines for strong intelligence support are presented and discussed.

2. Role of Intelligence in the Commander's Decisionmaking

a. The Threat and the Environment. The primary purpose of intelligence organizations is to provide the commander with quality intelligence information about the enemy essential to his making sound military decisions. The commander must be informed of the composition, capabilities, and intentions of the enemy and the enemy's probable courses of action. In addition, the commander needs to know how geography, weather, and climate will affect military operations. He must know the enemy's center of gravity, strength, location, disposition, reinforcement and sustainment capacity, combat efficiency, command and control, and vulnerabilities.

(1) CINC Strategic Estimate. The Combatant Commander's strategic estimate leads to the development of specific courses of action to attain the objectives required by the National Command Authorities. The CINC strategic estimate begins with a review from both a global and regional perspective of the applicable national security strategy, national military strategy and other national or coalition considerations. Characteristics of the area where operations will be conducted are then reviewed along with estimates of logistics, C3, and personnel and the implications of those operations on other CINC areas of operations in order to develop a strategic concept for operations (a broad statement of a course of action). After a review of the military, diplomatic, economic and sociopsychological dimensions, the CINC's staff develops possible specific courses of action and compares each with the threat or situation it is required to address. Recommendations for specific courses of action are then presented to the CINC for decision. See Joint Pub 3-0 for additional information.

(2) The Commander's Estimate. The commander's estimate of the situation is a logical process by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting a military situation and arrives at a decision on a course of action to accomplish a mission. There is a detailed discussion of this formal process contained in the Joint Operational Planning System (JOPS/JOPEs). (Joint Pubs 5-02.1 and 5-02.4) These publications include the format for the Commander's Estimate and the Staff Estimate.

(3) The Intelligence Staff Estimate. A key component of the Commander's Estimate is the Intelligence Staff Estimate. The intelligence estimate is an appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, based on available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. It also provides information about the impacts of weather, climate, and geography on friendly and enemy activities. The intelligence estimate differs from other staff estimates in that it evaluates probable or potential enemy courses of action. It also addresses intelligence capabilities to support each friendly course of action.

(4) Update and Revision. The intelligence estimate must be dynamic. The situation is constantly changing, as are the intelligence needs of the commander. The J-2 must be flexible and attuned to the situation and to planned and ongoing operations. There should be a continuous dialogue among the entire staff.

b. Quality Intelligence Support for Decisionmaking. Joint intelligence within the framework of the processes of the intelligence cycle is discussed in Chapter IV. The J-2 must understand the overall situation in order to determine, direct, and coordinate intelligence support for the commander's objectives and plan. Clearly the simple interpretation of the intelligence cycle presented earlier, where activities follow each other sequentially, serves only as a conceptual framework. No rudimentary concepts, rules, or operating procedures will suffice as a simple interpretation of the intelligence cycle would suggest. For joint operations the J-2 needs to help the commander and his staff develop a sophisticated understanding of the adversary so the commander can (1) develop and refine his estimate of the situation, (2)

determine his objectives, and (3) accurately and completely identify intelligence information requirements. The J-2 must then determine, plan, and direct intelligence collection and production efforts to maximize the command's probability of attaining its objectives. Providing good intelligence also depends on experience, judgment, and thorough preparation.

3. Guidelines for Integrating Intelligence into the Commander's Decisionmaking Process. Commanders should have the best possible understanding of the situation, including the enemy's capabilities and intentions or probable courses of action. This understanding is best achieved through a single intelligence authority, the J-2.

a. A major guideline for integrating intelligence into operations is to ensure that good communication exists between the operations, plans, intelligence, and communications staffs. The four staffs share responsibility for this communication.

b. Another major guideline is to ensure that interaction between operations and intelligence begins at the earliest stages, i.e., when joint force objectives are being conceived or refined. Additionally, the best intelligence support is achieved when the coordination between intelligence and operations continues throughout the planning process; constant interaction and feedback between intelligence and operations personnel are critical to achieving focused intelligence support and ultimately contribute to mission success.

c. In support of these major principles, a number of additional supporting guidelines can be delineated. First, the Services must have interoperable intelligence systems and use a common language. Another is to have well thought out and tested joint doctrine. Third, frequent realistic joint training and exercises should be conducted because they minimize communications difficulties, maximize understanding of the situation faced by operations and intelligence personnel, and orient personnel toward actual operating environments. Under such conditions, personnel gain valuable experience and institutional problems become apparent and can be corrected. Joint intelligence doctrine should be used as an aid in assessing whether exercise objectives are appropriate and whether exercises are being effectively planned and conducted.

d. Finally, good intelligence support for operations is obtained when a well defined liaison program is conceived and implemented. This liaison is so important that only highly qualified and experienced personnel should be considered for these jobs.

Chapter VI INTELLIGENCE FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

1. Introduction. When the United States has common political or strategic objectives with allied nations, some situations may require their force and resource capabilities acting in concert as a single and seamless force or as one operable system against an adversary. Other situations may require that nations be readily seen as capable of combined operations in order to deter hostilities.

2. No Single Doctrine. There can be no single intelligence doctrine for combined operations. Each coalition or alliance must develop its own doctrine. However, there are principles and concepts that provide an initial position for developing combined doctrines and that will be helpful in identifying the objectives and nature of combined doctrines.

3. Joint and Combined Doctrine Relationship. There are close analogies between joint and combined doctrines that stem from similar needs--to present an adversary a seamless force and for a unity of effort of multiple force elements. Many of the principles, issues, and answers to joint operations will be the same or similar for combined operations. For combined doctrines, differences in cultural and national perspectives must be understood in order to adapt doctrines or forge new ones. Whenever nations' forces should be integrated or act in concert, the concept of Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability (RSI) should be understood and considered.

4. Combined Intelligence Principles. Most of the principles of intelligence apply equally to combined operations and to joint operations. The principles below are offered as additional considerations for building intelligence doctrine for combined operations.

a. Adjust National Differences. A key to effective combined intelligence is a readiness, beginning with the highest levels of command, to make adjustments to national concepts for intelligence support that may be required to make the combined action effective. Areas that may need to be addressed include: designating a single director of intelligence activities and adjusting those intelligence support differences that may affect the integrated employment of intelligence resources and the sharing of information. With these things done, successful intelligence support rests in the vision, the

leadership, the skill, and the judgment of the command and staff groups.

b. Unity of Effort Against Common Threat. Intelligence officers of each nation need to view the threat from multinational as well as national perspectives. When the alliance is constituted against a common adversary, a threat to one element of a coalition force by the common adversary should be considered a threat to all elements of the coalition.

c. Determining and Planning Intelligence. The combined command and national forces' intelligence requirements, production, and use should be agreed, planned, tested, and replanned well in advance of operations. For anticipated situation and operations, a prime objective should be attaining compatibility of intelligence and operating concepts, intelligence systems, intelligence-related communications, language and terms, and intelligence services and products. Solutions to problems should be developed and tried before they are required for actual combined operations so that doctrines and procedures are not left to a trial and error methodology during combat. Illustrations of combined doctrine development and testing can be found in the concepts and exercise programs of NATO and the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command.

d. Special Arrangements. Special arrangements unique to coalitions and alliances should be considered for developing, communicating, and using intelligence information when there are differences in nations' culture, language and terminology, organizations, and structures, operating and intelligence concepts, methodologies, and/or equipment.

e. Full Exchange of Intelligence--Sharing

(1) Intelligence information. The nations should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence information about the situations and adversary to attain the best possible common understanding of threatened interests, to determine relevant and attainable objectives, and to achieve unified efforts against the adversary. The methodology for exchanging intelligence information should be conceived and exercised well before operations begin. The exchange must be monitored and, when necessary, adapted during operations to meet better understood or changed circumstances.

(2) Sources and Methods. Sharing of intelligence sources and methods, to include cooperative intelligence production, may help attain the common objectives of the alliance members. For example, in 1942-43, the British and Americans integrated their capabilities to collect German naval communications and shared the information. This sharing of intelligence sources and methods along with intelligence information contributed significantly to winning the Battle of the Atlantic.* However, when intelligence sources and methods cannot be shared among alliance nations, then the intelligence information should be provided after it is "sanitized" by effectively separating the information from the sources and methods used to obtain it.

(3) Deterrence. There may be situations when it is advantageous to share both intelligence information and its sources and methods with an enemy to deter him from action. The consequence of enemy miscalculation may be so grave that it is necessary to ensure the enemy understands his preparations for attack (or other action) will be detected and his actions can be countered. Such decisions, of course, must be made at the highest levels of government.

f. Complementary Intelligence Operations: Intelligence efforts of the nations should be complementary. Because each nation will have intelligence system strengths and limitations, or unique and valuable capabilities, the sum of intelligence resources and capabilities of the nations should be available for application to the whole of the intelligence problem.

g. Combined Intelligence Center. When there is a combined command, a combined intelligence center should be considered so that the combined commander, his Chief of Intelligence (C-2), and their staffs have the capability and facility for developing intelligence requirements statements, and for the acquisition and fusion of the nations' intelligence contributions.

* Based on intelligence from combined signals exploitation of German naval communications, from May 1942 through May 1943, 105 of 174 North Atlantic convoys were routed clear of U-Boat patrols and were not intercepted. Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelligence (Doubleday & Co., Inc., New York, 1978), pages 191-2.

h. Liaison Exchange. Intelligence liaison among commands and among supporting and supported organizations should be used to bridge the understanding between cultures, languages, terms, doctrines, and methodologies and operational intelligence requirements.

APPENDIX A
REFERENCES

National

EO 12333	United States Intelligence Activities, December 4, 1981
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Department of Defense

DOD 3305.2	DOD General Intelligence Training
DOD 5105.21	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD 5105.29	Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT) Activities
DOD 5105.32	Defense Attache System
DOD 5105.40	Defense Mapping Agency
DOD C-5230.23	Intelligence Disclosure Policy
DOD 5240.1	DOD Intelligence Activities
DOD 5240.2	DOD Counterintelligence Activities

Defense Intelligence Agency

DIA Manual 57-1	General Intelligence Production
DIA Manual 57-6	DOD Indications and Warning System
DIA Manual 58-1	Defense Intelligence Collection
DIA Manual 58-5	Imagery Requirements
DIA Manual 58-7	Time Sensitive Requirements Coordination and Management
DIA Manual 58-8	Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Requirements
DIA Manual 58-13	The Department of Defense HUMINT Management System
DIA Manual 58-17	Defense Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Requirements Manual

DIA Manual 59-1	Intelligence Dissemination/ Reference Services
DIA Reg 24-11	General Intelligence Training System
DIA APP-2600-3139-YR	Capabilities Handbook
DIA DC-2600-6062-88	Concept of Operations DIA Collection Requirements Management Program

Joint

AFSC Pub 5	Intelligence for Joint Forces
Joint Manual 146-84	DOD Collection Requirements Management Architecture
Joint Pub 0-2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
Joint Pub 1-01	Joint Publication System--Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program
Joint Pub 1-02	Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
Joint Pub 3-0	Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations
Joint Pub 5-02.1	Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) Volume I (Deliberate Planning Procedures)
Joint Pub 5-02.2	Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) Volume II (Supplementary Planning Guidance)
Joint Pub 5-02.3	Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) Volume III (ADP Support)
Joint Pub 5-02.4	Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) Volume IV (Crisis Action Procedures)
MJCS 111-88	Concept of SIGINT Support to Military Commanders

Department of the Army

AIMP	Army Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Target Acquisition Master Plan
FM-8-10-8	Medical Intelligence in a Theater of Operations
FM 34-1	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
FM 34-2	Collection Management
FM 34-3	Intelligence Analysis
FM 34-10	Division Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
FM 34-25	Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
FM 34-30	Military Intelligence Company
FM 34-35	Armored Cavalry Regiment Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
FM 34-37	Echelons above Corps (EAC) Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
FM 34-60	Counterintelligence
FM 100-5	Operations
FC 34-130	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
FC 34-125	Military Intelligence (MI) Company and MI Battalion Counterintelligence (EAC)

Department of the Navy

NWP 1	Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy
NWP 5	Naval Cryptologic Operations
NWP 10-1	Composite Warfare Commander's Manual
NWP 10-2	Strike Operations Against Land Targets
NWP 11	Naval Operational Planning

NWP 12-9	Naval Tactical Intelligence
FMFM 2-1	Intelligence
FMFM 3-23	Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare

Department of the Air Force

AFM 1-1	Basic Aerospace Doctrine
AFR 200-1	Air Force Intelligence Missions and Responsibilities
AFR 200-15	Air Force Intelligence Functional Doctrine
- - -	Air Force Intelligence Plan

Joint Pub 2-0
30 June 1991

Joint Pub 2-0
30 June 1991

GLOSSARY
PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACINT	- acoustical intelligence
ADP	- automated data processing
AO	- area of operations
AOI	- area of interest
AOIR	- area of intelligence responsibility
AOR	- area of responsibility
C3CM	- command, control, communications countermeasures
C3	- command, control, and communications systems
C3I	- command, control, communications, and intelligence systems
CI	- counterintelligence
CINC	- Commander-in-Chief
COMINT	- communications intelligence
ECM	- electronic countermeasures
EEFI	- essential elements of friendly information
EI	- essential elements of information
ELINT	- electronic intelligence
FISINT	- foreign instrumentation signals intelligence
GDIP	- general defense intelligence program
HUMINT	- human resource intelligence
I&W	- indications and warning
IMINT	- imagery intelligence
IPB	- intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IRINT	- infra-red intelligence
ITAC	- Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (Army)
JCS	- Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIC	- joint intelligence center
JILE	- joint intelligence liaison elements
JOPEs	- joint operation planning and execution system
JOPS	- joint operation planning system
JSPS	- joint strategic planning system
JTF	- joint task force
JTTP	- joint tactics, techniques and procedures
LASINT	- laser intelligence

MASINT	- measurement and signature intelligence
MC&G	- mapping, charting and geodesy
MSIC	- Missile and Space Intelligence Center (Army)
NAVINTCOM	- Naval Intelligence Command
NSA	- National Security Agency
NUCINT	- nuclear intelligence
OPINT	- optical intelligence
OPLAN	- operation plan
OPSEC	- operations security
OSD	- Office of the Secretary of Defense
PHOTINT	- photographic intelligence
RADINT	- radar intelligence
RINT	- unintentional radiation intelligence
RSI	- rationalization, standardization, and interoperability
SIGINT	- signals intelligence
UNAAF	- Unified Action Armed Forces (Joint Pub 0-2)
UTM	- universal transverse mercator

PART II--DEFINITIONS*

all-source intelligence. 1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, including, most frequently, HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, SIGINT, and open source data, in the production of finished intelligence. 2. In intelligence collection, a phrase which indicates that in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting systems and resources are identified for possible use and those most capable are tasked.

area of intelligence responsibility. An area allocated to a commander, in which he is responsible for the provision of intelligence, within the means at his disposal. (Joint Pub 1-02)

collection management. Encompasses those activities that result in the effective and efficient employment of collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting resources for the satisfaction of national and tactical intelligence needs. It entails the entire process of translating a user's request for intelligence into data collection, processing, exploitation and reporting activities. It consists of two major components: collection requirements management and collection operations management.

collection operations management. The authoritative development and control of collection, processing, exploitation, and/or reporting requirements that normally result in either the direct tasking of assets over which the collection manager has authority or the generation of single-discipline tasking requests to collection management authorities at a higher, lower, or lateral echelon to accomplish the collection mission.

collection requirements management - The authoritative development and control of collection, processing, exploitation, and/or reporting requirements which normally result in either the direct tasking of assets over which the

* Unless identified as extracted from Joint Pub 1-02, terminology herein is not standardized within the Department of Defense and is applicable only in the context of this document.

** Upon final approval of this publication, this term will be included in Joint Pub 1-02.

collection manager has authority, or the generation of single-discipline tasking requests to collection management authorities at a higher, lower, or lateral echelon to accomplish the collection mission.

combat intelligence. That knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command, control, and communications countermeasures. The integrated use of operations security, military deception, jamming, and physical destruction, supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C3 capabilities and to protect friendly C3 against such actions. Also called C3CM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

commander's estimate of the situation. A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander's estimate which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions, is called a commander's long-range estimate of the situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

communications intelligence. Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. Also called COMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

concept of intelligence operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a J-2's assumption or intent in regard to intelligence support of an operation or series of operations. The concept of intelligence operations, which complements the commander's concept of operations, is contained in the intelligence annex of operation plans. The concept of intelligence operations is designed to give an overall picture of intelligence support for joint operations. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose.

contingency plan. A plan for major contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of the command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. 1. Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations, or by individuals engaged in espionage,

sabotage, subversion or terrorism. (Joint Pub 1-02)

2. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs. (Executive Order 12333)

counterintelligence operations. See Director of Central Intelligence Directive 5/1, 19 December 1984, and annex to "Agreement Governing the Conduct of Defense Department Counterintelligence Activities in Conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation," 5 April 1979 (classified).

data base. Information that is normally structured and indexed for user access and review. Data bases may exist in the form of physical files (folders, documents, etc.) or formatted automated data processing system data files.

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

defense intelligence functional manager. A senior level (general/flag officer or SES) manager designated by the Joint Staff J-2, responsible for integrating all activities of a functional area (for example, imagery, ADP or communications, HUMINT) across the entire defense intelligence community.

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. See also combined doctrine; joint doctrine; multi-Service doctrine. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronics intelligence. Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. Also called ELINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

estimate. 1. An analysis of a foreign situation, development, or trend that identifies its major elements, interprets the significance, and appraises the future possibilities and the prospective results of the various actions that may be taken. 2. An appraisal of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential courses of action of a foreign nation or combination of nations in consequence of a specific national plan, policy, decision, or contemplated course of action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

estimative intelligence. A category of intelligence that attempts to project probable future foreign courses of action and developments and their implications for US interests.

finished intelligence. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.

foreign intelligence. Information relating to capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities. See intelligence. (Executive Order 12333)

general military intelligence. Intelligence information and/or finished intelligence concerning the (1) military capabilities of foreign countries and/or organizations or (2) topics affecting potential U.S./allied military operations, relating to the following subjects: armed forces capabilities, including order of battle, organization, training, tactics, doctrine, strategy, and other factors bearing on military strength and effectiveness; area and terrain intelligence, including urban areas, coasts and landing beaches, and medical, meteorological, oceanographic, and geological intelligence; transportation in all modes; military materiel production and support industries; military and civilian C3 systems; military economics, including foreign military assistance; insurgency and terrorism; military-political and/or sociological intelligence; location, identification, and description of military-related installations; government control; escape and evasion; and threats and forecasts. (Excludes scientific and technical intelligence.)

human resources intelligence. The intelligence information derived from the intelligence collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection instrument. Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

imagery intelligence. Intelligence information derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar, wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices or other media. Also called IMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence.** 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. (JCS Pub 1-02) 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.

intelligence discipline. A well defined area of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. There are five major disciplines: HUMINT, IMINT, CI, MASINT, and SIGINT (ELINT, FISINT and COMINT).

intelligence estimate. The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence operations. The phrase "intelligence operations" connotes the variety of intelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations or activities. Predominantly, it refers to either intelligence collection or intelligence production activities. When used in the context of intelligence collection activities, intelligence operations refer to collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting of information. When used in the context of intelligence production activities, it refers to collation, integration, interpretation, and analysis, leading to the dissemination of a finished product.

intelligence preparation of the battlefield. An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield builds an extensive data base for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The data base is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Also called IPB.

intelligence requirement. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for collection or information, or the production of intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

interoperability. (DOD, NATO) 1. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (DOD) 2. The condition achieved among communications-

electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See also combined doctrine; joint; multi-Service doctrine. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force which is composed of significant elements of the Army, Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise unified command or operational control over joint forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint intelligence doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the preparation of intelligence and the subsequent provision of intelligence to support military forces of two or more Services employed in coordinated action.

low intensity conflict. Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. Also called LIC.

mapping, charting, and geodesy. Maps, charts, and other data are used for military planning, operations, and training. These products and data support air, land, and sea navigation, weapon system guidance, target positioning, and other military activities. These data are presented in the forms of topographic, planimetric, imaged, or thematic maps and graphics; nautical and aeronautical charts and publications; and in digital formats. Also called MC&G.

Measurement and signature intelligence.** Scientific and technical intelligence information obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for

the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter, or sender and to identify, define, or measure the source or its signature. Also called MASINT. (Will replace current Joint Pub 1-02 definition.)

operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic or operational objectives in a theater of war or in a theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. Operational art translates theater strategy into operational and, ultimately, tactical action. No specific level of command is solely concerned with operational art. (Joint Pub 3-0)

operational continuum. The general states of peacetime competition, conflict, and war within which various types of military operations and activities are conducted. (Joint Pub 3-0)

operational intelligence.** Intelligence required for determining, planning, executing, and evaluating the effects of all types of operations. (Will replace current Joint Pub 1-02 definition.)

operation plan. A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation "plan" is usually used instead of "order" in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operational order. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rationalization. Any action that increases the effectiveness of allied forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the alliance. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher alliance needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support or improved interoperability, and grater cooperation. Rationalization applies to both weapons/material resources and non-weapons military matters. (Joint Pub 1-02).

rationalization, standardization, and interoperability. The concept of increasing the effectiveness of forces by unifying and integrating joint or combined commands, staffs, forces, organizations, or functions by applying sound doctrine and methodologies, terminology and equipment; and by using

systems, units or forces. Also called RSI. (See also Joint Pub 1-02 definitions of "rationalization," "standardization," and "interoperability.")

signals intelligence.** 1. A category of intelligence information comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. Also called SIGINT. (JCS Pub 1-02)
2. Intelligence information derived from communications (COMINT), electronics (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals (FISINT).

situation assessment. Produced by combining military geography, weather, and threat data to provide a comprehensive projection of the situation for the decisionmaker.

standardization. The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of:
a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic intelligence. Intelligence that is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical intelligence - Intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Tactical and strategic intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Targeting.** 1. The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)
2. The analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander's mission, his objectives, and the capabilities at his disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling,

or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy. (Adds second definition to current definition in Joint Pub 1-02)

validation. A process normally associated with the collection of intelligence information that provides official status to an identified requirement and confirms that the requirement is appropriate for a given collector and has not been previously satisfied.

war. Sustained armed conflict between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular and irregular forces in a series of connected battles and campaigns to achieve vital national objectives. War may be limited, with some self-imposed restraints on resources or objectives. Or, it may be general with the total resources of a nation or nations employed and the national survival of a belligerent at stake. (Joint Pub 3-0)