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NEWS RELEASE

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

May 21, 1992

PENTAGON ADOPTS COMBAT COVERAGE PRINCIPLES

The Defense Department today officially adopted new principles for battlefield coverage of the US military in combat.

The action follows eight months of discussions between the Pentagon and the news media on ways to improve combat coverage in the future. The sessions led to a consensus on nine principles that should guide future reporting from a battle zone. "I have directed that those nine principles be made part of Defense Department policy. They have now been formally incorporated into our directives," Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said in announcing the action.

"Both the military and the news media need to work together on such an important issue. I'm pleased that our discussions have resulted in a set of principles that will help us both do our jobs better in the future," said Pete Williams, the Pentagon spokesman, who represented the Defense Department at the discussions.

"The military has taken on the task of improving what it must provide to journalists. The Pentagon is developing new doctrine on the equipping and staffing of military units to prepare them to accommodate reporters on the battlefield. The military services are adding new courses to their schools, and field combat exercises now include training on working with journalists," Williams said.

While the Pentagon and the news media agreed on nine principles for combat coverage, they could not agree on a news media proposal for a tenth principle barring review of news material.

"The military believes it must retain the option to review news material, to avoid the inadvertent inclusion in news reports of information that would endanger troop safety or the success of a military mission. Any review system would be imposed only when operational security was a consideration," Williams said.

Williams also praised Stanley Cloud of Time magazine, Michael Getler of the Washington Post, Clark Hoyt of Knight-Ridder Newspapers, George Watson of ABC News, and Jonathan Wolman of the Associated Press, who represented the news media in the discussions.

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STATEMENT OF DOD PRINCIPLES FOR NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF DOD OPERATIONS

1. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.
2. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity -- within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.
3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.
4. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.
5. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.
6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.
7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.
8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.
9. These principles will apply as well to the operations of the standing DoD National Media Pool system.

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD GROUND RULES

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

- (1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multibattalion," "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."
- (2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.
- (3) Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Locations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.
- (4) Rules of engagement details.
- (5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.
- (6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.
- (7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.
- (8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.
- (9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.
- (10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.
- (11) Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.
- (12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night Operations -- Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news value of the photograph, film or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

(1) Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.

(2) In the event of hostilities, pool products will be the subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed materials to JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter's news organization.

(3) Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.

Remarks by Pete Williams
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
New York Bar Association
November 4, 1991

I've read the paper by the Committee on Civil Rights, which is a valuable contribution to the public debate about the Pentagon press policies during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I had first seen it when it was the subject of discussion at the ABA House of Delegates meeting in Atlanta in August.

The paper is a dispatch from the battlefield -- the one marked by combat between the Pentagon and the press. But what concerns me is that the paper reduces the concerns of the real battlefield, the one where combat takes place between US and enemy forces.

But before I get into the point and counter point, I want to review for a moment the press arrangements the military came up with in the Persian Gulf.

First, I think it must be noted that the military released an unprecedented amount of information while the operation was going on. The military offered two briefings a day in Saudi Arabia and one at the Pentagon. We released casualty information every day. We even released, at the request of news organizations, the videotape out of the gun cameras mounted inside the bomber airplanes.

Even so I realize the point in which this forum is most interested is the arrangements made for battlefield reporting of the operation by the press.

Last August, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, US forces began to arrive in Saudi Arabia. But there were no western reporters there. While the Saudi government studied whether to grant visas to journalists, they agreed to accept a pool of US reporters if the US military could get them in. So we activated the DOD National Media Pool on August 12th, because there was no other way to get western reporters into Saudi Arabia.

This point is often overlooked -- indeed, I read no reference to it in the paper by the Committee on Civil Rights: the first reporters to cover the operation got there only because we persuaded the Saudis to let them in as part of a pool. Once they were there, the number of reporters continued to grow.

We persuaded the Saudis to grant more visas. We intervened on behalf of the American television networks to obtain Saudi permission for them to bring in satellite transmitters. And as Mr. Apple can tell you, we responded to a concern of news organizations that they wouldn't have enough people on hand in the event of hostilities. We arranged a special military transport plane to carry in more journalists when the air war began.

During Desert Shield -- from August until the air war began in January -- reporters visited ships at sea, air bases, Marines up north, and soldiers training in the desert. They went aboard AWACS radar warning planes. They quoted generals who said their forces were ready and privates who said they were not.

There were stories about helicopter pilots crashing into the

sand, because they couldn't judge distances in the flat desert light. And reporters described the remarkable speed with which the US military moved so many men and women to the Gulf with so much of their equipment.

But the number of journalists, and their editors and support personnel, continued to grow throughout the fall and winter months. As we planned for the prospect of hostilities, it was clear that some kind of pool system would be required.

When the air war began in mid-January, reporters in pools were on an aircraft carrier in the Red Sea, where they saw the launching of the first air strikes. They were onboard a battleship in the Persian Gulf that fired the first cruise missiles ever used in combat. And they were on Saudi air force bases where US and coalition fighter planes and bombers were taking off around the clock.

Once the ground combat started, American units moved quickly -- some of them by air. To cover the conflict, reporters had to be part of a unit, able to move with it. Each commander had an assigned number of vehicles with only so many seats. You can't cover an airborne division by driving along so far behind it that you never see it.

While commanders could take care of the reporters they knew were coming, they could not have been expected to keep absorbing those who arrived on their own, unexpectedly, in their own rented four wheel drives -- assuming they could even find the units that moved out west and up north once the war started. And unlike the military that fought in World War Two or Vietnam, today's US

military fights at night, moving at speeds and covering distances unimaginable in both those previous conflicts.

By the time the ground war began, 131 reporters and photographers were out with the Army and Marines on the battlefield. There were reporters with every division and a few others at the two Army corps headquarters.

The pool system allowed us to tell the divisional commanders how many reporters they must accommodate. And the reporters in these pools were allowed to stay with the military units they covered, learning as much as they could about the unit's plans and tactics.

The civil rights committee paper traces the origin of pools to Grenada and says pooling has no deeper roots in our heritage. But of course, that ignores the military's pool arrangement for the major set piece battle of World War Two -- the D-Day landings at Normandy. Just 27 US reporters covered the landing, and not all of them were on the first wave. Reporters did not cover every element of the invasion force.

The four major still photography concerns covering World War Two -- AP, Acme, INS, and Life -- did their wartime work in a pool.

Pools in wartime are nothing new.

For all its drawbacks, the Persian Gulf pool system achieved three objectives: it put journalists on the battlefield and in place when the fighting started, it guaranteed that Americans at home got reports from the scene of the action, and it allowed the

military to accommodate a reasonable number of journalists without overwhelming the units that were fighting the enemy.

Part of the problem that drove us to use pools was the sheer number of journalists to accommodate. Richard Harwood, the Washington Post's ombudsman put it best when he said, "the communications industry, well-endowed financially, dispatched far too many people to cover the war."

As someone who works for the government, I can't decide who goes to cover the war and who doesn't. Maybe it's too much to expect as competitive an institution as the press to limit its numbers in a war, especially when local papers want to provide coverage to the hometowns where the troops come from. But it is a serious questions which news organizations need to address.

And what if reporters had been free to roam the battlefield at will? How many of them would have been killed? I raise that question not to make a rhetorical point. The United States lost 35 of its own troops to friendly fire. On that vast unmarked desert, allied troops sometimes had trouble telling where the line was separating them from the enemy. We mistakenly shot 31 of our own tanks and troop carriers. What if our tank crews also had to watch out for jeeps carrying reporters?

Several bureau chiefs told me last fall that in planning for war coverage, the security of reporters was their concern, not mine. The civil rights committee paper calls this concern "paternalistic." But I couldn't ignore that even if I wanted to.

After the cease fire, a group of US reporters decided to

cross the line from Kuwait into Iraq. They were captured by Iraqi troops. And while they were held, four news industry executives wrote to the President, saying that no US forces should withdraw from Iraq until the issue of the journalists was resolved.

The issue was raised by the US government -- with the Iraqi representative in Washington, with its ambassador at the U-N, with Soviet officials, with the International Red Cross and at two meetings between US and Iraqi military officers in the Gulf.

We thank God they were set free.

But news organizations must drop the pretense that the safety of journalists isn't the government's concern. The Civil Rights Committee may not think it is. But the actions of news organizations send a different message.

Whatever else the press arrangements in the Persian Gulf may have been, they were a good faith effort on the part of the military to be as fair as possible to the large number of reporters on the scene. They were a good faith effort to get as many reporters as possible out with troops during a highly mobile, modern ground war. And they were a good faith effort to allow as much freedom in reporting as possible, while still preventing the enemy from knowing what we were up to.

This was, after all, an enemy that had virtually as much access to American news reporting as people had here at home.

Once the war was over, Mr. Alter was the first to articulate one of the biggest concerns of the press. "With its quick win," he wrote, "the Pentagon will surely try to repeat its press

policy the next time."

Earlier this year, 17 prominent national news organizations jointed in writing a letter to Secretary Cheney about the pool arrangements used in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They said this: "It is imperative that the Gulf War not serve as a model for future coverage."

Secretary Cheney met with a representative group of the signers of that letter several weeks ago and reassured them that the Gulf rules will not be a blueprint. He said the press arrangements in the Gulf were dictated by the nature of that military operation. And he said whenever the next one happens, it will undoubtedly be different.

At that same meeting, Secretary Cheney also agreed that the Defense Department should work with news organizations on ways to improve combat coverage in the future. I'm now meeting with a group of Washington bureau chiefs on a set of ten principles to guide the military and the news media in the future.

We're making progress, and I'm optimistic that we'll develop a list acceptable to the Pentagon and to journalists. I hope we will. We are trying to resolve a difficult problem.

News organizations feel strongly that stories written and pictures taken on the battlefield should not be subject to military review before they are released. They argue that instead, the military should develop a clear set of reporting guildines intended to protect US forces and military operations. And, they say, if a reporter violates the rules, the military's recourse is to suspend the reporter's press credentials and expel

the reporter from the combat zone.

Journalists will tell you that this is an extraordinary concession for them to make. After all, they don't give their consent to ground rules for reporting on Congress or the Supreme Court.

But military commanders rightly question the comparability of the kind of arrangement now under discussion between the press and the Pentagon. Those commanders have a duty -- a legal obligation, in fact -- to safeguard the success of a military operation and the lives of their troops. They understand that reporters don't want to jeopardize either.

But what of a reporter who inadvertently reports something that seems innocuous but turns out to be of great value to an enemy? An operation might be compromised. Soldiers could conceivably be at risk. Once a story goes out, it can't be recalled. The commanders ask, where is the parity, when the military's only response would be to pull that reporter's press pass?

What both the news media and the military want most of all is a system they can both trust. We'd have no problem if all reporters were like Ernie Pyle and all commanders were like Dwight Eisenhower. But they're not. Not all reporters go to the battlefield with the background and experience they need to cover combat. Not all commanders understand the needs of the press.

I think the point was understood by Arthur Lubow, writing earlier this year in the New Republic. He said this, "Mutual mistrust is part of the shared heritage of soldiers and

journalists in time of war. So is mutual accommodation."

That is what we all seek, both the Pentagon and the press. We will find it by continued discussion. Forums like this can help. But as the paper of the civil rights committee itself notes, there's no decided case directly addressing military restrictions on combat reporting. The answer to this problem won't be found in case law.

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View From the Pentagon

PENTAGON, From D1

Another part of the reason for the military's high credibility, of course, is that Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney and Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made the decision that we would say only what we knew to be true. We were careful not to get ahead of our successes. We waited for initial field reports to be confirmed.

Washington loves to talk about spin control. This was the first government operation I know of that had euphoria control.

The least loved aspect of coverage arrangements in the gulf was undoubtedly the press pools—groups of reporters who represent the rest of their colleagues and file stories for all, rather than just for their own news organizations. But it was just such a pool that got the first reporters to the scene.

Following Iraq's Aug. 2 invasion of Kuwait, U.S. forces began to arrive a few days after Cheney's meeting with King Fahd in Saudi Arabia. While the Saudi government studied whether to grant visas to journalists, they agreed to accept a small number of reporters if the U.S. military could get them in. So we activated the Department of Defense National Media Pool, to ensure initial coverage of the U.S. buildup. At the time, there was no other way to get Western reporters into Saudi Arabia. The number of journalists grew to nearly 800 by December. Those reporters filed their stories independently, directly to their own news organizations.

After the president in mid-November announced a further buildup in U.S. forces, to give the coalition a true offensive option, the Department of Defense began working on a plan that would allow reporters to cover combat while maintaining the operational security necessary to ensure tactical surprise and save American lives.

News organizations worried last fall that they would not have enough staff in the Persian Gulf to cover hostilities. They did not know how the Saudi government would respond to their request for more visas. They couldn't predict what restrictions might be imposed on commercial air traffic in the event of a war, and they asked us for a military plane to bring in journalistic reinforcements. We

complied. A U.S. Air Force C-141 cargo plane left Andrews Air Force base on Jan. 17, the morning after the bombing began, with 128 news people aboard.

In formulating the ground rules and guidelines for covering Operation Desert Storm, we looked at the rules developed in 1942 for World War II, at those handed down by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's chief of staff for the reporters who covered the D-Day landings, and at the ground rules established by Gen. Douglas MacArthur for covering the Korean War. And we carefully studied the rules drawn up for covering the war in Vietnam. The ground rules were not intended to prevent journalists from reporting on incidents that might embarrass the military or to make military operations look sanitized. Instead, they were intended simply and solely to prevent publication of details that could jeopardize a military operation or endanger the lives of U.S. troops.

Some of the things that were not to be reported were:

- Details of future operations;
- Specific information about troop strengths or locations;
- Specific information on missing or downed airplanes or ships while search and rescue operations were underway; and
- Information on operational weaknesses that could be used against U.S. forces.

Reporters understand the reasoning behind these ground rules. Of all the aspects of the coverage plan for the war in the Persian Gulf, they were the least controversial.

The least understood was probably the system for copy review.

Reporters covering World War II wrote their stories and submitted them to a military censor. The censors cut out anything they felt broke the rules and sent the stories on. The decision of the censor was final. There was no such system of censorship in Operation Desert Storm. There was, instead, a procedure that allowed us to appeal to news organizations when we thought material in their stories would violate the ground rules. But unlike a system of censorship, the gulf rules left the final decision to publish or broadcast in the hands of journalists, not the military.

While the pools were in existence, 1,351 print pool reports were written. Of those, only five were submitted for our review in Washington. Four of them were cleared within a few hours. The fifth sto-



ry dealt in considerable detail with the methods of intelligence operations in the field. We called the reporter's editor-in-chief, and he agreed that the story should be changed to protect sensitive intelligence procedures. This aspect of the coverage plan also worked well.

As the number of troops in the desert grew, so did the number of reporters, rising to over 1,600 on the eve of the ground war. With hundreds of fiercely independent reporters seeking to join up with combat units, we concluded we'd have no choice but to rely on pools once the combat war started.

Before the air phase of the operation began in January, news organizations were afraid that we wouldn't get the pools out to see anything. But we did. Reporters were on an aircraft carrier in the Red Sea to witness the launching of the first air strikes, aboard a battleship in the Persian Gulf that fired the first cruise missiles ever used in combat, at the air bases where fighter planes and bombers were taking off around the clock, and with several ground units in the desert. Those early days were not without problems. For example, the first stories written about the stealth fighters were sent all the way back to the F-117's home base in Nevada to be cleared.

Now that the war is over and Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf has described the plan, it's clear why the press arrangements for the ground phase of the campaign weren't like those in World War II.

This was not an operation in which reporters could ride around in jeeps going from one part of the front to another, or like Vietnam where reporters could hop a helicopter to specific points of action.

American ground units moved quickly—some of them by air. To cover the conflict, reporters had to be part of a unit, able to move with it. Each commander had an assigned number of vehicles with only so many seats. While he could take care of the reporters he knew were coming, he could not have been expected to keep absorbing those who arrived on their own, unexpectedly, in their own rented four-wheel drives—assuming they could even find the units out west once the war started.

Nonetheless, by the time the ground war began, 132 reporters and photographers were out with the Army and Marines on the ground. Reporters were out with every division, and 27 more were on ships at sea or on air bases. The ground war wasn't like Vietnam, either, with minor skirmishes here and there and a major offensive every now and then. It was, as the world now knows, a set piece operation, with divisions from the Army and Navy moving quickly, supported by Air Force and Navy planes, and all of it carefully orchestrated.

In this sense, it was like something from a previous war—D-Day. Back then, 461 reporters were signed up at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, to cover the Normandy invasion. But of that number, only 27 U.S. reporters actually went ashore with the first wave of forces.

Now that it's just about over, it's time to look back. There are clearly some things we could have done better. Here are some preliminary observations:

We could have done a better job of helping journalists in the field. Judging from what I've heard from the reporters who went out in the pools, we had some outstanding escorts. But we must improve that process.

Escort officers shouldn't throw themselves in front of the camera when one of the troops utters a forbidden word. We need to teach public affairs personnel how to do their jobs so that reporters won't feel their interview subjects are intimidated.

Our first obligation is to get reporters out with the action, so that journalists are eyewitnesses to history. I've seen some excellent examples of that—some of Molly Moore's stories on the Marines for The Post, for example.

But we must do better at getting stories back to the press center. Some units did

well, using computer modems and tactical telephone fax machines. Others didn't do so well. I've heard from reporters who said their stories were delayed for several days. While delivery problems would have existed whether the press worked in pools or not, we need to do better.

But part of the problem was the sheer number of journalists to accommodate. Richard Harwood, The Post's ombudsman, raised this issue in his column last weekend when he said, "The communications industry, well-endowed financially, dispatched far too many people to cover the war."

The government cannot decide who goes to cover the war and who doesn't. Maybe it's too much to expect as competitive an institution as the press to limit its numbers in a war, especially when local papers want to provide coverage to the hometowns where the troops come from. But it's worth raising.

Several bureau chiefs told me last fall that in planning for war coverage, the security of reporters was their concern, not mine. But that's not realistic, because we couldn't ignore that even if we wanted to. It's not morally possible.

When a group of U.S. journalists was captured in Iraq after the cease-fire, four news industry executives wrote to the president, saying that no U.S. forces should withdraw from Iraq until the issue of the journalists was resolved. The issue was raised by the U.S. government with the Iraqis, and we succeeded in securing their release. Everyone is relieved they were freed. But we must drop the pretense that the safety of journalists isn't the government's concern.

Whatever else the press arrangements in the Persian Gulf may have been, they were a good-faith effort on the part of the military to be as fair as possible to the large number of reporters on the scene, to get as many reporters as possible out with troops during a highly mobile, modern ground war, and to allow as much freedom in reporting as possible, while still preventing the enemy from knowing what we were up to.

This was, after all, an enemy that had virtually as much access to American news reporting as people had here at home. From what we've been able to learn so far, Iraqi military commanders didn't have a clue as to which coalition forces were out there, where they were, or what they were up to. They appear to have been caught totally off guard by the quick move of the 18th Airborne Corps west of Kuwait, deep into Iraq. For the sake of the operation and the lives of the troops, we could not afford to let the enemy learn that.

View From the Newsroom

PRESS, From D1

tol the military, did a better job controlling the press than the press did carrying out its crucial, cranky function in a democracy.

The Pentagon and the U.S. Army Central Command conducted what is probably the most thorough and sophisticated wartime control of American reporters in modern times—what they could see, who they could talk to, where they could go, what they could tell the public and when they could tell it—a collection of restrictions that in its totality and mindset seems to go beyond World War II, Korea and Vietnam.

Because it all happened so fast and ended so happily, the implications of the Pentagon's victory over the press may not seem apparent or important. But had the war gone on longer or less well, the chances are that these restrictions would have been used to control and delay even more what the public knew about the fighting. The Pentagon has devised a system that tends to produce "good news"—and the Iraqis turned out to be a "good news" kind of enemy. But if allowed to stand as a model, the Desert Storm system runs the risk of seriously distorting reality for some uncertain time if the next war is a lot tougher.

There were many elements of the Pentagon's plan to control the press. They were there from the start of serious planning by the Defense Department last fall. These include:

■ **Censorship by delay.** Perhaps the crucial restriction turned out to be what the Pentagon calls "security review" and what the press called censorship. The issue, as it turned out, was not really censorship. Correspondents told of many instances of foolish military attempts to delete material that had nothing to do with real security—earthy language or embarrassing scenes. Yet there seems to have been relatively little else removed from reporter's copy.

Indeed, this tends to back up the point that news executives repeatedly tried to make to the Pentagon: that reporters will agree to and abide by sensible ground rules about what not to report without the need for field censorship, a system that worked essentially flawlessly in Vietnam. Barry Zorthian, the former U.S. Mission spokesman in Saigon, has said there were only four or five violations of security—some unintentional—by some 2,000 journalists over a five-year period.

What security review did do, however, is force reporters to turn their stories into their military murders in the field for review and transmission back to the military press headquarters in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Reporters totally lost control over their dispatches and the military gained the extraordinary power to delay transmission of news for unspecified amounts of time.

It is impossible to say for sure what happened to every dispatch or what every newspaper or network experienced. But the overwhelming evidence is that virtually all of these dispatches, or "pool" reports, were delayed because of tampering or various other reasons somewhere along the line by

the military, at best one day but far more frequently by two or three days. Reporters who had risked their lives, along with soldiers, to ride through minefields and be exposed to Iraqi fire, and who thought they had sent their material on its way to readers or viewers, were almost always disappointed.

There were undoubtedly occasions where public affairs officers tried their best and where bad weather meant that helicopters that might have speeded the movement of stories could not fly. But the fact is the Army should not have been in the business of reviewing and transmitting stories and pictures.

"They don't know how to transmit copy just like I don't know how to drive a tank," said The Post's veteran foreign and war correspondent, Ed Cody. Military officers have no incentive to rush back a story that they may not like, or to bug a senior officer to move it faster than a 20-hour "pony express" drive by truck, or to use the electronic means available to them.

The military refused to permit pool reporters accompanying troops to take their own vehicles, usually rented Land Rovers, or suitcase-sized satellite telephones out into the field. The phones could have given reporters direct access to their news desks.

New York Times reporter Philip Shenon, with U.S. armored forces, told the Associated Press his military hosts took 72 hours to transmit his stories, and that when reporters volunteered to go to a nearby Saudi telephone to file them, "we were given the ludicrous argument that we couldn't leave the base because there was a terrorist threat. They were supposed to help us file our story, but there seemed to be every desire to hinder us in getting the work out," Shenon said.

Contrast these delays with coverage of World War II. On June 7, 1944, within hours of the invasion of France, UPI reported "some of the first American assault troops storming the French beaches went down under a withering German crossfire . . . They swarmed ashore over the bodies of their dead until they established a foothold . . . At one point Nazi machine guns wiped out some of the first troops as soon as their landing craft swung open."

There is, in my view, zero probability that that kind of accurate, timely and dramatic reporting would have been allowed to have been transmitted without serious delay by the presslords of Desert Storm.

Fortunately, there were no such scenes to describe this time. But there were also no accounts of the relatively few combat engagements of the war that reached here until the military either wanted them to, or the system got around to moving them, and that usually meant days late—in many cases, not until the war was over. There were few if any pictures transmitted during the fighting of wounded or dead GIs and very few of what must be thousands of dead Iraqis. There were only the fuzziest, delayed accounts of death by friendly fire of U.S. and British ground troops, perhaps understandably, perhaps also to let the bad stuff dissipate before it became public. Pool reporters were kept away from the first significant ground clash at Khafji, while



PETER HOEY—THE WASHINGTON POST

briefers played down the role of U.S. Marines and played up the role of Saudi and Qatari forces.

■ **Death by briefing.** The ground war, while it was underway, was described primarily by military briefers in the Pentagon and Saudi Arabia, which is what the Pentagon wanted all along; for them, not the pools or the press, to control the flow of news. The quality of the daily briefings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, led to what one reporter described as "death by briefing."

Those televised briefings helped the Pentagon's general press strategy in other ways. Reporters who regularly cover military matters generally know what to ask. A war, however, brings everyone into the briefing room and the briefers know it. So a lot of people get called on who may appear to a television audience to be ill-informed and pushy and that helps feed the view that those at the podium know best about what the public should know.

When the commanding presence of Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin L. Powell or Desert Storm Commander H. Norman Schwarzkopf were added for good measure, the questioners didn't have a chance on the public relations meter.

Until it was clear that the enemy was routed, the ground war was presented in "much the same antiseptic way as the air war, in which videotapes of highly accurate smart-bomb strikes were shown to the public while repeated requests by reporters to go on raids or talk to crews of B-52s, which carry huge loads of less accurate bombs, were never acted upon.

■ **Blacking out the ugly parts.** As in Grenada and Panama, that first, potentially ugliest look at warfare, is what the Pentagon doesn't want anyone to see until it is on its way to doing what it wants to do.

When the ground campaign began, the first thing Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney did publicly was to announce a news blackout, which is known to have annoyed some U.S. generals in the field and which didn't seem to bother the British or French, whose reporters seemed to be getting more real-time information than were the Americans.

The Pentagon then partially relaxed its blackout within 12 hours so that Schwarz-

kopf could proclaim a "dramatic success" in the early going.

■ **Leakproof pools.** The other central element of the Pentagon's press control plan was the "pool" system itself, in which eventually about 150 reporters, cameramen and technicians out of more than 1,400 in Saudi Arabia at the time, were sent out in small groups with the armed forces to report back to their colleagues and the nation at large.

Contrary to some accounts, the pool system for Desert Storm was not signed out by news executives of the major media organizations. It was a Defense Department plan, aspects of which drew consistent complaints from news executives in each of its variations.

The pool system originally grew out of a recommendation of the 1984 commission headed by retired general Winant Sidle that was meant to deal with press complaints of exclusion from covering the 1983 invasion of Grenada. Sidle recommended the pool approach to give reporters assured access at the start of conflict, proposing that the pool remain in place "for the minimum time possible" before switching to full press coverage, and that the Pentagon rely on "voluntary compliance" by the press with security guidelines established by the military.

But in the invasion of Panama in 1989, the press pool was still kept away from the start of the conflict, and Desert Storm further violated Sidle's principles both by the crucial demand for field censorship and by keeping the pool system in place throughout the war.

The first published guidelines news executives saw in mid-December provided for something called Phase III, which meant that at some point open—or what the military called "unilateral"—coverage would begin. But Phase III, presumably on orders of Schwarzkopf's Central Command—which seemed to run everything including the civilian Defense officials in Washington—was dropped from the final guidelines.

Other aspects of the ground rules, in my view, also showed the Command's determination to place unprecedented restrictions on how the war would be reported.

Early on, Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams allowed that reporters who went to the field on their own and happened to hook up with pools could join that pool. But the final guidelines said "news media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals."

Reporters had to have escorts with them at all times and at one point CENTCOM tried to make sure that all interviews were on the record, both measures meant to deny reporters' freedom of movement and to ensure that whoever is interviewed doesn't say anything out of line. The military decided where they could go and who could talk to them—another form of censorship.

There is indeed an unavoidable tension between the military and the press simply because their roles in our society are so different. Yet the fact is that many commanders, field grade officers and soldiers like having reporters around because they like to have their story told too,

their courage and their part of the drama recorded.

The pool system is not without some merit. In a vast operation such as Desert Storm, with massive and swift movements of armor, hundreds of warplanes flying from Navy carriers and Saudi air bases, pools can provide a broader picture than we otherwise might get, certainly at the kickoff. But when, as in the case of Desert Storm, the system becomes a method of total control over what gets reported and when, that should be unacceptable for the news media—and untenable as well for the public when the news isn't good.

Some of the best coverage of the war came from those who bucked the pool system. One of those, and one of the newest reporters on the Desert Storm beat, was retired Army Col. David Hackworth, this country's most decorated living veteran.

Writing in Newsweek, Hackworth said as a reporter he had more freedom than a commander, "but I was very unhappy with the military's paranoia and their thought police who control the press. Although I managed to go out on my own, we didn't have the freedom of movement to make an independent assessment of what the military is all about. Everything was spoon-fed. We were like animals in a zoo, and the press officers were the zookeepers who threw us a piece of meat occasionally.

"I had more guns pointed at me," Hackworth added, "by Americans and Saudis who were into controlling the press than in all my years of actual combat."

Hackworth also had some critical things to say about the press, some of whom he called "irresponsible and unprepared" and who used the "power of the press for their own little trip."

Indeed, Desert Storm and its aftermath confront the press with many tough questions. Should a newspaper or network decide not to take part in pools anymore to force the Pentagon to change the system? News organizations, by their nature, are competitive, don't work together. Nor should they. So how will they pressure the Department of Defense?

How would they have covered Desert Storm without the pool system? This newspaper sent six reporters and a photographer to the war theater, not to mention correspondents in surrounding countries. Will we and other big organizations each send 10 the next time, each with a leased Land Rover and \$50,000 satellite phone, and tell them it's okay to drive across a vast, mined desert? And what will smaller papers do?

Who should control the sheer numbers of reporters, cameramen and technicians that flock to a war zone? Bitter cat fights emerged in Saudi Arabia among organizations trying desperately to land the few places on pools, something military press officers undoubtedly enjoyed watching. Major news organizations with millions of readers and viewers—who invested lots of money in sending as many reporters as possible to the region right from the start and who are rich in military or Arab world specialists—naturally want the spots. But who is to say the reporter from a small paper in Missouri with a Guard unit in the war zone cannot go?

There are ways to do it better than Desert Storm.

Ed Cody summed it up succinctly. "Don't just take us along. Leave us alone."

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The Baghdad Story

BAGHDAD, From D1

Upon my arrival in Baghdad on the eve of war I saw a repeat of what happened during the fall of Saigon. Reporters were bailing out for various reasons. I watched with wonder as this rich journalistic prize fell into fewer and fewer hands. Four days after the war began, only 17 journalists remained from the hundreds who had covered Baghdad.

Everybody out, the Iraqis said, except CNN. Even CNN isn't sure why they made that decision. Perhaps it is because CNN alone is seen globally. What the Iraqis told us is that they had found our coverage since August to have been "fair."

Eventually, there was only me; the growing intensity of the war made the continued presence of a CNN producer and technician dangerously superfluous. Also at the Al Rashid Hotel was a Palestinian team that provided a flow of videotape sent overnight to Amman, Jordan.

My means of communication was the INMARSAT phone, a suitcase-sized link with the world that I'd drag out each evening and aim at the heavens, while dialing into the International Desk at CNN Atlanta. At my end, we crouched in the chill of the evening, "we" being myself and at least one Iraqi censor, or "minder" as these censors came to be called. I prepared a simple, two-minute script that the minder approved, and that I then read into the phone.

But from the first day I established a procedure that I believe saved my credibility and made my presence in Baghdad a valuable one. That procedure was a question-and-answer routine between the CNN anchor of the hour and myself that followed each prepared script. The Iraqis were uncomfortable with it from the beginning because they could control neither the questions nor my answers.

The only rule I followed in these Q&A sessions was that I would not

discuss matters of military security. Thus I didn't talk about the Scud missiles I'd seen barreling northwards on camouflaged trucks; I didn't mention the antiaircraft weapons on buildings around the Al Rashid Hotel and I gave no details on military targets.

But that left a gray area of social change, of city life, of political and economic insights that I could glean from the daily trips we were permitted to make under supervision in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq.

Why did the Iraqis allow these Q&A sessions? I told them from the beginning that I was risking my life in Baghdad, but I was not prepared to risk my credibility. I accepted the limitations of military security, I said, but I needed the freedom to better explore the phenomenon of being in a capital at war.

Our arguments were long and sometimes heated. I sometimes had my bags half-packed to leave. But my views prevailed and the Q&As continued right up to my last broadcast, when I talked about finally being ordered out of Baghdad.

Several of my stories were the subject of controversy in the West too. My coverage of a number of bombing incidents in Baghdad, were, I have learned, the subject of debate. In time, I will address those and other stories.

But perhaps the most curious circumstances surrounding any story I did in Baghdad involved my interview with Saddam Hussein, conducted in the second week of the war. The promise of such an interview had kept Bernard Shaw in Baghdad during the war's opening days, and CNN president Tom Johnson had been urging me to pursue it.

I emphasized to officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and information the need for a coherent explanation of Iraqi policy at this stage of the war. We had been dependent on the patriotic tirades of Radio Baghdad, echoed in the daily press, for a sense of government direction.

Late one afternoon in one of the darkened recesses of the Al Rashid lobby, I was told I had an "important" interview. I presumed it was with the information minister, Latif Jassim, until five burly young men in suits and ties escorted me to a room on the second floor, asked me to undress completely, and began checking every pocket and seam of my clothing. My wallet, watch, pen and notebook, handkerchief and comb were put into a plastic bag and taken away. They were even reluctant to return my trouser belt until I objected.

Now fully dressed, I was taken into the bathroom and my hands were immersed in a disinfectant carried by one of the group. This was either an extreme form of security, or else, I mused, Saddam Hussein has a Howard Hughes-like phobia of germs. Then I was escorted back to the lobby, and instructed neither to talk to nor touch anyone.

As I waited in the gloom, my CNN colleagues arrived after a three-day overland trip from Amman with a portable satellite video transmitter and tons of other gear. As they joyfully descended on me, I had to shout, "Don't touch me!" When they later phoned CNN's international editor Eason Jordan and told him what had happened, he told them that maybe I was angry that they were late.

I was taken to a late model, black BMW and sat alone in the back seat as the driver crossed the July 14 Bridge and drove into the darkened city. It soon became clear he was checking to see if he was being followed, taking elaborate maneuvers to throw off any possible pursuer, rounding traffic circles three and four times, weaving in and out of poor neighborhoods.

After an hour of driving, we pulled up at a comfortable bungalow on a prosperous looking street where all the houses looked the same. A single attendant came to the car and took me inside. The living room had been transformed into a makeshift presidential suite, with brocade chairs, official seals and three Iraqi Television cameras—all brightly lit by power from a humming generator. Saddam's closest aides were there—his chief of



Tom Johnson for the Washington Post

staff, a nervous, obsequious young man; his personal secretary, who sported a halpice; his young interpreter, who was familiar from the 16 previous TV interviews Saddam had given the Western press.

While we waited for the president, the group discussed in English recent programming they'd seen on CNN monitors in government ministries in Baghdad, laughing at pictures they'd seen of me operating the satellite telephone in the garden of the hotel. Only the information minister knew my name. Saddam's secretary asked me to spell it twice before introducing me to the president when he arrived. Saddam shook my disinfected hand. I think that all he knew about me was that I was the man from CNN.

En route to the interview I resolved to be as tough in my questioning as the situation would allow. I was not intimidated by the prospect of encountering the man many had called "The Butcher of Baghdad." I figured he could do no worse to me than the constant bombing of Baghdad was threatening to do.

Saddam Hussein unsettled me initially when he appeared. I had expected him to be in uniform, but he wore a mohair topcoat over a well-tailored dark blue suit, set off with a fashionable flower-print tie. He made small talk by asking, through his interpreter, why I had stayed in Bag-

dad. I replied it had become a force of habit because this was my 17th war. He expressed the hope it would be the last I would have to cover, and asked if I had "a long list of questions" to present to him. I answered melodramatically that I intended to ask him the questions to which the world wanted answers. He smiled, nodded his head and invited me over to the cameras. "Let's go," he said.

I sat down opposite Saddam Hussein knowing this would be the most important interview of my life. I had not based my journalistic career on interviews, but over the years I'd undertaken a variety of them, from Fidel Castro to Yasser Arafat to Pham Van Dong. The day before I traveled to Baghdad, I had interviewed Israel's Yitzhak Shamir. He shook his head in disbelief when I told him some CNN staffers intended to remain in Baghdad through the January 15 deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. "They want to write books or something?" he wondered. At the time I was not aware of my own travel plans.

I knew the Saddam Hussein interview might shed important light on the course of the developing war. It might also have an impact on the course of my journalistic career if I didn't set the right tone. As I began my first question, I locked eyes with him, and stayed unblinking throughout. I was as undeterred as possible. From the corner of my eye I could see his aldea stiffening and muttering, but the president seemed relaxed and at the end thanked me for the conversation, posing with me for pictures which aldea sent over to the hotel a few days later.

After Saddam Hussein left the interview room, I had an argument over the videotape. There were three angles photographed by Iraqi TV cameras, and Saddam's secretary wanted to let me have them the following day. I wanted to take them with me immediately, because I was concerned that they might try to censor the material. We compromised; I would take delivery of the tapes within two hours at the hotel, dub them and return them to Iraqi TV.

We planned to transmit the inter-

view as our first video feed from Baghdad, and our two technicians struggled through the night to assemble the equipment. But by late morning, I discovered that the Iraqi officials had changed their minds about using the uplink for the interview. One told me, "the moment you start sending pictures of Saddam from here the Americans will bomb the satellite and the hotel."

This was the continuation of the argument over whether we should stay in the hotel at all. I had resisted initial attempts to move me to a "safe house" somewhere in the suburbs because there was no way I would give up the panoramic view of the air war from the hotel terraces. The government had also attempted to resist my use of the satellite phone to transmit daily reports in the earlier stages of the war. I argued successfully that the allies were more interested in hearing Saddam Hussein than in silencing him, and by late evening the first pictures were beaming to CNN headquarters in Atlanta—and I was praying that my confidence in the coalition's curiosity was not misplaced.

Because I am still on my way back to the United States, I have not seen enough of the commentary on CNN's coverage of the Gulf War to react to it. I know I have been criticized, and that many colleagues defended CNN's decision to allow me to stay in Baghdad. For that I am sincerely grateful. Later, in consultation with CNN, I intend to make a thorough examination of the criticism, and if necessary, a defense.

Criticism I accept—and expect. It's the labeling that angers me. For covering the Vietnam War the way we did, many of us were labeled "enemy sympathizers," if not communists. For being in Baghdad when I was, I was again labeled a sympathizer, if not a fascist.

I'd go anywhere for a story if there was enough viewer interest and CNN wanted coverage. I'd go to Hell itself for a story if someone important down there wanted to be interviewed. But then, the labelers would probably accuse I was down there because I was a fascist.

PENTAGON RULES ON MEDIA ACCESS TO THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
FEBRUARY 20, 1991

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PREFACE

POLICY OVERSIGHT MATERIALS

Operation Desert Shield

GROUND RULES—JANUARY 14, 1991

The following information should not be reported because its publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives:

(1) For U.S. or coalition units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies (e.g., artillery, tanks, radars, missiles, trucks, water), including amounts of ammunition or fuel moved by or on hand in support and combat units. Unit size may be described in general terms such as "company-size," "multibattalion," "multidivision," "naval task force," and "carrier battle group." Number or amount of equipment and supplies may be described in general terms such as "large," "small," or "many."

(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or cancelled operations.

(3) Information, photography, and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. Nations may be described as follows: all Navy embark stories can identify the ship upon which embarked as a dateline and will state that the report is coming from the "Persian Gulf," "Red Sea," or "North Arabian Sea." Stories written in Saudi Arabia may be datelined "Eastern Saudi Arabia," "Near the Kuwaiti border," etc. For specific countries outside Saudi Arabia, stories will state that the report is coming from the Persian Gulf region unless that country has acknowledged its participation.

(4) Rules of engagement details.

(5) Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, methods, and results.

(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational security or lives. This would include unit designations, names of operations, and size of friendly forces involved, until released by CENTCOM.

(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.

(8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures.

(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway.

(10) Special operations forces' methods, unique equipment or tactics.

(11) Specific operating methods and tactics, (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, or naval tactics and evasive maneuvers). General terms such as "low" or "fast" may be used.

(12) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against U.S. forces, such as details of major battle damage or major personnel losses of specific U.S. or coalition units, until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the enemy and is, therefore, released by CENTCOM. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

GUIDELINES FOR NEWS MEDIA—JANUARY 14, 1991

News media personnel must carry and support any personal and professional gear they take with them, including protective cases for professional equipment, batteries, cables, converters, etc.

Night Operations—Light discipline restrictions will be followed. The only approved light source is a flashlight with a red lens. No visible light source, including flash or television lights, will be used when operating with forces at night unless specifically approved by the on-scene commander.

Because of host-nation requirements, you must stay with your public affairs escort while on Saudi bases. At other U.S. tactical or field locations and encampments, a public affairs escort may be required because of security, safety, and mission requirements as determined by the host commander.

Casualty information, because of concern of the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By executive directive, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by a uniformed member of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which the next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through the news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media casualty photographs showing a recognizable face, name tag, or other identifying feature or item should not be used before the next of kin have been notified. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause far outweighs the news

value of the photograph, film or videotape. News coverage of casualties in medical centers will be in strict compliance with the instructions of doctors and medical officials.

To the extent that individuals in the news media seek access to the U.S. area of operation, the following rule applies: Prior to or upon commencement of hostilities, media pools will be established to provide initial combat coverage of U.S. forces. U.S. news media personnel present in Saudi Arabia will be given the opportunity to join CENTCOM media pools, providing they agree to pool their products. News media personnel who are not members of the official CENTCOM media pools will not be permitted into forward areas. Reporters are strongly discouraged from attempting to link up on their own with combat units. U.S. commanders will maintain extremely tight security throughout the operational area and will exclude from the area of operation all unauthorized individuals.

For news media personnel participating in designated CENTCOM Media Pools:

(1) Upon registering with the JIB, news media should contact their respective pool coordinator for an explanation of pool operations.

(2) In the event of hostilities, pool products will be the subject to review before release to determine if they contain sensitive information about military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities (see attached ground rules) that would jeopardize

ize the outcome of an operation or the safety of U.S. or coalition forces. Material will be examined solely for its conformance to the attached ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer on scene will review pool reports, discuss ground rule problems with the reporter, and in the limited circumstances when no agreement can be reached with a reporter about disputed materials, immediately send the disputed mate-

rials to JIB Dhahran for review by the Director and the appropriate news media representative. If no agreement can be reached, the issue will be immediately forwarded to OASD(PA) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication will be made by the originating reporter's news organization.

(3) Correspondents may not carry a personal weapon.

CENTCOM POOL MEMBERSHIP AND OPERATING PROCEDURES—JANUARY 30, 1991

General

The following procedures pertain to the CENTCOM news media pool concept for providing news to the widest possible American audience during the initial stages of U.S. military activities in the Arabian Gulf area. The CENTCOM pools will be drawn from news media within Saudi Arabia. Their composition and operation should not be confused with that of the Department of Defense National Media Pool. The pools are a cooperative arrangement designed to balance the media's desire for unilateral coverage with the logistics realities of the military operation, which make it impossible for every media representative to cover every activity of his or her choice, and with CENTCOM's responsibility to maintain operational security, protect the safety of the troops, and prevent interference with military operations. There is no intention to discriminate among media representatives on the basis of reporting content or viewpoint. Favoritism or disparate treatment of the media in pool operations by pool coordinators will not be tolerated. The purpose and intention of the pool concept is to get media representatives to and from the scene of military action, to get their reports back to the Joint Information Bureau-Dhahran for filing—rapidly and safely, and to permit unilateral media coverage of combat and combat-related activity as soon as possible. There will be two types of pools: eighteen-member pools for ground combat operations and smaller, seven-member pools for ground combat and other coverage. Pools will be formed and governed by the media organizations that are qualified to participate and will be administered through pool appointed coordinators working in conjunction with the JIB-Dhahran. The media will operate under the ground rules issued by CENTCOM on January 15, 1991.

Pool participation

Due to logistics and space limitations, participation in the pools will be limited to media that principally serve the American public and that have had a long-term presence covering Department of Defense military operations, except for pool positions specifically designated as "Saudi" or "international." Pool positions will be divided among the following categories of media: television, radio, wire service, news magazine, newspaper, pencil, photo, Saudi, and international. Media that do not principally serve the American public are qualified to participate in the CENTCOM media pool in the international category.

Pool procedures

Because of the extensive media presence in the Arabian Gulf, the fact that some media organizations are represented by many individuals, and the likelihood that more organizations and individuals will arrive in the future, membership in all categories except pencil will be by organization rather than specific individual. An organization will be eligible to participate in pool activities only after being a member of the appropriate media pool category for three continuous weeks. Members of a single-medium pool may use their discretion to allow participation by organizations which have had a significant stay in country, but which have had breaks in their stay that would otherwise cause them to be ineligible to participate under the three-continuous-weeks rule.

The single-medium pools will be formed and governed by the members. The members of each category will appoint a pool coordinator who will serve as the spokesperson and single point of contact for that medium. The print media will select a coordinator who will serve as the point of contact for the pencil cat-

egory. Any disputes about membership in or operation of the pool shall be resolved by the pool coordinator.

Each single-medium pool coordinator will maintain a current list of members and a waiting list prioritized in the order in which they should be placed on the pools. The same order will be used to replace pool members during normal rotations and those individual members who return from the field prematurely and who do not have another individual in Dhahran from their organization to replace them.

Membership of standing pools will rotate approximately every two to three weeks as the situation permits.

Pool categories and composition:

Television: The television category will be open to the major television networks.

Radio: The radio category will be open to those radio networks that serve a general (nonprivate) listening audience.

Wire Service: The wire service category will be open to the major wire services.

News Magazine: The news magazine category will be open to those major national news magazines that serve a general news function.

Newspaper: The newspaper category will be divided into two subcategories for participation in the eighteen-member pools. One will be open to those major papers and newspaper groups that have made a commitment since the early stages of Operation Desert Shield to cover U.S. military activities in Saudi Arabia and which have had a continuous or near-continuous presence in Saudi Arabia since the early stages of the operation, such as the *New York Times*, *Cox*, *Knight-Kidder*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Washington Post*, *USA Today*, and *Boston Globe*. The second category will include all other newspapers.

Pencil: The general category of "pencil" (print reporter) may be used by the print media pool coordinator in assigning print reporters to the smaller pools. All eligible print reporters may participate.

Photo: The photography category will be divided into the four subcategories of wire, newspaper, magazine, and photo agency. Participants may take part in only one subcategory.

Saudi: The Saudi category will be open to Saudi reporters as determined by the Saudi Ministry of Information liaison in the JIB-Dhahran. They must speak and write English and must file their reports in English.

International: The international category will be open to reporters from organizations which do not principally serve the American public from any news medium. They must speak and write English and must file their reports in English.

SHARING OF MEDIA PRODUCTS WITHIN THE CENTCOM POOLS

Pool participants and media organizations eligible to participate in the pools will share all media products within their medium; e.g., television products will be shared by all other television pool members and photo products will be shared with other photo pool members. The procedures for sharing those products and the operating expenses of the pool will be determined by the participants of each medium.

ALERT PROCEDURES FOR COMBAT CORRESPONDENT POOL ACTIVATION

When the pools are to be activated, the JIB-Dhahran director or his designated representative will call each of the pool coordinators and announce the activation of the pools. The pool co-

ordinators will be told when and where the pool members are to report (the reporting time will be within—but not later than—two hours of alert notification).

Operational security (OPSEC) considerations are of the utmost concern. JIB personnel, pool coordinators, and pool members need to be especially cognizant of OPSEC. All involved with the activation of the pools need to remain calm and unexcited. Voice inflection, nervous behavior, etc., are: all indi-

cators that something extraordinary is underway and could signal that operations are imminent.

Neither pool coordinators nor pool members will be told if the activation is an "exercise" or actual "alert".

Pool members should report to the predesignated assembly area dressed for deployment, with the appropriate equipment and supplies.

Recommendations for changes to pool membership or other procedures will be considered on a case-by-case basis.



Conduct of the Persian Gulf War

Final Report to Congress

***Pursuant to
Title V of The Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization
and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25)***

APPENDICES A - S

April 1992

APPENDIX S

MEDIA POLICY

"The first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile those sometimes diverse considerations."

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1944

INTRODUCTION

As in all previous American conflicts, the rules for news coverage of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were driven by the need to balance the requirements of operational security against the public's right to know about ongoing military operations. Department of Defense (DOD) policy calls for making available "timely and accurate information so the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy," withholding information "only when disclosure would adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces." The news media feel compelled to report as much information about current newsworthy events as possible.

The challenge to provide full news coverage of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm was complicated by several factors:

- The host nation, closed to western media before the operation began, was reluctant to permit reporters to enter the country and was concerned about reporting of cultural sensitivities.
- More than 1,600 news media representatives eventually massed in Saudi Arabia to report about the war.
- The combat actions of Operation Desert Storm used high technology, involved long-range weapons, and occurred on and over a distant, vast, open desert and from ships operating in adjacent bodies of water.
- The combined armor and airmobile attacks and drives through Kuwait and Iraq were rapid.

- This was the first major American war to be covered by news media able to broadcast reports instantaneously to the world, including the enemy.

From the beginning of the crisis, DOD worked closely with Central Command (CENTCOM), the Joint Staff (JS), the Services, and news media organizations to balance the media's needs with the military's ability to support them and its responsibility to preserve US combat forces' operational security. The goal was to provide as much information as possible to the American people without endangering the lives or missions of US military personnel.

When the *USS Independence* (CV 62) battle group arrived in the Gulf of Oman on 7 August and the first Air Force (USAF) F-15s landed on sovereign Saudi territory on 8 August, approximately one week after Iraq invaded Kuwait, there were no western reporters in the Kingdom. The US government urged the Saudi government to begin granting visas to US news organizations, so reporters could cover the US military's arrival. On 10 August, the Secretary of Defense called the Saudi ambassador to inquire about the progress for issuing visas. The ambassador said the Saudis were studying the question but agreed in the meantime to accept a pool of US reporters if the US military would arrange their transportation.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

National Media Pool

The DOD National Media Pool, formed in 1985, was alerted the same day. The pool enables reporters to cover the earliest possible US military action in a remote area where there is no other presence of the American news media, while still protecting the element of surprise – an essential part of operational security.

Starting with those initial 17 press pool members – representing Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, Cable News Network, National Public Radio, Time, Scripps-Howard, the Los Angeles Times, and the Milwaukee Journal – the number of reporters, editors, photographers, producers, and technicians grew to nearly 800 by December. Except during the first two weeks of the pool, those reporters all filed their stories independently, directly to their own news organizations.

Joint Information Bureau

To facilitate media coverage of US forces in Saudi Arabia, CENTCOM established a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) in Dhahran and, later, another in

Riyadh. Saudi Ministry of Information representatives also were located with the JIB in Dhahran, which let visiting media register with the Saudi government and the JIB at one location. The JIB coordinated with reporters and worked to arrange visits to units the reporters desired to cover. The Saudi government required that a US official escort reporters visiting Saudi bases. The CENTCOM Public Affairs Office (PAO) assumed this responsibility and provided escorts to facilitate coverage on Saudi bases and to US units on the ground and at sea and throughout the theater.

Media Concerns

One of the concerns of news organizations in the Pentagon press corps was that they did not have enough staff in the Persian Gulf to cover hostilities. Since they did not know how the Saudi government would respond to their requests for more visas, and since they couldn't predict what restrictions might be imposed on commercial air traffic in the event of a war, they asked the Pentagon to provide a military plane to take in a group of reporters to act as journalistic reinforcements. A USAF C-141 cargo plane left Andrews Air Force Base, MD, on 17 January, the morning after the bombing began, with 126 news media personnel on board. That plane left as offensive operations began, during the most intensive airlift since the Berlin blockade. The fact that senior military commanders dedicated one cargo airplane to the job of transporting another 126 journalists to Saudi Arabia demonstrated the military's commitment to take reporters to the scene of the action so they could get the story out to the American people.

The Pentagon worked closely with the CENTCOM PAO to determine how best to facilitate coverage of potential hostilities in the Persian Gulf. After several meetings at the Pentagon with military and civilian public affairs officials experienced in previous conflicts, and Pentagon press corps bureau chiefs, the Department published on 14 January a one-page list of ground rules and a one-page list of guidelines for the news media covering operations in the Gulf.

Media On The Battlefield

As early as October, it appeared hostilities in the region could result in a large, fast-moving, and deadly battle. The Pentagon sent a joint public affairs team to Saudi Arabia on 6 October to evaluate the public affairs aspects of hostile action and help CENTCOM prepare for media coverage of any such eventuality. The team was convinced that, given the size and distances involved, the probable speed of advance of US forces, the potential for the enemy to use chemical weapons, and the sheer violence of a large scale armor battle would make open coverage of a ground combat operation impractical, at least during its initial phase.

The team, therefore, recommended that pools of reporters be assigned to units to cover activity within those units. These reporters would stay with units to ensure they would be present with military forces at the beginning of any combat operations. Although the plan was initially rejected, the command ultimately implemented a similar plan calling for ground combat news media pools, all of which would be in place before the ground campaign began.

The second contentious issue was the requirement that in the event of hostilities, all pooled media products undergo a security review. Although most reporting from the theater had been unrestricted, the military was concerned that reporters might not realize the sensitivity of certain information and might inadvertently divulge details of military plans, capabilities, operations, or vulnerabilities that would jeopardize the outcome of an operation or the safety of US or other Coalition forces. The plan called for all pooled media material to be examined by the public affairs escort officer on scene solely for its conformance to the ground rules, not for its potential to express criticism or cause embarrassment. The public affairs escort officer would discuss ground rule problems he found with the reporter, and, if no agreement could be reached about the disputed material, it would be sent immediately to the JIB Dhahran for review by the JIB Director and the appropriate news media representative. If they could not agree, the issue would be elevated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) for review with the appropriate bureau chief. The ultimate decision on publication rested with the originating reporter's news organization, not the government or the military.

While the pools were in existence, only five of more than 1,300 print pool stories were appealed through the stages of the review process to Washington for resolution. Four of those were cleared in Washington within a few hours. The fifth story dealt in considerable detail with the methods of intelligence operations in the field. The reporter's editor-in-chief chose to change the story to protect sensitive intelligence procedures.

In addition to 27 reporters on ships and at air bases, when the ground offensive began, CENTCOM had 132 reporters in place with the US ground forces to cover their activity. This let reporters accompany every combat division into battle.

Although plans called for expeditious handling of pool reports, much of it moved far too slowly. The JIB Dhahran reviewed 343 pool reports filed during or immediately after the ground war and found approximately 21 percent arrived at the JIB in less than 12 hours, 69 percent arrived in less than two days, and 10 percent arrived in more than three days. Five reports, hampered either by weather or by poor transportation, arrived at the JIB more than six days after they were filed.

The press arrangements in Southwest Asia were a good faith effort on the part of the military to be as fair as possible to the large number of reporters on the scene, to get as many reporters as possible out with troops during a highly mobile, modern ground war, and to allow as much freedom in reporting as possible, while still preventing the enemy from knowing precisely the nature of Coalition plans.

An unanticipated problem, however, grew out of the security review issue. Reporters were upset with the presence of public affairs escort officers. Although it is a common practice for a public affairs officer to be present during interviews with military personnel, the fact the escort officer had the additional role of reviewing stories for conformance to ground rules led to the public affairs officer being perceived as an impediment. Normally the facilitators of interviews and the media's advocate, public affairs officers now were considered to be inhibiting the flow of information between the troops and the media.

Media Briefings

DOD and CENTCOM conducted extensive briefings on Operation Desert Storm. When the air campaign began, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs briefed the news media. Several hours later, during the morning of 17 January, the Commander-in-Chief, CENTCOM, and the CENTCOM Air Forces Commander conducted an extensive briefing in Riyadh. At the Pentagon, during the next 47 days, the JS Directors of Operations and Intelligence – two of the most knowledgeable officials about the operation – along with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs conducted 35 televised news briefings. Likewise, in Saudi Arabia, the command provided the Deputy Director of Operations for daily, televised briefings, and also provided background briefings at the news media's request. The command provided 98 briefings (53 on-the-record and 45 on background). Along with the news reports coming from reporters accompanying our forces in the field, these daily news briefings – conducted by the people responsible for planning and carrying out the operation – provided an unprecedented amount of information about the war to the American people.

OBSERVATIONS

Accomplishments

- DOD acted quickly to move reporters into place to cover the early stages of the American military buildup in Saudi Arabia, providing access for the first western reporters to the early stages of the operation. CENTCOM, in conjunction with DOD, established a pool system, enabling the news media to cover Operation Desert Storm through 159 reporters and photographers who were with combat units. In contrast, 27 reporters were with the D-Day invasion force in 1944 when the first wave of troops went ashore.
- The media pool system placed pool members in positions to witness actual combat or interview troops immediately after combat, as evidenced by the fact approximately 300 reports filed during the ground war were filed from forward deployed units on or near the front lines. Of that number, approximately 60 percent appeared to contain eyewitness accounts of the fighting.
- Pool members were permitted to interview front-line troops. Some 362 stories filed from the front included interviews with front-line troops.
- Frequent public briefings were conducted on details of the operation.

Shortcomings

- Command support for the public affairs effort was uneven. Some component commands were highly cooperative while others did not appear to place a priority on getting the story out. In some cases, this meant lack of communication and transportation assets or priorities to get stories back to the Dhahran JIB in a timely manner.
- Because of the scope and sensitive nature of much of the operational planning, a significant number of PAOs were not able to stay fully abreast of daily developments, nor were they trained to conduct security reviews of pool products. Many were therefore unable to judge operational security violations properly.
- The public affairs escort officers displayed a wide range of expertise in performing their duties. While many received praise from the media and unit commanders for having done excellent jobs, others, overzealously performing their duties, made mistakes which sometimes became news items. Occasional, isolated incidents, such as public affairs officers stepping in front of cameras to stop interviews, telling reporters they could not ask questions about certain subjects, and attempting to have some news media reports altered to eliminate

unfavorable information, were reported. Although these incidents were the exception, not the rule, they nonetheless frequently were highlighted in media reports.

Issue

- Media sources have voiced dissatisfaction with some press arrangements, especially with the media pools, the need for military escorts for the news media, and security review of media pool products. DOD is working with news media representatives on ways to improve news coverage of future US military combat operations.

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R.E. WILDERMUTH
CAPT, USN
22 MAY 1991

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MANNING PROPOSED IN REF A BASED ON EVENTUAL CONSOLIDATION OF MAIN-

JIS AND USCINCCENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (CCPA), PER MR. TAYLOR

OASD PA).

2. I&L SITUATION.

A. GENERAL. THIS PLAN PROVIDES SPECIFIC PA) TASKING AND

OVERALL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR IN-THEATER U. S. MILITARY PA

ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.

B. ENEMY. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS HOSTILE TO

THE ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN THIS PLAN CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONDUCT

SIGNIFICANT DISINFORMATION OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO DISTORT PUBLIC

PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE USG AND USCINCCENT. THESE

OPERATIONS CAN INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO: MISREPRESENTATION

OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY U. S. OFFICIALS, PLANTING INACCURATE DATA

WITH SELECTED MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES OR ORGANIZATIONS, AND OTHER

ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO ADVERSELY INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION IN CONUS

AND ABROAD.

C. FRIENDLY.

(1) OASD PA) WILL PROVIDE OVERALL PA) GUIDANCE AND COORDINATE PA

ACTIONS AFFECTING OTHER COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

AS APPROPRIATE.

(2) ASD PA) WILL ENSURE TIMELY NOTIFICATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF

THE DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL, IF ACTIVATED. ASD PA) WILL

COORDINATE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (DOS) TO OBTAIN HOST

GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR DOD NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOL AND WILL

ASSIST USCINCCENT PA) AS APPROPRIATE TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR

USCINCCENT REGIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOLS ENTRY INTO THE AREA OF

RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). DETAILED INFORMATION, SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS

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AND ITINERARIES FOR EACH POOL DEPLOYMENT WILL BE FORWARDED BY USCINCENT TO OASD-PAI FOR APPROVAL.

(1) RECEIPT OF INFORMATION AUTHORITY WILL ULTIMATELY BE DELEGATED BY MESSAGE TO USCINCENT. USCINCENT TWO JIB (JIB) AND OTHER COMMANDS DESIGNATED BY ADD-PAI AND USCINCENT-AS REQUIRED. UPON ACTIVATION OF THE JIBS.

(1) IAO (PAI) WILL ASSIST USCINCENT PA AS APPROPRIATE ON A CONTINUING BASIS DURING THIS OPERATION.

(2) THE U.S. INFORMATION SERVICE (UIS) REPRESENTATIVES AND THE PAOs IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSIES IN SAUDI ARABIA, QATAR, OMAN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, BAHRAIN AND OTHERS AS NEEDED, WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN IDENTIFYING HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES REGARDING PA POLICIES FOR THIS OPERATION. ADDITIONALLY, THESE REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY LOCALLY BASED U.S. MEDIA, PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING POLICIES REGARDING HOST-NATION MEDIA AND INTERFACE WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

(3) SUPPORTING UNIFIED COMMANDERS WILL COORDINATE IN ADVANCE WITH USCINCENT PROPOSED CHANGES TO PA GUIDANCE RELATING TO OPERATION DESERT SHIELD.

(4) US AMBASSADORS, USIA REPRESENTATIVES AND COMPONENT COMMANDERS WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF MILITARY PA ACTIONS AFFECTING THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH APPROPRIATE PA CHANNELS.

D. POLICY. USIPOLICY, IN THIS OPERATION, REQUIRES TAKING AN ACTIVE APPROACH TO INFORMING THE AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO DISSEMINATE ACCURATE, COMPLETE AND TIMELY INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC THROUGH THE NEWS MEDIA TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL SECURITY (OPSEC), PERSONNEL SAFETY AND HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES.

E. ASSUMPTIONS. THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS CAN BE MADE FOR PA PLANNING PURPOSES:

(1) THE ACTION DESCRIBED IN THIS PLAN IS OF EXTREMELY HIGH, WORLD-WIDE MEDIA INTEREST.

(2) THE DOD NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOL AND/OR REGIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOLS WILL BE ACTIVATED IN THE ACP CONSISTENT WITH HOST NATION SENSITIVITIES AND APPROVAL.

(3) STATEMENTS TO NEWS MEDIA AND/OR PUBLIC WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE.

(4) THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS) PA RESPONSE CELL WILL BE ACTIVATED TO ASSIST USCINCENT AND TO ADVISE THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY (NCA) OF THE PA ASPECTS OF THE OPERATION.

(5) THE MAIN JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU (JIB) WILL BE ACTIVATED IN RIYADH, S. A. IT WILL BE COLLOCATED WITH USCINCENT FORWARD. INITIALLY JIB WILL BE MANNED BY COL DON KIRCHOFFNER, USA; CAPT MIKE SHERMAN, USN; MAJ OLIN SAUNDERS, USA; CAPT KEVIN BAGGETT, USAF; AND CAPT TOM LAROCK, USAF. TEMPORARY COMMERCIAL PHONE NUMBER IS 811-966-1-478-1234.

(6) SUBORDINATE JIB WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT CJTFM AND MANNED BY LCDR RON MORSE, PHONE 811-973-736-413. AN ADDITIONAL SUBORDINATE JIB WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT DUBAI, UAE, WITH POTENTIAL JIBS AT ABU DHABI, UAE USIS OFFICE; USIS OFFICE MANAMA, BAHRAIN; AND OTHER LOCATIONS AS REQUIRED.

(7) MILITARY SUPPORT OF NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES (NMRS) WILL BE DEFINED (AW PARAGRAPHS 3. A. (1) (A) - (C), 3. A. -M, AND CJCS MSG REF E.

(8) ALL PA ACTIONS WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE DOD, JCS AND USCINCENT DIRECTIVES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY STATED OTHERWISE.

3. MISSION. USCINCENT, AS DIRECTED BY OASD-PAI, WILL EXECUTE AN ACTIVE PA PROGRAM THAT CONVEYS TO EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL AUDIENCES THE RESOLVE OF THE USG TO PROTECT ITS REGIONAL INTERESTS AND AFFORDS NMRS APPROPRIATE ACCESS TO UNCLASSIFIED, TIMELY AND ACCURATE ACCOUNTS OF U.S. OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, THE PROGRAM SEEKS TO ILLUSTRATE U.S. FORCES' ABILITIES TO DETER AND DEFEND, AND IF NECESSARY FIGHT AND DEFEAT ENEMY FORCES. THE FOLLOWING THEMES SHOULD BE STRESSED DURING MEDIA VISITS TO ALL UNITS:

A. U.S. FORCES ARE ONE PART OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE ASSEMBLED IN DEFENSE OF THREATS TO WORLDWIDE VITAL INTERESTS.

B. U.S. FORCES ARE PRESENT IN SAUDI ARABIA TO SET UP DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND THEN TO TRAIN AND WORK WITH THE SAUDI AND OTHER MILITARY UNITS, AS APPROPRIATE.

C. AMERICA DOES NOT SEEK CONFLICT, NOR DOES IT SEEK TO CHALLENGE THE

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DESTINY OF OTHER NATIONS, BUT AMERICA WILL STAND BY HER FRIENDS.
THE MISSION OF THE U. S. TROOPS IS WHOLLY DEFENSIVE.
O. U. S. TROOPS ARE NOT IN SAUDI ARABIA TO DRIVE THE IRAQIS OUT OF
KUWAIT. THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH THAT
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GOAL.

E. THIS IS A JOINT U. S. AND MULTI-NATIONAL EFFORT AS PERSONNEL
FROM ALL U. S. SERVICES, SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES ARE
ASSEMBLED PROVIDING THE EXPERTISE OF THEIR SERVICE TO THE COMMON
DEFENSE OF SAUDI ARABIA.

4. (U) EXECUTION

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. USCINCCENT, WITH THE GUIDANCE OF
OASD-DAI, WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL PA OPERATIONS OF USCINCCENT
HQRS SUPPORTING AND COMPONENT COMMANDS, AND OTHER PARTICIPATING
UNITS FOR THIS OPERATION. USCINCCENT WILL AUTHORIZE THE
USCINCCENT PAO TO CONDUCT ROUTINE PA MATTERS ON HIS BEHALF.
USCINCCENT PAO WILL PLAN, COORDINATE, AND DIRECT MILITARY PA
ACTIVITIES FOR THIS OPERATION. PA ACTIVITIES WILL BE CONDUCTED IN
COORDINATION WITH THE SENIOR DOD REPRESENTATIVES IN THE AREA.
SUPPORTING AND COMPONENT COMMANDS AND COMMANDERS OF PARTICIPATING
UNITS SHOULD PROVIDE PA PERSONNEL AUGMENTATION TO THE JIS/SUB-
JIS IN SUPPORT OF THE PA PLAN.

(I) NEWS MEDIA POOL OPERATIONS. IF THE DOD NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA
POOL OR A REGIONAL DOD NEWS MEDIA POOL ARE ON-SCENE, THEY WILL
RECEIVE, AT A MINIMUM, THE FOLLOWING CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
DIRECTED SUPPORT:

(A) DAILY, COMPREHENSIVE, AND UNCLASSIFIED OPERATIONAL BRIEFINGS.
(B) TO PERFORM ITS MISSION OF ENABLING POOL MEMBERS TO PROVIDE
IN-DEPTH COVERAGE OF THE EVENT, THE POOL REQUIRES ACCESS TO ACTUAL
AREAS OF COMBAT. THE MEDIA REALIZE AND ACCEPT THE ELEMENT OF RISK
INHERENT IN ACCOMPANYING MILITARY FORCES INTO COMBAT. THEIR
PERSONAL SAFETY IS NOT A REASON FOR EXCLUDING THEM FROM AN AREA OF
ON-GOING OPERATIONS. A REPORTER SHOULD BE TREATED AS A MEMBER OF
THE UNIT AND ALLOWED TO MOVE WITH IT. AT THE SAME TIME,
COMMANDERS MUST ENSURE THE UNARMED, UNTRAINED REPORTERS ARE NOT
RECKLESSLY PUT IN EXPOSED SITUATIONS. THEY MUST BE ALLOWED TO
COVER THE ACTION FROM POSITIONS OF REASONABLE SAFETY.

(C) REASONABLE ACCESS TO KEY COMMAND AND STAFF PERSONNEL. ALL
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THESE PERSONNEL WILL BE UNCLASSIFIED AND
ON THE RECORD.

(D) ONCE THEY HAVE RECEIVED THE ARRIVAL BRIEFING, POOL MEMBERS
SHOULD BE DEPLOYED IN SMALL ELEMENTS OF FROM ONE TO THREE PERSONS
THROUGHOUT THE COMBAT AREA IN ORDER TO PROVIDE BALANCED COVERAGE
OF OPERATIONS. ONCE THE POOL MEMBERS HAVE OBSERVED THE INITIAL
EVENT, THEY WILL NEED TO BE REASSEMBLED SO THEY CAN COMPARE NOTES
AND FILE A CONSOLIDATED POOL STORY. POOL MEMBERS SHOULD THEN BE
RETURNED TO THE OPERATIONAL AREA AND THIS CYCLE REPEATED AS OFTEN
AS NECESSARY UNTIL POOL OPERATIONS ARE TERMINATED. WHEN
CONSIDERING ACTIVITIES FOR THE MEDIA POOL TO COVER AND PLANNING
THEIR ITINERARY, IT IS ADVISABLE TO CONSULT WITH POOL MEMBERS. IF
WELL BRIEFED ON THE DAY'S OPERATIONAL EVENTS, THEY WILL PROBABLY
HAVE A GOOD IDEA OF THE TYPE OF COVERAGE THEY FEEL IS DESIRABLE.
MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY SHOULD BE BUILT INTO THE ITINERARY TO ALLOW
FOR POTENTIAL MINOR DELAYS. POOL ESCORTS SHOULD LOOK FOR TARGETS
OF OPPORTUNITY FOR ADDITIONAL COVERAGE, SUCH AS CIVILIAN EVACUEES,
DOD PERSONNEL, ETC.

(E) COOPERATION FROM ALL FORCES PARTICIPATING, ON A NOT-TO-
INTERFERE BASIS, IS ESSENTIAL.

(F) UPON ARRIVAL, THE POOL WILL BE MET BY THE UNIT COMMANDER OR
DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. THE COMMANDER OR DESIGNATED

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REPRESENTATIVE WILL GIVE THE POOL MEMBERS AN UPDATED OPERATIONAL BRIEFING. THE PA ESCORT OR JIB REPRESENTATIVE WILL GIVE THE POOL MEMBERS A PA BRIEFING ON COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES, BILLETING ARRANGEMENTS, TRANSPORTATION, AND THE ESCORT SYSTEM, ETC.

(J) NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES (NMRS).
 (K) NMRS WILL BE ESCORTED AT ALL TIMES, REPEAT AT ALL TIMES, BY PA STAFF MEMBERS OR OTHER MILITARY ESCORTS SUPPORTING THE PA STAFF. NMRS WILL NOT BE GRANTED ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED MATERIALS OR SECURE AREAS.

(L) AT NO TIME WILL NMRS BE OBTAINED OR THEIR FILM/EQUIPMENT/NOTES CONFISCATED.

(M) ALL INTERVIEWS WITH NMRS WILL BE "ON THE RECORD." ALL MEDIA REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH MILITARY PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION WILL BE COORDINATED THROUGH PA POOL ESCORTS, JIB PA PERSONNEL/SUB-JIB, USCINCCENT PAO OR DOD (PA) AS APPROPRIATE.

G. TASKS

(1) USCINCCENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER:

(A) ADVISE USCINCCENT ON ALL PA MATTERS FOR THIS OPERATION.

(B) SERVE AS THE ON-SCENE DOD PA REPRESENTATIVE, AS REQUIRED.

(C) ASSIST DOD TO OBTAIN HOST GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR ACCESS OF DOD NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOL AND PROVIDE MILITARY ESCORT SUPPORT TO NEWS MEDIA POOLS.

(D) COORDINATE PA ACTIVITIES WITH THE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE ON THE US COUNTRY TEAM, WHEN APPROPRIATE.

(E) IMPLEMENT PA POLICY GUIDANCE ISSUED BY USCINCCENT OR HIGHER AUTHORITY.

(F) AS APPROPRIATE, SUPERVISE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT INFORMATION BUREAU (JIB) OR SUBORDINATE JIBS, AS REQUIRED.

(G) CLEAR PROPOSED PAO, NEWS RELEASES AND AUDIOVISUAL RELEASES FROM ASSIGNED FORCES.

(H) DIRECT AND COORDINATE ON-SCENE PA EFFORTS, CONSISTENT WITH OASD- (PA) POLICY GUIDANCE.

(I) USCINCCENT COMPONENT COMMANDERS AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS OF FORCES ASSIGNED TO USCINCCENT:

(A) SUBMIT TO USCINCCENT PAO ANY MATERIAL OR INFORMATION PROPOSED FOR INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL RELEASE. USCINCCENT PAO WILL COORDINATE RELEASE OF ALL SUCH MATERIAL WITH OASD- (PA).

(B) PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE NEWS MEDIA AS DETAILED IN THIS ANNEX AND AS DIRECTED BY HIGHER AUTHORITY.

(C) PROVIDE EXPERIENCED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PERSONNEL TO THE JIB/SUB-JIBS, ONCE ESTABLISHED, TO SERVE AS PUBLIC OFFICERS AND LIAISON OFFICERS WITH OTHER FORCES, SERVICES AND DOD REPRESENTATIVES.

(D) COORDINATE WITH AND INFORM USCINCCENT PAO AND JIB ON ALL SIGNIFICANT PA ACTIONS AND PROBLEMS.

(E) ONCE OPERATIONS COMMENCE, IMMEDIATELY PROVIDE UNCLASSIFIED AUDIOVISUAL (AV) AND VISUAL INFORMATION (VI) TO DOD (PA) OR USCINCCENT PAO FOR RELEASE TO NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES AND FOR INTERNAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS.

C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) WHERE THE PRESENCE OF TROOPS, AIRCRAFT OR EQUIPMENT IS PLAINLY VISIBLE TO NMRS, SUCH PRESENCE MAY BE CONFIRMED TO NMRS WHO REQUEST CONFIRMATION.

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(2) DIRECT LIAISON IS AUTHORIZED BETWEEN PAOS AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND.

(3) ONCE IN PLACE, PERSONNEL WHO DEPLOY TO SAUDI ARABIA WILL NOTIFY USCINCCENT PAO OR RIYADH JIB OF UNIT'S LOCATION AND COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY, AND WHETHER COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY IS CLASSIFIED/ UNCLASSIFIED TELEPHONE OR RADIO.

(4) ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS WILL BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO USCINCCENT PAO AND JIB BY FASTEST MEANS.

(5) VERBATIM RECORDS OF RELEASES, NEWS CONFERENCES AND RESPONSES

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TO QUERIES WILL BE MAINTAINED, AND SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION WILL BE SENT TO USCINCCENT AND OASD-PA VIA FASTEST MEANS POSSIBLE. ALL NEWS CONFERENCES WILL BE RECORDED.

B. (1) ACCREDITATION. ALL NMRS WILL BE REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE ASSOCIATION WITH A RECOGNIZED MEDIA ORGANIZATION BY SOME FORM OF PICTURE IDENTIFICATION TO GAIN MILITARY SUPPORTED ACCESS TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. IF FORMAL ACCREDITATION BECOMES NECESSARY, USCINCCENT PAO, IN COORDINATION WITH OASD-PAI AND DOS, WILL ESTABLISH ACCREDITATION PROCEDURES AND ADVISE ALL APPROPRIATE PA PERSONNEL. WHILE ACCREDITATION WILL NOT PROVIDE NMRS WITH ANY SPECIAL PRIVILEGES, IT WILL FACILITATE THEIR ACCESS TO RELEASABLE INFORMATION.

A. NMRS WILL BE PROVIDED A COPY OF THE GENERAL AND SPECIFIC GROUND RULES IN EFFECT AND MUST AGREE TO ABIDE BY THEM IN RETURN FOR MILITARY SUPPORT AND INFORMATION.

B. NMRS WHO DO NOT HAVE APPROPRIATE IDENTIFICATION WILL BE SENT TO THE NEAREST US EMBASSY TO OBTAIN A LETTER OF IDENTIFICATION.

C. ACCREDITATION MAY BE WITHDRAWN BY OASD-PAI, USCINCCENT, THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER OR THE PAO IN CHARGE OF THE JIB FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: PERSONAL MISCONDUCT, VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES, OR FAILURE TO MEET FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS TO THE USG.

6. (1) FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP. NOT APPLICABLE.

7. (1) ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES.

A. FACILITIES. FACILITIES WILL BE AVAILABLE TO VISITING NMRS (AW REF P. ALSO SEE PARAGRAPH 3. A. (1) (A) THROUGH (F)).

B. INOCULATIONS. NMRS ACCOMPANYING FORCES TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS AS PART OF THE DOD NATIONAL NEWS MEDIA POOL WILL BE REQUIRED TO HAVE THE SAME INOCULATIONS AS MILITARY PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING IN THE OPERATION. NMRS ALREADY IN COUNTRY OR ARRIVING IN COUNTRY BY COMMERCIAL MEANS SHOULD ALREADY BE INOCULATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT.

C. EXPENSES. WHEN NO COMMERCIAL ALTERNATIVES ARE AVAILABLE, MESSING AND BILLETING WILL BE PROVIDED TO NMRS ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS.

D. SIMULATED RANK. NMRS WILL BE AFFORDED THE PRIVILEGES OF AN OFFICER IN THE RANK OF O-4 FOR MESSING, BILLETING, AND TRANSPORTATION.

E. DAILY BRIEFINGS. A REQUIREMENT FOR DAILY BRIEFINGS FOR NMRS WILL BE DETERMINED BY USCINCCENT IN CONSULTATION WITH OASD-PA.

F. COMMUNICATIONS. IF COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES ARE NOT AVAILABLE, THE USE OF US MILITARY FACILITIES (TO INCLUDE TELEPHONE, TELETYPE AND COURIER SERVICE) WILL BE USED TO FILE STORIES ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS BUT NOT AT THE EXPENSE OF CRITICAL OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS. MEDIA TRAFFIC WILL BE PROCESSED AS OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE.

G. COURIER FLIGHTS. IF COURIER FLIGHTS ARE AVAILABLE, SUCH FLIGHTS WILL BE USED FOR TRANSPORTING FILM AND VIDEO TAPS TO/FROM USCINCCENT PAO JIB AND OTHER LOCATIONS AS REQUIRED.

H. TRANSPORTATION. AUTHORIZED NMRS WILL BE PROVIDED WITH MILITARY TRAVEL INTO AND WITHIN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS WHEN SUCH TRAVEL IS IN CONNECTION WITH ASSIGNMENTS TO COVER THE OPERATION AND WHEN COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION INTO THE AREA IS RESTRICTED OR UNAVAILABLE. THIS REQUIREMENT IS A HIGH PRIORITY DOD REQUIREMENT AND SHOULD BE PROVIDED UNLESS GRANTING IT WOULD COMPROMISE CRITICALLY NEEDED OPERATIONAL TRANSPORTATION.

I. TRAVEL ORDERS. CORRESPONDENTS WILL BE ISSUED TRAVEL ORDERS, IF REQUIRED. AUTHORITY TO ISSUE TRAVEL ORDERS FOR NMRS FOR A SPECIFIC PHASE OF THIS OPERATION MAY BE DELEGATED UPON REQUEST FROM COMPONENT COMMANDS.

J. EQUIPMENT. DOD NATIONAL MEDIA POOL AND USCINCCENT REGIONAL MEDIA POOL MEMBERS WILL BE PROVIDED WITH THE TYPE OF EQUIPMENT CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE FOR THE SITUATION (E.G., HELMETS, CHEMICAL PROTECTION GEAR, CANTEENS, BODY ARMOR, ETC.)

K. MEDICAL SUPPORT. MEDICAL SUPPORT WILL BE PROVIDED AS REQUIRED.

8. (1) SECURITY OF OPERATIONS AND PERSONNEL.

A. OPERATIONS.

(1) THE BASIC PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION IS THAT ALL INFORMATION THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND DOES NOT COMPROMISE THE SAFETY OF US OR FRIENDLY NATION

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(2) NO NMRS COVERING THIS OPERATION HAVE A SECURITY CLEARANCE AND THEY WILL BE PROVIDED ONLY UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

(3) ALL STATEMENTS MADE TO THE NMRS WILL BE "ON THE RECORD." "OFF THE RECORD" STATEMENTS WILL NOT BE MADE IN BRIEFINGS OR DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE MEDIA. PUBLIC OR MEDIA KNOWLEDGE OF ANY CLASSIFIED ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED WITH AN OPERATION DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THE INFORMATION IS UNCLASSIFIED OR THAT IT MAY BE RELEASED OR CONFIRMED.

(4) MILITARY SUPPORTED ACCESS OF NMRS TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS IS CONTINGENT UPON THEIR AGREEMENT TO ADHERE TO ALL GROUND RULES ESTABLISHED BY OASD-PAI OR USCINCENT.

B. PERSONNEL. PERSONNEL SECURITY IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NMRS.

9. (U) OPERATIONS SECURITY. NMRS WILL BE ALLOWED FREE ACCESS TO ALL UNCLASSIFIED OPERATIONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY OPERATIONAL AND PERSONAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS.

10. (U) AUDIOVISUAL/VISUAL INFORMATION. PA AUDIOVISUAL (AV) AND VISUAL INFORMATION (VI) WILL BE REQUIRED FOR DISSEMINATION TO NEWS MEDIA THAT MAY NOT BE IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS OR TO NEWS MEDIA THAT HAVE BEEN DELAYED IN REACHING THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, AV AND VI PRODUCTS WILL BE REQUIRED FOR INTERNAL INFORMATION PRODUCTS.

11. (U) INTERNAL INFORMATION.

A. COMPONENT AND SUPPORTING COMMANDS WILL ENSURE THAT ALL PARTICIPATING PERSONNEL ARE PROPERLY BRIEFED ON THIS OPERATION INCLUDING INFORMATION IN REF F.

B. HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASES ARE NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL AFTER OPERATIONS ARE COMPLETE OR USCINCENT PAO NOTIFIES PARTICIPANTS.

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RELEASES MUST ADHERE TO SECURITY RESTRICTIONS AND BE CAREFULLY FORMULATED TO ENSURE SAFETY OF PERSONNEL AND MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT AND WILL NOT, REPEAT NOT, MENTION SPECIFIC COUNTRIES WHERE DEPLOYED. DATALINES WILL BE IN THE "PERSIAN GULF AREA," "MIDDLE EAST AREA," ETC. HOMETOWN NEWS RELEASE MASTER STORIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO SECURITY REVIEW BY USCINCENT PAO. APPENDIX I TO ANNEX F TO USCINCENT OPLAN DESERT SHIELD (U) PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR JIBS AND SUB-JIBS

1. (U) PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS WILL VARY FOR EACH JIB/SUB-JIB WITH THE SITUATION AND ASSETS AVAILABLE. MAIN JIB SHOULD BE MANNED FOR 24 HOUR-A-DAY OPERATION TO PROVIDE THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER PA SUPPORT IN MEDIA RELATIONS, SECURITY REVIEW, AUDIOVISUAL MANAGEMENT, PA TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION COORDINATION, ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY.

2. (U) JIBS AND SUB-JIBS, WHERE POSSIBLE, SHOULD BE LOCATED WITH THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER'S HEADQUARTERS OR OTHER MAJOR MILITARY HEADQUARTERS OR MEDIA FILING POINTS, TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES.

3. (U) COMPONENT COMMANDS WILL AUGMENT THE USCINCENT MAIN JIB AND SUB-JIBS AS FOLLOWS:

RANK	SERVICE	POS	CLR	NAME
08	USN	OIR	S/TS	WILDERMUTH-CENTCOM
08	USAF	OEP	S/TS	OLSEN-CENTCOM
08	USN	OEP	S/TS	DOUBLEDAY-CHINFO
07	USAF	MEDIA	S/TS	TIEDEMANN-TAC
04	USA	MEDIA	S/TS	SAUNDERS-CENTCOM
04	USN	OPS	S	OAKLEY-8TH ARMY
04	USN	INTERNAL	S	KNOX-NAVINFO
04	USMC	OPS	S	SANTANA-CENTCOM
03	USMC	MEDIA	TS	SIVIGNY-CENTCOM

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83	USAF	INTERNAL	TS	ENGELHARDT-CENTCOM
83	USAF	OPS	S	LAROCK-MILTRANCOM
88	USAF	PA CHIEF	S	BRIGGS-SAC
88	USMC	MEDIA	TS	TREADWAY-CENTCOM
87	USN	MEDIA	S	VACANT-NEEDS FILL
86	USN	BROCAST	S	VACANT-NEEDS FILL
86	USAF	JOUR	TS	AUNE-TAC
86	USMC	JOUR	S	VACANT-NEEDS FILL
86	USA	JOUR	S	VACANT-NEEDS FILL
86	USAF	JOUR	S	VACANT-NEEDS FILL
86	USN	ADMIN	S	VACANT-NEEDS FILL
86	USAF	ADMIN	TS	VACANT-NEEDS FILL
86	USAF	ADMIN	S	VACANT-NEEDS FILL
86	USA	ADMIN	S	VACANT-NEEDS FILL

TACSAT OPERATIONS PERSONNEL PROVIDED BY JCSE.

SUB-JIB -- DHAHRAN

86	USN	DIR	S	SHERMAN-NAVINFO LA
86	USMC	DEF	S	VACANT-NEEDS FILL
84	USA	MEDIA	S	SIDDLE-4TH ARMY
84	USA	OPS	S	SCHMIOT-SAPA
83	USAF	MEDIA	S	BAGGETT-TAC

SUB-JIB -- CJTFMC/BAHRAIN

84	USN	MEDIA	S	MORSE-NAVINFO LA
86	USN	JOUR	S	EDWARDS-CJTFMC

SUB-JIB DUBAI

84	USN	MEDIA	S	VACANT-NEEDS FILL
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NOTE: IN THE EVENT OF GENERAL HOSTILITIES, PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE DOUBLED AT ALL LOCATIONS DUE TO INCREASED REQUIREMENTS. (TO BE ACTIVATED ON CALL)

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCCENT OPLAN DESERT SHIELD (U) EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR JIBR/SUB-JIBS

1. (U) EQUIPMENT NEEDED TO SUPPORT JIBS AND SUB-JIBS SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED IN LOGISTIC REQUIREMENT TABLES. SUCH EQUIPMENT WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING AND WILL BE PROVIDED BY COMPONENT

COMMANDERS:

COMMANDERS: (FOLL	ITEM	AMOUNT
DESKTOP COMPUTER WITH MONITOR		(2)
LAPTOP COMPUTER		(2)
PRINTER WITH CABLE		(2)
FAX MACHINE		(2)
TYPEWRITER (COURIER AND OCR)		(2)
TELEPHONES		(3)
CASSETTE TAPE RECORDERS		(2)
CHAIRS		(15)
FIELD DESK		(15)
TELEVISION		(2)
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER (3/4 FMT)		(2)
PORTABLE COPIER		(2)
TACSAT (WITH OPERATORS) (CS PROVIDE)		(1)
35MM CAMERA KIT		(2)
OFFICE SUPPLIES		

LIST IS ASSUMING STEADY ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY.

IN THE EVENT OF FULL-SCALE HOSTILITIES, EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE DOUBLED.

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX F TO USCINCCENT OPLAN DESERT SHIELD (U) GENERAL GROUND RULES FOR THE MEDIA (U)

1. (U) GENERAL. THE PRINCIPLE OF MAXIMUM INFORMATION FLOW TO THE PUBLIC IS TO BE FOLLOWED, CONSISTENT WITH SAFETY OF THE FORCE AND SECURITY. THE SITUATION IN ANY MILITARY OPERATION IS SUCH THAT CORRESPONDENTS MAY COME INTO POSSESSION OF INFORMATION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED OFFICIALLY UNDER GROUND RULES SET FORTH IN THIS ANNEX. NMRS SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE INFORMATION AND ASKED NOT TO RELEASE IT. U. S. MILITARY ACCREDITATION IS ISSUED BASED ON NMRS OBSERVANCE OF THE ESTABLISHED GROUND RULES. CORRESPONDENTS MAY FIND THAT, AT TIMES, THEIR MOVEMENTS MAY BE RESTRICTED IN CERTAIN MARSHALLING, STAGING, AND MANEUVER AREAS. THESE RESTRICTIONS WILL BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM BUT MAY BE APPLIED BY A COMMANDING OFFICER WHEN THE SECURITY OF AN OPERATION WARRANTS SUCH ACTION. CORRESPONDENTS WILL BE ADVISED OF RESTRICTIONS BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER OR PAOS OF THE UNIT

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2. (U) GROUND RULES

- A. ALL INTERVIEWS WITH NMRS WILL BE "ON THE RECORD."
- B. SECURITY AT THE SOURCE WILL BE THE POLICY.
- C. CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION NOT RELEASABLE

(1) GENERAL

- (A) ALL STORIES BY MILITARY OR CIVILIAN REPORTERS COVERING THIS OPERATION WILL NOT DISCLOSE LOCATIONS/DESIGNATIONS OF UNITS.

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HEADQUARTERS, OR OTHER SIGNIFICANT MILITARY INFORMATION. ALL
DATELINES MUST BE: 'IN THE PERSIAN GULF' OR 'ABOARD THE USS [FILL
IN NAME OF SHIP] IN THE PERSIAN GULF.' THERE CAN BE NO MENTION OF
COUNTRY OF EMBARK IN REPORTING.

(B) DUE TO SECURITY CONCERNS, NAMES OF PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED
OTHER THAN THE TASK FORCE COMMANDERS AND COMMANDING OFFICERS OF
THE UNITS WILL NOT BE RELEASED.

(C) ANY INFORMATION GENERAL, IMPLIED, OR SPECIFIC, REGARDING ANY
ASPECT OF ACTUAL, CONCEPTUAL OR HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE MILITARY
PLANS, ACTIVITIES, OR OPERATIONS. INCLUDES ALL DETAILED
INFORMATION DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH COMBAT, COMBAT
SUPPORT, OR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ENDEAVORS (I.E., OPERATIONS,
LOGISTICS, ADMINISTRATION, POLITICAL-MILITARY, CIVIL AFFAIRS, C3I,
ETC.).

(D) DETAILED INFORMATION ON ANY COMMAND, CONTROL, PERSONNEL,
OPERATIONAL, OR SUPPORT VULNERABILITIES, WEAKNESSES, OR
SHORTFALLS.

(E) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT DETAILS.

(F) DETAILED INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY UNIT/COMMAND STRENGTHS,
ON-HAND EQUIPMENT, OR SUPPLIES. THE PRESENCE, ACTIVITIES, AND
METHODS OF OPERATION OF SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED UNITS OR
EQUIPMENT.

(G) INFORMATION OF FRIENDLY FORCE SECURITY AND DECEPTION
MEASURES/COUNTERMEASURES.

(2) US AIR, GROUND, SEA OPERATIONS (FUTURE)

(A) SPECIFIC CURRENT INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY FORCE CURRENT
OPERATIONS/MOVEMENTS, DEPLOYMENTS, AND DISPOSITIONS.

(B) INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE
TARGETS, METHODS, AND RESULTS.

(C) INFORMATION ON IN-PROGRESS OPERATIONS AGAINST HOSTILE
TARGETS.

(D) IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION AIRCRAFT POINTS OF ORIGIN OTHER
THAN GENERIC (I.E., LAND OR CARRIER BASED).

(E) INFORMATION ON THE EFFECTIVENESS/INEFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY
CAMOUFLAGE, COVER, DECEPTION, TARGETING, DIRECT/INDIRECT FIRE,
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, OR SECURITY MEASURES.

(F) INFORMATION ON MISSING OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT OR SHIPS WHILE SAR
OPERATIONS ARE PLANNED OR IN PROGRESS.

(G) INFORMATION ON UNIQUE OPERATIONS METHODOLOGY/TACTICAL AIR
OPS ANGLES OF ATTACK, SPEEDS, ETC.; NAVAL TACTICAL/EVASIVE
MANEUVERS, ETC.).

(H) INFORMATION IDENTIFYING POSTPONED OR CANCELLED OPERATIONS.

(I) INFORMATION ON UNCONVENTIONAL/SPECIAL PURPOSE
OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES.

D. CATEGORIES OF RELEASABLE INFORMATION FOLLOWING INITIAL
OFFICIAL RELEASE

(1) GENERAL

(A) ARRIVAL OF MAJOR US UNITS IN AOR WHEN OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED BY
US SPOKESMAN.

(B) APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY FORCE STRENGTH FIGURES, AFTER APPROVAL
BY HNG.

(C) FRIENDLY CASUALTY AND POW FIGURES, BY SERVICE, FURNISHED BY
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(D) ENEMY CASUALTY AND POW FIGURES FOR EACH ACTION, OPERATION, OR CAMPAIGN, DAILY OR CUMULATIVE AS FURNISHED BY OASD (PA).

(E) US AIR, GROUND, SEA OPERATIONS (PAST AND PRESENT).

(F) FRIENDLY CASUALTY AND POW FIGURES BY COMMAND IN AN ANNOUNCED OPERATION IN GENERAL TERMS OF "LIGHT," "MODERATE," OR "HEAVY" IAW THE FRIENDLY FORCE SIZE IN THAT ACTION OR OPERATION. MAJOR END ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT DAMAGED OR LOST DUE TO ENEMY ACTION.

(G) FRIENDLY FORCE SIZE IN AN ACTION OR OPERATION USING GENERAL TERMS ("MULTI-BATTALION," "NAVAL TASK FORCE," ETC.). SPECIFIC FORCE/UNIT IDENTIFICATION THAT HAS BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND NO LONGER WARRANTS SECURITY PROTECTION, MAY BE RELEASED.

(H) NON-SENSITIVE UNCLAR OPERATIONS DETAILS.

(I) IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY TARGETS AND OBJECTIVES PREVIOUSLY UNDER ATTACK.

(J) GENERIC ORIGIN OF AIR OPERATIONS (I.E., LAND OR CARRIER BASED).

(K) DATE/TIME/LOCATION OF PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY MISSIONS/ACTIVITIES.

(L) PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL MISSION RESULTS.

(M) TYPES OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN GENERAL TERMS VICE AMOUNTS.

(N) NUMBER OF AERIAL COMBAT/RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS/BORTIES FLOWN IN THEATER OR OPERATIONAL AREA.

(O) TYPE FORCES INVOLVED (INFANTRY, ARMOR, MARINES, CARRIER BATTLE GROUP, INTERCEPTORS, FIGHTER-BOMBERS, ETC.).

(P) WEATHER/CLIMATIC CONDITIONS.

(Q) ALLIED PARTICIPATION BY TYPE AFTER APPROVAL OF HMG.

(R) CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS NICKNAMES.

E. PRIOR TO ARRIVAL, ALL AMERICAN SERVICEMEN SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT PARTICIPATION IN MEDIA INTERVIEWS IS VOLUNTARY. SERVICEMEN AGREEING TO BE INTERVIEWED SHOULD NOT SPECULATE ON EVENTS IN GENERAL AND RESTRICT COMMENTS TO AREAS OF THEIR DIRECT PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE.

F. CHUSMTM RIYADH PLEASE PASS TO UBCINCENT FORWARD. //

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