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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1983

National Security Decision
Directive Number 74

NSC DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW (E.O. 12958)
/X/ Exempt in part and redact as shown
by R. Soubers Date 9/17/02

13A

VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF
PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE (U)

At the NSC meeting of January 14, 1982, on the visit to the United States of Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan, there was substantial agreement on our approach to this critical visit. It is important that we reaffirm the major objectives in our overall bilateral relationship with Japan that we seek to attain in the coming year. In this delicate stage of our relations, which will shape the future of our strategic alliance, the challenges we face, particularly in the trade and defense areas, make it essential that our strategies and policies be coherent and that our actions be consistent and mutually reinforcing. The public perception of these discussions at home and abroad will have an important bearing on the course of our relationship, and therefore we must ensure that the statements surrounding the visit be supportive of our goals.

Consistent with the broad guidance outlined in NSDD-62, we should emphasize the following themes during this crucial visit:

Trade Relationship

- We should express our appreciation for the recent measures which the Japanese Government, under Prime Minister Nakasone's personal leadership, has taken thus far to open Japan's markets. (S)
- We should acknowledge that we still have a long way to go and stress the overriding importance of increasing further access for U.S. goods, services and investment to the Japanese market on a basis equivalent to that enjoyed by Japan in the U.S. market. (S)
- We should impress upon the Prime Minister the serious political difficulties that we face as a result of protectionist attitudes in the United States focused on Japan. (S)
- We should seek from Prime Minister Nakasone a commitment to a concrete process and time table for dealing resolutely with unresolved issues. (S)

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- We should be prepared to follow up on the Prime Minister's expressed interest in Alaskan oil exports to Japan by actively exploring what reciprocal measures Japan may be willing to take which, if we so decided, might then assist us in overcoming legislative and domestic obstacles. (S)

Defense Relationship

- We should stress the importance we attach to our defense relationships. (S)
- We should express our satisfaction with the recent reformulation of Japanese policy governing defense technology transfers and our interest in facilitating and simplifying the technical arrangements. (S)
- Taking favorable note of the Nakasone government's recent increase in defense spending, we should press them for a clear commitment to undertake the improvements necessary to implement the agreed "division of labor" between our countries, within a reasonable period of time. (S)
- We should reaffirm our desire to continue close consultations on force plans and programs and the progress made in attaining our common objectives. (S)

During this visit, it is essential that we navigate a careful path. We wish to reinforce the positive position taken by Prime Minister Nakasone in making Japan's relationship with the United States the centerpiece of his foreign policy. At the same time, it is necessary that we stem the strong and growing protectionist sentiment in the Congress which, if not contained, risks overtaking our concerted efforts to achieve significant and measurable progress in resolving our serious bilateral disputes. Failure to do so could also contribute to an unraveling of the international trading system.

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The themes to be pursued in regard to trade and defense have been spelled out in some detail in order to assure that all officials follow a common line in regard to these key bilateral issues. In the course of the visit we should also discuss with Nakasone major regional and global issues of common interest, where we want to enlist Japan's support and cooperation. In this connection, it is anticipated that special attention will be given to foreign economic and debt assistance, East-West

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relations, the Middle East situation, and important Asian issues, including China, Korea, and ASEAN, as well as to such international economic questions as the work program to follow up the GATT Ministerial. Such discussions will serve to highlight the full spectrum of mutual interests where we can work together.

Ronald Reagan

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**NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NO.**

**VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF
PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE**

At the NSC meeting of January 16, 1982 on the visit to the United States of Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan, I sensed substantial agreement on our approach to this critical visit. I think it is important that we reaffirm the major objectives in our overall bilateral relationship with Japan that we seek to attain in the coming year. In this delicate stage of our relations, which will shape the future of our strategic alliance, the challenges we face, particularly in the trade and defense areas make it essential that our strategies and policies be coherent and that our actions be consistent and mutually reinforcing. The public perception of these discussions at home and abroad will have an important bearing on the course of our relationship, and therefore we must ensure that the statements surrounding the visit be supportive of our goals.

Consistent with the broad guidance outlined in NSAD-62, we should emphasize the following themes during this special visit:

Trade Relationship

-- We should express our appreciation for the recent measures which the Japanese Government, under Prime Minister Nakasone's personal leadership, has taken thus far to open Japan's markets.

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-- We should stress the overriding importance of receiving access for U.S. goods, services and investment to the Japanese market on a basis equivalent to that enjoyed by Japan in the U.S. market. (S)

-- We should impress upon the Prime Minister the serious political difficulties that we face as a result of protectionist attitudes in the United States focused on Japan. (S)

-- We should seek from Prime Minister Nakasone a commitment to a concrete process and time table for dealing resolutely with unresolved issues. (S)

-- We should be prepared to follow up on the Prime Minister's expressed interest in Alaskan oil exports to Japan

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Defense Relationship

-- We should stress the importance we attach to our defense relationships. (S)

-- We should express our satisfaction with the recent reformulation of Japanese policy governing defense technology transfers and our interest in facilitating and simplifying the flow of information. (S)

-- Taking favorable note of the Nakasone government's recent increase in defense spending, we should press them for a clear commitment to undertake the improvements necessary to implement the agreed "division of labor" between our countries, within a reasonable period of time. (S)

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-- We should reaffirm our desire to continue close consultations on force plans and programs and the progress made in attaining our common objectives.

During this visit, it is essential that we navigate a careful path. We wish to reinforce the positive position taken by Prime Minister Nakasone in making Japan's relationship with the United States the centerpiece of his foreign policy. At the same time, it is necessary that we stem the strong and growing protectionist sentiment in the Congress which, if not contained, risks overtaking our concerted efforts to achieve significant and measurable progress in resolving our serious bilateral disputes. Failure to do so could also contribute to an unraveling of the international trading system.

