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AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
REPORT

US ARMY UH-60
BLACK HAWK HELICOPTERS
87-26000 AND 88-26060

VOLUME 14

TABS V-038 thru V-066

AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
REPORT

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LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

NAME	RANK	TAB
MATTHEWS, PERRY J	CW2	V-001
MURREY, DANIEL P.	Second Lieutenant	V-002
MURREY, DANIEL P.	Second Lieutenant	V-002A
MURREY, DANIEL P.	Second Lieutenant	V-002B
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant	V-003
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant	V-003A
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant	V-003B
DAWSON, KENNETH D	Captain	V-004
CONTROL WITNESS 02	AWACS Co-Pilot	V-005
CONTROL WITNESS 03	AWACS Flight Engineer	V-006
CONTROL WITNESS 04	AWACS Instructor Comm Tech	V-007
CONTROL WITNESS 05	AWACS Instructor Navigator	V-008
CONTROL WITNESS 06	AWACS Aircraft Commander	V-009
CONTROL WITNESS 07	AWACS Instr Comm Syst Op	V-010
CONTROL WITNESS 08	AWACS Comm Tech	V-011
CONTROL WITNESS 09	Mission Crew Commander	V-012
CONTROL WITNESS 10	AWACS Instr Mission Crew Cmdr	V-013
CONTROL WITNESS 10		V-013A
CONTROL WITNESS 11	AWACS Senior Director	V-014
CONTROL WITNESS 11		V-014A
CONTROL WITNESS 12	AWACS Instr Weapons Director	V-015
CONTROL WITNESS 13	AWACS Enroute Weapons Dir	V-016
CONTROL WITNESS 13		V-016A
CONTROL WITNESS 14	AWACS Tanker Weapons Director	V-017
CONTROL WITNESS 14		V-017A
CONTROL WITNESS 15	AWACS Air Surveillance Officer	V-018
CONTROL WITNESS 16	AWACS Advanced Air Surv Tech	V-019
CONTROL WITNESS 17	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech	V-020
CONTROL WITNESS 18	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech	V-021
CONTROL WITNESS 19	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech	V-022
CONTROL WITNESS 20	AWACS Instr Comp/Display Tech	V-023
CONTROL WITNESS 21	AWACS Airborne Radar Tech	V-024
CONTROL WITNESS 22	AWACS Airborne Radar Operator	V-025
CONTROL WITNESS 23	ACE/DUKE	V-026
CONTROL WITNESS 23		V-026A
CONTROL WITNESS 24	AWACS TAOR Weapons Director	V-027
CONTROL WITNESS 25	F-15 Wingman	V-028
CONTROL WITNESS 25		V-028A
CONTROL WITNESS 26	F-15 Lead	V-029
FOSTER, CHRISTOPHER T	Captain	V-030
SCHULZ, JOSEPH W.	Captain	V-031

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

NAME	RANK	TAB
RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS J	Colonel	V-032
PILKINGTON, JEFFREY S	B-Gen	V-033
KULA, JAMES D.	Colonel	V-034
KULA, JAMES D.	Colonel	V-034A
BICKET, JOHN S.	Major	V-035
WHITE, BARTON W	Senior Airman	V-036
SCHMITT, MICHAEL N	Lt Colonel	V-037
ROCHEN, JERRY G., JR.	Chief Master Sergeant	V-038
RIVERS, GLORIA H	Civilian	V-039
NORMAN, TODD B.	Airman First Class	V-040
THOMAS, BENNIE, JR.	Sergeant	V-041
ZAHRT, JOHN W.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-042
SONNENBERG, DAVID L.	Colonel	V-043
(RESERVED)		V-044
COGGINS, LYNDON R.	Sergeant	V-045
YOUNG, LAVERM	Major	V-046
NETHERLAND, SCOTT R.	Major	V-047
MENARD, MICHAEL J	Chief Warrant Officer 4	V-048
HENRY, WILLIAM E.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-049
HOLDEN, KENNETH D	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050A
HOLDEN, KENNETH D	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050B
KOCH, KENNETH J.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-051
BOULEY, WILLIAM R.	Staff Sergeant	V-052
PATTERSON, SCOTT F	Staff Sergeant	V-053
BEACHLER, CORY C.	Sergeant	V-054
BOWEN, DEON M.	Sergeant	V-055
MCCARTHY, JOHN A.	Specialist	V-056
MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M	Specialist	V-057
MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P	Specialist	V-058
INGRAM, JOHN	Civilian	V-059
PAGE, GILMAN WILLIAM	Civilian	V-060
STREET, TERRY W.	Civilian	V-061
NEUSER, STEVEN T.	Captain	V-062
JOLY, MICHELE	Captain	V-063
TAHSIN, MOWFIK	Civilian	V-064
AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-065
AMIN, AZIZ MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-066
AMIN, MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-067
CARLSON, MICHAEL A.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-068
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major	V-069

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

NAME	RANK	TAB
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major	V-069A
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major	V-069B
FRASER, GEORGE M.	Captain	V-070
GANZE, ELIZABETH	Captain	V-071
SHORT, JOHN E.	Staff Sergeant	V-072
LARREAU, ROD P.	Staff Sergeant	V-073
DAIGLE, CONNIE S.	PFC	V-074
DEWITT, TERRY A.	Staff Sergeant	V-075
CONTROL WITNESS 34	CFAC Mission Dir (Mad Dog)	V-076
CONTROL WITNESS 34		V-076A
DONOVAN, JOHN C.	Staff Sergeant	V-077
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES	Captain	V-078
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES	Captain	V-078A
KENT, JEFFREY L.	Captain	V-079
DOUGHERTY, MARK E.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-080
CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR.	Technical Sergeant	V-081
NOLAN, WILLIAM C. III	First Lieutenant	V-082
MANION, KEVIN J	Captain	V-083
NILSEN, CARL R., JR.	Staff Sergeant	V-084
SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C., JR	Staff Sergeant	V-085
LINDAMOOD, DONNA G.	Technical Sergeant	V-086
GODIN, ROBERT A.	Technical Sergeant	V-087
MARCIK, ROBERT J. II	Master Sergeant	V-088
ZIMMERMAN, GARY R.	Captain	V-089
FEMENELLA, JAMES C.	Senior Airman	V-090
HUNT, JOSEPH F.	Colonel	V-091
EMERY, CURTIS H. II	Colonel	V-092
FELS, JAMES D.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-093
FRECHTLING, ANDREW C.	Major	V-094
MALBROUGH, RODNEY L. JR.	First Lieutenant	V-095
PINTER, MICHAEL W.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-096
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.	Colonel	V-097
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.	Colonel	V-097A
WIGGINS, BURTON D.	Major	V-098
MUSTAFA, ALI	Civilian	V-099
THOMPSON, GERALD B.	Colonel	V-100
THOMPSON, GERALD B.	Colonel	V-100A
ATKINS, BRIAN MICHAEL	Lieutenant Colonel	V-101
BALL, TERRY G.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-102
BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain	V-103

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

NAME	RANK	TAB
BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain	V-103A
NYE, MICHAEL A	1st Lieutenant	V-104
NYE, MICHAEL A	1st Lieutenant	V-104A
THOMAS, SCOTT ALLEN	Captain	V-105
PINGEL, STEPHEN R.	Colonel	V-106
HENSON, ALLEN T.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-107
HASSELL, LEONARD G.	Colonel	V-108
WHITE, LARRY D.	Major	V-109
WITCHER, CARL J.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-110
CUMBEE, MARK K.	Lieutenant	V-111
HALL, WILLIAM E., JR.	Colonel	V-112
BETHEL, PAULETTE M.	Major	V-113
STEVENS, PHILIP R.	Captain	V-114
FOLEY, JOHN M. II	Civilian	V-115
THOMPSON, ALAN	Colonel	V-116
MASON, WILLIAM D.	Major	V-117
BERNARD, ANDREW T.	1st Lieutenant	V-118
BERNARD, ANDREW T.	1st Lieutenant	V-118A
BRONSON, MATTHEW F	Staff Sergeant	V-119
MAHER, ROGER D.	Colonel	V-120
ROGERS, JAMES R.	Staff Sergeant	V-121

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)

NAME	RANK	TAB
AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-065
AMIN, AZIZ MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-066
AMIN, MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-067
ATKINS, BRIAN MICHAEL	Lieutenant Colonel	V-101
BALL, TERRY G.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-102
BEACHLER, CORY C.	Sergeant	V-054
BERNARD, ANDREW T.	1st Lieutenant	V-118
BERNARD, ANDREW T.	1st Lieutenant	V-118A
BETHEL, PAULETTE M.	Major	V-113
BICKET, JOHN S.	Major	V-035
BONG, JAMES I	First Lieutenant	V-003
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant	V-003A
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant	V-003B
BOULEY, WILLIAM R.	Staff Sergeant	V-052
BOWEN, DEON M	Sergeant	V-055
BRONSON, MATTHEW F.	Staff Sergeant	V-119
BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain	V-103
BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain	V-103A
CARLSON, MICHAEL A.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-068
CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR.	Technical Sergeant	V-081
COGGINS, LYNDON R.	Sergeant	V-045
CONTROL WITNESS 02	AWACS Co-Pilot	V-005
CONTROL WITNESS 03	AWACS Flight Engineer	V-006
CONTROL WITNESS 04	AWACS Instructor Comm Tech	V-007
CONTROL WITNESS 05	AWACS Instructor Navigator	V-008
CONTROL WITNESS 06	AWACS Aircraft Commander	V-009
CONTROL WITNESS 07	AWACS Instr Comm Syst Op	V-010
CONTROL WITNESS 08	AWACS Communication Tech	V-011
CONTROL WITNESS 09	AWACS Mission Crew Commander	V-012
CONTROL WITNESS 10	AWACS Instr Mission Crew Cmdr	V-013
CONTROL WITNESS 10		V-013A
CONTROL WITNESS 11	AWACS Senior Director	V-014
CONTROL WITNESS 11		V-014A
CONTROL WITNESS 12	AWACS Instr Weapons Director	V-015
CONTROL WITNESS 13	AWACS Enroute Weapons Director	V-016
CONTROL WITNESS 13		V-016A
CONTROL WITNESS 14	AWACS Tanker Weapons Director	V-017
CONTROL WITNESS 14		V-017A
CONTROL WITNESS 15	AWACS Air Surveillance Officer	V-018
CONTROL WITNESS 16	AWACS Advanced Air Surv Tech	V-019

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)

NAME	RANK	TAB
CONTROL WITNESS 17	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech	V-020
CONTROL WITNESS 18	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech	V-021
CONTROL WITNESS 19	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech	V-022
CONTROL WITNESS 20	AWACS Instr Comp/Display Tech	V-023
CONTROL WITNESS 21	AWACS Airborne Radar Tech	V-024
CONTROL WITNESS 22	AWACS Airborne Radar Operator	V-025
CONTROL WITNESS 23	ACE/DUKE	V-026
CONTROL WITNESS 23		V-026A
CONTROL WITNESS 24	AWACS TAOR Weapons Director	V-027
CONTROL WITNESS 25	F-15 Wingman	V-028
CONTROL WITNESS 25		V-028A
CONTROL WITNESS 26	F-15 Lead	V-029
CONTROL WITNESS 34	CFACC Mission Dir (Mad Dog)	V-076
CONTROL WITNESS 34		V-076A
CUMBEE, MARK K.	Lieutenant	V-111
DAIGLE, CONNIE S.	PFC	V-074
DAWSON, KENNETH D.	Captain	V-004
DEWITT, TERRY A.	Staff Sergeant	V-075
DONOVAN, JOHN C.	Staff Sergeant	V-077
DOUGHERTY, MARK E.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-080
EMERY, CURTIS H. II	Colonel	V-092
FELS, JAMES D.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-093
FEMENELLA, JAMES C.	Senior Airman	V-090
FOLEY, JOHN M.	Civilian	V-115
FOSTER, CHRISTOPHER T.	Captain	V-030
FRASER, GEORGE M.	Captain	V-070
FRECHTLING, ANDREW C.	Major	V-094
GANZE, ELIZABETH	Captain	V-071
GODIN, ROBERT A.	Technical Sergeant	V-087
HALL, WILLIAM E., JR.	Colonel	V-112
HASSELL, LEONARD G.	Colonel	V-108
HENRY, WILLIAM E.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-049
HENSON, ALLEN T.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-107
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050A
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050B
HUNT, JOSEPH F.	Colonel	V-091
INGRAM, JOHN	Civilian	V-059
JOLY, MICHELE	Captain	V-063
KENT, JEFFREY L.	Captain	V-079
KOCH, KENNETH J.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-051

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)

NAME	RANK	TAB
KULA, JAMES D.	Colonel	V-034
KULA, JAMES D.	Colonel	V-034A
LARREAU, ROD P.	Staff Sergeant	V-073
LINDAMOOD, DONNA G.	Technical Sergeant	V-086
MAHER, ROGER D.	Colonel	V-120
MALBROUGH, RODNEY L. JR.	First Lieutenant	V-095
MANION, KEVIN J.	Captain	V-083
MARCIK, ROBERT J. II	Master Sergeant	V-088
MASON, WILLIAM D.	Major	V-117
MATTHEWS, PERRY J.	CW2	V-001
MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P.	Specialist	V-058
MCCARTHY, JOHN A.	Specialist	V-056
MENARD, MICHAEL J	Chief Warrant Officer 4	V-048
MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M.	Specialist	V-057
MURREY, DANIEL P.	Second Lieutenant	V-002
MURREY, DANIEL P.	Second Lieutenant	V-002A
MURREY, DANIEL P.	Second Lieutenant	V-002B
MUSTAFA, ALI	Civilian	V-099
NETHERLAND, SCOTT R.	Major	V-047
NEUSER, STEVEN T.	Captain	V-062
NILSEN, CARL R., JR.	Staff Sergeant	V-084
NOLAN, WILLIAM C., III	First Lieutenant	V-082
NORMAN, TODD B.	Airman First Class	V-040
NYE, MICHAEL A	1st Lieutenant	V-104
NYE, MICHAEL A	1st Lieutenant	V-104A
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.	Colonel	V-097
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.	Colonel	V-097A
PAGE, GILMAN WILLIAM	Civilian	V-060
PATTERSON, SCOTT F.	Staff Sergeant	V-053
PILKINGTON, JEFFREY S.	B-Gen	V-033
PINGEL, STEPHEN R.	Colonel	V-106
PINTER, MICHAEL W.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-096
(RESERVED)		V-044
RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS J.	Colonel	V-032
RIVERS, GLORIA H	Civilian	V-039
ROCHEN, JERRY G., JR.	Chief Master Sergeant	V-038
ROGERS, JAMES R.	Staff Sergeant	V-121
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major	V-069
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major	V-069A

LIST OF WITNESSES
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NAME	RANK	TAB
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major	V-069B
SCHMITT, MICHAEL N.	Lt Colonel	V-037
SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C.	Staff Sergeant	V-085
SCHULZ, JOSEPH W.	Captain	V-031
SHORT, JOHN E.	Staff Sergeant	V-072
SONNENBERG, DAVID L.	Colonel	V-043
STEVENS, PHILIP R.	Captain	V-114
STREET, TERRY W.	Civilian	V-061
TAHSIN, MOWFIK	Civilian	V-064
THOMAS, BENNIE, JR.	Sergeant	V-041
THOMAS, SCOTT ALLEN	Captain	V-105
THOMPSON, GERALD B.	Colonel	V-100
THOMPSON, GERALD B.	Colonel	V-100A
THOMPSON, ALAN	Colonel	V-116
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES	Captain	V-078
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES	Captain	V-078A
WHITE, BARTON W.	Senior Airman	V-036
WHITE, LARRY D.	Major	V-109
WIGGINS, BURTON D.	Major	V-098
WITCHER, CARL J.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-110
YOUNG, LAVERM	Major	V-046
ZAHRT, JOHN W.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-042
ZIMMERMAN, GARY R.	Captain	V-089

CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

NAME	RANK	TAB	CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM
MATTHEWS, PERRY J.	CW2	V-001	
MURREY, DANIEL P.	Second Lieutenant	V-002	
MURREY, DANIEL P.	Second Lieutenant	V-002A	
MURREY, DANIEL P.	Second Lieutenant	V-002B	
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant	V-003	
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant	V-003A	
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant	V-003B	
DAWSON, KENNETH D.	Captain	V-004	
CONTROL WITNESS 02	AWACS Co-Pilot	V-005	
CONTROL WITNESS 03	AWACS Flight Engineer	V-006	
CONTROL WITNESS 04	AWACS Instr Comm Tech	V-007	
CONTROL WITNESS 05	AWACS Instr Navigator	V-008	
CONTROL WITNESS 06	AWACS Aircraft CC	V-009	
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CONTROL WITNESS 11	AWACS Senior Director	V-014	
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CONTROL WITNESS 17	AWACS Air Surv Tech	V-020	
CONTROL WITNESS 18	AWACS Air Surv Tech	V-021	
CONTROL WITNESS 19	AWACS Air Surv Tech	V-022	
CONTROL WITNESS 20	AWACS Comp/Disp Tech.	V-023	
CONTROL WITNESS 21	AWACS Radar Tech	V-024	
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FOSTER, CHRISTOPHER T	Captain	V-030	pgs 1-6

CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

NAME	RANK	TAB	CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM
SCHULZ, JOSEPH W.	Captain	V-031	pgs 4,5,10
RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS J	Colonel	V-032	pgs 21-24
PILKINGTON, JEFFREY S	B-Gen	V-033	
KULA, JAMES D.	Colonel	V-034	
KULA, JAMES D.	Colonel	V-034A	
BICKET, JOHN S.	Major	V-035	
WHITE, BARTON W.	Senior Airman	V-036	
SCHMITT, MICHAEL N	Lt Colonel	V-037	
ROCHEN, JERRY G., JR.	Chief Master Sergeant	V-038	
RIVERS, GLORIA H	Civilian	V-039	
NORMAN, TODD B.	Airman First Class	V-040	
THOMAS, BENNIE, JR.	Sergeant	V-041	
ZAHRT, JOHN W.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-042	
SONNENBERG, DAVID L.	Colonel	V-043	
(RESERVED)		V-044	
COGGINS, LYNDON R.	Sergeant	V-045	
YOUNG, LAVERM	Major	V-046	
NETHERLAND, SCOTT R.	Major	V-047	
MENARD, MICHAEL J	Chief Warrant Officer 4	V-048	
HENRY, WILLIAM E.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-049	
HOLDEN, KENNETH D	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050	
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050A	
HOLDEN, KENNETH D	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050B	
KOCH, KENNETH J.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-051	
BOULEY, WILLIAM R.	Staff Sergeant	V-052	
PATTERSON, SCOTT F.	Staff Sergeant	V-053	
BEACHLER, CORY C.	Sergeant	V-054	
BOWEN, DEON M.	Sergeant	V-055	
MCCARTHY, JOHN A.	Specialist	V-056	
MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M.	Specialist	V-057	
MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P.	Specialist	V-058	
INGRAM, JOHN	Civilian	V-059	
PAGE, GILMAN WILLIAM	Civilian	V-060	
STREET, TERRY W.	Civilian	V-061	
NEUSER, STEVEN T.	Captain	V-062	pgs 19-22,24,26,30,37,51
JOLY, MICHELE	Captain	V-063	
TAHSIN, MOWFIK	Civilian	V-064	
AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-065	
AMIN, AZIZ MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-066	

CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

NAME	RANK	TAB	CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM
AMIN, MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-067	
CARLSON, MICHAEL A.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-068	
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major	V-069	
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major	V-069A	
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major	V-069B	
FRASER, GEORGE M.	Captain	V-070	
GANZE, ELIZABETH	Captain	V-071	
SHORT, JOHN E.	Staff Sergeant	V-072	
LARREAU, ROD P.	Staff Sergeant	V-073	
DAIGLE, CONNIE S.	PFC	V-074	
DEWITT, TERRY A.	Staff Sergeant	V-075	
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CONTROL WITNESS 34		V-076A	
DONOVAN, JOHN C.	Staff Sergeant	V-077	
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES	Captain	V-078	
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES	Captain	V-078A	
KENT, JEFFREY L.	Captain	V-079	
DOUGHERTY, MARK E.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-080	pgs 39-41
CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR.	Technical Sergeant	V-081	
NOLAN, WILLIAM C. III	First Lieutenant	V-082	pgs 4,6,7
MANION, KEVIN J	Captain	V-083	pgs 5,7
NILSEN, CARL R., JR.	Staff Sergeant	V-084	
SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C.,JR	Staff Sergeant	V-085	
LINDAMOOD, DONNA G.	Technical Sergeant	V-086	
GODIN, ROBERT A.	Technical Sergeant	V-087	
MARCIK, ROBERT J. II	Master Sergeant	V-088	
ZIMMERMAN, GARY R.	Captain	V-089	
FEMENELLA, JAMES C.	Senior Airman	V-090	
HUNT, JOSEPH F.	Colonel	V-091	
EMERY, CURTIS H. II	Colonel	V-092	pgs 4, 21, 24, 30, 31
FELS, JAMES D.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-093	pgs 5,12
FRECHTLING, ANDREW C.	Major	V-094	pgs 6-8,14
MALBROUGH, RODNEY L. JR	First Lieutenant	V-095	
PINTER, MICHAEL W.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-096	
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.	Colonel	V-097	
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.	Colonel	V-097A	
WIGGINS, BURTON D.	Major	V-098	
MUSTAFA, ALI	Civilian	V-099	
THOMPSON, GERALD B.	Colonel	V-100	

CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

NAME	RANK	TAB	CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM
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ROCHEN, JERRY G., JR V-037

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT JERRY G. ROCHEN, JR.
53d Fighter Squadron,
Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany

The interview was conducted by Major Jeffrey M. Snyder at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1125 hours, 25 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

My name is Jerry G. Rochen, Junior, and I'm a Chief Master Sergeant. My organization is 53d Fighter Squadron, Spangdahlem, Germany. I'm a Maintenance superintendent and have been assigned to Spangdahlem Air Base since November of 1993. I was previously assigned to Bitburg Air Base in Germany. I arrived at Incirlik on the 5th or 6th of March of 1994 and will return to Spangdahlem on the 10th of May.

I've been in the Air Force for approximately twenty-one years. My current Air Force Specialty Code is 3A200. The common term that is used to describe the AFSC is Aircraft Maintenance Manager. Earlier in my career my Air Force Specialty Code was 431X1C, Tactical Aircraft Maintenance Specialist One and Two Engine Fighters, Jet Aircraft. I've been in the Aircraft crew chief career field my whole career. The training that I've received in my career field was, I attended tech school in 1973. I then did on-the-job training, CDC's. I've been to field training detachment courses for egress Augmentation on T33's. I've been to aircraft maintenance qualification field training detachment on the F15's, and I've completed the seven levels in CDC courses, Career Development Courses. These are correspondence courses.

I've been assigned to F15 aircraft since June of 1993, when I was assigned to the 53d Fighter Squadron. Prior to that, in the mid eighties, I was associated with the F15 for about 3 years. My current job in the 53d Fighter Squadron is that of the aircraft maintenance superintendent. I've been doing that since January of 1993. The responsibilities of the aircraft maintenance superintendent are primarily managing personnel, schedules, resources; ensure quality maintenance and training are accomplished, and look at long term planning, and try to take care of personnel matters for the troops. I am involved with the policy process in the squadron. In conjunction with the Squadron maintenance officer, we establish pretty much the policy for the maintenance side of the squadron.

Our squadron procedures for verifying the serviceability of identification, friend or foe system, prior to takeoff for an Incirlik mission, is what I refer to as "squirt box." The technician

gets in front of the aircraft and ensures that the portion of the identification of friend or foe system is operational. This is done as the aircraft is coming out of the hardened aircraft shelter and going towards the end of the runway for the last checks.

If the identification, friend or foe system checks bad during this check, the aircraft is stopped, and the pilot is informed that he has a problem. The technicians then go and correct the problem, or else the aircraft is grounded and the pilot takes a spare.

I can't say whether the procedures my squadron uses here are different than the procedures used back home at Spangdahlem. Prior to coming down here, we'd had not flown any operational missions out of Spangdahlem.

The procedures for checking the my identification, friend or foe system at Bitburg, was done at least once a week. I can't honestly say whether the requirement at home station was directed by regulation. I do believe there is command guidance on checking the system at least periodically.

I'm not aware whether the requirement for an IFF, identification friend or foe check here at Incirlik, is directed by a regulation. This is one of the checks, that is done along with several other checks on the aircraft, to ensure that the aircraft that are sent out on missions are at the highest caliber possible. That's the total reason for doing the checks all the time.

The squadron's procedures for when a pilot reported discrepancy cannot be duplicated by a maintenance technician, a production inspector, who is a highly experienced individual, is authorized to sign off, red x's, then verifies that the problem cannot be duplicated and clears the write-up as such. A red x, write-up on the aircraft is a condition that makes the aircraft unsafe for continued service.

The purpose of this procedure as to how a production inspector can inspect the aircraft, is to ensure that all appropriate steps of the trouble-shooting sequence have been taken care of, and if there's anything above and beyond that, this person has learned over the course of time, he would also verify that the system is 100 percent.

It's not common for a maintenance technician to be unable to duplicate a discrepancy that a pilot has reported. I don't know how to adequately quantify CND discrepancies. All I can do is take a stab in the dark. "CND" stands for Could Not Duplicate. Yes, it is more common for "could not duplicate" discrepancies on the avionics system, than the other systems on the airplane. Avionics for the majority cannot duplicate discrepancies.

ROCHER

I was on the flight line on the 14th of April for the launch. I don't recall anything unusual that occurred during the preparation and launch of Tiger 1 and Tiger 2 on the sortie. The recovery was unusual. I'd been told by the aircraft while they're airborne that there had been munitions expended, so I made the appropriate notifications to my technicians that the aircraft were coming back. They would be re-configured. I told them not to discuss anything with anybody here or off station. The aircraft recovered. I was down by Tiger 2, and he seemed to be real happy. We re-configured the aircraft and launched them on the next sortie. "Re-configured" means we replaced the expended munitions on both aircraft and serviced the aircraft, so that it could fly again. I did see which munitions had been expended on the airplanes. Tiger 1 expended an AIM-120, and Tiger 2 expended an AIM-9. Those munitions were replaced before the aircraft flew again.

I believe it was some place around an hour to an hour and fifteen minutes, possibly, that the aircraft were on the ground from the end of the first sortie, the mishap sortie, to the time they took off, again. The turn time that day was a little shorter than normal, but that was driven by the Tiger Flight being extended a little bit on the first sortie. They were a little late coming back, so that cut into the turn time.

I first got notified by the MOC over the telephone that something unusual occurred on the first sortie of the day, Tiger 1 and Tiger 2. The MOC informed me that there had been some munitions expended and would send me some replacements. I was notified probably two hours into the flight, but I'm not sure. I heard rumor there could have been a problem at probably 4 o'clock in the afternoon, but it was through rumor control, not official channels.

I was already off duty by the time Tiger Flight recovered from the second sortie. However, my production superintendent received a call stating that the aircraft were to be impounded immediately upon landing. The aircraft pulled into the parking spots, and my technicians pushed the aircraft into the hardened aircraft shelter, number 8, and the door was secured.

I did talk to the pilot of Tiger 2 on the recovery of the aircraft from the first sortie, the mishap sortie. Tiger 2 told me his aircraft is Code 2, which means it's still flyable as is. The problem was the Radar Birds, and then I congratulated him. Tiger 2 said to make the airplane Code 3; it doesn't have its flag on it. I told him, not a problem and that we would get her on tonight. Radar birds are erroneous targets displayed on your radar scope.

I did not talk to the pilot of Tiger 1 because by the time I made it down to Tiger 1, he had already gotten in the crew truck to head back to OPS. It is normal procedure in my squadron that the videotape is removed from the aircraft by the pilot.

ROCHER

Verifying IFF is done after the crew chief has taken the ladder down, and the pilots have already started taxiing out. The aircraft is ready for flight. The aircraft will be stopped by maintenance personnel one more time before it gets airborne when we verify that the IFF is working. At this point, the aircraft have already pulled out of their parking spot and are moving to the aircraft front-line.

You can verify that the IFF is working by the test set that the technicians uses, he aims at the aircraft; and if there's any radio frequency of a particular spectrum in the band, it will tell its test set that the system is working. The technician checks to make sure that the aircraft is transmitting his code. He checks to make sure that it transmits, not whether it interrogates.

The check that I described, we take the box and point it at the aircraft to ensure that the aircraft is transmitting its appropriate code. My understanding is that the tester will tell the maintenance technician or the pilot that if he's interrogated, the airplane is giving the proper response. I'm not a navigation systems technician.

Code 2 means there is a minor malfunction of a system that is still combat capable. The malfunction that he referred to was the Radar Bird. I believe it was documented up on the aircraft form as being a malfunction after the flight.

The comment was given jokingly that it's Code 3 because we had several aircraft that had kills during the Gulf War, and those aircraft have Iraqi flags painted on for the number of kills. So he jokingly said, hey, this aircraft is Code 3; it's missing its flag.

I was told why the Tiger Flight was late getting back. The maintenance operation center called me, when they told me there was the munitions expenditures, and said that two Hind helicopters were downed by the Tiger Flight. I'm merely assuming that was the reason the sortie was extended.

I don't have any further information, statements or evidence that I wish to present.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1555 hours, on 21 April 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **JERRY G. ROCHEN, JR.**, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, U.S. Army
Legal Advisor

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RIVERS, GLORIA H.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
OF
GLORIA H. RIVERS
HEBCO, INCORPORATED

This telephone interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Black at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1422, 16 May 1994. The Witness was located in Georgia. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the Witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

My name is Gloria H. Rivers. I am Program Manager at the Macon Facility of HEBCO, Incorporated, and we are technical manual publishers for the Warner-Robbins ALC.

At this facility, we do technical manual documentation for the Warner-Robbins ALC. During the latter part of 1992, we were tasked to update some manuals in the C-130 world concerning the IFF transponder. They were doing a MOD from the KIT 1A/ KIR 1A to a KIT 1C/KIR 1C. At that time, we also started noticing some TCTOs coming through that were affecting the F-15s and affecting the MH or UH-60 helicopters as well. In the source data package that came to us from the Base, there were 14 pages of procedural steps that went along with this MOD. We were instructed to do nothing but change verbiage in the books from KIT 1A to KIT 1C and we were told not to incorporate the procedural steps; that later in time they might come out with some operational supplements to pick that up. I questioned that at that point in time for a variety of reasons; one reason being I felt like the data was critical and we were told to go ahead and just change the 1As to 1Cs and not worry about the procedural steps.

We began doing that. I continued to have correspondence with the base voicing my concern and finally got it in writing from them to just do the 1As to 1Cs and forget about the procedural steps.

When I saw in the paper that there was a possible transponder situation with the accident, I went back and pulled the TCTOs on the F-15 and I pulled the TCTO on the Air Force version of the Black Hawk helicopter to see how that transponder information had been incorporated. I started seeing many discrepancies, and I felt like perhaps some of the technical data had been left out and could have made it possible where the transponders could not be used properly. I then made my first call to Major Clark.

As far as which procedures specific to the modification to the KIT and the KIR 1 Charlie that I was concerned about, in terms of level of detail, I did keep copies of all of

that. It was 14 pages and it covered everything. It even covered the keying instructions on the different modes, the Modes I through IV, and the key loading into the KYK setup. The initial 14 pages of instructions came to us from a product directorate at Warner-Robbins ALC. It was signed by Anthony L. Davis out at LUHAT. When these procedures came in to us and one of our technical writers was attempting to incorporate it into the manuals, it was not clear where this data should go in because it was different from the KIT 1A. It would not sit easily into the place where the KIT 1A had been so we began making the phone calls to the engineers to find out where they wanted it incorporated; and the gentleman that handled the IFF project out on the Base was a man by the name of Ronnie Sous, and he was the one who told us not to put it in there. This went on for a period of probably 12 or 14 months with us dealing back and forth. I finally called a meeting with my contract liaison out there, and we brought the engineers to the table, and I voiced my concern then. At that point in time, they acknowledged that these procedural steps should be incorporated, and they gave a list of books that it should be incorporated in. They included the F-15s. They included the H-60 and the H-53 helicopters, and we were told that these books would be coming to us for complete incorporation. About a week later, I got a letter from my contract liaison out there with simply two manuals on it for incorporation. I called them and said--"Where are the rest of these books for the proper incorporation?" He said he wasn't going to ask any questions, that they weren't coming his way, and he just wasn't going to deal with it.

I knew there were a large series of books that this needed to be incorporated in, and I knew they weren't coming to us for incorporation, and us being the overflow contractor, that's where they would have come. After I heard about the accident, I went ahead and took it upon myself to get printed copies of all these manuals that should have been affected to see if it had been properly incorporated, and unfortunately, it had not.

It was the keying procedures for the new KIT and KIR 1 Charlie that were the primary piece of tech data that I didn't think was put in enough detail. It had the instructions on how to even pull it to put batteries in. It's a very detailed 14 procedures. Some of the information comes off an F-15 ALC Form 252. I have that on the TCTO, the TCTO that was done to deal with the initial installation of the KIT 1C--I have that 252. As far as that TCTO goes, I'm talking, specifically, the F-15.

My Company does not do any kind of tech data work for the Army regarding the UH-60, just the Air Force version of that. I've pulled the Air Force versions to see how the IFF was dealt with in those manuals. There are gaps there as well. I can't say how the Army dealt with it but as far as the Air Force has dealt with it, there's problems with the incorporation of the transponder information that probably needs to be dealt with.

RIVERS

We've got maintenance manuals for the wiring kit installation for the new KIT 1 Charlie, but the changes weren't made. There were some installation changes that needed to be done also.

The original, detailed information I got came from Warner-Robbins, and subsequent conversations with another section in Warner-Robbins said to not use that detailed information but; basically, go through the manuals and substitute KIT 1 Charlie for every KIT 1 Alpha. We were not even instructed to replace the KYK-18 references with KYK-13. This was actually approved by the originators of the 252. I had to work back through my liaison, but the final say so was through the originator of the 252.

(The standard witness caution was given and the Witness had no questions.)

(The interview concluded at 1437, 16 May 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of GLORIA RIVERS as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

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NORMAN, TODD B.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

OF

TODD B. NORMAN, AIC
53 FS
SPANGDAHLEM AB, GERMANY

The interview was conducted by Major Jeffrey M. Snyder at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1546 hours, 25 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I have been in the Air Force since October 1992. I attended technical school for seven months, and currently I am a 3-level in the Navigation, Communication, Penetration Aviation Specialist career field. I arrived at Bitburg AB, Germany in June of 1993, and then came to the 53rd FS at Spandahlem AB, Germany as an F-15 Avionics Technician. I am responsible for the UHF communications, TACAN, EWWS and RWR -- Tactical Air Navigation, Electronic Warfare Warning System, and Radar Warning Receiver.

"AAI System" is Air Interrogation. I cannot tell you what the AAI System does different to the IFF System, because I am still in training and that is still really not clear to me.

The purpose of the F-15 IFF system is to interrogate other aircraft and it can be interrogated by other aircraft in the air and can be identified as friends or enemies.

I am a 3-level technician in upgrade training. I do know how the IFF codes are loaded into the aircraft; it's in the KYK-13 electronic gear. On the aircraft we use the KYK-13 to enter the Mode IV key codes, and we also enter the KY-58 codes, secure speech codes with the same keyer. To perform that task it varies, it changes every morning; an avionics technician does this every morning either myself, Senior Airman Randall George, or Senior Airman James Femenella.

I am familiar with what the implication is if the wrong Mode IV code is loaded into an aircraft. We could not properly interrogate other aircraft and other aircraft that would need to interrogate us, knowing that we were friendly, would get a wrong response.

I am familiar with the operation of the 424 test set. It's just to make sure that the codes are matched and are correctly coded before the jets takeoff. The KYK-13 is used to load the Mode IV code into the aircraft. They are loaded under door 3R on the KIT and KIR. The KIT and KIR are black avionics boxes under door 3R. The 424 test set is designed to send a signal to the antenna on the jet, that are used for Mode IV interrogation and to be interrogated. It sends a signal out, and it matches the codes that are in the jet with the code that is in the box which should be the same. Usually, an avionics technician does this test; the same as I've named before. This test is usually done when the jets are cranked up about ready to head out to the end of the runway, every morning.

I am qualified to use the 424 test set. First, I am trained to do it, and then it is signed off in my 623, training record, to be qualified to do it.

I was using the 424 test set on the first launch of the day on the 14th of April.

The 424 test set does not only interrogate Mode IV, it also interrogates Mode I, Mode II, Mode III, Mode C, and Mode IV. An indication in the 424 test set that it has successfully interrogated an aircraft depends on -- we usually only test Mode IV when they go up and usually get a green light. Well, this test set is a semi good/semi bad test set. It works good, it's just that you don't always get a green light; that's usually the indication. When we check the aircraft prior to launch, we check Mode IV. Every once in a while we will go through all the Modes. They are usually in a hurry, so we check Mode IV. When I used the 424 tester on the morning of the 14th, I only tested Mode IV, which is a normal procedure for our squadron. We use the 424 test set when the EOR crew is doing the EOR checks, which is a normal procedure for your squadron. "EOR" is, end of runway. Aircraft 790025 and 840025 did pass the IFF test that morning. I know that because, like I said, it's not normal to get a green light because the test set sometimes blinks out. On 4025, I had it on Mode IV. I got an "A" which means the reflection of the beam that I send out was not right, and I kept getting an "A" on both my antennas. So, I went through all the Modes because sometimes if you go through all the Modes, it will reset the code and it will make it a good signal. I pointed it back at the jet, pushed the test bottom, got a thumbs up from the pilot and I got a green light. The pilot's indication from the cockpit that there had been a successful interrogation is thumbs up. The pilot's indication that the test has been successful is located on the left-hand console. We have a reply light and sometimes it gives a beep in the headset; it all depends on how he has it set up.

Aircraft 790025 did pass the test. I did not get a green light, but he gave me a thumbs up on the upper and lower antennas. On the 424 test set you don't always get a green light, but the test can still be good. The test is good because the pilot gives you a

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thumbs up. On the 14th of April, the pilot gave a thumbs up on both aircraft even though one aircraft had a green light and the other aircraft did not. If the aircraft had not passed that test they probably would have taken off anyway. The pilot, if their codes aren't correct in the jet, have what we call a ""BIT light," and if they have a BIT light, they call for a red ball and we rekey the jet before they taxi off their spots. We check the aircraft as they are in the runway, which is basically the last stop before they takeoff. I am not aware of any instance where passing or failing the Mode IV check has resulted in the aircraft not taking off. I did not observe anything unusual during the morning launch the 14th of April. When we used the 424 test set, those test results are not documented in any way.

I am familiar with the KYK-18 keyer; it's the old type of keyer. The KYK-13 is the new electronic keyer; it's the new way of putting the Mode IV into the jet. The KYK-18 is the older version. You had to load the code in manually, by hand. You look at the code and you enter it manually by hand and you push it into the boxes under the jet. At Incirlik Air Base, we currently use the KYK-13. I have not used that keyer the entire time that I have been deployed here at Incirlik Air Base.

I do not remember exactly when we stopped using the KYK-18. We did the TCTO on the KITs and the KIRs to put in the electronic ones approximately a month to a month and a half after we got here in February. "TCTO" is Time Compliance Tech Order. I personally did not modify the aircraft to the new KIT and KIR configuration since I have been deployed here; it was done since we have been here.

There is a KYK-18 still in our squadron. The 424 tester cannot be keyed with the new electronic keyer because another TCTO needs to be done on the keying system for the 424 tester; it needs another cable. So, we still have to load the KYK-18 every morning so we can load the 424 tester with the Mode IV code.

The KYK-13 and the KYK-18 are two separate keying operations. We have two different sets of codes for the Mode IV. One is electronic, and when you look at it, it is just a bunch of documents you cannot read it. Then, we have the old version when we use the KYK-18 keyer to load the jet. We still get those codes and you can sit there and you can read it, number for number for the setting of the pin that you have to put in the keyer. The other one you cannot. You couldn't make a mistake unless the keyer and the box that loads the keyer were bad, because we look at the date on the code to make sure it has the correct date before we do the keying procedure. Now, the only way that we can make a mistake is on the KYK-18 when you set the pin in the wrong place.

If the wrong code is loaded in the 424 test set and the correct code into the aircraft, when we did our test at the end of the runway, we would send the wrong signal to the aircraft and the aircraft would be unable to reply. The pilots could not give me a

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thumbs up, or like I said, with aircraft 4025, I could not have gotten a green light. When we do the manual code in the KYK-18, it is usually verified by another person. There are always two people present when we are working with the codes. I'm not going to say always, I'm going to say 90 percent of the time because sometimes you have to go and do something else, but 90 percent of the time there are two people present.

The witness had no further information, statements or evidence to present.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

(The interview terminated at 1610 hours, 25 April 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of TODD B. NORMAN as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

BRYAN T. LAWLER, Lt Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

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THOMAS, BENNIE JR.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
OF
SERGEANT BENNIE THOMAS. JR.
53rd Fighter Squadron
Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany

The interview was conducted by Lt Col Scott C. Black, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1445 hours, 21 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I'm currently deployed to Incirlik, Turkey. I have been assigned to Spangdahlem ever since the move from Bitburg. I had been at Bitburg for 6 years, and I moved from Bitburg over to Spangdahlem with the unit. I've been stationed in Europe for 6 years. The move from Bitburg to Spangdahlem occurred on the 5th of February, and I arrived at Incirlik for duty on the 10th of February 94. I'm scheduled to return to Spangdahlem on 10 May 1994. I've been in the Air Force for 8 years. I'm a tactical aircraft crew chief.

As a crew chief I've learned about many systems of the aircraft, i.e, engines, flight controls, the basics of the aircraft. It is sort of a jack of all trades. After basic school I attended technical school to get the basic knowledge of the aircraft, which was 7 weeks long. I went to FTD, which was approximately 2 months long. I've been to numerous FTDs after that consisted of breaking down the systems, and so forth, to gain F-15 unique experience. FTD is the field training of the aircraft. I've been assigned to the F-15 as a crew chief since August of 1987, almost 7 years.

My basic responsibilities as an aircraft crew chief are to ensure that the aircraft is safe for flight for the aircrew. I'm there to make sure that all required inspections and all required servicing are complied with prior to the flight crew coming out to the aircraft. Any system that has a problem, I'm there to assist the specialist of that system, to give him a hand at whatever he may need. Preparing the aircraft for flight is not the only responsibility of a crew chief. Anytime the aircraft has to go in for major inspections, the crew chief is the one that goes with it. The crew chief is the main person in the loop for any type of maintenance or upkeep of the aircraft.

I do participate in the launch and recovery of the aircraft. To prepare an aircraft for flight the first thing I do is go out to the aircraft in the morning with my tool box. The aircraft is normally covered up, so I'll take all of the covers off of the aircraft that are there to keep foreign objects and small animals from entering the aircraft. I check the servicing of the engines, of the hydraulic systems, the lock systems, tires, tire pressure, and I make sure all required inspections are complied with. I then go up and make sure that the canopy is clean for the pilot so that he has a good view. I go through the aircraft forms to ensure that everything that is supposed to be signed off has been signed off, and that everything that is supposed to be done has been done. After that I wait for my aircrew to show.

After the aircrew arrives at the aircraft he normally does his walk around and I assist him in that for the purpose of answering any questions he might have concerning the aircraft.

After he is satisfied with the aircraft we will go up to the cockpit and I will help him strap into the aircraft and make sure that he is all set up there. I will then come down and put on my communication headset so that he and I can talk during his starting up of the aircraft. I will then just basically standby and wait for him to start the aircraft so that we can get on with the launch check list.

I am there to make sure that he has a safe start of both engines, to make sure that if there is a fire hazard or something goes wrong, the pilot is able to get out of the aircraft without harm. If there is a fire I have to try and put the fire out. I basically let the pilot know that everything is going good on the ground. Normally, for recovery, I will be waiting at the appropriate spot where the aircraft will be returning to. I will marshal the aircraft back into the spot. Once he has come to a complete stop, I will check the tires for any cuts or damages to the tires that may have occurred during the landing or take-off. I will roll them forward and check the bottom of the tires and insert the wheel stops. If there are no write-ups for the radar or any kind of code two or code three write-up that he might want to talk to a specialist about, we will proceed with the shutdown of the aircraft. A code two or code two write-up is anything that the pilot feels would hinder a good flyable aircraft.

Once the aircraft is shut down, and there is no type of hazard that would damage the aircraft, the crew chief makes sure that the flight crew gets out of the aircraft. I will go up and help the pilot down with his flight bag and anything else that he will need help with. Once the pilot is out of the aircraft he will do a walk around of the aircraft. I follow him around the aircraft to ensure that there is not damage to the aircraft that occurred during the flight. If it is a good aircraft, the pilot will leave the aircraft forms with me and then he will go to debrief his mission. I am the very first person to talk to the pilot after his mission.

I performed the duties as crew chief, as I just described, during the launching and recovery of aircraft 79-0025 on the morning of 14 April. I do not recall any problems during the preparations for launching that aircraft. It was a pretty routine launch. The aircrew showed up to the aircraft. We did our walk around and we talked a little bit about some other aircraft, namely, the F-4 Phantom. We were waiting for him to get the word to climb into the cockpit. The word came and I helped the aircrew into the aircraft. He set the cockpit for the mission. I then stood by the aircraft, waiting for the signal for start-up.

There was a write-up in the aircraft forms about a program that the pilot was concerned about. There was a specialist there on the spot that informed the pilot of the meaning of the write-up. The problem system was a red diagonal and the write-up was that CMD had the wrong program. The CMD has to do with the chaff and flare. The pilot was satisfied with the answer.

There were no problems with the flight that morning. Everything went pretty smooth. Like I said, it was pretty routine. It doesn't take very long to do a launch. You're looking at maybe 10 or 15 minutes, from engine start-up to the very last check. After the pilot goes through the flight controls and all of his checks, the very last thing I do is look over the aircraft to make sure all pins are pulled and all panels are secured, that there are no leaks coming from anywhere under the aircraft that I can see. After that I make sure that everything is okay with the pilot up in the cockpit. If there are no problems, I will go ahead and pull my comm set and wait out in front of the aircraft. There were no problems with this aircraft on that morning. It was a good aircraft.

THOMAS

The recovery of 79-0025 after the mission was uneventful. The aircraft came back and I parked it. We shut down the aircraft and I went up and helped the aircrew out of the aircraft. We did our walk around. There were a number of people out around the aircraft waiting for its return. I then took the oil samples. Oil samples have to be taken after the first flight of the day. I got some numbers for the aircrew to take to the debriefing. He came back, shook my hand, and gave me a few "attaboys," and he pressed on to debrief.

I don't know who all of the people were that met the pilot at the aircraft. One was my production supervisor, the chief of AMU was there, and a few of the other guys were weapons specialists. I believe one was the intel guy, and the other guys may have been part of the debriefers.

When I climbed up the ladder and helped the pilot with his gear, I asked him how was the flight? He replied that it was a "shit hot" aircraft. I asked him how the mission went and he said it was just another day at the office.

Nothing out of the ordinary occurred during the launch and recovery of this aircraft. I was the crew chief that prepared the aircraft for the next sortie. The aircraft was on the ground approximately 45 to 50 minutes between the time it taxied in and when it flew the next sortie. This amount of time is not unusual at all for an aircraft to be down between sorties.

My Air Force Specialty Code has recently changed. I don't know what the new one is, but my old one was 45254A, tactical aircraft maintenance specialist. "Crew chief" is the nickname, I guess you could say. Only the numbering system has changed; I have always been a crew chief.

After we did our walk around, the pilot then went to the tape recorder and popped out his tape. It's a standard practice for the ground crew to let the pilot insert and take out his own tape. That way there is no problem with the tape getting caught. It is the aircrews' responsibility to ensure that the tape is installed. I never touched the tape. The pilot took the tape and then put it into his flight bag.

When I climbed up to the cockpit and met the pilot on his return, he was quite cheerful, quite happy. He was smiling and pretty happy.

I have no other information, statements or evidence that I wish to present to the Board at this time.

The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of SGT BENNIE THOMAS, JR, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

Scott C. Black

SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Col, USA
Legal Advisor

THOMAS

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ZAHRT, JOHN W.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN W. ZAHRT
55th Special Operations Squadron
Hurlburt Field, Florida

The interview began at 1918 hours, 19 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

My name is John Wagner Zahrt and I am a Lieutenant Colonel. My home organization is 55th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Florida. I'm presently assigned as the Commander of Air Force Special Operation Forces, which is the air component under Joint Special Operation Task Force. My duties as the Commander of the Air Force Special Operation Forces, I have a responsibility for one hundred and forty to one hundred and fifty-five individuals to conduct the airlift for the Joint Special Operation Task Force in support of Combined Task Force, for the mission of, primarily search and rescue of down CTF air crew.

We also have contingency missions that relate to other specific support functions in support of the Military Coordination Center. I can't go in any further details on those.

On 14 April, I was sitting in my office at Incirlik Air Base in building 110, and I think it was mid-morning or maybe late morning. I got a phone call from Major Leibach down at SOC3 and he told me over the phone, he went secure and told me over the phone that he had just heard that two Hinds had been shot down. He didn't have any other information and at that point I went immediately to the Joint Operation Center in CTF Headquarters, and I attempted to notify my Commander, who is Colonel Hunt, who is the Joint Special Operation Task Force (JSOTF) Commander, and not for the sake of any particular purpose. However, when unusual activity occurs as the alleged shooting down of Hinds is unusual for around here. My personal focus would be to find out what was going on so that the JSOTF would be prepared to respond to any possible contingency.

The first time that I learned that there were two UH60 helicopters shot down was when I was on the ground at the crash site, several hours later. I had strong suspicions early in the development of this situation.

I was directed through my chain of command to go to the crash site by Colonel Hunt, to launch the JOSTF Force to the crash sites. We anticipated a search and rescue situation, what we call in Special Forces mass casualty response. We did not know whether there were any survivors and we had to operate under the assumption that there were at the time of launching.

However, we had suspected there were numerous, either injuries or fatalities. I was in the Joint Operation Center (JOC) when I found out that there was a possibility that Black Hawk helicopters may have been shot down.

Throughout my career I have been a Combat Helicopter Pilot and always have been since I've been on active duty. The search and rescue liaison officer Major John Bicket is also a former member of the Squadron I'm in. He's functioning as the Search and Rescue Liaison Officer or SARLO. He was also present at the JOC. Both he and I were aware of the fact that Eagle Flight was flying that day, and I learned after I was at the JOC that they were flying down to Irbil for the purpose of interacting with the Kurdish Leaders in the area.

When the discussion of the Hinds was going on, the questions that the SARLO was asking and the question that I was monitoring was, has anyone made positive contact with the Eagle Flight. And the initial answer I overheard, and I can't tell you exactly who said it, that yes, we know where Eagle Flight is. Later I was led to believe that that was based on a final flight plan, not on actual contact.

When we still had not been able to get in touch with Eagle Flight, Major Bicket and I expressed our concerns verbally to each other that something may have happened.

Throughout the flight en route we were having serious communication problems with both our HF radio, which is one of our long range radios. Also the SATCOM radio was not working very reliably on our aircraft.

We took off at roughly 1500 hours and it took three and a half hours to get to the Iraq Border. And after we crossed the border it took us forty minutes to get to the crash sites. We were the first Americans to arrive at the sites to my knowledge. We were the first Combined Task Force personnel to arrive at the sites.

As we flew over we were concerned that this was a non permissive environment, that there were threats in the area without going into any further details. We assumed a defensive posture as we approached and there was one aircraft that maintained an orbit overhead after we did an initial survey of the area from the air. Then the flight lead aircraft commander split off each helicopter to its own crash site to do a survey and then make an approach to land nearby it.

The first site by the stream with the village in front of it seemed to be confined to a small area. It was very burnt on the ground. You couldn't see any details at all from the air.

At this time, the sun had set and there was still some light in the air, so it wasn't dark at all. There was quite a bit of light at that time. When we got to the site there were no personnel still alive. The second helicopter that went to site two, had to land away from the crash site itself, because of uneven terrain, and landed considerably higher than where the investigation team

ZAHRT

landed because they had not spotted that particular location. It took them about ten minutes to walk down to the site and the team was moving very rapidly. Now, it would have been a fifteen minute hike up in my view.

The team that was at the second site, away from the stream up in the hills, reported that there were fourteen bodies located. And the teams reported that there were twelve at the first site. I am led to believe, although I do not know this from first hand experience, that that information came from the local Kurds in the area who walked the team members around and pointed out the location of the fatalities.

As soon as we got to the site, Colonel Hunt exited the aircraft. There were about two hundred Kurds in the area. They were up on the road relatively well above us at a distance of about a hundred yards from where the helicopter landed. I stepped out of the helicopter along with the Para Rescue Specialist Team, and started to do a ground survey of the site. We had not established good communication with CTF at that point , although we were trying . Colonel Hunt directed us to pull everyone back into both helicopters and we would resume the work in the morning of removing the remains, when we could do it in an orderly fashion in the light. However, before we departed the site, Colonel Hunt directed me to contact CTF and that took quite a bit of time because of inadequate communications. The communication problems were related to a combination of hardware problems on the aircraft as in poorly designed and installed radios, which is a current problem that we know about as well has having a satellite that is not optimally position for where we were.

Eventually we were able to contact CTF and the direction from CTF was to retrieve the remains that night. At that point, once it became clear, we had CTF reiterate that direction. I informed Colonel Hunt and he said let's do it. I asked him, do you want us to do this one site at a time or both sites simultaneously and he said to do one site at a time. From that point on, his concern was accurate accountability of the remains in terms of the total numbers, making sure that we had every one of them.

We had been on the ground in the vicinity of an hour, and we began the process of taking the body bags over to the crash sites and putting the remains in the bag, collecting them at a collection point near the landing zone where the helicopter was parked, then eventually loading them in the helicopter.

My immediate role in that was to assist Colonel Hunt in controlling the air flow. While Colonel Hunt positioned himself up by the road which overlooked the LZ, and his concern was to establish a tactical SATCOM for a controlling agency and to have a relatively high ground in which to observe for security. All of this was being done under a sense of urgency. The focus of the team was to move the bodies as quickly as possible to the aircraft and to extract them as

quickly as possible. In my view it didn't take that long to get site one completed. However, I'm told by others that were with us that it was a period of about three hours. It was about 10:30 p.m. Incirlik time by the time we had completed site one. Now, what we did, because of extremely limited space in the MH60 helicopters, we moved nine sets of remains from that location back to Zakhu; off loaded them and brought the helicopter back. Eventually, we came back to site one to get the other three remains.

My intent as the Airborne Mission Commander was to move the remains in a total of three helicopter lifts to Zakhu. Remove all the Americans from the scene to Zakhu and then move the remains on up to Diyarbakir.

Again, site one was relatively easy because it was flat terrain. When we had site one all done, we moved to the second LZ. Colonel Hunt repositioned himself along the road, further to the East so that he had line of sight communications with the second crash site. We landed the helicopter again on the higher elevation and I walked down to the site and was met by John Coolaw[phonetic], an American who's an employee of the MMC at Zakhu.

About less than a half an hour after we first got to the scene a ground force of six Special Forces had showed up, that had driven from Zakhu to the crash scene, late in the afternoon after CTF had cleared them to proceed. That was very important, as a security team and as manpower assistance. John Coolaw is very well versed in dealing with the local Kurdish population.

Because of the climb and the steep rocky terrain, it was not practical under a sense of urgency to move the bodies up the hill. John had explain to me that it was also not practical to move the bodies to the road because that would entail moving the bodies over a ridge and across a few streams. The challenge to move them across that ground would have been just as great as going up the hill. An alternative that was available to us was to use hydraulic hoist on the helicopter which is primarily a rescue device to lift one or more individuals up to the door of the helicopter and pull them into the helicopter. One of the air crew requested permission to take a look at possibly doing that and I gave that to him. So, it was approached from a very cautious perspective. The first one took an half an hour. The helicopters would, as they needed to, fly over to the refueling tanker, get fuel in the air and come back. Another helicopter came in to get another litter and pretty soon was able to develop a system wherein, it lowered down an empty stokes, picked up a full stoke that the Para Rescue Specialist had already loaded and prepared for lifting. And in so doing, we lifted out the remaining people.

So, I remained at that location for the rest of the night as that took a considerable degree of time and I was in communication with Colonel Hunt and keeping him advised as to what remained on the scene.

Shortly before the break of morning twilight, we had all Americans off the ground with the exception of John , who again, normally works deep in country and was staying there to provide an American presence the following morning.

ZAHRT

All the bodies were then taken to Diyarbakir. Colonel Hunt and the Para Rescue people and I stayed at Zakhu for the next day.

I believe that other people went to the site after we departed and before the investigation team arrived. I think EOD and I don't know who else was on that flight, flew to the sites the following day and returned later that same day.

No, I didn't prepare a sketch of the helicopter site. Because of my Air Force background, I am concerned about the matter of proper investigation technique. However, under the circumstances, this particular force was in a presumed hostile environment and time was of the essence.

I personally did not see any tampering of the site when I got there. From the time that I left and the time I came back with the accident investigation team, I did not notice any difference.

I noticed the array of the wreckage at site one. I never did actually get directly to site two. I didn't get eyes on site two until the day that the team went out there, because the collection point at site two was at a higher elevation and offset from the actual wreckage.

At site one, I noticed that, with the exception of one body, all remains were in a relatively confined area. I'm not an engineer, so I don't know exactly what that means.

At site two, it appeared as though the aircraft had impacted against a hill. The hill faced the south. It was a south facing hill in other words, where the crash occurred, implying to me that the aircraft was moving north-east. And frankly, it just hit right up against the hill and may have rolled.

I don't know if the bodies at site two were fairly contained or not. I wasn't physically at the site. There were witnesses who are available who can answer that for you. The personnel that could best answer the location of the bodies around site two, are each of the people who assisted in collecting the bodies, the Para Rescue Specialist , and Special Forces people who assisted with that. I can provide you with a list, but I don't have that with me. I think I have something in the car that would be suitable.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 2006 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of JOHN W. ZAHRT, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

BRYAN T. LAWLER, LT COLONEL, USAF
Legal Advisor

ZAHRT

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SONNENBURG, DAVID L.

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VERBATIM TESTIMONY

COLONEL DAVID L. SONNENBERG
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
PANAMA CITY, PANAMA

COL WILCOX: The time here is now 1752, and we're -- the 26 of May 1994. The persons present, in here at the interview, are Major General Andrus, the Board President. We're presently interviewing Colonel David Sonnenberg, who is stationed in Panama City, Panama. Also present is Colonel Mickey Fain, Staff Sergeant Charles, who is the court reporter, and I'm Colonel Wilcox.

(The witness was identified by a judge advocate in Panama.)

Colonel Sonnenberg, I'm going to give you some basic information about the investigation that we're conducting, and then I think Colonel Fain will have some questions for you.

WITNESS: Okay.

The interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation ----

GENERAL ANDRUS: Standby. We're at Ramstein, not Incirlik.

COL WILCOX: Excuse me. Ramstein. I'm sorry.

WITNESS: Right.

COL WILCOX: This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. It is an Aircraft Accident Investigation conducted under Air Force Regulation 110-14. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings, and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes, and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

SONNENBERG

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Colonel Sonnenberg, do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and this Accident Investigation?

WITNESS: Yes, I do.

COL WILCOX: Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

WITNESS: Yes. I do.

COL WILCOX: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No, I don't.

COL WILCOX: Your testimony will be recorded, so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon, speak slowly, clearly, and loudly. Please remember to explain your testimony carefully, so that others who do not have your technical training will be able to understand.

As this is an official investigation, you're required to answer questions put to you by the board. You're further advised not to discuss classified information, unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it is necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

WITNESS: I understand.

COL WILCOX: Great. If you'd raise your right hand, please, I'd like to swear you in.

WITNESS: Okay.

(The witness was sworn.)

EXAMINATION

Questions by Colonel Wilcox:

1Q: Would you please state your full name, grade, and organization.

SONNENBERG

1A: David L. Sonnenberg, Colonel, United States Air Force; currently scheduled at -- currently at the SOUTHCOM, J-3/DDD.

2Q: And what -- Your present duty station is -- your present duty assignment now is with SOUTHCOM?
2A: That is correct.

COL WILCOX: Colonel Fain will ask you some questions now, Colonel Sonnenberg. Thank you.

Questions by Colonel Fain:

3Q: Okay. Colonel Sonnenberg, could you relate to me the duty activities that you have at your current station; your duty position, and what type of job that is, please.
3A: Yes. I am the deputy director for counter-drug, and my job is to coordinate all counter-drug activities for DoD and inter-agency access for the United States Air -- for United -- for the Southern Command.

4Q: Okay. Thank you. Could you relate to me any experience that you have in the European theater of operations.
4A: I was -- I've been in Europe on two different occasions at Bitburg Air Base; once, between about '75 and '79; and, again, between 1988 and ....

5Q: You were broken. Would you give me the dates, month, and year of the last tour, please.
5A: I don't actually remember the exact dates, but I think I got there in -- I think, maybe May of 1988. I think -- and I left in July -- No, that's not correct. I left in October of 1990.

6Q: Okay. I copied May of '88 to October of '90. What position did you hold during that tour at Bitburg?
6A: I was an operations officer at 525. I was the chief of safety, and I was a squadron commander to the 22 Squadron.

7Q: And would you give me the approximate dates that you were the squadron commander of the 22 Squadron, please.
7A: About, I think, July of '89 to October of '90.

8Q: During that period, did you have occasion to meet, or do you know the names -- without using those -- of the incident pilots, involved in the incident, that we're investigating?
8A: I know one name.

SONNENBERG

9Q: And did you have the opportunity to supervise that individual?
9A: I did, indeed.

10Q: And could you relate to us your impression of his tactical capabilities.
10A: I would say average to slightly above average.

11Q: Did you have any cause for concern, regarding his ability to perform the duties of an F-15 fighter pilot?
11A: No.

12Q: And could you relate to me how you know the name of the individual involved in the accident. Through what source were you given that information?
12A: I honestly don't know. I guess, several -- I honestly don't know when I first found out, but .... I honestly can't tell you when I found out, or how I found out.

COLONEL FAIN: Okay.

(The telephone interview recessed at 1759 hours, and thereafter resumed at 1801 hours, 26 May 1994.)

COL WILCOX: Can you hear me, Colonel Sonnenberg?

WITNESS: Yes, I hear you.

COL WILCOX: Okay. We're back on the speakers. It's 1801, after about a 2 minute recess.

Questions resumed by Colonel Fain:

13Q: I'd like to ask a couple of questions to establish the individual's identity, the one that we're referring to. Could you tell me the positions that the individual held, while at Bitburg, while you were there?
13A: I -- He was my -- I think he was an assistant ops officer of mine. I mean, he was an assistant ops officer of mine; and then, I think he went to the wing somewhere, but I'm not exactly sure, maybe DOT.

14Q: And what rank was he at that time?
14A: [The grade was consistent with Control Witness 25.]

15Q: And do you know what job he went to after he left DOT?
15A: I'm not sure because I was gone then. It may be an ops job; I don't know.

SONNENBERG

16Q: Okay. And could you give me a rough, physical description. The purpose for our questions is just to determine that we're talking about the same individual.
16A: Yeah. I'd say he's about 5'6", 175 pounds, thinning hair.

17Q: Okay. Let me ask you a couple of other questions, regarding his flying abilities. Did you ever see anything to indicate that he was dangerous in an aircraft, either proficiency-wise, or tactically?
17A: No.

18Q: Would you consider the individual to be "trigger-happy."
18A: No.

19Q: Have you ever said those words about this individual?
19A: No.

20Q: Have you ever said to anyone that you felt the individual was dangerous?
20A: No.

21Q: Okay. And would you consider him qualified, at the time you knew him, for the positions that he held?
21A: Yes.

COL FAIN: Okay.

COL WILCOX: Colonel Sonnenberg, I'm going to ask you one final question and-- We've avoided using the name of the individual. We will delete the name from the record, but just for the record, to make sure we have a positive identification, what is the name of the person to whom you are referring?

WITNESS: I can say the name?

COL WILCOX: Yes.

WITNESS: [The witness accurately identified Control Witness 25 by name.]

COL WILCOX: Do you have any further information, statements, or evidence which you wish to present?

WITNESS: No.

SONNENBERG

COL WILCOX: You're reminded that this is an official investigation, and you're ordered not to divulge the nature of this investigation, or the questions, answers, or discussions included in this interview with anyone, unless authorized to do so by the Board President, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone, other than a member of this board, should approach you, regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No.

COL WILCOX: The time is 1805, here at Ramstein, Germany; and the interview is concluded.

(The telephone interview terminated at 1805 hours, 26 May 1994.)

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

The above sworn telephone interview statement given by **COLONEL DAVID L. SONNENBERG** to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask. Words contained within brackets, [ ], indicate language that has been substituted at the direction of the Board, to avoid the release of classified information which could not be downgraded and/or personal details which would disclose the identity of military members directly involved in the incident. The substituted language accurately conveys the essential meaning of the original language. Except as so noted, I certify that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.

Janet R. Charles

JANET R. CHARLES, SSG, U.S. Army
Court Reporter

SONNENBERG

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(RESERVED)

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COGGINS, LYNDON R.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
OF
SERGEANT LYNDON R. COGGINS
8th Prime Beef
Kelly AFB, Texas

The interview was conducted by Lt Col Bryan T. Lawler, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 0808 hours, 20 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

My name is Lyndon Roy Coggins, Sergeant, currently stationed at Kelly AFB, under the civil engineering squadron, active duty in the United States Air Force. I am currently TDY to Incirlik Air Base working on the Tent City power plant. I have come to know some AWACS crewmembers because of where our tents are located in tent city. Our tents are located right next to theirs. I have become acquainted with them socially, and we are on a first name basis.

I am acquainted with two AWACS crewmembers Mark and Dennis, currently deployed here at Incirlik Air Base, and I usually only see them in the "Hooch" our small little bar Prime Beef runs in the tents. I believe they are both senior airman. Mark is currently deployed here at Incirlik Air Base and is about 5'8"/5'9", dark headed, a little heavy set and wears glasses. The guy named Dennis is about 5'8"/5'9" as well, a little thinner build and has brown hair and does not wear glasses. They are always together. I am not familiar with their duties as AWACS crewmembers.

When they introduced themselves to me two to three weeks ago I was then informed that they were AWACS crewmembers. I am not acquainted with any other AWACS crewmembers nor have I seen any other deployed crewmembers in the "Hooch." I am not acquainted with nor would I know any officers on the AWACS crews.

On the 13th of April 1994 I saw Mark and Dennis in the "Hooch" about 9:00PM until midnight that evening in the Prime Beef Bar. We were all playing pool and having a drink. I wasn't paying attention to them that night but I did observe them drink a beer. I'm really not sure but I think Mark and Dennis might have consumed about two beers a piece. Both were in civilian dress and there was nothing unusual or specific about their manner nor was I aware of any other AWACS members present. I don't know of anyone else that would be familiar with any AWACS crewmembers frequenting the squadron bar. There are about twenty people that I associate with on a regular basis in the "Hooch." Mark, Dennis and myself have sat together before and had a couple of beers.

COGGINS

They did say that they would have to go to work the next day but they didn't specify a time. I really didn't know if they were on flying status and I don't know if their duty the next day involved flying. I have no knowledge of how long Mark and Dennis might have been here at Incirlik. When I first met them they were new to the area especially the "Hooch" and did indicate to me that were recent arrivals.

I don't believe that to my knowledge that I know of anything else that wasn't covered today that could help in this investigation.

(The standard witness caution was given, the witness had no questions and the interview was concluded at 0825 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of SERGEANT LYNDON R. COGGINS, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

BRYAN T. LAWLER, Lt Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

COGGINS

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YOUNG, LAVERM.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

MAJOR LAVERM YOUNG
C COMPANY, 159th AVIATION REGIMENT
GIEBELSTADT ARMY AIR FIELD, GIEBELSTADT, GERMANY

The interview was conducted by Colonel Bennett, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1451 hours, 22 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

TESTIMONY

My name is Laverm Young, Junior, Major, United States Army. My organization is C Company, Sixth Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment, stationed at Giebelstadt Army Air Field, Giebelstadt, Germany.

My present duty position is Commanding Officer for C Company, Sixth Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment. I have been serving in that position for approximately eleven months. I'm the Commanding Officer of a UH-60, Corps level assault helicopter company assigned to a general support aviation battalion. My duties include the supervision of three flight platoons, a POL platoon, maintenance company, and associated support sections, such as a mess hall, motor pool, communications platoon and what have you. I'm also the commanding officer of the flight detachment that is stationed down in Diyarbakir, Turkey with the mission of supporting Operation Provide Comfort.

At the current strength, I have 134 personnel that are assigned or attached to my company. I keep six aircraft in Diyarbakir and the rest of the aircraft, the other nine are in Germany. After the accident, I now have four aircraft in Diyarbakir and I have eleven now in Germany. I picked up two from the 11th Brigade two days ago. Normally there are 23 personnel and 6 aircraft at Diyarbakir.

There is also an LNO who works the 12th Aviation Brigade Commander that supports me. However, he indirectly works for me. I pass him most of his taskings. We talk on a regular basis and he is assigned up here at Incirlik Air Base and works up here as a go between, between us, the CTF staff and the command structure in Europe. His name is Lt Rogie Malbrough. He has an office in the C4 complex, which is right across the street from the CTF Headquarters, where the French Liaison Team is at, and they've also now moved the C4 folks into that area also. He

is rated by Lt Colonel Coleman, senior rated by Colonel Hayes. His day to day supervisor would be... It's kind of hard to say, because he doesn't really work for anyone per se, with exception of probably the J3. He works closely with him. I would probably say that that would probably be his indirect supervisor, because he gets a lot of information and taskings from the J3.

Off and on, I try to come down to the detachment at Diyarbakir during every rotation. I would say I have been there somewhere in the neighborhood of approximately 30 to 60 days total. I have flown a total of about 10 missions down into the TAOR with my personnel.

My last mission down into the TAOR was a 4 ship mission on 11 or 12 April. No I take that back sir, the 15th, the day after the accident. I was on that mission that went back down to the accident site.

In regards to procedures that we follow concerning transponder operations, we get our missions from the MCC rear. They tell us the day before what missions we have. We get the information from the MCC when they give us our missions. They give us the data that tells us the "SPINs", that basically tells what the codes are, that we have to set into the transponders. We normally set in the transponders, the codes that come directly out of the spins. We normally set 42 in the Mode I, and Mode III, we set the normal codes that are in there, and also in Mode IV, we key that into the Kit 1 Charlie, with the KYK 13, with the codes that are in there. That's the way that we key up the Mode IV. We depart out of Diyarbakir, everything is on, all Modes are operating. When we cross the gate, then we turn off Mode III and Mode Charlie. The entire time that we're inside TAOR, Mode III and Charlie stay off. Crossing the gates heading back into Turkey, then we turn on Mode III and Mode Charlie.

We go through a transponder check to ensure the transponder is operating properly. It's a standard transponder check that's outlined in the Dash 10 and also when the codes are keyed in, if you get certain lights on the transponder, it will tell you that something is inop. Like for instance, if the Kit 1 Charlie or something is inop, then you'll get a little light that will tell you that.

We contacted AWACS during the mission of the 11th or the 12th once we climbed out and frequency changed to Batman. We contacted Cougar, just to give him enroute information. This is us, this is where we're headed. We normally do that as standard procedure.

Not out of Diyarbakir. Once we started climbing to altitude, from 3500 feet to 8500 feet, which is our transition altitude going to Zakhu, then we call Cougar to establish radio communications with them, so that they know exactly where we're at. As I recall, we did that after we had contacted Batman, which is a control in the agency that the Turks use. We

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contacted them and said this is Eagle. And Eagle One called, you know, and said this is us, we're headed toward Zakhu, and of course we use codes. The other time that we contacted them, was departure out of Zakhu. We told them that we were departing Zakhu enroute to code name for Irbil. Coming back we did the same thing. In fact, we had problems at one point trying to contact them and the aircraft climbed to about 800 feet AGL, and then contacted them, and made the call, and then descended back down to training flight altitude. We were about 10 miles to the east of the airport, that's to the north, when we climbed to 800 feet. The name escapes me. It was after Zakhu.

I did contact Cougar between Diyarbakir and Zakhu. I seem to recall making the guys make a call that we were enroute to Zakhu. And again, I remember that. I'm not sure if I established radar contact with Cougar, I don't remember. I did contact Cougar after I left Zakhu, going into the TAOR. So I was in radio communications with Cougar after I left Zakhu.

I'm not sure if I had radar contact with Cougar after I left Zakhu into the TAOR. The only thing that I can recall as far as radar is concerned, is we split up into two different flights. The tanker birds which we had, went down to the south, went to Irbil. The two other aircraft did village hopping. At one point in the flight, Mr. Holden made the comment that he had been interrogated and got the lone interrogation reply light. That was the only thing I remember as far as radar contact being made then.

Mr. Holden was not the pilot in command on my aircraft. He was the chalk 2. He had received interrogation on his Mode IV.

Normally, we get down and if we have problems with radio communications, then we try to get a little altitude to try and get a little bit better radio reception, because of the way our antenna are located and where their antenna is located at. So we try to put a little altitude on us to get off a good radio call.

The MCC Rear is in Pirinclik. The base that we live at. They receive a mission from the MCC forward that's in Zakhu. At that time, they state that it's either a TAOR mission or an admin mission. At that point the MCC rear, then comes over to the Eagle flight commander, who at that time is Capt McKenna and says we have a requirement for two ships or one ship. If it's an admin mission, then we send one aircraft. If it's a TAOR mission, then we send at least two, always at least two. At that point, the crews are selected by the Ops officer, who is normally the platoon leader or the Det commander. Crews are posted on the board. Crews are notified that night that they have a mission and of course crew chiefs are selected. Then aircraft assignments are made by either the maintenance test pilot or the maintenance supervisor or what we call the flight line sergeant, whoever that may be.

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Once we receive the order and the crews are selected. Then the majority of the mission planning and the briefing occurs the next morning. All crews report to operations about 0615. We go through an intel brief. We check the current air tasking order. We also make sure that all the crews are issued their blood chits. Make sure that the crew that's going out in lead has a KYK 13 that's keyed up properly. We then move out to the flight line and of course the flight plan is prepared at that time also. A copy of that flight plan goes over to the Turkish base operations. Normally the operations officer takes it to Turkish base operations.

Then we go out to the hanger and we're issued a weapon. The crew chiefs draw their door guns. They go and hang them on the aircraft. Get the aircraft ready to go. The crews then go out and pre-flight and we launch. Prior to launch, we contact tower for engine start. They'll either approve or disapprove, depending on whether or not the flight plan has been passed to them. If it hasn't, then they will normally delay you, or if there is some other reason, they'll delay you.

At any rate, once we get the clearance to go, we take off. About 5 miles out of Diyarbakir, we frequency change to Batman. Make contact with them, tell them that we're transitioning from 3500 to 8500 feet. Contact AWACS, let them know that we're there and in route to Zakhu. We fly the low level transit route, 1, 2, 3, and 4, which are basically down the valley, and then turn south, and turn east, and then back down into Zakhu. We arrived at Zakhu, we shut down and then we receive a mission briefing as to where we are actually going. Because before we get there, we don't actually know. If it's a TAOR mission, we don't know exactly who we're carrying, or where we're going until after we get that briefing where we shut down.

When I file my flight plan at Turkish base ops at Pirinclik, the route of flight is determined by LLTR, which is low level transit routes 1, 2, 3, and 4. 1 is the corridor going down, 2 is the turn point that takes you down the south, 3 turns you back to east, and 4 is the route that takes you into Zakhu. And that's all it has on there and then it has TAOR on it also. Than means that we're going somewhere inside of the Area Of Operation.

We very seldom know where we're going in the TAOR prior to arriving there. Every once in a while, there will be a meeting at a particular village or I recall one mission, where they wanted us to go out and recon a road. They were looking for a place to build a road over the top of a mountain. We knew the general area, but we didn't know exactly what it was going to involve, the number of people. But very seldom do we know that.

When we get to Zahku, we don't file a flight plan in the formal sense, where you fill out the form. What we do is, when we take off out of Zakhu, we contact Cougar and we use code words that say we're departing out of Zakhu headed to another location. They have a copy of the code sheet, so that they know exactly where we're going.

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We have a UHF frequency that we use to contact Cougar on. I don't recall what the exact frequency is. It's plain UHF. We don't have Have Quick in any of our aircraft.

Our flight plan also gets passed to MCC Forward at Zakhu. We call them up on the radio and we tell them that we're off at this time. Again, we use the same code words. That we're enroute to, you know, destination, depending on that code. So the MCC forward in Zakhu has the route of flight and Cougar has the route of flight.

An example of what we would say to them about the route of flight, would be for instance, if we were going to Irbil, if I was contacting Cougar, we would say Cougar this is Eagle One, we're off of say, Alpha enroute to [code word for Irbil]. When we say we are enroute to [a point], it means that we are going direct to that point. That means we are going in a straight line to that point. As straight as terrain will allow us, because what we try and do..., because of the threat down in that area, we try and mask ourselves behind hills, try and travel in the low ground to stay as low as possible, and to stay out of range of any ADA weapon system that may come up on us. So even though we're going to Irbil, it's not a direct line of flight, where you climb up and just go directly, it would be down valleys, streams. Very seldom do we fly on the other side of the ridge at the Dahuk, unless we have to go down at the Dahuk. We kind of stay in that little valley on the other side of that ridge line. Because again, it puts terrain between us and the enemy.

I don't know if our route of flight or our mission is passed from the MCC forward at Zakhu to the MCC rear after we get there or to the CTF in Incirlik. I don't think it is, I really don't.

We always contact AWACS or Cougar after departure from Zakhu. That's standard procedure. In fact we won't fly in the TAOR. Up until a couple of months ago, actually up until about 6 months ago, they would allow us to fly into the TAOR without Cougar's coverage. We expressed some concerns about flying around down there without any AWACS coverage, so now they published a new order that said that we would not fly in the TAOR without Cougar being up. That order came out of the J3 shop. It was in the form of a memo as I recall. I think I still have a copy of that memo, I'll go back and check. I'm not sure if the memo says radio coverage or radar coverage, I don't recall. The only thing I recall is that it said that we would, if I'm not mistaken, and its been such a long time that we would not fly in the TAOR without Cougar's coverage or AWACS coverage is what it said I think.

I actually had no responsibilities in connection for the preparation of the Eagle Flight mission of 14 April, because I had come back up to Incirlik to talk to the J3 about putting a non-directional beacon down in Zakhu that would allow us to fly IFR from Diyarbakir down into Zakhu. And I wanted to express my concerns about doing that and about rushing that beacon in

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operation without first coming up with a procedure... to get down there. So I was up here and very little mission prep... input in the mission prep for that.

A couple of things are presented to my unit to give them threat information on what is going on in the TAOR and the local area at Diyarbakir. One, we get intel updates from the J2. They normally will send somebody down at our request to do a threat briefing and kind of give us the big picture. For missions, we normally receive a little intel summary from MCC Rear, which is there at Pirinclik that says this is what's going on. And other than that, that's about all we get. We do not get any threat update at MCC forward at Zakhu.

We don't receive a threat briefing from MCC Rear, we just pass the intel summary. A piece of paper that just says this is what's going on. Here's what's here. As far as the mission briefing, Maj Bethel, and before, it was Maj Cheefer, would come over and say this is what you've got, this is what time you're leaving, here's the number of pax that are coming in from Incirlik that you will probably have to carry down. And of course, if it's the MCC Rear commander, he would then tell us it's a TAOR mission or it's an admin mission, which means, we just take stuff down to Zakhu and we come back if it's an admin mission.

A crewchief is responsible for maintenance of the aircraft, preparing the aircraft for the flight, and supervising the duties of the gunner, which is kind of his assistant. The crewchief also acts as another set of eyes inside of the aircraft especially when we're low level and identifying targets. When I say targets, I'm talking about additional aircraft that may be flying around down there. So, besides the maintenance, they also act as another crew member on board the aircraft.

The gunner will assist in some maintenance functions. The gunner's main responsibility is act as a gunner first and than act as an assistant to that crewchief, as such we will try and keep maintenance personnel in the gunner's positions. Although, we have had some non-maintenance personnel in those positions. In which case, those personnel do not work on the aircraft. The gunner is also supposed to identify targets or other aircraft in the area.

I can't say that I have the duties of the crewchiefs and gunners written down, not right off hand. Not something that would distinguish, this is what a gunner does, this is what a crew chief does. I don't recall having that written down or in the SOP that's down here.

There's a Mode IV check that's required. But it's a periodic check. As far as a daily check of the transponder, we do that whenever we put it in operation before we fly. And again, because we're keying Mode IV up, and if it doesn't take the secure code, then it will tell you that it's dropped off line. But other than that, there is no checks that I've ever seen that said we do that.

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No I do not have a daily requirement on these missions to check in and do a transponder or a code check with Cougar. What I have seen in the past is that when you check in with Cougar, then they'll tell you that you've got radar contact. Of course, we assume that everything is working, but other than that, there is nothing written that said they will check our transponder or give us a Mode IV check. We have asked for Mode IV checks. The mission I was on, on the 11th, we asked for a Mode IV check and their response was that their system wasn't up and operating, to that effect. So we didn't do a Mode IV check for that particular aircraft on that day. Whoever the Cougar operator was we were talking to on UHF told us their system wasn't up and operating. I don't know who exactly that was.

My maintenance test pilot is responsible for supervising the SERV-AIR contract workers. They are rotated out periodically, usually within 90 days, from SERV-AIR workers in Germany. It's not just out of my unit, they come from any unit within Germany, they can be sent down here. But it's my maintenance test pilot that supervises the work of the SERV-AIR. He's also assisted by the flight line sergeant, who ever that may be. So their priorities, as far what's to be worked on and what's needs to be done, is usually set by the maintenance test pilot.

The contractor does have AVIM level responsibilities. We do some bearing changes, that are normally AVIM level. There's certain sheet metal repairs that would be AVIM level, that they will actually go out there and do. And some component repairs, and I couldn't get into the specifics.

I cannot with 100 percent certainty say yes the contractor has the AVIM level manuals and technical manuals that they need to do their job. I do know they do have some of the AVIM manuals down here. I don't think they have them all.

I think the maintenance posture of the detachment at Diyarbakir is pretty good. In fact, I think it's excellent, with the OPTEMPO that we're running down there, the number of hours that we fly, and the limited amount of time that we work on those aircraft. We have been maintaining an operational readiness rate of somewhere around 92 percent. I think that's excellent, with the mission that these guys are doing.

For unit level maintenance, I would say yes, I feel that we have all the current technical manuals and publications that we are required to have. For AVIM level maintenance, if I had to do a task, or if those guys had to do a task, I would say I don't know. Because again, I'm not real sure exactly, what manuals they have.

There's a couple ways that we ensure the detachment receives the necessary changes if needed to its publications. One, we established an account for them, and two, if a change comes in, my maintenance platoon leader in Germany sends down changes to the detachment

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periodically to be incorporated into their manuals. Their account is located in Germany and the mail box for this account is in Germany. We get some publications from Baltimore, some from Rodelheim.

The only other information that I could probably add is that I was in the JOC when the accident occurred. Having been there and talked to... and hearing people talk, I was kind of involved in the whole process and up until the time that I jumped back on a plane and went back down. And one of the things that was said, that AWACS had made radar contact with Eagle flight when they took off. And that Captain McKenna had contacted AWACS and had reported that he was off of Zakhu and off to the code word which is Irbil, and that they had had radar contact with them and they lost it. And they assumed, because they had dropped down behind a ridge line or something like that, and that they had radar contact. Now that was the information that was passed to the JOC while I was standing there.

They were talking on one of the radios that was up in the corner of the JOC back there, and they passed it to Colonel O'Brien. And then he passed it to me and said " Yeah well, we know they were..." Because we weren't sure at that point, the radio had come on, and they had said that the Harrier pilot said that they had saw two aircraft in a parking lot in Irbil. And at that point, I said, well those were my guys, that's where they were going. He then told me that he was going to have the Harriers go back down to Irbil to take a look. As it turned out the Harriers ended up going over to the crash site, taking pictures of the crash site. When I was first notified to come up to the JOC, they had told me, that they had thought the aircraft were two Hind-Ds. And that our aircraft had just made it to Irbil and that Captain McKenna had failed to call him, call Cougar and tell him that he had reached Irbil, after a couple of hours, then I told them McKenna doesn't normally make a mistake like that, cause he's got SATCOM, he's got UHF. And I called my guys back at Diyarbakir, at Pirinclik...

It started with my platoon leader... came over to get me out. I was over in the VOQ room and he said they needed to see me over at the JOC ASAP. So I went over to the JOC, went in, and Colonel O'Brien briefed me, and he told me that two F-15s had shot down, or had reported that they had shot down two Hinds. And he asked me where were our aircraft, and I told him they were going...

This was close to noon, sir. It was about 10 o'clock. I think it was between 10 and 11 o'clock, somewhere around there. He a... In fact it was around 10 o'clock as I recall. He told me that they had been shot down. However there was some concern because Eagle 1 and 2 had taken off and that he said that they had had contact with them going out of Zakhu. That they had reported departing Zakhu enroute to Irbil. And he used the term, and that they reported the code word. And he asked me what the code word was, and I told him I'd have to get the little code sheet and tell him exactly where those coordinates were and where they were going. I sent Lt

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Malbrough out to find the crews. I had two crews that had just arrived that were going to do a night vision goggle flight up here. And I asked him to go out and find them, find that sheet, so I could tell him what the code word was.

At that time, he told me that there was concern and that they shot those two aircraft down, and ours had not been reported. However, he didn't think at that point, that they were our aircraft. Because he said that AWACS had got a radar... had picked them up on radar, then it lost them. Because he assumed that they had dropped behind the hills or something. And that they had actually reported departing Zakhu in route to Irbil. So he told me to stick around until we could figure out what was going on. About an hour passed. Information started coming in. The next thing that came in was, he said that the Harriers had just reported that they flew over a parking lot and that there were two Blackhawks in the parking lot, just on the north side of Irbil. And I said those were probably my aircraft, because that's where they were actually headed, down near Irbil. He then turned to one of the staff officers and said lets get those guys back over the parking lot and verify that the aircraft are in the parking lot.

They started working that, and then he came back to me and said well there's another theory, your guys have not arrived yet. And the theory is that the Hind-Ds may have shot them down, or fired at them and they went somewhere and hid, and that our fighters shot down the two Hind-Ds. I told him, I said well sir, our guys were in that same area. And he says well, when you find out exactly where McKenna is at, I want you to give him a big hug, and then I want you to kick him in the butt for not reporting. And at that time, I told him sir, that's unlike Captain McKenna to go somewhere without reporting to us. One, he has a SATCOM radio, portable SATCOM radio that they take with them and he would have reported to somebody.

I got on the telephone, called back to Eagle operations at Pirinclik and asked the RTO, Specialist Harvey, if he had heard from Captain McKenna on the SATCOM because we monitor it back there also. He said no he hadn't. I asked him to keep trying to get touch with him. And as soon as he had contact with him, to call me back at the JOC to let me know they were on the ground safely. So time unfolded and then a report came in that Kurds were on the site. I guess some pilots had flown over the site, and that the concern then in the JOC was that people would start taking stuff. So they said that they were going to send some Harriers out to take some photos. The photos came back in and they went down to the British, a little information center. There was a UH-60 pilot, Air Force type, that was on duty, a Major. He went down to view the photos. I asked the ah... Colonel O'Brien, if I could go down and look at them also, since we suspected that they were our aircraft.

I went down to the British information, the little intel center, looked at the photos and identified pieces that looked like a Blackhawk. Namely the overhead cowling, that covers up the pilot's (inaudible) area. There was a door that goes around the engine that we use for a work

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platform. I told them that definitely looked like a Blackhawk. The other Blackhawk Air Force guy agreed. He said yes, this is probably the wreckage of a Blackhawk. At that time they didn't know where the second wreckage was at. They said that the guys were still out there looking.

They gave me a copy of the photo, asked that if, when I was done with the photo, if I would destroy it. Once I got up there, I told the British Major, that I was riding with, I'd just give it to him. Since it was their product and he could destroy it. We went back up to the JOC, they had... by then they had other photos that they had taken. And we looked at it, and from different views. I then told them that yes, I thought those were our aircraft. At the point, Colonel O'Brien grabbed some of the photos and I guess he went downstairs to talk to General Pilkington. I told him that I needed to get back out to the Detachment at Diyarbakir. And he said "Standby."

The next thing they said, well we need to get some guys down... We need to get people down to the site. A photographer. And they said well, can you guys go back down. I said well sir, I got an aircraft sitting out on the ramp and I'm up here. So I would say all the crews were up here. If those two guys are our folks, then there are no more crews down in Diyarbakir. So I said, I would have to turn that aircraft and send it back. About that time the crews came up, not knowing what had happen. I told them to get the aircraft ready to go and return to Diyarbakir, and I would brief them when I got there. They kept asking why, I said I can't tell you right now, because I've been told not to say anything, not to release any information. You guys need to turn and burn and get back down to Diyarbakir and stand by and get two aircraft ready to go. And we'll launch when I get down there. So that crew took off.

I went back upstairs and they started talking about launching the JSOTF folks. They had some problems getting those guys launched, because one, the Turks were insistent that Eagle Flight do it. I explained to the Turkish General that we couldn't do it because all the crews were up here or enroute and there was nobody down there to launch from there. Finally the General got the go to launch JSOTF. It took him awhile to get three aircraft out and down there. Then the problem came up, and then they had problems with trying to get approval for the tanker to launch to refuel. By then, I went down and caught a C-12 back down to Diyarbakir and went back down on site. And waited for the aircraft to come in. The first aircraft came in about 2 in the morning with the bodies on board. And then one at about 4, and then one about 5:30.

Again we off-loaded the bodies. And then that morning or late that night I got a call from the JOC and Col O'Brien said hey, I'm going to need you guys to go back out to the site tomorrow, cause we need to go back out there. So I told him I would check with the crews. I didn't know what condition my guys would be in and I would let him know in the morning if we could fly. He asked how soon could we be ready to get back in the saddle and go back out there. I told ah... because most of the crews had been back out. I told him about 11 o'clock departure would be about the proper time that we could get out there.

YOUNG

Got the crews up the next morning, briefed them, I told them that I only wanted the senior personnel on the flight because of what we had to go out there to do. And that was basically, we were told that there were certain remains that were missing. We had to take a mortuary out there, an EOD guy out there, and we had to go out and look for parts that they didn't recover the night before. So I put together probably the most senior people we had in the detachment. And we launched and we went back out there the next day. Took off at 11, about 1115, and stayed on site until late that evening when it started to get dark. Brought everybody back in. The mortuary team had showed up, had all the caskets laid out and they started putting the bodies in caskets and then they flew them out. The 141 left and headed back to Germany.

There isn't anything else that I would like to add. That's about it sir. That's about the way it unfolded.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness that no questions. The interview was concluded at 1548.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of MAJOR LAVERM YOUNG, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

YOUNG

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TAB V-047

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NETHERLAND, SCOTT R.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

SCOTT R. NETHERLAND, MAJ
HHC, 12TH AVN BDL
CMR 467, BOX 5014
APO AE 09096

The interview was conducted by LTC Scott C. Black, at Pirinclik, Turkey, beginning at 1610 hours, 20 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

EXAMINATION

I am at this moment the Interim Detachment Commander for Eagle Flight, as a result of the loss of Captain McKenna on the mission and when Lieutenant Aguillard went back to Germany on the day of the incident. There was no commissioned officer here to serve as the Detachment Commander. I am essentially between jobs.

On 13 and 14 April 1994, I had completed a transition from my duties as Brigade Adjutant, and I am the in-coming Company Commander to take command of Charley 6/159 Avn Bn at Giebelstadt, Germany. I was here to do a change of command inventory of the unit property located with Eagle Flight in Turkey.

I played no direct role in the mission. The previous day, the 13th of April 1994, I had flown to get an idea of what the mission of Operation Provide Comfort was all about, and concluded the orientation around 1600 hours. After we returned, we secured the aircraft and visited with Sergeant Finely, the supply Sergeant, to wrap up some of the items that were changed on the inventory. There was no mission that was done that was a rehearsal for the mission on the 14th of April 1994, I think that might be a misconception.

I was not involved at all in the pre-mission planning for the 14th of April 1994, because that was my departure day. I got to the flight line as the crew were pre-flighting and getting ready to depart on their mission. I actually left on a C-12 before they departed on their mission. I saw the crew out pre-flighting the aircraft. I went by each aircraft to bid my farewells to the individuals that I had met during the week.

On the 13th of April 1994, I was in the Ops office and I did hear the mission briefing for the 13th of April 1994.

I was not aware of the pre-mission brief activities for the 14th of April 1994. I did not talk to Captain McKenna at all about the mission on the 14th of April 1994. I did not talk to any other pilots about the pre-briefs for the 14th of April 1994.

I am familiar with the mission briefing procedures that is an Army standard brief sheet for a mission, which is a routine that the crews go through everyday.

On the 14th of April 1994, I left on a C-12 prior to the launching of the Eagle Mission. I arrived in Incirlik and linked up with Major Young. We went to the Officer's Club for lunch. While we were at lunch, Lieutenant Aguillard came in and mentioned to Major Young that he needed to speak with him privately. After about 15 minutes when Major Young had not returned, I left the Club. I then went to the terminal because we were expecting to depart for Germany. I somehow got in touch with Major Young and found out that the situation was very much developing itself. But, what Major Young could tell me at that point in time was that there was a report that two F-15s had shot down two Hind helicopters. However, AWACS had not been in contact with the Eagle Flight. So, we were very much concerned that something was awry, but we didn't know any of the details. I inquired of Major Young if there was anything that I could or should do. We were trying to prepare to come to Germany on the C-5 that afternoon. Major Young said that there was nothing that I could do at that point, and that I should just continue back to Germany. I boarded the C-5 not knowing exactly what had happened on the ground, and I returned to Germany. Upon my return I called back to the Brigade Headquarters and confirmed our suspicion that it was, in fact, the Black Hawks.

The first day that I arrived here was on the 9th of April 1994 and I was here through the 14th of April 1994. I left on the 14th of April 1994 and came back on the 16th of April 1994.

There is nothing that stands out in my mind that would be of value to your investigation.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of SCOTT F. NETHERLAND, as given, and sworn to, before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

Scott C. Black

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
MICHAEL J. MENARD, CW4
V CORPS(CASSD)
ILLESHEIM, GERMANY

The interview was conducted by CW5 Steven A. Meline at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1051 hours, 25 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I am CW4 Michael J. Menard, CW4, attached to the V Corps Safety and Standardization Detachment, which is home based out of Hanau-Mulheim, and Illesheim, Germany. I'm the Standardization Instructor Pilot and Instrument Flight Examiner for the UH-60 for CASSD, the Corps Aviation Safety and Standardization Detachment.

The Detachment is responsible for aviation standardization and recently aviation safety for the whole European Theater. I'm the UH-60 representative -- one of two UH-60 representatives in that Detachment.

I volunteered to come down and do a rotation as a member of Eagle Flight and to deploy with field units, because of my responsibility for standardization in this theater. This is a recurring mission that has visibility and a large amount of critical missions performed by my aircraft type, specifically the UH-60. Obviously, the UH-60 is the only thing that Eagle Flight uses. So, I went to my commander and volunteered to come down here and do a rotation as a pilot to see how things were going, and to ensure as an invited guest, at least rather than an evaluator, to see that procedures were being followed and techniques that were being used were appropriate for the mission that they were trying to accomplish.

During assignment to Eagle Flight, I was a UH-60 pilot. I flew with the pilots in command by my own request. When I came down, I talked to Major Young, who is the Company Commander for the parent organization for Eagle Flight back in Giebelstadt. Subsequently Captain McKenna, who was the Detachment Commander, requested that I only perform duties as a pilot rather than a pilot in command or an instructor pilot. So, I would be given the opportunity to fly with all the pilots in command repeatedly because that was my primary concern. I didn't want to come down here and do duties as an instructor. I wanted to fly with PCs, which would afford me the best opportunity to see exactly what procedures were being done and how things were going.

In the standard mission profile, there were primarily two types, but we had what we referred to as an Admin Mission or an Administration Mission where we take-off out of Diyarbakir and fly down to Zakhu, land, normally shut down and then wait for an

indefinite time on the ground, come back to Diyarbakir. Then, the other mission profile is what we referred to as a TAOR mission which is Tactical Area of Operational Responsibility, I think. But, for a TAOR mission we would, again, fly down to Zakhu, be briefed for exactly where the MCC members wanted to go, and then we would either shut-down and up-load after we refueled and then go into the AOR and conduct a mission for the day, return to Zakhu, of course, drop them off, gas and then go back to Diyarbakir.

The MCC briefed us when we got to Zakhu before going out on a mission into the TAOR. Any time before we went out into the AOR on the missions that I flew, I do understand that this is not universal, but occasionally they would go down and be prebriefed. They knew what village -- they had been to the same villages before so the passengers would be awaiting on arrival. They would refuel. The passengers would up-load, and then they would go. But, just coincidentally, all the TAOR missions that I flew, we shut down and went inside. Major Sanders usually briefed all the individuals that were involved in the mission depending on what it was. While he briefed the pilots, they had a one over fifty, a small scale tactical map up on the wall where they briefed, very explicitly briefed, the routes, the villages they wanted to stop at, how long they anticipated being on the ground, and the route back. They had the whole thing on the map, and it was primarily, I think, for the pilots' sake so that we would know exactly where they wanted to go and what they wanted to do. Of course, on one of the other walls they had the seating diagram for each aircraft exactly where everyone would be seated, and let us know if there were any special considerations for what they wanted to see, who was going to be sitting on which side of the aircraft and other factors like that. So, we usually got an extensive briefing on the ground while we were shut-down before we ever went out into the TAOR.

I'm afraid I'm not that familiar with the process of how Eagle Flight received their mission from the start, because this is my only rotation, and not being a member of the organization involved in the operations and that process, the information that I would give you would be -- I mean, I know they come from MCC and then Major Bethel passes them on to the Eagle Flight's Ops officer about 5:30 the night before. That's about all I can tell you. I know that's not very helpful, but I'm not really familiar with all that.

To the best of my knowledge Eagle Flight did not fly a rehearsal flight prior to the actual mishap mission. There was no rehearsal of that particular mission other than the exact same mission had been flown before. I mean, from what I understand their destination and the probable route that they had flown, it was relatively routine. There would have been no need to rehearse what they were doing. I do not recall the previous date was of the same mission flown by Eagle Flight.

I'm not sure what you mean by a "regular mission" on the 14th of April. But, the

notification for the AOR mission was given, to the best of my recollection, the day before -- Captain McKenna and Mr. Holden, who will be able to tell you much better shortly. The AOR mission for that day originally had four aircraft going down. The reason that I was involved in that is because Mr. Holden and I were scheduled to come here to fly night vision goggles for that up-coming weekend. I believe the 14th was Thursday. Ken and I left to come up, and we were in the air actually flying to Incirlik when the accident occurred. So, I'm just pointing out the fact that originally we had been involved. There was some talk about canceling the goggle trip that weekend because we needed four aircraft to go into the AOR on the 14th. So, I would characterize that from what I'm familiar with as a -- I'm not sure, again, what you mean exactly by regular mission requirements, but I think that came down relatively routinely, and they went back to two aircraft in the AOR. So, Ken and I were released to go ahead and go to Incirlik.

The coordination altitude for rotary wing aircraft is 400 feet AGL and below. I've heard a couple of different things as to coordination for the fighters; I'm not familiar with that. I've certainly seen them lower than 10,000 feet, which was one figure I heard initially, and I've heard other things. We would occasionally see fast movers in the AOR much lower than 10,000 feet.

I flew both aircraft prior to the mishap on the 14th of April. In fact, I would characterize the condition of both aircraft, specifically, and certainly the aircraft that I have flown since I have been here during this mission as far above average. In terms, as you are well aware, when we conduct a mission like this and go through the procedure that we do to key up all our radios and get the right codes in all the right places that they need to be, that often does not go smoothly. It's doable but it takes a lot of work. But, that process had been refined here better than I have seen it in my career frankly, because I'm not sure there is a big mystery as to why that is but it certainly worked extremely well. The avionics were a go-no-go factor for AOR missions so they paid a lot of close attention to them and they worked extremely well. I was not aware of any write-ups that could have degraded any of the avionics.

Both of the UH-60s had external wing tanks on them. On a routine basis to do the AOR mission, my personal preference as a pilot and not as a CASSD guy, is, if I'm going out on that AOR mission, I prefer to have the tanks and have some fuel in them because of the distances that we travel. Usually, the cargo requirements were minimal. That is to say that we filled the aircraft with PAX. We still had no power limitations in terms of doing this mission. So, as a pilot I would much rather have an extra 100 gallons of gas

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and not need it than get stuck out in the AOR. Because of the criticality of the terrain we were flying in and not to mention the threat being out there and finding yourself in a low fuel situation has obvious implications. So, to answer your question, I would have to respond affirmatively.

Not all of the aircraft with the tanks are scheduled for AOR missions, but we routinely did. We didn't have all the aircraft configured with ESSS; the external tanks. So, it was just a luxury we did not have. I certainly preferred it, but it wasn't always the case.

The distinctive identification or other markings on the two aircraft were at least six large red, white and blue American flags painted on the outside of the external tanks, on the cargo doors and on the bottom of the aircraft.

Helicopters could conduct missions in the area without AWACS being airborne. To the best of my knowledge, as long as we did not exit the security zone we could do so without AWACS coverage. We could conduct a mission and occasionally did a mission in the TAOR as long as we did not go outside the boundary of the security zone.

The common frequency for AWACS, fighters and helicopters while we are in the TAOR that can be used by all aircraft is mission primary. Normally, going down to the AOR, the requirement for AWACS contact fell on the second aircraft; Chalk 2. So, most days, of course we get the information when -- we would know when AWACS would be up and often times we could get them even before they were all the way ready to conduct their -- but we would contact AWACS usually as soon as we left Diyarbakir, regardless of when we thought they were going to be mission ready, because often times we would get them on the way out when they were kind of gearing up so to speak. Every time that I did that and they were available, they would have us radar contact before we got away from the airfield boundary. Often times I would just call AWACS by their call sign and say, "This is Eagle 1", and they would respond before I requested anything, before I told them where I was or anything; they would respond with radar contact. They knew we were there before we even called. So, initial contact with AWACS was normally not a problem if they were in the air. On occasion we would not contact AWACS initially leaving Diyarbakir because the Frag would not have them in the air until let's say 9:30, and if we took off at 8:30 we would assume AWACS was not available. I can't say if everyone contacted AWACS or attempted to contact AWACS until that time, but normally they did. As soon as we got off we contacted AWACS and told them where we were going just for flight following purposes.

The UH-60 is Have-Quick capable generically. There are different types of Have-Quick. I'm not prepared to discuss the Have-Quick idiosyncrasies because I'm not familiar

MENARD

with it. But, I do know that we are Have-Quick capable with some of our UHF radios, not all of them, and then there are others of our UHF radios that have modifications made to them which I think is classified to make them more Have-Quick capable than the others. We have some of both of those radios, but not all of our aircraft are Have-Quick capable by definition to the same level.

Flight following procedures that Eagle Flight would use in the TAOR is a relative term, because flight following, in fact, by regulation is not mandatory. We flight follow internally. We have two aircrews. We are required to have two aircrews to be in the AOR. So, as far as flight following goes in terms of I'm going out and I want someone to know where I've left and where I'm going to, our primary -- at least in my perception -- flight following is certainly internal. We back that up, and we are required by regulation to do position reporting to, and we certainly do that with Cougar in the AOR -- I'm sorry, with AWACS in the AOR. The problem, of course, is that AWACS wasn't always up. When we were in the AOR, we would not be guaranteed that they would still be on station. The times I was in the AOR, I would say usually when we had that problem it was rarely in the morning because they were usually up fairly early. So, when we were on our way out on a mission, we could almost always contact AWACS. Coming back in, occasionally, they'd be off-station before we left the sites that we were visiting, and we would recover to Zakhu without AWACS coverage.

If we went to a field site out in the AOR and we were unable to contact AWACS, we had the MCC individuals who had communications with their base everywhere we went. One of the first things that they did everywhere we went, regardless of our ground time, was immediately establish communications with Arrow base.

I am not familiar with the process with Arrow base contacting either the JOC or the AWACS to let them know that we had arrived at our location.

"Position reporting" is required by regulation. Our Army Regulation 95-1, this is our general aviation requirements, which requires all VFR aircraft to position report with certain intervals. Flight following is not a regulatory requirement. We flight follow normally by SOP. In USAREUR, for example, the individual aviation brigades have varying missions and they have their own flight following requirements predicated on the kind of mission they are on and the area that they are operating in. If they are operating at very low altitudes in the TAOR environment, for example, they are required to flight follow more often and more restrictively than if they are just on a high altitude routine administrative mission. But, flight following is one of those subjective terms. The pilot in command by strict definition has more latitude to flight follow at his option in some cases than he does position reporting. Position reporting is not optional, flight following is.

MENARD

But, having said that, it's one of those interchangeable terms we oftentimes when we as aviators say position reporting or flight following they are virtually interchangeable. Strictly by definition as I just said, they are different, but when we talk about flight following and position reporting we really make the distinction of which one is which.

We find the codes that are required to be placed in the transponders for the day's mission in the SPINS --the Air Tasking Order -- that we get each day, which is classified. It lists them explicitly by aircraft type and by Mode type.

Mode I is different and has been changing almost daily in its format just recently. This is a variable. If this is what I was provided prior to my mission, there is our Non-AOR Mode for us, and this is, obviously, classified on Mode IV. Outside the 50 nautical mile circle aircraft -- that 50 nautical mile circle aircraft is the terminal control area around Incirlik Air Base and we would squawk 2400 for Mode III. And Mode II it says it's on Frag line and I would then go back to my individual aircraft Frag line -- it's all highlighted for me on a daily basis when I pick it up.

The specific Mode information that would be placed in the aircraft, if I was in the lead aircraft, on Mode II, I would squawk 5530 as Eagle 1, and 5531 as Eagle 2 on Mode III. For Non-AOR Modes, Mode I, I would squawk 42. For Mode I, II, 5530. Mode III would be 2400. And Mode IV is classified. I don't set Mode IV. I just get my classified equipment in the aircraft keyed in the morning. If we went into the TAOR the Modes would change, that's why I say this was a little different than what I expected to see. That's why I was kind of stumbling with it initially. But, in the last few days in the missions that I flew, there was inside the AOR Mode I and an outside the AOR Mode I, I don't see that. I'm not reading this word for word. It had been right in the same vicinity as the other Mode Is; I don't see it today.

Prior to the 14th of April, when I flew missions inside the AOR, I did not change the Mode I frequency. There was one single Mode I code, and we entered that prior to take-off and that remained for the entire mission.

Each pilot in command of the aircraft, sir, were provided a copy of what Mode I and Mode II frequencies were to be taken with them in the cockpit. We had a mission briefing before each day's mission, and part of that briefing discussed things like transponder code. In addition to that, if I wanted to look it up to verify it I had a copy of the document in the cockpit with me.

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The briefing officer provided the briefing of Mode I, Mode II or Mode IV in the briefing and provided a sketch that laid out these frequencies. Prior to the accident we squawked Mode I, IV, II, that didn't take up a lot of our briefing time because it was unchanged; it was as previous missions each time. We would verify that just quickly before the briefing with the SPINS.

Normally, the crew chief for the day prior to take-off while the APU is on-line will key Mode IV on the aircraft. We have an auxiliary power unit on the UH-60 that provides a certain type of power that we do not have with just the battery switch on. So, after we crank the APU, we would then key up the radios. Another reason for that is that without the APU on-line, not all of our secure equipment except one radio can be keyed, or punched, or made operational. So, we normally waited until we cranked the APU, but that did vary. It was normally the crew chief. If we had any problems with any of the secure radios being operational or the KIT IC being keyed for the day, we would just call the maintenance guys over who were very knowledgeable and very familiar with the little idiosyncrasies about making that happen. Every single time that we called them over, they were successful almost immediately in solving the problem. Of course, they were always available. If one of the KYs wasn't taking a fill for the day they would change it out immediately. They were prepared to deal with that problem, and -- rather than make us sit on the ramp, running, waiting to launch, they would have the KY pulled and a new one in in just a matter of minutes, literally.

The maintenance personnel, I'm afraid I only know them as SERV-AIR, but they are civilian contractors who do routine maintenance on the aircraft at Diyarbakir. There are four of them, at least there were four on my rotation. That's the maintenance guys that I was talking about. I'm not really sure if the SERV-AIR personnel have security clearances to work with the classified radio systems and key the aircraft that you know of.

An aircraft would be rejected for a mission with inop transponders.

I have not encountered any other helicopter in the area during our flights while I was in the TAOR.

Both of the aircraft had chaff installed. Doctrinally we deploy chaff. It was something that we discussed in academics, and I would suggest that most of the pilots would, in fact, if they were locked on by some radar on their ASE equipment and, in fact, on their air survivability equipment, their APR 39 will indicate when the type of weapon is, in fact, tracking you. Verbally, I don't know if that's classified or not -- I think it is -- but it will actually tell you if it is tracking you and what direction it is coming from and whether a missile is involved in the process.

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(The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board recessed at 1239 hours, 29 April 1994 and resumed at 1242 hours.)

EXAMINATION CONTINUING

I was going to allude to the fact that is there is some subjectivity in terms of where you are, what you are doing, what you have routinely seen on your aircraft's survivability equipment in previous flights, or previous days, or even that day. But chaff is cheap, and if I thought I was locked on -- by something -- by any type of missile, there is a toggle switch that is very easily reached, and I would definitely punch chaff without any hesitation whatsoever.

Chaff has been deployed during a mission by Eagle Flight in the TAOR.

To my knowledge there is nothing written in the SOP about when you abort a mission, degrade it for inop ASE. I have read the SOP, and there is explicit criteria for aborting a mission, but the question is too vague. There were too many variables with Colonel Thompson on board, and then depending on where we were and what mission we were doing. To "abort" is a relative term, that is to say especially with two aircraft out there. If, and again, I think it would be dependent on which piece of equipment we were talking about and whether we would turn around and to head home, based on an IFF light -- identification friendly or foe light -- in the cockpit. I'm afraid it's too subjective. To my knowledge that is not addressed explicitly in the SOP, that, "If that happens you will do the following", because of the subjectivity. The mission came first, and Colonel Thompson was a real smart guy and if he wanted to continue I think we would probably continue the mission.

While I was flying on Eagle Flight missions, I have not had a master caution light come on with an IFF segment light when being interrogated by AWACS.

The operations clerk at Eagle Operations did not prepare mission briefing sheets for us off of the ATO. He would provide us the SPINS in that he would go through and highlight the information that we needed on a recurring basis. He would circle our line numbers. When I say highlight, that varied. Sometimes it was actually a highlighter, or he would just block it in in black pen. But we could quickly find our line numbers, the transponders codes and sometimes the code words for the day would be there. Information for the AWACS would always be blocked out. But, the aircrew mission briefing process itself, as you know, the operations clerk is not really involved in that process. So, he did not provide that on the aircrew mission briefing form itself. That was located in the SPINS; we extracted that individually ourselves.

MENARD

I believe that a policy letter from the MCC Commander mentioned that helicopters could conduct missions in the area without AWACS being airborne; I'm not sure about that. That was the type of information that as a CASSD person conducting this mission with Eagle Flight, if I was to ask that question I readily accepted what I was told rather than -- because it was not an issue. If, they said they had, in fact, permission to operate in the AOR without AWACS coverage, I did not pursue that as to say, "Well, show me in black and white." That wasn't the purpose of my visit.

To the best of my knowledge, fighter coverage was not a requirement for AOR missions.

To the best of my knowledge, we never inquired as to whether or not the fighters went through the AOR and sanitized it before we went into the AOR had transpired before we arrived. So, it was our assumption that that was not a requirement or we would have inquired as to whether or not the AOR was clean prior to entry, and we did not do that routinely.

When we contacted AWACS, we normally went to the enroute frequency. The enroute frequency for all aircraft, is 257.3, which varied according to the ATO but we remained on the enroute frequency as we conducted our mission, both enroute on the way to the AOR and then while we were enroute in the AOR.

What I meant, when I said that you could contact the fighters on mission primary frequency while we were in the AOR, was that that was a common frequency. The few times we were pushed to mission primary by AWACS, I did notice a significant increase in the radio traffic. So, I would assume that is where they spent some of their time, but I don't know that all the fighters were up mission primary anymore because we weren't on mission primary. I would occasionally hear AWACS pushing what I would assume to be a fighter by call sign to a different frequency. So, there is a lot of frequencies in the ATO in addition to the enroute frequency and the mission primary frequency. There is probably 20 other frequencies listed in there for different purposes. So, I really don't know which frequency they spent most of their time on, but I think mission primary would be where I would go if I was instructed to contact someone.

I have seen the Airspace Coordination order, but I don't recall if there is any guidance for what frequency we should be on in the AOR.

The times when I have contacted AWACS, they come back with a special code word as to the condition of your equipment. On occasion we have a maintenance requirement for our transponders to test the Mode IV capability periodically, and I believe that's every 25 hours. I'm not sure about that maintenance requirement, but I do know

MENARD

when it's entered in the log book and it is due. We would routinely request what we call a Mode IV sweep from the AWACS. They would normally say, "Stand-by" and within a minute, sometimes 30 seconds, we would indicate that they had done that, and the code word that they would normally use would be "sweet," that it was functioning as advertised and "sour" if it was not.

We would not receive these code words when we contacted AWACS routinely. We would just get radar contact.

There were no procedures to follow if radar contact was lost with AWACS in the AOR, because it happened on a routine basis. The altitude we fly and the type of terrain in AOR, we would routinely go behind ridge lines so there would be no coverage. In addition to that, when we would call off of a location and arrival at a location, and in-between those two points, we did not routinely talk to AWACS. We didn't do a five minute radio check or update every fifteen minutes. We would call off of WHISKEY, for example, and go enroute to Lima; we would call arrival at Lima. So, if we lost radar contact in-between, we would be unaware of it, unless AWACS called us and said radar lost. I personally never experienced that in AOR. However, I never experienced AWACS calling us up to say, "contact lost" in the AOR, nor did they call us to reconfirm radio contact.

When we would land in Zakhu our shut-down procedures of our aircraft would be to call arrival to -- Cougar -- AWACS that we were arriving at WHISKEY for an indefinite ground time and that we would call back off. They would acknowledge that call if we were to shut down to get gas, given a hot refuel capability. But if we were to shut down and get gas, we would use the checklist that is an abstract from the operator's manual. The checklist has individual steps to shut the aircraft down which we follow explicitly, of course. The aircraft would arrive on the refueling pad with shacks. Shut down on the refueling pad because there were no other aircraft that needed to use those while we were. Of course, we would go through the check list, shut the aircraft down, but prior to removing power from our transponders we have to hold the code or it would be "dumped" as we call it. So, of course, in addition to the normal checklist procedures we would have to go through the whole procedure on the transponders prior to removing power from the transponders.

Eagle Flight could operate within the security zone if the fighters or AWACS were not present, however, they could not operate outside of the security zone unless they were in contact with AWACS.

I do not recall seeing any guidance in the ACO that would prohibit aircraft from operating in the TAOR unless the fighters have sanitized the area.

MENARD

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I did not get involved in any of the preparations for the missions on the 14th of April, because I was on a different mission. I was flying up here at the time. At the time, I was on my way to Incirlik in a UH-60 with another pilot; so we were pretty much involved in the mission planning for our mission.

I arrived at the Eagle Detachment from USAREUR on 15 March.

From 15 March to the 14th of April, I do not know how many flights were conducted in the TAOR. I don't have that information.

During that period of time it was very routine to fly in the TAOR. The exceptional mission was the Admin Mission that we -- usually it was a one-shipper which meant that the other six pilots or seven pilots on the rotation didn't have to fly that day. So, the routine mission was a two-shipper AOR mission.

Yes, sir. "Admin Mission" would be characterized as the mission that we took off out of Diyarbakir and flew to Zakhu, landed and normally shut down, but not always but normally shut down for an indefinite time on the ground. Then up-loaded the passengers or PAX that wanted to come back to Diyarbakir, and we took-off and came directly back. So, that was characterized as an Admin Mission because we were not going go into the AOR.

The closest an F-15, or any fixed wing or fighter aircraft has flown by me in the TAOR were several thousand feet. I would have thought it would be difficult to say explicitly they were at this altitude, they were traveling real fast. But, there was no proximity to it at all. I would guess like 10,000 feet.

I do not know if the two aircraft that were in the accident had the Have-Quick radios. That certainly would have enhanced their ability to communicate with anybody in the AOR; Have-quick is still line of sight. If you are behind a ridge line, you have five Have-Quick radios and you are still not going to talk to -- Cougar -- to AWACS.

The current doctrine in our training manual dictates that if we encounter a fighter threat, the current doctrine indicates that when you should consider the maneuver ability of the aircraft and the speed that you are traveling at. If I'm actually intercepted by a fighter, there is little I can really do. Doctrinally we instruct our pilots to, if you suspect you have been locked on by a fighter and you have him in sight two huge variables that you should, in fact, attempt to fly toward him to have him increase the severity of his dive to continue to target you. In 1994 with the sophistication of the weaponry that we are, in fact, facing in our threat environment, that isn't necessarily as sound as it used to be. They don't have to be, as most of us know. They are not going to increase their dive to continue to target us. So, the most important thing that we teach, the three magic words

MENARD

if you encounter that situation is to "deploy to cover." If you go hide and they can't see you, it's going to make it much more difficult for them to engage. So, "deploy to cover" would be the first answer.

I have no knowledge of code words between helicopters. First of all, the indications we get in the cockpit that are classified don't tell me what type of aircraft, so I wouldn't know what necessarily what type of aircraft that was, and there was no discussion in my presence of code words between the Eagle Flight aircraft for action to be taken if that transpired.

If a friendly aircraft, an F-15 or a fighter, locked on in the AOR, I would have no way of knowing whether it was friendly or otherwise. If I got locked on by a fixed wing aircraft, I would immediately suspect, knowing what I do of what our own Air Force is doing in the AOR, in terms of enforcement of the no-fly-area -- I would immediately suspect, if it was a fixed wing lock that it was in fact, our aircraft.

Not knowing if it was a friendly lock to try to break that lock and deploy to cover, again, it's very subjective. I suspect that in the AOR given that circumstance we got a fixed wing tracking indication, and, again, the indication that we get is classified, but if I made that value judgment that I was being tracked by a fixed wing, I would probably not deploy to cover. I would not think it strange, because I know the only people flying fixed wing is us. Anybody else gets whacked immediately. So, I have nothing to fear from fixed wing.

The rotary wing aircraft have a ceiling of 400 feet AGL in the AOR. We are not allowed to go above 400 feet AGL, with a very minor exception that is to say our gracious host country who represent us here requires us to be at a very high altitude when we cross the border into Iraq. Therefore, we have to descend with a reasonable consideration for the people on-board; so their ear drums don't burst. We are well above 400 feet above in Iraq while we come out of altitude going through the gate. But, other than that we do not go above 400 feet AGL. The coordination altitude, as we call it, require rotary wing aircraft to be below 400 feet AGL. I'm not familiar with what altitude restrictions the other aircraft operate on other than rotary wing aircraft. So, I couldn't tell you which fast mover is authorized to go below any other altitude or what circumstances he would have to meet to do that I'm not familiar with that at all.

I have not been personally been tracked in the AOR by a fixed wing aircraft; nor locked up in the TAOR by a fixed wing aircraft.

You can conduct flights in the TAOR without AWACS coverage so long as you remain in the security zone. The boundaries of the security zone I could show you on a map. The maps that we carry in the cockpit have the security zone clearly marked on it.

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All the maps at -- the -- Zakhu where we landed that we commonly refer to as TEXACO have the boundaries and the security zone marked clearly. So, we would know prior to any time that we went to the AOR whether the mission requirements would require us to go -- outside the AOR or not -- I mean, outside the security zone before we ever left Zakhu. So, it was never a variable where we might go out, or we might not, or we weren't sure where it was. It is very black and white.

I've been to the crash sites a couple of times, which are located inside the security zone.

It has not been necessary for me to go out of the security zone when there is no AWACS coverage, but subjectively, as a pilot, my first responsibility is mission accomplishment. If Colonel Thompson had a requirement for me to do that and it was understood clearly the requirement that we had to have AWACS coverage, my first requirement would be to meet that mission requirement. If he wanted to go outside the security zone without AWACS coverage, my job is to accomplish the mission in the safest possible way that I could and I would follow his orders and do that. It never occurred to my knowledge that -- that requirement never came up.

I am not familiar of any SOP or any requirement in the ACO that would specify procedures that I would follow for an exception.

I stated earlier that chaff has been deployed in the TAOR, and now that I think about it, I was not involved in the incident myself. We were much more concerned with the threat outside the AOR than we were inside the AOR because inside the AOR we were constantly under coverage of the Air Force. We knew that anybody who turned on any radar inside the AOR got whacked immediately. I think I did say that. I would have to apologize; I misspoke. When I answered the question, I was thinking in terms that chaff had been popped, but now that I think about it, that probably occurred outside the AOR on the way back and probably was within Turkey, very close to the Syrian border. But, I was not involved in the exact incident, and had no reason to investigate explicit details other than just hangar talk with the other pilots. I don't think that was inside the AOR, now when I think about it. I remember talking to Mr. Hall and Mr. Garrett specifically about that particular incident because both of them were on the aircraft.

If you don't hold down the transponder before you remove the power it dumps the code, and then you would not be able to respond properly to an interrogation by a friendly aircraft or friendly radar. Then you would get the indication in the cockpit on the caution advisory panel caution light, which is offset to the right of the left seat pilot station -- a yellow caution light -- with the letters "IFF" and a master caution light would illuminate. If we get interrogated by another aircraft or another radar site and we do not respond correctly, we get an IFF light to tell us that for whatever reason, whether we dumped it, or

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whether it was just a gremlin or for whatever reason we are not responding correctly to Mode IV right now.

If we have a two-ship mission on the ground and we dumped our transponders code, there is no procedure to follow to continue the mission. The only alternative is to continue the mission with one aircraft without the code. That has never happened to me, so I'm not sure. The aircraft mission commander for the day in conjunction with Colonel Thompson's guidance would have to make that decision at the time. We do not routinely carry the device necessary to reinsert that code with us because for obvious reasons, it's highly classified and we do not take that into the AOR. Once we are keyed for the day and the pilots followed procedures they would not routinely dump the code, so we didn't take that device with us. The only alternative would be to return to Diyarbakir and get that code reinserted. In other words, cancel the mission or explain to Colonel Thompson the circumstances, and he would make that decision himself.

There is no keying device at Zakhu with Kit 1 Charlie.

I was not present for the mission brief for the 14th of April's mission brief that went to Zakhu. Their mission briefing routinely was earlier than I was required to be present that day. So, that all transpired before I came into operations because my flight was departing after theirs; I was coming to Incirlik and they were going down range to Zakhu.

The aircrew mission briefing process is different from the briefing that we get, that the mission commander is responsible to ensure the pilots obtain. Occasionally, that responsibility can be delegated. The air mission commander doesn't necessarily have to physically give the briefing himself; he can delegate that responsibility to someone who he is attempting to familiarize with the process. Normally, because of the small numbers involved in Eagle Flight-- two aircraft in an AOR mission -- we're talking about four pilots, normally, the air mission commander for the day uses the briefing book with an explicit checklist, and goes right down the list and gives the briefing to the pilots himself. This is what normally transpired. That would have been Captain McKenna on that day, but I was not present and I don't know whether Captain McKenna actually did the briefing. He probably did. The operations clerk would normally prepare the ATO packets for the pilots. There were two; a Specialist, maybe a Sergeant -- Specialist McCarthy and a Private Harvey, I think his name was. When we came in the morning, that packet with our PRC 112 radios, our night vision goggles for the day, -- we took goggles with us down range everyday just in case we needed them -- our radios, our blood chits -- our radios, our SPINS and the device for keying up all that equipment was in a bag all set for us. So, all we had to do was inventory it, sign for it and go out the door. I was not present during the preparation of the ATO packets for the mission of 14 April. I do not know who prepared the ATO packets.

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If Mode IV was in the "on" position when we went to the normal position on our transponders switch we would get an IFF light immediately. So, you would know before you ever left your location whether your code was good or not.

I would like to take that opportunity to say that the timing of my being present with Eagle Flight was absolutely coincidental, that is for the -- Corps standard -- UH-60 standardization guy to be down here during that time was coincidental. But, I was fully prepared to go back and brief my boss, Lieutenant Colonel Walker, the Deputy Corps Aviation Officer, Colonel Hayes, the Corps Aviation Officer, of what I had experienced while I was conducting missions with Eagle Flight. That report would have, in fact, reflected something along the line that I was repeatedly very pleasantly surprised, and what I mean by that, I mean I have been in standardization for a very long time and I have encountered a full gambit of procedural situations where guys were or were not following everything that they were supposed to. In this particular case, this organization just happened to be one of the most conscientious, professional groups I have encountered in my 26 years. They were very, very adamant about ensuring that their secure communications were functioning properly before they took off, their transponders were functioning properly before they took off, their ASE equipment was functioning properly before they took off, almost to the point that they were too thorough in those areas. The reason that I point that out is because that is not always the case in Army Aviation, be that as it may. But, in this particular case they were especially thorough. I was very much impressed by that. That was not an area that I was concerned about, let's say, but I was very impressed with the procedures that they followed and the thoroughness that they went through in their mission planning up to take-off along those lines repeatedly. I think it's important from an outsider's stand point, I was fully prepared to go either way on the things that I encountered from Eagle Flight. Coming in from a Corps Standardization context, I could have very easily done that. Many times in my career I've gone back and said that things were not that way and it wouldn't bother me in the least. But, in this particular case, I was fully prepared to go back and say otherwise. That response probably would not have gone past Colonel Hayes because of the circumstances of my visit, because I was not sent to evaluate them as such. It was much more routine than that. It was an opportunity for me to get back out in the field as an older guy and experience what it was like to do the real mission thing again which I jumped at the opportunity to do. In conjunction with that I was tasked to see how things were going, so I was prepared to respond to that.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

MENARD

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of MICHAEL J. MENARD as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

TAB V-049

HENRY, WILLIAM E.

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF
CW3 WILLIAM E. HENRY
C COMPANY, 6/159 AVIATION
GIEBELSTADT, GERMANY

The interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Black at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1035 hours, 22 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

My name is CW3 William Edward Henry. My organization and permanent duty station is Company C, 6/159th, Giebelstadt Army Air Field, Germany. My present duty assignment is as a UH-60 Maintenance Test Pilot. At Eagle Flight, I'm the Maintenance Officer and I am in charge of PC and overseeing QC a little bit--quality control--excuse me--production control and quality control. Back at the unit, I assist with production control and aircraft flow and day-to-day test flights and maintenance operational checks as they arise in the unit, which is a lot so it varies a little bit between Garrison and down here. I have a lot more responsibility down here.

I am also a Maintenance Examiner here in Europe. I'm an AMOC graduate--Aviation Maintenance Test Pilot Course graduate in 89 and UH-60 AQC in 86. I graduated from flight school in 1985. I was a maintenance officer for a 6-ship medical detachment at Fort Polk, Louisiana. I spent six years at Fort Polk and about half of that was as a maintenance test pilot to Charlie 6. We went from Schwaebisch Hall to Giebelstadt.

Turning my attention to the specific aircraft involved in the accident under investigation, I was involved as Maintenance Officer/Test Pilot, I guess, in maintaining these two aircraft. My duties would consist of flowing the airplane, scheduling the airplane, scheduling the airplane so it coincides and goes into phase at the correct time--anything that is worked on or replaced on the airplane has to have a maintenance operational check and those arise very, very frequently. You might have to run it up for a specific--say a PC rod bearing replacement. They pull the PC rod out or "pitch change" rod out and put it back in. It seems silly, but we have to do a test flight for that. There is just a barrage of things that we have to do but overall, I am ultimately responsible for scheduling the airplane and making sure that it's maintained while it's in Eagle Flight. All phases are now conducted back at Charlie 6.

We have a full compliment of UH-60 TMs available to us--technical manuals. I am not aware of any instances where the tech manual guidance is not followed in performing maintenance on the Eagle Flight UH-60s.

Referring to civilian maintenance personnel, we are trying to get an additional supply person, but as far as mechanics, four personnel are adequate to accomplish the Eagle Flight mission.

I did perform maintenance, operational checks and test flights on these particular aircraft. As far as the condition of both aircraft on the day of the accident, these were two of the best airplanes of the 6--period. I did a track and balance on 060 about two weeks prior to the accident. You'd have to check the 6-month file to remember the exact date. I laid alignment for inflight tracking and balance--it's just overall ground balance of the airplane. We hook up test equipment to it and get it within spec. I don't remember anything in particular on the other aircraft. Those particular airplanes--I don't have any recollection of any avionics problems. I am not aware of any transponder problems in either aircraft whatsoever. As a matter-of-fact, Mr. Koch did a sweep on it the day before because we were with the AWACS.
Mr. Koch, our Platoon IP, did a sweep with Cougar and he came back to make sure and tell me it had come out sweet. Specialist Robinson, the Crew Chief on the bird that day, also came back and told me the same thing, that it had worked.

(There is a recess taken at this point.)

Mr. Koch did not fly both the aircraft. He flew 060 the day before the accident. I do not know when the last transponder check was done on the other aircraft. I'd have to look at the records. I don't remember having really any problems with the Kit 1 Charlie or the transponders on this rotation--none, zero. I believe you are required to check the Mode IV every 25 hours. I would have to check, but I'm almost positive it's every 25 hours. I do not know if that's the published inspection sequence for the Mode IV. I'm not positive. I'd have to check the book. To find the required check sequence, I'd look--it's in the TM for the--I don't think it's a special inspection. I think it's in the TM for the Kit 1 Charlie and the transponder reg. The publication I would have readily available to tell me how often it's supposed to be checked, I imagine, would be the APX100 book. Kit 1 Charlie has a separate book. I know it's posted on the Dash 18 for each aircraft. It's 25 hours--I believe. A Dash 18--2408-18 is an Army form for periodic inspections due on the airplane.

I'm not familiar with how the Mode IV is checked and what equipment is used to perform these checks. That was mostly done by our civilians and, without, having the book out in front of me, I don't want to go into a lot of detail. The civilian contractors did the Mode IV checks and we did sweeps. I know we did Mode IV checks with the AWACS regularly. A lot of times we confirmed Mode IV with AWACS out of boredom because we had a long flight down. It was an hour and something down to Zakhu. We might fly four and five hours in a day and very frequently, I wouldn't give a specific time, but I know I did them most every time I flew.

With the deployment for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, as far as changes in inspection procedures, some things were increased, but it was mostly engine-related stuff. We

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were doing engine flushes every 50 hours instead of the one hundred hour inspection. We kind of did away with that because it didn't seem to help effect the life of the engines. We just continued--everything was pretty much the same as it was in Garrison. There was no particular increase of inspections on any of the ASE, particularly the Mode IV.

The APR 39 gives you--based on frequency, gives you unfriendly and it gives you a target direction. The ones we have are Victor 1 Alphas which is sort of an in between. It has a voice and it tells you the type of threat, based on the frequency, that that threat is working off of and a clock angle--It shows up on the screen. We got--last rotation we got a SA8 detected--SA8 launch and we did some evasive maneuvers and punched some chaff in relation to that. This was the last time I was down here. As far as I knew, we had an Alt Dash 18 code threat card in all the processors. I verified this several times. I had to go through a lot to get those cards down here. Everything on the systems--we did the self tests every day. The self test on a Victor 1 Alpha will tell you if an antenna is bad because that antenna won't flash. It gives you four flashes of the antennas and that antenna won't flash and it will give you a fail code. As far as I knew, every part of that system was working on every one of my airplanes. We did have problems with them from time to time, but this rotation has been golden. That's why I have the luck to do things like track and balance because I wasn't buried in other things that come up.

An APR 39 is--two words--radar signal warning device that's installed in our airplanes. The APR 39 is checked with a scope check, but I'd have to get out the book for that one. There is a scope check. I am not familiar enough with the equipment that they use to perform this check to talk about it, to tell you how they go about doing that check. We did it at my previous unit, but with another type to check for threats. We used--a guy came down with a hand-held missile and we did it that way to check. The civilian contractors provided the check with our crew chiefs.

As far as the APR 39, the gun that they used, the yellow gun, I've seen it used before, but I'm not familiar with the system. As far as I know, the civilian contractors did that test on the aircraft. I do not know how often that check is required. It would be in the processor manual. The periodic inspection is on the Dash 18, yes. According to the Dash 18, it's something like 25 or 30 hours, but I'm not sure. I don't remember.

(A brief recess is taken at this point.)

I believe the scope is the equipment used to perform the checks on the APR 39. The inspections and/or operational check procedures are the same; there wasn't any increase in inspections, no.

The ALQ-144 is a heat-emitting device. We call it the disco light and it's up on top just forward the APU and it's part of a system combined with the what we call HIRSS, Hover

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Infrared Suppression System--I hope that's right. Those two, combined together, are designed to defeat SA7s and below. Mr. Garrett, who was in the accident, gave us some stuff for the ALQs settings. He went to the ASE course, a setting for those. An ASE course is Aviation Survivability Equipment. He had some settings for the ALQ-144. He gave us some settings to put on the chaff, the M130 chaff dispenser and all those things were being utilized at this time. Mr. Garrett was a school-trained Aircraft Survivability Equipment Specialist. It's a recent MOS change for warrant officers and it was the first phase of becoming a tactical operations guy and he attended that school in Germany.

As far as how often are you required to check the ALQ-144, there's a 50-hour inspection that came out on a TWX. We keep track of our hours on those. When we do the periodic, we have somebody read the hours and we were keeping the hours on the Dash 18 and we have spares so we can float them around. We have three or four spares so we can float them around. We have had some difficulty getting that inspection done. We've had to take them and send them back to Germany and it's kind of a hassle, but we do follow it. There's a heat emitter inspection, I believe. I think the ALQ-144 is all done on the bench. I don't believe there's any check. It either works or it doesn't. I don't remember any particular check for the ALQ. I don't believe there is any equipment to do any checks. It's all done in an avionics shop, as far as I know. When the aircraft deployed for Eagle Flight, they did not change or increase the amount of inspections or the number of times that it's looked at.

Neither of the aircraft had problems with the UHF, VHF or FM radios that I know of. The aircraft involved--we occasionally have problems with getting K-Ys to load up, but we load the UHF and the FMs. We didn't, obviously, load VHF, but occasionally we'd have problems getting it to load, so we would always have at least FM so we could talk internal and 98% of the time we had UHF secure also.

We did not load VHF radios because we don't have the capability to do it.

The Kit 1 Charlie is the coding device for the APX 100 transponder. Normally, we come out in the morning for pre-flight and either right after we crank APU or some time during the run up phase, we would key each airplane, key the Kit 1 Charlies and UHF and FM radios and you know if you got your fill because we do the test from a Mode IV and you get a light as the Dash 10 tells you how to do it and then we do a radio check. If you dump the fill, you get an IFF light, it's like a dummy light--it's like an oil light in your car.

Normally, the crew chiefs or one of the SERV-AIR people key the radio, secure devices and the Kit 1 Charlie. I'm 99% confident that everything was keyed prior to the mission on 14 April. It's a routine thing. We do it every day. Nobody leaves without being keyed up--period. I was not there that morning. I am not aware of any write-ups on either aircraft that could have degraded the capability to perform the mission on 14 April. Both UH-60s carried external fuel tanks. Both aircraft had distinctive markings. They had American flags painted on the tanks, on

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the cargo doors, one on the nose and one underneath the helicopter. We did our best to make sure that everything was working every day and no one took off without it being operational.

Aircraft Tail Number 001 was scheduled to fly on the mission, however, it had a maintenance problem that caused it to not go on the mission. We had a weight on wheels switch that was sticking and it was causing the back up pump to stay on and all the audio--the engine audio and the low audio--one of those was staying on all the time because the switch was staying down in the depressed position. We sprayed a little--like a solvent on it and it started working again. It was just something that they couldn't--that was one of those things where the test pilot helps out the SERV-AIR guys. It's usually the other way around, but I had seen it before so we fixed it real fast. I wasn't out there in the morning that morning to help them so they were a little confused.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of CW3 WILLIAM E. HENRY as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

TAB V-050

HOLDEN, KENNETH D.

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 3 KENNETH D. HOLDEN
Company C, 6/159 AVN, 12th AVN BDE

The interview was conducted by Lt Colonel Black at Pirinclik, Turkey, beginning at 1447 hours, 20 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

EXAMINATION

My duty is as a UH-60 flight instructor. It involves training and evaluating assigned aviators and tactical and administrative flight tasks. I was performing these duties for the Eagle flight operations on the 13th and 14th of April, 1994, but only in an administrative sense. The Turks will not allow us to conduct any flight training in Turkish airspace.

Additionally, I'm also the Operations Officer and my assistant was CW2 Mike Hall, and we would alternate on a daily basis the mission preparations and gathering information we needed for the following day. On the 13th, Mister Hall received the mission information from the MCC, the departure times, PZs, LZs, the purpose of the mission and just the basic flight information.

Normally Captain McKenna will go over to MCC at five-thirty on the day prior to the mission. If Captain McKenna's not available, then myself or Mister Hall will go. I don't know who went in this case. Mister Hall did the mission planning so I don't know if he went or if Captain McKenna went. In many cases the MCC will call us and tell us what's posted on the schedule. In that case, we already have the departure time, we have how many aircraft are required and we have the PZs, the villages where we're going to go.

This mission was a two ship mission. On the mission sheet it's listed as a two ship MCC support mission going to Irbil and that's the way the mission read. I received the mission schedule, the ten day schedule, and we post that in operations and we refer to that repeatedly. As I said, as we alternate back and forth, Mister Hall took care of all the information the evening prior.

An ATO is an Air Tasking Order that comes from the comm center on Incirlik. It actually comes from CTF headquarters. The ATO for this particular mission was received the day prior in the comm center. One of the operations clerks will walk over and pick up the ATO for the

following day. I don't know who picked it up in this case. When the operations clerk brings it back, he makes a copy for each aircraft. The ATO is only good for twenty-four hours.

On this day specifically, I know that he made three copies because we had three ships flying that day. I was also flying that day, a separate mission to Incirlik for night vision goggle training so I had a copy of that myself. The other two birds had one apiece.

The Air Tasking Order is also called the SPINS for special instructions. CTF may have a copy of the ATO for that day but we destroy all those at the end of the mission.

(The witness was shown a copy of a SECRET document)

This is the Air Tasking Order and the special instructions for 20 April '94. An ATO contains information on all the players that will be flying the mission that day, code words for aircraft's type, frequencies, squawk codes for the transponders, Mode One, Mode Two and Mode Three. Mode Four is keyed in on a K-Y-K so it's not in here. One of the key things that we brief every day is the word, number and letter of the day. That's utilized for search and rescue procedures.

AWACS, on-station times, all this is given in Zulu time, and all that is briefed to the crews. The crews are specifically briefed on the code word, letter and number of the day. All the other information in the ATO is extracted on an as needed basis, with the possible exception that as we're looking through this and we see that there's been a change.

The document I have in front of me is dated 20 April '94. The difference between this document and the ATO of the 14th of April is that on page two, in the left hand column, it lists page two, and then it's got like a three and then a period and paragraph. I'm not exactly sure how that's broken down. There's a difference in the Mode squawk for Mode One. Without divulging the code, prior to 19 April '94, Mode One squawk codes for rotary wing aircraft was consistently the same number for all operations. Previous to that date, there was no change on a daily basis from SPINS and there was no change enroute. They were consistently the same up to the 19th of April.

On that date we noticed when we picked up the SPINS that there was a change in the Mode One code and we had a specific code listed here for non-AOR airspace, in other words Turkish airspace and then they had a separate code for when we crossed the border. So when we crossed the border, we had to include that in our procedures for crossing the border to change the transponder code to that as briefed in the SPINS.

On the 20th of April, once again they changed the code number. So this was two days in a row that they changed the Mode One code. The only purpose I would see for changing the code is to make our return signal different. When the transponder is interrogated, it sends out a

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coded signal based on what we have keyed into the transponder. We respond with a different set of numbers than if we had left it the way it was before. It's a change in procedures. It's just like the change in the code word.

(The chief initialed the top right hand corner of the page he was referring to and placed the date on the sheet)

We get the ATO and we go through it to get pertinent information. We actually work on an extract of the ATO and the SPINS and what we take in flight is actually just a few pages of what the entire document consists of. I can't tell you what pages it was in previous documents but as of this date, on this document, it begins on page five.

(The witness was asked to place his initials in a circle on the bottom right hand corner of the pages he would normally take)

The marked pages are the pages we take on each flight. On the first page with my initial and number one is the AWACS information, the on-station time for AWACS. It lists several other information here that's Air Force specific and we don't really pay any attention to that. On page two with my initials, it comes down to where the UH-60 information is and our Ops clerks will always circle AWACS on the first page, UH-60 on the second. Coming down from UH-60 page, it lists our call sign, Eagle One and Two under page four. It lists the squawk code for Mode Two, a separate code for one and two and it lists the departure points and arrival points and next to each one of these is AR which means "as required." If there was a hard time, they could publish a hard time in here and that would be the launch time we would be expected to take off. By leaving this open, as required, we can file a flight plan for whatever time is required for the mission. Also the gate time is open so we can file for a gate time.

If you come down here, you've got Eagle One and Two, Eagle Three and Four and then you come down the med-evac SAR. Eagle One through Four is always from Diyarbikir to Zakhu and return.

At the top of page three with my initials on it is the med-evac SAR. If there was an aircraft that went down in the TOR, an F16, F15 and they ejected. They would launch us to go recover the flight crew. This would be the call sign you would work on and that's the Mode Two squawk.

And then you have another, on page five, this is maintenance test flight line numbers. Then below that begin with Eagle Ten call signs, the mission number, Alpha 20-77 is the information for departing from the out and going back to Incirlik, because those have a separate mission number and a separate call sign. And these again are as required.

On the day that I flew from here to Incirlik, I used Eagle Ten on my departure from here

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and on my return, I used Eagle Twelve with the appropriate squawk.

Something else on three, listed underneath the SPINS is the code words, and these code words are utilized to give information without compromising the information we're trying to give.

Page four is a continuation of the code words.

Page five is a list of addresses where this message is sent. We normally take this with us because there's also a couple of code words down here that we utilize.

And on page six, they begin with a continuation of code words and this is where the frequencies are listed for all the players who are working in the TOR. And we do utilize these frequencies when speaking with AWACS.

Page seven is a continuation of those frequencies including the search and rescue freqs.

Now the next page, which is page eight, is again a list of addresses where this is sent to. The only part that applies down here is under the secret final section of six listed at the bottom of the page. It deals with the plus or minus fifteen minutes for your departure times which is a standard.

At the beginning of page nine, under paragraph three, is the Mode squawks for the transponder. Under page three are the code words for aircraft specific type and then continues down with special instructions for transponder squawking based upon different circumstances that the flights may find themselves under.

And page ten is the final page. And that's just a continuation of page nine that deals with fuel for the Air Force.

Again, there's another page here. Page eleven would also be included in that one. The pages that I marked, one through eleven, are pages that we would take on the flight.

When we get the complete ATO, we normally take it, go to the marked pages, one through eleven, and we get all of the pertinent information and we Xerox those pages and give them to the crews. The operations clerk will take the entire document, extract these pages that contain pertinent information that we need, and will post those and give those to each flight crew.

(The witness then read a statement)

I CW3 Kenneth D. Holden would like to make the following statement:

The Air Tasking Order/Special Instructions, referred to now as the ATO and the SPINS,

HOLDEN

dated 20 April 1994, is identical to the ATO/SPINS utilized on 14 April 1994 with the following exceptions:

On 19 April 1994, the Mode One for helicopters was changed to include a separate code number for area of operations and a separate code number for non-area of operations. This code was also changed on 20 April 1994, to a different code number. Prior to 19 April, the Mode One for rotary wing operations was set at a specific number and did not change. On 19 April, the Mode One for rotary wing operations was set at a specific number for non-AOR operations and changed to a specific number on crossing the Iraqi border. On 20 April, Mode One was set at a specific number for non-AOR operations and changed to a different number upon crossing the Iraqi border. I made a separate note for the 19th and the 20th because the code number changed on both of those days.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of Kenneth D. Holden, as given, and sworn to, before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

Scott C. Black

SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Colonel, USA
Legal Advisor

HOLDEN

TAB V-050A

HOLDEN, KENNETH D.

VERBATIM TESTIMONY

CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 3 KENNETH D. HOLDEN
CHARLIE 6/159 AVIATIONA REGIMENT, GIEBELSTADT, GERMANY
(2nd Interview)

LTC BLACK: The time is now 1540 on 29 April 1994 April 1994. The persons present are the following: LTC Black, Legal Advisor; Lt Col Velluze, Associate Member; CW5 Meline, Board Member; CW4 Sousa, Board Member; CW3 Holden, Witness; SSgt Moore, Recorder.

LTC BLACK: This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINC USAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. It is an Aircraft Accident Investigation conduct under AFR 110-14. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and this Accident Investigation?

WITNESS: Yes sir, I do.

LTC BLACK: Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

WITNESS: Yes sir.

LTC BLACK: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No sir.

HOLDEN

LTC BLACK: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed verbatim so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon. Speak slowly, clearly and loudly.

Remember to explain your testimony carefully so that others who do not have your technical training will be able to understand. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it's necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

Would you please rise so that I can swear you in.

(The witness was sworn)

EXAMINATION

1Q: Would you state your full name and grade?
1A: My name is Kenneth D. Holden, H-O-L-D-E-N. My rank is CW3.

2Q: What is your organization and permanent duty station?
2A: Charlie 6/159 Aviation Regiment, Giebelstadt, Germany.

3Q: What is your present duty assignment?
3A: Operations Officer and Instructor Pilot Forward, Eagle Flight Detachment.

4Q: And where is that located?
4A: At Pirinclik.

5Q: What's your duty assignment when you're stationed back in Germany?
5A: As a Platoon IP, Instructor Pilot.

6Q: Is Eagle Flight part of PROVIDE COMFORT?
6A: Yes it is.

7Q: Who are you OPCON to?
7A: MCC Forward in Zakhu.

8Q: Describe your duties and responsibilities while assigned to Eagle Flight.
8A: Individual duties?

HOLDEN

9Q: Yes.
9A: On a daily basis as an Operations officer, I'm responsible for coordinating the mission requirements and the scheduling requirements for that mission; assisting the detachment commander and assigning crews based upon paperwork crew mix, based upon their experience level and their ability to perform the mission.

10Q: Is this your first tour with Eagle Flight?
10A: No this is my 3rd tour.

11Q: Describe if you can how a mission is formulated at MCC Forward and the routing that the missions go through until you receive it at Eagle Flight.
11A: Eagle Flight Operations receives a weekly mission schedule. Based upon that weekly mission schedule, our forecast then is a... is confirmed the day prior or changed the day prior. From the weekly schedule, MCC Forward down in Zakhu will call back to MCC Rear, either to confirm that we are going as scheduled based upon the weekly forecast or there is a change in the mission. And at that time, approximately 1730 the day prior to the mission, they will give us the change or confirm that we are going with the scheduled mission. At that time, we do the mission planning for the following day for that mission. On the day of the mission, we launch at the appropriate departure from Diyarbakir and go to Zakhu, and there we usually shut the aircraft down and go inside for an additional mission brief. This is the last minute up-to-date brief for the mission for that day. Occasionally, there are some minor changes in the mission based upon events that weren't foreseen prior to that. And the mission will be briefed accordingly. And then we will execute that mission according to that brief.

12Q: If there's a mission change the day prior to the scheduled mission, do you inform the JOC or C-3 here at Incirlik of that change that day?
12A: No. Prior to April 14th, our only contact with the JOC was for line numbers and gate numbers for our departure out of Diyarbakir. The JOC, really as far as I know, did not have any detailed information as far as our mission and exactly where were are going. If they did, that would have come from MCC Forward.

13Q: Did Eagle Flight fly a rehearsal flight for the April 14th mission?
13A: I don't know that I would call it a rehearsal flight. But I flew this... I flew 2 solid and.. on the 11th of April with Colonel Thompson and General Pilkington aboard. And Colonel Thompson made the remark at the close of the mission as we were approaching Zakhu, that we would be doing this same mission on the 14th. And that wasn't the weekly schedule that we had. There was a typewritten entry on the weekly schedule that had been crossed out and handwritten in that showed our destination on the 14th as being Irbil and Salah ad Din. And that was in accordance with that, and then he told me on the 11th that we would be flying to Salah ad Din, then again on the 14th.

HOLDEN

14Q: That mission sheet that you just referred to, where it was crossed out and the Salah ah Din mission written in? Was that received from MCC Rear like that, or MCC Forward like that, or was that change made by Eagle Flight Operations?
14A: I can't say exactly where the sheet came from. The copy that we had in operations was a faxed copy. I'm assuming that MCC Forward faxed the mission schedule to MCC Rear and they in turn gave that schedule to us.

15Q: Okay.
15A: The copy that I received had already had that scratched out, had already been... The change had already been made prior to being faxed.

16Q: Okay. Do you know what the coordination altitude is in the TAOR for helicopters and fighters?
16A: For helicopters it's 400 feet and below.

17Q: Okay. So do you know what it is for the fighters?
17A: I can't be certain, without looking in the ACO.

18Q: Did you fly either aircraft prior to the mishap?
18A: Yes, I had flown both aircraft.

19Q: How would you assess the condition of each of those aircraft, or the aircraft that you flew, the last time that you flew it, just before the incident?
19A: That's difficult to quantify exactly, but I would say they were well above average in terms of the utility helicopter fleet across the board. Well above average in terms of maintenance and... just the cosmetics features of the aircraft.

20Q: Are you aware of any write-ups on either of those two aircraft that could have degraded the capability to perform the mission on the 14th?
20A: No, I'm not aware of any.

21Q: On the morning of the 14th, there was an aircraft change, because of a maintenance problem. Do you know what that maintenance problem was?
21A: Not specifically. However, I did hear afterwards it had something to do with what the mechanics call the squat switch. Which in actuality is the weight-on-wheels switch on the drag beam.

22Q: Okay. Did both UH-60s that were in the incident have external wing tanks on them?
22A: Yes they did.

HOLDEN

23Q: Do you on a routine basis need the fuel that is carried in those wing tanks when you go on a missions into the TAOR?
23A: Not routinely, no. For the missions that we leave the security zone, when we go extended to the furthest points to the east and to the southeast, we do need those tanks for the range. And they're also installed for contingency operations as well. We also have the SAR, that's the search and rescue requirements.

24Q: Did the unit aircraft have any distinctive identification or other markings?
24A: Yes. Each aircraft had American flags painted on the outside of each external wing tank. two flags painted underneath the under side of each aircraft. And 060, the lead aircraft, had two additional flags painted on the cargo doors. I don't know about 00, the other aircraft, 000.

25Q: You don't know if the other aircraft had flags painted on the doors?
25A: I can't confirm that, no.

26Q: Do the Blackhawks have Have Quick Radios?
26A: A few Blackhawks do have Have Quick. The utility helicopter fleet within the Army inventory has been very slow to embrace the Have Quick modification.

27Q: Do you know if the two incident aircraft had the Have Quick Radios on them?
27A: I can't confirm that, I don't know.

28Q: Describe how you flight-follow or position report when your operating in the TAOR?
28A: The initial call into the TAOR is the border crossing call in accordance with the ATO and the SPINS. We call, if Cougar's up, we call with the code word, the appropriate code word that we're crossing the border. At that point, we go into the tactical area of operations. We also call arrival at Zakhu base upon the Eagle Flight coordinate kneeboard sheet that we have with coordinates listed Alpha through X-ray.

The coordinates are associated with a specific village within the TAOR. In this case, Whiskey is Zakhu. So we would call that we are arrival Whiskey. If we're going to shut down, we would tell Cougar, that we will be indefinite ground time and that we'll call him when we come back up. Upon departure from Zakhu, we call off with Cougar, if they're up, we're off of Whiskey enroute to wherever our destination is, based upon the kneeboard sheet or if we're not going to one of those villages, we will give them a vicinity of, for example, we're off Whiskey in route to 10 miles north of Charlie. And that gives them a general reference of where our destination is.

HOLDEN

That's initial call off coming out of Whiskey or Zakhu. From that point on, we don't make it, any additional calls to Cougar, unless there's a change in the mission. For example, the MCC Commander would decide that he would like to deviate and go look in something else. At that point there's a deviation from -- the -- our initial call from Cougar or as we briefed in the mission in Zakhu. At that point we will call that in to Cougar and give them that updated real time information. The only other call that we will make, is upon our arrival at our destination, in which we call Cougar, that we are arrival, an example that I gave earlier, we would be arrival Charlie.

29Q: What are the procedures for -- if flight-following or position reporting is lost? In other words do you have any procedures if you arrived at your destination and are unable to contact AWACS to let them know that your there?
29A: Yes. Quite frequently that does occur. We will lose radio contact with AWACS. Upon arrival at our destination, the MCC party will exit the aircraft and they always have a commo guy with them who will set up a portable TACSAT and he will then call into Arrow base which is in Zakhu, and report that we are arrival there and give them an estimated departure time. So that information is passed to Zakhu then through the TACSAT.

30Q: OK. Do you use the same procedures to call Arrow base leaving that until you can get contact?
30A: Yes, we do. When they've completed their mission there on the ground, they will recover the aircraft and the last call that they make to arrow base is that we are departing in 5 minutes. And then everybody loads up the aircraft and we depart.

31Q: OK. Do you know if Arrow base passes that on to the C-3 or the JOC, who then relays it to AWACS?
31A: I don't know.

INTERVIEWER: That's all I have for right now sir. You will need to wait.

LTC Black: This interview is in recess. The time is 1558.

LTC Black: This interview is again in session, the time is 1608. The record should reflect that all parties that were present when the interview was recessed are again present. In addition, the interview has been joined by Major General Andrus, the Board President; Colonel Bennett, the Deputy Board President; Colonel Fain, Chief Investigator; and Mr. Brummell, Technical Advisor.

HOLDEN

32Q: Mr. Holden, I would like to ask you a few questions about how you prepare a flight to go on a mission into the Tactical Assembly Area? Can you tell me when you first get notified that there is... into the TAC, into the TAOR? Can you please tell me when is the first time that you know that there's a mission into the TAOR?
32A: We receive a weekly forecast sir, that forecasts the following week, the missions, and then we'll annotate on that that it is a mission into Tactical Area of Operations. The day prior to the mission at 1730 hours, we receive conformation from MCC, that that mission is a go, as forecasted on the mission forecast, or whatever changes are required for that mission. At that point, we will complete all of our administrative procedures, the mission brief, assigning the flight crews, calling it into weather, the 40-1 request, calling the JOC to set up a line number and gate time, and we just take care of all those administrative things the night prior. And then post that mission sheet, the schedule in the billets, so the air crews will see what time they need to be at work the following day.

33Q: Were you present or included in the briefing for the mission on the 14th of April?
33A: No sir, I was not. I was... I am the Operations Officer, or I was for this last rotation. But I was assisted by Mr. Hall, CW2 Mike Hall. He was on one of the aircraft involved in the accident. He would assist me in doing this on an every other day basis, so that one of us didn't have to be there continuously around the clock. He would help me with those administrative procedures. So he was the one who actually filled out the flight plan, initiated all the administrative requirements the night prior.

34Q: Now you received the mission and you did your mission brief. Where did you get the information so that you would know frequencies and other details in that regard?
34A: All of our internal frequencies are extracted from our SOP, from which we have the kneeboard sheet that we utilize in the cockpit. Any other information comes from the ATO and the SPINs.

35Q: Okay. I got a copy of the ATO for the 14th of April. This is the ATO for the day of the accident. Could you please look at this ATO and tell me, is that the complete ATO you received that comes over from the Comm Center?
35A: One of our operations personnel, in this case it was Specialist McCarthy, goes to the Comm Center the day prior and picks up the ATO. From that he makes an extract that we take with us. Based upon this first page, this... we don't take this first page with us, nor the second. I would have to look through this to determine which pages he extracts for us. This is the first page. Under the helicopter information, down to the communications plan with the code words...

36Q: Okay. Could you please mention what page numbers of the --
36A: Okay. That's page 6 of 10 --

HOLDEN

37Q: And that is evidence exhibit number...

(Someone replied: 76 Alpha)

37A: 7 of 10, 8 of 10, 9 of 10, 10 of 10, and that's all that you have here -- that we have.

38Q: Could you please then, where did Specialist McCarthy get his instructions to separate the different pages from the ATO?
38A: I'm not sure exactly when that procedure was initiated sir.

39Q: Based upon the pages that he gave you, could you please tell me the frequencies, the transponder mode codes, that you would use for conducting a mission?
39A: On page 6 of 10, under mission Alpha 1470, it's a transport mission for Eagle 1 and 2. Listed next is the appropriate squawk code for Mode II. Now that's for both aircraft, Eagle 1 and Eagle 2.

40Q: Okay. Are there any other mode codes or any other frequencies that you use?
40A: Yes, for Mode I, on page 9 of 10 under air space, under mode squawks, Mode I for rotor wing is listed there.

41Q: And what is that?
41A: Mode 42.

42Q: Mode 42?
42A: Yes sir.

43Q: Okay. What frequencies, you mentioned the mode code, what frequencies would you talk to AWACS on?
43A: We contact AWACS on the enroute frequencies sir. Which is 257 3.

44Q: Okay. Is that the same frequency that you would talk to AWACS throughout the mission?
44A: Yes, sir, it has been. Historically upon our initial call with AWACS, we contact them on the enroute frequency and they never... I shouldn't say never. On 2 occasions AWACS pushed me to the primary mission frequency. The rest of the time, upon our initial call with AWACS, they just copy. Usually they extended their radio communications with us, as the word "copy". So when we call off of Diyarbakir in route Whiskey, which is Zakhu, they just copy.

45Q: Do you change any transponder codes or do any changes to the transponder when you conduct your missions?
45A: Not this type, no sir.

HOLDEN

46Q: Do you do any changes with ATC on transponder codes, when you go into the TAOR?
46A: Yes sir, we squawk 2400 and Mode III, Alpha and Charlie upon crossing. Lead aircraft squawks that, trailer or captain. Yes, Mode III Alpha and Charlie out. Upon crossing the border lead aircraft will turn off Mode III Alpha and Charlie.

47Q: Are both aircraft squawking Modes I, II and IV?
47A: Yes sir.

48Q: You do not have a shut off of one aircraft? So both aircraft are simultaneously squawking Modes I, II and IV?
48A: Yes sir.

49Q: Okay. To clarify if I'm right, Mode I and code 42, that you mentioned, would that be what you'd squawk, both in route to Whiskey and then departing Whiskey and operating in the AOR?
49A: Yes sir.

50Q: You would not change that during the flight?
50A: No sir, we squawk in accordance with the ATO and the SPINS. Subsequent to this, they have had us change. I testified in the earlier testimony to that.

51Q: What I'd like to do is go into some questions concerning operations within the TAOR. Can Eagle Flight helicopters operate in the TAOR without AWACS being operational?
51A: Yes sir, within the security zone.

52Q: Okay. Where do you receive this guidance from?
52A: It's in our SOP and reading files sir.

53Q: Okay. What if you are outside of the security zone?
53A: Then -- We're not authorized to fly outside the security zone without AWACS coverage.

54Q: Okay. What about fighter coverage, do you have any requirements for fighter coverage operating in the security zone or operating outside of the security zone?
54A: No sir, not that we're aware of.

55Q: Are you familiar with the air space coordination order known as the ACO?
55A: Yes sir.

56Q: Are you aware of any requirements for the fighters to be the first aircraft into the AOR, the TAOR, prior to any other aircraft?
56A: No sir.

HOLDEN

57Q: While you're flying in the TAOR, are there any procedures that you must follow if you lose radio contact or radar coverage with AWACS?
57A: No sir. Our radio coverage with AWACS is very limited sir. The terrain is very steep, very mountainous terrain and we fly in a tactical flight envelope, which is normally at 100 feet AGL for us. And then in the terrain that we fly in, we lose radio contact quite often sir. The further we move to the east, the south and to the east, we lose... the more often we lose radio contact.

58Q: Okay. What are your procedures to contact AWACS? Can you tell me when you take off from Diyarbakir? Talk me through the contacts, the normal contacts that you have with AWACS. What you say to them and what they say to you.
58A: Yes, sir. After departing the airport traffic area of Diyarbakir, we will check with the ATO and the SPINS, if Cougar's up, then we will call them, that we're off of Diyarbakir, enroute to Whiskey. Which is in accordance with the kneeboard sheet, the Alpha through X-ray grid coordinates that we need, that we utilize. They "copy" that transmission and then we continue until crossing the border, at which point we give the appropriate code word for crossing the border and then we begin our descent and landing in Zakhu, we call AWACS and we tell them that we have arrived at Whiskey. Usually we'll be sitting down, so we tell them we will have an indefinite ground time and then we will call them upon departure.

59Q: Okay. If I could interrupt for a second. Can you talk me through the procedures that you do as you shut down the aircraft at Zakhu?
59A: Upon landing, we execute the after landing check list, in accordance with the check list. I can't give them to you verbatim without referencing the check list, I wouldn't want to do that in the testimony, that's not the way we do business sir.

60Q: Okay.
60A: Initially though upon landing, in the initial after landing checks, as I turn off the IRCM safe, take the chaff dispenser to safe, and hold the code on the transponder, and then we shut the transponder off. And we continue with the check list.

61Q: Okay. Now, do you go in then for a briefing and what type of briefing do you get?
61A: Yes sir. We shut the aircraft down. The crewchiefs will stay with the aircraft, refuel the aircraft. The pilots will go to the mission briefing room, and there Major Sanders will brief the mission. He will reiterate the mission briefing, the information that we received the night prior in a little bit more detail or he will give us any changes at that point, if there is a change in the mission, he will brief it at that point. Normally, when we receive the mission the day prior, that's the mission we execute the following day.

HOLDEN

62Q: Okay. After you receive the briefing and everything else, and you know where you are going to go, continue on with what you do.
62A: Major Sanders will give us a take off time and we will brief our crewchiefs accordingly and they will load up the passengers and we will depart as required to meet the mission.

63Q: Okay. And who do you contact when you depart?
63A: Upon initial departure, we contact Arrow base on VHF telling them that we're off at this time. And then we will also call Cougar, if they're up, and advise them we're off of Whiskey in route to the point we had designated on the kneeboard sheet or the coordinates.

64Q: Does Cougar say anything about radar contact when you take off or does Cougar ever tell you that they have radar contact of you at any time?
64A: Sometimes. Sometimes they do sir.

65Q: Does Cougar ever say to you "sweet" or any other code word such as that?
65A: On occasion, yes sir. It's not a consistent call though. Sometimes, of course we're shut down on the ground there. So when we take off, we don't know what status Cougar is, in terms of radar, whether or not the radar's temporarily down or whatever the current situation is, in terms of Cougar. So when we call off with them... it's usually just "copy".

66Q: Have they ever told you their radar was down?
66A: Yes sir, quite often. They give the appropriate code word in accordance with the ATO and SPINS.

67Q: As you take -- Can you please talk to me about the checks that you would make on your transponder before you take off to insure that you held the code in the transponder for Mode IV?
67A: Okay. If I can take you back to Diyarbakir, sir. After we load up the Kit 1 Charlie, during the aircraft run up, we test the transponder in the Mode IV and the Mode I, II and III. We do not depart unless all ASE equipment is on and operational, that's in our SOP. That's one of the mission... going over our requirements that we have. So we've initially tested the system at Diyarbakir. Upon arrival there in Zakhu, we don't routinely check, re-check the system, if we held it and shut it off and then we turn the system back on, the system works as advertised. We haven't had any problems with that.

68Q: Can you tell if the system didn't work? Is there some way for you to know that if you had lost the Mode IV?
68A: Oh yes.

HOLDEN

69Q: How's that?
69A: If AWACS is up, and they do sweep you, you'll get an IFF caution light in the cockpit. That happened to me one time, I left the transponder on standby and as soon as I took off, I got an IFF caution light. I looked down, realized we had missed that step, turned the transponder up. So I knew immediately that I had missed that step.

70Q: So they swept you, was that a routine sweep or were they doing a Mode IV check?
70A: I had no knowledge that they were sweeping at the time sir. I was surprised to be honest with you, because I had missed that step.

71Q: So if you are interrogated, you would get an IFF light in the cockpit?
71A: Yes sir. On the master caution panel, we have an IFF caution light and that will illuminate.

72Q: You now are flying enroute to your first destination. Can you tell me what you do upon arrival at that destination?
72A: We call arrival with Cougar, tell them that we are arrival at the destination and that we will be shutting down for an indefinite ground time. To the points further to the east sir, we usually don't have contact with the Cougar at that point. So we just arrive, make a call in the blind and shut the aircraft down. At that point, the MCC team will dismount and they'll set up a portable TACSAT and they will call back to our base and let them know that we have arrived.

73Q: Could you please tell me if there are any differences in any of your other legs or your return to Zakhu of what you've described of this leg or are they basically the same for radio and transponder operations?
73A: I not sure that...

74Q: I'm sorry. If you are returning to Zakhu, what are your procedures that you would do... Zakhu, Zakhu. What are your procedures to return to Zakhu?
74A: Upon completion of the mission sir, they... Colonel Thompson will return to the aircraft... At that point commo guy will call back to arrow base on the TACSAT and tell them we are departing in 5 minutes, for example. They load everybody up. We crank up the aircraft and depart. Upon departure, again we make the appropriate call to Cougar, we're off of, whatever check point we're off of, enroute to another check point or returning back to Whiskey as appropriate. Again a lot of times that call's made in the blind, as Cougar will not receive us. And occasionally sir, for the longer missions that we fly to Dinarta, Salah ad Din, Shaqlawah, or Irbil, if it's late in the afternoon, occasionally Cougar and everybody else has gone home, and we crank up the aircraft, there's nobody there.

75Q: You mentioned Irbil, is that outside of the security zone?
75A: Yes sir.

HOLDEN

76Q: Do you routinely fly outside the of security zone?
76A: No, it's not routine, sir. Any flight outside the security zone has to be approved by the CTF Commander and of course we have to have AWACS coverage to fly outside the security zone. It's not routine, I would say maybe, without looking in my log book, maybe 1 or 2 missions every 2 or 3 weeks. The vast majority of our missions are flown within the security zone.

77Q: When you fly a mission to Irbil, do you fly directly to Irbil in a straight line from Zakhu?
77A: No sir. We have to avoid the Iraqi threat, we can't fly over those positions on the ground. Therefore we need to stay behind the military crest upon the terrain there. We utilize the terrain and traverse to the east and then cut to the south. We utilize the terrain to our advantage.

78Q: Are you aware of any requirement to fly straight from point to point?
78A: Generally sir, our routes are point to point, with deviations for terrain and threat.

79Q: Did you fly General Pilkington on the 11th of April?
79A: Yes sir, I did.

80Q: Was he on board your aircraft?
80A: Yes sir.

81Q: What time did you take off from Diyarbakir for that mission?
81A: I can't be certain sir, without looking at flight logs. I assume that was approximately 0820 in the morning, with an arrival time...

82Q: Was that local or Zulu?
82A: Local.

83Q: Local time?
83A: Yes sir.

84Q: From Diyarbakir?
84A: From Diyarbakir.

85Q: Okay.
85A: Yes sir. It's an hour and 5 minutes, maybe an hour and 10 minute flight to Zakhu. At that point we shut the aircraft down, refueled the aircraft, briefed the mission and then General Pilkington went with Colonel Thompson back to the safe house in Zakhu. And when they returned we cranked up the aircraft and departed.

HOLDEN

86Q: So approximately, what time would you say that you left Zakhu on the mission?
86A: Approximately 1040, sir.

87Q: Now what would that be in Zulu time?
87A: I'm using Turkey time, so it's 3 hours prior. So it would have been 0740. 0-7-4-0.

88Q: To go from Zakhu to--
88A: To Salah ad Din.

89Q: Salah ad Din?
89A: Yes sir.

90Q: How long did it take you to get to Salah ad Din?
90A: 1 hour. I arrived there at 1040... I'm sorry, 1140.

91Q: Which is, your saying 0840--
91A: Which is 0-8-4-0 Zulu. Yes sir.

92Q: Okay. How long were you there on the ground?
92A: I can't be certain of that again sir. We shut the aircraft down. General Pilkington and Colonel Thompson had the meeting inside. For perhaps maybe an hour, hour and a half, and then we had lunch afterwards in the dining room there in Salah ad Din. It was sometime in the afternoon. I can't--

93Q: Did you go to Irbil after Salah ad Din?
93A: No sir.

94Q: Is Salah ad Din outside of the security zone?
94A: Yes sir.

95Q: Did you return after Salah ad Din back to Zakhu?
95A: Yes sir. We were in a... It seems like we were always in a big hurry that day.

96Q: Okay.
96A: We were in a hurry to get there and then in a hurry to get back. So we went almost as direct as I could, again utilizing the terrain and avoiding any threat to the south.

97Q: Okay. Was there a requirement for AWACS to be operational on that day?
97A: Yes sir, we left the security zone. And AWACS was operational that day, sir.

HOLDEN

98Q: At 0740, approximately Zulu, when you took off?
98A: Yes sir.

99Q: OK. Have you... Were fighters in the area?
99A: I don't know sir. To tell you the truth, I don't know what those guys do up there, really. We know that Cougar's there and we know that there's supposed to be fighters there and we know that there's supposed to be aerial refuelers there. But there's always been this certain division between tasks there. The Air Force takes care of all the high stuff, we take care of all the low stuff. We're not really read up on what the other guys are doing out there.

100Q: Are you familiar with a requirement for the fighters to sanitize the TAOR prior to any aircraft entering the TAOR?
100A: Not at that point, no sir. We had a briefing on Wednesday, up here with the 39th, and they explained that to us. Prior to that I was not aware of that sir.

(The interviewer asked the group: Any questions?)

101Q: Can you think of anything Mr. Holden, that could possibly help us in this investigation or any information you may have that we did not think of a question to ask you?
101A: Because of my intimate knowledge of our flight procedures and our flight profile. I have come to the informal conclusion that based upon the way we routinely fly the mission that after Chalk 2 was hit, lead was performing evasion maneuvers to avoid whatever the threat was. Based upon the way the terrain at that point goes to the east in their flight log. I'm very convinced of that sir. I don't know if that would have any effect on the information that you have or not. But there is absolutely no way that lead could have been where he was, unless he was turning to avoid, avoid the threat. Yes sir.

102Q: Would you have expected the lead aircraft to have made a radio transmission at that point?
102A: Yes sir. You would expect, but it's easy to look back, and Monday morning quarterback so to speak. I'm sure it came as a very traumatic surprise to see that happen to the trail aircraft. They may have been trying to call on the radio. But at that point, the terrain that they actually turned into was a very, very steep ravine. And I flew the same mission profile the following day and contacted Cougar repeatedly every five minutes enroute and I'd be about close to the information on the map. And we had no radio contact with Cougar at that point sir.

103Q: And it was your testimony that you would expect the frequency to be the enroute frequency at point?

HOLDEN

103A: Yes sir. Army helicopter pilots, as a rule sir, are pretty low on the scale of things. For our initial impression, to come down here and work directly with AWACS and work directly with the joint services that we do, it's rather unusual for line pilots to have that type of exposure and interaction. Normally, all that stuff is taken care of at a brigade or Corps level. So initially when we come down here and we find ourselves dealing with AWACS on a routine basis, we just assumed that if they wanted to do something, they would tell us. So they didn't tell us to leave the enroute frequency, we just assumed that we're where we're supposed to be.

104Q: I have no further questions.

LTC BLACK: You're reminded that this is an official investigation. You are ordered not to divulge the nature of the investigation or the questions, answers or discussions included in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

LTC BLACK: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No sir.

LTC BLACK: The time is 1636 and the interview is concluded.

I certify that the above sworn interview, given by CW3 Kenneth D. Holden to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded during an open microphone interview session monitored by SSgt Beverly Y. Moore. The tape from the session was reviewed and transcribed by me and the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that recorded interview statement.

KENNETH J. KING, MSgt, USAF
Court Reporter
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

HOLDEN

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TAB V-050B

V-050A

HOLDEN, KENNETH D.

V-050B

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TAB V-051

V-050A

KOCH, KENNETH J.

V-050B

V-051

CW3 KENNETH D. HOLDEN
EAGLE FLIGHT DETACHMENT
PSC 95
APO AE 09825

I, CW3 Kenneth D Holden, wish to add the following statement to my testimony concerning the the downing of two UH-60 Blackhawks on 14 April 1994 in Northern Iraq.

The AN/APR -39V installed in the UH-60 Blackhawk will not give a warning indication or a signal if the pilot is being tracked by a "friendly" radar system. Therefore, during the moments prior to the incident on 14 April 1994, none of the crew members were forewarned that they were being tracked by radar. Apparently the two F-15s made a low pass over the Blackhawks for a visual identification. Having been intercepted by F-15s in the past I can confirm that this would not be construed as a hostile act. We have quite frequently encountered the fighters at low altitudes. Additionally, the AN/APR-39 is not a reliable system. A formal poll of the UH-60 pilot community will reveal that the system is plagued with false indications and cries "wolf" all to frequently.

I would also like to clarify that both aircraft were installed with operational transponders and that the switches would not have been turned off for any reason. Each of the pilots flying the Blackhawks had over 200 hours of flight experience in the TAOR and were well versed in tactical flight operations. They all knew the importance of following established flight SOPs.

Certain individuals of the CTF staff have accused Eagle Fight Detachment of failing to adhere to certain Command and Control issues. Army flight crews have no reason to question flight procedures that have been accepted as standard procedure by the CTF staff for over 3 years. Army flight crews operate at the "user" level and are not normally involved in Command and Control issues. These Command and Control issues are normally resolved at the O-6 level in the Division or Corps primary staff. As previously mentioned in my testimony and clarified in this statement the maximum altitude for helicopter operations in the TAOR is 400 feet AGL. The steep terrain severely limits our ability to maintain radio contact at these altitudes. As a result we make our calls in the "blind" when necessary and report our location to Arrow base over the "TACSAT" after landing. Additionally Eagle Flight remains on the en route frequency while conducting operations within the TAOR because we have rarely been asked to change to the primary frequency. (We do not have "Have Quick" capability.)

I sincerely regret that I failed to discuss these issues during my original interview and I thank you for allowing me to include these statements as a part of my testimony.

Kenneth D Holden
KENNETH D. HOLDEN
311-64-7732
CW3, USA

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

18 May 94
Date

CW3 KENNETH D. HOLDEN
EAGLE FLIGHT DETACHMENT
PSC 95
APO AE 09825

2 MAY 1994

I, CW3 Kenneth D Holden, wish to add the following statement to my testimony concerning the the downing of two UH-60 Blackhawks on 14 April 1994 in Northern Iraq.

During the evening of 29 April, 1994 I initiated a conversation with LTC Pintor at the Incirlik Officers Club. I thought that LTC Pintor worked for the 39th Wing and I wanted to propose a future meeting for a Low Level Transit Route that Eagle Flight Detachment had designed in the hopes of getting this route incorporated into the new Airspace Control Order.. I very quickly learned that LTC Pintor did not work for the 39th Wing and subsequently I discovered that he was an F-15 pilot. He continued the conversation in a very conciliatory manner and expressed his regrets about the incident on the 14th of April. After a moment of reflection he then accused Eagle Flight detachment of failing to comply with the following procedures:

Failure to "squawk" the proper mode I codes.

Failure to maintain radio flight following and radar contact with AWACS.

Failure to report to AWACS that Eagle Flight had landed and taken off from the village of Barzan.

Failure to understand the Command and Control issues involved.

Failure to understand or properly utilize the Air Tasking Order/SPINS.

Failure to be pro-active in announcing Eagle Flights intentions and location on the primary frequency

During the course of the primarily one way conversation LTC Pintor became more aggressive and repeatedly pointed his finger in my direction in an intimidating and accusatory manner. LTC Pintors comments were accusatory in nature and reflected his belief that if Eagle Flight had followed proper procedures this unfortunate incident would not have happened. I cautiously guarded my comments in an attempt to avoid a clash. I did remark that Eagle Flight Detachment utilized the proper mode I codes. I also asked LTC Pintor what threat a helicopter posed to an F-15. His answer, "none". I was subsequently introduced to COL O'Brian of the CTF C3. The conversation at this point became less confrontational in COL O'Brians presence and LTC Pintor drifted away to join another group.

LTC Pintors comments seem to imply a lack of understanding of the employment and limitations of Army aviation. (This appears to be true in the entire CTF staff.) Although I can understand LTC Pintors frustration, I was quite disturbed by these unprofessional remarks and consider them to be entirely inappropriate under the circumstances.

KENNETH D. HOLDEN
311-64-7732
CW3, USA

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

12 May 94
Date

WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

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TAB V-052

V-050A

BOULEY, WILLIAM R.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

KENNETH J. KOCH, CW2
CHARLEY COMPANY, 6 159TH AVIATION
GIEBELSTADT, GERMANY

The interview was conducted by CW5 Steven A. Meline, at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1225 hours, 22 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I am Kenneth J. Koch. I am a CW2 in the United States Army. I have been assigned as a UH-60 Instructor Pilot, stationed at Charley Company, 6 of the 159th Aviation in Giebelstadt, Germany, since 16 February 1992.

While I have been assigned to the Eagle Flight, during this rotation here, I'm one of the two flight IPs; Mr. Holden is the other one. The flight detachment calls for one IP, since there was more than one here, I was not the acting IP. I still do my duties of IP, but I was not the acting IP.

I attended training to perform my duties as an IP at the Instructor Pilot Course at Fort Rucker.

I have flown missions similar to the Eagle Flight mission in past assignments. I was stationed in Honduras in 89 and 90. I had deployed there with the 101 Airborne and we did similar missions out into the villages in Honduras and in Guatemala, providing medical assistance and other various assistance to people of those two countries.

A mission here for Eagle Flight starts out with a show time in the morning in Eagle Operations. The show time is generally somewhere between 6:15 and 6:25. We show at Ops. The operations personnel and the pilots take care of the paper work, filing the flight plan, preparing the flight plan, and getting the weather brief. We conduct a mission brief there, we sign for all the equipment that we are taking along on the mission, NVGs, so on and so forth, and once all of that is completed we have a time table that we follow. We get in the vehicles that we have, drive out to the flightline, turn our flight plans into base operations there at Diyarbakir, preflight the aircraft, do a commo check, and HIT check. The arrival of the C-12, whether it's early or late, usually has a impact on our departure time. We load the PAX and the cargo up, depart Diyarbakir enroute on the LLTR (low level transit route) down to Zakhu, and from there it is whatever the mission calls for.

KOCH

"NVG" is night vision, goggle. "HIT" check is a health indicator test for the engines.

I flew 060 the day prior with Mr. Garrett as my co-pilot, Specialist Robinson as my crew chief. My gunner that day was Major Netherland, who was our in-coming company commander who came down to see what the operation was like. We did a two ship TAOR village mission.

"TAOR" is Tactical Area of Responsibility.

I flew that aircraft the day prior, and there were no problems noted, whatsoever. Aircraft survivability equipment was working properly. In fact, I did a Mode IV check with COUGAR, -- it wasn't a requirement at that time, we just did it anyway -- and the Mode IV checked okay. There were no other problems with the aircraft.

We have the Mode IV check in the standard configuration for a flight. We call COUGAR and ask them to do a Mode IV sweep on us. At that time, we look down to see if the reply light lights up to tell us if we had a good interrogation or not, which we did that day.

The AWACS, the fighters and the helicopters have a common frequency, but it is not the same one; it's a classified frequency. We have a frequency classified that we use with AWACS, the fighters are not on the same frequency as us.

The helicopters can conduct missions in the AOR and the TAOR without AWACS being airborne.

Eagle Flight did not fly a rehearsal for the April 14th mission.

A normal crew for the type of mission that Eagle Flight flew on the 14th of April consisted of two aircraft, which is the requirement for the TAOR, pilot and co-pilot for each aircraft, crewchief and a gunner for each aircraft and a Turkish LNO for each aircraft. There are two aircraft mandatory for TAOR flights and if you fly within the security zone. We use the UHF, ultra high frequency radio to contact AWACS. In the TAOR the only aircraft that you can talk to 100 percent of the time is the other UH-60. Otherwise within approximately five miles from Arrow Base, which is in Zakhu, that is about the range that we get with our VHF radio-- very high frequency radio.
Then, approximately, to my best guess, 30 to 40 percent of the time, we can communicate with AWACS on the ultra high frequency radio. I'm not really familiar with the AOR, I always call it the TAOR. The TAOR is once we cross the border into Iraq. In the TAOR

KOCH

we squawk Modes I, II and IV. Flight lead squawks I, II, III, III Alpha, Charley and IV. Aircraft 2 only squawks Mode I, II and IV. "Squawk" is where our transponder is in normal and it is actually sending signals.

The ATO, which is the Air Tasking Order, or the Spins is where we would find the codes that are required to be placed in the transponder for that day's mission. Mode II is our squawk which can be found on the page marked as "19/28" in the ATO. The Mode I squawk is on page 26. The Mode II squawk is on the fragline, which I showed you on page 19. The Mode III squawk is on page 28. Mode IV is listed for the ATACs information.

Rules of engagement are not in the actual SOP per se, or the reading file; it's in the safe under rules of engagement, which is part of our reading file. The SOP for rules of engagement are not classified.

You would deploy a chaff during your mission if one of the crew members aboard the aircraft visually identified a smoke trail or observed ground fire of some sort coming toward the aircraft, and if we received some type of indication on our APR 39 of what type of threat was coming toward the aircraft, obviously, a radar guided missile. "APR 39" is a radar warning receiver. Depending on the threat, when the APR 39 reports what type of threat it is and the crew member notes what side of the aircraft the threat was inbound from, we would pop the chaff and then position the aircraft, immediately move 90 degrees away because of the time that you are actually being tracked on the APR 39. The band is very narrow at that point so that once you pop the chaff you would maneuver 90 degrees away so that the chaff would hopefully cause the missile to believe that that is the aircraft. I do know of chaff being deployed in the TAOR or AOR.

The unit SOP, Standing Operating Procedures, covers mission abort requirements. Each type of mission has different requirements for each type of mission. Most of the missions are two-ship missions. We have six aircraft at our location, if we were to go to the flightline, it was briefed in the morning during the pilots brief that if one of the aircraft had a problem, personnel were to try and fix it on the spot. If they were not able to, we would jump into one of the aircraft that the flightline and the NCOIC would determine at that time. I would abort a mission for degraded or inop aircraft survivability equipment.

I did not take any actions in connection with the preparations for the mission on April 14th.

I'm not aware of any other information that may be helpful to this investigation.

KOCH

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of KENNETH KOCH as given to the Aircraft Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

KOCH

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TAB V-052

V-050A

BOULEY, WILLIAM R.

V-050B

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V-052

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
OF
STAFF SERGEANT WILLIAM BOULEY
C Company 6/159 Aviation
Giebelstadt, Germany

The interview was conducted by CW4 Douglas C. Sousa, beginning at 1248 on 22 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I am Staff Sergeant William Robert Bouley, assigned to C Company 6/159 Aviation, Giebelstadt, Germany. I am the Standardization Instructor for the unit. I am responsible for monitoring the flight records and ensuring that our crew chief and gunners receive the proper training and are up to requirements for their flight duties. I having been serving in that position since October of 93.

I was a flight instructor performing the duties for 14 months while assigned to the same unit as a platoon sergeant. I have not held many maintenance positions in the past. I've been "flights" for the last 15 years and also a technical inspector for five years. That's been four years since I've been there.

I was not involved in maintaining or contributing to the two aircraft involved in the accident. I arrived in country at Diyarbakir on the 13th at approximately 1730 hours to inspect weapons and perform flight evaluation of crew chiefs and that is it. I arrived the day prior to the accident. There are no manuals or guidance in writing that spells out what you need to do for this mission. My primary mission was coming to inspect weapons and my orders state that I was down here as the armorer.

Even though I was there for a short time, and not necessarily physically working on the aircraft, my assessment of those aircraft was they were in good condition. I have been down here on three full tours, once as a technical inspector, twice as unit first sergeant and as a backup gunner-crew chief on all those rotations.

And with our civilian maintenance team that we've had on hand, from the time we've been in this operation, the aircraft have been in very good condition.

I am not aware of any transponder problems or Mode IV problems with either aircraft. I was under the impression that the Mode IV was checked everyday prior to the aircraft crossing into Northern Iraq. I haven't seen anything in writing about that. I have always confirmed the Mode IV check with Cougar, we have been swept, and we make sure we get a light and if they

receive a proper reply from our aircraft. Cougar is the AWACS aircraft call sign; it is the AWACS aircraft we have been dealing with here and sweeping us with the radio signal and receiving our IFF identifier on the proper code that IDs a friendly aircraft. We request them to check our IFF and they reply with radar.

As far as if the APR 39 was working, they do self tests prior to missions and if it doesn't work you don't go. APR 39 is a system on the aircraft with four antennas mounted left front, right front, left rear, right rear of the aircraft, that picked up radar signals. They show on the screen with an audio to the pilot and co-pilot and it will tell you you're being searched by radar, being locked on by radar, and it will define what kind of weapon system that is tracking you, what is being fired.

The ALQ 144 on both aircraft are checked for self test and again if they are not operational the aircraft is not allowed to go in the zone. It is a series of mirrors. I don't know if it has been declassified or not but it's electrical equipment for electrical scattering, I'm not exactly sure how it works. But it's mounted on the top of the aircraft, forward and between both engines on the rotor system, and it emits heat signals or electrical signals to the air to try to confuse tracking systems. I cannot define what particular tracking system it is trying to confuse.

I do not know of any problems on the UHF/VHF and FM radios on those two aircraft. Again prior to every mission before they take off they have the commo check on both secure and nonsecure on all aircraft and their mission for that day.

Kit One Charlie is keyed every morning prior to flight along with the KY's again prior to mission launch, and normally one person will do both aircraft. KY 58 is for secure radio transmission, and Kit One Charlie is for feeding in the codes for the day for identification friend or foe for radar/transponder. In the past when I've been here, usually one person will key both of them; how it works this rotation I don't know. All the crew chiefs are trained to key the Kit One Charlie and the KYs. I don't know who keyed them that morning, I wasn't on the flight line. Usually the crew chief or one of the SERV-AIR representatives, usually the electrician, that way if there is a problem with it they can fix it at that time.

I am not aware of any of the write ups on either aircraft that could have degraded the capabilities to perform the mission on 14 April. Both of the UH-60s carried external fuel tanks. Both aircraft had distinctive identification; six approximately two foot by three foot, red white and blue American flags on their fuselage. Both wing tanks had on the outside of both of the external wing tanks an American flag on both cargo doors. Inboard from the wing tanks were American flags and two on the bottom of the aircraft, one forward and one aft.

I do not have any other comments or information for the board pertaining to these two aircraft. I have been doing this mission for 32 months and our procedures are the same. It's been proven procedures in the past and everything is done by the book. Everytime.

BOULEY

(The standard witness caution was given, the witness had no questions and the interview concluded at 1301 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of STAFF SERGEANT WILLIAM R. BOULEY, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Colonel, USA
Legal Advisor

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TAB V-053

V-050A

PATTERSON, SCOTT F.

V-050B

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V-053

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF
STAFF SERGEANT SCOTT F. PATTERSON
COMPANY C, 6/159TH AVIATION
GIEBELSTADT, GERMANY

The interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Black at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1155 hours, 25 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the Witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

My name is Staff Sergeant Scott F. Patterson. My organization and permanent duty station is Charlie Company, 6/159th Aviation, Giebelstadt, Germany. My present duty assignment is as a Technical Inspector. I have been serving in that position for a year now. I inspect the work that the mechanics do to make sure the aircraft is safe to fly. To perform these duties, I went to an Army School--Basic Noncommissioned Officer School at Fort Eustis. I have served, in the past, as a mechanic and crew chief.

I was involved in signing off the work done on the specific aircraft involved in the accident under investigation. My responsibilities with respect to these two aircraft was to make sure that the aircraft are safe to fly after they've been worked on and I do that by inspecting the work that was done by the mechanics. For a replacement of a part, for example, I would make sure the part is installed correctly, all the hardware is hooked up correctly, cotter pinned, safety wired, whatever needed to be done on that particular task. Pertinent aircraft technical manuals, along with administrative manuals are available to me to perform these duties for Eagle Flight. I am not aware of any instances where the tech manual guidance is not followed in performing maintenance on the Eagle Flight UH-60s.

As far as the civilian personnel, four maintenance personnel is an adequate number to accomplish the Eagle Flight mission. I, myself, did not work on these particular aircraft, but I did perform the duties of technical inspector, to the best of my knowledge, about one or two days prior to this happening.

As far as my assessment of the condition of both aircraft on the day of the accident, they were safe to fly. All inspections were completed and signed off. All avionics were in working order. I am not aware of any transponder problems in either aircraft. There were no problems, to my knowledge, of the Mode IV or transponder whatsoever. They were keyed up as usual every morning before they fly. The Mode IV is the IFF code that the aircraft gets interrogated with by other aircraft or radar. The "Identify Friend or Foe" is used by aircraft or radar to interrogate our aircraft so that they know whether it's a friendly aircraft or an unknown aircraft.

They are keyed up every morning. The Mode IV check is done and published in a TM every 30 days. We get a "parrot check" or an IFF interrogation from Cougar every time we fly. A "parrot check" is what they call the IFF check that we do. Cougar is the AWACS aircraft that will interrogate our IFF code. They call it a "parrot check" because it's the squawk of the Mode IV, the IFF, and when Cougar or AWACS interrogates us, our aircraft, the Mode IV squawks back at them and tells them if we're friend or not friend. Squawk is the code that is sent back from our IFF to the AWACS aircraft. Our aircraft will squawk out the code or send it back to the AWACS aircraft. I don't know exactly what component on the aircraft this code is being sent to.

We don't have a transponder test set at our location so we can't perform the check on the Mode IV. We do ours with the AWACS aircraft.

The organization did not change the inspection procedures upon deployment for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. They did not increase the number of inspections or the number of operational checks or decrease the amount of time between inspections or anything like that. Since we are interrogated by AWACS every day, we didn't step up the inspection criteria.

To my knowledge, neither one of the aircraft had any problems with the APR-39. The APR-39 is our way, in the aircraft, of telling when a radar is searching us or locking onto us. We are required to check the APR-39 with the test gun every 30 days. We have the test gun on site and it's also self-tested every morning after it's turned on before it flies. Inspection procedures and operational check requirements did not change at all because of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. The number of inspections did not increase. The time between inspections did not decrease.

Neither of these aircraft had any problems with the ALQ-144. The ALQ-144 is an infrared jammer to throw off infrared seeking missiles. You are required to check the ALQ-144 every 30 days. The check on the ALQ-144 is a visual inspection to make sure that none of the mirrors are cracked on it and it's run up for 15 minutes every 30 days which is the check, but it's on the whole time we fly every day, every time that we fly. When you do this 30 day check and you run it up for 15 minutes, there is nothing you can do to check from the maintenance or technical inspector side. There is nothing that we can check as long as the master caution light doesn't come on that says that it's bad. There is no special equipment used to check the ALQ-144. There was no increase, because of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, in the number of inspections and or amount of time, just that we use it every day every time that we go up.

The M130 chaf dispenser is used to throw off heat seeking missiles. There is a requirement to check it every 30 days. It is checked with the M130 chaf dispenser test set, which we have at the site. There was no increase in the number of inspections and/or operational checks of that. It's checked every 30 days with the set and a visual inspection.

PATTERSON

I know of no problem either aircraft had with UHF, VHF or FM radios.

The Kit 1 Charlie is keyed before each flight. The Kit 1 Charlie holds the code for the IFF, the transponder. That's where the code is put into. The KY58s are the normal procedures for keying the aircraft radios. They are keyed with Kit 13. The KY58s and Kit 1 Charlie are either keyed by the crew chief or one of the civilian contractors that we have. The KY58 is the secure for our FM and UHF radios. I was not present when the Kit 1 Charlie was keyed on either aircraft prior to the mission on the 14th.

I am not aware of any write-ups on either aircraft that could have degraded the capability to perform the mission on 14 April.

Both UH-60s carried external fuel tanks. These aircraft did have distinctive identification on them. There were six American flags painted on the aircraft--one on each tank, one on each cargo door and two on the underneath side of the aircraft.

(The standard witness caution was given and the Witness had no questions.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of STAFF SERGEANT SCOTT F. PATTERSON given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

PATTERSON

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TAB V-054

V-050A

BEACHLER, CORY C.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

SERGEANT CORY C. BEACHLER
Company C, 6/159th Avn, 12th Avn Bde
APO AE 09096

The interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Black at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1105 hours, 20 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I'm the NCOIC for the airfield here in Turkey. I also run production control which is basically the maintenance, and I'm in charge of the crew chiefs and the gunners. I schedule flights as far as which aircrafts the pilots get and which crew chiefs and gunners the pilots get. These are all the responsibilities as the NCOIC of the airfield.

On the 14th of April 1994, the day of the accident, I was present for duty and performing these duties. The pilots were going to be flying to Irbil, so they needed Black Hawks with tanks, external fuel tanks or the auxiliary fuel tanks that are mounted on the exterior of the aircraft. We didn't do anything out of the ordinary that day. We always check over the log book to see if there is any upcoming inspections. There's no sense in sending a bird with the external fuel tank if it's restricted from using it, so we just checked all that stuff. That morning, we were getting all three of wing birds ready to go, two for the Irbil mission and one for the flight to Incirlik. We had a problem with one of the birds that was supposed to go to Irbil. The engine out audio would not go off; it was just a switch that was stuck. They told me that they needed another bird, so I went out and talked to Captain McKenna. I told him the only other aircraft I had with wings was 060, and that it was going to Incirlik. I also told him that if he needed it, he should let them know right then, so he could use that bird and cancel the Incirlik mission. Captain McKenna said that's what he would have to do, and we moved all the equipment, weapons, and everything, over to 060 from 001. That's basically all we did; nothing out of the ordinary.

To prepare the birds in the morning, depending on whether they're in the hanger or they're tied down on the flight line, we unchain them with the crew chief. The gunner is responsible for cleaning the windows. We always clean the ALQ before each flight. The ALQ is a counter measure for, I believe, for heat seekers. It's what we call the disco light, and it's located on top of the aircraft, about the center of the aircraft behind the main rotor. I really don't know what "ALQ" stands for. The gunner is responsible for also cleaning the ALQ. During that process, the people who are doing weapons that day will bring the weapons out. They usually get to the airfield about 20 minutes after the rest of us. They would then mount the 60's and the M16's,

and they load the M16's in the bottom -- (witness interrupted by ringing telephone). Our mission down here is to fly these aircraft, so we pay a lot of attention to detail.

We set up the number of ICS cords that we're going to need. ICS stands for internal communication systems. We decide what kind of mission it's going to be that day, whether we'll be carrying a lot of PAX, or just going to be picking up cargo. We knew we were going to be carrying PAX that day. Chopper one is usually the passenger bird. Chopper two is usually the cargo bird when we go down to Zakhu. Once we get down to Zakhu, however, it turns into a passenger bird during TAOR. As a result, we make sure that all the ICS cords are set up. We all usually go around with the pilots and check the fluid levels, as well as the damper and the curvature on the blades.

I did not mount the external tank myself, and I did not see who did. Those tanks were on those birds when we got down there from the rotations. The external tanks have been on those aircraft since I've been down here in September. I don't know exactly when they were mounted. I know that 000 had tanks the last time I was down here, but I can't remember whether 060 did. Three of the birds that were the SLICKS that had no tanks or external just came from Germany. In Germany, they had wings in the external stores, but we'd take them off when we do the load-out with the C-5 to bring them down. I remember what the tanks on this particular aircraft look like. They were marked with American flags on the outside of both aircraft. We have flags on the bottom of the aircraft. We use to just have them on the outside of the cargo doors, and then we had them on the outside of the tanks. The last rotation we also had an incident with small arms fire, so we painted flags on the bottom of the aircraft as well. There should have been a minimum of five American flags painted on the aircraft. I saw another aircraft the next day that didn't have one on the bottom, but there was one on the front part of the nose. I saw another one the other day that had the flag on the middle, but I really couldn't honestly tell you whether there were -- I do know, however, that there should have been a minimum of at least five American flags painted on the aircraft. The locations of these flags are the outside of the external fuel tanks, the cargo doors, and one on the glide scope antenna on the nose. All the flags are about the same size, but I believe the one on the nose is a little bit smaller. The flags are about 2 foot high by 3 foot long in size. The flags were pretty much done by free hand or stencil, and some were civilian made, but they were pretty good. The condition of the flags were pretty good. They weren't as bright as they would be brand new. The flags were not faded to the point where they needed to be redone, or anything like that.

I really didn't have a lot to do with the mission that morning. I helped with the weapons and I helped when we had to switch from 001 to 060. I helped carried the equipment, and I helped the gunner carry some of his stuff. That aircraft was pretty much prepared because Specialist McCarthy was preparing 060 to go to Incirlik, so he had already washed the windows,

BEACHLER

cleaned the ALQ, set up the seatbelts and ICS cords, and everything. It was pretty much ready to go. I actually saw the mission launched. Pretty much everybody helped out in preparing these birds to fly -- myself; Staff Sergeant Patterson, our QC Sergeant; PFC Eleanor and Specialist Covert who were the crew chief and gunner that flew the mission. I don't recall whether the SERV-AIR guys keyed up the radios that day. The crew chief would key up the radios most of the time; and if we ever had a problem, the SERV-AIR were there. As a matter of fact, the SERV-AIR didn't do it because they jumped on 001 and started fixing the problem we had there. They were still going to try to get 001 to go ahead and just basically switch missions with 060, since 060 was not going to Irbil. And once they fix 001, they were going to send that to Incirlik.

I actually saw the mission launched. In between preparing the birds and the mission launch, I usually go back into the office to see what everybody is getting ready to do. I would start preparing for the maintenance for the rest of the day. I didn't really talk to any of the mission personnel that day. It was really strange because the last thing I really said to Captain McKenna was about 060 being the only other bird with wings that he can take. We only have three of them with the external fuel tankers. He then said that is what he'll have to do, and that's basically the only thing we said to each other that morning.

I was not there for any pre-mission brief, or anything like that. I did not overhear any discussion between any flight personnel about the scope of the mission, or anything else to do with the mission. I just knew they were going to Irbil, and they felt that they would need the external tanks. I can't recall anything unusual in preparation for this mission. To the best of my knowledge, all the equipment functioned properly.

They had brought in a finance team here to Pirinclik because they had heard that we were having complications with pays in the rotations. This has been going on since we basically started this mission. They had called me out at the airfield and said it was mandatory for us to come by and at least check in to do the paperwork. I told everybody we'd be leaving early for lunch. We usually leave between 11 and 1130. I said once the aircraft was gone, we'd wait for awhile because sometimes the weather causes them to come back I decided to wait around just a little while to see if the Incirlik bird would make it off all right, but the Incirlik flight was delayed. We went ahead and went to finance and took an earlier lunch. About 1 o'clock when we were getting ready to head back when somebody came over and said that Eagle operations said that we might want to take our flight gear out to the flight line. I made sure everybody had their flight gear because they said they hadn't heard from the Eagles in about 3 hours. I made sure everybody had their flight gear, since we may need a mission to go out for obvious reasons. We all got our stuff and went back to the airfield, and then it was just a waiting game from there.

BEACHLER

I've really thought about this incident a lot. What I'm about to say is not just for this investigation or because a lot of these people are gone. Captain McKenna was one of the best commissioned officer that I've ever worked with. One of the reasons I like coming down here, even though it's separation from my family, is that everything down here has always been done on an extremely professional basis.

We had tested the equipment. The IFF boxes apparently failed, according to the papers. We even had a CAS D inspection. I believe Mr. Cook had also tested the equipment. We would check our boxes, our Mode IV, and all that, every twenty five flights out. I was not involved in any of these checking that are in question. However, I have done some of the checking before. Usually we'd call the AWACS enroute and ask them to interrogate us, and they would tell us whether it was good or bad, whether we're responding or not. CAS D came down and ask what manual we went by for these checks. Our "Dash 18" and our aircraft log show which manual to refer to for every inspection. They were also checking this out in Germany because it does not say in the manual -- what they said is that the number of flights we have down here, every 25 flight hours for the Mode IV check was good enough. We were flying three to five hours per day.

I have not kept any personal diaries, books, or documents, or anything that I've stored within the last 4 or 5 days, that I think might be useful to this investigation team.

I can't think of anything else to add. I'm not as involved in actually preparing the aircraft as much as the crew chiefs and the gunners. Basically, what I do is just come and hang around the aircraft as they're doing it in case they need anything done, and the gunner and the crew chief is busy. Sometimes I'll leave right before they takeoff to see what I've got to do for that day and who's got to do what. That particular morning I was out there when the flight took off.

The witness had no further information, statements, or evidence to present. The standard witness caution was given.

(The interview terminated at 1122 hours, 20 April 1994.)

BEACHLER

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **CORY C. BEACHLER,** as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Legal Advisor

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BOWEN, DEON M.

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SUMMARY TESTIMONY

SERGEANT DEON M. BOWEN
C COMPANY, 6/159TH AVIATION, 12TH AVIATION BRIGADE
GIEBELSTADT, GERMANY

The interview was conducted by LTC Scott C. Black, at Pirinclik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1130 hours, 20 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-4.

EXAMINATION

I'm a crewchief. I sometimes help out Sergeant Beachler a little bit on whatever he needs done. Sergeant Beachler is the airfield NCOIC. My duties as a crewchief basically are as a extra crewmember on the aircraft. I help clear that aircraft so that it can fly around. The main thing that we do is get the aircraft ready for flights and pull maintenance on them with certain kinds of scheduled inspections and stuff like that. On the 14th of April I wasn't scheduled to fly that day. There was a last minute change to the flight schedule. My aircraft was scheduled but they didn't change the crews. So, my aircraft was flying, so I was helping Specialist Robinson who flew on the aircraft that day to get it ready plus also help everybody else out. Because our main mission in life, when we go out there in the mornings is to get the aircraft flying ready. And until they're gone, we don't usually do anything else.

Preparing for this particular mission wasn't any different from any other day. We got the aircraft ready. I helped Specialist Robinson. In fact, I think I took some fuel samples on the aircraft that day, helped clean the windows, anything usually that the crewchief that's crewing the aircraft that day would want you to do. That's what everybody usually does. This is actually the day of the mission.

Like I said, they changed the flight schedule to a different aircraft the night before because they wanted to have an aircraft with external tanks instead of slicks. Which mine was one with the external tanks. The crewchiefs when they're not flying just work on their aircraft and get them ready. Just go over them and do any inspections that are due on them.

Myself and Private Ellner had brought the weapons out, which we do every morning and it's different people all the time. So, it's an NCO and somebody else, just those two people there.

The kind of weapons we had loaded on the aircraft were two M60s per aircraft for a total of four. Two M16A1 per aircraft, four total, and four 9mm per aircraft, it would be eight total; and, two ammo cans. Each aircraft gets its respective weapons and one ammo can, and that's all we brought out.

Myself and Private Ellner physically loaded the weapons and ammunition on the aircraft. Usually it's the crewchief and the gunner on that aircraft does that.

Ellner was the gunner on one of those aircraft that day. That's basically what I did to prepare the aircraft. After that we waited until after the aircraft got ready to run up. The two aircraft that were scheduled was the 000 and 001. And 001 had a maintenance problem, so they switched to 060. So, when they found out they had the maintenance problem, we helped them switch over to the other aircraft and then the civilians were working on it and seeing if they could figure out the problem on 001.

I did have a conversation with the flight personnel on 000 before it took off. It was basically small talk. It wasn't nothing out of the ordinary. Specialist Colbert was kind of angry because he'd gotten one aircraft ready and it was broken, so they had to switch to another one and he was kind of angry about that.

I can't remember if I was there at either aircraft when they did their crew briefings, but I knew what they were suppose to do that day. Everybody always knows where they're going.

I don't recall hearing the specific preparations for the flight. Everybody seemed like they always are. Everybody was in a good mood and they were ready to go do the mission and get back. We were looking forward to our day off on Saturday or Sunday and it was getting closer, so everybody was like, let's hurry up and get this week over. Everybody was in good spirits.

The rest of the day was pretty slow because he really didn't have a whole lot of stuff to do. We came back here at Pirinclik for lunch a little early I think and while we were back here and we got word that no one was heard from, either aircraft, Eagle I or II. So, it was kind of strange but sometimes you don't worry because they fly so low that radio contact is lost or they might be landing somewhere. That's what we thought at first and it wasn't no real big deal, really. As time went on, we were like, well it had been a while. I figured that they should have called somebody.

If they were landed, there's a least two SATCOM with both aircraft. We always carry one and then the MMC folks have one. Then as we heard more about it, we realized it was a serious thing. Then when we heard what exactly had happened, we were all pretty scared.

I don't think there's anything particular about the activities of that day that I participated in that might be helpful to the investigation.

BOWEN

I don't keep a personal diary or notebook. I don't have any documents at all that might be helpful.

I can't think of nothing that was unusual or extraordinarily that happened that day. It was a normal day. Everything was the same as any other day.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1145 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of SERGEANT DEON M. BOWEN, as given, and sworn to, before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt COLONEL, USA
Legal Advisor

BOWEN

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MCCARTHY, JOHN A.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

SPECIALIST JOHN A. MC CARTHY
Company C, 6/159 AVN, 12th AVN BDE
Giebelstadt AB, Germany

The interview was conducted by Lt Colonel Black at Pirinclik, Turkey, beginning at 1447 hours, 20 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

EXAMINATION

I'm a sixty/seven Tango helicopter mechanic. My duties entail being a crewchief on helicopters, to prepare the aircraft for flight at the beginning of each mission day, also responsible for flying with the aircraft and coordinating any other maintenance problems that happen to come about during the day.

I drew a fuel sample from aircraft 060. I prepared the aircraft for a flight to Incirlik that morning, and one of the aircraft had broke down so they used 060 for that mission. I opened up all of the cowlings for the preflight inspection of the pilots, made sure the fuel levels were serviced, made sure the interior of the aircraft was straight and ready for passengers. I straightened the seat belts, putting protection on each seat and made sure all of the equipment was secured to the floor, tool boxes, ammo boxes if we were carrying them and installing the weapons. I did not install the weapons. They were installed by Specialist Colbert which was the crewchief that flew 060 the day of the incident. I assisted. I loaded the ammunition for him and loaded up the ammo can into the aircraft and he mounted the actual weapons. This was transferred from 001 to 060.

After we loaded the ammo and the weapons, I asked him if he needed any other assistance and he said no, he's all set and I proceeded to unload my personal gear off that helicopter and move it into Eagle's nest while I waited on another aircraft. Eagle's nest is the office that we have down at the flight line where all of the business for the flight line is conducted.

During the course of preparing for the mission, I spoke to Captain McKenna, Mr. Garrett, Specialist Robinson, Specialist Elner, Specialist Colbert, Specialist Bass. I was just asking them how they were doing and if they needed anything else and just general friendship conversations.

I did not overhear any area of the premission briefs. As I was walking by, I overheard the crew brief on 060 when they gave just the regular brief to transfer the controls to the pilots and other duties assigned by the pilot in command to the crewchiefs. Captain McKenna was doing the brief. I didn't hear any specifics that I can recall. This was a crew duty brief.

After I moved my personal gear into the Eagle's nest, I started preparing other aircraft that was sitting in the hangar, aircraft 634 for a flight to Incirlik that day. I did not have any other contact with the Eagle flight. I was there when they launched.

There was nothing unusual or anything that stands out in my mind as being different than the normal procedures that are followed. There was nothing during the remainder of the day that stood out in my mind or came to my attention later as being out of place in preparation for that particular mission.

I usually retain a copy of my own flight records and my flight time that I personally log. I did not keep any kind of log of the daily activities of that particular day.

I recall a radio call from Cougar trying to contact the Eagles about the time of the accident that day. Cougar tried to contact the Eagles and got no response. This was approximately 1020 in the morning. That was the only thing that I noticed and didn't pay much attention to it until we got into Incirlik and within a half hour after we landed on the ground we were secured by the LNO that works up there for us and he put us in our rooms and told us to remain standing by until further notice. That's when we got the word that we needed to come back and sit by the flight line. Major Young was preparing to go to view the videotapes of the F15, the gun tapes.

I have visited the crash site. The day after, I went up to the crash site with the EOD team. We were in chock one and in chock two to crash site one. Crash site one, coming from Zakhu would be the first accident site that you come into next to the river and out by a road. And we proceeded over to crash site two which was located in a valley on the side of a mountain and that's where we shut down and we proceeded to assist the EOD team.

The on-scene commander from EOD took pictures of the site but myself and the crew that I was flying with that day did not take pictures.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

MC CARTHY

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of John A. McCarthy, as given, and sworn to, before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Colonel, USA
Legal Advisor

MC CARTHY

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MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

SPECIALIST CHRISTINA M. MONSULICK
Company C, 6/159th Avn, 12th Avn Bde
APO AE 09096

The interview was conducted by LTC Scott C. Black, at Pirinclik, Turkey, beginning at 1428 hours, 20 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

EXAMINATION

I'm a Crew Chief on the UH-60. My duties are preparing the aircraft before a mission. I get the aircraft ready for the mission day.

I was conducting those duties the week of the 13th and 14th of April. I was not a crew member the day of the accident, but I was an assistant. I did participate in the mission preparation functions for the mission that resulted in the accident. That day I prepared the first aircraft, which was 001. Fuel sample and weapons, that's all I did on that aircraft. 001 did not make the mission because there was a problem. They had to get a replacement aircraft. After 001 went down, I secured the weapons and everything to the other aircraft that went, which was 060. Basically all I did on 060 was move the weapons from 001 to 060 and made sure all the crew's equipment was moved over to the other aircraft. I believe I pulled a fuel sample on that one too.

I did talk to some of the other crew members that were making the mission that day. I talked to Specialist Colbert. I just asked him if he needed anything as far as headsets and things of that nature. I wasn't present during any of the crew briefings. I didn't really overhear any conversations among any of the crew members concerning the up coming mission. After I loaded the weapons on 060, I wasn't at the aircraft for an extended period of time. I was running back and forth between the two aircraft. I just wasn't there long enough to overhear anything.

The helicopters carry two M-60s, two M-16s and personal weapons which I believe at that time were 9MMs.

After the weapons were secured, Specialist Colbert said he wasn't requiring any additional help. So I went back to 001 and stood by in case they needed any help trouble shooting, because they were still working on that aircraft. I wasn't really clear on why the aircraft did not make the mission. Basically it was unflyable. SERV-AIR was appointed to the aircraft to correct the fault. They do all of the trouble shooting.

I was there when the mission departed. I did not overhear any conversations, among the crew members, relating to the mission brief. There was nothing unusual about the launch. It was typical. After launch, I just stayed around and just did little maintenance after they had left. We knew they were off.

There was nothing unusual or out of the ordinary that happen that day that I would think is of value to the investigation in terms of the accident. I do not keep any personal diaries or notes concerning my daily activities. I did not come across any documents, books or records that I think might be valuable to the investigation. There is nothing else that I can think of that I would like to add.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of SPECIALIST CHRISTINA M. MONSULICK as given, and sworn to, before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USAF
Legal Advisor

MONSULICK

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MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

SPECIALIST RUSSELL P. MCCARTHY
COMPANY C, 6/159 AVIATION
APO AE 09096

The interview was conducted by LTC Scott C. Black, Pirinclik, Turkey, beginning at 1020 hours, 20 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

EXAMINATION

I'm the Operations NCOIC for the Eagle Flight Detachment. Basically, I have two people under me. We run the operations, and handle communications; whether it be radio or telephones. We help with the mission scheduling, keeping track of the hours for the individual aviators, crew members, working liaison between the flightline and the people in the rear, making sure we help them with any of necessary equipment or things of that nature that they might need down there.

I was not performing those duties on the 14th of April, the date of the accident. I was present, but I was off that day. I come in a couple of times a day when I'm not working a shift, to check to make sure things are going all right. I first came into the Ops Center on the 14th of April, maybe a little after 10:00 o'clock.

I came in and PFC Daigle, who assigned operations shift that day, told me that they were having a hard time getting in contact with the Eagles. I told her that at times it happens that they lose communications or it could be that they landed in a village or something like that. So, I told her to just listen to the radio and keep a heads up on what's going on. Things like that happen occasionally when we don't have communications with somebody. It could be anywhere from them being on the ground right now.

I didn't know the full scope of it at that time. When they said they couldn't make contact with the Eagles, I figured maybe they were flying in a valley or something like that, or maybe they were on the ground, or maybe somebody's just not doing the correct procedures.

I've been the Operations NCOIC for about eight months. We also fly occasionally so I know sometimes the terrain might affect the reception with the AWACS. This wasn't an unusual occurrence. I felt it would clear up in a couple of minutes.

MCCARATHY

After that, I stepped out for a moment. When I came back in, she told me that they still didn't have any contact with the Eagles. At that time, I called over to the billets where CW3 Henry, the maintenance test pilot, answered the phone. I said, "Well, you know that happens from time to time." "Just keep a heads up and I'll be out on the flightline if you have any questions." So, he left and at that time the Joint Operations Center called and said the same thing, that they couldn't get in contact with the Eagles.

At that time, I started getting an uneasy feeling, so I called back to billets and CW2 Koch answered the phone, who is one of the IPs for Eagle Flight. When I told him the situation, he said, "Well, just keep a heads up on what's going on." CW2 Koch then asked me if he needed to come over to help me out, and I said, "Well, there's really no information right now." I just said, "Well, are you going to be in the billets in case I have another question?" He said, "Yes."

From that moment on I stayed on-station. Things started escalating a little bit and I received another phone call from Lieutenant Marlborough, who is the LNO of Incirlik, at the Joint Operation Center. Lieutenant Marlborough stated that he needed to get ahold of Captain McKenna as soon as possible. I said, "Well, Captain McKenna is out flying right now." Lieutenant Marlborough stated that he would like to speak with the senior person, and I stated that "Well, I am the senior person right now."

At that point, I knew something was up, because I kept hearing AWACS on the UHF/VHF radio. I don't periodically hear MCC forward, which is Arrow base contacting Arrow mobile; the patrol, whether they are on the ground in vehicles or in an aircraft. So, I started getting real uneasy then.

I told them to initiate a time line and start pulling down the information exactly as you knew it. PFC Harvey, one of the other Ops guys came in and said he had a little bit of information. I told that to Daigle, since she was officially on duty to start a log and Harvey put his input on what he had heard.

I was on duty the night before this particular Eagle Flight, and prepared the Air Tasking Order -- frag lines and SPINS. A frag line is the mission numbers for the aircraft. It has anywhere from transponder settings, to AWACS code words, to frequencies. It's committed to a document and we pick it up from the comm center every evening. I'm the only one that has a comm center badge, so it's my responsibility to pick it up every evening. That particular document has been destroyed. Two of them were on the aircraft. We don't retain a copy of them. We get a copy everyday. It stays the same except for the rescue word letter of the day. That's about the only thing that really changes on a daily basis.

MCCARTHY

The SPINS are also part of the Air Tasking Order. SPINS stands for special instruction notices. These entail, basically, the frequencies for each element in the OPC. I also prepared the KYK-13 for the next day's mission. The KYK-13 is the code holder and transfer for the crew. We put in the daily codes from the 3662s. We have to insert them into the KYK-13 and then chalk one pilot signs for the KYK-13. The KYK-13 gets retained at the flightline for the pilots to pick it up at the end of the mission and bring it back here and turn it in and then we sign it off. I prepared all of those on the evening of the 13th of April.

We prepare our situational report and things like that the night before when we do the mission, make the necessary phone calls to the Joint Operations Center, to weather. I believe Mr. Hall, the Assistant Operations Officer, was in there helping. I believe all I did was the KYK-13 and called for a weapons draw. I think Mr. Hall notified the Joint Operations Center. There's a sign off list that's in the front room that you might have seen. It's just so standard the people just do it and then sign off and then the next person sees what needs to be done and if it hasn't been, then they do it. So, when it's completed, we do a final check. And that completes our activities in connection with preparing for the mission. About 1900 everything is done.

When we get the disk done and take it over to the comm center, which is the situational report for personnel, aircraft, hours and things like that. I take that disk over to so they can transmit it back to Germany and the CTF, and then pick up the ATOs and any kind of Intel reports and bring them back here. The Intel reports are still sitting in the safe. It tells what the intelligence officer would look at; Mr. Garrett. It just has air defense activities in Iraq and things like that. He prepares that on an overlay and puts it on a map board just to brief the pilots on what's going on.

There's always an Intel briefing before a mission. It's part of the mission brief. I did not participate in any way in preparation for this particular mission.

It was a standard TAOR mission. We've done it hundreds of times before. Since I'm the supervisor, I come in and made sure the equipment was signed our properly, the superseded classified material had been destroyed, just make sure nobody needs to go eat or run an errand or something like that.

I don't have any personal notes or notebook concerning the activities of the 13th of April. We weren't really involved in what was going on after that, except for answering phone calls and people wanted to know who was on the aircraft.

I can't think of anything else that might be of importance to this investigation. All I can say is that we took care of the nightly mission. It was standard, we didn't cut any corners. We did everything by the book.

MCCARTHY

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of RUSSELL P. MCCARTHY as given, and sworn to, before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

MCCARTHY

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INGRAM, JOHN

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
OF
JOHN INGRAM
SERV-AIR, INC
DIYARBAKIR, TURKEY

The interview was conducted by Lt Col Scott C. Black, at Diyarbakir, Turkey, beginning at 0952 hours, 28 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

My name is John F. Ingram and I'm the SERV-AIR representative supervisor of a four man team in Diyarbakir, Turkey. My home station is C Co., 6/159 AVN, in Giebelstadt, Germany. I help maintain the aircraft and make sure the people that are working for me are competent and qualified to perform their job. I work as a mechanic in several different positions in Giebelstadt, I've served with SERV-AIR for nine months and I also worked on Blackhawk UH 60 helicopters. I did maintain the two aircraft that were in the accident mishap. The maintenance of the aircraft are followed by the standard operating procedures set by the Army along with maintenance manuals. We strictly enforce following the procedures set out in the manuals when performing maintenance on the Eagle Flights.

I do feel that four maintenance personnel is adequate to accomplish the Eagle Flight mission because of the quality of personnel and crew chiefs. The maintenance is performed by the military. We (SERV-AIR) are just a complimentary maintenance team to aid and assist the military and perform a higher level of maintenance if need be. I would have to check records to check to see when the last time I worked on those two aircraft. We try to maintain or at least work on them daily to keep the log books up and any unscheduled maintenance is done.

Both aircraft to my knowledge had no defects or faults. Everything was in working condition. The avionics on these aircraft with respect to the mission we perform has to be working at all times before they leave on the mission. I am not aware of any transponder problems on that aircraft. Neither aircraft had any problems with Mode IV. Prior to each flight the avionics, the transponder, and Mode IV are checked daily. Usually if the pilots have a problem with the avionics, transponder or Mode IV or anything of that nature they will write it in the book and we will fix the problem prior to them taking off. We don't have any transponder test sets, it's checked daily by the pilots and operational check.

The APR-39 has a scheduled inspection by date and it's performed on those dates when due. I don't know of any inspection procedures that were changed upon deployment for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT without checking the logs. There probably have been some

changes when we had updated equipment. For the ALQ-144, the only thing we are required to remove and replace is a component if it's defective. Not to my knowledge did either aircraft have any trouble with UHF, VHF, or FM radios. For the Kit 1 Charlie most of the procedures were performed by the crew chiefs daily, and if assistance was needed or they had a problem, we were always available to assist them in any way.

I do not know if the Kit 1 Charlie was keyed on prior to the mission on 14 April. I'm not aware of any write-ups on either aircraft that would have degraded the capabilities to perform the mission on 14 April. To my knowledge everything was airworthy and operating when the aircraft left. Both UH-60 carried external fuel tanks. Both aircraft were distinctly marked with, I think, four or five American flags and that's the markings we put on for PROVIDE COMFORT on the doors, fuel tanks and bottom of the aircraft also.

The maintenance we provide is general maintenance. We are allowed to do some aviation intermediate maintenance work with authorization from the unit. But mostly it's aid and assist, repair, replace default components. If a transponder breaks, the only thing we can do is remove and replace. The one that is removed is tagged unserviceable and turned over to the military parts supply system. It's either hand carried by military air to Germany or sent back through normal channels.

We do aid and assist the crew chiefs. Most of the time the crew chiefs will key the radio and if they have a problem and we are able to assist them and fix the problem, we will. Most of the time I will talk with the sergeant in charge of maintenance and we will discuss the maintenance that needs to be done on the aircraft that day. We know when the aircraft comes back I look at the log books, we determine what we can fix and when we have the ability or the time we will fix it. We have a small group of people here and everybody knows what is going on. If something happens to one aircraft everyone knows it. I did not experience any conflicts with any military commanders or Capt McKenna.

(The standard witness caution was given, the witness had no questions, and the interview was concluded 1020.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of JOHN INGRAM, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

Scott C. Black

SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Col, USA
Legal Advisor

INGRAM

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

MR. GILMAN WILLIAM PAGE
SERV-AIR, INC.
PIRINCLIK AIR BASE, TURKEY

The interview was conducted by Lt Col Scott C. Black, at Pirinclik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1735, 28 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I am Gilman William Page. I'm employed by SERV-AIR, subsidiary of E-Systems. I am permanently employed in Giebelstadt, Germany. My present place of employment is Co C, 6/159. My present duty location is Diyarbakir, Turkey.

I'm an aircraft technician assigned to Charlie Company, Eagle Flight. I am also an inspector for the same. In the past, I have been an electrical sheet metal technician and general aircraft maintenance technician. I've been serving in that position 17 years. We're here to assist the Army Aviators in Operation Provide Comfort. By that I mean if they have any problems with the aircraft, or any mechanical or electrical problems. We're there to help them fix it. We're just here to aid these people, so they can perform their mission on a daily basis. I was an Air Force crew-chief for 4 years on CH-53 helicopters. Then I got out and went to work for Fort Rucker for 11 years, working on helicopters and fixed wing, primarily at the test activity. I worked every type of army airframe, or airplane, or helicopter. I moved to Germany in '89 and I've been working various Army aircraft throughout Europe.

I was involved in maintaining those specific aircraft in the accident under investigation. We did a broad range of work on the aircraft. It's everything. Today we fixed two broke aircraft as you guys seen and that's a daily occurrence. We're out there to keep the aircraft in a safe and flyable condition. Today we had a stabilator problem, which is the large air foil on the rear of the aircraft and we had two bearing failures on a rotating flight control. I don't have a specialty of any particular kind. I can fix anything on any helicopter. I can most definitely fix avionics. I have no training in avionics, just experience. As I said, I've got 17 years aviation experience. When you're out in environments like this, you've got to be able to do it all. You've got to be able to fix everything. You can't rely on them sending a specialist in.

I haven't been to any special schools for avionics in particular. I went to the Sikorsky Factory years ago. Just generally went TDY with test activity twice and they more or less just

hands on showed us how to work on the aircraft. I got an Associates Degree in Aeronautical Technology. I got an FAA, A and P along with an IA, which means airframe and power plant mechanic and I am an authorized FAA Inspector.

As an airframe power plant mechanic, you're allowed to do a minimal amount of maintenance without an inspector coming in and looking at it. Preventive maintenance, an A and P is allowed to do without an inspector, as is a pilot. He's allowed to do that also. But when they do something major, such as pull an engine, do an "annual", which every civilian aircraft has to have done under 12,500 pounds, I have to go in and physically do the inspection myself or certify that the piece of equipment was installed properly in accordance with the FAA regulations. I have to release the aircraft for safe flight. There are no other grades of inspectors. I represent the FAA. At any given time the FAA can revoke that privilege, if I mess up somehow. I've now held the license for two years; no complaints.

You pulled a thorough inspection down at the flight line, yourself and the other people involved in this investigation. And you're well aware that we have one set of working manuals, although there are three on the flight line, there's only one complete set of working manuals that we can use that are reliable and up to date. Of course, due to where we're at and how hard it is to get stuff in and out of this country. We don't deviate from the manuals. There are some things we do, the manual doesn't exactly state cut and dry. For example we were discussing the bearing problems. The manual says remove bearings. It's impossible to remove the bearings. We actually had to take an air hammer and beat them out of there. That's just one of the things, I mean the manual is great, it's a great guideline, but it's lacks a little. But it is a great guideline, and we do abide by them.

There are four people working down here. I would love to see ten more down here, but four is enough.

I don't remember when the last time I did anything on either one of the two incident aircraft, I'm sorry. It's a couple of weeks ago. To the best of my knowledge both aircraft were in serviceable and flyable condition on the day of the accident. I'd have gotten in either one of the aircraft and flown. Concerning the aircraft avionics, I know for a fact every system was up. There had been a problem with the transponders in the aircraft back over a period of time. And only because transponders have been mentioned so many times. We had a problem with 001, which is one of the tail numbers down on the flight line. The Mode C would not take the fill, so we replaced the component. And I'm sorry, there was one other incident where the transponder failed a self test, and I don't recall the tail number of the aircraft.

And one time we had to replace the entire transponder itself and it was also failing antennas and it wasn't antenna problem, it was internal in the box. So we replaced that

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transponder. Since I've been here, and I've been here for almost three months, they were the only problems that I recall. 001 was not one of the helicopters involved in the incident, it was the one that was replaced out that morning. 001 was supposed to fly the mission, but did not. I want to say that was the one we replaced the transponder in, and of course, we jump from aircraft to aircraft, and sometimes tail numbers are a little more difficult to remember than any aircraft on the left and the aircraft on the right. I believe it was 001, because it was a winged aircraft.

If the transponder is bad on an aircraft, I green tag it and give it to the military. When we green tag it, that means that an unserviceable condition exists on the component; therefore we can't use it. We put tags on it, and in this case it's called a green tag. The supply people worked the green tag items for Eagle. They take that piece of equipment, put it on the soonest available airplane, send it back to be repaired and order one in the same. I don't have a clue if it goes back to Giebelstadt to be repaired.

I have been informed the Mode IV of the transponder is checked daily. We can't check it, there's really no piece of equipment for us to use. We can check Mode C, the height elevation. We don't even have that piece of equipment here. As far as checking the Mode IV, these aircraft are swept daily. When AWACS are flying, they ask for the aircraft to identify itself. That's our only test we have in this area. There was no problem with the APR 39s on either one of the aircraft, they wouldn't of left here if there was a problem. Neither one of those aircraft had any problems with ALQ144, or they wouldn't have left the airfield with a problem with either one. There were no problems with the UHF or the FM radios that I knew about. 060 just had one FM, due to the fact that there was a personnel locator system installed. When you install this system, you have to disable FM 2 and use the same power supply. We check those chaff dispensers regularly.

I am not in agreement with the normal procedures for keying the Kit 1 Charlie, but... and I expressed this with Captain McKenna. This was going to be changed that week actually. They key up the Kit 1 Charlie and the KYs on a daily basis, the crew chiefs do. The kits that we have down here have been here for 3 years. Therefore, it's makes them a little difficult to use and load. So if they can't get them to fill or can't get them to load, they go ahead and call us over, cause we been here so long, we know what angle to hold the kit. If it hadn't been loaded, there would of been a light in the cockpit telling them such. And they would not have taken off without it loaded. And the same with the KYs, there not going to leave this area unsecure.

The KYK 13 is loaded with a classified code on a certain day of the week. And we take that KYK 13 and plug it into the secure radios and Mode IV, and put the information that's in there into these radios. Therefore, everybody's on track with the same code, I guess, for lack of a better word.

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I am not at liberty to know if the Kit 1 Charlie was keyed that morning. Normally, they fill every day. The Kit 1 Charlie is filled everyday.

There was no write-up on that aircraft that could have possibly degraded the capability to perform the mission on that day.

I am not aware of what the SERV-AIR contract says concerning what level of maintenance that can be performed. We perform unit level maintenance, we perform intermediate level maintenance. And on rare occasions, we have performed depot level maintenance with authorization from AVSCOM Engineer.

I did see the mission go off that day, on the 14th. I don't want to use the word repetitious, but working down here basically everyday of the week, long days, it becomes a blur after awhile. Of course, we're still doing the work and our work is always double checked to make sure we're doing it to the best of our ability. But on that morning, we always get out on the flight line and make sure the flights get off OK. And they had a problem with 001. The problem was easily fixed. It just didn't click right away how easy it was. So we went ahead and gave them a spare, which is something we don't normally give. We've been pretty fortunate that the aircraft are in great shape, and we don't have to give out spare aircraft. That was one of the few occasions, so it kind of sticks in my mind a little bit. As soon as they got into the other aircraft, the first aircraft already running, they got the second aircraft, 060, on line and made the launch on time. It was a good launch. So there was really nothing peculiar about... other than having to give out a spare. That's the only thing that really sticks in my mind.

How I found out about the problem with 001, is when the pilots stick their heads outside the window and say they need us, we rush right over. Captain McKenna did it on this one. He was in 001 at the time. He was piloting 001 and he had the auxiliary power unit on and that's as far as he got. I talked to him about the aircraft. Probably more than anything, I like to know that I can fix the aircraft right there on the spot. So when I tell the pilot that he needs to go get another aircraft, then 5 minutes later, I find out, look how simple this is, so I remember the conversation well. He asked me if I knew what was wrong right off hand, I said no. He gave me some of the symptoms. But as soon as he got out, I realized what the rest of the symptoms were and was able to fix it. He asked what spare we could give him, and I told him you need to talk to the military about that, but I think it's 060. He just walked on over to the aircraft, like it was an everyday thing.

I didn't have any conversations with any of the other crew members. Once we started working... we thought we would just start working, and then after we get it fixed, we would explain what we did, and how we fixed it and what the problem was.

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I can't think of any thing else that might be helpful to the investigation in figuring what happen and why it happened.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1802.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of GILMAN WILLIAM PAGE, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

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STREET, TERRY W.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
OF
MR TERRY STREET
PIRINCLIK AB, TURKEY

The interview was conducted by CW4 Douglas C. Sousa, at Pirinclik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1832 hours, 28 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

My name is Terry W. Street and I am employed by SERV-AIR Incorporated. I am permanently employed at Giebelstadt, Germany and presently employed at Diyarbakir, Turkey. My current duty position is avionics technician. I have been serving in that position with SERV-AIR since October of 1993. I basically perform avionics and electrical maintenance on the UH-60 Black Hawk with the Army. I've undergone training with several Air Force schools, civilian schools, and I have a FAA airframe license. The avionics schools attended were through the Air Force - auto pilot, instrument, and electrical. Maintenance positions I've held since 1968 are avionics and electrical. I did perform maintenance on the two aircraft that were involved in the accident.

I do not know of any particular maintenance procedures that may work better than the manuals. We follow the procedures set out in the manuals. I can't recall the last time I worked on those two aircraft, without looking at the logs. The avionics on both aircraft were working good. There were no transponders or Mode IV problems on those two particular aircraft. The Mode IV check is performed by the crew chief before the aircraft is ready to go by using a coding device. The code is inputted into the aircraft and if it is accepted, there is a light on the master console panel that will extinguish, saying that the system is up and it has accepted the code for the day. After takeoff, and from my understanding, they check with AWACS and then they would be in code Squawk. I'm not a flying person, but my understanding is that they do that procedure every mission. If aircraft didn't accept the code and the caution light came on, they would call us and we would perform maintenance.

On the 14th of April we waited for them in the truck prior to takeoff. When the crew chiefs opened the hood and put in the codes, they didn't call us so I assume everything was okay. I am familiar with the APR 39 system, but as far as I know there was nothing wrong with APR 39 system on either of those aircraft. We received a call from Europe about a week or two ago in reference to the ALQ 144. We had to check to see if they were set on number 2, threat selection. We checked them all and they were set on number 2 and that information was relayed back to Europe. I do not know of any chaff dispenser problems on those aircraft and the chaff dispenser is checked every thirty days. I don't know of any particular problems with the UHF, VHF or FM radios on those aircraft.

STREET

The Kit 1 Charlie is keyed every morning before the flights and they are keyed by the crew chiefs. I don't know for sure if the Kit 1 Charlie was keyed that morning, but it is done every morning prior to flight. My understanding and feelings are the flight crews wouldn't forget. We have neither the testing equipment nor the facilities to perform any maintenance on the transponders, we just change components. If we have a problem with a transponder, we just turn them into the Army to be replaced by another transponder. There has been no conflict between SERV-AIR and Eagle Flight.

I did see the mission go off on the 14th. It was a standard mission, they got in the helicopter and left. They did change aircraft which is something that is done all the time. It's my understanding that they didn't miss their departure time from swapping helicopters. They were working with the Turkish people at the control tower. They have a time frame that they can only take off from when they file a flight plan. The aircraft had a problem and wasn't able to fly and they didn't want to try to fix it, so they got into another airplane and left. They took 001 and 060. Aircraft 001 was the one that had problems. Unfortunately this aircraft was also "E triple S" which means that they have the wings -- tanks, exterior things that make them look like the Hind. The crew chief would have been the one to key the radio.

I'm not sure if they were pressed for time. It wasn't like a Chinese fire drill, it was pretty coordinated. We have done this before. They were running the auxiliary power unit; they had not started the engines. The electrical sources from the auxiliary power is how they found there was a problem. If they were keying the secure radios and Kit 1 Charlie, they would open the hood on the front of the Black Hawk and they go inside with the coding device, put it in, and do their check. I can't say for sure if that is what happened, my feelings are that it did happen and they are not going to leave unless that stuff is in there. No it is not normal for them to key the two primary aircraft and the standby aircraft in the morning. They would key the two primary aircraft and if they needed the standby they would key that one. The other aircraft was not designated to my knowledge for another mission. Getting back to keying of the radios, the two aircraft need to talk to each other. If one aircraft was coded incorrectly and the other didn't get his encoding they wouldn't be able to talk to each other unless they went to the red. I don't believe that they could get in such a hurry that they could forget because the other person would catch it.

(The standard witness caution was given, the witness had no questions, and the interview was concluded 1850 hours.)

STREET

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of TERRY STREET, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Colonel, USA
Legal Advisor

STREET

TAB V-062

NEUSER, STEVEN T.

VERBATIM TESTIMONY

OF

STEVEN THOMAS NEUSER, CAPTAIN
53 Fighter Squadron
Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany

LTC MUDGE: The time is now 1128 on the 20 April 1994. The persons present are the following: Major General Andrus, Colonel Fain, Colonel At Lee, Colonel Mudge, Lieutenant Colonel Velluz, Lt Colonel Lawler, Group Captain Doggett, Colonel Armen and the court reporter and the witness, Captain Neuser.

This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official Air Force Regulation 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony given in this accident investigation, may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

WITNESS: Yes sir.

LTC MUDGE: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No sir.

LTC MUDGE: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed verbatim so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon.

As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by the board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it's necessary for you to discuss classified information, you will need to identify it as such.

NEUSER

Would you please rise so that I may swear you in.

(The witness was sworn)

EXAMINATION

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

1Q: Will you please state your full name and grade?
1A: Steven Thomas Neuser, Captain, United States Air Force.

2Q: And what organization are you assigned?
2A: The 53d Fighter Squadron.

3Q: And where is that station?
3A: At Spandahlem Air Base, Germany.

4Q: And what is your current duty assignment?
4A: Presently I'm assigned to Charlie Flight and I work in weapons as Plans Officer.

5Q: And . . .
5A: I'm a wingman.

6Q: And you're assigned TDY to Incirlik now?
6A: Yes sir.

7Q: What are your normal duties and responsibilities in the squadron?
7A: Here at Incirlik, sir?

8Q: Yes. Well, at home.
8A: All right. I'm the squadron plans officer and what that entails is keeping current on the current NATO operations as it pertains to our squadron and I'm also in charge of making sure the weapons library is current and up to date.

9Q: And . . .
9A: And also I'm a wingman assigned to the squadron and all duties involving that is keeping current on tactics and procedures and studying up to be the best wingman that I can be.

10Q: How long have you flown the F15?
10A: I've flown the F15 since July of 1992 when I started RTU.

NEUSER

11Q: How many hours do you have in the F15?
11A: Approximately three hundred and eighty?

12Q: How many total flying hours do you have approximately?
12A: Total of all military aircraft?

13Q: Yes.
13A: Two thousand four hundred.

14Q: And what other airplanes have you flown besides the F15?
14A: I was a previous Army aviator as a Chief Warrant Officer II with Third Infantry. I flew the UH-1 Huey, OH-58 Alpha and Charlie models which are Scouts -- Bell Jet Ranger, I flew the AH-1 Cobra as my primary assigned aircraft and then T-37, T-38, AT-38, F15.

15Q: Do you have any special -- special qualifications as an F15 pilot . . .
15A: Not at this time.

16Q: . . . or any at home, SOF, range officer, or any . . .
16A: No sir.

17Q: . . . other special duties? Are you DACT -- or Dissimilar Air Combat qualified?
17A: Yes sir, we all are.

18Q: Okay. Have you flown in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC) before?
18A: Yes sir.

19Q: How long have you -- when did you last fly in OPC before this rotation?
19A: I was here from the period November of last year through -- actually December, correction, December through the beginning of February.

20Q: Do you have any idea approximately how many sorties you flew then?
20A: Yes sir, I flew eighteen sorties.

21Q: Okay, and how long have you been in Turkey on this rotation?
21A: Since -- I keep trying to think of the date. Approximately three weeks. I got here around the 28th of March.

22Q: And how many sorties have you had here on this rotation?
22A: Four.

23Q: What duties and responsibilities do you have here while you're deployed to Incirlik?
23A: On this rotation I have no special additional duties.

NEUSER

24Q: Are there -- is there anything that you do extra, other than fly, while you're down here?
24A: Yes sir. On my non-flying days, I come in, we have weapons and tactics training. I also make it a point to get into the books because back at Spandahlem we haven't had that opportunity with the move. I've been studying up the aircraft operating handbook, tactics, I review the ATO and that type of thing also, SPINS, keeping current, and threat knowledge also.

25Q: What -- could you describe a normal work day?
25A: A normal flying work day?

26Q: Uh-huh (Affirmative)
26A: Get up, you know, eat breakfast, go to the squadron. We brief two hours prior to take off so you show up at the squadron. My duties entail getting the current weather for the base and out in the area and also the Notices to Airmen of anything that would affect the safety of flight. That's printed. The NOTAMS. We then brief. It usually takes about an hour or so. Get suited up, sign out our life support equipment, go out to the aircraft, fly. Depends on what type of a flying day it is. We have what we call "B" days and "C" days. A "B" day is a less flying day where there's only four missions and a "C" day is six.

Go out, fly the mission, we debrief it for any lessons learned or things noted, and after that usually get something to eat, finish that, go to the gym, work out, weights, basketball, that kind of stuff, take a break and then we usually get together for dinner.

27Q: How long would a normal flying day be? Time at the squadron.
27A: Depending on how long your flying period is, anywhere from about eight -- eight hours to -- yeah, eight hours is about the longest, eight to nine.

28Q: On a -- a day when you're not flying, how long would you spend at the squadron?
28A: Four hours. There's not enough room to really stay around in that area, if you've seen it. It's -- we just get in each other's way.

29Q: Okay. How much longer do you expect to remain in Turkey on this rotation?
29A: I was scheduled to return last Saturday, so based on the board's releasing me.

30Q: Prior to your deployment, when was the last time you took leave?
30A: Okay. I was on leave actually about two weeks prior to coming down here for five days in conjunction with some training that I had -- had to attend in the States, so I took five days of leave to go home to New York and see my mom.

31Q: Do you expect to get leave when you go back home?
31A: It's not really an option because I'll be going TDY again on Friday or Saturday. We're going to Florida on the 29th, I think we're leaving.

NEUSER

17-

32Q: Before you took your leave, what was your work schedule like back home at Spang?
32A: It entailed mainly getting the squadron moved from Bitburg to Spangdahlem. We -- we were spending an average of -- or for me, anyway, in the weapons shop, ten to twelve hours a day moving safes, making sure that everything was done by the book so we accounted for everything, being the publications officer and making sure, you know, everything gets moved was a big responsibility keeping track of all that.

Very little flying was going on. It was a period of which we had people deployed down here, so anybody that was back at Spangdahlem was -- was doing a whole lot of physical labor. We were building our facilities ourselves, a self-help project. Pilots working as carpenters basically for about three weeks. During that time I -- I did not fly for at least three weeks, from the time I came back from my training in St Louis and took those five days of leave, I -- I probably didn't fly for three weeks until I came down here. It -- it was a pretty busy period but there was really no -- no way around it. We had everybody gone to -- you know, a third or more of the squadron gone, and then we were picking up all these new people from Spangdahlem that we didn't even have working with us previously so just setting up shop was the big priority so we could get down to, you know, we had a date where we had to be operational by so everything else was secondary priority to getting to that point to where we could start flying ops on that day.

There was some flying going on, however, it was pretty limited.

LTC MUDGE: According to the aircraft logs, you flew 9025 on the 14th . . .

COL AT LEE: Excuse me. Before you start if I could just ask a follow up question.

(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

33Q: The schedule that you described at home before you came on this rotation, was that fairly typical for other people in your squadron who were at home?
33A: Yes sir. And we were working on Saturdays also. There were a couple of times where we came in to get stuff done.

34Q: And the people who are with you on this rotation, are they -- were they also with you at home station?
34A: About half of them were. Yes sir, we rotate in and out.

35Q: Referring to Tiger One and Tiger Two, relating to the matter of this board, were they with you at home?

35A: Yes sir.

COL AT LEE: Thank you.

NEUSER

(Questions by General Andrus)

36Q: Do you feel that that sort of a schedule limited or reduced your ability to perform the assigned mission here at PROVIDE COMFORT?
36A: Yes sir, I can say that that is, in fact, true and that point was brought up while we were at home and it -- I'm just a wingman so I don't make any decisions pertaining to the flying training schedule, but it was brought up and it did have a very negative impact. I mean, we're not flying. It's a perishable skill.

37Q: Do you think that that schedule reduced your combat capability?
37A: You mean for -- speaking for me personally? Yes sir.

(Questions by Colonel Fain)

38Q: My question is, was the workload that you describe back at Spangdahlem, as it relates to squadron level supervision, about the same, more or less?
38A: I would say they were probably doing more, to be quite honest, because they had to organize this whole thing. I mean, I was just a worker bee. I was told where to go and what to do and, you know, I had initiative as far as my areas, but we were moving furniture as our main job, you know, and putting up the walls, dropping tile, rug, electrical work. We had enlisted members whose job was not that at all helping us. I mean we had medics working there, we had Intel guys. It was a big effort to get the squadron up to speed.

(Questions by General Andrus)

39Q: You said you brought up your concerns about the perishable skills and the -- the workload at home. To whom did you make those comments?
39A: To my flight commander.

40Q: Do you know if they were made to anyone above your flight commander?
40A: I also talked to our ADOs about it. I mean, I was not alone in this, you know. We all sat around at the end of a work day, you know, look back over our shoulder and go, "Wow, we got a lot of stuff done today." And we go, "Yeah, but, you know, this is not helping us, you know, to fly, fight and win.

(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

41Q: For the record, would you define ADO?
41A: Oh, I'm sorry. Our Assistant Director of Operations.

COL AT LEE: Thank you.

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(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

42Q: Okay. To resume and get into the aircraft that you flew. According to the logs, you flew aircraft 9025 on the 14th of April on the afternoon sortie. What is your assessment of the aircraft systems when you flew the jet?
42A: The aircraft systems when I flew the jet were all fully functional and I did check them out as I was flying. In fact, my technique is to run the videotape recording system on the ground and in the air and if you review it -- I know it was impounded, you'll see that there are some systems that I did use that everything worked. There was only two discrepancies that I could come up with and one was that the left engine temperature gauge light was not operating, which is not a big deal. You can -- you can still see it,. and that the radar was having some anomalies with it, but it was -- it was combat capable even though the radar was a little degraded. It was not really impacting the -- the operation of the radar.

43Q: Can you describe the discrepancies on the radar and the anomalies without getting classified?
43A: No sir.

44Q: Okay. We'll discuss that in more detail later then. What systems tests did you run specifically on the ground?
44A: Okay. I run through my normal procedure of running built in tests, what we call BIT -- BIT checks -- Built In Tests. I always run an Air Data Computer check, the TACAN, which is the Air Navigation System, the Horizontal Situation Indicator, which is our compass -- TACAN, HSI, the -- the lead computing gyro for the -- the gun director, the heads up display. All -- basically every one you've got over here I try to run on the ground to verify that everything works.

(The witness motioned with his hand to what would be a console to the left and slightly behind him)

Obviously I ran a Radar BIT, Air to Air Interrogator BIT, I ran -- what else is on there. Oh, Radar Warning Receiver BIT and the Chaff and Flair Dispenser BIT. There was a slight degradation that I remember on the Chaff and Flair Dispenser. Everything wasn't inventoried, but it was within tolerance. That's pretty normal.

COL AT LEE: To note for the record, when the witness said , "basically everything you have over here," he was indicating with his left hand as though there was an instrument panel on the left side of the cockpit.

WITNESS: Yes sir, the -- sorry -- to clarify that, you can't see it on the tape, we have a built in test selector panel over here and basically what it is is a rotary knob with a pointer and what it does it initiate a check on the desired system that you select, and there's probably twenty-five

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systems you can check on the ground, and that's part of our before takeoff/before taxi procedure, to check all that, so that we can isolate any -- any faults with the system and have a specialist work them.

(Questions by Colonel Fain)

45Q: Are there warning lights that would alert you if there was a failure of any or all of those components on the ground or in flight?
45A: Yes sir. There's what we call the built in test panel down there and we call them BIT lights and as I ran all these checks, none of the lights remained on which would indicate a failure mode. There are certain lights that stay on all the time but they are systems that are not currently used in the aircraft, like the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, JTIDS, that's always on. As a technique, you can extinguish those lights and if any one system should fail, it would cause all of them that are affected to come back on. The reason we like to turn them off is that the panel gets pretty hot and to save the bulbs and stuff so that it doesn't burn out. It's a very reliable system.

So after I check it, I turn -- I turn that panel to dark so that when we are ready to take off, I look over there. If no lights are on, I'm okay and nothing new has failed..

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

46Q: Are there any external checks that are done on the airplane?
46A: Yes sir, we have a panel in the nose gear well called the ASP -- I guess Aircraft Status Panel. I'm not sure what ASP stands for, but there are certain ones there that if they are right, it's called a latched situation. If it's latched, then that system may be suspect from a previous flight and the crew chief resets all of them after you start up both engines. And they were indicating normal to me.

47Q: Are there any other checks that you do after the airplane starts up? Do you run your BIT checks while you're taxiing out to check systems operation?
47A: Sure. To verify without getting too classified, the Airborne Interrogator -- I usually try to check that on lead as we're taxiing out. Sometimes you're too close and it doesn't always work, but on this day, I'm not sure if I did check it. I was on spot eight and he was down, I think, on six. Actually yeah, I did check it because he told me to wait and then he went -- right, yes. So we do that and . . .

48Q: Did that system check out?
48A: It checked fine. Yeah, it checked Mode I and it was fine.

49Q: Did you check any other Modes?
49A: Un-huh (Negative). I'll wait for my systems check once we're in the air to do the rest, but

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that just gives me a -- a good feeling because if we're going into the weather, I need to follow him and identify him using it. I also check my flight controls, obviously, coming out of the -- where we're parked, make sure that they're all still working even after the crew chief has checked and to make sure that our Control Augmentation System has not had any malfunctions. I also run my tape to check the videotape recording system. As a technique, we're told to run it for a total of about five minutes. What that does is get to a clean piece of tape so that you're not always recording over the same piece and it also allows the internal workings of the machine to warm up on the ground.

50Q: Do the maintenance people run any checks against your airplane systems while you're arming, taxiing out?
50A: Yes sir.

51Q: What checks were run on that airplane that day?
51A: Okay, while they're doing the arming checks, there's usually -- or always here at PC, an individual who checks your Mode IV interrogation and all that does is that it -- it's for identification from your Mode system, and if you were not responding properly, you would get a warning light, then it would tell you. If you are responding properly, you get a reply light and a tone and I always make sure that I check both the light and the tone because he checks both antennas. So for the first part of the check it's a tone and it makes a -- a burping sound -- a better description of it, it kind of burps at you and you hear it. You know, I always check on my Mode 4 and then I flip it over to light and then I get light only, and this way, every time AWACS interrogates you, you don't have this burping in the headset, because after six hours, it gets in the way. So you just have the light over here that comes on. (The witness indicated the left side of the cockpit) And it was functional.

52Q: Okay, you had mentioned a systems check. Did you always do -- did you do one on the 14th?
52A: Yes sir.

53Q: Could you describe how you do that please and what you check?
53A: Okay, what normally occurs is lead will take off. I will wait fifteen seconds and I will take off. This gives you about a mile to a mile and a half distance between aircraft, and as briefed on this sortie by my lead, Tiger 1, he said, "Get your systems checked while you're coming on board." And what that means is as I'm closing to formation with him, I can check various modes of the aircraft. The first thing that I always check is my radar modes for acquiring him. So I manually lock onto him when I take off so I know that one works. I will then break the radar lock and it will use the different radar modes we have. I mean, they're not -- the names of the modes are not classified so I'll use what we call Auto Guns -- okay, it locked on. I'll break lock on that. I'll go Super Search, which is out in front and that works -- Boresight, and that works. I'll break lock and then I'll pull off to the side and use Vertical Scan. So I check all of those four modes. Then I relock him and I'll check the Air to Air Interrogator, Mode I, Mode IV,

and Mode II which I should have already set on the ground because we use that to track each other so as soon as I lock on him, I check the Mode II.

So Mode I and Mode IV are working. And I go over to Auto, this is all in correct code in the Air to Air Interrogator. Go to Auto, check that one and that also checked good. Then with -- with that accomplished, I want to close on him so I'll light the afterburners again, feel the acceleration, note the engine indications that confirm their working, get some overtake, and as I'm closing onto him, I'll cool my heat seeking missiles which makes them more sensitive. I'll test the right missile, test the left missile to make sure they both track him and I get a good tone, indicates that they're doing it, and all this is done with the Master Arm in the safe position to preclude inadvertent weapons release, and you don't touch the firing buttons anyway during this.

Once I get tones on both, at that point I'm pretty much done with all my systems check and I break lock and I come up next to lead and then he goes and does his.

54Q: Just to confirm, did every Mode and Code in your Airborne Interrogator worked correctly?
54A: Yes sir.

55Q: And the radar did lock onto the airplane correctly?
55A: Yes sir.

56Q: Is this a standard way you conduct checks -- is this the squadron standard -- is this the way normal pilots would conduct the check?
56A: Yes sir.

57Q: Did you -- how did you have the switches set that control the interrogation scheme of the S1 and S2 switches?
57A: They're set at our squadron standard, zero-three.

REP: I'm sorry, sir, I didn't catch what you were saying. "They're set at your . . ."

WITNESS: Yeah, the squadron standard down here at Incirlik is zero three.

GENERAL ANDRUS: If I could ask a question reference the previous question.

(Questions by General Andrus)

58Q: Where you indicated that you checked out the AAI and it had functioned properly, are you aware of any maintenance that may have been done on the AAI between the previous flight and your flight?
58A: Not that I know of, sir. It was -- I was at the jet when it landed. We met them when they

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had landed and then we went back to the squadron, put on our gear and came back out. I don't know that there was any maintenance performed on the aircraft as far as that way.

GENERAL ANDRUS: Thank you.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

59Q: Did you acquire or assess any targets while you were flying to or from the AOR or in the AOR?
59A: Yes sir.

60Q: Did you have any problems with your radar or the AAI system while -- when you acquired and locked on?
60A: There were some difficulties because of the distances involved. It was a rare -- I was coming from behind and I think the contacts were at about forty-five miles, so you know we have trouble sometimes, depending on aspect, without getting classified, but it would lock them up. I think it was a tanker that we were following out and I like to check it out and I checked my different radar modes, like "track while scan" and other modes while we're going out there just to see. And it's also a good aid to clear in front of you, to clear your flight path to make sure he's not coming in at you. But there were some -- some indications with the radar that it wasn't operating the full -- it was operating within my personal tolerances -- we'll put it that way, but I know there were some things wrong with the radar so I was checking it out with the AAI appeared to be functioning in the modes I interrogated. Once I get through with my systems check on lead, I only check Mode I and Mode IV using the switch on the Air Interrogator panel to determine what I'd like to interrogate, but the tanker was squawking properly.

61Q: Okay. Did you have any problems with your radios, radio one or radio two?
61A: No, not on this day.

62Q: Did you encounter any anomalies with any of the systems that would affect your ability to communicate with someone or intercept, identify and engage someone?
62A: No sir.

63Q: Were there any other minor discrepancies or write ups that you told the crew chief to fix or that you simply forgot to document after you landed?
63A: As I mentioned previously, the left engine temperature gauge light was inoperative and the crew chiefs knew about the radar in this aircraft having some problems and I did validate that that was, in fact, what the problem was. What the crew chief told me -- he told me -- he goes, "Hey, when you go up there, could you check this out, sir?" And I said, "Sure, no problem," and I ran airborne checks on the radar and I actually shut the radar to a standby position to run this check, trying to clear this problem which it will occasionally do if you run a self test on the radar. It sometimes is called a therapeutic built in test and it will -- it'll just sort of massage all the electrons

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somehow. I'm not an engineer. And it will come back and say clean matrix which means there's no problems that it can detect. Now that doesn't -- it can lie to you too. The radar can have problems and not tell you and still come up clean matrix. However, it was coming up with this recurring deficiency that I -- may probably be classified so I don't want to mention it here, but I can tell you about it later.

64Q: Okay.
64A: But those were the only two discrepancies that I -- that I landed with. Everything else functioned as it should.

(Questions by General Andrus)

65Q: Excuse me. And to reiterate, those discrepancies would not have affected your ability to communicate, intercept, identify or engage an aircraft?
65A: No sir.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

66Q: And so what is your assessment of your aircraft's capability to conduct the tasked mission?
66A: I'd say it was fully mission capable as far as that went.

(Questions by General Andrus)

67Q: What -- what is your assessment of your capability to conduct your tasked mission that day? Do you feel that you were fully capable and fully prepared to carry out your assignment?
67A: That's sort of a -- a broad based question. On my personal proficiency level where I'm very comfortable with the mission and any contingencies that come up versus very uncomfortable, say on a scale of one to ten, ten being very comfortable? I'd say I'm about a -- on that day, about a -- a strong seven or eight because of the proficiency I'd gained through the first few missions being back here.

68Q: On a scale of zero to one, zero being not capable of performing the mission and one being capable of performing the mission, did you feel that you were a zero or a one?
68A: Sir, I'd have to go with the one on that scale.

69Q: Prior to -- when you took off to fly your first mission on this deployment to PROVIDE COMFORT, do you feel that you would be -- on that scale of zero, not capable to perform the mission, or one, capable to perform the mission?

69A: Sir, basically I was capable of performing the mission as it is briefed and fragged. There are a lot of -- a lot of portions of the mission that you may be better able to deal with as a

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wingman or lesser able to deal with. I mean, I'm a combat ready aviator and I'm able to perform my mission to the best of my ability, and that's -- that goes without saying. But as a pilot yourself, you probably understand where I'm coming from here. If you haven't done a thing for three weeks and you come back and, "boom," here you go, your first mission is over North Iraq, have at it. I was doing this a little slower, a little more by the book on my first -- well, we always do things by the book, but I'm monitoring my own procedures a lot closer than I would, say, for something I've done a lot recently -- recent experience.

70Q: Understanding that your work schedule prior to your flying down here was very demanding, a difficult work schedule, and that it certainly was not something that would be part of what would normally be expected, certainly would not be contributing to increasing your skills and capabilities, do you feel that those skills and capabilities -- if I understand correctly what you just said previously, you've indicated that in spite of those, perhaps degraded skills, that you felt -- still felt that they were -- that you were sufficiently capable to perform the mission -- still capable to perform the mission; is that correct?
70A: Yes sir.

(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

71Q: A couple of questions in clarification. Do you recall the take off time for your flight, approximately?
71A: No sir, I don't. It was -- it was a few -- quite a few days ago.

72Q: You're familiar with the flights that this board is investigating; is that correct?
72A: Yes sir.

73Q: And the take off for your flight was before them or after?
73A: It was after that. It was in the later afternoon.

74Q: And you made reference to Tiger One on your flight.
74A: Yes sir.

75Q: Did you mean by that the same individual, without making reference to names, who was Tiger One on the flight being investigated here?
75A: No sir, it was a different individual.

76Q: And were you present when the mission pilots that were the sub -- that are the subject of this investigation or the mission that is the subject of this investigation, returned to the base that day?
76A: Yes sir.

77Q: Did you go out to the aircraft when they returned?

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77A: Yes sir.

78Q: Do you remember who else was there at the aircraft other than those mission pilots?
78A: Yes sir.

79Q: Okay, would you -- were any of those individuals supervisors of the mission pilots then?
79A: No sir, not that I know of.

80Q: Do you recall any questions or discussion about what had occurred during that flight?
80A: Yes sir.

81Q: Okay. Can you give this board a sense of what the general feeling was of what had occurred, what your impression was of what had occurred?
81A: Okay. Well, I was -- I was notified in my room by the duty supervisor that I might want to come into the squadron early, prior to my brief time and I said, "Why?" And he said, "Well, I can't tell you." He said, "Just, you might want to come in." And so I said, "Okay." And so I -- I was ready. I went into the squadron and the duty supervisor at that time said, "Why do you think I -- we told you to come in?" I thought, well maybe I've done something wrong but I had just gotten up this morning, can't be doing too much wrong then. And basically he said, you know, "We've got -- we've got two helicopters shot down over Iraq." He goes, "We got two Hinds." And I said, "Wow. Cool." I said, "Well, who was it?" And he goes, "Well, Tiger flight." And I said, "Wow, okay." And so we went into the back and we kind of like, "Where did it happen?" Everybody would like to know because I knew that I was next on deck and I was going out to fly.

82Q: Excuse me. Let me caution you here. Please be careful not to use names unless you're specifically asked for them.
82A: Sure. And so we went into the -- into the Intel section of our area there, looked on the map where it happened and I said, "Wow, those guys were pretty far north. It's strange that we didn't find them before but they were the original guys going in and everybody's got their, you know, speculation of how they would have done it and what was happening, but for the most part, we didn't really know much more than that. And it had come across on the Intel net and our Intel officer was briefing that -- kind of a subdued -- not like big jubilation in the squadron I think. It was kind of a subdued thing. It affects people differently, you know. When you're right there at ground zero when something happens, you don't know. And then -- so, you know, we were all kind of in a state of, not shock, but just -- kind of strange when you're at the point where something happens.

And then we went and didn't really discuss it too much, we were just waiting for them to land. And then we were, you know, saying, "Okay, when they land, we need to, you know, go out to the jet and meet them and we were trying to get more information basically is what -- what the mood of the squadron was. And we -- we slowly discerned that what was, you know, what coordinates was used and that -- to clarify it, and we just waited for them to land and didn't really

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speculate too, too much on it. And then some people for Intel came from C2 and that was when the first kind of shadows of doubt started falling on this saying, you know, "Eagle Flight was overdue ,"and there was some talk about Eagle Flight, and then they started saying, "Well that, you know, what's -- well where were they supposed to fly," and we went and looked at our briefing board and it showed Eagle Flight for that day was -- and I -- I remember that pretty clearly, that they were supposed to be at Zakhu at six-thirty Zulu, and it was half past seven-thirty so that obviously couldn't be. And then I -- I asked one question, based on my previous experience, having seen Black Hawks, etcetera, I said, to our Intel officer, I said, "Were they carrying E triple S pods which is the external stores -- it's so they can carry fuel tanks, E-S-S-S. Anyway, he said he didn't know. Then he goes, "Why?" I said, "Cuz. It looks a lot like an attack helicopter with those things on it." I've seen them a lot, you know, from my previous experience at my previous base, they were carrying them, and I said, if you looked at them, you know, you could use them for Hind simulators actually. Outside of about a mile, you really can't tell the difference and I'm probably getting out beyond the scope of this question here, but that was pretty much the gist of our conversations there and then people were kind of going, "Oh," and the C2 people weren't talking very much, so that was kind of a bad sign for me. I -- I had a strong position that something was real wrong and yeah, and I still tend to think like a helicopter pilot when I see terrain and stuff.

So, I -- I didn't want to voice my concerns beyond that. I didn't want to start any bad rumors so I just left it at that. I just basically was quiet and I waited for the rest of the people and information to come in.

83Q: Can you give the board a sense of the extent of your experience that you were relying upon in making that assessment that it looked a lot like -- that you could use it as a Hind simulator -- use a Black Hawk as a Hind simulator figured -- configured that way. How often had you had an opportunity to observe it?
83A: Sir, I served four years at Giebelstadt Army Air Field and I've got one thousand two hundred hours of military helicopter time, of which about eight hundred is on the Cobra. I operated on an almost daily basis with Black Hawks and we escorted them -- we -- we did missions with them as an attack gunship pilot. I -- I was exposed to them a lot and I was able to tell the difference between that and say a Cobra just based on the rotor spatter type of thing. But if you didn't see these things a lot and have some type of a good database to draw from, I'd say it'd be difficult. My personal expertise is that I was a -- a unit instructor in air-to-air gunnery -- or not air-to-air, air-to-ground gunnery, I'm sorry, and also in threat. I taught my -- my company, which is the equivalent to like a flight, I was the threat instructor and that meant that I was the expert in Soviet armor, Soviet helicopters and to a lesser degree, Soviet jets.

84Q: Had you used any of that expertise in teaching your squadron here?
84A: I would say on the last deployment I did, yes sir. On this deployment here, to a lesser degree.

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(Questions by Colonel Fain)

85Q: Excuse me. Were either of the pilots, Tiger One or Tiger Two on the previous deployment?
85A: Tiger Two was on the previous -- no, Tiger One was on the previous deployment. I believe this was Tiger Two's first time here.

(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

86Q: To be specific, I have asked you a general question about using your expertise to teach the squadron. Had you taught the squadron visual identification indicators concerning the Black Hawk similarity to Hinds or to attack aircraft when configured that way?
86A: Not in that specific instance, sir, and I'll tell you why. Is because in the Air Force fighter community, they're not overly interested in what you used to do or where you came from. It's here and now. And when we were doing the operation in Bosnia, the DENY FLIGHT, I did do some academics with the squadron and we were talking about how to intercept helicopters because that was our specific task, and I did bring up some of these similarities and characteristics. But also the flight leads and instructor pilots aren't going to put too, too much credence in a wingman that they, in their opinion, hasn't really proven himself in the squadron yet.

87Q: In the DENY FLIGHT flight training that you referred to, were either Tiger One or Tiger Two from the mishap aircraft part of that?
87A: I believe Tiger One was there, yes.

88Q: I started all of this by asking you about going out to the aircraft. You indicated no supervisory personnel there.
88A: Not that I remember, sir. [Control Witness identification deleted]

89Q: The -- do you recall anything that was said during the course of discussion around the aircraft?
89A: Yes sir.

90Q: Referring to people by their Tiger designation if you do recall that, would you say what it was?
90A: Okay, we -- I personally went to Tiger One's aircraft with a group of other pilots and some of the -- our Intel officer, probably about six of us, and the discussion went to the effect of, "Hey, you know, pretty -- pretty exciting up there." We were -- we were kind of trying to get some information out of them, you know, like what happened and stuff. There was some comments about, "Hey, you landed with a missile missing." Kind of -- there was some excitement, I mean, seeing a jet come back with a missile missing and at this point there wasn't too much speculation that it might not have been a -- an enemy aircraft at the aircraft site, and like
I said, I didn't want to put any kind of a -- a damper on any of this so I just didn't say a whole lot.

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Shook -- we all shook his hand when he got down out of the aircraft and knowing that Intel was going to talk to him, we didn't want to bring up too much right there on the specifics, just -- I know I shook his hand and said, "Hey, Shit hot, good job," you know. And not knowing much more, you know, except that they'd shot and destroyed some aircraft. And then I -- it was time for me to go put on my gear, so me and my flight -- my new flight lead, we had to depart that area and we -- we drove back and got our stuff on. I spent maybe about two minutes and then actually we were getting ready to drive away and Tiger Two came over from his aircraft and we took some pictures, I think, of them by the aircraft. I didn't take any pictures. I was just standing there. And shook his hand also and said, "Well, got to go." And I said -- and I asked him, I said, "How's the aircraft?" And he goes, "It's pretty good except for the radar," and he did mention the radar problems. And then I -- when I did get out to the jet, I discussed more of it, like I mentioned, with the crew chief.

91Q: Do you recall any discussion about a double bubble canopy in the course of any of the discussions that you've related?
91A: Actually yes, now that you bring it up. I asked Tiger One -- I said, "I've got one question." I said, "Did you see two canopies?" I said, "Did you see a double bubble canopy on it?" Because once again, I didn't want to put a damper on this saying, "Hey, I don't think it was a Hind." And he goes, "Well, it was kind of -- kind of hard to tell." He says, "The best of my ability, it was hard -- kind of hard to tell. It had kind of a . . ." He goes, "It had kind of a long nose. It could -- could have been." He goes, "Yeah, it could have had a double -- could have had two canopies." And then I think I asked him, "How -- well, how close did you get?" And I don't remember what he -- what his response was. But yeah, I did ask him about the double bubble canopy.

COLONEL AT LEE: Okay. Nothing else.

COLONEL FAIN: Are we going to take a break?

COLONEL MUDGE: Yes. Any further questions? Do you have any further information or statements or evidence you wish to present at this time?

WITNESS: No sir.

COLONEL MUDGE: All right. I remind you that this is an official investigation. You're ordered not to divulge the nature of this investigation or the questions, answers or discussions included in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

COLONEL MUDGE: Do you have any questions?

NEUSER

WITNESS: No sir.

COLONEL MUDGE: The time is now 1215 and this interview is completed.

NEUSER

COLONEL AT LEE: This board is back in session. For the record, would you state your name?

WITNESS: Stephen Thomas Neuser.

COLONEL AT LEE: And you're the same Captain Steven Thomas Neuser who testified previously in these proceedings?

WITNESS: Yes sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you recall the advisement regarding the purposes of this board that you were earlier given?

WITNESS: Yes sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you have any questions about that?

WITNESS: No sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: I'd like to remind you that you're still under oath.

WITNESS: Yes sir.

COLONEL MUDGE: We'll continue the interview at this time. I would note for the record that this interview will cover information which is classified up to SECRET. If there is any need to discuss any level of classification above that which is not anticipated, any member present should bring that matter up immediately.

We're going to get into questions about the Rules of Engagement, the ROE, and need to remember that the ROE that we will discuss is the ROE that was in effect on 14 April.

WITNESS: Yes sir.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

92Q: Would you please, in your own words, explain the Rules of Engagement that were in effect on 14 April?
92A: Okay, the Rules of Engagement that we are applying -- or were applying at that time, we had -- they're pretty in depth, but putting it in simple fighter pilot's type of thing, what we would use is [Classified portion deleted (36 words)]

NEUSER

93Q: And that's using your . . .
93A: Airborne interrogator -- air-to-air interrogator. So if I say AAI, that's what I mean, air-to-air interrogator. [So through various methods, identification would proceed] and there's something that's beyond -- I can't discuss now. Okay -- or -- I can't talk about that either. So for us -- and also presence north of the thirty-sixth. He was considered -- [Classified portion deleted (16 words)] however we still needed to meet the identification tree, as we referred to it, the ID tree, before -- before releasing ordnance.

(Questions by General Andrus)

94Q: If I might. You mentioned things that you could not talk about, and if the answers to my question are such that you still can't talk about it, that's fine and we'll sort that out. Are these other things additional means of identification?
94A: Yes sir, they're electronic means that are SECRET NOFORN.

95Q: And you had the capability of using those means on this particular aircraft?
95A: Yes sir. They were fully functional.

96Q: Would it be normal practice to use those means?
96A: Yes sir.

(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

97Q: If I may clarify. Those are means of [Classified portion deleted (1 word)]?
97A: Yes sir.

(Questions by General Andrus)

98Q: To further go on that thought, you said that if an unidentified aircraft had -- was not squawking the correct Mode I or Mode IV, that that's one way that you would identify them as being hostile.
98A: No sir.

99Q: That that was one of the steps? Say that first one again, if you will.
99A: Okay. [Classified portion deleted (17 words)] If he's not squawking Mode I and not squawking Mode IV, it simply means that maybe his system is inoperative. Okay? You need to go to like a more reliable higher level . . .

100Q: Would it be fair to rephrase it and say negative friendly, possible negative friendly because, as you just said, it may be that it's not operating at that stage. That does not automatically make

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him unfriendly just because it's not operating.
100A: Exactly, sir. What -- what I mean by negative friendly is it's a negative reply.

101Q: I see.
101A: Okay. It's a negative reply so he could possibly be friendly sure. Yeah. And that's a common thing that we use as a -- as a means to determine it and if, at any point in this whole tree I get a yes response, like okay, he's not squawking Mode I, I check Mode IV and I get a positive Mode IV response, I know he's friendly. I don't have to proceed any further with my identification or interception or anything and I will tell my flight lead this, what I see. I also will tell flight lead if I don't see positive responses to my interrogation.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

102Q: What is your assessment of the clarity and the ease of use of the ROE?
102A: It's written down in a somewhat complex form, however we did simplify it to a usable level in the aircraft. Based on what I -- I just said, if I had to put it in a nutshell, [I would use the identification tree.]

103Q: Okay, you said you had it reduced down for the cockpit. Did you have something with you that delineated what the ROE was or did you mean for use in the cockpit you had your own mental way of -- could you describe what you meant by that?
103A: Yes sir. What I -- what I mean is when you're flying there, you know, at five hundred miles an hour, you need to have something that is simple and usable and in accordance with the ROE and that's what we -- we use the ROE to develop this step. And it's not a written down thing that you have on your person or anything, but when we would brief this, you would draw this up on the board saying, "This is the ROE ID tree." And that was covered during the briefings when we would go out to fly, just to review it, and that was exactly in keeping with what the written ROE was which was a lot more verbiage. Yeah, it's just a decision tree.

104Q: When you went out to fly, were you comfortable with your knowledge of the ROE?
104A: Yes sir.

(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

105Q: I need to follow up on your decision tree. If you make it through your decision tree, [Classified portion deleted (13 words)] and you said a positive or a VID . . .
105A: Uh-huh (Affirmative)

106Q: VID is what?

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106A: As in visual identification that the aircraft is an Iraqi military aircraft, and this all is caveated by the fact that it has to be north of the thirty-six.

107Q: Okay. And if it is visually IDd as an Iraqi military aircraft north of the thirty-sixth parallel, what do you believe you first are authorized to do?
107A: You are -- [are cleared] to enforce the intent of the Rules of Engagement.

108Q: And what do you feel you should do under those circumstances?
108A: I believe you should follow the Rules of Engagement.

109Q: Okay. Is it your understanding that the Rules of Engagement then -- if you make a positive identification as an Iraqi aircraft north of the thirty-sixth parallel, [then you should apply the ROE]
109A: Yes sir, that's what this whole operation is about, is it not? There was no option for people to defect. There is nothing in the ROE that says we can escort defectors and etcetera and etcetera. [Classified portion deleted (5 words)], and I believe that's in the ROE.

(Questions by General Andrus)

110Q: Is there anything in the ROE that says you should take into consideration the possibility of defection?
110A: Not that I'm aware of, sir.

111Q: Is there anything in the ROE that says you should take into consideration the possibility of the individual being lost?
111A: No sir.

112Q: Is there anything that you're aware of that would say that you should take into consideration the possibility of electronic malfunctions on your aircraft?
112A: It's not specifically addressed in the ROE. However, that's why we have the VID option and we would default to that in the event I knew I had a bad Air-to-Air Interrogator or I could not -- if I was not comfortable with the situation, again, I'm a wingman, I'm not a flight lead. I don't make these tactical decisions, but what I've seen and what I would do, if I were, I would default to making a visual identification pass and again reporting back to AWACS what I had seen because they're -- they have a larger picture or they should have a larger picture of this whole thing going on and basically, if they come back and tell you, "Hey, it's a hostile," they don't have to give you clearance to fire either as -- as you're well aware.

(Questions by Group Captain Doggett)

113Q: May I ask a question? Perhaps it will help to some extent to overcome the SECRET

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NOFORN problem. And that is, and if your answer is beyond the scope, please don't answer it. But of all the identification systems that you have on board, including the visual identification, which one of those systems do you have the most confidence in?
113A: I would say besides a visual identification . . .

114Q: Including a visual identification.
114A: For me personally, sir?

115Q: Yes.
115A: I would say VID.

(Questions by Colonel Fain)

116Q: Let me ask one more question to add to that list a declaration of hostile by AWACS. That wasn't included -- or by competent authority.
116A: I do not have a higher confidence in AWACS declared hostilities than I do in my own systems. I don't want to elaborate on that because it's beyond the scope of this question.

(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

117Q: One area of clarification. I may not be able to replicate your words exactly, but you said words to the effect that "There is nothing which allows for defection or to escort a defector." What is your source of information to that effect? Why do you believe that?
117A: Having reviewed the Rules of Engagement, the SPINS -- the special instructions, etcetera, etcetera, and having asked this exact question on my initial deployment back here, the weapons instructor -- it was all confirmed through that that there is no option. Basically, if a guy gets lost taking off out of Quayarrah West and comes north of the line, he is -- he is in violation of -- of the No-Fly-Zone.

118Q: Do you recall specifically who that was?
118A: Yes sir.

119Q: Who was that please?
119A: It was a Captain James Brown, our weapons officer.

120Q: Have you ever seen anything in writing to that effect?
120A: No sir, but it's a . . .

121Q: I mean stated that was as opposed to your -- your understanding of the absence of it in the ROE?
121A: No sir, I've never seen it written specifically addressed to that effect, no, but it's admitted.

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COLONEL AT LEE: I'm just looking for sources of information.

WITNESS: Okay.

COLONEL AT LEE: Thank you.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

122Q: Do you know who had the authority to clear fighters to engage and destroy aircraft?
122A: Yes sir.

123Q: Would you please elaborate on who that is?
123A: Okay. Basically, with different flight leads I have flown with, about one-third of the flight leads that -- that the flight lead would clear me to fire. He did not want me taking the first shot. He, in fact, would be making an additional imposition of clearance to fire for me. And I understand why that is because he's in charge. About two-thirds said, "If you are in compliance with the Rules of Engagement, and we have already gotten to the point where we're intercepting this aircraft, we have gone Arm Hot, the Master Armament Switch to a Hot position which will allow ordnance to be fired, that is de facto clearance to fire provided that the Rules of Engagement were followed. To quote one flight lead, he said, "You're a big boy. You can do this and you've been trained to do this." He says, "If I clear your Arm Hot and we look at your tape and there's not an "I" which is showing that you're interrogating and you don't follow the Rules of Engagement, you're going to jail." And that was his exact quote. I said, "Okay. I understand that. It was pretty clear."

So there was a very strong emphasis on following the Rules of Engagement because we [Classified portion deleted (7 words)] There were no -- well, there were occasions while I was up there flying in the AOR that we would get contacts on things, ask AWACS for -- just a clarification, and they would not be able to give it to us in any reasonable amount of time that would have mattered in a tactical engagement. So we were honor bound, as the keepers of the Rules of Engagement, to put as many restrictions on ourselves to follow it to the letter before engaging anything.

124Q: Other than what you've already discussed, what would justify engaging and destroying airborne aircraft?
124A: Besides following the ROE? If he was an unknown and I was defensive or I saw ordnance come off an aircraft, for instance, if someone came across and we did not -- self defense. Besides ROE.

125Q: What means would you use to intercept an unidentified aircraft in the AOR, the Area of Responsibility?
125A: Okay. If it was a single contact, what our normal procedures have been, depending on

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who you fly with is you have different intercept options, but once you get a radar lock on the contact, the aircraft that doesn't have the radar lock would do what we call sanitize the airspace around this to make sure there wasn't another one, and whoever had the radar lock would then basically commence an intercept while getting the interrogations, you know, negative Mode I, negative Mode IV, etcetera, etcetera, because we don't want to go chase friendlies down.

126Q: Can you describe what you mean by the other airplane sanitizing?
126A: Okay. For instance, if flight lead who looks at the lower altitudes, normally by our doctrine, if he gets a radar contact, say at five thousand feet, it's my responsibility since his radar is now tied up, to make sure that no one is coming in from above that so that the low guy is like a decoy. And I would make sure that I would keep my radar sweeping back and forth looking for another contact up to a certain range. Once we get to that range, what we call meld range, and then -- we'd already committed on him, then it would be my responsibility to be visually supporting flight lead by checking that there were no surface to air ordnance being fired at him, or that there wasn't another guy coming in that I just had not seen. So until you get to within a certain range, you've got one guy running the intercept and the other guy is the supporting fighter who is, you know, clearing the airspace for other contacts, other hostile contacts.

127Q: If you were to have conducted an intercept and identification run on an unidentified aircraft on 14 April, what communications would have taken place during that contact intercept and ID?
127A: Okay. We did, in fact, intercept some aircraft on that date during my period there, and I ran my tape for the intercept so you can get some specifics off that. However, in general, you're going to tell each other who's got a radar contact, a descriptive of the radar contact, his -- his position, his bearing, range and altitude off of our known point out in the area to determine if he's north of the thirty-six or south, you know, depending on if we're going to engage him or not. His altitude, his aspect and any supplementary information that we can gather from -- from AWACS. You'd be getting, you know, usually the flow of information should be Tiger One, Tiger Two and then AWACS, and that's the flow of information. Tiger One talks, Tiger Two and then AWACS, and if you don't have anything to add as Tiger Two on the situation, you just don't say anything and it skips over to AWACS, hopefully telling you, "Yes, contact there, bandit, bogie or, you know -- a bandit being a hostile, bogie being an unknown, friendly being a friendly.

We would do some of this talking on our -- our auxiliary radio, what we call the back radio because it's -- you -- you use the switch in the aft position to talk, something that is just, you know, like I'm floating to your right side to get away, you know, to clear. The communication process for an intercept, there's not a whole lot of talking going on except to confirm the identification of the aircraft as hostile or not. Then some communication would also involve where your radar is looking and if, in fact, you have any response to your interrogation.

We call diamonds or spades -- some of our calls. Diamonds means I'm seeing a friendly Mode I interrogation. Spades means I'm not seeing any interrogation reply form the guy. If

anybody says I see diamonds, well boom, he's a friendly, just leave him alone. The same thing from Mode IV, call circles. That's -- he comes up and it's a classified brief obviously so you bring this up. Closing to within, you know, if we were running on a guy near the border, I would also bring up communications stating that we're getting close to the border of the thirty-six parallel which we use as a -- a cut off, [Classified portion deleted (10 words)], but I mean -- yeah. So we're -- the communications process is just involved getting where the target is, sanitizing the airspace around it, and then closing to employ ordnance if that is the, you know, if that is what you're desiring, or going in for a visual ID pass. And if you were to go in for a VID pass, normally you'd do a single side offset where one guy is out in front, the other guy is slung about a half mile behind him, say thirty degrees off of his tail so that he can easily see me
and make sure that there's nothing being shot at him if that's a -- a threat, and then as he comes off, the other guy would come in and also try to look at the target, also with a radar lock at that time.

(Questions by General Andrus)

128Q: Would these procedures apply to helicopters as well as fixed wing aircraft?
128A: Yes sir.

129Q: One of the questions was what means would you use to intercept and identify an unidentified aircraft. If that were to be specifically a helicopter, what procedures would you use to identify the helicopter? Would you modify those procedures at all?
129A: Intercepting a helicopter is a slightly different proposition because you're usually down lower. We would -- we would still do a single side offset as I had mentioned, but you're basically going after something that for all purposes is almost stationary because of our great rate of speed and its lower speed. But it poses a unique risk trying to get a guy identified down low. There is a lot of risks, especially, for instance, if you're running towards the east into a rising sun or to the west with a setting sun, and there's other problems that come about going down to that lower altitude environment, you know, hills -- in fact, it's pretty hilly up there also, so you can't devote as much time to running the intercept and getting an exact long look at something when you're down low.

For instance, a helicopter VID, and you know it's a helicopter because of the speed. You see that on your radar, okay? It's pretty obvious and also it's moving all around. The radar has problems tracking the helicopter down low because of all the clutter. So, as a result, a large percentage of your time is spent in not hitting the ground, okay, and clearing the flight path. It's a much more difficult thing to do, dividing up your tasks, not hitting the ground and being in primary and then getting VID on a guy. So that's why we like to have both guys go in so that if the first guy doesn't see it, he can come off and also number two is far enough back where if he starts shooting missiles up at him, he can still do something about it, you know, and also give him a little bit of time.

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130Q: What would be, if there is a standard -- let me say, what would the normal altitude separation be and how close would you normally get to the helicopter in order to make the visual ID?
130A: Sir, that's very much dependent on the terrain you're doing this in. If it was over a nice flat open plain, you could go by that guy at fifty feet away from him, okay? Provided the radar holds lock and you have a good idea where he is.

131Q: In mountainous terrain? In a canyon.
131A: It's simply physics. Going down a canyon, say you've got a ridge in front of you, you can't go by this guy and hope you make it up and over, like getting, you know, causing your aircraft to strike the ground just trying to run this intercept, you know, is a big concern, because it's much more difficult, as I stated. I would say to get -- put numbers on it, if the valley was wide enough and all of the factors would depend on each individual location. where he was, time of day, visibility. He's -- he's down low is a problem also. It may be clear outside but you get into a valley, you get smoke from these little towns. To -- to put a distance on it would be very difficult. I'd say you could probably get within a mile of it and then hope your radar doesn't break off on the guy because now it's getting a look angle problem.

132Q: Let me clarify it. You have conducted the intercept to the point where you have acquired the target visually.
132A: Okay.

133Q: And you are in VFR conditions, visual on the target and visibility on the terrain. How close do you think you would need to get, both in altitude and in distance, in order to accurately identify the helicopter?
133A: Speaking for me, personally, and with a little bit of experience in this, I'd say you'd have to get within five hundred feet of the guy, and that's like a bubble. So, you could be level with him, five hundred feet off to the side, or, you know, up off to the side, but I -- I would like to go over this guy about five hundred feet or closer, if possible, and not directly over the top of him. I'd want to get some plan form and some angle so that you could come at him, say from his -- his forward quadrant is not optimum because he might have forward firing ordnance, so you'd like to come in from behind and off to the side, say maybe from his four o'clock, and do a kind of pass right over him, if you can. Not -- not going by him because then he can point and shoot at you, so you want to come up and over and get back up out of that low altitude environment because you're very vulnerable.

GENERAL ANDRUS: Do you think that with your experience as a . . .

COLONEL AT LEE: Excuse me. I'm sorry, sir, but before I forget. As the witness was speaking, he was indicating by hand -- by hand gestures, one hand representing the fighter aircraft coming towards the other hand representing the helicopter as though he was coming from a four o'clock position and then breaking to the left away from the helicopter as he came abreast of the

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helicopter. Is that a fair description?

WITNESS: Yes sir, exactly.

(Questions by General Andrus)

134Q: Would you refrain from crossing over the helicopter then?
134A: No sir. I would not try to cross in front of his forward hemisphere though.

COLONEL AT LEE: Excuse me, I have to -- I'm sorry, I have to correct what I said. The witness has said four o'clock with a hand gesture actually indicating coming from about a seven o'clock, not a four o'clock and breaking to the left.

WITNESS: That's four, sir. Here's the target. You're reversed. Yeah. Four o'clock to five o'clock.

(Questions by General Andrus)

135Q: In your experience then as a previous helicopter pilot with many, many hours in the air observing other helicopters, you feel that in order to make accurate identification, that you would need normally, under visual conditions, to close within five hundred feet to positively identify on the helicopter type; is that correct?
135A: Yes sir, and at that distance, you can barely see markings on the aircraft because I've done this in Bosnia. I've closed to within that distance and closer.

136Q: Let me clarify again. I initially said to identify the type of aircraft . . .
136A: Type, yes sir.

137Q: . . . not referring to the nationality . . .
137A: Yes sir. At five hundred feet, you can tell clearly what it is.

138Q: Could you tell clearly what it would be beyond five hundred feet? In your opinion.
138A: You could possibly tell a general type of aircraft. For instance, is it a heavy cargo aircraft or is it a smaller reconnaissance type aircraft.

139Q: Could you differentiate between a Black Hawk and a Hind beyond five hundred feet? In your opinion? At the speeds that you're traveling?
139A: No -- no sir, I do not believe it's possible.

140Q: Do you feel that you could identify the difference between a Black Hawk and a Hind with your experience passing directly over or very close to the flight path of the helicopter but with an altitude separation of fifteen hundred feet? Or greater.

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140A: No sir, that would be very difficult. Having not been in that exact situation on a Hind, okay, etcetera, I would say no, I don't think it's possible. You need to get really close.

(Questions by Colonel Fain)

141Q: I have a couple of questions if I may. What is your relative currency at low altitude terrain like this?
141A: I have not flown over mountainous terrain in a low type of thing since June of this year when we left Aviano.

142Q: June of -- last year.
142A: Last year.

143Q: Yeah. And you assessment of the relative currency of the members of your squadron that are here now in the same situation, is it -- are they all roughly the same? Are there guys with more experience than others -- current experience?
143A: There could be certain individuals that might be more current. To clarify what I mentioned here since June, the terrain over there is similar to what we have here in Iraq. I did fly down to five hundred feet for a recurrency low altitude, but it was over in Belgium and we were doing some exercise -- actually France, not Belgium. We were doing an exercise with them. But it was relatively flat terrain. Currency is pretty low in the squadron for low altitude training.

144Q: Are you comfortable at the five hundred feet in this terrain with a visual identification?
144A: Now sir. I am not comfortable at that altitude. I would do it if I had to, but the comfort level is not a -- not a factor.

145Q: And the basis for your lack of comfort there is what?
145A: Having not done it in a long time and also you get a little apprehensive down there going these speeds just trying to avoid the rocks, you know. Your mission time to accomplish a mission is somewhat smaller than just trying not to hit the rocks.

COLONEL FAIN: Okay.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

146Q: Stepping back again to the communications, and trying to separate to make clear in my mind the differences between communications that you would make if you were intercepting and IDing an airplane, and then talking about engaging and destroying, I'd like to focus on the intercepting and IDing, identifying an unknown aircraft and we discussed the communications on the 14th of April with the various airplanes that were out in the area. What communications would you normally make as you were conducting an intercept and identification run, or would you normally expect to hear?

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146A: Okay. As the wingman, you wouldn't expect too much to be heard from me, at least on the HAVE QUICK net. Lead should definitely -- well, what you would normally expect to hear would be that AWACS would have a contact and pass it off to the fighters for investigation or we might get the contact first and tell AWACS about it and then usually they would do something to change the gain on their radar and they would see it too after a while. Down low usually we would get a contact first though just because of the geometry, they're so far away and we're right there.

Once contact is made, you would call them on the main radio saying, "I've got a contact at this bearing, range and altitude from what we call the bullseye which I believe right now is called -- I can't even think, they keep changing the points. Anyway you'll call it from the bullseye which is basically on the thirty-six line -- "Spoiler" -- that's what it's called. Spoiler's our bullseye point. Then you would set up your intercept flow, again waiting to hear what -- what AWACS has to say on it. Maybe it's a friendly or whatever, simultaneously in both cockpits in the fighters you're interrogating Mode I and Mode IV and so lead would say, "Tiger One shows spades there." Might say, "Two same," or "Two shows diamonds or circles," and if at any point, like I mentioned, you would interrupt that intercept for -- we would stop doing that because we wouldn't want to run a friendly. And, okay, [we've used the ID tree.]. I think, knowing that if it was helicopter, that you'd be more inclined to going in and running a visual identification, even if he is down low, because it's real hard to tell by other means, you know, for AWACS to say "Yeah, it's a bandit," or for us, and so maybe you'd be more inclined to maybe go do a visual identification pass.

If it was a fighter type aircraft and we knew this and you can tell that by the speed a lot of times, then the communication would be a little bit more brisk back and forth, of "Hey, I've got a single contact here at this altitude." In the meantime, I'd be sanitizing high and I would say like, "Two is clean high." At this point I know that nobody is sneaking in because I'll use an eighty mile scope to check this, and then I could come down and look in the low area to try to find a break out, maybe there's two aircraft flying very close together and you cannot discern this. So usually lead will say, "Still one group narrow only," and once again, we're just trying -- constantly trying to get this guy to squawk, you know, Mode I interrogator or Mode IV. You keep trying it back and forth and at that point, if AWACS hasn't come back with a positive hostile and we're not comfortable with it, and we're not getting any other means to identify it, that it is in fact a hostile, you're committed to a VID pass or you can just skip that and reset and go back farther away, try to get some more time, provided if it's a slow mover, like a helicopter, you've got more time to work the problem, and if you're not worried about radar breaking on a lock on it where you'll lose him.

Now, the communication would go up to the point where one's got a contact, two shows spades, one shows spades, and now, at that point, if we did come up with an alternate means to declare him a bandit, he would tell me that and at that point I would know. Also somewhere in

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there you would hear -- you do an AT&T check which is your Arm Hot, jettison your tanks, if necessary -- your external wing tanks would be our first thing we would jettison to give us more maneuverability in case we have to fight a fighter type aircraft, and then tapes on. And a lot of times we just turn the tapes on if it was an unknown because, depending on what kind of an Intel threat brief we got, what we could expect, we just turn the tapes on and say, "Okay, we'll run it on some -- to get some Intel off of it." And, as you get closer and closer to this aircraft, your decision to fire gets closer to that also based on the Rules of Engagement. So comm would be pretty straight forward.

147Q: During an intercept and identification run, would you expect to communicate with the airborne command element, Duke?
147A: Duke? No sir. You talk with Cougar.

148Q: Who is the AWACS . . .
148A: Cougar is the guy who runs us and I guess he's got Duke on board.

149Q: Now, if we were to go into the phase where we were going to engage and destroy, would anything change significantly in the communications with Cougar or Duke and what would that be?
149A: No sir. Not -- not that I could tell. We're just keeping them in the loop, apprised of how the intercept is going, waiting for them to come in at any moment and saying it's a friendly or it's a bandit, but if they continue to meet the Rules of Engagement, as we've discussed, we are cleared to fire. So there will not be any unusual communication with them. What they might hear is Tiger's Master Arm Hot. Okay, you know that there's some shots about to come off if you hear Master Arm Hot. And I'd respond with Tiger Two Master Arm Hot. And at this point, I'd -- I'd confirm that my tapes were on and if we were going after a fighter, I'd say, "Tiger Two requests jettison tape -- or tanks," so I don't -- I'd have to get permission from lead to jettison the tanks, and if at that point he goes, "Oh, that's a good idea," I would jettison the tanks.

Then the next communication that might come out from our flight would be "Fox Three" which is firing AMRAM missile, that's the code word we use or "Fox Two," and at that point AWACS would now know that there was ordnance coming off the aircraft. And if they, you know, if they had met all the criteria, we're fully within our rights to do that.

(Questions by General Andrus)

150Q: If you had identified a confirmed Iraqi helicopter visually and you had set up to make your firing pass, and AWACS were to come on the radio and tell you to knock it off, terminate the engagement, not fire, what action would you take?
150A: I would not fire. I'd continue to monitor the situation because it states clearly that decisions from Cougar and Duke are not to be questioned. You do what they say.

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(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

151Q: If you didn't hear anything from them or you didn't hear calls other than an acknowledgment, would that have any particular significance for you?
151A: Yes sir. It's telling me that they're not seeing anything in their identification process that would lead me to believe that it was not a hostile.

152Q: So absence of communication from them would signify what in terms of increasing your belief that this is or is not hostile?
152A: It would increase my belief that this is a hostile, sir. Now, I'm not taking their silence as a declaration of hostile, okay? That needs to come from them. However, I have my procedures that I can follow and if they're not coming back with suspected friendly, all they have to say is just "We suspect it's a friendly," not "Yes, it's a friendly," okay we'll take a good look at this again and really go in there and maybe press a little closer, even if the terrain is bad, etcetera, etcetera. You know. I mean, the cadence of the communication is, if you don't say anything, you agree with everything you've heard and you have nothing to add.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

153Q: If you were to be in a situation where you are trying to make a visual identification of an Iraqi military aircraft, how would you do that?
153A: Sir, could you rephrase that again?

154Q: If you were responsible for determining whether or not this unknown or unidentified aircraft was an Iraqi military aircraft, how would you do that? How would you determine it?

(Questions by General Andrus)

155Q: Once you have a visual, how would you determine -- visually, first of all. We've talked the other.
155A: Yeah, without repeating what we've mentioned before, I would get -- personally? I'd get -- I'd get fifty feet away from this guy going five hundred knots, like I mentioned before, and pass him as close aboard as I could stand it without hitting rocks, etcetera, but if I could, I would press down there and visually identify a -- a Hind. There's two types of Hinds. You've got the Hind D which is a double bubble canopy and you've got the Hind A model which has got a -- a squarish nose. It's got the wings out to the sides and it carries four anti-tank missiles, two on each wing, and it's got a fifty-seven -- fifty-seven millimeter rocket pods inboard of that, and maybe some -- another set of rocket pods. So it's got a lot of stuff on the wings; they're round. It's a five bladed rotor system. Of course, you can't tell that. The blades spin the wrong way for U.S. helicopters. It comes over your left shoulder so it spins clockwise as viewed from above. U.S. helicopters spin counter-clockwise as viewed from above.

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156Q: Is that discernible from an F15 cockpit?
156A: If you went by him at fifty feet, you might be able to tell, but you -- that wouldn't be a deciding factor. I mean, for me, I'm somewhat familiar with this, so I notice these things. But I don't think you'd notice it from the cockpit. You may, based on the way the light is hitting it. Yeah, I'd go right by him and pull wing up as I came up over him. I would roll to ninety degrees of bank as I was going from his, say, back right, coming back and around to sweep over to his left side to give me a nice long look as well as giving me an upward motion. So I'd pull up, roll over, and as I was coming up, I'd look at him and not only would I have had a side angle view of the guy, but also a top profile view to sort of confirm it.

157Q: Okay, you've discussed how you would identify it if it was a Hind. How would you determine if it was an Iraqi helicopter?
157A: If it had the -- the Iraqi markings on it, for instance, you know, the -- the Iraqi flag type of thing or their -- their Iraqi roundels, the green, white and red. That would be about the only way. I mean, it could be Iranian for all you know.

158Q: If it was a Hind helicopter, positively visually identified, would you automatically presume then that it was an Iraqi helicopter -- an Iraqi helicopter, or would you feel that you would still need to determine if it was an Iranian or Iraqi Hind helicopter?
158A: Well sir, I'll tell you that if I got that close to tell it was a Hind and I came off, I'm not going to go back down there and do it again. Okay? He probably knows I'm there. I would consult with AWACS, first of all, okay. We're assuming here I've got, you know, flight lead type responsibility. I would talk to AWACS and tell them exactly what I saw. "Hey look, I've got two Hind helicopters. They're proceeding down here and this is what they're doing," and have them get on the horn to whoever they know, you know, their Intel channel is way beyond what I ever see, I'm sure, to determine if there was, in fact, a reason to believe there was Iraqi helicopters. The -- the Hind does pose a significant problem to fighters to try and engage it because it flies so low. It is armed with anti-aircraft missiles and it's got a pretty good cannon on it, twenty-three millimeter. And it's also a big threat against ground targets, so that -- that's it's main job is destroying targets on the ground.

159Q: Would identification of a helicopter as a Hind, according to your understanding of the ROE, be sufficient to engage and destroy or would you feel that you would have to identify that it was specifically an Iraqi Hind?
159A: Okay, based on strict interpretation of the ROE, you would need to tell it was an Iraqi Hind because sure, theoretically, you can't tell it is, but it does have a presence north of the thirty-six. I know there's no coalition aircraft that are Hinds. Me personally, I've had discussions with my flight leads during the briefings and what I have said in the past was I can't believe they're going to let us shoot helicopters. I said, "There's not a big threat from him. He can't normally shoot me if I'm smart." Okay? When I first got here and -- the last time, in December, and I'm reading this ROE and, you know, I -- I still sort of think like a helicopter pilot on occasion when I deal with them, and I said, "This is just strange," you know. And then we sat down and talked

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about it, and said, "Yeah, but you know Hind is a big threat to the Kurds or whoever else is out there." I mean, that's probably a bigger threat that a Fitter or a Flogger or something would be, a jet. So, knowing that the Iraqis have Hinds and if I did positively VID it as a Hind, as I came back on my cold leg, basically being away from the target, hot being towards the target, on the cold leg, I'd be on -- on the radio talking to AWACS going "Cougar, I have got two military Hinds and -- on -- don't shoot them. I mean, if you don't tell me -- if you tell me, "Don't shoot them," I will not shoot them. And say, "I am -- I am following the ROE here and I'm going to roll in and I'm going to shoot these guys," and I'd give them 'til the time where it took me to turn around and come back hot to determine if they were going to say, "No, don't shoot."

160Q: Does the ROE allow you to shoot an Iranian Hind?
160A: Not if . . .

161Q: According to your understanding.
161A: No sir, if it's positively identified as an Iranian Hind, no, you cannot shoot it.

162Q: Does the ROE allow you shoot a Syrian Hind?
162A: Sir, the ROE only refers to Iraqi military aircraft.

163Q: Are you aware of whether or not the Iranians have Hind aircraft?
163A: I believe they do, sir, yes.

164Q: Are you aware as to whether or not the Syrians have Hind helicopters?
164A: I believe they also do.

165Q: Would that mean you would have a requirement to differentiate between an Iranian, an Iraqi or a Syrian nationality Hind in order to engage?
165A: For me personally, sir, yes, I believe it would.

166Q: According to your understanding of the ROE, would that be required?
166A: Yes sir. Now, to be fair to how military operations go, our U.S. Army helicopters, there's not a color on it other than olive drab or black. And trying to tell a flag, unless they were really dumb and painted it on the side, it would be nearly impossible to tell the difference between those.

167Q: Are you aware of the markings carried on the Black Hawk helicopters operating in PROVIDE COMFORT?
167A: Yes sir, I am.

168Q: And would you describe those marking for us please?
168A: Okay. On the Black Hawks that we have out here, the special ops ones, those are the only ones I'm sort of familiar with for PC, they've got a -- a U.S. flag that I would say is probably -- a color U.S. flag, with red, white and blue, it's about twelve inches long and it's on the door. And

they've also got another one on the outside fuel tank on -- on both sides, I believe. It's a U.S. flag, it's maybe twelve inches high by about eighteen inches long and -- yeah. The reason I know this is I have seen them by driving by them and I've had contact with them because I wanted to go look at one of their aircraft.

169Q: Do you know if the pilots in your squadron are aware of the American flags painted on the Black Hawk helicopters?
169A: I believe they are, sir. To be honest, though, since this has occurred, there's been a very big increased emphasis on this, though. Previously it was not really stressed.

170Q: Do you feel that if you were close enough, as you indicted, within five hundred feet of the helicopter in order to positively identify it as a Hind helicopter, that it would also be close enough to see the colored American flag on the helicopter?
170A: No sir. You could not see what it was.

171Q: In your estimation, how far away could you differentiate the American flag on the helicopter?
171A: I'd say about a hundred feet, sir.

172Q: Are you aware of any markings that either the Iranians, the Iraqis or the Syrians have on their helicopters?
172A: No sir, I have not looked into that subject.

173Q: Is there any way then that you could determine that a Hind helicopter -- that you could determine visually that a Hind helicopter that you saw in the No-Fly-Zone of Iraq was a Iraqi, Iranian or Syrian?
173A: The only way that that would be possible, sir, is if I got within a hundred feet of it, saw a color representation of their flag or their standard markings, and -- and -- if there was any doubt, we have a pilot aid that has all this and it, okay, it shows you. So if you just get a look at it and you go, "All right, what was that?" And then you get up higher and you look -- you pull out your pilot aid and you verify it. I'm familiar with Iranian markings and also Iraqi markings though.

174Q: If you were unable to differentiate between the nation -- and determine positively the nationality of the Hind helicopter, what would your actions be? Would you fire or would you not fire?
174A: If I could not determine that it was an Iraqi military aircraft, I would not fire.

175Q: Even though you had determined that it was a Hind helicopter. Would you still not fire?
175A: That's correct, sir. As I mentioned, I would tell AWACS what I had and basically let them have the hammer.

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(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

176Q: When -- when you were talking about that, I believe you indicated that if -- if you couldn't tell, that you'd call AWACS and say, "I've got a military Hind here -- out here and I'm going to fire unless you tell me otherwise." Is that a reasonably accurate . . .
176A: Yes sir.

177Q: . . . presentation? Okay. Now, at that point, it would seem, if I put all the pieces together that you've said, that if they were silent, they did not respond to you, that you would feel entitled to fire at that point.
177A: Exactly.

178Q: But would you at that point have a positive identification of an Iraqi aircraft?
178A: The difficulty in this situation is postulating is it Syrian, is it Iranian, is it Iraqi. There's no real reason to think it's not an Iraqi aircraft if it's up there. I mean, I don't know what operations they've been undertaking to attack the Kurds in the past, etcetera, but for all intents and purposes, as I discussed with the General, sure, by the letter of the law, it's got to be an Iraqi military aircraft. And me personally, with my helicopter background, I still -- I still feel that if AWACS did not say anything, and I believed it was an Iraqi aircraft, it -- it would be destroyed. And I'm putting some extra requirements on myself that may not be exactly spelled out in the ROE for every engagement.

179Q: What I'm -- I'm trying to distinguish between is, going through your decision tree, if you will, the silence of AWACS in that decision tree, and you've told them you intend to fire unless they tell you otherwise, somehow seems to be being taken by you as confirmation that it's Iraqi . . .
179A: Exactly.

180Q: Even though under that scenario, you yourself would not have confirmed that it was Iraqi.
180A: Right. And this would fill in another piece in the identification problem. By them not saying, "Hey, we think it's a Syrian," or "We think it's this," I mean, the Syrians have MIGs, exactly the same brand as the Iraqis, okay? And if one of those guys comes across, you know, they're border neighbors, how do we know he didn't just fly into Iraq and come up north? You can't hold the pilot responsible to sit there and look at every fin flash. I mean, not -- not to, you know, try to -- do you see where I'm coming from? I can tell you that, "Yeah, it's a MIG." Okay? I can tell you it's an F-4. It could be an Iranian F-4. It could be a U.S. F-4. It could be a Turkish F-4. All right. And if AWACS doesn't know what it is, we need to say it's a possible friendly. Silence to a fighter pilot means they agree with what you're saying and they have nothing further to add, because we don't want them talking while we're targeting because it garbages up the radios and makes communication difficult. And it's also a very time compressed problem you have there because if you don't get the first shot off and there's more of them, they . may be shooting you down because you hesitated.

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(Questions by General Andrus)

181Q: What if AWACS has a radio problem or a receiver problem, transmitter or receiver problem and they don't hear your call or you don't hear their call? Would you then take that -- would that silence still mean consent?
181A: If I was unaware that they had a radio problem, I would have to take their silence as what I just mentioned.

182Q: If you were the helicopter pilot in similar circumstances, and you were the one they engaged, would that make you feel comfortable knowing that the possibility of radio problems could be taken as meaning consent that you were an Iraqi helicopter pilot and that could mean that they were cleared to engage.
182A: Yes sir, that would make me very nervous. The other thing that I'm not clear on but I understand that our search and rescue Air Force Black Hawks have Have Quick and I believe the Army does not have the Have Quick, if I'm not mistaken, so they probably wouldn't even hear all these calls that, "Hey, I've a contact thirty-five miles north of Irbil" and all this to where they could go, "Well, crap, we're thirty-five miles north of Irbil. We need to say something." And the [ROE furnish adequate authority] that whole engagement could already be done and we could lose these guys and who knows, they might be strafing villages and that might be what they're going to do. You know, there was villages in that area, I believe, and going beyond the scope of that question.

(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

183Q: Just clarification. HAVE QUICK refers to secured radio?
183A: Sir, HAVE QUICK is not a secure radio. What it does is it skips frequencies. It can't -- it is very difficult to monitor and very difficult to jam, but it is not an encrypted form of communications so it cannot be considered secure.

COL AT LEE: Thank you.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

184Q: You mentioned earlier in that regards to HAVE QUICK, you would normally expect intercept to be on HAVE QUICK to conduct the intercept -- visual identification, engagement and destruction?
184A: Yes sir. That's our primary communications with Cougar and any tactical communication is done over HAVE QUICK.

185Q: Can you tell me what training, if any, you received at home station, either academic or

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practical where you got flying exercises that prepare you to fly in the PC kind of environment with airborne command elements like Duke and multi-national forces and helicopters that are simulating enemy and friendly, fast movers and specific ROE?
185A: Okay. One of the training opportunities we have for that that not everyone gets to attend is called the Tactical Leadership Program up in Florennes, Belgium. Okay, you get large force exercises, multi-national, etcetera. It's not obviously on the scale of this here, but our day to day ops, you normally practice warning Combat Air Patrol (CAP) that we call, and the identification, sometimes you -- you run into different identification ROE and during your mission ready training, there are different problems that are posed to the pilot who is going through the mission ready training, like the flight leads will brief and say, "Okay, on this intercept, you make sure you squawk friendly, you make sure that you fly at this altitude on what we call transit level, that's another identification thing, so that you have to make these decisions. But there's nothing to compare with the operation PC and we have very, very little contact with helicopters whatsoever when we're flying back at Bitburg or now at Spandahlem. I mean, that's just not one of the things that we can use our limited training sorties to go train to at that kind of standard.

186Q: All right. During training exercises, have you had Rules of Engagement that are framed much like they are here that forces you to make tactical decisions during the intercept ID, portions like down here?
186A: Yes sir. We -- on almost every training sortie that involves a two-ship going against another two-ship or larger, we always brief what the -- what we call "Beyond Visual Range" identification requirements are, and it's usually negative Mode I, negative Mode IV. It's very similar to what we do here.

187Q: In that training, have you been restricted to visual identification?
187A: Yes sir.

188Q: Have you practiced that against helicopters before?
188A: No sir, not in the F15.

189Q: Have you had any specific Rules of Engagement training?
189A: Reference to OPC or just in general?

190Q: In any -- in any theater. Have you had specific training on the Rules of Engagement and the details or the problems that that would bring up?
190A: Yes sir, we always do that.

191Q: Could you describe that training?
191A: Okay, what normally will involve, as I mentioned earlier, when you get to the squadron for mission readiness training, you go through the requirements and the importance of going through this ID tree, not just shooting missiles at random, because you know that you're fighting two guys and they're coming at you. The discipline that that involves is very important and they've tried to

foster a strong sense of discipline in applying this so that you don't shoot until you know. Some comments I've heard during this training that I had with my flight commander and instructors and throughout the career I've had so far with the fifty-third, has been it's better -- you know, it's better to -- to miss the shot than to take on one you're not sure of, so -- and I think that's pretty common across the eagle community.

Now, if you're positive -- you're sure that it's a bandit, you know, you're committed to take that shot at the earliest opportunity though, so VID scenario, as you alluded to, is one of our worst things that we want to do. It's just horrible because you're putting the guy at risk to go get that VID when he, himself, could be shot by an unknown -- unseen forces. When we got to Aviano for DENY FLIGHT, we briefed the ROE. The first thing you did when you came into the squadron was the -- at the deployed location, and here also, same thing, we -- we run it the same way, is you go through the new guy check list and there's -- okay, you read the SPINS, you read this, and then you sit down with someone who actually briefs you on local area procedures, how to get to and from the area, the tanker act, how you do that, and the also sits down and discusses the tactics and what we are going to do and our standards -- the MPC standards and ROE when you get him, so that if you have any questions, it's absolutely no problem sitting there talking about it. Like I mentioned, when I first got here in December, I was saying I can't believe they're going to let us shoot helicopter kind of thing because my previous experience was over at DENY FLIGHT where they, you know, the helicopter guys would thumbing their noses at us and going, "Hey, we're going to fly where we want, and it was 'operation provide escort' out there in Bosnia as far as helicopters were concerned. And over here, I said, "Well it's a very different ROE," and they said, "Yes, we can explain it to you in detail exactly what -- what it means so that you don't have any questions," and they ask you, "Do you have any questions?" And when I was done, I had none, although I did periodically review all of the ROE, you know, about twice a week while I was here.

(Questions by General Andrus)

192Q: If I could again, to clarify, I believe you said that part of your training is -- and these may not be the exact words you used, but in effect, "If in doubt as to the identity, I don't shoot. Better to miss the shot than to make a mistake." Is that correct?
192A: Yes sir.

193Q: Applying that to the previous situation that we had with the helicopter, if in doubt as to whether the helicopter was an Iraqi or an Iranian helicopter, understanding the ramifications of shooting down an Iranian Hind helicopter, would that still apply -- when in doubt, don't take the shot?
193A: Yes sir, it would still apply.

194Q: So in a situation -- again, I know we're going over old ground, but to clarify in my own mind, in a situation where you have positively, visually identified a Hind helicopter but were not

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able to determine the nationality of that helicopter, either by verbal communication with the AWACS or any other means, again, what action do you feel would be the action authorized and that you should do according to the ROE?
194A: For me personally, I would not shoot if I had a doubt.

195Q: And according to the ROE, do you think that that would still apply or do you think that you would be authorized to shoot, according to your understanding of the ROE?
195A: Well, sir, it's all in the perception of the pilot. If he perceives that an Iraqi aircraft, he will shoot. If he, like I said, with my previous experience, I -- I know that there are other aircraft from other nations, you know. The average F15 pilot doesn't want to have anything to do with helicopters, but if there was a Hind military aircraft and it's in the No-Fly-Zone, they could only -- I could see where it would be logical for someone else to shoot it knowing, to himself, right or wrong, that it was an Iraqi military aircraft.

We had talks amongst the pilots, "What are we going to do if an Iranian comes across the border, etcetera, etcetera?" And we had long drawn out discussions I won't go into here, obviously, about that. And then, you know, it goes back to the old thing, do you see a fin flash or not. Well, if you don't see a fin flash, then the Iraqis may be using that to their advantage and they're not going to be dumb and paint stuff all over the side.

196Q: So when in doubt . . .
196A: When I doubt, I would not shoot, sir.

197Q: When in doubt, what would the ROE require you to do, according to your understanding of the ROE?
197A: The ROE would require you to get a positive visual identification of it being an Iraqi military aircraft.

198Q: And lacking positive visual identification . . .
198A: You would be held by the ROE,. do not shoot.

GENERAL ANDRUS: Okay.

(Questions by Group Captain Doggett) .

199Q: May I ask a follow up on that. If you positively identified a Hind aircraft in the position of the mishap, would you -- would it have occurred to you that it was anything other than an Iraqi aircraft?
199A: No sir, it wouldn't. To be quite honest. If I didn't see any markings to the contrary, I -- I'm pretty much sure that that would be what his job up there is is to go and be an Iraqi military aircraft causing death and destruction to the Kurds.

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(Questions by General Andrus)

200Q: Were you aware of any Turkish Air Force activity in that area last week?
200A: Not in that last week, sir. I had seen it previously but . . .

201Q: Were you aware of any Iranian activity on the Iranian side of the border in the -- opposite the northern area of Iraq during the last week?
201A: During the last week, sir, no.

202Q: Were you aware of any Iraqi activity north of the thirty-sixth parallel anytime within the last week?
202A: Yes sir, I was.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

203Q: If on 14 April you were the first flight into the AOR and you had a contact, AWACS says nothing to you, Duke says nothing to you, and on 14 April you VIDd him as a Hind, would you have expected to engage and destroy that unidentified object that you said was a Hind?
203A: Yes sir, I would. If I positively identified it describing the procedures I earlier mentioned, I would expect that that was my job out there.

204Q: I'm trying to make a distinction here. You come into the AOR, you know of no friendly traffic because there is silence from AWACS, you come in, you and your flight lead identify the Hind helicopter -- this is on 14 April before all the discussions we've had . . .
204A: Yes sir.

205Q: . . . what do you think your action would have been?
205A: I think we would have -- we would have shot it down.

(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

206Q: When you were referring to the discussions with other pilots in the squadron about what would you do about an Iranian aircraft, were you referring to discussions before or after the 14th of April?
206A: Before this, sir.

207Q: And what was the general sense of the pilots in those discussions as to what they would do?
207A: The general impression was that the ROE was -- was kind of bad for this type of situation and that it would basically be going to the default of the defense option were if they started spiking me -- creating a, you know, spiking -- illuminating me with their radar, and I knew that they were Iranians because AWACS has a good idea where they are because they -- on previous

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occasions we've seen them capping against us on the other side of the border, they -- they have a real good idea of fast movers up high. And if this guy comes across there and we -- we would shoot him if it was a defensive situation.

Now defensive isn't always the guy sitting there gunning you, okay? He's not right in your, you know, not in gun range. He's spiking me and my lead decides to turn around in the defensive response, he's in a -- a missile engagement zone on me, you know, there would have been a chance that defensively we would shoot these guys.

Now the problem, without going too long on this, the problem we ran into was there was a lot of Turkish F-4 activity up in that area, okay? And they were not squawking Mode I and they were out there doing who knows what, and they would transit back and forth and we would see them and we would keep tabs on them so that we had a good situational awareness that these guys were out there working on the border over there and we would bring it up to AWACS and they'd say, "Disregard. Turkish military. Special mission aircraft, I believe." And we'd, "Okay," and we didn't receive -- we weren't spiked by them, so there was no reason for us to get nervous, but it really complicated things having somebody out there that was not squawking the proper OPC Mode I and other things, so there -- it would have been a very difficult problem because we said, "Okay, great. So we get some Turk F-4s that are westbound being chased by some Iranian F-4s, you know. Okay? Well, what now, nobody's squawking. So, it -- it's not optimal. Okay?

208Q: Aren't there other airplanes out there though that because of the type of airplane that they are, the electronics systems they have or the electronic systems they engage, you are unable to electronically identify them?
208A: Yes sir.

209Q: Do you remember what airplanes -- or do you have an idea what airplanes those are?
209A: Yes sir.

210Q: Could you elaborate please?
210A: Sir, the -- the F-111, when he's jamming, is a -- is kind of a problem but we know exactly what altitude they're going to be at. We know exactly where the locations are. So you turn around and you get a target that's not squawking. You go, "Okay, it's probably Elvis," and if you were in doubt, you could -- you could use a special radar mode of "track while scan" which should not upset his radar warning receiving and get his altitude off of that and you know that that is who it is. In fact, there was an incident when an F-16 was going -- running on Elvis when he was out near the border, I guess about two months ago, three months ago, and an AWACS was, you know, yelling at this F-16 that, "Hey, we think it's Elvis." He closed and VIDd him and he was about ready to shoot. But yeah, the -- the one-elevens give us a big problem with identifying, but with good S-A and they always do the same thing, so you always know exactly where they are, and they talk to people too. So you call them up on HAVE QUICK and go, "Hey, Elvis. Are you Spoiler, you know, whatever, whatever -- his location. You go, "Yeah, I

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am." In fact, AWACS seems to have trouble keeping track of them too because they're not squawking properly. So -- and they ask them about once an hour, do you hear them, you know, what's your location, and they have trouble hearing you too when they're jamming. They can't hear what you're talking to them, so -- but that's the only aircraft that gives us any problems with electronic identification.

(Questions by Colonel Armen)

211Q: If a Turkish helicopter mistakenly entered the area, you don't have any contact with the AWACS, what kind of action are you going to take?
211A: If we visually identified it as a say UH-1, which I know the Turks have . . .

212Q: Sikorsky helicopter.

REP: I'm sorry, sir, I didn't understand what you said.

COLONEL ARMEN: Sikorsky helicopter.
212A: Say a Turkish Sikorsky goes in?

213Q: Yes.
213A: Like -- like a Black Hawk or . . .

214Q: Yes, the Black Hawk -- similar to Black Hawk.
214A: Me personally, sir? As I mentioned, I imposed other more restrictive things on me. If I was the flight lead, I wouldn't let us be out there shooting helicopters without talking to AWACS, just because I know what helicopter capability is. I don't think we would shoot a Turkish aircraft because it would have a marking on the tail.

215Q: You would get a positive ID, right?
215A: Yes sir. A positive VID and get very close and make sure you see exactly what it is. But if this was, indeed, a Turkish aircraft, it may have been the same result. I'm just -- speculation.

(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

216Q: Were the members of your unit, to your knowledge, if I'm putting the pieces together of what you said correctly, that if they were outside of five hundred feet, they would be both unable to tell whether it was an aircraft type of the Iraqi and unable to tell its markings?
216A: Yes sir, I believe they -- they would be, especially people who had been to Bosnia.

(Questions by Colonel Fain)

217Q: I have two questions regarding that. What is the lowest altitude to which you are allowed

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to go in OPC in a tactical scenario -- tactical situation, a non-training situation?
217A: Without running an intercept, it's ten thousand feet.

218Q: But running an intercept -- tactically engaging or identifying; then what's the minimum altitude?
218A: My personal is I'm allowed down to five hundred feet.

219Q: And what altitude are you allowed in peace time training to train to, in the low altitude structure?
219A: Five hundred feet -- if we can find airspace that they will allow us. Presently in Germany, we're only allowed down to a thousand feet and from the pilot's standpoint, the difference between five hundred feet and a thousand feet, you might as well -- instead of being at a thousand, you could be up at five thousand feet, because the demands down low are exponential. It's not just -- it's very much more difficult down to five hundred feet.

220Q: Are those demands depending on terrain -- nature of the terrain?
220A: Yes sir, very much so.

LTC MUDGE: Would you please explain in your own words the Air Task Order and the information it contains?

GROUP CAPTAIN DOGGETT: Sorry. May I interrupt? I've got two more questions along the previous comments.

(Questions by Group Captain Doggett)

221Q: On previous sorties, did AWACS inform you of any helicopter traffic in the area?
221A: No sir.

222Q: So you just confirmed for me. You would not expect, nor would anyone else on the F15 squadron, expect to be told of any helicopter traffic?
222A: That's correct, sir.

223Q: You mentioned that certain flight leads withhold the authority to fire of the wingman in a pair of aircraft.
223A: Yes sir.

224Q: If the flight lead -- qualified flight lead is flying as a number two, do they normally still withhold the authority to fire?
224A: I would not be able to -- it would only be speculation, sir. I -- I don't know.

225Q: You've never been in that situation yourself?

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225A: No sir, I would have to be in on their briefing and listen to what he actually briefed. I think it goes back to a matter of how much latitude he wants to give his wingman to make independent actions. Okay? The flight lead has overall responsibility for the conduct of the flight and I have no problems if he wants to say, "I am your clearance to fire." That's just another check and balance. Now, defensively I can fire, obviously.

226Q: Can you just clarify one point for me? If the more senior of the two aircraft was flying as the number two, does he still maintain flight lead status for that sortie?
226A: No sir. The flight lead is flying in the number one position and unless the -- unless the wingman or the man acting as number two is a flight instructor, and there is a safety of flight issue, the individual appointed as flight lead has overall responsibility for the flight, regardless of his rank or position in the squadron.

GROUP CAPTAIN DOGGETT: Thank you.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

227Q: Would you please then, backing up a little bit, explain in your own words, the Air Task Order and the information it contains?
227A: Yes sir. The Air Tasking Order comes to our squadron basically about 1400 local each day. It contains the next day's orders for that day. It tells you exactly how many aircraft by call sign, which type are going to be out in the AOR, it defines periods of vulnerability -- our vul periods. For us, some of the more important data we get off there is takeoff times, estimated landing times, refueling is very important in there. It tells you what tanker you're getting, your gas from and what amount, what altitude, tankers mode -- tankers Mode II squawks so you can tell him from the other ones out there, it tells you what your search and rescue word, number and letter of the day are. It also tells you your own Mode I for the area once you pass the gate what you should be squawking. Administratively it's got notes in the back and it also talks about what the code words are and what they mean. That's basically everything that's in the Air . . .

228Q: When you say Mode I past the gate, you're inferring that you're in the AOR and there's a specific Mode I squawk for the AOR?

228A: Yes sir. The -- as part of the ATO, you will squawk Modes I, II and IV in the area. Mode III and altitude readout, Mode Charlie, will be turned off when you go into the area. And all players that are in there need to be squawking those Modes.

229Q: What's your assessment of the ATO they use at PC?
229A: I think it's excellent. It's pretty user friendly. It tells me everything I need to know.

GENERAL ANDRUS: Can we take a break?

COLONEL MUDGE: Certainly.

(The session was recessed at 1409 hours, 20 April 1994)

(The session was reconvened at 1423 hours, 20 April 1994)

COLONEL AT LEE: I'd like to note we're starting again at 1423. The individuals who were present when we took the recess are present once again and you're reminded you're still under oath.

WITNESS: Yes sir.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

230Q: You indicated that you flew the mission in the AOR on the afternoon of the incident in question; is that correct?
230A: Yes sir.

231Q: Could you tell us about the time that you entered the AOR on your mission and about the time that you finally departed the AOR to return base, approximately?
231A: Okay. Approximately it was around I'd say -- we took off at 1130 Zulu, from my memory, so we got to the area about 1215 Zulu and we departed the area about five hours later, so 1715, 1730. It was already dark.

(Questions by General Andrus)

232Q: It was already dark when you had departed. How long had it been dark, approximately?
232A: Forty minutes.

233Q: Forty minutes. While you were on your mission, were you advised of any helicopter traffic operating in the AOR?
233A: Yes sir, at that time we were.

234Q: Were you passed the flight plans of any helicopter traffic?
234A: Yes sir.

235Q: Did you make radar contact with any helicopter traffic?
235A: Yes sir.

236Q: And did you intercept any of the helicopters?
236A: Sir, we intercepted one helicopter that was not part of what we were briefed -- that we understood was not part of what was supposed to be out there.

237Q: And when you intercepted that one helicopter, was it in daylight?
237A: It was in twilight, sir. We didn't get closer than about two miles.

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238Q: Did you then close for a visual identification of the helicopter?
238A: Yes sir, but like I mentioned, we didn't -- the radar broke lock at about two miles of the V10 line and we did not want to press it. So lead even said, "Watch out for the rocks and we just came off." And then AWACS, as we were coming off said, "Possible friendly."

239Q: Did -- were you able to get an ID as to what type of helicopter it was that you intercepted?
239A: No sir.

240Q: So from either visual or electronic means, you don't know and you did not know what type helicopter that was. Is that correct?
240A: Correct sir.

241Q: At the time. Did you subsequently find out what type of helicopter it was?
241A: No sir, not to this point, no.

242Q: Were there any Black Hawk helicopters flying in the AOR during the time that you were flying, to the best of your knowledge?
242A: Yes sir, we were briefed on the secure radio by Cougar that there were going to be three -- three MH-60s.

243Q: But you did not detect those on your radar?
243A: I did detect them on my radar.

244Q: And on detecting them, were they already identified as friendly?
244A: Yes sir.

245Q: I see. Did you detect any other aircraft in the area during your operation?
245A: Yes sir, we detected the -- the C-130 that was refueling -- an HC-130.

246Q: In detecting the C-130, did you first detect it on radar?
246A: Yes sir.

247Q: Was that prior to the AWACS detecting the C-130?
247A: I'm unaware if they detected it. They told us they were coming in through the gate at that point and we looked over that way.

248Q: Did you do an intercept on the C-130?
248A: No sir.

249Q: Did you do an intercept on any other aircraft during the time period that you were in the AOR?

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249A: Yes sir, we did.

250Q: What aircraft?
250A: Okay, we -- we ran on another -- first we ran on the helicopter as you alluded to, but it was not part of the package because they were still half way between the gate and the site. And there was another aircraft in the area that was westbound at low altitude, about three hundred knots and it's on my tape also so you can probably see it, and it was a C-130. I visually identified it myself. He had his running lights on and his anti-collision beacons. And as lead flew over it, he didn't see it. He pitches up and I -- I see it and I tell lead, "Hey, he's right below you," and then lead also sees it and it was a C-130.

251Q: Was that after dark?
251A: It was at dusk, sir.

252Q: At dusk. How far away from that C-130 was lead when -- what was the closest point that the C-130 and the lead aircraft approached each other?
252A: From my vantage point, sir, I would have to say half a mile, three thousand feet.

253Q: Would that be unusual considering the time and the lighting conditions to not be able to see an aircraft like a C-130?
253A: No sir, it wasn't unusual at all. He was proceeding up the valley and he was heading westbound and we offset to come in behind him as we normally do and we were looking into the setting sun and I had a different angle just because of the geometry of the intercept.

254Q: So at some angle, low altitude, in this case low light -- poor light could very well obscure or hinder the pilot's opportunity to make a visual sighting of an aircraft; is that correct?
254A: Yes sir, and the only reason I could see him as well as I did was he was probably about two or three thousand feet above the ground itself, so we weren't in any kind of a real low altitude environment plus I was watching lead and your eyes are focused at that distance and as he went by, I saw the light. "There he is." And plus my radar was tracking him and I put him into my heads up display to see him.

GENERAL ANDRUS: Okay, thank you.

(Questions by Colonel Fain)

255Q: I had one question on the helicopters that you detected that were part of the package. Did you have IFF returns in any mode off of those helicopters?
255A: Okay, sir, the only IFF mode we had off them was a Mode II which is not normal for the AOR. We were interrogating Mode I and neither the C-130 nor the three helicopters were squawking Mode I. They were squawking Mode IV, though. We went up secure with Cougar and determined what exact modes they were squawking and the C-130 and helicopters were

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squawking different Mode IIs.

256Q: Do you recall -- that was still on the fourteenth. Do you recall what modes they gave you?
256A: Yes sir. I was -- I was interrogating the helicopters, Mode II, fifty-five, fifty-five was the code and I believe the C-130 was sixty-one, sixty-one.

257Q: Did they give you a Mode I squawk, that any of those participants should or were squawking?
257A: No sir. We made some comments on our back radio between lead and I saying, "You'd think these guys would be squawking Mode I, and they weren't.

258Q: If they were squawking Mode I but something other than what you expected to see, would you still detect any Mode I squawk? Would you have detected . . .
258A: No sir, not in the mode we were using. We're going by very narrow correct code only. So if it's even one digit off, it's not going to come back as a friendly.

(Questions by General Andrus)

259Q: So if this helicopter that you intercepted was squawking Mode I but not squawking the correct coded Mode I, you would not have seen that; is that correct?
259A: Yes, exactly sir. He would come up as -- as no return -- as spades.

260Q: So in this case, if the helicopter that you intercepted did not have an operational Mode IV and the Mode I code was not correct, would you have been able to electronically identify this helicopter by the IFF system as friendly?
260A: No sir.

261Q: And according to your previous testimony, the transmission would have been negative or friendly, if I remember correctly . . .
261A: Right.

262Q: . . . which would have meant I have negative indications that he is a friendly aircraft.
262A: Yes sir. And then we would have to default to AWACS to declare it, also a VID.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

263Q: How did you find out about the helicopter flights?
263A: We would receive a -- it was written on a board next to our map. Are we talking about while we were in flight sir?

264Q: Before the flight and during flight, but what are the various means that you could get

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there.

270Q: So your Intelligence officer is the one that would brief you on the helicopter flights and that was the only means that you had of knowing when there were going to be Eagle Flights out there?
270A: Basically yes, and the Intel officer didn't make it a point to highlight the fact that there was going to be an Eagle Flight going here or here, because normally they did not even enter into the AOR. They only went to the gate, which is Zakhu.

271Q: Of the various sources and all the procedures at OPC, have you received any guidance, written or verbal regarding OPC flying that confused you and was contradictory?
271A: Yeah, you can go through it. I've seen some contradictions.

272Q: Can you explain which ones?
(S) 272A: Well, for instance, in the -- the classified air crew read file we have at the squadron, there's a section on -- it does talk about Rules of Engagement, and in some areas it talks about all you have to do to -- [to shoot a guy basically is he's got to be declared hostile north of the thirty-sixth and an Iraqi military aircraft]. Well then you read down a couple of paragraphs lower than that and it -- it talks about -- it's almost like our standard NATO Rules of Engagement for a hostile act and etcetera, etcetera. There are some contradictions there that may make you wonder, "Well, which one do I follow?" Although we -- we set it down pretty clearly when we brief a new guy and tell him exactly what it is.

(Questions by Colonel Fain)

273Q: I have a question regarding that. You're talking about internal briefings and your briefing. As a new guy, as you put it, when you come into the organization, do you get a briefing from someone outside of the squadron within the OPC structure?
273A: We don't have anyone specifically that comes in and briefs us in our . . .

274Q: Do you have any mass briefings?
274A: Not that I know of, sir, no. Basically if three or four guys come in on a flight, what we'll do is get the most senior member of the weapons shop, like our -- our weapons officer or the -- the senior most experienced guy to sit down and, "Okay, this is exactly how we do it." And I also got a refresher upon coming back here so that not -- it was not only briefed initially when I got here in December, but also back in March when I came back.

275Q: Administered within the squadron?
275A: In the squadron in the briefing room, sir.

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NOTE: PAGE EITHER MIS NUMBERED OR REPORT MISSING PAGE # 50.

(Questions by Colonel Fain)

276Q: Let me clarify one point then. Your organization does not swap out in mass?
276A: No sir.

277Q: It swaps out . . .
277A: For normally two to four pilots every other week, so we've got a large overlap of experience and one of the requirements we have in the squadron is before a certified flight lead from back at base is allowed to lead a mission here, he's required to fly one mission on the wing with another more experienced flight lead so that he gets to see how things are done, even if he's gone and comes back. He's still got to do that just to see how things are running.

(Questions by Group Captain Doggett)

278Q: Can I ask a follow-up on the ROE? You say that one of the areas that you're confused about was with the ROE within the active read file and you also mentioned that briefs were given within the squadron on ROE. Was there anything written or anything carried in the aircraft that simplified or made more clearly the ROE for the air crew?
278A: No sir.

279Q: And so the only thing from the single ROE document to the brain of the pilot flying were verbal communications.
279A: Yes sir, supplemented with the written instructions on the board when you got briefed. We drew out the VID tree and basically, before you were allowed to go fly, you had to brief back to the guy on exactly what the ROE was. Okay? They're not going to let you go out there if you don't have a full understanding and there's no problem with giving you time to learn it, but most guys spend a lot of in depth study working on what the exact ROE is.

280Q: This ID tree, is it written down anywhere?
280A: Not in the PC documents, no sir. What we do is we'd adapt ROE and translate it into what an F15 pilot can use while he's flying.

(Questions by Lt Colonel Mudge)

281Q: When is the last time, prior to 14 April, that you had visual reconnaissance, vis-recce training that included helicopters?
281A: As far as self-study, there were books on the table in our area and I would review those about twice a week. Organized, like a slide type of vis-recce thing? Oh boy. Before we made the move. I'd say January. December. Yeah, December or January of '93 -- December of '93.

282Q: And do you ever remember being shown photographs in the organized training or your own self-study that showed a helicopter from the rear aspect?

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282A: Yes sir.

283Q: Do you remember seeing the recce photographs of Black Hawks with auxiliary tanks?
283A: No sir, that's a very hard picture of a Black Hawk to ever find, at least for the manuals I've gone through. They're always shown carrying nothing. No hoists, no refueling probes, nothing. It's just a straight UH-60 Alpha, a straight Black Hawk.

284Q: We've discussed a lot of training, academics and so on, are there any specific areas that you feel that when you came here to OPC on this last rotation, that you were going to be extremely proficient and good at accomplishing or some that you'd be deficient in?
284A: Yes sir.

285Q: Could you elaborate which ones you thought you were deficient in and which ones you thought you'd be -- do well in?
285A: Okay, as far as deficiencies, due to recent experience, I felt that my personal skills were not as what they once were in basic fighter maneuvers, basically where you turn with another aircraft engaged, individual fight, that was definitely a problem, that and my "G" tolerance would be down, my ability to withstand the "G"s from turning in BFM. Tanker Ops, I was a little concerned about coming here having not refueled on a tanker since my previous time down here, so it was about three months ago. But that proficiency is regained pretty quickly. I think those are probably the biggest, that and just maybe also air combat maneuvering or air combat tactics where you're doing an engaged fight with another aircraft. All of the close in, within ten mile type of maneuvering we had not done in a long time. We did some at the ACMI range -- the Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation Range in England, over the North Sea, but a lot of that was more of a beyond visual range exercise. Those are some -- those are probably the only areas that I felt I was not as strong in as previous.

286Q: After completing a tour down here, a normal rotation, what areas do you think you'd be deficient in?
286A: Oh, those areas I just mentioned because we don't do much of that, would continue to be even worse, I'm thinking. We would have tactics talks and, you know, pilots sitting around talking about, "Okay, you're going to do this, you're going to do that. How would you handle it? But until you go out there and actually put eight and half, nine "G"s on a jet, you know, you're just not going to be as good at it.

287Q: Do you think your overall combat capability and your ability to complete the mission that's assigned down here -- let me rephrase that. Do you still have the ability to complete the tasking that you have down here at OPC at the beginning and at the end of your transition through here?
287A: Yes sir. The mission here is not comparable to what we do in training though. and we're sitting up here with the auto pilot on doing circles in the sky, running a radar scope, so I got very very good at running my radar, but as far as the standard fighter pilot engage maneuvering things,

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your proficiency is just remarkably decreased, and for a guy with my level of experience in this aircraft, I need to be able to do this a lot and a lot of that engage visual maneuvering to keep my skills sharp. And a more experienced pilot may not require it, but for me, I definitely thought I was having some real degraded capabilities as a result of my time here.

288Q: But only in those specific areas and they would not affect your capability to perform the mission here?
288A: That's correct, sir.

COLONEL MUDGE: Any further questions?

(Questions by Colonel At Lee)

289Q: One area unrelated to the sequence we've just done. You had made reference in your earlier testimony to Tiger One and Tiger Two of the mission mishap aircraft. To clarify, referring only to grade, would you clarify which of those individuals is the senior person in grade, Tiger One, Tiger Two.
289A: Tiger Two is senior in grade.

COLONEL AT LEE: Thank you.

Is there anything, any further information, statements or evidence that you would like to offer?

WITNESS: No sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: You're reminded that this is an official investigation. You are ordered not to divulge the nature of the investigation or the questions, answers or discussions included in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

Do you understand?

WITNESS: Yes sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No questions, sir.

NEUSER

COLONEL AT LEE: Thank you very much for your testimony today.

(The interview was terminated at 1445 hours, 20 April 1994)

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by Steven Thomas Neuser to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.

BRUCE H. PEGGS, DAEC
Court Reporter
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

NEUSER

TAB V-063

JOLY, MICHELE

AFFIDAVIT

I am Captain Michele Joly. I am assigned to the 22 Fighter Squadron as the Officer in Charge of the Intelligence Branch. My squadron is deployed to Incirlik AB, Turkey, in support of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). We fly F-16 aircraft. The squadron Intelligence Branch is responsible for aircrew intelligence training which includes visual recognition of friendly and enemy aircraft. AF regulations require visual recognition training and testing for aircrew members every six months. The scope and content of the training is left to the discretion of the squadron's Intelligence Branch. At our home base, the squadron trains on visual recognition of aircraft before every deployment, usually every two to three months. Additionally, daily visual recognition is conducted for flight crew members flying that day. Formal testing is conducted every two to three months. Here at OPC, our training and testing program is less formal. Each day we brief a threat of the day for aircrew members flying on that day and we conduct informal testing every other week.

The following resources are available at Incirlik AB, Turkey, to train aircrew members on visual identification of aircraft;

1. Middle East and Africa Theater Recognition Guide, Part I
   DIAM 57-25-131, 1 July 1988
2. Visual Aircraft Recognition
   FM 44-30, October 1986
3. Threat Guide and Countertactics
   MCM 3-1 Vol II, 29 Oct 1993

The first two documents listed above are written for ground observers to identify aircraft flying above their position. They include written descriptions as well as line drawings of helicopters from the front, side and below. MCM 3-1 contains a threat assessment and pictures from the side of a Hind. This document is not intended to be used for visual recognition purposes, but is often used as such.

MICHELE JOLY, Captain, USAF
22 FS Intelligence Officer
Spangdahlem AB, Germany

Sworn to and subscribed before me on this 12th day of May 1994.

CHARLES H. WILCOX II, Colonel, USAF
Legal Advisor

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TAB V-064

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TAHSIN, MOWFIK

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

MOWFIK TAHSIN
AMADA, IRAQ

The interview was conducted by LTC Scott C. Black, at Crash Site 1, Iraq, beginning at 1300 hours, 18 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

NOTE: This interview was conducted through an interpreter (Shafik Taha). The summarization is therefore based upon his translation of the witnesses words.

EXAMIMATION

I am the camera man who was on the ground and filmed the video tape that was subsequently released to the United States Air Force.

When I first saw the aircraft I was on my roof. My house is one of the highest places in the village. The old time was 1050, that means it was 1150 hours. The weather was very good. It was very clear weather and hot.

I first saw two F-15s and then the helicopters. When I saw the helicopters, I thought it would be a very nice picture on the video. The sun was to the left of me and the aircraft were coming from the right. The sun did not interfere with my ability to see the aircraft. I could not see any markings on the jet aircraft.

I saw the F-15s first and I took a picture, and then I saw the helicopters.

I saw the missile hit the helicopter, but I had turned my camera off. I could see the one helicopter was hit by a missile and another airplane hit the other helicopter in another place.

The first airplane hit the second helicopter. There is no time between when they were hit and then exploded. From the village here I could not see the helicopter after this time. I saw the fire and the smoke, and knew that the second one had been hit. I did not see the second helicopter get hit by the missile.

When the first helicopter was hit the jet flew away and after the second was hit they flew for five minutes around the place. The first one went away straight ahead towards the second helicopter.

I was surprised because maybe they see the village. I took a picture by my camera, and then I needed to see by my eyes.

TAHSIN

I myself did not see the second helicopter get hit, but there is more people in my house. They said they saw the missile hit the second helicopter also. I watched the first helicopter get hit. I did not see the second helicopter get hit because we thought that maybe he came to hit at our village.

After the helicopters were hit, I took my camera off. One half to one hour after the accident happened , I gave the cassette personally to General Ali. I told him that I had taken a picture of an airplane and of the United Nations helicopters. I gave General Ali the cassette because General Ali needed to visit us here at our place. I later gave the cassette to Mr. Bareini's brother. That was the last time I saw the cassette. After I gave Mr. Bareini's brother the cassette, I stayed there one night because I was tired, I took food there and the next day I came back to the village. Mr. Bareini's brother did not take any pictures of the crash site.

General Ali was at my house. They made it down to the fire by the river. They tell the people not to touch anything unless the people from the U.S.A. come to see the accident. I was at the accident site for one hour before I had the message. There were 100 to 200 people, most of them from our village, that came to the site of the accident.

I never saw anyone taking pictures of the accident except for General Ali when he came to visit the area and his camera was with him. He came to the accident and he took a picture. I do not know who General Ali's camera man is. I did not talk to General Ali's camera man.

You can bring your camera man to take pictures the same ways that I did.

(The standard witness caution was given, and the witness had no questions.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accuate summary of the testimony of MOWFIK TAHSIN as given and sworn to, before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

Scott C. Black

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

TAHSIN

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TAB V-065 V-064

AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED V-065

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF
HADI MOHAMMED AMIN
TUSHEKEY VILLAGE, IRAQ

The interview was conducted by LTC Scott C. Black at Crash Site 1, Iraq, beginning at 1426 hours, 18 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

NOTE: This interview was conducted through an interpreter (Shafik Taha). The summarization is, therefore, based upon his translation of the witness' words.

EXAMINATION

We were at the scene of the accident because we came to do our garden and we saw the airplane was coming . This was about quarter to 12. I first came out that day at about 8:00.

I saw the airplane. The airplane color was white. I saw the helicopter first. The airplane was maybe about two or three circles over them, above them. The helicopter was coming closer to me. The airplane was behind it. The first airplane was near the second helicopter. As I looked out on the hill, it was below me. I was not close enough to be able to see the pilots of the helicopters. I could see the windows of the helicopter cabins. I did not look close enough at the helicopter to see people inside. I looked at the helicopters and after that, I looked at the airplanes. The two helicopters were about 40 to 50 meters apart. The first helicopter was before the second helicopter when they hit it. The helicopter was coming up the valley and I was standing on the hillside -- it was in front of me.

I did see the jet fire. The missile looked like a piece of fire. I did see the missile hit the helicopter in the back. After it was hit, it changed from side to side and the helicopter was damaged. The helicopter turned one-quarter turn to the right and was now facing me as it fell to the earth. The fire got bigger then and each piece of the helicopter had some fire in it in each place. Before the helicopter hit the ground, the fire was on the outside back of the helicopter. There was no fire inside before it hit the ground, but before it hit the earth, some pieces were falling off and they were on fire.

I saw the second missile hit the second helicopter. The second helicopter was hit in the front. It hit the blades. It hit the very top of the helicopter under the blades in the middle. After the missile hit there, there was some fire on the helicopter and some pieces broke off the helicopter. The fire on the first helicopter was in the middle and it was bigger than the fire on the second one.

HADI MOHAMMED AMIN

It looked like the first one knew that the second helicopter was hit because they changed their line like they were going up and down, trying to keep behind the mountains. They changed their line to back and forth, left to right, still going forward. They did that two to three times. When the helicopter was hit with the missile and caught on fire, the helicopter went behind the mountains and I could not see after that.

In the area where I was with my father and brother, I did not see anyone else.

The time between the first helicopter being hit and the second helicopter being hit was not more than one minute.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of HADI MOHAMMED AMIN as given, and sworn to, before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

HADI MOHAMMED AMIN

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TAB V-066

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AMIN, AZZIZ MOHAMMED

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

AZIZ MOHAMMED AMIN
TUSHEKEY VILLAGE, IRAQ

The interview was conducted by Lt Col Scott C. Black, at Crash Site 1, Iraq, beginning at 1425 hours, 18 April 1994. The witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

NOTE: This interview was conducted through an interpreter (Shafik Taha). The summarization is therefore based upon his translation of the witness' words.

EXAMINATION

I am the son of Mohammed Amin. I was also present on the side of the hill overlooking crash site "1" at the time the first helicopter was hit.

I first saw the airplane, and after that I saw the helicopter. I then saw the helicopter was hit by a missile from the airplane. There was a big fire and a bullets sound.

It was about 8:00 o'clock, when my father, my brother and I were working in the garden, which has four parts to it. When I first saw the aircraft I was in the fourth line or the very top of the garden. I first saw the airplanes. I saw the airplanes going around in circles around the village. I t was about one minute after that that I saw the helicopter. As the helicopters came up the valley they were flying normal. The helicopters were never moving from side to side. The helicopters were about 100 feet apart. The next thing that happened was the first airplane was over the second helicopter. My brother was seeing everything careful because he was on the top above me. I saw the missile hit the first helicopter. The missile hit the helicopter in the back. When the first helicopter came by I could not see the pilots because they were not close enough. The missile hit the helicopter, it was going straight and the missile made the helicopter turn a quarter turn so that it was facing me. When the missile hit the back it made a sound like a bullet. Then they returned to my line before they hit the ground. When the helicopter hit the ground it was turned on its side.

The aircraft was flying on a 12 to 6:00 o'clock heading and when the missile struck the aircraft was turned to a 9:00 o'clock heading. It turned back to a 7:00 o'clock heading and rolled 45 degrees to the left just before it hit the ground.

When the missile hit, I saw fire coming out of the rear crew compartment window of

the helicopter. After the helicopter hit the ground there were many pieces and each piece has a big fire in it.

The second aircraft I did not see fire at the second helicopter because I did not look carefully. My brother saw everything. We went into the village and did not go to the site. After we saw other people we went there. I did not see anyone else in the area. I could take your camera man up the hill to where my father, my brother and I were standing so that he could take pictures.

The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.

WITH THE U.S. ARMED FORCES AT)

CRASH SITE 1, IRAQ)

I have read the foregoing summarization of a statement I provided to Lt Col Scott C. Black on behalf of the aircraft Accident Investigation Board convened to inquire into the Black Hawk helicopter accident on 14 April 1994. I hereby swear (or affirm) that the statement I provided was true and accurate when given, and remains so to the best of my belief and knowledge. I further swear (or affirm) that I am the same AZIZ MOHAMMED AMIN who provided that taped statement, and I am satisfied this is a true and accurate summary of that statement.

AZIZ MOHAMMED AMIN

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26 day of April, 1994.

AZIZ MOHAMMED AMIN

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