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
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Releasable

OPERATION



KINGPIN

DEC 1960



63

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Freedom of Information Act) 5U.S.C. 552
(b) (1)

RECOMMENDED NMCC CONFERENCE ROOM ACCESS LIST

SECDEF	DDOs
DEPSECDEF	Director, DIA and Deputies for Production
ASD - Public Affairs	Director, NSA
Chairman, JCS and Joint Chiefs	BGen Allen, USAF
Director, Joint Staff	BGen Baldwin, USA
Operations Deputies	RAdm Engen, USN
LTG Knowles	BGen Blackburn, USA
J-3	Mr. Zaslow, NSA Rep
Deputy J-3	Captain Train, USN

OPERATIONS PERSONNEL

(Will be on a shift bases)

Col Mayer, USA, Chief Special Ops Div, J-3	DIA Representatives
Col Gibson, Dep SACSA	Capt J. S. Harris, USN
Col Norman, Opns Officer	Cdr John Bruce, USN
Col Rice, NMCC Opns Officer	Capt N. J. Nash, USAF
LTC Little, Opns Officer	Capt J. E. Kennedy
LTC Pattee, Opns Officer	Mr. R. C. Guemther
LTC Hatch, Opns Officer	Mr. J. T. Berbrich
	SSgt S. E. Graves, USA
	Draftsmen
	Sp Jordan
	Draftsman Downing
	Mrs. F. L. Earley, Secretary

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SCENARIO

This operation provides for a raid in North Vietnam to be conducted by Army Special Forces personnel assaulting the Son Tay prison camp in Air Force helicopters assisted by a Navy air diversion. The most advantageous period for this undertaking is between 21 and 25 November when predictions of conditions for light and weather are most favorable. The concept includes feints to confuse the enemy and mask the main effort which will employ one HH-3 helicopter to land within the prison compound to gain immediate access and surprise.

The Son Tay prison camp is located approximately 20 NM NW of Hanoi, well away from civilian habitation, in rice paddies about one KM NW of Son Tay City, sometimes referred to as Son Tay Citadel (Fig 1).

The Camp consists of two separate portions; the walled compound, and an Admin Support area outside the wall containing an estimated 45 Vietnamese, including dependents (Figs 2 and 3). US PWs are apparently housed in the four large buildings in the compound having a wall about seven feet in height and two, possibly three, guard towers along the west wall. The communications/headquarters building is outside the compound and is the terminus of the only visible power and telephone lines. The remainder of the structures are guard quarters or support buildings.

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US Forces arrive in this objective area by air, according to a precisely timed movement from Thailand over Laos and into NVN from the west. After the proper NCS approvals and weather clearance, and at approximately 4 hours prior to the actual assault landing, the first aircraft, a specially configured C-130 designed for essential enroute and pinpoint terminal navigation, departs Takhli for Nakhon Phanom. At this location the C-130 is joined by 4 A-1 aircraft and both elements proceed to a H/C air refueling point north of the Plaine de Jarres. Shortly thereafter, a second similar type C-130 launches from Takhli, overflies Udorn, and proceeds to this same refueling point (Fig 4). The assault helicopters, 1 - HH-3 and 5-HH-53s depart Udorn in time to rendezvous with their refueling aircraft, and complete refueling by H-1:00.


H-1:00 is the time that these forces combine and form 2 groups, with the lead C-130 and the H/Cs comprising the first group followed in 10 minutes by the other C-130 with 4 A-1s.

These two groups then continue in trail, crossing high points on the route in Laos at 2000 feet above ground level, and descending to 1000 feet as they move into North Vietnam about 30 minutes prior to TOT. The NVN NW radar network

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should not detect the penetration until it enters the Red River Valley at approximately 12 minutes prior to TOT and, from that point on, the formation is subject to continuous tracking by enemy radar (Fig 5).

Just prior to the appearance of the force from the west, diversionary penetrations by Navy air, consisting of two staggered thrusts toward the coast by squadron-sized forces beginning at H-20 minutes, are expected to trigger a conventional air attack response by the North Vietnamese. The real effort will then be competing for resources and attention (Fig 6).

Additionally, 8 F-4s are available for MIG CAP and cycle into the objective area in flights of 2 to perform orbits both NE and SE of Hanoi. They depart Udorn in time to be on station by H-hour under the control of COLLEGE EYE (EC-121s) orbiting over the Gulf of Tonkin providing enemy and friendly air order of battle information to the command center located in the TACC-NS at Da Nang. ¹An RC-135 aircraft also orbits in the Gulf and functions as the alternate mission control with the airborne mission coordinator aboard. The Mission Commander, General Manor, is at the tactical air control center located at MONKEY MOUNTAIN near Danang and is able to monitor developments as they unfold and direct the forces accordingly (Fig 7).



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at the prison, move to relatively isolated areas four kilometers to the northwest where they will land and wait until called back by the Ground Commander (20 - 30 minutes).

The reserve, with one C-130, the remaining 1 A-1s, and 2 empty HH-53s not used in the assault turn right, out of the line of flight, 3 minutes away from the target and form a helicopter and A-1 pattern north of Ba Vi Mountain with the C-130 holding west of the Black River (Fig 9).

Having left the assault helicopters about 30 seconds out from the target, we will return to the ground operation that these troop carrying aircraft will initiate. The ground attack force consists of 56 Army Special Forces personnel commanded by Colonel Arthur D. Simons. This ground force is organized into three groups; command, assault, and support. The essentials of this operation are surprise, speed, and simplicity.

The attack starts with a heliborne assault on Son Tay PW camp at H-30 seconds with three helicopters making flare-lighted west-southwest firing approaches. The guard towers communication center, and guard quarters area are neutralized. H-hour puts the lead helicopter, the HH-3, on the ground in the courtyard of the PW compound. The assault group aboard this helicopter, consisting of three

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action elements, secures the inside of the compound and the demolitionist blows the wall near the southwest corner. This force then proceeds to designated cellblocks to release and guide PWs to a control point (Fig 10). Immediately after the assault group lands inside, helos #1 and #2 with the command and support groups, land outside to the south of the compound in cultivated rice fields.

The support group sweeps through the area housing communication facilities and enemy support troops, including compound guards. The bridge north of the objective is secured, the communication cable on the bridge cut, and the bridge span closest to the objective blown. Buildings immediately across the road are swept. The command group establishes blocking positions on the road south, the canal southwest, and the southwest corner of the compound wall from which the PWs will be exited.

The final phase finds organized and closely controlled aircraft loads being moved to the pickup point, one load at a time, for final count, loading, and takeoff. Ground forces are phased out of the area with PW loads, and security elements are rolled back to the pickup point. These security elements, the last PWs along with the ground force commander, depart the objective area on the last aircraft. All aircraft depart the target area individually, with time and route

~~_____~~

separation for safety, bound for Udorn where provisions have been made for reception and treatment. The HH-3 will be left in the compound and destroyed with a timed explosive charge.

The support element has four thirty-pound prepared satchel charges for dropping the bridge span at the south end and adhesive charges for cutting the cable.

A-1 aircraft provide air cover and early warning to the ground force and are responsive to enemy threats with 20 MM cannon fire, rockets, and bombs.

In the event that "hard" confinement cells are encountered, a capability exists of cutting through 3/8 inch steel plate with back-packed oxy-acetylene gear, removing locks with compound bolt cutters, and cutting through hardwood stocks with chain saws. Great trouble along this line is not anticipated.

The ground commander is positive that the operation will succeed. He has personally selected every man on this mission - they are all volunteers, dedicated, and free from any discernible defect. The training was thorough, definitive, and intense.

The aircrews are among the best available. They were also individually selected and all aircraft commanders are volunteers. The forward looking infrared navigation systems recently installed in the two C-130 lead aircraft have performed very well, [as has a VHF jamming device placed on] ^{te}

~~_____~~

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Three A-1 aircraft just prior to the operation. Dress rehearsals, to include complete full profile missions, have been conducted with the special munitions and electronic equipment selected, to achieve a peak in forces.

In all planning and training, security has been uppermost of all priorities. We have in the group, highly qualified security personnel and have incorporated their ideas into every facet of operational planning and deception. A communications monitoring unit was established at the Eglin AFB pre-deployment training site and CIA/DIA also assisted in the security endeavor. Project personnel have been thoroughly briefed on the security requirements and charged with the responsibility for compliance.

In all cases, the location and TOT of our operation have been closely held. D-day, and H-hour, plus required code word meanings, were passed verbally from designated members of the Joint Task Group to required element commanders only. Formatted messages are being used whenever possible in our communications for: execution approval, delays, or cancellation. Secure communications have been established with General Manor in Da Nang, Admiral McCain and selected personnel in the NMCC to provide as much of the real-time progress of the operation as the deliberately limited traffic will permit.

~~_____~~


If resources in support of this operation reveal that the enemy may have determined our objective, the operation will be cancelled.

KINGPIN

EVENT	H-HOUR COUNT	NORTH VN/THAILAND		EASTERN STANDARD	
		PLAN	REAL	PLAN	REAL
NCA APPROVAL					
1st WEATHER "GO"	H-9:00	1718		0518	
2nd WEATHER "GO"	H-5:00	2118		0918	
1st C-130(STRIKE) DEP TAKHLI	H-4:10	2208		1008	
2nd C-130 (ASSAULT) DEP TAKHLI	H-3:20	2258		1058	
HELOs (ASSAULT) DEP UDORN	H-3:00	2318		1118	
A-1s (STRIKE) DEP NKP	H-2:40	2338		1138	
REFUELING COMPLETE	H-1:00	0118		1318	
CROSS LAOS-NYN BORDER	H-0:38	0140		1340	
BEGIN NAVY COASTAL DIVERSION (45 MIN)	H-0:20	0158		1358	
I.P. ENROUTE TO TARGET	H-0:06.5	0211.5		1411.5	
ASSAULT LANDING	H-0	0218		1418	
EXTRACTION & WITHDRAWAL FROM TARGET	H+0:20 to H+0:30	0238 to 0248		1438 to 1448	
RECOVER AT UDORN					

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VM/R-2
17

GULF

O F

VM/R-2

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TONKIN
VIC 1

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100

100

(120)

(120)

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CE

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
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


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FIG 2

SON TAY PW CAMP


21 08 36N 105 30 01E



LEGEND

-  PW CELLS
-  PROBABLY ENEMY OCCUPIED

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LEGEND





-  PW CELLS
-  PROBABLY ENEMY OCCUPIED
-  ADMIN & SUPPORT BLDGS.
-  LAIRING

FIG. 1





FIG 4
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Scale 1:7,000,000



MAE NAM
CHAO PHRAYA
LOWLANDS


H-3:10
H-3:20

TAKHLI
LOP BURI

FIG 5

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Scale 1:2,000,000



NORTH VIETNAM DIVERSION H-20 TO H-05




FIG 6

FOPCES

PRIMARY MISSION

1 - C-130E [ENROUTE NAVIGATION] -

12 USAF

3 - HH-53 [ASSAULT] -

13 USAF, 42 SPEC. FORCES

1 - H-3 [COMPOUND ASSAULT] -

3 USAF, 14 SPEC. FORCES

2 - A-1 [GROUND SUPPORT] -

4 USAF

RESERVE

1 - C-130E

2 - HH-53

2 - A-1

SUPPORT

1 - RC-135 [COMBAT APPLE]

2 - EC-121 [COLLEGE EYE]

2 - HC-130 [HELICOPTER TANKER]

8 - F-4 [MIG CAP]

NAVY DIVERSION

10 - F-4/F-8

4 - RA-5

8 - A-4/A-7

8 - A-6

14 - VARIOUS SUPPORT

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TARGET AREA TACTICS

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F-4
MIG
CAP

NE OF HANOI

HANOI
20 NM

F-4
MIG
CAP

SE OF HANOI




FIG-8

21 08 36N 105 30 01E

HH-53 HOLDING
AREA 1 KM

BRIDGE
DEMO

SON
CON

TRENCHES

BAMBOO GATE

CONCERTINA
WIRE ON WALL


COMO
BLDG

ASSAULT

TRENCHES


APPROACH

LEGEND

 PW CELLS

 PROBABLY ENEMY
OCCUPIED

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


FIG 1

TARGET AREA TACTICS

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F-4
MIG
CAP
NE OF H.

HANG
20 N

F-4
MIG
CAP
SE OF HA




FIG 9

ALTERNATE PLANS

Blue Plan

Organization and Forces: Same as basic plan minus Assault Group, due to aircraft loss or abort prior to reaching target area.

Scope of Operations: Command Group breaches wall, clears compound and releases PWs; Support Group assumes responsibility for area outside compound to include bridge and road/canal junction. Alternate plan conducted with a tempo commensurate with reduction in Ground Force party.

Red Plan

Organization and Forces: Same as basic plan minus Command Group due to aircraft loss or abort prior to reaching target area.

Scope of Operations: Assault Group lands within compound, neutralizes guard towers, main gate and buildings, releases and guides PWs; Support Group secures area north, east and south of compound, destroys bridges and communications cable, provides control point for evacuation of PWs. Support Group aircraft mini-gun fires increased. Alternate plan conducted with a tempo commensurate with reduction in Ground Force party.

Green Plan

Organization and Force: Same as basic plan minus Support Group due to aircraft loss or abort prior to reaching target area.

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Scope of Operation: Assault Group lands within compound, neutralizes Guard Towers, main gate and buildings within compound, releases PWs. Command Group lands in field near Building 7B, secures area north, east and south of compound; establishes control point for évacuation of PWs. Alternate plan conducted with a tempo commensurate with réduction in Ground Force party.

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COMMAND POSTS

Headquarters

Location

National Military Command Center (NMCC)	Pentagon
CINCPAC	Camp Smith, Hawaii
CINCPACFLT	Kunia, Hawaii
COM 7th FLEET	Western Pacific
COMTF 77	Yankee Station
CINCPACAF	Hickam AFB, Hawaii
COM 7 AF	Tan Son Nhut, RVN
DEPCOM 7/13AF	Udorn, RTAFB, Thailand
COMJCTG Overseas Headquarters and Staging Base	Takhli, RTAFB, Thailand
Employment Command Post- Tactical Air Control Center North Sector	Son Tra, RVN (Monkey Mountain)
Ground Force, HH-53, H-3, F-4, HC-130 Element Command Posts	Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
C-130 Element Command Post	Takhli RTAFB, Thailand
A-1 Element Command Post	Nakhon Phanom, RTAFB, Thailand
RC-135 Element Command Post	Kadena AFB, Okinawa
KC-135 Element Command Post	Utapao RTAFB, Thailand
EC-121 Element Command Post	Korat RTAFB, Thailand/ Danang AFB, RVN
Navy Diversionary Aircraft Command Post	Yankee Station
Recovery Base	Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
Redeployment Base	Takhli RTAFB, Thailand

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VHF FM Enroute and Ground Command Net. Provides:

- Enroute communications for the Primary and Reserve Element aircraft.
- Close air support direction and coordination.

UHF Enroute and Air/Ground Net. Provides:


- Enroute communications (via relay as required) between COMJCTG, the Assault and Strike aircraft, and the Airborne Mission Coordinator.
- Communications (via relay as required) between the Ground Force Commander and COMJCTG.
- SAR communications as required.

Ground Operations Communications

- During ground operations, the ground force commander, as the overall "on scene" commander will establish and control communications (FM and UHF) to subordinate ground elements, air strike elements, (A-1s), and air assault elements (HH-53s).
- The Airborne Relay Link (A-1E - RC-135) is the primary communications between COMJCTG and the ground forces commander during ground operations, accordingly, the air ground net (UHF) is critical both for relay of COMJCTG command communications and the primary "on scene" radio net for the ground commander's control of subordinate air elements in the target area.

Ground Force Commander

- Activates net control station in ground force command radio net (FM) as the primary communications with subordinate ground force group leaders and for alternate communications with subordinate air strike (A-1) and air assault (HH-53) elements.
- Activate net control station in air/ground radio net (UHF) at H+1 minute as primary communications with subordinate air strike and air assault elements and relay of critical reports to COMJCTG.

- 
- Direct activation of forward air guide net (FM) and enter as alternate net control station as required.
 - Be prepared to employ backup audio and visual communications for command and control of major subordinate groups elements.


Search and Rescue Operations

- Coordinated by Air Force HC-130 (Crown) which will guard ground command net (FM) and air ground net (UHF) as well as SAR guard frequencies required to coordinate SAR operations.
- All ground force personnel will be provided an AN/PRC-90 radio for emergency search and rescue operations. In the event that all other communications means fail during ground operations, the AN/PRC-90 may be used by ground force group/element leaders for communications with the ground force commander on PRC-90 alternate guard frequency.

OPERATION COVER STORIES

1. Successful - No cover required. News release will emphasize exact nature of operation.
2. Successful with Loss of Aircraft - Results justified the risk.
3. Disclosure prior to launch - Highly classified operation, no details.
4. Aborted - Disclosed after launch and aborted - SAR mission, downed airman.
5. Unsuccessful before reaching target - SAR mission, downed airman.
6. No PWs in camp or unsuccessful at target - intransigence of NVN made attempt necessary, results worth risk.

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DECISION POINTS - 21 NOVEMBER

<u>Time (EST)</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Authority</u>
0518	First Weather "Go/No-Go"	COMJCTG
0918	Final Weather "Go/No-Go"	COMJCTG
Before 1008	Abort operation prior to launch	CJCS/COMJCTG
Up To 1208	Delay launch for weather	COMJCTG
1008-1418	Abort operation en route	CJCS/COMJCTG
1418-1448	Operational decisions at objective	COMJCTG/CO Gnd Force
Any Time	Cancel operation (pre-arranged Code Word)	NCA/CJCS

NOTE: 24 hour weather delay may be directed by COMJCTG for a D-day of 23 Nov and 24 Nov with no change in H-hour. A delay for a D-day of 25 or 26 Nov will require a new H-hour of one hour later. A new D-day of 27 Nov or after will revert to original H-hour.


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[REDACTED]

EXPECTED REPORTS..

<u>Report</u>	<u>Responsible HQ</u>
* NCA approval	JCS
* Acknowledge receipt of NCA approval	JCTG
First weather "Go/No-Go" (H-9:00)	JCTG
Final weather "Go/No-Go" (H-5:00)	JCTG
* Launch (H-4:10)	JCTG
Refueling complete (H-1:00)	JCTG
Cross Laos - NVN Border (H-0:38)	JCTG
Cross I.P. (H-0:06 1/2)	JCTG
TOT (H-Hour)	JCTG
Cross NVN-Laos Border	JCTG
Return refueling complete	JCTG
* Recover at Udorn (H+3:30)	JCTG
PWs undergoing medical clearance procedures. Names forwarded (H+5:00)	JCTG
PWs depart Udorn by C-141 for CONUS (H+6:00)	JCTG

NOTE: Times in parenthesis are approximate for action to occur. Reports to NMCC will be received at a later time.

* Required.

[REDACTED]

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NMCC OPERATIONS DUTY

20 Nov 70 - 21 Nov 70

Team One

(0930 Hrs, 20 Nov 70 - 2000 Hrs, 20 Nov 70)

Col E. E. Mayer, USA, Chief Special Ops Division,
J-3

Col W. C. Norman, USA, Ops Officer, Special Ops
Division, J-3

Col F. C. Rice, USAF, Ops Officer, NMCC

Team Two

(2000 Hrs, 20 Nov 70 - 0800 Hrs, 21 Nov 70)

Col B. P. Gibson, USAF, Dep SACSA, J-3

Lt Col D. C. Hatch, USAF, Ops Officer, Special
Ops Division, J-3

Lt Col J. R. Pattee, USAF, Ops Officer, Special
Ops Division, J-3

Lt Col N. R. Little, USAF, Ops Officer, Special
Ops Division, J-3

NOTE: Appropriate DIA representation will be present.

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SCHEDULE OF BRIEFINGS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
19 Nov	1700	Col Mayer briefs DDOs in Office of SACSA.
19 Nov	1500	SACSA briefs Mr. Henkin in Office of SACSA
20 Nov	on call	SACSA conference with BGen Allen, USAF, BGen Baldwin, USA, RAdm Christiansen, USN and Colonel Disilvio in Senior Authorities Room.
20 Nov	1315	SACSA briefs selected participants in NMCC Conference Room

Note: Other briefings will be conducted as required during progress of operation.

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ARTICLE FROM **VIETNAM**

OPERATION KINGPIN *raid*

Almost flawless in execution, the daring rescue raid at the Son Tay prison camp deep within North Vietnam lacked only one essential ingredient--POWs.

As told by Terry Buckler

On November 21, 1970, at the U.S. Air Force base at Udorn, Thailand, helicopters carrying U.S. Army Special Forces personnel took off into the inky blackness of the night sky. Those aboard had been training secretly for months and were ready to execute Operation Kingpin, the final phase of a daring plan--the rescue of American prisoners of war from the North Vietnamese prison camp at Son Tay.

The Son Tay prison camp was located approximately 23 miles west of Hanoi. The camp was small, the courtyard a mere 140 by 125 feet, and it was surrounded by rice paddies and 40-foot trees. In addition, a 7-foot wall encircled the prison, and three observation towers were strategically placed to observe the POWs, who were housed in four large buildings in the main compound.

Son Tay and Ap Lo, another POW camp 30 miles from Hanoi, were first identified by the Interagency Prisoner of War Intelligence Committee in May 1970. The committee, established in 1967, was responsible for identifying POWs and the camps where they were interned and for diverting U.S. bombing missions away from those areas.

The committee determined that the Son Tay camp was being enlarged to handle additional prisoners and confirmed that 55 American POWs were imprisoned there. Reconnaissance photographs also revealed the letters SAR (search and rescue), spelled out by what appeared to be the prisoners' laundry, and an arrow with the number 8 next to it, indicating the distance the POWs had to travel to the fields where they worked.

Army General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), approved a plan to rescue the POWs at Son Tay. On June 10, 1970 a 15-man group led by 53-year-old Army Brig. Gen. Donald D. Blackburn, the special

assistant to General Wheeler for counterinsurgency and special activities, began the planning stage of the operation. This initial phase of the rescue attempt was dubbed "Polar Circle."

Further reconnaissance of the area around Son Tay revealed some troublesome aspects of the proposed raid. First, the headquarters of the Twelfth North Vietnamese Army (NVA), totaling 12,000 troops, was located close by. Second, an artillery training school, a supply depot and an air defense installation were also in close proximity to the prison. Third, about 500 yards south of Son Tay was a compound known as the "secondary school," which was used as an administrative center for the guards. Lastly, the Phuc Yen Air Base was only 20 miles northeast of the compound. It was clear that a raid would have to be accomplished very quickly because the enemy could muster reinforcements to Son Tay in a matter of minutes.

"Ivory Coast," the second phase of the rescue operation, swung into action as soon as Polar Circle was complete. Air Force Brig. Gen. Leroy J. "Roy" Manor, a stickler for organization, headed up the group. This part of the operation kept constant surveillance on Son Tay, using Lockheed SR-71 Blackbirds and unmanned Buffalo Hunter drones.

By the summer of 1970, photos showed Son Tay to be less active than usual, and by autumn the camp had very few signs of life. However, Dong Hoi, another POW camp 15 miles to the east of Son Tay, had increased in activity.

Why had the POWs been relocated? Had the North Vietnamese learned about the rescue attempt? Unknown to the planners, the POWs had been moved for a simple reason: Son Tay was located on the Song Con River, which had overflowed its banks. Because of the flooding, the POWs had been transported to Dong Hoi.

Operation Kingpin, the final phase of the rescue of the POWs at Son Tay, was approved on November 18. The following day Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the new chairman of the JCS, received information that the POWs had definitely been moved to Dong Hoi. Unfortunately, the planners nixed the idea of moving on Dong Hoi. They felt that the raiders had rehearsed for months for a raid on Son Tay and that shifting camps at the last minute might prove to be disastrous.

The result of the raid is now well known--the raiding group found no live American POWs at Son Tay. However, that does not detract from the dedication and bravery demonstrated by the men who were willing to risk their lives to save their fellow countrymen.

Sergeant Terry Buckler, then 20 years old, was the youngest member of the raiding force to enter Son Tay and was the only team member who had not had a tour of duty in Vietnam. He also holds another unique distinction: His entire time "in-country" was only 27 minutes--all of it in North Vietnam. He could very well be the only Vietnam veteran to make that claim.

Vietnam's contributing editor Al Hemingway talked to Terry Buckler about his

experience in the Son Tay raid.

Vietnam: When you joined the Army did you want to be a member of Special Forces?

Buckler: I was drafted on March 18, 1969. Three or four days later I did extend my enlistment to enter Special Forces. After jump school at Fort Benning, Ga., and training at Fort Bragg, N.C., I was assigned to the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg.

Vietnam: How were you selected to be a part of the Son Tay rescue team?

Buckler: That is an interesting story. First, at 20 years of age, I was the youngest man on the mission, and "Bull" Simons (Colonel Arthur Simons, leader of the Son Tay group) was the oldest. I was in the field, at a place called Smoke Bomb Hill, when the call for volunteers was announced. All they said was that it was a secret mission that Bull Simons was heading up. We were to report to the Little White House, the headquarters of Special Forces at Fort Bragg. There were about 500 of us at the first meeting. After that, they started holding interviews.

Vietnam: What kind of man was Colonel Bull Simons?

Buckler: Simons looked as if his face had been chiseled out of stone. He was the type of soldier you would follow to hell and back. He took care of his men. He always scared the hell out of me. When he talked, you snapped to. He always had an old half-chewed stogie hanging from his mouth. In fact, I don't think he bought new cigars, he bought used ones. He also had a great sense of humor, and he most certainly had everyone's respect.

Vietnam: Did Simons conduct the interviews himself?

Buckler: No, there were two sergeant majors that did them. My paperwork got lost somehow, and it was about 7:30 in the evening and I was the only one left standing outside. I grew impatient and began to holler at the two sergeant majors. Looking back, that was a stupid move on my part because they could have killed me. But they instructed me to report back to them the following morning. The next day I was the first one to be interviewed, and then I went back to my unit to await their decision. We were at a state forest, practicing mountain climbing, when I received the word to pack my bags because I had been selected for the mission.

Vietnam: What other officers were part of the team?

Buckler: Our commanding officer was Lt. Col. Elliot P. Sydnor, who was second-in-command. Sydnor was a Ranger and there was some animosity between the Rangers and Special Forces. He was more military than us. I think the Special Forces attitude was more unorthodox. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Robinson was in charge of the administrative end. Some of the others who stand out in my mind are Sgt. Maj. Vladimir Jakovenko, who was definitely a hell-raiser and a real inspiration. Also, "Pappy" Kittleson, a real good soldier.

Pappy was a three-war veteran and had a calming effect on everyone. He was in his 50s but was in real good physical condition. I wouldn't want to mess with him. Then there was Master Sgt. Herman Spencer, who was in a class all by himself. And Sgt. 1st Class Tryone Adderly, who would win a Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the raid.

Vietnam: It seems you had experienced senior NCOs. Where did your group go from there?

Buckler: They sent us to Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. We had a building that had been used by the Central Intelligence Agency near Airfield No. 3. Concertina wire was strung around it, and we posted a 24-hour guard. Between guarding that building and training, we had time for little else. After about a month of this, I stopped Bull Simons one morning and told him that I could have remained at Fort Bragg if I wanted to pull guard duty. I asked what my chances of making the mission were.

Vietnam: Another brash move! What did Simons say?

Buckler: He told me to be patient. A couple of days later they came out with cuts. From then on, I didn't have to pull guard duty.

Vietnam: What was your training like?

Buckler: We had a mockup of Son Tay. However, we didn't know it was Son Tay at the time. Some people have said that it was dismantled every night and reassembled in the morning, which isn't true. We started training in the daytime, going through dry runs. We practiced our positioning and what to do when our choppers hit the ground. There were three ships (one Sikorsky HH-3 Jolly Green Giant and two HH-53 Super Jollies) going in; "Greenleaf," "Blueboy" and "Redwine" were their radio call signs. Then we began doing night training. There was a flare ship above us that lit up the compound. We used live ammunition the entire time as well.

Vietnam: You knew it was serious business then.

Buckler: Oh, yes. Even the old-timers were impressed. They had never used live ammo during training either, so it was all new to them as well. They wanted the training to be as realistic as possible. We also used several old buildings on the base and had some of our people who were not going on the raid act as prisoners. We would find them and take them out. Again, they included certain situations to add realism to the scenario. For example, when we brought the prisoners out to safety, one would accuse another of collaboration and want to kill him on the spot.

Vietnam: So how did you diffuse the situation?

Buckler: First, we would take a head count of the prisoners and determine who was in charge (usually the ranking officer) and then separate people who were arguing. Our primary concern was getting out of there and then sorting

everything else out later.

Vietnam: By this time, did you know you were going after American POWs at Son Tay?

Buckler: No. We thought we were going to rescue people who were being held hostage aboard a hijacked plane. At that time, quite a few hijackings were taking place. They kept us pretty much in the dark.

Vietnam: What else was involved in your training?

Buckler: Quite a bit of physical training. One of our officers, Captain Dick (Richard) Meadows, had what he referred to as the "Meadows Mile." It was a 4-mile run in the beach sand that he liked to lead.

Vietnam: Meadows was an extraordinary soldier. He was one of only two, to the best of my knowledge, who received a battlefield commission from General William Westmoreland during the Vietnam War.

Buckler: That's right. Quite a guy. Getting back to the training, it was very physical. We fought a lot. As a matter of fact, it was listed on the training schedule as the Friday Night Fights. Once training commenced, we were all restricted to base. As a result of being cooped up, one tends to get restless. I recall one night Master Sgt. Herman Spencer had a few too many. He returned to the barracks to get his weapon and kill Bull Simons. I guess he had a disagreement with him on how the mission should be run. Well, we took the weapon away from him. The next morning Simons had him locked at attention and went up one side of him and down the other.

Vietnam: Simons was certainly no one to fool with.

Buckler: Well, he had remarked that he didn't want a bunch of Boy Scouts, and he didn't get them.

Vietnam: How long did this training last?

Buckler: Three months. One night they told us to pack our bags and loaded us on a Lockheed C-141 transport plane. From that point on we were not allowed to wear any military uniforms or insignia of any kind. We were what they called "sterile." We were flown to Takhli Air Force Base in Thailand and huddled into the special operations area. I felt like I was in prison. There was a big fence around the compound, and there were also guard dogs. After three or four days, we were ushered into a large auditorium. Simons addressed the group and said that Lt. Col. "Bud" (Elliott P.) Sydnor, in charge of the security command group, had something to tell us. Sydnor stood up and pulled down a huge map of Hanoi, and there was a big red circle around Son Tay. He turned and said, "Gentleman, this is where we're going in." Just then everybody busted out laughing. I guess it was from all the fear and anxiety that we felt inside.

Vietnam: It must have been a great feeling when you first realized you were

going to rescue American POWs.

Buckler: Absolutely. It was a real high knowing that. The CIA had made a miniature model of the Son Tay prison. We went in and studied it so we would know what to expect when we hit the ground. It was very accurate. So accurate, in fact, they had a little bicycle parked in the prison compound.

Vietnam: That's real attention to detail!

Buckler: The night before the mission they gave us sleeping pills so we could get a good night's rest. After we awoke and got ready, they flew us to Udom, Thailand. From there, we boarded our choppers for the mission.

Vietnam: There were three assault groups?

Buckler: Yes. The groups were code-named "Blueboy," "Redwine" and "Greenleaf."

Vietnam: That was so your group code names would not be confused with the call signs of the choppers, which were Apple 1, Apple 2, Apple 3, Apple 4 and Apple 5. In fact, Apple 4 and Apple 5 hovered 1,500 feet above the Son Tay camp to act as flare ships in the event the other flare ships, the Lockheed C-130E Combat Talons, malfunctioned.

Buckler: That's probably true. However, I didn't see any of that.

Vietnam: There was a mix-up with Bull Simons when the groups first entered Son Tay, right?

Buckler: Yes, Simons' group, Greenleaf, went into the wrong area. They landed at the secondary school. Unfortunately, it was no school at all--it was a barracks filled with NVA soldiers. They had a firefight, killing a lot of NVA before the chopper pilot realized his mistake. Fortunately, there were no American casualties, and they were choppered back to Son Tay.

Vietnam: Who entered the prison camp first?

Buckler: Dick Meadows' group, Blueboy. The chopper crashed inside the compound after it hit a tree. Luckily, no one was seriously injured. My group, Redwine, landed outside the compound, blew a hole in the south wall and ran in and took up positions. Of course, Meadows thought it was Simons' group, which was still back at the secondary school. What was really embarrassing was the firefight we got into with Simons' men when they arrived at Son Tay.

Vietnam: So your group, Redwine, was actually supposed to be following Simons' group, Greenleaf.

Buckler: Yes. If you look at the initial plan, Greenleaf's touchdown was to take place 30 seconds before ours. We were only 60 to 80 feet apart. It was dark, and we thought they were the enemy. Simons figured out what was going on and put

a stop to it immediately. It was tense there for a while.

Vietnam: Were you scared?

Buckler: Not until we boarded the chopper after the raid. Captain Dan Turner and I were sitting in the tail of the helicopter with a minigun between us, and we could see Hanoi all lit up. About that time what looked like orange telephone poles started coming up at us.

Vietnam: Surface-to-air missiles!

Buckler: That's right. Our pilot was doing everything he could to dodge them. That's when it really got tense.

Vietnam: You never entered the compound?

Buckler: No. The only people that went in were the Blueboy group and Bull Simons. He searched every room looking for those POWs.

Vietnam: Of course, they had been relocated.

Buckler: Yes, but we didn't know that at the time. Boy, Simons was mad.

Vietnam: When you heard the report of "negative items," meaning no POWs had been found, what was your reaction?

Buckler: I thought my headset was screwed up. I told Captain Turner, and he didn't believe me.

Vietnam: The raid lasted only 27 minutes.

Buckler: That's correct. It wasn't long at all.

Vietnam: Luckily, with the exception of Bull Simons landing in the wrong place, things went pretty much according to plan.

Buckler: They did. However, Sergeant Noe Quezada was shot in the back of the leg. Also, the crew chief aboard Blueboy suffered a broken ankle. Those are some of the risks you take when you're part of special operations. When we were first told where we were going, we all had an opportunity to withdraw from the mission. Nobody did. Our plan of escape, if things did not go right, was to pull back with our backs to the river and take out as many of them as we could. Simons told us: "There's a 50-50 chance of us not coming back, guys. If the mission is compromised, we'll make them pay for every inch of ground we occupy."

Vietnam: You had no prior tour in Vietnam?

Buckler: There were only two of us who had not been in combat before: Sergeant Keith Medenski and I.

Vietnam: What happened when you returned to the United States?

Buckler: They turned it into a media event, trying to get as much publicity out of the raid as they could. In retrospect, it was a good thing to do. It proved that we could get into the enemy's backyard undetected and get out without losing anyone.

Vietnam: How did you deal with the publicity?

Buckler: Well, I tried to keep a low profile. Besides, in Special Forces there were so many guys who had gone on similar missions, it didn't matter. Some years later, after I got out of the service, Ross Perot held a big party in San Francisco, for the Son Tay prisoners and the raiders.

Vietnam: Did you talk to any of the former POWs?

Buckler: Oh, yes. It was very emotional. We were quite upset that we did not succeed in bringing them home. One of the most interesting comments I heard was they started receiving better treatment after the raid. The raid proved to the NVA that we meant business.

Vietnam: At least it wasn't a total loss.

Buckler: Another thing that really impressed me was the dedication the guys on the raid had. I was the youngest person there, so I felt my life was unimportant. But the others had families. They could have gotten off the mission at any time, but they stayed. Those guys were willing to lay down their lives for their comrades. They were true professionals. *

Suggestions for further reading: The Raid, by Benjamin Schemmer (Harper & Row); The Secret Vietnam War: The United States Air Force in Thailand, 1961-1975, by Jeffrey D. Glasser (McFarland & Company); and "Bring our POWs Back Alive," by Dale Andradé, Vietnam Magazine, February 1990.

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COMMANDER JCS JUNT
CONJUNCTION WITH

REPORT ON

THE SON TAY

PRISONER OF WAR

RESCUE OPERATION

PART I

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS

1. This report is classified to protect information revealing operational capabilities of US military forces. Information contained herein will be disseminated only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require access to the report.
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COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

1. This is a report of the salient facts concerning the planning, training, and conduct of the Son Tay Search and Rescue Operation. The operation was extremely complex, and it is believed important to view specific facets in the context of the overall operation; hence, it was necessary to limit the Part I narrative of the facts and comments to consumable proportions. It should be noted, however, that the exceptionally capable staff and forces involved in this operation produced an infinite number of concepts and ideas which were the real fabric of this, for the most part, pioneering endeavor. Some of these ideas emerge in Parts I and II; others are evidenced in the raw data in Part III. However, only those who lived with the operation on a daily basis can fully appreciate the ingenuity, imagination, judgments, and decisions which were fundamental to the success of the operation.

2. I can unequivocally state that, other than the absence of prisoners at the objective, there were no major surprises in the operation. Service and national intelligence agencies' assessments of enemy capabilities and reaction were the basis for the concept of operations and, considering the lack of precedent for this type of operation, were highly accurate. The initial judgment that we could get to the objective safely and probably undetected proved valid. The air and ground diversions worked as expected. Each element of the force had vital tasks to perform, and each performed admirably.

3. The ground force's mission was the important one of conducting the 30-minute mission on the ground at Son Tay. This required extensive training with every facet of the operation exercised more than 170 times. Every conceivable contingency was provided for and exercised. Each man knew precisely what his task was under each contingency and was an expert

in his area - from the demolition specialist to the radio operator. The rapid and smooth transition to an alternate plan at the objective testifies to ability of the force to adapt to varying conditions. Innovations were made in equipment, procedures, and tactics. The capability was developed to enter cell blocks regardless of degree of security or hardness of construction. Night viewing devices were obtained to provide maximum visibility for the road block elements. A night firing optic was obtained from commercial sources which was adapted to the weapons and increased night firing effectiveness threefold. The communications gear and procedures were specially adapted to provide dependable command and control on the ground. Redundancy in communications was considered essential and provided. The extensive joint training with the helicopter and A-1 elements assured a closely knit team which was essential to survival and extremely effective.

4. The task of the air element was infinitely complex. The overall success of the entire operation was dependent on the capability of this element of the force to perform its assigned task. Basically, the task was to transport the assault force to the objective area undetected, protect it while there, then return it - and hopefully a large number of POWs - to a planned recovery base. The total mission time from launch to recovery was approximately five and one-half hours with 30 minutes of holding while the troops were on the ground in North Vietnam. Over one hundred primary mission and support aircraft, operating from seven bases and three aircraft carriers, participated in the operation. While in retrospect it might appear that excessive forces and resources were committed to the operation, it should be noted that we were successful not only in what was done but what could have been done if necessary. Under the conditions that were generated in North Vietnam during the operation, it would have been possible to respond successfully to most

conceivable emergencies. Our training emphasized many alternative courses of action. Indeed, as much effort went into planning and training for emergencies and unforeseen circumstances as was expended in the planned concept. The flying training began on 20 August 1970 and terminated on 8 November 1970. The training involved unorthodox formations of HH-53s, an EH-3, UH-1H, C-130, and A-1s. Innovative tactics and procedures were developed, tested, refined, and employed. New concepts were developed and proved feasible. New methods of ordnance delivery were devised and tested. "Short-cut" procedures were undertaken at my discretion because time did not permit following accepted regulatory procedures. Extremely close supervision was exercised and a completely safe program resulted. The over 1,000 hours of incident-free flying training conducted primarily at night under near combat conditions attests to the highly professional and safety conscious approach of the operations staff and aircrews. The foregoing was made possible only by resting broad latitude and decision authority with the Commander of the JCTG. Such a procedure is considered sound and operationally feasible when the luxury of using select aircrews, troops, and supervisory personnel is provided.

5. The diversionary actions performed by Carrier Task Force 77 were vital to the overall success of the mission. The results of this effort were exactly as foreseen during the planning phase. It caused the enemy defense authorities to split their attention and concern thereby contributing greatly to the confusion and chaos which resulted. In short, it served to deny the enemy the option of concentrating his attention to our true and primary mission. The timing of the Navy diversion was precisely according to plan. The US Navy planning and mission execution was superb in every respect. I am deeply grateful for the wholehearted and enthusiastic support received from the Commander of Carrier Task Force 77.

6. The timely, rapid, dependable, and completely responsive airlift provided to deploy the Task Group from Eglin AFB, Florida, to Southeast

Asia and return under exacting conditions designed to satisfy security requirements contributed greatly to overall success. The support and cooperation from the CONUS major Air Force and Army commands were completely responsive to JCTG requirements. The resources, support, and guidance provided by CINCPAC, both personally and through his subordinate commanders, were indispensable. Reliance was especially heavy on Seventh Air Force resources. Not only were the numerous basic resources provided, but also placed at my disposal were an extensive reserve capability and alert force should they be required.

7. As Commander of the JCTG, I emphasized the importance of a completely joint and unified approach to every facet of this complex operation. In fact, this was viewed as essential and was insisted upon throughout the planning, training, employment, and report preparation, culminating in a unique joint ceremony believed to be without precedent during which the Secretary of Defense presented decorations to members of the JCTG at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 9 December 1970.

8. Specific lessons learned were many but also, to a major extent, perishable. It is unlikely that the environment experienced in North Vietnam on 21 November 1970 will ever be duplicated. Further, it would be unwise to project concepts or tactics precisely tailored to that specific situation into a different environment. In general terms, however, it is believed that the key aspects of the operation were the accurate assessment of enemy capabilities and the imaginative amalgamation of numerous state of the art capabilities into the unique concept employed. Fundamental to this were the command arrangements that allowed the Task Group the freedom to develop optimized concepts for the situation at hand and, once approved by the National Command Authority, vested in COMJCTG go-no-go authority and operational control over all forces with authority

to make all tactical decisions from launch to recovery of the force.

This degree of command prerogative is considered essential for operations of this type.

Leroy J. Manor

LEROY J. MANOR, Brigadier General, USAF
Commander, Joint Contingency Task Group, JCS

FOREWORD

This report is structured in three parts. Part I is a condensed narrative report on the operation from inception to completion. Part II includes expanded reports on various facets of the operation which are considered to be of major significance. Part II is designed to provide more extensive information to those individuals or agencies having intelligence or operational requirements for this detailed information. Part III is a compilation of extensive raw data such as verbatim text of communications recorded during the operation, debriefings, flight plans, charts, and other similar information. Part III exists in only one copy and the voluminous data must be carefully researched and interpreted to be of value. The TABLE OF CONTENTS for Parts II and III is included as Attachment 1.

Part I of this report is organized chronologically insofar as possible. However, there were many instances when numerous actions occurred simultaneously and, because of the large number of elements involved, it was not possible to report all activities concurrently. Therefore, it is suggested that the reader examine and rely on the TABLE OF CONTENTS as a guide in placing portions of this report in the proper context.

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Attachment 1

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PART I

CONDENSED NARRATIVE REPORT

A. SUMMARY. A Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved feasibility study conducted during June and July 1970 concluded that it was possible and proposed a concept to forcibly rescue an estimated 50-60 US prisoners of war (POW) being held in a camp on the outskirts of Son Tay, 23 miles northwest of Hanoi. On 08 August 1970, a Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG) was formed reporting to the JCS to prepare a plan, train the force, and conduct the operation. Planning was completed during the last two weeks of August, and training began on 20 August 1970 at Eglin AFB, Florida. The Army element was billeted at Eglin Auxiliary Field 3 and was composed of 56 primary mission troops with an additional 47 alternate and support personnel. The Air Force element included two C-130E, five HH-53, one HH-3, and five A-1 aircrews drawn from CONUS and overseas units. In addition, two Army UH-1H crews were attached to the air element. Aircraft and maintenance support during the training phase was provided by MAC, TAC, and Army CONUS units. Advance elements of the JCTG deployed to Southeast Asia (SEA) in early November to coordinate theater forces required for the operation. The Task Group closed at Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, on 17 November. On 20 November, after three days of detailed briefings, aircrews and the ground force deployed to other bases in Thailand where theater aircraft had been prepared for the mission. The mission was conducted almost exactly as planned, and no losses of aircraft or personnel were sustained in the objective area. The POWs had been moved from the Son Tay Prison prior to the operation. No POWs were rescued.


B. BACKGROUND. In mid-May 1970, Colonel George J. Hles and Colonel Rudolph C. Koller, both assigned to the 1127th USAF Special Activity Squadron (Headquarters Command), obtained intelligence indicating that US POWs were being held in a camp on the outskirts of the city of Son Tay, 23 miles

northwest of Hanoi. This information was provided to Brigadier General James R. Allen, Director of Plans and Policy, DCS P&O, Headquarters USAF, who commissioned a cursory conceptual study of rescue possibilities and presented the findings to Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA), JCS.

On 5 June 1970, Brigadier General Blackburn briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommended that an in-depth feasibility study be conducted. The JCS approved the study and, on 10 June 1970, SACSA convened a 12-man study group with representation from the Services and DIA. (See Part II, Section A, for listing of personnel participating in the feasibility study.) Colonel Norman H. Frisbie, USAF, chaired the group and, on 10 July 1970, briefed the JCS that a rescue effort was considered feasible and presented an expanded concept of operations. The JCS approved the concept and directed commencement of detailed planning and training. On 8 August, a Joint Contingency Task Group (JCTG) was formed under the JCS with SACSA as the Office of Primary Responsibility. Brigadier General Leroy J. Minor, Commander, USAF Special Operations Force (SOF), Eglin AFB, Florida, was designated Commander and Colonel Arthur D. Simons, USA, J-4, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was assigned as Deputy Commander of the Task Group.

C. INTELLIGENCE:

1. Planning Phase:



provided additional background information primarily obtained from enemy POW interrogations.

c. Both SR-71 and drone (low altitude) resources were programmed to obtain aerial photography of the objective, the surrounding area, and the tentative route. Primary emphasis was initially placed on drone coverage as large scale photography was desired for POW verification and positive identification of enemy order of battle. [

] The drones obtained coverage of the surrounding area and provided a basis for and verification of high altitude photography. The drone effort was terminated on 28 October 1970 [

] d. Photo interpretation of SR-71 and drone missions during the planning stages revealed no major changes to the military installations throughout the objective area. An Early Warning/Ground Control Intercept (EW/GCI) training site was identified approximately 3.3NM south southeast of the objective and an increase in truck/vehicle activity was noted in the area south and west of the objective. This increase was attributed to an apparent increase in driver training activity and an increase in watershed control construction and harvesting operations. No increase or significant redeployment of surface-to-air missiles (SAM), antiaircraft artillery (AAA), or ground or air forces which would adversely affect the operation was identified.

e. Changes in the activity level at the objective area were detected on photographic coverage during this period; however, other intelligence satisfactorily explained these changes. The activity level appeared to decrease as noted through photography of 3 October 1970, and then apparently began to increase on 2 November with the camp appearing

active on 20 November 1970. No indication of automatic weapons (AW), AAA deployment, or increased ground force activity in and around the camp was detected.

f. Extensive photo derived target materials were provided to the planners, ground force units, and aircrews. These consisted of route check/turning point photos, annotated photo mosaics of the target area, objective and bridge models, initial point (IP) to objective mosaics for use by the C-130 forward looking infrared (FLIR) operators, detailed route and objective charts, and detailed briefings. The value of this program was verified during the operation.

2. Theater Coordination: [

coordination accomplished insured immediate flow of data to Tactical Air Control Center-North Sector (TACC-NS) and PACOM Air Defense Analysis Facility [] All for operations and operations recap.

b. Collateral in-country coordination consisted of working with and assisting the intelligence officers and crews of the F-105 WILD WEASEL and F-4 MIG CAP units with mission planning, threat analysis, and evasion and escape which would be used on the mission.

c. A Task Group Photo Interpreter deployed to Yokota AB, Japan, (67th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron) seven days prior to the operation to coordinate and accomplish photo interpretation of SR-71 photo reconnaissance missions flown in support of the operation.

d. Interpretation results, film, and briefing materials from missions flown on 6 and 13 November 1970 were handcarried to Takhli RTAFB on 17 November where aircrews and intelligence personnel were briefed. Current electronic order of battle, air order of battle, and missile order of battle were obtained from Seventh Air Force and transmitted to Takhli RTAFB on 19 November.

3. Deployment/Employment:

a. It was originally planned to have both SR-71 and drone coverage on the day prior to the operation. However an SR-71 "package" was developed for periodic photo coverage between 10 November and 21 November to be interpreted in-theater. This package consisted of three special tracks designed to cover the objective, surrounding area, and the JCTG penetration and egress routes. The first three missions were to be flown on or about specific dates and the last two missions were mandatory regardless of weather, unless changed by COMJCTG. The missions of 20 and 21 November were flown, processed, and interpreted as scheduled, and the processed film was handcarried to Washington, D. C., arriving on 22 November 1970.

b. All photo reconnaissance flown after 5 November 1970 in support of the operation was interpreted in-theater and the results given to the JCTG. The interpretation of the last photo mission was transmitted to COMJCTG (telecon) six hours and the National Military Command Center (NMCC) three hours prior to H-hour.

4. Objective Area Operations:

a. Enemy Ground Reaction:

(1) The level of enemy reaction at the Son Tay POW Camp was as expected. NVN personnel within the POW complex experienced complete tactical surprise and were unable to effectively resist US forces. NVN

personnel outside the walled compound experienced initial surprise then actively engaged the ground force with small arms fire throughout the operation.

(2) The primary external ground threat to the operation appeared to originate from what was previously considered as the Son Tay Secondary School located approximately 400 meters to the south of the objective area. This installation should be reclassified as a "military installation" as numerous armed personnel were encountered at this location. The ground forces noted that these personnel were oriental, larger (5'10"-6') than other NVN personnel in the area, and were not wearing the normal NVA dress but instead, wore T-shirts and fitted dark undershorts. Their nationality was not determined. Personnel, possibly from this installation, subsequently engaged "blocking" elements of the US Ground Force south of the POW Camp.

(3) Another possible reaction was the sighting of four or five small vehicles, possibly jeeps, which were proceeding west toward the POW Camp from the "light industry" complex located approximately 600 meters from the objective area. These vehicles stopped when taken under fire by US personnel. No threat materialized from the military installations located two to four nautical miles south and southwest of the POW Camp or from Son Tay City.

(4) The A-1Es reported no vehicular movement or other indications of reaction from Son Tay City.

b. Enemy Air Defense Reaction:

(1) The initial NVN Air Defense System reaction against the task force was first noted approximately 20 minutes after the first helicopter landed at the landing zone (LZ). Two SAM missiles were launched at the F-105 WILD WEASEL aircraft with the first missile damaging Firebird

03. Approximately 16 SAMs were launched against the USAF aircraft in the western area. None of the missiles detonated further west than the "Finger Lake" nor below 4,000 to 5,000 feet in the target area. However, two were seen to detonate at an estimated 30,000-40,000 feet.

(2) No anti-aircraft or significant ground-to-air automatic weapons fire was noted in the objective area.

(3) Crew members reported two suspected MIG aircraft sightings in the objective area and one during egress. Time correlation with friendly aircraft disposition indicates these were probably Task Group aircraft.

5. Post Operations Analysis:

a. Objective:

(1) Assault Group personnel identified two of the five major buildings within the prison compound as cell blocks. One of the other buildings was an open bay, possible group confinement area, and the other two buildings (built in late 1969) had probably never been used, and their function was unknown.

(2) The two cell blocks contained a total of 10 cells, each secured by a steel door with a peephole. Two of the cells were for either solitary confinement or two people, while the remainder appeared capable of holding a greater number of prisoners. Some were being utilized as living quarters and others for storage. No shackles, posts, or anchors for restraining devices were noted in any of the cells or buildings.

(3) Garden plots had been started in the main courtyard and north addition. This could account for the apparent increase in activity noted on 2 November photography. The overall appearance of the prison compound - as evidenced by hanging shutters, unused latrines, litter,

stench, livestock, and deteriorating buildings - gave the appearance of having limited use for a considerable period of time. It is apparent that the facility had been a prison; however, at the time of assault, it was either being repaired for reoccupancy or was merely in caretaker status.

b. Enemy Ground Reaction. Post operation analysis did not reveal additional enemy ground force reactions. The lack of resistance within the walled compound is attributed to the shock caused by the initial assault. The personnel engaged in the support area of the camp complex were definitely NVA military personnel as evidenced by clothing and weapons. Ground force personnel were unable to determine the nationality of the hostile troops encountered at the military installation located south of the Son Tay POW Camp. (See Part II, Section C, Special Intelligence, for additional details.)

c. Enemy Air Defense Reaction:

(1) It appears that, due to the tactics and maneuvers of the F-105 WILD WEASEL aircraft and the possible limited detection of the Strike Force (A-1E or C-130E aircraft) by missile radars after reaching the objective, there was considerable confusion within the NVN Air Defense System. This could have contributed to the slow reaction of the system, indiscriminate firing of SAMs, ineffective AAA fire, and lack of airborne MIG aircraft. The Navy diversionary tactics achieved the degree of confusion desired. (See Part II, Section C, Special Intelligence, for additional details.)

(2) Based on SAM sightings, it appeared that most of the missiles were launched against the F-105 and F-4D aircraft. After-action reports indicate two F-105 aircraft were damaged by SAMs, with one landing safely at Udon RTAFB and the crew of the other aircraft ejecting over northeast Laos. C-130E Electronic Warfare Officers (EWOs) reported they

received periodic emissions from EW/GCI and SAM missile radars. There is no confirmation that the Task-Group was tracked during ingress and objective area operations.

(3) Post operation analysis reports do not confirm suspected MIG "sightings." (See Part II, Section C, Special Intelligence, for further details.)

d. Photo Intelligence:

(1) The objective and objective area were covered on large scale and small scale SR-71 photography from two flights on 21 November 1970. The coverage taken during late morning showed considerable activity at both the Son Tay POW Camp and the military installation located approximately 400 meters to the south.

(2) The aft section, two main rotor blades, and burned out wreckage of the HH-3 were visible within the POW compound. Several of the buildings showed roof damage and one guard building was burned out. Numerous personnel and several 3/4 ton vehicles were noted on the north/south road east of the objective on both flights. Several personnel and a 3/4 ton vehicle were at the transformer station which had been damaged by the US ground force. Many personnel were noted in and around the military installation south of the camp, with a group of about 15-20 at the initial landing site of HH-53 #1.

(3) Outside of the immediate objective area, activity appeared normal. No evidence of high interest levels could be detected at the HH-53 helicopter holding areas. A class was being conducted by one of the SAM launchers (missile loaded) at the SAM training facility 2.7NM south of the objective. Confirmation or negation of Shrike damage to the struck SAM sites could not be determined.

D. PLANNING. The feasibility study group formed the cadre for the expanded planning staff. Additional personnel were provided by the Services and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA) participation was also obtained. The planning staff, numbering 25, with part-time augmentation personnel, convened in the Pentagon during the week of 10-14 August 1970 and was organized along traditional Joint Staff lines. With the expanded concept of operations developed in the feasibility study as a basis, outlines for both Training and Operations Plans were developed, and schedules for planning and training were established. It was intended that the staff complete the Training Plan before the Operations Plan so that arrangements could be made and facilities readied to begin training on 1 September. However, a draft of the Operations Plan was requested by 28 August 1970, and both Training and Operations Plans were produced simultaneously. The Training Plan was completed on 20 August 1970, and the Operations Plan was reviewed by the Services and published on 28 August 1970.

1. Personnel. Concurrent with planning, the Army and Air Force elements identified sources of personnel and initiated recruitment/selection programs. The Army screened more than 300 volunteers from the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in selecting their 103-man operations and support force. Two key Army officers were name requested from the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. Air Force aircrew personnel were selected from numerous sources, with the final determination on all individuals being made by the Commander JCTIG. Four helicopter aircraft commanders were obtained from the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Training Center (ARRTC), Eglin AFB, Florida, one from TAC's Shaw AFB, and one from SEA. Helicopter copilots were drawn from SEA units and ARRTC. The SEA personnel provided the needed current in-theater expertise. Likewise, five A-1 aircraft commanders were drawn from 1st Special Operations Wing, Eglin AF Auxiliary Field 9, Florida, and five

pilots were obtained from the 56th Special Operations Wing, Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand. One C-130E aircrew was obtained from Detachment 2, 1st Special Operations Wing, Pope AFB, North Carolina. The second C-130E aircrew was drawn from the 7th Special Operations Squadron, Ramstein AB, Germany. One HC-130P (tanker) aircraft commander from ARRTC trained with the force and provided night refueling expertise to the theater HC-130P aircrews. Two UH-1H Army aircrews were provided by the JFK Center.

2. Aircraft. The aircraft used and their sources can best be discussed in terms of training and operational phases. The HH-3 and HH-53 helicopters and the HC-130P tankers used in training were provided by the ARRTC at Eglin AFB. Helicopter and tanker resources used during employment were provided by SEA rescue units. The 1st Special Operations Wing at Eglin AF Auxiliary Field 9 provided A-1E aircraft during training while resources of the 56th Special Operations Wing at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB were used during the actual mission. One unconventional warfare configured C-130E (COMBAT TALON) aircraft was provided by Detachment 2, 1st Special Operations Wing, Pope AFB. The second C-130E was a PACAF aircraft which was withheld from returning to the theater after completion of a modification program. These two C-130s were used throughout training, deployed to Takhli RTAFB for the mission and redeployed to the CONUS upon completion. In addition, one airlift C-130E aircraft was provided by TAC to allow formation training to begin on schedule while the two COMBAT TALON aircraft were being modified with special mission equipment. In keeping with the original concept of using a UH-1H as the assault helicopter, two UH-1Hs were obtained from the JFK Center. These aircraft were used throughout training, and one was deployed with the JCTG and used as a backup for the HH-3.

3. Training Site. Eglin AFB, Florida, was selected as the training site because it provided an isolated training area, adequate troop facilities, and was the home base for HH-3 and HH-53 helicopters and HC-130P tankers.

Additionally, A-1 strike aircraft required for training were conveniently located at the adjacent Auxiliary Field 9 (Hurlburt Field). While range scheduling and other minor problems were troublesome, the range and troop facilities at Eglin were excellent and the ready availability of aircraft was a key factor in the on schedule completion of the extensive training program.

4. Logistics. During the planning phase, the JCS directed that each Service fund and provide Service-related support. The support provided by Service staffs was excellent. CONARC and other Army commands were issued verbal instructions by the Army staff to support the JCTG and responded fully to all requests. Chief of Staff, Air Force, provided COMJCTG with a personal letter to major commanders, directing full support on a "no questions asked" basis. This letter was handcarried by COMJCTG to the Commanders of MAC, TAC, and AFSC who provided the majority of Air Force support during training and deployment phases. Specific requests for support were then submitted verbally and these commands responded fully and rapidly to all requests. Individual requests for support from Navy units were submitted through OPNAV and were expeditiously satisfied.

5. Signal. Communications-electronics joint planning was conducted concurrently in three major areas of command interest: Task Group Communications, COMJCTG Command and Control Communications, and Command Authority Communications. Initial planning concepts established three basic principles which were applied on a joint basis in each major area of interest: maximum use would be made of existing communications capabilities, facilities, and standard service equipment; communications requirement and capability at each level of command would be identified and integrated into one flexible, responsive system from national level to ground force component level; and the ground force command communications system in the objective area would be critical to the success of the mission. Accordingly,

planning would be based on the key limitations imposed by ground force equipment capability to include frequency availability and compatibility.

a. Joint Contingency Task Group. The Task Group Communications Plan was developed in Annex K COMJCTG OPLAN, based on the ground force concept of operations in the objective area and the air element's operational procedures. The communications plan was coordinated with other JCTG planning elements and DOD staff elements to ensure feasibility, compatibility, and availability of US Army and US Air Force communications electronics equipment. The communications plan established the primary means of communications as radio telephone with audio (bulhorns) and visual (flares) as backup. The ground forces were to establish internal radio nets utilizing standard lightweight manpack, squad, and air ground radios. Air elements were to be integrated into the ground force communication system by guarding the ground force command net (FM) and entering the air ground net (UHF) utilizing standard aircraft radios. Individual survival radios were to be procured through US Air Force channels and issued to each individual in the ground force for coordination of search and rescue operations. Alternate ground force plans, when developed, required minimum change in the basic communications plan.

b. COMJCTG Command and Control Communications. The plan was based on the Seventh Air Force Operations Order for out-of-country operations. It identified existing in-theater secure/non-secure telephone and teletype circuits as the primary means of communications between the elements of the Command and Control System. To maintain security during the planning phase, it was directed that minimum use be made of telephonic and electronic message transmission means. Operational code words were obtained for use during the employment phase of the operation. The plan did not include frequency assignments. These were to be obtained from in-country personnel.

c. Command Authority Communications. The Fast Reaction Procedures for Controlling Forces Worldwide (NMCC Operating Procedures 9-18) provided for communications using "RED ROCKET" messages between the NMCC, CINCPAC,

and COMJCTG as the method to be used for transmission of mission approval from the National Command Authorities. In addition, the plan required secure record and secure and non-secure voice communications between the NMCC, CINCPAC, TACC-NS, Takhli RTAFB, and Korat RTAFB.

6. Medical. Screening of medical records was accomplished during the interview and selection of US Army personnel. A typical POW profile was prepared pointing out the various patient-type medical situations that could be anticipated. Several items of clothing and equipment were specially designed for POWs for recovery medical care and evasion and escape during egress.

7. Security:

a. The Security Staff Section was organized on 11 August 1970 and charged with the responsibility of establishing and maintaining the security and counterintelligence posture of the project. The first actions of the section established the security of the planning group. Work areas were surveyed, visitor control established, room and area checking procedures instituted to insure that classified material was stored properly, written instructions published outlining personal responsibilities regarding control and handling of classified material, and all outgoing messages were channeled through the section for review prior to release.

b. The next effort was directed toward planning the security aspects of the operation. The Cover and Deception Annex was developed and provided cover stories for the training and deployment phases, and the Counterintelligence Annex tasked organizations to provide specialized assistance in collecting information concerning possible organized threats to the mission. The detailed advance planning for the security of the Eglin training complex began immediately after the training site was chosen. A counterintelligence survey of the site was conducted. Technical security surveys of key buildings were made, and movement control and access procedures were established where necessary.

E. TRAINING:

1. Organization:

a. The total training effort for the JCTG was organized to support the concept that all training would be centrally accomplished prior to departure from the CONUS. As noted previously, the driving factor in the selection of Eglin Air Force Base as the training site was availability of needed resources. This same factor dictated that air operations be conducted from Eglin Main and Hurlburt Field; security and proximity to the primary range (C-2) dictated that ground forces operate from Eglin AF Auxiliary Field 3. (See Part II, Section E.)

b. Planning, direction, and control of all air activities were conducted by a full-time operations and planning staff of two officers and two noncommissioned officers. Augmentation was provided on an as-required basis from aircrew resources. Liaison with base support agencies was effected initially through a SOF Liaison Officer as planned. Once contacts were established, the JCTG operations staff coordinated directly with all base support functions. This approach facilitated coordination and enhanced security.

c. Planning, direction, and control of ground force activities were conducted by a full-time staff of six officers and three enlisted personnel operating from Field 3. This operations and planning staff, responsive to the ground forces commander, concerned itself with operations activities exclusively while an element of 42 personnel provided necessary support. Coordination with base support facilities was accomplished through the air operations staff.

d. As training progressed from individual service to joint activities, the air and ground operations planning staffs assumed the joint planning function. Regularly scheduled joint meetings were used as a vehicle to effect necessary coordination of all joint activities.

2. Facilities:

a. Preliminary facility requirements were identified to the support base by an advance survey team composed of Army and Air Force personnel. Because of the extremely limited time available, this team was not able to accurately and thoroughly establish requirements and insure that all needed facilities were made available. Consequently, the operations staff, upon arrival, found itself deeply involved in arranging facilities before it could begin its function.

b. Air Force facilities were limited to those used at Eglin Main. The maintenance area was excellent with aircraft parking allocated in close proximity to the maintenance office. Office space provided for both the operations and maintenance functions was adequate. Normal base facilities such as billeting, messing, and services proved satisfactory.

c. Army facilities were limited to those on Field 3. These included a secure building used as a Tactical Operations Center, barracks for use by Task Group personnel, supply buildings, and storage buildings. Additionally, normal base facilities such as messing, laundry, exchange, Noncommissioned Officers Club, and theater were available for use. (See Part II, Section E.)

d. Of particular significance was the total dedication of Range C-2 to this operation. This range, in close proximity to Field 3, provided an excellent training area quickly reached and easily secured.

3. Logistics:

a. Identification of logistics requirements during the early planning stages were minimal because of the lack of time for detailed planning. Requirements generated during the training phase were satisfied by a combination of joint and Service actions. Although these logistics

actions occurred during the training phase, the majority of the requirements identified were to support the actual operation. Since there was no JCTG logistics staff officer available at the training site, the air operations staff assumed responsibility for this non-operational activity.

b. Logistics support provided by Eglin AFB was generally adequate. In the area of aircraft spares, several items not available through Base Supply were obtained through lateral support. Special support needed to maintain the peculiar equipment aboard the COMBAT TALON C-130E aircraft was provided by the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC). This support, along with special attention given by AFLC to the HH-53 spare parts situation, greatly facilitated air operations throughout the training phase. Support for the UH-1H helicopters was provided on a timely basis by Fort Rucker and Fort Bragg.

4. Ground Forces Training:

a. Individual and Unit Training. Individual and unit training was accomplished throughout the training period in accordance with the outlines contained in Part III, Section E. Joint training was the major theme of Phases III and IV. (See Part II, Section E.)

b. Tactics and Techniques. The special tactics and techniques employed during the training period and the operation were the employment of the helicopter as a gun platform, techniques for POW cell search, specially adapted hand and arm signals, and the bridge demolition plan. (See Part II, Section E.)

c. Special Equipment Development. The nature of the mission, that of forcibly removing the POWs from the compound cells, led to the examination and selection of many special items of equipment. This equipment, plus other non-standard US Army equipment, is itemized and uses explained in detail in Part II, Section E.

5. Air Force Training. The training phase of this operation was accomplished basically in accordance with the published JCIG Training Plan. Minor adjustments were made to compensate for changes dictated by experience as the training progressed. Unilateral Air Force training (including Army UH-1H operations) can best be treated in terms of special equipment development, tactics and techniques, individual and crew training, and formation training.

a. Special Equipment Development. The early phases of training included a concerted effort to develop special equipment either designed or adapted to the particular needs of this mission. These separate programs constituted an additional workload on both operations staff and aircrew personnel and further complicated an already complex flying schedule.

(1) Two types of night viewing devices were obtained and tested. These were lightweight starlight scopes and electronic binoculars. Training required for aircrews in the use of these devices was minimal. Both the scopes and binoculars were tested by C-130E crews as an aid to visual navigation but proved to be of little benefit due to the cockpit lighting. Ultimately, HH-53 crew members used the binoculars to better determine landing clearances and the starlight scopes to survey the surrounding countryside while on the ground in their holding areas.

(2) The QRC-128 VHF jammer was installed for testing on an A-1H aircraft. Test missions were flown over the Gulf of Mexico to verify the effectiveness of this system against CCI voice commands. After some minor interface problems, the systems were certified to be effective for this mission. Three QRC-128 jammer kits were prepared for installation in theater A-1 aircraft. This tactic insured that one jammer would be in the immediate objective area at all times. (See Part III, Section O, for detailed test report.)

(3) The FL-2B forward looking infrared (FLIR) systems were installed on the two COMBAT TALON C-130Es by Lockheed Air Service. Two technical representatives of the Texas Instruments Company were provided to maintain the systems. Early in the training phase, it was determined that the FLIR system would require the full-time attention of one navigator; therefore, one additional navigator was added to each crew. The FLIR proved to be reliable and a highly valuable aid in identifying check points enroute and pinpointing the objective. (See Part III, Section O, for additional information.)

(4) The AN/APQ-115 Radar GAR/I (Ground-to-Air Responder/ Interrogator) with the Motorola Radar Transponder SST-124 KU/XA was employed by the Assault Force C-130E []

[]
(5) The MK-20, MOD II, rocket dispensers were tested on A-1H aircraft. These were intended to provide a road denial/anti-vehicle weapon that could be delivered from [] [] During the tests, which were conducted in the Eglin Range Complex, all rocketeers impacted on or within [] [] No problems were noted during the testing. Prior to deployment, a munitions loading checklist was developed for use with these munitions.

(6) C-130E Ordnance Delivery. Special procedures were developed for dropping illumination flares, firefight simulators, BIJ-27/B napalm fire bombs, and MK-6 log flares. Numerous test drops were made on land and water ranges from 1,500 feet above ground level to test dispersal patterns and timing sequences. Flares and firefight simulators were hand launched through the paratroop doors and log flares over the ramp. The

BLU-27/B fire bombs which were modified to function as visual markers required special rigging and palletizing for delivery from C-130 aircraft. The crew loadmasters, flight engineers, and one pilot safety officer received special training in their fusing, arming, and safe handling. These development and test programs included the preparation of all necessary checklists for handling, loading, and delivering these varied munitions. (See Part III, Section O, for detailed test report.)

b. Tactics and Techniques:

(1) The tactics envisaged in original mission planning called for two separate formations each comprised of a lead C-130E, helicopters, and A-1Es. As training and mission planning progressed, a change in tactics was dictated by the wide variance in aircraft low speed capability. Consequently, a tactical concept of two formations, each with a lead C-130E but with either helicopters or A-1Es, was developed which would provide better formation integrity and ease of maneuver.

(2) The low altitude profile intended to reduce likelihood of radar detection proved feasible during training. It was determined that the excessively nose high attitude resulting from the extremely low airspeed (105 knots indicated airspeed) degraded the C-130E terrain avoidance radar capability. Although the degradation was significant, it did not create a dangerous situation.

(3) Electronics countermeasures (ECM) tactics were revised when testing in the Eglin area showed that the COMBAT TALON lead C-130E ECM equipment could afford a degree of protection to its formation.

(4) During the early phases of training, intelligence data militated toward use of the UH-1H for the compound landing. The most cogent factor dictating against the UH-1H was its limited range which required

staging from a forward base in northern Laos. In an effort to eliminate the staging requirement, auxiliary fuel tanks were obtained, installed, tested, and proved feasible. With this quantum improvement in range, the UH-1H appeared to be the leading candidate as the assault vehicle. However, almost simultaneously, refined photo interpretation data confirmed the feasibility of using an HH-3 for the compound landing. This information, coupled with its increased troop carrying capacity, twin engine reliability, greater firepower, and aerial refueling capability making a last minute abort possible, dictated that the HH-3 be used in lieu of the UH-1H. In order to insure maximum flexibility and redundancy, the UH-1H crews continued to train as backup for the HH-3.

(5) Since the major enemy threat to a successful helicopter landing within the compound was the guard towers at either end of the walled area, the tactic of using an HH-53 as a gunship was conceived. This tactic was designed to augment the firepower of the HH-3 and was incorporated into the mission profile.

c. Individual and crew training. Specialized aircrew training began immediately upon arrival at the training base. Training required to master the unorthodox procedures and maneuvers was minimal because of the extremely high experience and proficiency levels of all crew members selected for this mission. Special training in munitions handling and rigging for C-130E aircrews, special night air-to-ground gunnery training for select HH-53 gunners, and formation training for the Army UH-1H crews constituted most of the unique individual aircrew training accomplished.

d. Formation Training. Formation training consisted of developing new procedures and techniques to formate the various types of aircraft involved. Both the HH-3 and UH-1H were required to operate beyond their normal envelope. To cope with the excessive density altitude and gross weight combination, they flew in a drafting position immediately behind

the left wing tip of the lead C-130E and HC-130P. All formation flying was done at night with minimum aircraft lighting and almost total radio silence. Additionally, procedures were developed and perfected for loss of visual contact, weather penetration, and hostile environment contingencies. Training for C-130E and A-1E formations was minimal since their airspeeds were more compatible.

6. Joint Training. As air and ground elements of the force achieved the desired level of proficiency in accomplishing their individual tasks, integration of the air and ground forces was started. The building block concept of insuring that each facet of the operation was mastered before moving on to the next element of the problem was the underlying philosophy throughout training. Joint training began by insertion of individual ground elements into the objective area on Range C-2. These insertions were conducted during daylight and at a "walk through" pace. As proficiency increased, the pace was stepped up until real-time movement was achieved. Simultaneously, training progressed from dry to live fire in the target area and the insertion of all ground elements in real-time sequence. As aircrews and ground troops mastered the coordinated heliborne assault phase, the A-1E element was introduced and air-to-ground ordnance delivery started. As each phase of training was mastered during daylight, training in that phase was then shifted to periods of darkness. Following the integration of all aspects of the objective area operation, partial and, finally, full scale real-time mission profiles were introduced. The force was declared ready to accomplish the assigned mission following the full profile mission on 6 October 1970.

7. Signal. Joint communications training was conducted concurrently with joint operational training. The primary means of coordination and direction of this joint training was through preparation and publication of Ground Force Signal Operating Instructions (SOI) based on Annex K, Communications Electronics JCRC OPLAN. The SOI was modified in each

successive training phase to reflect new operational requirements and procedures which had been identified in previous training as best supporting effective mission execution. Assault force communications training was conducted in four phases:

a. Phase I training emphasis was placed on classroom instruction in operation and maintenance of communications equipment, radio telephone procedures, and net discipline. Reduced distance radio nets were established to insure that every member of the ground force could set up and operate each type radio to be used. Two problem areas resolved were frequency assignment and logistics support for radios.

b. Joint communications training during Phase II moved out of the classroom into actual communications support of joint operational training at realistic distances under specific conditions.

c. Joint communications training during Phase III was concentrated on placing a realistic traffic load on the assault force communications system during full mission profile training. A continuing evaluation was made of the communications system to determine its responsiveness and effectiveness in meeting actual operational requirements. Problem areas identified and resolved during Phase III training were command emphasis on radio net discipline and procedures, visual signals, an additional forward air guide radio net, and utilization of new mission radio equipment during full mission profile training.

d. Joint communications training during Phase IV was directed toward detailed refinement of the assault force communications system to support not only the basic plan but also four alternate plans. Adjustments continued to be made in net structure, equipment distribution, and configuration in relation to assault force mission requirements. Problem areas identified and resolved during Phase IV training were net structure and reporting procedures for COMARCOM to COMJCTG, establishment of an additional

ground force emergency radio net, preparation of detailed communication requirements lists for final equipment checks, and development of internal ground force code words for inclusion in Ground Force SOI. The principal objective and value of Phase IV training was in accomplishing final refinements to the basic communications plan and rehearsing the communications adjustments required in execution of the four alternate plans. The actual ground force mission SOI was prepared directly from the Phase IV Ground Force SOI and, after in-theater coordination, was implemented with minimum change. The value of one document such as a Ground Force SOI or a communications flimsy to guide and direct joint communications training was repeatedly demonstrated and is considered essential to successful joint communications training.

8. Medical:

a. Instruction. Medical lectures during training covered preventive medicine in the field, first aid, and medical psychology. Among specific areas covered were personal hygiene, jungle survival, administration of intravenous fluids, care of wounds, and malnutrition.

b. Preventive Medicine:

(1) Operational Personnel. All personnel were weighed and blood pressure and pulse recorded in the early part of training. Men were again examined during the last week of training. Smaller, lean individuals gained one to two pounds, which was attributed to muscle mass. All overweight individuals lost weight, with the average weight loss being approximately one-half pound. All pertinent immunizations, including the October influenza injection, were administered. Each man who was not a stable reactor, or who did not have a recent Tine or PPD Test for tuberculosis was tested. All individuals were instructed on malnutrition and the effects of stress on individuals who had been internees for a long period of time.

(2) POBs. Ear plugs were prepositioned on each rescue helicopter and the paramedics were instructed to insert them into the ears of

the POWs as soon as possible after egress. Appropriate clothing was also prepositioned on the rescue helicopters and at the staging hospital. Delousing and laboratory testing was to be accomplished at the recovery hospital at Udorn RTAFB.

9. Security. The actual start of training signaled the most critical phase in the security posture of the project. Large numbers of military, both Army and Air Force, began gathering in various locations in the Eglin AFB complex, and the support required, in terms of housing, work areas, and administrative support, had to be justified with a creditable cover story. Early warning measures to detect the possibilities of disclosures of espionage activities were initiated and continual monitoring of personnel, both during and after duty hours, provided a constant reminder to project personnel that security was paramount. Extensive cover and deception measures were taken in the construction of the mockup of the target POW Camp at the field training site. Project radio and telephone communications were continually monitored and analyzed by members of the USAF Security Service to provide warning of possible compromise.

F. MISSION APPROVAL. At the time the JCTG was formed on 8 August 1970, JCS approved only detailed planning and training. COMJCTG was instructed to report to JCS when, in his opinion, the concept was tested, proven feasible, and training was nearing completion. The JCS would then decide at that point whether to seek higher authority approval for the deployment. On 16 September 1970, COMJCTG reported to JCS that the concept had been proven feasible and that the Task Group would be trained and ready to deploy on 10 October 1970. COMJCTG recommended that in-theater coordination and deployment be accomplished so that the operation could be conducted during the 20-25 October window. The JCS concurred and, on 24 September 1970, COMJCTG briefed the Secretary of Defense recommending approval for October. The Secretary deferred approval pending coordination with higher authority but approved briefing CINCPAC. COMJCTG briefed CINCPAC in Washington on 25 September 1970. CINCPAC offered full support and indorsed COMJCTG as having full authority and command of the operation. At the request

of the Secretary of Defense, COMJCTG briefed the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on 8 October 1970, and it was determined that the operation should be delayed until November. On 27 October 1970, Chairman, JCS, approved the deployment of the in-theater coordination staff starting on 1 November and deployment of the Task Group commencing 10 November. Final approval for the operation was transmitted from JCS to COMJCTG via RED ROCKET message on 18 November 1970.

G. THEATER COORDINATION:

1. Headquarters Briefings. During the period 2-7 November 1970, detailed briefings on the operation were presented to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, Commander Seventh Air Force, and Commander Carrier Task Force 77 by the Commander and Deputy Commander, Joint Contingency Task Group. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were represented at these briefings by the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities. The briefings included all aspects of the proposed operation and generally were presented only to Commanders, Deputy Commanders, and Chiefs of Staff.
2. Facilities and Force Generation. Theater facilities and force generation was accomplished exactly as planned. Starting on 5 November 1970, JCTG staff officers visited each wing, squadron, or facility commander supporting the operation and delivered letters of instruction containing the information necessary for the commanders to perform their assigned functions. Senior officers at Seventh Air Force established the bona fides of the JCTG staff officers prior to their visits and all commanders enthusiastically provided requested support. To attract as little interest as possible, the JCTG staff elected to rely on scheduled and space available airlift to conduct the visits. This proved to be very time consuming and only numerous fortuitous connections made possible the completion of coordination on schedule. It is considered that dedicated airlift for this purpose would have obviated many of the problems encountered and allowed individuals more time to accomplish their tasks. As planned, electrical

communications were held to an absolute minimum and only a very few messages in a limited access privacy channel were required to follow up the personal coordination visits. One major deviation from the published plan was the decision by the COMJCTG to add an F-105 WILD WEASEL force for SAM suppression. Although the inclusion of this capability had been discussed during planning, the decision to employ F-105s was made during in-theater coordination. The decision proved to be well-founded. It appears that the NVN SAM sites concentrated almost exclusively on the F-105s rather than the primary mission force.

3. Logistics. Logistics requirements were predominantly Air Force oriented since the ground force was able to deploy all but its housekeeping support. Again, theater commanders provided logistics support to the extent identified in the operational plan. Difficulties were encountered at the staging base because of the base closure program. However, all needed support was eventually produced and proved adequate. Supply support was provided from the JCTG organic spares kit which proved adequate in all respects.

4. Signal:

a. General. All coordination was conducted with the in-country Tactical Air Control System organizations using the cover that additional communications were required to test and evaluate the integration of automated COLLEGE EYE (EC-121T) air surveillance inputs into the existing automated Tactical Air Control Center-North Sector.

b. COMJCTG Command and Control Communications. Additional UHF and HF/SSB frequencies were obtained from MACV through the 1964th Communications Group. The TACC-NS, alternate TACC-NS, COLLEGE EYE, and radio-relay aircraft were requested to activate and operate spare equipment for all assigned task force communications nets. Since the Southeast Asia

COLLEGE EYE Task Force had returned to the CONUS in July 1970, the returning aircraft had to conduct several digital data link tests involving the radio-relay aircraft and the TACC-NS prior to the operational mission.

c. Command Authority Communications. The NMCC tasked the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) to terminate two dedicated voice circuits at TACC-NS and a teletype circuit at Takhli RTAFB. All requested communication links between NMCC, CINCPAC, and COMJCTG were operational 24 hours prior to their required use. Periodic tests were made to insure their immediate availability. The SEA DCA Detachment and 1964th Communications Group personnel installed the requested equipments and were continuously available in the event of a circuit failure.

5. Medical. The repositioning of medical evacuation aircraft was coordinated by COMJCTG. Two C-141 medical evacuation aircraft were repositioned at Clark Air Base, Philippines. Upon request of COMJCTG, these two aircraft arrived at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand, shortly after the Task Group aircraft recovered. The JCTG Surgeon arranged for the base hospital at Udorn RTAFB to provide medical personnel and equipment necessary to activate and operate a Casualty Staging Unit.

6. Weather. Protecting the security of the operation imposed some special problems during in-theater coordination. Much of the decision base for the final launch hinged upon timely classified weather data. It was imperative that this data be available to COMJCTG and his staff. Air Weather Service, through Military Airlift Command, imposes its own set of restrictions and release authority for access to its classified data which generates a problem for coordinating close hold, low visibility missions. Initial access to classified weather data was denied by the 1st Weather Group Commander, acting within his AWS guidance

and authority. The project staff weather officer determined neither time nor security permitted Military Airlift Command and Air Weather Service approval. The problem of access was solved by a personal message from the Director of Operations, Headquarters USAF, to the Vice Commander, Seventh Air Force. There were no communications at Takhli RTAFB to handle classified weather data nor a secure voice circuit for necessary discussion. To accommodate this problem, a special unclassified code was developed for unclassified communication, a less than desirable, but acceptable, substitute for the full data. Through the 1st Weather Group, Seventh Air Force provided excellent support. The Southeast Asia Weather Center focused its efforts on project support and began issuing special forecasts on 17 November with hourly amendments through the night for specific locations. The 1st Weather Group, at COMJCTG request, provided two NCO forecasters and an NCO observer - all possessing expert area knowledge, a necessity for the mission. Some local interest was raised by requests to reinstall a weather facsimile at Takhli RTAFB and to provide map plots previously discontinued in the phasedown. Curiosity was satisfied by a cover story.

7. Security. A counterintelligence warning system was established to alert the JCTG Security Staff Section if MACTHAI/JUSMAG, CAS Bangkok, and/or OSI in Thailand received indications of a possible hostile threat to the bases in Thailand. Secure facilities at Takhli RTAFB were obtained to billet and brief operational personnel.

H. DEPLOYMENT:

1. Planning. During the planning phase of JCTG activities in August, airlift of the force was addressed. Conversations of an exploratory nature were held with action officers from the Directorate of Transportation, Headquarters USAF. As training progressed and briefings conducted which gave confidence in mission execution, the airlift problem was again addressed. Two avenues were pursued: identification of accurate requirements and investigation of the best means of satisfying these requirements.

2. Identification of Requirements. COMJCTG contacted Commander MAC for assistance in load planning. A standardization loadmaster from Dover AFB, Delaware, was sent to Eglin AFB to assist the JCTG staff in firming mission airlift requirements. After surveying both Air Force and Army mobility requirements, he produced load plans for four C-141 loads which took into account time-phased arrival and departure requirements as well as cargo constraints in weight, cube, and compatibility. (See Part III, Section H, for original load lists.)

3. Airlift Coordination. In mid-October COMJCTG coordinated specific airlift arrangements. He visited Headquarters MAC and discussed the problem with the Commander, who expected no difficulty with the JCTG requirement including the rigid security constraints which would be necessary. He asked that the special airlift mission requirements be requested from Headquarters USAF as this would create less question within his staff, although he was willing to satisfy the requirement on his own authority. Accordingly, a message directing MAC to proceed was dispatched by the Directorate of Operations, Airlift Division. The message was coordinated with the JCTG and Directors of Budget and Transportation before release. On 4 November 1970, a JCTG action officer traveled to MAC to complete final detailed arrangements. Working from the latest update of load lists and security guidance of the JCTG staff, deployment plans were completed. The aeromedical evacuation requirement was fully defined and procedures for deployment were established.

4. Execution. In addition to the MAC airlift programmed, the two mission C-130s transported maintenance personnel and equipment. These aircraft departed Eglin AFB on 10 November and closed on schedule at Takhli RTAFB on 14 November 1970. MAC C-141s were scheduled for departure on 10 and 12 November with two scheduled on 16 November. Aircraft arrived as planned for departure during hours of darkness. Loads were prepositioned on the ramp and loading completed substantially on schedule. Minor departure delays occasioned by loading and maintenance difficulties were made up enroute.

5. Security. In the period immediately preceding and during deployment, the Security Staff Section increased its security and counterintelligence measures and psychological operations. Cover stories were developed and disseminated to prevent espionage or sabotage from interfering with the movement of the force, to insure the element of surprise, and to deny information regarding the movement. The section conducted surveys and inspections, recommended measures for maximum secrecy, and provided instructions to unit personnel concerning movement security. The section monitored the move to prevent, report, and investigate possible security violations and other security threats and to initiate corrective actions. Technical security surveys were conducted at Takhli RTAFB and Udon RTAFB and secure working areas were established and maintained. Counterintelligence inspections were conducted to insure that all personnel practiced the highest degree of safeguarding classified information and material.

I. EMPLOYMENT:

1. D-3 to H-7:

a. US Army. This period covers the actions of the ground force at the staging base (Takhli). (See schedule in Part II, Section I.)

(1) Following an uneventful but long and tiring flight, the ground force arrived at Takhli under cover of darkness as planned. Movement to billets was by closed van. Billets were occupied as assigned by the advanced party. A meal was fed to those who wished it. The remainder of that morning was spent resting and recovering from the flight. As part of the security cover, no insignia of rank nor US Army identification was worn and no outside formations were held.

(2) Preparation and Unit Activity:

(a) At 1400 hours, the US Army and US Air Force operational and support personnel were assembled in the base theater for a joint operational briefing. The air plan was covered by General Manor and the ground plan by Colonel Simons. Upon adjournment of the briefing, the platoon leaders, support personnel, and Army staff members were briefed on the schedule of events for the next three days.

(b) For security reasons, the exact geographical location and the name of the prison camp were withheld from members of the ground force who had not participated in planning. This precaution was intended to suppress leaks of highly sensitive information that might jeopardize the mission or a future mission should the current one be aborted. Further, it was felt that the members had sufficient information to fulfill their mission assignments. These strict security measures were slightly relaxed on 18 November as a copy of the OPLAN was passed among the platoon leaders for their personal perusal. On 18 November, a question period was held with platoon leaders concerning the order of scheduled activities and OPLAN content. During this period, platoons had unpacked all personal operational items, individual webbing, equipment, and weapons. These items were secured in individual billets. The communications equipment was in process of being checked out by the communication specialists, a process that would take until noon the following day.

(c) The schedule for 19 November was followed. Ammunition and grenades were transported in bulk to the billets from the supply hangar in closed vans. Ammunition was issued by platoon according to the munitions list. (See Part II, Section I.) Later, a search and rescue (SAR) briefing was presented by an in-theater SAR Commander. Slight adjustments were made in the force SOP to accommodate in-theater procedures. Immediately following the briefing, the platoons were engaged in weapons test firing and issue of communications items. The assault platoon leader, acting as Range Officer, set up the range and supervised platoon firing. Closed vans were utilized to transport the weapons and one element member fired the weapons of his element. The firing was not extensive but was intended to confirm the zero of the "night-sight" and to instill personal confidence that each weapon would function properly. Weapons cleaning period was modified to simply running a patch through the bore. During this period, the demolitions charges were checked and repacked. Initiation devices were completed and checked. An evasion and escape (E&E) briefing was given to the ground force by a CAS employee. The briefing covered Laos only. Plastic E&E maps and blood chits were provided.

(d) At noon on 20 November 1970, the launch order had not yet been announced to the ground force. On the premise that the order would be given, sleeping pills were issued as required and rest was ordered from 1300 to 1700 for all members. During the rest period, the launch order was received. Following chow, the force was assembled in the theater. A route briefing and target briefing was given to include the geographical location, the name of the target, its relationship to Hanoi's location (cheers went up) and specific instructions concerning the conduct of the force in the target area. Included were: decisive action, importance of time to success, care of wounded, SAR operations, and fighting as a complete unit in case of emergency actions. Colonel Simons then answered individual questions.

(e) Following return to billets to procure individual weapons and equipment, platoons were moved by closed van to the supply hangar. The following one and one-half hours were spent in a detailed and meticulous inspection of individual equipment following previously prepared checklists. Final preparations included pinning insignia of rank on collars and camouflaging skin surfaces. The atmosphere was one of carefully controlled excitement. No signs of apprehension were evident. All seemed confident and sure of success. Perhaps this had its roots in the extensive rehearsals conducted and the security gained from knowing one's job and having confidence in others knowing their jobs equally as well. During the last 10 minutes of the period, marshalling briefings were given for the staging area at Takhli RTAFB and for the launch base, Udon RTAFB. The troops were moved to the C-130 transport aircraft by closed van. At approximately 2225, following an uneventful flight, the force debarked at Udon RTAFB and were led by guides to the waiting assault aircraft. Platoon leaders checked assigned aircraft and loaded spare ammunition for the return flight. POW medical supplies had been loaded earlier in each of three primary HH-53 helicopters. The force loaded and departed as scheduled.

b. US Air Force:

(1) Briefings. Final flight plans were approximately 95% complete prior to deployment. Work was continued on mission charts and flimsies on D-3. A general mission briefing was given to all aircrew members (F-4, F-105, COLLEGE EYE, COMBAT APPLE, HC-130P, C-130E, A-1, UH-1H, and HH-3/53) on D-2. This briefing included detailed employment information such as altitudes, communications, and enroute procedures. Participants recommended minor changes, clarified procedures, and finalized mission documents. On D-1, briefings were presented which covered command and control, intelligence, SAR, and E&E. These were followed by

a detailed aircrew brief back covering each aircraft's portion of the mission. On D-day, the final weather and latest intelligence were briefed. Scheduling and contents of all briefings were according to plan.

(2) Aircraft Generation:

(a) The generation of mission and support aircraft proceeded on or ahead of schedule during the three days prior to D-Day. Both C-130E lead aircraft arrived at Takhli RTAFB on 15 November and were in-commission. They were test flown for systems checks on 16 and 17 November and were certified mission ready on 18 November. The 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group redistributed HH-53 helicopters within South Vietnam and Thailand so that ten HH-53Cs were at Udorn RTAFB on 15 November. On 17 November all 10 aircraft were mission ready although only seven (five primary and two spares) were requested. The primary and spare HH-53 helicopters arrived at Udorn RTAFB on 15 November. After extensive removal of unnecessary systems and equipment to reduce weight, the aircraft were test flown on 19 November and declared mission ready. Two CONUS-based EC-121T aircraft (airborne radar platforms) were prepositioned at Korat RTAFB on 14 November and mission ready on 17 November. All other primary mission and support aircraft were drawn from larger fleets and no problems were encountered. It is significant that, other than the redistribution of HH-53 helicopters, all other forces were generated without a change in daily Frag Orders or operational patterns.

(b) The need for SAR augmentation by available theater forces was recognized during planning and training activities. This augmentation was considered essential in the event a SAR situation developed during egress of the assault and strike forces. Therefore, the Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) at Udorn RTAFB was asked to identify and alert

rescue forces considered necessary to mount a first light SAR effort. These forces consisted of MH-53, HC-130, and A-1 aircraft normally not on alert status during the hours of darkness. A schedule was devised whereby such a force could be alerted, launched, and in position in northern Laos at first light.

c. US Navy. Three Strike carriers were needed to support the large number of aircraft required to carry out the Navy diversion mission. Two carriers were utilized from CTF-77 assets. The third carrier was diverted from CINCPACFLT resources. The Navy plan called for a total of 60 aircraft to participate in its area of operation. This force was made up of strike and support aircraft all of which were operationally ready for launch as scheduled.

2. H-7 - Weather Decision:

a. Critical Weather Factors:

(1) Favorable weather was a fundamental requirement for the mission and, as expected, proved to be one of the most difficult decisions required in the course of the operation. A moon of 25-75% illumination, 15 to 45° above the eastern horizon was desired to aid navigation, reduce detection, and provide adequate light for the ground forces. Launch could be conducted under instrument conditions but after joinup there had to be good visibility at flight level with an adequate open layer between 5,000 and 10,000 feet to permit the force to proceed safely. For refueling, only light turbulence could be tolerated. Upon reaching the Red River Valley, there could be no more than scattered low and middle clouds to permit moon reflections off lakes and rivers, no more than scattered clouds below 3,500 feet for A-1 tactics. Visibilities had to be good, and surface winds light.

(2) For the Navy diversion, Gulf of Tonkin seas had to be light to moderate, visibilities good, ceilings along the coast high enough to permit Navy tactics up to 17,000 feet.

(3) Weather at DaNang had to be good enough for COMICTG and his control party to land and proceed to the TACC-NS.

b. The Weather:

(1) Throughout North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos, October and November 1970 were the worst weather months in years. Roughly five years worth of typhoons, based upon climatic norms, moved into the area during the two months. Cold surges of air from North Asia were far stronger and more frequent than ordinary for autumn. The last typhoon had helped to pull down a cold air surge from China blanketing North Vietnam and the mountains of Laos with rain and thick clouds for several days prior to 18 November. Typhoon Patsy at midday on the 18th was moving through the Philippines heading due west while another cold front was moving south through north China.

(2) The morning of the 19th, the Mission Commander was informed that Patsy was forecast to bring low clouds, rain, poor visibilities, and high winds to the northern half of South Vietnam, the panhandle of North Vietnam and the southern Gulf of Tonkin by evening on Saturday, the 21st - the date originally targeted. A cold front was expected to enter the Red River Valley on Sunday, the 22nd, with at least four days of very poor weather expected to follow. North Vietnam and Laos were still covered with clouds the morning of the 19th but an induced high pressure ridge with dry air from China was forecast to form between the typhoon moving west and the cold front moving south. By late afternoon of the 19th, there was good evidence that this ridge was building as forecast, with clearing in south-east China beginning to extend into North Vietnam.

(3) The Commander's decision-making process for the weather decision was influenced by basic weather data, forecasts relative to route and objective area, and by the fact that many mission elements were already

in motion such as the Navy diversionary force, tanker preparation, and the COMBAT APPLE launch. Knowing that Typhoon Patsy would, without doubt, force cancellation of the mission on 21 November and knowing that Carrier Task Group 77.0 would be affected by the typhoon in 48 hours, the Commander was faced with the dilemma of accepting what was considered a marginal enroute situation on 20 November or an almost certain delay of five to seven days by waiting for improved weather. The primary concern with the marginal enroute weather was the possibility of using higher than planned altitudes. Higher density altitudes would force the H-1-3 to operate closer to its operating limits thereby removing flexibility of maneuver. Additionally, higher altitudes would make the formations more vulnerable to earlier enemy radar detection.

(4) On the afternoon of 20 November, an RF-4, with a weather observer aboard flew weather reconnaissance across north Laos to the North Vietnamese border, landing at Takhli RTAFB at 0900Z for debriefing. This mission further verified the anticipated drying air.

(5) Mission briefings provided an enroute forecast of scattered to broken clouds, bases 5,000 feet and tops 8,000 feet with broken to overcast clouds over high mountain areas, good visibilities, and no turbulence. In the Red River Valley, little cloudiness was expected with good visibilities and light northwest winds. Actual weather observed was very similar to that forecast.

c. The Decision:

(1) With these factors as a background, plus the added consideration of continuing to maintain operational security with a force already assembled, the Commander's decision was to launch the mission on 20 November 1970. Execution of the mission proved this decision correct.

(2) By midnight on the 21st, with Typhoon Patsy less than 100 miles offshore, the Navy diversion would have been impossible. DaNang's weather was marginal with crosswinds gusting to 30 knots. Extensive clouds, poor visibilities, and high winds covered the panhandle of North Vietnam and were beginning to work into the Red River Delta. The cold surge pushed through slightly behind schedule continuing the widespread poor weather into the following week. The night of 20/21 November 1970 was the only night for many days before and after that date that launch would have been possible.

3. Personnel Deployment. Deployment of ground troops and aircrews from the staging base to launch bases was accomplished by theater airlift as planned. Following coordination with Seventh Air Force, three C-130E airlift aircraft were positioned at U-Tapao RTAFB on 18 November and placed on alert for use by the JCTG. Thereafter, specific airlift requirements were coordinated with the Thailand Airlift Control Center (ALCC) at U-Tapao RTAFB. One C-130E airlifted the F-105 WILD WEASEL and F-4 MIG CAP flight leaders from Takhli RTAFB to Korat RTAFB and Udorn RTAFB respectively early on D-Day. On schedule, one C-130E airlifted the helicopter and HC-130P tanker aircrews from Takhli RTAFB to Udorn RTAFB and proceeded to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB with the A-1 aircrews. A second C-130E airlifted the ground force from Takhli RTAFB to Udorn RTAFB while the third C-130E acted as a spare aircraft during these vital movements. The spare UH-1H was deployed to Udorn RTAFB by the JCTG crews and was prepared to fulfill the assault helicopter role if needed.

4. Departure:

a. Assault Force:

(1) C-130E. Scheduled takeoff - 1555Z; actual takeoff - 1618Z. An IFR flight plan was filed from Takhli RTAFB to Udorn RTAFB.

The assault C-130E overflew Udorn RTAFB and the flight plan administratively closed. No problem was encountered with the clearance. During engine start, problems were encountered in starting #3 engine. After maintenance personnel were unable to quickly solve the problem, a decision was made by COMJCTG to proceed with only three engines. A final effort to start #3 engine proved successful. Departure was made 23 minutes late. Had it been necessary to fly the mission on three engines, this aircraft would have assumed lead of the Strike Force rather than the Assault Force.

(2) HH-3/53. All helicopter starts at Udorn RTAFB were normal. Light signals were used to indicate "ready for taxi." Taxi was started at prebriefed time with radio silence. All takeoffs at Udorn RTAFB were accomplished on time and without incident.

b. Strike Force:

(1) C-130E. Scheduled takeoff - 1525Z; actual takeoff - 1528Z. A delay in takeoff from Takli RTAFB was due to an inoperative aircraft heading reference system which became operational after minor maintenance. An IFR flight plan was flown to Nakhon Phanom and time made up by flying higher than planned airspeeds.

(2) A-1E. Takeoff from Nakhon Phanom RTAFB was made four minutes prior to scheduled time because of takeoff direction. The A-1 force was abeam the takeoff point at the programmed time. The joinup after takeoff was slow because of gear indication problems on the third A-1. The remainder of the departure was as programmed. The departure was made in complete radio silence.

c. Support Forces:

(1) HC-130P. The two HC-130Ps departed Udorn RTAFB as scheduled at 1607Z. The lead tanker rendezvoused and joined with the

helicopter formation. Because of an unidentified aircraft in the vicinity of the helicopter formation, the first tanker was delayed a few minutes in accomplishing the joinup. The second tanker remained to the rear of the formation and did not experience any difficulties. After the first tanker assumed lead of the helicopters, the formation proceeded according to flight plan.

(2) F-4 (MIG CAP). The 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Udorn RTAFB was tasked to provide eight primary mission and two airborne spare F-4D aircraft as MIG CAP for the Task Group. The first four aircraft took off at 1818-1819Z. The balance of the aircraft became airborne as scheduled.

(3) F-105G (WILD WEASEL). The 6010th WILD WEASEL Squadron at Korat RTAFB was tasked to provide five primary mission and one backup F-105G as SAM/AAA suppression aircraft. One aircraft ground aborted and the aircrew changed to the spare aircraft. The first four aircraft took off in flights of two; the first flight at 1745Z, followed by the next flight five minutes later. The fifth aircraft was airborne ten minutes later.

(4) COLLEGE EYE. The primary aircraft was airborne on schedule at 1500Z and the secondary aircraft at 1510Z.

(5) COMBAT APPLE. The primary [redacted] departed Kadena AB in sufficient time to arrive on-station six hours prior to H-Hour. The Airborne Mission Coordinator was aboard this aircraft. A backup [redacted] aircraft with an Vaternate Airborne Mission Coordinator aboard, was available over the Gulf of Tonkin, if required.

(6) Radio-Relay Aircraft. A KC-135 radio-relay aircraft is normally on-station over the Gulf of Tonkin 24 hours per day. A specially configured aircraft equipped to support this mission departed U-Tapao RTAFB in sufficient time to arrive on station two hours prior to H-Hour.


(7) KC-135. Ten KC-135 tanker aircraft departed U-Tapao RTAFB as required to insure three primary and one spare tanker aircraft were on Lemon and Orange extension refueling tracks from 15 minutes prior to fighter refueling time until released.

5. Enroute. (See map on following page.)

a. Assault Force:

(1) C-130E. The Assault C-130E regained lost time by flying higher than planned airspeed and shortening the route by eliminating dog-legs which were preplanned for just such a situation. The aircraft crossed over Udorn RTAFB eight minutes behind flight plan time. The higher airspeed was maintained until information was received that the HC-130P (tanker) was expected to reach Point 4 (end of refueling) six minutes behind flight plan. At this time, the flight plan airspeed was resumed. The Assault Force C-130E assumed lead of the Assault Force after Point 4. At this time the Assault Force estimated time of arrival to Point 7 (NVN border) was one minute ahead of flight plan. The mission was continued according to flight plan except for a small climb between Points 5 and 6 to avoid clouds. The Assault Force arrived over the acceleration point (one minute and 45 seconds from the objective) one minute behind flight plan time.


(2) HH-3/53. After takeoff and just as the helicopter joinup was being finalized, an unidentified aircraft passed through the formation on a reciprocal heading causing the formation to disperse. An immediate rejoin was accomplished. Rendezvous with the HC-130P tanker was accomplished without further incident. Climb to altitude was completed between Points 1 and 2. After level off at flight plan altitude, the formation flew through the tops of some clouds. All helicopters had intermittent visual contact and the formation, except the HH-3, temporarily increased separation. Air refueling was completed as programmed. The transfer of



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
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
1:50,000

1962



REFUELING FORMATION		ASSAULT FORCE		STRIKE FORCE	
TURNING POINT	ETA ATA	TURNING POINT	ETA ATA	TURNING POINT	ETA ATA
UDORN TANKERS	1607	TAKHLI	1555	TAKHLI	1525
	1606		1618		1528
UDORN HELICOPTERS	1617	UDORN	1655	NAXHON PHANOM	1651
	1617		1703		1654
1	1637	1	1706	1A	1726
	1639		1711		1728
2	1713	2A	1727		1745
	1717		1730		1748
3	1734		1738		

BE
SC



1	1633	1	1711		1728
2	1712	2A	1727	2A	1745
	1717		1730		1749
3	1734	3	1733	3A	1754
	1739		1743		1801
4	1815	4	1815	4A	1821
	1816		1816		1826
5		5	1822	5A	1827
			1822		1832
6		6	1832	6A	1833
			1832		1839
7		7	1838	7A	1843
			1838		1844
8		8	1848	8A	CUT OFF
			1848		1849
9		9	1856	9A	1851
			1857		1856
10		10	1904	10A	1856
			1905		1859
IP		IP	1911	11A	1905
			1912		1908
				IP	1916

lead from the HC-130P to the Assault C-130E was normal. Navigation to the start climb point was without incident. (See Part II, Section I, for route and altitude details.)

b. Strike Force:

(1) C-130E. The Strike Force experienced some difficulty in adjusting speeds and track for proper timing. When information was received that the HC-130P was estimating Point 4 (end of refueling) six minutes late, the Strike Force maneuvered to lose six minutes. However, after refueling was complete and the Assault Force was formed, Assault Force lead estimated arrival at Point 7 one minute early. This placed the Strike Force seven minutes behind flight plan. Since the maximum airspeed of the A-1s, in their mission configuration, was 145 knots indicated airspeed, it was necessary to bypass Point 8 and turn short of the IP to gain time. The Strike Force was less than one and one-half minutes behind the flight plan at H-hour. They had successfully regained their scheduled timing.

(2) A-1s. All aircraft had joined and were proceeding toward Point 1A at 7,600 feet. The Strike Force C-130E approached the formation from the left rear. At the time the A-1s were maneuvering to effect a joinup with the C-130E, the formation penetrated weather and the A-1s lost sight of the C-130. The A-1s started a slow climb and broke out on top of all clouds at 8,500 feet. The formation again acquired the C-130E and a normal rejoin was accomplished. The remainder of the flight to the objective was without incident.

c. Support Forces:

(1) HC-130P. The two HC-130Ps (tankers) and the six assault helicopters proceeded enroute as planned. Weather became a factor between Points 2 and 3, and it was necessary for the HH-53s to increase spacing in the formation. The HH-3 was able to maintain visual contact with the tanker.

The formation climbed at a faster rate than scheduled to avoid and remain clear of weather. Refueling operations were accomplished between Points 3 and 4 without difficulty. The Assault Force C-130E assumed lead of the formation after the HC-130P had turned toward Point 5. The lead tanker proceeded back to Udon RTAFB for additional fuel as planned. No problems were experienced returning to Udon RTAFB, refueling, or returning to Point 4. The second HC-130P remained at Point 3 while the force was in the objective area.

(2) F-4 (MIG CAP). All aircraft refueled on the Orange refueling track on schedule. The first flight arrived at its holding area at 1910Z.

(3) F-105 (WILD WEASEL). All aircraft refueled on the Lemon refueling track and completed refueling on schedule. The flights dropped off the tanker at four-minute intervals and spaced themselves to arrive in the objective area at two-minute intervals. The first aircraft arrived over the objective at 1908Z. A time pad had been planned in the refueling operation should a takeoff delay be encountered. This pad allowed the F-105G crew that experienced a maintenance delay to make up time and depart the tanker on schedule.

(4) COLLEGE EYE. The two EC-121T aircraft proceeded to DaNang without incident. All equipment was checked and found operational. Upon passing DaNang, both aircraft descended to 1,000 feet to avoid radar detection by the NVN Air Defense System. At 1735Z the primary aircraft lost #2 engine (broken oil line) and, since it was impossible to climb to operational altitude (10,000 feet), the aircraft aborted the mission and returned to DaNang. The backup aircraft climbed to its operating altitude and entered orbit over the Gulf of Tonkin at 1833Z. At this time it was noted that the APX-83 designed to receive friendly IFF/SIF was not receiving returns at extended ranges. A spare unit was installed with negative results. All other systems were operational.

- (5) COMBAT APPLE. All systems were operational.
- (6) Radio-Relay Aircraft. All systems were operational.
- (7) KC-135. Refueling of fighter aircraft was completed as scheduled.

6. Objective Area. (See map on following page.)


a. Assault Operations (HH-3/53):

(1) The Assault Formation arrived at the start climb point (3.5NM west of the objective) at 500 feet above ground level (AGL). The lead C-130E transmitted a heading of 072 degrees and pulled up and away from the helicopters. This heading was five degrees left of flight plan (077) to accommodate four degrees right drift and a displacement of 150 meters to the right of course at the start climb point.

(2) The first and second HH-53s and the HH-3 slowed to 80 knots. The third HH-53 slowed to 90 knots. The fourth and fifth HH-53s began their climb to 1,500 feet to perform their role as spare flare aircraft in the event the flares dropped by the C-130E were either offset or failed to ignite.

(3) The flares dropped by the C-130E ignited directly over the objective and HH-53s numbers four and five from their higher altitude observed HH-53 numbers two and three and the HH-3 proceeding to the right of course. Since the flares were satisfactory, numbers four and five proceeded to their holding area on islands in the Finger Lake 7NM west of the objective.

(4) The third HH-53 arrived first at the military complex 400 meters south (to the right of the inbound course) of the objective and started a firing maneuver but recognized that it was not the proper target. Number three did not fire and proceeded north to the correct objective



HH-53s 4 and 5

Assault C-130E Egress

Strike C-130E Holding Area

Assault and Strike Force Ingress


Start Climb

A-1E 5 and 1

Strike C-130E

H + 2:40
Marker Logs

H + 2:37
Fire Bomb
Markers



1B1-53s 4 and 5

1B1-53s 1, 2, and 3

H hour
4 flares

A-1E Start Climb Point

Assault and Strike Force Ingress

A-1Es
1 and 2

H + 41 sec
Simulator

A-1Es
3 and 4

Strike C-130E

H + 2+18

CHAMP DE BATAILLE
Fire Bomb
Markers

H + 1-20
Simulator

H + 2+57

Fire Bomb
Markers

Assault C-130E

where a firing pass was accomplished destroying the northwest guard tower and damaging the southwest tower, and the guard barracks in the support area.

(5) The HH-3 followed the third HH-53 and also recognized that the intended landing zone was the military complex south of the target. The HH-3 turned and proceeded to the correct objective. This delayed the landing in the compound by approximately one minute.

(6) The first HH-53 followed the HH-3 and, due to concentration on the landing zone, failed to see the HH-3 depart for the correct objective and proceeded to take buildings under fire and land in an area very similar in appearance to the intended landing zone at the objective.

(7) The second HH-53, which was 10 seconds behind number one, lost sight of number one and proceeded to the correct objective. Recognizing that number one was not at the objective, number two notified the Ground Force Commander aboard that alternate Plan Green, which allowed for the loss of HH-53 number one, was being implemented. Number two then proceeded to take number one's targets under fire and landed on the proper landing zone. After disembarking the Army troops, number two proceeded to the holding area one and one-half nautical miles west of the objective and landed.

(8) Meanwhile, the first HH-53 had disembarked Army troops at the complex south of the objective. Two minutes after departing the mistaken objective, the Army Component Commander recalled number one and the helicopter returned to move the troops to the proper objective. This was accomplished without incident and the troops in number one were disembarked at the objective seven minutes after the HH-3 and the second HH-53 had landed. Number one then proceeded to the holding area.

(9) At H+14 minutes, the first HH-53 was recalled to the objective area to onload troops arriving at H+19 minutes. Troops loaded rapidly and number one departed the objective at H+21 minutes.

(10) At H+21 minutes, the second HH-53 was recalled to the objective area to onload the remaining troops. Arriving at H+23 minutes, number two loaded and departed the area at H+26 minutes.

(11) Upon departure of the second HH-53, the third HH-53 departed the holding point and exited the objective area.

(12) As soon as the troop carrying helicopters cleared the Finger Lakes on egress, the fourth and fifth HH-53s departed their holding points and started egress.

b. Ground Operations (Through Extraction). The ground operation is described in four sections. An overall description of the operation is followed by sections detailing ground force actions by group.

(1) Overall Description:

(a) The ground force of 56 US Army officers and men was transported on three helicopters (see Part II, Section B, for organization of the ground force). The Assault Group (Blueboy) was transported by HH-3; the Command Group (Redwine) including the Ground Force Commander (Wildroot) and the Support Group (Greenleaf) plus the Alternate Ground Force Commander, by HH-53. The approach was made on an area similar in appearance to the target but approximately 400 meters south of the target area. The pilots of the HH-3 and the third HH-53 recognized the approach error and recovered sufficiently to enter the target area as planned with minimum delay. The pilot of the first HH-53, not realizing the approach error, inserted and debarked the Support Group south of the target area. The pilot of the second HH-53 did a 360 degree turn to realign his approach with that of the HH-3. Recognizing that the first HH-53 was absent from the planned formation, the pilot of the second HH-53 executed his portion of Plan Green by directing his left mini-gun to fire on guard building 7B while he landed. The Ground Force Commander was advised that the first HH-53 had not landed at the target area at H+2-1/2 minutes. (See Figures 1, 2, and 3 which follow.)





FIGURE # 1
TARGET AREA


Legend:

- A - PW COMPOUND
- B - COMMAND & CONTROL CENTER
- C - INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

0 200 400M
 Scale (approximate)

FIGURE #2






*										COMMAND GROUP
		*	*				UNK	200 RDS, GATE OPEN	2 EN BRNG S-N	ASSAULT GROUP
			*							SUPPORT GROUP
			*							SUPPORT GROUP
		N79								SUPPORT GROUP
		N79								SUPPORT GROUP
		N79								SUPPORT GROUP
		N79	N60							SUPPORT GROUP
*	*	*				*	2			SUPPORT GROUP
							2			COMMAND GROUP
	*	*	*							COMMAND GROUP

LEGEND.

- X = EN KIA/WIA (COMMAND GROUP)
- O = EN KIA/WIA (SUPPORT GROUP)
- Δ = EN KIA/WIA (ASSAULT GROUP)

SON TAY PW CAMP N-69

21 08 36N 105 30 01E




CURTAIN	CHIMNEY	FINED ON	FINED ON S & C	FIRE INCYD FROM	ENEMY IN BLDG SEEN	ENEMY IN BLDG KIA	REMARKS	UNIT
		*				UNK	11G 7.62 11-16 5.56	ASSAULT GROUP
		*				UNK	M-16 150 RDS	ASSAULT GROUP
							NON EXISTENT	ASSAULT GROUP
								ASSAULT GROUP
								ASSAULT GROUP
								COMMAND GROUP
								ASSAULT GROUP
							EN SEEN E. OF BLDG 5 KIA	ASSAULT GROUP
								ASSAULT GROUP
								ASSAULT GROUP
		*					1 PD INTO CEMENT BAG TO BREAK BAG	ASSAULT GROUP
		*	*		2/1		NOT ENTERED: BURNING	COMMAND GROUP
		*	*	*	6		RIFLE & GRENADE 6 KIA BURNING	COMMAND GROUP
								SUPPORT GROUP
							BURNING HEAVILY	SUPPORT GROUP
		*	*	*	7*		ASLTD, UNIFORMED AK-47	COMMAND GROUP
		*		*			MOVEMENT HEARD, 2 EN RAN OUT 1 KIA?	COMMAND GROUP
								COMMAND GROUP
		*				UNK	M16 200 RDS, GATE OPEN 2 EN MANG SH	ASSAULT GROUP
		*						SUPPORT GROUP
		*						SUPPORT GROUP
								SUPPORT GROUP
								SUPPORT GROUP
								SUPPORT GROUP
								SUPPORT GROUP
					2			SUPPORT GROUP
					2			COMMAND GROUP
								COMMAND GROUP

11-16-68 (COMMAND GROUP)
 11-16-68 (SUPPORT GROUP)
 11-16-68 (SUPPORT GROUP)

FIGURE # 3

COMMAND & CONTROL CENTER



Legend:

X = EN KIA
 --- = BARBWIRE

(b) H+2-1/2 to H+8 Minutes. Plan Green was partially executed by voice command from Wildroot to Redwine. Radio nets at that moment had not been opened. Redwine, less Element 2, initiated Plan Green with a delay of approximately two minutes. The Assault Group, which was not affected by the change of plan, continued to clear and search. In the area to the south, the Support Group Leader, recognizing his insertion had taken place in the wrong target area, was organizing for an extraction and attempting to break contact with the enemy. He was assisted by the Alternate Command Group who manned the LZ and contacted the extraction aircraft.

(c) H+8 to H+9-1/2 Minutes. The Support Group extracted under fire without casualty. Upon insertion at the correct target area, the Basic Plan was instituted without extensive radio traffic.

(d) H+9-1/2 to H+10 Minutes. The Support Group linked up and passed through Command Group elements. The Command Group then executed portions of the Basic Plan not yet carried out; clearing the pump house, demolition of the power pole, and destruction of the power station. Blueboy advised, "Negative items (POWs) at this time."

(e) H+10 to H+12-1/2 Minutes. The Command and Support Groups continued to move through their assigned areas neutralizing and clearing. Greenleaf Element 1, the demolition team, waited to be passed through the area enroute to the bridge north of the target area. Blueboy advised that search of the compound was complete with negative items present, and no items had been there in a long time. A Wildroot net call was made advising groups to "Prepare to withdraw to the LZ for extraction. Command and Assault Groups exit on first extraction helicopter. Set up LZ security, Command Group to west, Support to east."

(f) H+12-1/2 to H+21-1/2 Minutes. Decision to withdraw using only two helicopters was made. The first HH-53 was called in at H+14

minutes and requested flare as a directional aid. The lead A-1 was requested to strafe the bridge north of the target area. The HH-53 landed at H+18 minutes 50 seconds and unloaded the Command Group (minus Element 3, the Marshalling Area Control Officer (MACO), and Pathfinders) and Assault Elements 1, 2, and 3. A MACO count of 26 aboard the first HH-53 was passed to Wildroot.

(g) H+21-1/2 to H+23-1/2 Minutes. The second HH-53 was called in at H+22 minutes. The Support Group readjusted LZ security and the Assault Group Leader directed demolition of the HH-3.

(h) H+27 Minutes and Following. Final extraction was completed by the second HH-53 and Wildroot reported, "Count 33, count correct," to the aircraft commander. The total force of USA/USAF personnel on ground was 59. The MACO reported 26 aboard the first HH-53 and 33 aboard the second HH-53. No recount was taken. About an hour later, a recount was requested. On recount it was determined that the first HH-53 had 25 aboard. Several counts and recounts were taken without aid of cabin lights in both aircraft until it was determined that 59 were aboard, 25 on the first and 34 on the second HH-53.

(i) H+3 Hours. Immediately upon recovery at Udorn RTAFB, headcount confirmed that all personnel were present. Two casualties were sustained - one USAF sergeant with a broken foot and one USA sergeant with a flesh wound in the inner thigh. Key personnel were retained at Udorn for debriefing. The Ground Force was transported to Takhli by waiting C-130 aircraft.

(2) The mission of the Command Group was to secure the south wall, act as reserve for Assault and Support Groups, and act as control for evacuating prisoners to helicopters. (See Figures 1 and 2.) A detailed chronological record follows:

- (a) H-20 Minutes. Twenty-minute warning was given.
- (b) H-10 Minutes. Group was alerted and all gear was checked.
- (c) H-5 Minutes. Group followed SOP checklist. Standup, secure seats up, remove tape from grenade, lock and load all weapons except 45 caliber pistol, one M-72 was primed by Security Element 2 and all radios were turned on.
- (d) H-2 Minutes. All personnel ready to go. The Command Group Leader assumed his post adjacent to the left mini-gun.
- (e) H-30 Seconds. Standby to debark.
- (f) H-Hour. Flare drop.
- (g) H+1 Minute. The HH-53 helicopter made a tight, left downward movement to get into position, followed by an extremely tight right turn into a go-around pattern. Approach to the landing zone was fast and violent. Both door gunners opened fire with mini-guns.
- (h) H+2 Minutes, 30 Seconds. Command Group debarked and each element proceeded to its area of responsibility.
- (i) H+2 Minutes, 45 Seconds to H+9 Minutes, 30 Seconds. The Command Group Leader realized that the second HH-53 had landed on the Support Group's LZ and that the Support Group had not landed. Plan Green was initiated and all elements were notified and diverted except Security Element 2. Element 2 was too far away for verbal contact and radio contact had not been established. The Command Group Leader, while directing Security Element 3 into position, came under small arms and rifle grenade fire from building 7B. The building was taken under fire and the threat eliminated. The Command Group then noticed three to four NVA personnel

running north between buildings 11 and 12 and the compound wall. (See Figure 2.) The enemy was engaged with rifle fire. At the same time, another NVA ran between the Command Group and Security Element 1 in the direction of the Ground Force Command Party. The Command Group called out to the Ground Force Commander informing him an NVA was approaching, at which time the NVA was killed by a member of the Command Party. The Command Group then moved north to begin clearing its area of responsibility. Security Element 1 received word Plan Green was in effect while enroute to its objective, buildings 8E, 8D, and 4A. At approximately the same time, the element received small arms fire from building 7B and the area immediately west of that building. Fire was returned and two NVA with AK-47 rifles were killed. As Element 1 reached the hedge running east to west, south of building 8D, it received a heavy volume of fire from the building area. Movement was heard in building 8D, and the building was taken under fire. The building was assaulted by three members of the element, and a grenade thrown through a window. Five NVA personnel armed with AK-47 rifles were observed east of the building and were engaged by fire. At the same time, another NVA fired on the element from the west end of the building. This threat was eliminated. At the same time, two NVA came around the east end of the building and fired on the element. These two NVA, and one other observed running between buildings 8D and 8E, were killed. The portion of Element 1 not engaged in clearing building 8D had moved to the immediate west of that building, clearing buildings 8E and 4A. As they were doing so, four enemy ran out of these buildings and were fired on; results unknown. After buildings 8E and 4A were cleared, portions of Element 1 moved to the hole in the west compound wall where they linked up with the Assault Group. Security Element 2 did not receive word that Plan Green was in effect and, therefore, proceeded with the Basic Plan. On the way to its objective area, an M-72 LAW was fired at the power station. The station was hit, and the element moved on to its objective where it received

small arms fire from the southwest from approximately 200 meters. The enemy position was engaged and fire suppressed. One member of the element proceeded to set up Claymore mines in defensive positions, and another member moved back and cleared the power station. The element then received fire from the east side of the road from approximately 10-15 meters south of the canal from two NVA armed with M-1 carbines. This threat was eliminated by fire from the element. Security Element 3 moved approximately 60 to 70 meters toward its objective, the canal and river junction, when it received word verbally from the Command Group that alternate Plan Green was in effect. Due to the roughness of the terrain, it was difficult to move swiftly. There was a slight delay before the element managed to arrive in position to assault its area of responsibility. The element was in position south of building 7B at approximately H+5 minutes when the M-79 gunner and M-60 gunner took the building under fire. As the element assaulted the buildings, it encountered some difficulty in trying to traverse the concertina wire which surrounded the buildings. Also, there was a drainage ditch approximately five to six feet deep south of building 7B, running east to west. Upon reaching the objective area, the element first cleared the small building west of 8F and then 8F. The small building contained ducks, and building 8F was empty. Approaching building 7B, two NVA were encountered and eliminated. One member of the element entered the building and eliminated eight NVA hiding there. Another member of the element killed two NVA running through the courtyard, one carrying an AK-47 rifle. The Pathfinder Element, while enroute to the primary LZ, received word (verbally) that Plan Green was in effect. One member of the two-man element moved toward the pump station while the other member moved to the concrete power line pole. The Pathfinder, moving toward the pumping station, noticed a figure running in the same direction he was going. Upon reaching the pump station, the Pathfinder threw one concussion grenade into the building and, upon detonation, fired thirty rounds into the building. The Pathfinder then returned to the power pole to assist in

placing the demolitions on the structure. Just prior to igniting the fuze, the Pathfinders noticed an HH-53 inbound with the Support Group. As the helicopter landed on the LZ, the element ignited the time fuze and ran to the drainage ditch north of the primary LZ.

(j) H+9-1/2 to H+20-1/2 Minutes. The Command Group Element was notified by the Ground Force Commander to have elements in the Support Group area hold up until the Support Group reached its position then revert to the Basic Plan. After passing this information to its elements, the Command Element received word by radio from the Pathfinder Element that the primary LZ was ready and that the tower was down. Shortly thereafter, Security Element 1 reported its area clear and linkup with the Assault Group. This information was relayed to the Ground Force Commander who then informed the Command Group Leader that there were no items in the compound and that the Command Group was to embark minus the Pathfinder Element. After the grenade exploded in building 8D, Security Element 1 entered the building and seven NVA with AK-47 rifles were found dead. A portion of the element then moved to the west and linked up with the other portion of the element at the southwest corner of the compound wall where the entire element engaged a target across the river, identified by use of the night vision device, with M-79 and M-16 fire. Shortly thereafter, the element received word to pull back for extraction. The element then linked up with the Assault Group coming out of the compound and moved to the LZ. Shortly after eliminating the threat to the south of the canal, Security Element 2 received word from the Command Group Leader to pull back for extraction. At approximately the same time, a convoy of four or five small trucks were spotted at approximately 200 meters moving northeast on the NE/SW road. The convoy was engaged with a M-72 LAW, which halted the convoy. The element then moved to the LZ. After clearing building 7B, Security Element 3 came under fire from building 7B. As it was returning the fire, the element received word from the Command Group to pull back.

At the same time, elements of the Support Group reached their position. Element 3 then proceeded to pull back to the Command Group's location. The Command Group had Element 3 revert to the Basic Plan at this time. Upon reaching the pump station, the element cleared the building and set up in a security position to wait for the second extraction helicopter. NOTE: Element 3 should have boarded first helicopter. After the charge detonated, the Pathfinder Element noticed the tower had fallen and there were hot wires on the ground. The element then proceeded to set up the primary LZ lights and notified the Command Group of its actions. The Pathfinders then proceeded to set up the alternate LZ.

(k) H+20-1/2 to H+26 Minutes. Security Element 3 boarded the second extraction helicopter. As the Pathfinder Element moved to the telephone pole to cut it down, it met the Support Group Leader who informed them of the change in plans and that the element was to board the second extraction helicopter which it did at that time.

(3) The Assault Group mission was to secure the inside of the POW compound, to include guard towers, gates, and cell blocks and to release and guide POWs to the control point. (See Figures 1 and 2.)

(a) H+30 Seconds. The HH-3 assault helicopter approached the enemy's military complex 400 meters south of the POW compound. Door and window gunners began firing, assuming this site was the true objective. The HH-3 corrected the approach and flew north to the POW compound.

(b) H+1 Minute. The HH-3 made a west to east approach, crossing the west wall and began its descent into the compound. Again, door, window, and ramp gunners fired on areas of responsibility. Large tree limbs and one 10" tree trunk were severed by the HH-3 blades as it began settling to the ground, causing a violent, sudden maneuver of 30-40 degrees to the right. The right door gunner was thrown clear of the

aircraft but was unhurt and continued with the ground operation plan. The aircrew completed its landing procedures and the Assault Group debarked.

(c) H+1 to H+5 Minutes. Headquarters Element moved to its area of responsibility; cleared building 3, the southwest guard tower, broadcasted messages to prisoners, placed and detonated a demolition charge on the wall (4'x4' hole was blown), and established radio contact with the Ground Force Command and all action elements. Action Element 1 moved to cell block 5A. As the cell block was being cleared by two members, the other two members covered them by placing automatic weapon fire on the northwest tower. All members then moved to the rear of cell block 5A again splitting into two-man teams. Two moved to the tower, cleared it, and the area along the interior west and north wall, then entered cell block 5C. The other team of two men moved to cell block 5D causing three to five enemy to flee from this area toward the gate area where they were killed by Action Elements 2 and 3. Cell block 5D was entered. Vietnamese voices could be heard outside of the compound, and a large volume of automatic weapon fire including AK. Action Element 2 moved swiftly to cell blocks 5E and 4. As the doors to cell block 5E were being checked, two enemy soldiers rushed from the gate area and were killed. Locks on the doors were cut with bolt cutters and all cells were entered and cleared. Two of the locked cells were used to secure 100 plus bags of cement and metal bars. Action Element 3 moved to the gate and cell block 5B. One concussion grenade was thrown into the guard tower at the south side of the gate. Three enemy soldiers were killed inside and north of the gate and two were killed outside near building 7A. Cell block 5B was entered, and all cells were searched.

(d) H+8 to H+10 Minutes. Headquarters Element received an all clear and zero item count from all Action Elements. Elements were ordered to move to the previously blown exit hole in the southwest wall and to stand by. "Zero items" was transmitted to the Ground Force Commander.

A demolition charge was placed inside the HH-3. The Command Group photographer arrived via the blown hole and was taken to cell block 5A by Action Element 1 where he took three pictures. Action Element 3 reported that the Support Group had not arrived to relieve him at the gate (COMMENT - Plan Green was in effect, and the Support Group was not in target area.)

(e) H+10 to H+15 Minutes. Headquarters Element received orders to deliver the first group of POWs. Action Elements 1, 2, and 3 were dispatched to Command Group MACO position. The Headquarters Element remained behind to complete the mission of destroying the HH-3.

(f) H+15 to H+18 Minutes. Headquarters Element reported ready to "marry up," i.e., activate helicopter demolition, to the Ground Force Commander. At H+25-1/2 minutes, permission was received, the demolition charge activated, and Headquarters Element Leader activated the fire-fight simulator.

(g) H+24 to H+27 Minutes. Headquarters Element departed the compound via the blown hole and linked up with the Ground Force Commander.

(h) H+33 Minutes. A large fire, believed to be the HH-3 exploding and burning, was seen to erupt in the target area by the Assault Group Leader.

(4) The Support Group mission was to secure the area north and east of the compound to include the bridge 150 meters north.

(a) H-30 Seconds. Stand by to debark.

(b) H-Hour. Flares.

(c) H+30 Seconds. Door gunner engaged target with left mini-gun.

(d) H+1 Minute. Support Group was inserted at the military complex located 400 meters south of Son Tay POW Compound. (See Figure 1.) Upon debarking, the Headquarters Element, while being exposed to automatic weapons fire, assaulted and penetrated the complex clearing the billet located at the southern end of the compound utilizing concussion and fragmentation grenades and rifle fire accounting for ten NVA soldiers killed. All elements were advised that a withdrawal was imminent. Element 1 secured the LZ and protected to the south and west. Element 2, upon debarkation, was exposed to automatic weapons fire and moved in an easterly direction placing fire on the road east of the compound.

(e) H+2 to H+5 Minutes. The Headquarters Element continued clearing the southern billets. More enemy personnel than expected were encountered, and a large volume of automatic weapons fire was coming from the two-story building located in the center of the compound. An M-79 gunner, detached from Element 1, placed accurate fire through windows and doors of the building eliminating the threat. At H+3 minutes, this billet was secured. Element 1 was receiving automatic weapons fire from the western edge of the compound. An M-60 machine gun was employed eliminating this threat. Element 2 had moved to the road and started clearing in a northerly direction on both flanks of the road for a distance of 150 meters. Several enemy were encountered but no enemy kills were confirmed due to distance involved. The element leader received instructions to close and secure the southeast portion of the extraction LZ. At H+4 minutes, the element began the movement as instructed.

(f) H+5 to H+9 Minutes. The Headquarters Element was clearing the southern end of two adjacent billets with fragmentation grenades. Four NVA, attempting to reach the two-story building (armory) from the eastern billet, were killed. At approximately H+6 minutes, movement was begun toward the extraction landing zone as directed. Movement

was completed at H+7 minutes, and all elements were accounted for by the Support Group Leader. The LZ was marked with strobe lights. Element 1 secured the extraction LZ and placed suppressive machine gun fire on the western portion of the compound. Element 2 closed the LZ and secured in a southerly direction.

(g) H+9 Minutes. Headquarters Element was last to board the HH-53 for extraction. The Headquarters Element plus the M-60 machine gunner from Element 1 laid down a base of fire into the compound while Element 1 and 2 boarded the aircraft. All support personnel were extracted. No casualties were sustained.

(h) H+9-1/2 Minutes. Support Group was inserted at Son Tay POW Compound. Upon debarkation, a radio transmission was received from the Ground Force Commander informing the Support Group Leader that Plan Green was in effect. This transmission was relayed to Elements 1 and 2.

(i) H+10 Minutes. The Headquarters Element completed linkup with, and passed through, Command Element 3 and implemented the Basic Plan. Buildings 7B and 8F were cleared utilizing concussion and fragmentation grenades and rifle fire, accounting for five enemy kills. A steady volume of fire was coming from building 7A and was neutralized by M-79 fire. Element 1 debarked and established a secure position approximately 15 meters south of building 7A. Element 2 debarked and headed in an easterly direction taking building group 13E under fire utilizing M-60 machine gun, M-79, and M-16 rifle fire.

(j) H+11 to H+22 Minutes. The Support Group Leader received a radio transmission indicating there were no POWs inside the compound. At H+12-1/2 minutes, the Ground Force Commander instructed the Support Group to withdraw and establish security for the extraction LZ.

This was accomplished at H+17 minutes. Element 1 was informed at H+12-1/2 minutes to close on the eastern portion of the LZ and secure. This was accomplished at H+14 minutes. Element 2 assaulted and cleared building 13E with concussion grenades and M-16 rifle fire. Two NVA were killed in building 13E. At H+13 minutes, Element 2 was instructed to close on and secure the southern section of the extraction LZ. This was accomplished at H+17 minutes.

(k) H+22 to H+27 Minutes. Headquarters Element received instructions from the Ground Force Commander to board the second HH-53 for extraction. The helicopter landed at H+23 minutes and the Support Group Leader notified Elements 1 and 2 to board the aircraft. At H+27 minutes, all Support Group personnel were extracted. No casualties were sustained. Element 1 secured east utilizing M-60 machine guns, M-79, and M-16 rifle fire. Element 1 was first to embark at H+26. Element 2 secured south utilizing M-60 machine gun, M-79, and M-16 rifle fire. Element 2 was the last element to embark at H+27 minutes.

(5) Synopsis:

(a) The ground operation was basically a long distance heliborne raid characterized by tactical surprise, violent execution, and swift withdrawal. Complete tactical surprise was achieved by the manner in which the raiding force was transported and inserted into the target area. The landing of the Assault Group aircraft directly in the POW compound was a key factor. Violence of execution plus the heightened ability of raiding force members to deliver accurate fire using the single point sight accounted for the lack of friendly casualties compared to those sustained by enemy forces. As a consequence, swift execution of the mission was not measurably slowed by enemy action.

(b) The extensive and detailed rehearsals conducted by the joint force paid great dividends in the successful conduct of the raid.

Despite the absence of one-third of the force during the initial insert, the mission was neither aborted nor seriously delayed.

(6) Lessons Learned:

(a) The value of extensive and detailed rehearsals in the event of emergencies or changes in plans cannot be over emphasized. The success enjoyed by the force is attributed primarily to its level of training achieved through repeated rehearsals.

(b) Ability to successfully engage a target at night is of immeasurable value to a unit. This ability is estimated to be the major factor underlying the extremely light casualty figures of the raiding force even though the enemy possessed weapons of relatively equal capability.

c. Air Operations:

(1) Mission Forces (Through Extraction):

(a) Assault Force C-130E. Acceleration and climb was initiated at the acceleration point. The aircraft arrived directly over the objective and dropped four flares, all of which ignited. The aircraft then turned right and dropped two battlefield simulators southeast and south of the city of Son Tay, on target. At the release point for the BLU-27/B fire bomb markers, the first weapon armed but did not exit the aircraft. The second unit was dropped on target. The jammed BLU-27/B was freed and jettisoned in a lake west of the objective area. The MK-6 log flares, positioned in the aircraft behind the jammed BLU-27/B, could not be dropped on target. Therefore, the aircraft commander elected to not drop the log flares after jettisoning the BLU-27/B for fear of creating an additional and unplanned marker, which could have confused friendly forces. The flares were disarmed and returned to base. The aircraft exited the objective area and proceeded to its orbit point in Laos as planned.

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(b) Strike Force C-130E. The Strike Force C-130E proceeded to the A-1 holding area southeast of Mt Ba Vi and dropped the two BUJ-27/B fire bomb markers and pallet of MK-6 log flares on target. The aircraft then proceeded to and established an orbit over the mountains 15NM west of the objective. At approximately H+13 minutes, the EWO reported receiving SAM radar activity from both southeasterly and easterly directions. Evasive action was taken, the orbit pattern was abandoned, and protection behind the hills was sought. The remainder of the loiter time was spent at low altitude, below 1,000 feet AGL, with almost continuous SAM radar activity being received. Approximately eight SAMs were sighted over the objective area. The strike C-130E departed the orbit area after the last primary force pilot reported that he was exiting the objective area.

(c) A-1s. The Strike Force flew from the IP to the objective area as briefed. The fifth A-1 dropped off over the Black River as planned and the third and fourth A-1s dropped off at the holding point marked by the C-130E. The two primary A-1s arrived over the objective area and set up a left-hand orbit at 3,000 feet AGL. After two orbits, the Ground Force Commander requested the A-1s to attack the foot bridge to the southeast. Four white-phosphorous 100 pound bombs were dropped at this location. During the next few minutes, the A-1s expended six rockeyes on isolated areas on the road southwest of the camp. This was accomplished to decrease aircraft weight and increase maneuverability and loiter time. The Ground Force Commander then called the primary A-1s and requested an attack on the bridge north of the objective. The lead A-1 acknowledged and advised number two to strafe using 20mm. After one strafing pass by each aircraft, SAMs were sighted. Three more strafing passes were made by the A-1s. The ground forces were withdrawing at this time. The primary lead A-1 called the reserve lead to bring his element in to replace the first

element. The third and fourth A-1s arrived and the first and second departed to the west, jettisoning their remaining ordnance in the Black River as they egressed. The last helicopter was lifting off the ground as the second flight of A-1s completed one orbit over the objective area. No ordnance was expended by the reserve A-1 element in the objective area. The fifth A-1 maintained an orbit west of the objective area with lights on to draw MIGs should the Assault Force be threatened.

(2) Support Forces:

(a) F-4D (MIG CAP). While in the holding area, the aircraft maintained a 10-mile separation at 16,000 and 18,000 feet. AAA radar was observed initially at 1925Z and SAM radars at 1930Z. When the SAMs appeared to be in the direction of a MIG CAP flight, evasive maneuvers were initiated. The radar homing and warning gear performed as expected. The launches were easily verified as the launch appeared as a large orange fire ball followed by the white-orange flame trailing from the missile sustainer as it ascended. MIG CAP aircraft were forced to rely on their own airborne intercept radar for the detection of enemy aircraft due to equipment failure on the COLLEGE EYE airborne radar platform. [

] In addition, several MIG CAP aircraft performed a RESCAP role in escorting a damaged F-105G aircraft and orbiting over the downed crew.

(b) F-105G (WILD WEASEL). FanSong radar indications were not received until 1928Z; however, radar emissions were received from GCI search radars from the time the first aircraft arrived on station. Approximately 16 SAMs were launched at the WILD WEASEL force. At two different times, six missiles were seen airborne at the same time. Eight of the ten Shrikes carried were fired. There is no confirmation that the Shrikes struck their targets. All of the crews believed they fired within

the parameters of the Shrike,

Most of the Shrike launches were against less than "3-1/2 ring" signals because of the tactics used by the SAM batteries. The FanSong never locked on the aircraft as it headed toward the site. Full strength signals were not received until after 45 degrees of turn toward the escape heading had been made, at which time a lock-on occurred and the SAM fired. Another aircraft would have to be lined up with the site to take advantage of the strong signal. At 1945Z the F-105G flight leader directed the aircraft to move westward five miles from preplanned orbits as the SAM sites did not appear to fire when their targets were over 15 miles from the site. At 1940Z, the third F-105G, Firebird 03, was damaged by a SAM. While cruising at 13,000 feet, two SAMs were launched at Firebird 03. When the SAMs were within one mile of the aircraft, the pilot rolled over and descended to approximately 5,000 feet. When the two missiles arched down following the aircraft, the pilot made a hard pullout. The first SAM passed over the aircraft and detonated behind it. The second passed under the aircraft and detonated behind and below the left wing. The explosion was heard and it appeared that the left wing was on fire. The other F-105G aircraft in the air observed a bright ball of fire in the sky and detected an afterburner coming out of the fireball. The left wing and side of the aircraft remained bright for 12 to 15 seconds and then the fire went out. The aircraft continued to operate normally and egressed the area without further incident. At approximately 1946Z, the fifth F-105G, Firebird 05, was damaged by another SAM which detonated close enough to fill the cockpit with a brilliant flash and provide a mild shock wave. The only sign of trouble was the loss of the stability augmentation system which would not re-engage. The aircraft continued in the area until it was determined that the aircraft was leaking more fuel than it was burning. It appears that the SAM burst ruptured the fuel tanks. The aircraft

gressed toward the Plaine des Jarres where it flamed out at 32,000 feet. The aircrew ejected at 8,000 feet after a maximum range descent. Ejections were successful and the aircrew picked up at 2310Z and 2320Z. The foregoing recap of WILD WEASEL actions in no way represents the hazardous environment of multiple night SAM launches they encountered. The force went into this high threat area knowing it was "bait" and that its mission was to keep the missiles away from the Task Group. They did this successfully since all of the missiles appeared to be fired at the "high flyers." Their performance proved the need for and potential of a WILD WEASEL force.

(c) COLLEGE EYE. All systems were operational except the APX-83 (IFF/SIF) equipment.

Without the IFF/SIF capability, the aircraft operated primarily as a MIG warning agency and radio relay. No MIG warnings were issued. Voice contact with the MIG CAP (F-4D) and WILD WEASEL (F-105) aircraft was exceptionally good.

(d) COMBAT APPLE. The [] systems performed as expected. In addition to its normal functions, the FM enroute frequency of the Task Group was monitored. Enroute position reports were relayed to the TACC-NS via the COMFY SILK UHF net.

(e) Radio-Relay Aircraft. All equipments were operational with four channels available. The use of this aircraft permitted a direct UHF link between COMJCTG, the Task Group aircraft, and CTF-77.

7. Navy Operations:

a. A total of 59 Navy aircraft were launched with the primary purpose of diversion. This force included seven A-6s and 20 A-7s simulating

strikes over northern NVN and the Haiphong Harbor area. The combat air patrols consisted of 12 F-4 and F-8 aircraft. Six ECM/ES-1 aircraft and 14 anti-submarine warfare, tanker, and other support aircraft constituted the remainder of the force. The strike plan consisted of two waves of aircraft divided into three tracks and three IRON HAND orbits. All Navy aircraft adhered to the specified tracks and the entire diversionary operation, including timing, was executed as planned.

b. Three Shrikes were fired at active FanSong radars in the Haiphong area and a total of 190 flares were dropped. No other ordnance was expended.

c. It is estimated that a total of 20 SAMs were launched at the Navy force, most of them at extreme range with ineffective results.

d. NVN reaction was initially slow, reaching a peak of intensity as the second wave was over the Haiphong Harbor. To the degree observable, the principal objective of the Navy diversionary effort was achieved. The density of Navy operations in the Gulf of Tonkin was the most extensive Navy night operation of the SEA conflict. Considering that two of the carriers arrived in-theater just prior to this operation, the precise execution of this mission without incident is commendable.

e. Weather in the Haiphong and northeastern NVN area was clear with unlimited visibility.

f. No operational difficulties were encountered and all Navy aircraft recovered safely.


g. See Part II, Section I, for a detailed concept of operations.


8. Egress. (See map on following page.)


a. Enroute:

(1) HH-53s. As the first and second HH-53s crossed the Black River several crew members on HH-53 number three observed either A-1s or F-105s in their vicinity and issued MIG warnings. Upon hearing the MIG call, number three A-1 decided to jettison ordnance to increase maneuverability but elected to fire the rockets before jettisoning the pods to preclude use of the rockets if recovered by the enemy. Number three A-1 fired the rockets into a ridge line just west of the Black River. The rocket firing was observed by the helicopters and, in conjunction with the MIG calls, interpreted as an attack. The helicopters took evasive action by descending to minimum altitude.


At this point, HH-53 number three declared an emergency due to a transmission chip light which came on prior to the assault and had not been called to avoid confusion or concern. Number five HH-53 intercepted and escorted number three until Firebird 05, a SAM suppressing F-105, was reported down in the vicinity of the Plaine des Jarres. HH-53 number three then joined with number two. Numbers four and five departed with the HC-130 tanker, refueling enroute to the SAR area. Numbers one and two refueled enroute to Udon RTAFB. Numbers four and five arrived in the SAR area where a C-130A aircraft was dropping flares in two locations about one-half mile apart. Number four proceeded to the southern set of flares and number five went to the northern set. After locating the immediate areas of both downed survivors, number five reported ground fire. The SAR aircraft then withdrew to await first light. Numbers four and five rendezvoused with King 21 (SAR HC-130) and number five refueled. During the refueling, number five was called into the SAR area to pinpoint the survivors for Sandy lead (SAR A-1). Number four arrived on scene and recovered the downed EWO. Number five then recovered the downed pilot,








X2	1938	Y2	1938
	1939		1937
X3	1938	Y3	1933
	1943		1932
6	1943	Y4	1939
	1941		CUT OFF
21	1943	Y5	1952
	1947		1957
ORBIT	2027	Y8	1958
	2030		2002
Z3	2053	Y9	2005
	2056		2071
2A	2050	Y10	2011
	2102		2015
1	2115	Y11	2027
	2118		2027
UDORN	2125	Z3	2037
	2128		2036
ORBIT	2125	2A	2125
	2122		2131
1	2131	1	2133
	2133		2147
UDORN	2147	UDORN	2140
	2157		2157
	2202		2202





X1	1921	Y1	1921
	1922		1922
X2	1923	Y2	1923
	1924		1924
X3	1925	Y3	1925
	1926		1926
6	1927	Y4	1927
	1928		OUT OFF
Z1	1929	Y5	1929
	1930		1930
ORBIT	2027	Y8	1931
	2030		2032
Z3	2033	Y9	2033
	2036		2037
24	2038	Y10	2014
	2102		2015
1	2115	Y11	2027
	2116		2027
UDORK	2125	Z3	2037
	2126		2036
ORBIT	2125	24	2125
	2122		2122
1	2133	1	2131
	2147		2133
UDORK	2149	UDORK	2147
	2157		2149
	2202		2202

rendevoused with King 21 and refueled. Numbers four and five then recovered at Udorn RTAFB.

(2) Assault C-130E:

(a) Enroute to its holding point on the NVN/Laos border, the aircraft received emissions from FanSong radar (SAM target tracking and missile guidance). The aircraft descended to 1,000 feet AGL, the radar signal disappeared and the aircraft climbed back to flight plan altitude. At this time, a missile launch was detected by the EWO. The aircraft descended to 1,000 feet AGL and remained at this altitude until reaching its holding point in northeast Laos. Soon after the missile launch was detected, a missile was seen exploding several miles to the east of the aircraft. No further SAM activity was noted. The aircraft orbited its holding point for 49 minutes, providing UHF direction finding steers for returning A-1s and helicopters.

(b) After insuring that all aircraft had passed the orbit point, a climb to flight plan altitude was initiated. After passing 3,500 feet the EWO detected a conical scan airborne intercept radar approaching from the southwest. The radar signal disappeared after a rapid descent to 1,000 feet. A short time later a climb was made to flight plan altitude. No further radar activity was detected. The remainder of the flight was completed in accordance with flight plan.

(3) A-1s:

(a) Departure of the A-1s from the objective area closely followed preplanned procedures. Numbers one and two departed with the first HH-53. They jettisoned a total of five pods of rockets, four white phosphorous bombs, and two CBU-14 units in the Black River as they crossed outbound. Numbers three and four departed with HH-53s numbers two and three. These A-1s jettisoned their full ordnance loads on a 3,500 foot

karst peak approximately 3NM south of course on the west side of the Black River. Number five departed behind the HH-53s and did not jettison any ordnance.

(b) All aircraft utilized the preplanned return route and recovered at Udorn RTAFB. Recovery times spanned a 30-minute period because of varying airspeeds. Only number three recovered with less than one hour of reserve fuel.

(4) Strike C-130E. The Strike Force C-130E departed the objective area in low level terrain following mode due to a warning that MIGs were in the area. At approximately 90 miles from the objective area, the aircraft climbed to 8,500 feet and proceeded to the planned orbit point northwest of the Plaine des Jarres. UHF/DF steers were provided for all returning mission aircraft. After the last aircraft passed the orbit point, the strike C-130E proceeded to Udorn RTAFB without further incident.

(5) HC-130P. The spare HC-130P tanker refueled HH-53s numbers one and two and provided DF information as necessary on egress. The primary tanker refueled HH-53s numbers four and five and then proceeded with the helicopters to the area where an F-105 crew (Firebird 05) ejected. The primary tanker coordinated with the Udorn RTAFB SAR Center and directed the SAR effort for the Firebird crew members. Flares were dropped over the downed crew members and the HH-53s prepared for a night pickup. However, the flareship was unable to drop flares precisely over the downed crew members and it was decided to wait for a first light pickup. At first light, Sandy lead cleared HH-53s numbers four and five to make their pickups. All SAR forces returned to Udorn RTAFB without incident.

(6) COLLEGE EYE. The backup aircraft departed station at 2032Z and returned to Korat RTAFB.

(7) COMBAT APPLE. Upon completion of the operation, the aircraft assumed its normal responsibilities and remained on station until 0100Z.

(8) Radio-Relay Aircraft. Upon completion of the operation, control of the aircraft reverted to Commander, Seventh Air Force.

b. Recovery. All primary mission JCTG aircraft including the F-105s recovered at Udorn RTAFB. A parking plan for all aircraft was worked out in advance and a ramp coordinator was appointed to insure that aircraft were rapidly directed to designated parking areas. A majority of the aircraft arrived within the period between 2100 and 2200Z. Although available debriefing facilities and aircrew transportation were overtaxed, the recovery was orderly and no significant problems were encountered.

9. Reconstitution. The JCTG was reconstituted at Takhli RTAFB after recovery. Ground forces and helicopter and A-1E crew members were returned from Udorn RTAFB to Takhli RTAFB by theater airlift aircraft upon completion of preliminary intelligence debriefing. Crew members of F-105 WILD WEASEL aircraft were returned to Korat RTAFB by the same means. Mission C-130E and spare UH-1H aircrews returned their own aircraft to Takhli RTAFB. The A-1E and spare HH-3 aircraft were returned to respective home bases by unit crews.

10. Signal:

a. General. The detailed communications electronic planning, coordination, and training proved effective during the employment phase in providing required communications support from National Military Command level down to and including assault force operating elements in the objective area.

(1) Communications support to the National Military Command Center in Washington, D.C., was responsive and reports from the objective area were received with a two-minute delay from the objective area.

(2) Communications support in the TACC-NS at DaNang provided COMBAT real-time display and control of operations throughout the tactical area of operations.

(3) Communications support organic to the assault force provided effective command and control communications in the objective area.

b. Assault Force Communications:

(1) The assault force communications procedures established in the Ground Force Mission SOI (eight radio nets and visual signals) provided responsive and efficient command and control communications during the assault force ingress to, operations in, and egress from the objective area.

(2) All radio nets with the exception of the forward air guide (FAG) net were activated and functioned as planned.

(a) The air ground net (UHF) was extensively utilized for coordination of close air support, recall of helicopters for extraction, and relay of operational reports from COMARCOM in the objective area to COMJCTG at the TACC-NS.

(b) The FAG net (FM) was not activated as an enemy ground buildup did not develop to the extent that FAGs were required to direct close air support strikes.

(c) The three ground force task group nets were used by ground force group leaders for internal control and reporting during ground operations in the objective area.

(d) The ground force emergency net was used by the ground force support group in attempting to coordinate execution of the alternate plan and the SAR emergency net was used in recovery of two downed F-105 pilots.

(3) Visual signals (green star clusters, bean bag marking lights and strobe lights) were used as planned and on an emergency basis to

mark ground force elements' locations for helicopter pickup and to mark helicopter LZs.

11. Security. During force employment, the Security Staff Section monitored secure working areas for final mission study and briefings. Cover stories were developed and disseminated to account for personnel movement and aircraft departures. Aircraft movement security measures were implemented during the actual force employment, including radio silence, IFF silence, and strict ECM and radar beacon emission control.

J. COMMAND AND CONTROL:

1. General:

a. COMJCTG was responsible to CINCPAC for the conduct of the operation and continued to maintain operational control of JCTG elements throughout their deployment to Takhli RTAFB. At H-5, he assumed operational control of augmenting theater forces.

b. Mission control and coordination of the Task Group during the ingress, objective area, and egress operations were centralized with COMJCTG at the Tactical Air Control Center-North Sector (TACC-NS), Monkey Mountain, RVN. The command and control system was comprised of in-being elements of the Southeast Asia Tactical Air Control System augmented by two COLLEGE EYE airborne radar platforms which were obtained from USAF CONUS resources.

c. COMJCTG was in place [REDACTED] to H-hour. The following elements were utilized and responsive to COMJCTG: Control and Reporting Centers (radar sites) at Udorn, Thailand, and Monkey Mountain, RVN; airborne radar platforms (COLLEGE EYE); [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] digital
links with Navy's automated Tactical Data System afloat in the Gulf of

Tonkin; radio-relay aircraft; and the Tactical Air Control Center-North Sector. All elements performed as planned except the airborne radar platforms and the digital link with the Navy's automated system.

d. Two airborne radar platforms were planned to be operational over the Gulf of Tonkin; however, the primary aircraft lost an engine and aborted; the backup aircraft experienced a failure in its IFF equipment used to track friendly aircraft. Thus COMJCTG was deprived of the capability of electronically monitoring the low flying task force. The periodic failure of a computer buffer (USMC-operated) between the Air Force and Navy automated systems deprived the TACC-NS of continuous display of the real-time air picture derived from Navy sensors. The backup automated teletype system was activated and provided a near real-time (two-minute delay) display of Navy derived air situation data.

e. All planned communications performed satisfactorily. In every case, more than one element monitored each assigned frequency and equipments were available for a total backup capability. COMJCTG was capable of maintaining direct control of assigned forces through the use of the radio-relay aircraft (UHF) and HF/SSB communications. In addition, two dedicated voice circuits (unsecure) were activated between the TACC-NS and the NMCC and CINCPAC. These permitted close to real-time mission progress reports to CINCPAC and NMCC.

f. The Control and Reporting Center at Udorn, Thailand, controlled all refueling operations for the F-4 MIG CAP and F-105 WILD WEASEL aircraft and provided required radar control of task force aircraft operating over Thailand and Laos.

g. SAM warnings were issued by an airborne Navy ELINT aircraft 10 minutes prior to the firing of the first SAM at the task force. However, task force elements do not recall hearing the warning. No MIG warnings were issued by control elements.

h. The airborne aircraft (COMBAT APPLE) provided a capability to monitor A-1 and C-130E FM transmissions, [REDACTED]

2. Rules of Engagement. The Rules of Engagement specified in the JCTG Operational Plan were amplified by COMJCTG to permit the Air Force and the Navy diversionary force to utilize air-to-ground missiles (Shrike/Standard Arm) against NVN radar controlled SAM/AAA defenses that posed a threat to US forces. Also, CTF-77 was advised that no authorization had been granted by higher authority for the Navy forces to drop bombs.

3. SAM/MIG Warnings. It was originally planned to have all agencies with the capability to detect hostile aircraft issue hostile aircraft warnings on Guard channel. SAM warnings were to be issued to the high flying jet aircraft on their primary frequencies. During the mission briefings at Takhli RTAFB, it was recognized that extensive use of Guard channel for warning purposes would interfere with normal ground force communications. The ground force UHF radios possessed a Guard channel override feature, thus permitting Guard transmissions to block out normal communications. Because of this, all communicating stations were instructed to keep Guard transmissions to an absolute minimum unless an actual emergency existed. This procedure accounts for the minimum number of SAM warnings issued and received by the Task Group.

4. Control Messages. Code words were used in all message traffic dealing with Command and Control. (A listing of these messages is in Part II, Section J.)

K. REDEPLOYMENT:

1. Airlift Coordination. Direct coordination with the MAC Airlift Command Post at Clark Air Base was effected by the JCTG Operations Staff.

Two aeromedical configured C-141 aircraft, prepositioned at Udorn RTAFB to return recovered prisoners, were dispatched to Takhli RTAFB for an H+15:00 departure to the CONUS. These two aircraft were used to move all Army troops except a small group of operations staff personnel who were retained to prepare equipment for shipment. The remainder of the passengers were Air Force crew members and support personnel. Two additional C-141s departed on D+1 with loads consisting of maintenance equipment, the UH-1H and accompanying personnel. The remainder of the JCTG departed Takhli RTAFB via C-141 on D+2 and closed at Eglin AFB at 0800Z on 24 November 1970. No significant problems were encountered on the redeployment of the JCTG.

2. Redistribution of Theater Assets. One theater airlift C-130 aircraft was retained at Takhli RTAFB until D+1. This aircraft was utilized to return theater helicopter and A-1E crews to their home bases and to return survival and special equipment to theater units. Survival equipment included vests, radios, weapons, and parachutes which had been provided by operational units at Udorn RTAFB and Nakhon Phanom RTAFB. Special equipment consisted of two helium compressors and helium cylinders which had been provided by the 3d ARRCp. These were returned to point of origin via rescue HC-130P aircraft.

3. Mission Aircraft Movement. Both mission C-130E aircraft were prepared and loaded with enroute support items on 21 November. The aircraft departed Takhli RTAFB on 22 November and arrived at Norton AFB, California, on 25 November 1970. The aircraft were input to Lockheed, Ontario, on 26 November for FLIR demodification. Aircrew personnel and enroute support items were returned to Pope AFB, North Carolina, via TAC airlift C-130 on 26 November.

4. Security. The Security Staff Section continued to implement safeguarding procedures for classified information and material. Applicable movement security measures were used. Security briefings were given to aircrews flying redeployment missions and actions taken to prevent unauthorized press releases.

I. POST OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES. Upon return to Eglin AFB, Florida, air and ground elements of the JCTG conducted detailed debriefings, prepared and submitted recommendations for awards and decorations, prepared letters of appreciation to supporting organizations, and prepared performance reports on personnel assigned to the JCTG.

1. Debriefings. Extensive and in-depth debriefings were conducted by both ground and air elements. A compilation of debriefing statements by members of the ground force is contained in Part III. A verbatim transcript of the aircrew debriefing is also contained in Part III.

2. Awards and Decorations. An Awards and Decorations Staff was designated and, concurrent with debriefing and report preparation, citations for awards were prepared for 115 Army and 162 Air Force members of the JCTG. These were submitted to JCS J-1 on 3 December 1970.

3. Letters of Appreciation. During the six months course of this operation, many organizations, agencies, and individuals rendered exceptional support to the Feasibility Study Group and the JCTG. There were so many, in fact, that it was impossible for the small JCTG staff to recognize all such support to the degree desired. However, numerous letters of appreciation were prepared for major organizations and units providing support and assistance.

4. Performance Reports. The majority of the personnel assigned to the JCTG were assigned for periods exceeding 90 days and, therefore, required performance reports. All required reports were prepared and submitted prior to release of the reporting officials.

5. Security. All JCTG personnel were given a thorough oral debriefing and subsequently executed a security termination and debriefing certificate. Safeguarding procedures regarding classified information and material were emphasized. The Security Staff Section was directly responsible for the

planned and systematic establishment and maintenance of the maximum secrecy of this operation. This accomplishment was one of the most significant contributions to the successful mission which was carried out with complete surprise and resulted in the safe return of all air and ground personnel.

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MISCELLANEOUS

EGLIN AFB, FLORIDA WAS SELECTED AS THE TRAINING SITE BECAUSE OF ITS VAST AREA AND THE FACT THAT OTHER JOINT TRAINING EXERCISES WERE CONDUCTED THERE AT FREQUENT INTERVALS WE FELT WE COULD CONDUCT THE TRAINING WITHOUT CREATING ANY SPECULATIONS AS TO WHAT THE ACTUAL MISSION WAS. WE EMPLOYED COVER STORIES TO INDICATE WE WERE TRAINING A FORCE TO RECOVER BELEAGUED US NATIONALS, GIVING THE IDEA THAT PERHAPS WE WERE GOING TO TRY TO RECOVER KIDNAPPED DIPLOMATS. THE CODE WORD FOR THE PROJECT WAS IVORY COAST WHICH AUTOMATICALLY LEADS ONE TO THINK OF AFRICA.

WE WANTED THE TASK GROUP TO BE COMPOSED OF 100 PERCENT VOLUNTEERS. COLONEL SIMONS WENT TO FORT BRAGG, N. C., THE HOME OF THE US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES, TO SELECT THE PERSONNEL FOR THE ARMY FORCES. WE NEEDED APPROXIMATELY 100 ARMY PERSONNEL. ALTHOUGH WE COULD NOT TELL THEM WHAT THE MISSION WAS, EXCEPT THEY WERE VOLUNTEERING FOR AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT MISSION AND ONE THAT HAD CONSIDERABLE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH IT, FIVE HUNDRED PERSONNEL VOLUNTEERED FOR THE ASSIGNMENT. EACH VOLUNTEER WAS INTERVIEWED BY COLONEL SIMONS AND A MEDICAL OFFICER BEFORE FINAL SELECTION OF THE 100 PERSONNEL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MISSION.

I SELECTED THE US AIR FORCE PERSONNEL BASED ON THEIR EXPERIENCE. WE FELT WE HAD THE VERY BEST AIRCREWS AVAILABLE FOR THIS OPERATION. THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL WERE ALL COMBAT EXPERIENCED PEOPLE AND HAD SERVED PREVIOUS TOURS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA EXCEPT FOUR OF THE ARMY FORCE WHO WERE SELECTED BECAUSE OF CERTAIN SPECIALTIES WE NEEDED.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY WAS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE AND THIS ACTION WAS STRESSED THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION SINCE ANY BREACH OF SECURITY WOULD CERTAINLY CAUSE CANCELLATION OF THE MISSION. THE TASK GROUP WAS AUGMENTED BY SECURITY EXPERTS FROM THE USAF OSI, THE USAF SECURITY SERVICE AND THE US ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

THROUGHOUT THE PLANNING AND TRAINING CYCLES WE CONCENTRATED ON THE STUDY OF THE ENEMY DEFENSES AND CAMP ACTIVITY. CLOSE COORDINATION WAS EFFECTED WITH ALL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. WE RECEIVED EXCELLENT PHOTOGRAPHY, PHOTO INTERPRETATION AND A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON THE PRISONERS OF WAR FROM THE DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND USAF INTELLIGENCE. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WORKED CLOSELY WITH US AND THEY CONSTRUCTED A SCALE MODEL OF THE POW CAMP WHICH WAS EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN OUR PLANNING AND TRAINING. A FULL SCALE MODEL OF THE CAMP WAS CONSTRUCTED AT EGLIN AND TO GIVE YOU A GOOD APPRECIATION FOR OUR CONCERN FOR SECURITY THE CAMP WAS USED AT NIGHT FOR OUR TRAINING AND DISASSEMBLED PRIOR TO DAYLIGHT IN ORDER TO AVOID DETECTION BY.

THE TRAINING WAS INTENSE AND VERY THOROUGH. THE GROUND TACTICS WERE REHEARSED A TOTAL OF 170 TIMES AGAINST THE MODEL OF THE SON TAY CAMP. JOINT TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED NIGHTLY, INCLUDING WEEKENDS AND HOLIDAYS. THE JOINT ASPECTS OF THE MISSION WERE STRESSED THROUGHOUT THIS TRAINING AND JOINT TRAINING MEETINGS WERE HELD DAILY PRIOR TO MISSION BRIEFINGS. NO INTER-SERVICE PROBLEMS DEVELOPED AT ALL.

EVEN THOUGH WE DECIDED TO USE OFF-THE-SHELF EQUIPMENT AND PROVEN TECHNIQUES TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WE DID COME UP WITH SOME EXCELLENT INNOVATIONS FOR LOW LEVEL NAVIGATION, COMMUNICATIONS, FIRE FIGHT SIMULATORS, ORDNANCE AND NIGHT OPTICS. AS AN EXAMPLE, WE PROCURED A NIGHT OPTICS SIGHT ON THE COMMERCIAL MARKET. THIS SIMPLE SIGHT, NORMALLY USED BY HUNTERS, INCREASED THE NIGHT FIRING ACCURACY FROM THE NORMAL 35 PERCENT TO ABOUT 95 PERCENT.

IN THE MEDICAL AREA, OUR MEDICAL STAFF OFFICER MADE A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE POW'S. HE WENT BACK TO WW II AND THE KOREAN WAR TO STUDY THE CONDITIONS WE HAD FOUND AMONG OUR POWS. HE DETERMINED WHAT CONDITION WE MIGHT FIND THESE PEOPLE IN AND WHAT KIND OF FOOD, MEDICINES, AND CLOTHING WOULD BE REQUIRED BY THE POWS.

ON 16 SEPTEMBER I BRIEFED THE JCS ON THE TECHNICAL CONCEPT AND REPORTED THAT THE PLAN WAS FEASIBLE AND THE FORCE WOULD BE TRAINED AND READY FOR EMPLOYMENT BY 8 OCTOBER. WE RECOMMENDED THE MISSION BE CONDUCTED ON 21 OCTOBER. WE BRIEFED THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE DIRECTOR, CIA, ON 24 SEPTEMBER.

THE SECRETARY DEFERRED HIS APPROVAL PENDING WORD FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY AND AUTHORIZED US TO BRIEF ADMIRAL McCAIN, CINCPAC, WHO WAS TO BE IN WASHINGTON ON 25 SEPTEMBER. THE PLAN WAS ENTHUSIASTICALLY RECEIVED BUT IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE OPERATION SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL NOVEMBER, OUR ALTERNATE DATE.

ONE REASON I WANTED TO GO IN OCTOBER WAS BECAUSE I WAS VERY MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT SECURITY. HOWEVER, THE DELAY ALLOWED US TIME FOR FURTHER TRAINING AND COORDINATION.

ON 27 OCTOBER THE CHAIRMAN, JCS, APPROVED THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN IN-THEATER COORDINATING STAFF ON 1 NOVEMBER AND THE TASK GROUP ON 10 NOVEMBER. THE FINAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT THE MISSION WAS GIVEN TO ME ON 18 NOVEMBER, AFTER I ARRIVED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

THERE WAS A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF COORDINATION TO BE ACCOMPLISHED ONCE WE ARRIVED IN-THEATER. AIRCRAFT AND CREWS HAD TO BE MOVED FROM THEIR NORMAL OPERATING BASE TO THE LAUNCH BASE. ALL CREWS HAD TO BE BRIEFED SINCE WE WERE USING SOME ADDITIONAL IN-THEATER FORCES THAT HAD NOT BEEN USED DURING THE TRAINING PERIOD. ALL ELEMENTS OF THE JOINT TASK GROUP WERE IN PLACE AND IN A HIGH STATE OF READINESS TO PERFORM THEIR INDIVIDUAL MISSIONS. IT WAS THE US AIR FORCE'S JOB TO TRANSPORT THE US ARMY RAIDING FORCE INTO THE OBJECTIVE AREA, TO PROTECT THIS FORCE WHILE THEY PERFORMED THEIR MISSION AND TO AIRLIFT THIS FORCE, PLUS POSSIBLY UP TO ONE HUNDRED US PRISONERS OF WAR, FROM THE CAMP AND RETURN THEM TO THE STAGING BASE. IN THE MEANTIME, THE US NAVY WOULD BE CARRYING OUT THEIR ASSIGNED DIVERSIONARY MISSIONS TO CONFUSE THE ENEMIES DEFENSES AND TO DRAW THEIR ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE ACTUAL OBJECTIVE AREA. EVERYONE WAS SET TO GO ON THE NIGHT OF 21 NOVEMBER.

WE WERE ADVISED ON 18 NOVEMBER THAT TYPHOON PATSY WAS OVER THE PHILIPPINES AND MOVING WEST WITH A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF WEATHER ASSOCIATED WITH IT. ALSO, A FRONT WAS MOVING DOWN FROM CHINA AND THE TWO WERE FORECASTED TO CONVERGE OVER HANOI ON THE NIGHT OF 21 NOVEMBER, OUR PRIMARY DATE. THE WEATHER EXPERTS TOLD ME THAT THE ONLY THING THAT COULD SAVE THE DAY WOULD BE FOR A RIDGE TO

FORM AS IT SOMETIMES DOES OVER HANOI AND IF THIS HAPPENED IT WOULD MOVE THE CLOUDS OUT OF THE HANOI AREA BUT ONLY FOR A FEW HOURS. I THEN MADE THE TOUGHEST DECISION OF THE ENTIRE OPERATION. I DECIDED TO GO ON THE MISSION ONE DAY EARLY.

JUST A FEW HOURS BEFORE LAUNCH TIME THE GROUP WAS ASSEMBLED AND FOR THE FIRST TIME THE MEN WERE TOLD OF THE ACTUAL MISSION. THEY WERE SO THRILLED AND ELATED THEY STOOD UP AND APPLAUDED. THEY WERE IN HIGH SPIRITS, UP FOR THE MISSION AND READY TO GO. I FELT I HAD THE BEST TRAINED AND BEST SUPPORTED FORCE EVER ASSEMBLED FOR A SPECIAL OPERATION. I WAS CONFIDENT OF OUR CAPABILITY TO DO THE JOB.

ALL FACETS OF THE OPERATION WENT PRECISELY AS PLANNED. THE WEATHER ENROUTE AND OVER THE OBJECTIVE AREA WAS EXCELLENT. THE TRICKY REFUELLING OPERATIONS AT NIGHT WERE WITHOUT INCIDENT. OUR COMMUNICATIONS WORKED WELL AND THE TIMING WAS NEAR PERFECT FOR THE RAIDING FORCE AS WELL AS ALL THE SUPPORT ELEMENTS. THERE WERE NO SURPRISES ON ENEMY REACTION. OUR MISSILE AND A MIG SUPPRESSION WAS EFFECTIVE. THE NAVY DIVERSION EFFORT UTTERLY CONFUSED THE ENEMIES DEFENSES AND OUR A-1s PROVIDED EXCELLENT COVER FOR THE C-130s AND THE HELICOPTERS OVER THE PRISONER OF WAR CAMP.

THE ASSAULT FORCE LANDED INSIDE THE PRISON WALLS EXACTLY AS PLANNED AND THE REMAINDER OF THE RAIDING FORCE LANDED JUST OUTSIDE THE PRISON WALLS. THE EFFECT OF SURPRISE AND SHOCK ON THE ENEMY WAS OBVIOUSLY ACHIEVED. OUR INTENSE TRAINING HAD PAID OFF. WE WERE ORGANIZED, THE ENEMY WAS NOT. THE ASSAULT FORCE WENT DIRECTLY TO THE BUILDINGS WE SUSPECTED OF HOUSING OUR POWs. THE ENEMY DEFENDERS WHO INTERFERED WERE QUICKLY NEUTRALIZED. ALL OF THE CELLS AND BUILDINGS WERE QUICKLY AND THOROUGHLY SEARCHED. THERE WAS GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT WHEN THE CELLS WERE FOUND TO BE EMPTY - A DRY HOLE - A TREMENDOUS DISAPPOINTMENT TO ALL OF THE MEN WHO PLAYED A PART IN THIS HEROIC EFFORT. WE SUFFERED NO CASUALTIES.

THE EXTRACTION OF THE FORCE AND THE RETURN TO THE RECOVERY BASE WERE FOR THE MOST PART UNEVENTFUL ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SOME TENSE MOMENTS DUE TO THE SAM FIRINGS AT OUR AIRCRAFT. THIS ACTION FOR THE MOST PART WAS INEFFECTIVE AND WE RETALIATED BY FIRING AIR-TO-GROUND MISSILES AT THE ENEMY'S SAM GUIDANCE

RADARS THAT HAD LOCKED ON OUR AIRCRAFT.

UPON THEIR RETURN TO THE RECOVERY BASE I TALKED WITH THE MEN AND PRAISED THEM FOR THEIR EXTRAORDINARY AND VALOROUS EFFORTS. THERE WAS A UNIVERSAL FEELING OF DISAPPOINTMENT AND DISBELIEF. MANY OF THESE MEN EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO TRY AGAIN AND ASKED TO BE INCLUDED SHOULD ANOTHER ATTEMPT DEVELOP. THESE BRAVE MEN SYMBOLIZE OUR PROUD HERITAGE OF MEN WHO HAVE BEEN WILLING TO MAKE THE SUPREME SACRIFICE TO HELP THEIR FELLOW MAN AND TO SUPPORT AND DEFEND OUR CHERISHED FREEDOMS.

ONE COULD ASK THE QUESTION, WHY WOULD WE ATTEMPT SUCH AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS MISSION DEEP IN THE HEARTLAND OF THE ENEMY? WE MUST NEVER FORGET THAT THERE ARE SOME 1,550 AMERICANS EITHER PRISONERS OF WAR OR MISSING IN ACTION AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT WITH NORTH VIETNAM. WE MUST REMEMBER THAT IN JUST TWO SHORT MONTHS FROM NOW SOME OF OUR MEN WILL HAVE BEEN PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING FOR SEVEN LONG-SUFFERING YEARS. NEVER HAVE AMERICANS BEEN HELD FOR SUCH A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

NORTH VIETNAM HAS CONTINUALLY REFUSED TO HONOR HER GENEVA CONVENTION AGREEMENTS RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR. NORTH VIETNAM HAS REFUSED TO RELEASE THE SICK AND WOUNDED; REFUSED TO ALLOW FREE FLOW OF MAIL; REFUSED TO RELEASE OFFICIAL LISTS OF THOSE THEY HOLD PRISONER AND THOSE THEY KNOW TO BE DEAD; AND REFUSED TO ALLOW IMPARTIAL INSPECTIONS OF PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS.

IN SHARP CONTRAST ARE THE PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHERE THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HOLDS ABOUT 37,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG PRISONERS. THESE CAMPS ARE REGULARLY INSPECTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS. DEFICIENCIES ARE CORRECTED AND THE COMMITTEE MAY SPEAK WITH PRISONERS HELD BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRIVATELY OR IN GROUPS.

THE WORD TO DESCRIBE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IS "INHUMANE." "OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE," AS RECENTLY STATED BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LAIRD, "IS TO BRING THE PRISONERS BACK HOME AND REUNITE THEM WITH THEIR LOVED ONES." UNTIL THAT IS A REALITY, THE GOVERNMENT WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PRESSURE NORTH VIETNAM INTO OBSERVING THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION.

I WAS EXCEEDINGLY PROUD TO BE A PART OF THIS JOINT SERVICE EFFORT. IT WAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO AGAIN TAKE THE WAR TO THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE ENEMY'S CAPITAL AND GIVE THEM A TASTE OF THEIR OWN TACTICS. THIS WAS THE FIRST POSITIVE ACTION THAT HAS BEEN TAKEN TO ATTEMPT TO FREE OUR PRISONERS OF WAR. THIS MISSION REAFFIRMED TO THE WORLD OUR NATION'S CONCERN FOR OUR MEN HELD CAPTIVE BY THE ENEMY. IT GAVE RENEWED FAITH AND HOPE TO THE FAMILIES OF THE POWS AND THOSE MISSING IN ACTION AND HOPEFULLY, IT GAVE RENEWED FAITH AND HOPE TO THE POWS TOO. IT PROVED TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT THEY ARE NOT INVULNERABLE TO INCURSIONS DEEP IN THEIR TERRITORY WHEN WE FEEL A HUMANITARIAN NEED TO DO IT.

I WILL CLOSE BY EMPHASIZING THE JOINT SERVICE ASPECTS OF THE ENTIRE OPERATION. TO ME, IT WAS THE EPITOME OF COOPERATION AND WORKING IN CLOSE HARMONY BY ELEMENTS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE. THE PLANNING, TRAINING AND EXECUTION WERE ALMOST PERFECT IN EVERY RESPECT.

THE MISSION WAS CULMINATED IN A UNIQUE JOINT SERVICE CEREMONY, WITHOUT PRECEDENT, AT FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA, WHERE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PRESENTED DECORATIONS FOR VALOR TO THE MEMBERS OF THE FORCE.

GENTLEMEN AND YOUR LADIES -- I HAVE BEEN LOOKING FORWARD TO COMING DOWN TO HURLBURT SINCE I RECEIVED THE INVITATION FROM GENERAL KNIGHT/COLONEL POPE.

THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS -- FIRST, IT GIVES ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO

RUB ELBOWS WITH MY AIR FORCE COMPATRIOTS. AND SECONDLY, COMING BACK TO HURLBURT IS A VERY PLEASANT REUNION FOR ME. I DID ENJOY MY RECENT TOUR AT EGLIN AS COMMANDER OF THE SOF -- THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE. I HAD A FINE GROUP OF MEN TO WORK WITH, A GOOD BUNCH OF AIRPLANES TO FLY, AN EXCELLENT SET OF GOVERNMENT QUARTERS AND A BOAT. LET ME TELL YOU ABOUT THE BOAT -----!

BUT SERIOUSLY, THERE'S A THIRD REASON THAT I ENJOY COMING DOWN HERE TO THE HOME OF THE AIR COMMANDOS AND THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES. THAT REASON IS THAT I ALWAYS WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT THE SOF CONCEPT. I BECAME A FIRM BELIEVER IN THIS CONCEPT AND THIS MORNING I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT THE FUTURE OF SOF.

THERE ARE CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE SOF FUTURE THAT ARE FAIRLY PREDICTABLE. HERE I AM TALKING OF OUR ROLE IN GENERAL AND LIMITED WAR PLANNING. THERE IS NOW AND THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A REQUIREMENT FOR SOF FORCES ESPECIALLY IN SUPPORT OF THE UNCONVENTIONAL WAR MISSION - THAT UNIQUE COMBINATION OF THE RELATED ACTIVITIES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE, ESCAPE AND EYASION, SUBVERSION, DIRECT ACTION AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES. THESE SNEAKY-PETE MISSIONS WILL REMAIN. AND SO WILL THE REQUIREMENT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS. ALL TYPES OF COMBAT GENERATE REQUIREMENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND OUR SOF WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS. THESE UW AND PSYOP CONTRIBUTIONS WILL BE OF A CONTINUING NATURE.

AT THIS POINT YOU ARE PROBABLY ASKING YOURSELVES -- WELL WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF SOF IN COUNTERINSURGENCY, AFTER ALL THAT'S WHAT THE NAME OF THIS COURSE IS?

ANY PROGNOSTICATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF OUR SPECIAL OPS, FORCE MUST BE DONE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE. PARTICULARLY THAT PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY THAT STATES AND I QUOTE "CONSISTENT WITH THE NIXON DOCTRINE. WE CAN AND WE WILL PROVIDE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SUPPLEMENT LOCAL EFFORTS WHERE OUR INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED". UNQUOTE. YOU MIGHT ASK: "WHAT IS THE NIXON DOCTRINE?" ACTUALLY, THERE IS NO SINGLE PIECE OF PAPER BUT RATHER A SERIES OF FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENTS THAT DESCRIBE STRATEGY. THIS IS THE STRATEGY BY WHICH WE HOPE TO REALIZE OUR GOAL OF PEACE AS SUMMARIZED IN THE THREE PILLARS OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970s -- PARTNERSHIP, STRENGTH AND A WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE. THE COURSE WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS CHOSEN TO ATTAIN THIS GOAL IS THE COURSE OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS NOT THE PATH OF ISOLATIONISM--WHICH HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US, DOES NOT LEAD TO PEACE IN THE WORLD. NOR IS IT THE PATH OF THE PAX AMERICANA, WHICH WOULD IMPOSE ON OUR COUNTRY THE BURDEN OF BEARING THE PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFEGUARDING THE PEACE OF THE WORLD AGAINST ALL POSSIBLE THREATS. THE PRESIDENT'S COURSE CAREFULLY MAINTAINS A LEVEL OF MILITARY STRENGTH ADEQUATE TO MEET THE THREATS TO OUR SECURITY, AVOIDING TRUCULENCE, PROVOCATION, OR DOMINATION ON THE ONE HAND AND, AVOIDING, ON THE OTHER, THE WEAKNESS THAT INVITES AGGRESSION.

THERE HAVE BEEN SOME RECENT ACTIONS TOWARD IMPLEMENTING THE NIXON DOCTRINE. ONE OF THE FIRST STEPS HAS BEEN THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM AND THE ATTENDANT US FORCE REDUCTIONS. KOREA TOO, AS WELL AS OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD ARE SEEING US FORCE REDUCTIONS UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE.

ANOTHER ACTION IS THE REVISED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT ACT SENT TO CONGRESS. IT APPEARS THAT THESE NEW ACTS WILL NOT BE ACTED ON BY CONGRESS THIS YEAR BECAUSE OF HEAVY POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IN AN ELECTION YEAR.

THE MILITARY SERVICES FOR THEIR PART ARE CURRENTLY REEVALUATING THEIR FORCE STRUCTURE, TACTICS AND DOCTRINE IN ORDER TO MORE EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT THE NIXON DOCTRINE. WE ON THE JOINT STAFF ARE CONSTANTLY SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY TOWARD ASSISTING THE PRESIDENT IN THE ATTAINMENT OF HIS FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.

WE SHOULD EACH STUDY THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND STUDY ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AIR FORCE. INCIDENTALLY, I MIGHT ADD HERE THAT IT LOOKS LIKE THE NIXON DOCTRINE WOULD NOT BE OUT OF VOGUE WITH AN ADMINISTRATION CHANGE, IN VIEW OF CONTINUING PRESSURES OF AUSTERE FUNDING, INCREASED INTEREST IN DOMESTIC CONCERNS, ETC. I BELIEVE THOUGH THAT THE TONE OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE IS QUITE CLEAR -- LESS INVOLVEMENT OF US FORCES IN INSURGENCIES AND OTHER CONTINGENCIES. YET IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WILL BE NO US INVOLVEMENT IN THESE ACTIVITIES. CERTAINLY WE MUST MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO EXERCISE MILITARY OPTIONS FOR THOSE POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES WHERE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED.

THERE ARE SOME WHO VIEW THE NIXON DOCTRINE AS SUGGESTING THERE WILL BE NO FUTURE INVOLVEMENT OF US FORCES IN ASSISTING LESSER-DEVELOPED NATIONS! I CANNOT ACCEPT THAT INTERPRETATION. MR. NIXON WAS QUITE CLEAR WHEN HE SAID THE US WOULD PROVIDE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THREATENED NATIONS. HE DID NOTE, THOUGH, THAT THE HOST NATION WOULD PROVIDE THE "MANPOWER."

SO WE CAN ANTICIPATE US PARTICIPATION, THEN, WHERE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE AFFECTED BY COMMUNIST INSURGENT ACTION AGAINST A FRIENDLY NATION REQUESTING OUR ASSISTANCE. BUT WHAT DO WE ENVISION AS THE TYPE OF US INVOLVEMENT? CERTAINLY, THERE WILL BE A CONTINUATION OF THE MOBILE TRAINING TEAM (MTT) CONCEPT WHICH I'M CONFIDENT YOU DISCUSSED IN THE CLASSROOM HERE. THESE TEAMS OFFER A UNIQUE CAPABILITY TO PASS ALONG ADVICE, ASSISTANCE, TRAINING AND TO ENHANCE THE RAPPORT BETWEEN FRIENDLY AIR FORCES. AND THEY CAN BE USED FOR MANY TYPES OF

TRAINING -- E.G., TEACHING GUNSHIP EMPLOYMENT TO THE THAIS OR ESTABLISHING A SQUADRON OFFICER SCHOOL FOR THE VNAF. OUR RECORDED SUCCESSES OVER NEARLY A DECADE OF SOF-ORIENTED MTTs HAS PROVIDED AN INVALUABLE EXPERIENCE BASE UPON WHICH TO BUILD AND EXPAND OUR FUTURE ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. PARTICULARLY ON A JOINT BASIS, THE ARMY ESPECIALLY AND THE NAVY, TOO, FIELD A WIDE VARIETY OF MTTs. SOME OF THESE COULD AND SHOULD BE JOINT EFFORTS AND WE MAY SEE MORE OF THESE IN THE FUTURE. THE MTT CONCEPT WILL CONTINUE AS A VIABLE PROGRAM.

WE MAY ALSO SEE AN ENHANCED ZI TRAINING PROGRAM FOR OUR ALLIED AIR FORCES. DUE TO AUSTERE FUNDING AND THE DESIRE FOR A LOW-VISIBILITY, LOW-PROFILE US PRESENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT MORE OF THE TRAINING WILL SHIFT TO THE UNITED STATES.

THERE IS AN INTERESTING ASPECT OF THE TRAINING MISSION THAT SOMETIMES GOES UNNOTICED. YOU CAN TRAIN AN INDIGENOUS SOLDIER, AN INFANTRY-MAN, IN A MATTER OF MONTHS. AND WITH A FEW MONTHS TRAINING, HE'LL PERFORM FAIRLY WELL IN COMBAT. BUT THIS IS NOT TRUE OF THE AIR TEAM. IT TAKES OVER A YEAR AND IN SOME CASES NEARLY TWO YEARS TO TURN OUT A COMPETENT COMBAT-READY PILOT OR CREW. THE SOPHISTICATION -- EVEN OF UNSOPHISTICATED AIRPLANES -- OF AVIONICS, HYDRAULICS, ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, ETC., ALSO REQUIRES CONSIDERABLE TIME. THIS TIME IS NEEDED TO INSURE THAT MAINTENANCE CREWS ARE COMPETENT AND CAPABLE OF KEEPING THEIR BIRDS FLYING. WHAT I'M SUGGESTING HERE IS THAT OUR EFFORTS WITH MTTs AND OTHER ASSOCIATED TRAINING IS A VERY VITAL ASPECT OF OUR S.O.F. MISSION. AND OUR AIR-ORIENTED TRAINING PROGRAMS ARE MUCH MORE DEMANDING THAN THOSE OF OUR SISTER SERVICE COUNTERPARTS. CONSEQUENTLY, YOUR JOBS ARE THAT MUCH MORE CHALLENGING.

ANOTHER EXTREMELY VITAL AREA AND ONE WE'VE HAD CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS WITH IS CIVIC ACTION. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS -- PROPERLY PLANNED AND EXECUTED AND EMPHASIZING THE ROLE OF THE INDIGENOUS FORCES -- HAVE PROVIDED MANY PEOPLE WITH IMPROVED CONDITIONS. BUT, AGAIN, I SUSPECT THIS HAS BEEN TAUGHT HERE IN DETAIL, SO I WON'T REFLOW OLD GROUND. I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE

THOUGH, THAT WE ARE REALIZING THE ADVANTAGES OF CIVIC ACTION "TYPE" PROJECTS IN OUR OWN COUNTRY. THE DOMESTIC ACTION PROGRAMS WHICH WE ARE PRESENTLY PURSUING ARE BEGINNING TO REAP BENEFITS. YOUTH OPPORTUNITY SUMMER RECREATION PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN QUITE SUCCESSFUL AT MANY AIR FORCE BASES. THESE PROGRAMS PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR UNDERPRIVILEGED YOUTH TO ENJOY THE RECREATION, EDUCATION, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, ETC., THAT IS ALL A PART OF "SUMMER CAMP." ALSO MANY BASES HAVE BECOME INVOLVED WITH COMMUNITY "POVERTY POCKETS" AND HAVE ASSISTED THE RESIDENTS WITH ORGANIZED CLEAN-UP PROJECTS. THIS "GET INVOLVED" ATTITUDE OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IS SHOWING IMMEASURABLE RETURNS WITH THE POOR, THE LESS-EDUCATED AND WITH MINORITY GROUPS. AND WITH OTHER SEGMENTS OF OUR SOCIETY, TOO. LAST WINTER, YOU MAY RECALL, AIR FORCE UNITS DROPPED MANY TONS OF FEED TO BLIZZARD-MAROONED CATTLE OUT WEST. JUST LAST MONTH OUR C-123s WERE ON INSECT CONTROL SPRAY MISSIONS IN SOUTHERN LOUISIANA HELPING TO ERADICATE VEE, THE VENEZUELAN ENCEPHALITIS FEVER THAT HAS BEEN FATAL TO SO MANY HORSES.

THE ARMY, TOO, HAS HAD A GREAT DEAL OF SUCCESS IN THESE DOMESTIC CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS. AT FT. BRAGG, THE SPECIAL FORCES UNITS, THE GREEN BERETS, THAT IS, HAVE BEEN TRAINING THEIR TROOPS IN CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS BY ASSISTING THE PEOPLES OF TWO NEARBY COUNTIES THERE IN NORTH CAROLINA. THESE AREAS HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED AS ECONOMICALLY DEPRESSED AND THE SPECIAL FORCES PEOPLE HAVE AIDED MANY OF THE LOCAL RESIDENTS BY HELPING OUT WITH MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND YOUTH ACTIVITY PROGRAMS AS WELL AS NUMEROUS OTHER ENDEAVORS.

THESE ALL SHOW OUR POPULATION -- ESPECIALLY THE ANTI-MILITARISTS -- THAT WE MAY EVEN BE A BIT HUMAN, THAT WE MAY REALLY CARE ABOUT THINGS OTHER THAN WAR AND DESTRUCTION; AND I'M CONFIDENT IT WILL NOT ONLY HELP OUR IMAGE, BUT ALSO -- AND MORE IMPORTANTLY -- IT WILL AID IN THE CURE OF SOME OF OUR DOMESTIC ILLS. WHAT IS IT REALLY? CIVIC ACTION AT HOME. I WOULD ENCOURAGE THOSE OF YOU ON YOUR WAY OVERSEAS TO SPEND SOME OF YOUR TIME AND ENERGY IN CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS AND THEN WHEN YOU RETURN TO THE STATES, TRANSFER THAT KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE, AND HELP WITH OUR DOMESTIC ACTION PROGRAMS AT THE BASE/COMMUNITY LEVEL.

THIS "GET INVOLVED" APPROACH IS NOT THE STRICT DOMAIN OF THE MEN.

LADIES --- SO FAR I HAVE ADDRESSED MOST OF MY REMARKS TO THE MEN -- BUT NOW I WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO YOU FOR A MINUTE. I KNOW THAT YOU LADIES HERE TODAY HAVE A FINE APPRECIATION FOR CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES. MOST OF YOU ALREADY HAVE OR WILL IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BECOME INVOLVED IN LOCAL CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS SUCH AS, CHURCH ACTIVITIES, HOSPITAL AID WORK, AND SCHOOL AFFAIRS. HERE IN THE US, THIS PARTICIPATION OF THE MILITARY FAMILIES IS IMPORTANT AND IT IS EVEN MORE SO WHEN YOU ARE IN FOREIGN LANDS. ANYTHING THAT YOU CAN DO TO THAT LEADS TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY FOR THESE PEOPLE IS ANOTHER EXTENSION OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE; SO THOSE OF YOU THAT ARE GOING OVERSEAS WITH YOUR HUSBANDS, I URGE YOU TO CONTINUE YOUR EXCELLENT WORK. AND THOSE OF YOU THAT STAY HERE IN THE US, PARTICULARLY WHILE YOUR HUSBANDS ARE AWAY, I WOULD ADD THAT THIS COUNTRY OF OURS AND THE AIR FORCE NEEDS ALL THE HELP IT CAN GET, SO YOUR HELP IS NEEDED AND APPRECIATED.

GETTING BACK TO THE FUTURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCES YOU HAVE PROBABLY ASKED:

HOW ABOUT ACTUAL COMBAT INVOLVEMENT OF US FORCES IN FUTURE CONTINGENCIES? WE CAN READILY SEE THE NEED TO EMPLOY THOSE FORCES WHICH ARE EASILY ENGAGED AND EASILY DISENGAGED -- I.E., THOSE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE AND MILITARILY EFFECTIVE FORCES. OF COURSE, AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE IS THE CASE OF AIR SUPPORT IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS DURING RECENT MONTHS. AIR IS MORE IMPERSONAL -- EASIER TO INITIATE AND EASIER TO TERMINATE -- HENCE WE SEE A GREATER ROLE FOR THE USAF IN THIS AREA. NOT ONLY IS AIR SUPPORT EFFECTIVE, BUT IT ALSO RUNS FEWER RISKS TO AMERICAN LIVES. SECRETARY LAIRD NOTED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

AIRPOWER AND ITS ABILITY TO FUNCTION WITHOUT HEAVY US CASUALTIES IN AN AUGUST NEWS INTERVIEW WHEN HE SAID ABOUT OUR SOUTHEAST ASIAN OPERATIONS "...THE REASON WE ARE USING AIR POWER TO STOP THE BUILDUP OF SUPPLIES AND MANPOWER IN THAT AREA IS TO MINIMIZE AMERICAN CASUALTIES, BECAUSE THE CASUALTIES THAT ARE INFLICTED BY THE USE OF AIRPOWER AS FAR AS AMERICANS ARE CONCERNED ARE ALMOST ZERO..."

WE FORESEE CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES AND SITUATIONS WHERE AIR POWER MAY BE THE ONLY US COMBAT FORCE INVOLVED. THEREFORE, WE RECOGNIZE A NEED FOR AN ENHANCED INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITY--AND SPECIFICALLY, ONE THAT DOES NOT RELY ON GROUND SOURCES. THIS NATURALLY LEADS TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN ENHANCED AIRBORNE SENSOR CAPABILITY--ONE THAT WILL PROVIDE ACCURATE, DEPENDABLE, REAL-TIME TARGET INPUTS. WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO ENTERTAIN ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THIS ASPECT OF OUR OPERATIONS. CONVERSELY, WE RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY FOR JOINT OPERATIONS. MY OWN EXPERIENCE WITH THE SON TAY POW RAID HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR FULLY INTEGRATED, JOINT OPERATIONS. I CAN TELL YOU THAT IN OUR EFFORTS TO FREE THE POWS EACH OF THE SERVICES WORKED WHOLEHEARTEDLY AND VERY EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER. IT WAS TRULY A TEAM EFFORT.

LET ME MOVE NOW TO A FEW COMMENTS ABOUT THE "PEOPLE" - PEOPLE LIKE YOURSELVES WHO WILL BE INVOLVED WITH THESE TRAINING, CIVIC ACTION AND ACTUAL EMPLOYMENT MISSIONS.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE WOULD INDICATE THAT AIR POWER WILL PLAY THE DOMINANT ROLE IN FUTURE CONTINGENCIES. BUT I WOULD GO FURTHER AND SAY THAT THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL WILL BE PARAMOUNT. THAT IS, THE ROLE OF THE "TOTAL" PERSON--THE "TOTAL" OFFICER OR AIRMAN WORKING WITH US AGENCIES, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, WORKING WITH OUR ALLIES AND HOST AIR FORCES AROUND THE WORLD.

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT YOUR STUDIES HERE AND YOUR SELECTION FOR YOUR ASSIGNMENTS PLACE YOU IN A UNIQUE POSITION OF UNDERSTANDING THIS "HUMAN" ASPECT, AND THEREBY PROVIDES YOU THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE--WHEREVER YOU MAY SERVE.

I'VE ALREADY NOTED THE AUSTERE FUNDING WE FACE IN THE FUTURE. THIS WILL PLACE EVEN GREATER CHALLENGES ON THE INDIVIDUAL--DEMANDING GREATER KNOWLEDGE, GREATER INITIATIVE, GREATER SACRIFICE--WHILE PROVIDING BETTER ASSISTANCE TO OUR ALLIES, YET DOING IT WITH LESSER MATERIAL RESOURCES.

THE CHALLENGE OF AUSTERITY BECOMES AN EVEN GREATER CHALLENGE WHEN WE RECOGNIZE THAT MUCH OF OUR ROLE IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS IS RELATED DIRECTLY TO ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. AND IN THESE CASES, WE WILL BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR ALLIED FRIENDS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS--NATIONS WHOSE DEFENSE BUDGETS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED AND HENCE--AUSTERITY TO THE NTH POWER. WHILE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE FIND A WAY TO UPDATE THE "FLINTSTONE FLEETS" OF THE AIR FORCES IN THE DEVELOPING NATIONS--WE HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THESE LIMITED BUDGETS.

LET ME NOTE ANOTHER "PERSONNEL" OR "PEOPLE-ORIENTED" CONCERN--THAT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OR "PSYOPS." WE ARE AGREED THAT POPULAR SUPPORT IS A REQUISITE FOR SUCCESS IN COIN. AND THIS POPULAR SUPPORT CAN BE ENHANCED CONSIDERABLY BY PSYOPS ACTIVITIES.

TRADITIONALLY THE AIR FORCE HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED AS THE PSYOPS MESSAGE "DELIVERY BOYS." EITHER WE DROP LEAFLETS OR WE EMPLOY AIRBORNE LOUDSPEAKERS TO BROADCAST TAPED MESSAGES. PERSONALLY, I FEEL THIS IS A VERY NARROW VIEW OF OUR TOTAL PSYOPS CAPABILITY.

THERE IS A PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT INHERENT IN AIRPOWER ITSELF. ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION, THE CAPTURED VC OR NVA SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM HAVE EXPRESSED A FEAR OF AIRPOWER. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, AIRPOWER EMPLOYED IN HUMANITARIAN RO E.G., HELICOPTER RESCUE OF FLOOD VICTIMS; AERIAL RESUPPLY OF VICTIMS OF EARTHQUAKES, TORNADOES, ETC; OR AIR EVACUATION OF CRITICALLY ILL TO DISTANT MEDICAL FACILITIES, ALL TEND TO INFLUENCE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS. GREATER ATTENTION MUST BE GIVEN TO ASSISTING FLEDGLING AIR FORCES TO EXPLOIT THESE INHERENT CAPABILITIES.

FURTHER, WE NEED TO GET A BETTER HANDLE ON ANALYZING AND ACTUALLY REACHING TARGET AUDIENCES IN THE PSYOPS FIELD. WE NEED BETTER TRAINED PSYOPS PERSONNEL WHO ARE WELL-EDUCATED IN BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND CROSS-CULTURAL RELATIONSHIPS. WE CAN THEN INFLUENCE WHAT THE MESSAGES SHALL CONSIST OF-- RATHER THAN JUST DELIVERING THEM. AGAIN THIS MISSION CAPABILITY WILL PROBABLY NEED TO BE EXPANDED IN THOSE CONTINGENCIES I NOTED BEFORE--THOSE WHERE AIR POWER IS THE PRIME, IF NOT ONLY, FORCE EMPLOYED.

ANOTHER "PERSONNEL" AREA THAT MAY SEE SOME CHANGE IN THE FUTURE IS THE AREA OF AIRCREWS. WHILE WE STARTED IN THE EARLY 60S WITH THE "JUNGLE JIM" OR AIR COMMANDO CONCEPT, WE HAVE TENDED TO MOVE AWAY FROM THIS IN RECENT YEARS. HOWEVER, WITH PROGRAMMED FORCE REDUCTIONS, DECREASED BUDGETS AND SIMILAR OR ENLARGED MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES, I SEE A TREND BACK TOWARD THE JUNGLE JIM "TYPE" AIRCREWMAN, I.E., A HIGHLY QUALIFIED VOLUNTEER, WHO WILL BE MULTI-CAPABLE AND ABLE TO IDENTIFY WITH AND OPERATE IN THE AUSTERE ENVIRONMENT WITH WHICH HE WILL BE FACED. I ENVISION NO GREATER DIFFICULTY IN OUR RETURN TO THE HIGHLY MOTIVATED CADRE FORCE, SINCE WE WILL PROBABLY HAVE FEWER FORCES, WE CAN BE MORE JUDICIOUS AND EXERCISE GREATER SELECTIVITY IN DETERMINING WHO MAKES THE TEAM. THESE--THEN--ARE A FEW CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPS IN THE FUTURE. WE WILL BE OPERATING WITH REDUCED BUDGETS, BUT VERY LIKELY BE INCURRING EVEN GREATER MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES. IT IS ONLY THROUGH THE HARD WORK, THE INGENUITY AND THE DEDICATION OF SUCH PEOPLE AS YOURSELVES THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH OUR TASKS. YOURS IS A CONSIDERABLE CHALLENGE. YET I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU--LIKE THE MANY US MILITARY MEN BEFORE YOU-- WILL MEET THE CHALLENGE.

I SALUTE YOU AND WISH YOU GOD SPEED IN YOUR FUTURE ENDEAVORS. GOOD LUCK TO EACH OF YOU.

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#61

COMMANDER JCS JOINT
CONTINGENCY TASK GROUP

REPORT ON

THE SON TAY
PRISONER OF WAR
RESCUE OPERATION

PART 2

SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS

1. This report is classified to protect information revealing operational capabilities of US military forces. Information contained herein will be disseminated only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require access to the report.
2. The information contained in this document is disseminated on a "SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" basis.
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Declassified

FOREWORD

The complete report on the Son Tay Prisoner of War Rescue Operation is structured in three parts. Part I is a condensed, chronological narrative report on the operation from inception to completion. Part III is a compilation of extensive raw data such as verbatim text of communications recorded during the operation, debriefings, flight plans, charts, and other similar information. Part III exists in only one copy, and the voluminous data must be carefully researched and interpreted to be of value.

Part II includes expanded reports on various facets of the operation which are considered to be of major significance. Part II is designed to provide more extensive information to those individuals or agencies having intelligence or operational requirements for this detailed information.

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 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

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PART II

SECTION A PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. The following attachments list project personnel by duty functions:

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| Attachment 1 | Feasibility Study Group Convened by SACSA
10 June 1970 |
| Attachment 2 | Planning Group Convened by SACSA 8 August 1970 |
| Attachment 3 | Administrative Support/Augmentation |
| Attachment 4 | C-130 Aircraft |
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| Attachment 7 | Army Support Group |
| Attachment 8 | Army Command Group |
| Attachment 9 | Army Assault Group |
| Attachment 10 | Other Army Support Personnel |
| Attachment 11 | F-105 Aircraft |
| Attachment 12 | F-4 Aircraft |
| Attachment 13 | Maintenance |
| Attachment 14 | Security Police/Units |

2. Security Instructions. The complete listing of personnel is
CONFIDENTIAL. In Attachment 14, the names are UNCLASSIFIED.

FEASIBILITY STUDY GROUP CONVENED BY SACSA 10 JUNE 1970

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
FRISBIE, NORMAN H.	Col	USAF	Hq USAF
NORMAN, WILLIAM C.	COL	USA	SACSA
BRITTON, WARNER A.	Lt Col	USAF	ARKTC
GRIMES, KEITH R.	Lt Col	USAF	Air Univ
MINOR, THOMAS F.	LTC	USA	DCSOPS
ROPKA, LAWRENCE, JR.	Lt Col	USAF	Hq USAF
ANDRAITIS, ARTHUR A.	Maj	USAF	Hq USAF
MORRIS, BOYD F.	MAJ	USA	USAJFKCEN, Ft Bragg, NC
GRAEOWSKY, THEODORE A.	LT	USN	CNO
JACOBS, JAMES A.	Capt	USAF	DIA
KNOPS, JOHN H.	Capt	USAF	Hq USAF
BRINSON, JAMES A.	1/LT	USMC	DIA
DAVIS, DONALD M.	SGM	USA	6th SFGA, Ft Bragg, NC
EARLEY, FRANCES L.	GS-8	DA	SACSA
STROSNIDER, BARBARA L.	GS-6	DAF	Hq USAF

PLANNING GROUP CONVENED BY SACSA 8 AUGUST 1970

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
MANOR, LEROY J.	Brig Gen	USAF	USAFSOF
SIMONS, ARTHUR D.	COL	USA	Hq XVIII Abn Corps
FRISBIE, NORMAN H.	Col	USAF	Hq USAF
CAMPBELL, WILLIAM M.	Capt	USN	CNO
HERSHEY, CLAIR R.	Lt Cndr	USN	CNO
BAILEY, JAMES V.	LTC	USA	Hq DA AC/S COMELEC
CATALDO, JOSEPH R.	LTC	USA	Hq DA SG
GRIMES, KEITH R.	Lt Col	USAF	Air Univ
KRALJEV, BENJAMIN N., JR.	Lt Col	USAF	Hq USAF
PESHKIN, RICHARD A.	Lt Col	USAF	Hq USAF
ROPKA, LAWRENCE JR.	Lt Col	USAF	Hq USAF
SYDNOR, ELLIOTT P.	LTC	USA	USAIS, Ft Benning, GA
WILLETT, HOMER	Lt Col	USAF	Hq USAF
ANDRAITIS, ARTHUR A.	Maj	USAF	Hq USAF
BENEA, RICHARD S., JR.	Maj	USAF	Hq USAF
MACOMBER, THOMAS E.	Maj	USAF	Hq USAF
MORRIS, BOYD F.	MAJ	USA	USAJFKCEN, Ft Bragg, NC
MORRIS, JAMES H.	MAJ	USA	7th SFGA, Ft Bragg, NC
NEWMAN, MAX E.	MAJ	USA	USAINTC/USAFAC
JACOBS, JAMES A.	Capt	USAF	DIA
KNOPS, JOHN H.	Capt	USAF	Hq USAF
BRINSON, JAMES A.	1/LT	USMC	DIA
DAVIS, DONALD M.	SGM	USA	6th SFGA, Ft Bragg, NC
GANN, WILLIAM S.	MSG	USA	6th SFGA, Ft Bragg, NC
SHERROD, JESSE E.	SFC	USA	6th SFGA, Ft Bragg, NC
HARLEY, FRANCES L.	GS-8	DA	SACSA
STROSNIDER, BARBARA L.	GS-6	DAF	Hq USAF

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT/AUGMENTATION

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
HARRIS, JOHN S.	Capt	USN	DIA
RICE, FRANKLIN C.	Col	USAF	NMCC
KENNEDY, JOHN E.	Lt Col	USAF	PDAF
HALLMAN, HARVEY D.	Maj	USAF	USAFSOF
VOGEL, FRANK C.	Maj	USAF	Hq USAF
BATSELL, MICHAEL L.	1/LT	USAF	USAFSOF
BABER, BILLY B.	MSGT	USAF	USAFSOF
DOWNING, LARRY	DM 1	USN	OJCS
GRAVES, STANLEY G.	SSGT	USA	DIA
MARTIN, JOHN J.	SSGT	USAF	USAFSOF
RUSSELL, ELNEITA S.	GS-8	USAF	USAFSOF

C-130 AIRCRAFT

CHERRY 1

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
FRANKLIN, IRL L.	MAJ	USAF	7 SOS
MOSLEY, THOMAS L.	MAJ	USAF	7 SOS
CUSTARD, RANDAL D.	CAPT	USAF	7 SOS
ECKHART, THOMAS K.	CAPT	USAF	7 SOS
GUENON, WILLIAM A., JR.	CAPT	USAF	7 SOS
McKENZIE, JAMES F., JR.	CAPT	USAF	7 SOS
STILES, THOMAS L.	CAPT	USAF	7 SOS
TOLMAN, LESLIE G.	MSG	USAF	7 SOS
KENNEDY, WILLIAM A.	TSG	USAF	7 SOS
LIGHTLE, KENNETH C.	TSG	USAF	7 SOS
SHEPARD, JAMES M.	TSG	USAF	7 SOS
PARKS, EARL D.	SSG	USAF	7 SOS
*RENNER, ROBERT L.	SSG	USAF	7 SOS

CHERRY 2

BLOSCH, ALBERT P.	LTC	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
*CLARK, CECIL M.	LTC	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
GARGUS, JOHN	MAJ	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
PANNILL, HARRY L.	MAJ	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
CONNAUGHTON, JOHN M.	CAPT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
*JONES, RONALD L.	CAPT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
KENDER, DAVID M.	CAPT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
MAZUREK, NORMAN C.	CAPT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
STRIPLING, WILLIAM D.	CAPT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
ELLISTON, BILLY J.	TSG	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
*POTTS, FAIUS	TSG	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg

* Alternates who did not fly

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
RIGGS, JIMMIE O.	TSG	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
STIERWALT, PAUL E.	TSG	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
*BROWN, WILLIAM T.	SSG	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
CRINER, DALLAS R.	TSG	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
GIBSON, MELVIN B. D.	SSG	USAF	- Det 2, 1SOWg

HH-3 AIRCRAFT

BANANA 1

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
ZERNDER, HERBERT R.	LtCol	USAF	ARRTC
KALEN, HERBERT D.	Maj	USAF	ARRTC
*VAUGHN, DAVID E.	Maj	USAF	37 ARRSq
WRIGHT, LEROY M.	TSGT	USAF	ARRTC

* Alternate who did not fly

HH-53 AIRCRAFT

APPLE 1

BRITTON, WARNER A.	LtCol	USAF	ARRTC
MONTREM, ALFRED C.	Maj	USAF	ARRTC
HARVEY, HAROLD W.	MSGT	USAF	ARRTC
TASKER, MAURICE F.	MSGT	USAF	ARRTC
HOBERG, JON K.	SSGT	USAF	40 ARRSq

APPLE 2

ALLISON, JOHN V.	LtCol	USAF	ARRTC
STRAYER, JAY M.	Maj	USAF	40 ARRSq
LESTER, WILLIAM E.	TSGT	USAF	ARRTC
MONTGOMERY, CHARLIE J.	TSGT	USAF	ARRTC
MCCOMB, RANDY S.	SSGT	USAF	40 ARRSq

APPLE 3

DONCHUE, FREDERIC M.	Maj	USAF	ARRTC
WALDRON, THOMAS R.	Capt	USAF	ARRTC
HODGES, ARON P.	SSGT	USAF	ARRTC
ROGERS, JAMES J.	SSGT	USAF	ARRTC
SCWELL, ANGUS W., III	SSGT	USAF	ARRTC

APPLE 4

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
BROWN, ROYAL C.	LtCol	USAF	37 ARRSq
DREIBELIS, ROY R.	Maj	USAF	37 ARRSq
WELLINGTON, LAWRENCE	TSGT	USAF	ARRTC
LABARRE, DONALD	SSGT	USAF	ARRTC
FISK, WAYNE L.	SSGT	USAF	40 ARRSq

APPLE 5

MURPHY, KENNETH D.	Maj	USAF	703 SOSq
McGEORGE, WILLIAM M.	Capt	USAF	40 ARRSq
McLEOD, DAVID F.	TSGT	USAF	ARRTC
GALDE, DANIEL E.	SSGT	USAF	ARRTC
ELDRIDGE, JOHN J.	SSGT	USAF	40 ARRSq

HC-130P AIRCRAFT

LINE 01

KORNITZER, WILLIAM J., JR.	Maj	USAF	ARRTC
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A-1 AIRCRAFT

PEACH 1

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
RHEIN, EDWIN J., JR.	MAJ	USAF	1SOWg
WARESH, JOHN C.	MAJ	USAF	56SOWg

PEACH 2

GOCHNAUER, JAMES R.	MAJ	USAF	1SOWg
SENKO, ROBERT M.	CAPT	USAF	56SOWg

PEACH 3

SKEELS, RICHARD S.	MAJ	USAF	1SOWg
PAINE, JAMES C.	LT	USAF	56SOWg

PEACH 4

BUNN, EUSTACE M.	MAJ	USAF	1SOWg
SKELTON, ROBERT H.	CAPT	USAF	56SOWg

PEACH 5

SQUIRES, JOHN C.	MAJ	USAF	1SOWg
SUTTON, WILLIAM R.	CAPT	USAF	56SOWg

UH-1 AIRCRAFT

WILLIAMS, GEORGE W.	1/LT	USA	6 SF Gp
WARD, JOHN J.	CW-2	USA	6 SF Gp
EXLEY, RONALD J.	CW-2	USA	6 SF Gp
KEELE, JACKIE H.	CW-2	USA	6 SF Gp
BOOTS, LARRY C.	SP/6	USA	6 SF Gp
WOOD, ALAN H.	SP/4	USA	82 Abn Div

A-9

Atch 6

ARMY SUPPORT GROUP

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
SIMONS, ARTHUR D.	COL	USA	Hq XVIII Abn Corps
NELSON, ERIC J.	CPT	USA	Co B, 7th SFG
ROUSE, GLENN R.	CPT	USA	IHC, 2d Bn USAIMA
WALTHER, UDO H.	CPT	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
BLEACHER, EARL	SFC	USA	2d Bn, USIMA
CARLSON, LEROY N.	SFC	USA	Co C, 7th SFG
JAKOVENKO, JOHN	SFC	USA	Co C, 6th SFG
JOPLIN, JACK G.	SFC	USA	HHC, 6th SFG
JURICH, DANIEL	SFC	USA	Co B, 7th SFG
LAWHON, DAVID A. JR	SFC	USA	Co C, 7th SFG
SUAREZ, SALVADOR M.	SFC	USA	Co B, 6th SFG
TAAPREN, DONALD E.	SFC	USA	Co C, 6th SFGA
VALENTINE, RICHARD W.	SFC	USA	Co B, 7th SFG
MILLER, WALTER L.	SSG	USA	Sig Co, 6th SFG
NELSON, ROBERT L.	SSG	USA	Co B, 6th SFG
NICKERSON, DAVID S.	SSG	USA	Sig Co, 6th SFG
POWELL, THOMAS E.	SSG	USA	Co D, 7th SFG
RODRIGUEZ, JOHN E.	SSG	USA	Co C, 6th SFG
KEEL, GARY D.	SGT	USA	Co C, 6th SFG
MEDENSKI, KEITH R.	SGT	USA	Co B, 6th SFG
ROE, FRANKLIN D.	SGT	USA	Co B, 6th SFG
THOMAS, MARSHALL A.	SGT	USA	Co D, 6th SFG

ARMY COMMAND GROUP (SECURITY)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
SYDNOR, ELLIOTT P.	LTC	USA	USAIS, Det #1
CATALDO, JOSEPH R.	LTC	USA	Surgeon General, Hq DA
TURNER, DANIEL D.	CPT	USA	Co A, 6th SFG
MC CLAM, JAMES W.	CPT	USA	Co A, 6th SFG
LUPYAK, JOSEPH W.	MSG	USA	Co D, 7th SFG
SPENCER, HERMAN	MSG	USA	Co C, 7th SFG
ADDERLY, TYRONE J.	SFC	USA	Co A, 6th SFG
BLACKARD, DONALD D.	SFC	USA	Co B, 7th SFG
DOSS, FREDDIE D.	SFC	USA	HHC, 6th SFG
HILL, JERRY W.	SFC	USA	2d Bn, USIMA
HOWELL, MARION S.	SFC	USA	Co A, 6th SFG
MARTIN, BILLY R.	SFC	USA	Co A, 6th SFG
MASTEN, CHARLES A. JR	SFC	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
MC GUIRE, GREGORY T.	SFC	USA	Co A, 6th SFG
MURRAY, JOSEPH M.	SFC	USA	Co A, 6th SFG
QUEZADA, NOE	SFC	USA	Co D, 7th SFG
STRAHAN, RONNIE	SFC	USA	Co B, 6th SFG
BUCKLER, TERRY L.	SGT	USA	Co D, 7th SFG
POOLE, PAUL F.	SSG	USA	Co B, 6th SFG
YOUNG, LAWRENCE	SSG	USA	2d Bn, USIMA

ARMY ASSAULT GROUP

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
MEADOWS, RICHARD J.	CPT	USA	Det #1, USAIS
JAEGER, THOMAS W.	CPT	USA	Co A, 7th SFG
MC KINNEY, DAN H.	CPT	USA	Co D, 7th SFG
PETRIE, GEORGE W.	1LT	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
KEMMER, THOMAS J.	MSG	USA	Co B, 6th SFG
MOORE, BILLY K.	MSG	USA	Co C, 6th SFG
KITTLESON, GALEN C.	MSG	USA	Co B, 6th SFG
DODGE, ANTHONY	SFC	USA	2d Bn, USIMA
ROBBINS, LORENZO O.	SFC	USA	Co B, 6th SFG
TAPLEY, WILLIAM L.	SFC	USA	Co C, 6th SFG
WINGROVE, DONALD R.	SFC	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
ERICKSON, CHARLES G.	SSG	USA	Co B, 7th SFG
MC MULLIN, KENNETH E.	SSG	USA	HHC, 6th SFG
ST CLAIR, PATRICK	SGT	USA	Co C, 6th SFG

OTHER ARMY SUPPORT PERSONNEL

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
ROBINSON, BILL L.	LTC	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
KILBURN, GERALD	LTC	USA	HHC, JFKCMA
SMITH, RANDLE L.	CPT	USA	HHC, JFKCMA
PYLANT, MINOR B	SGM	USA	Co A, 6th SFG
BLACK, JESSE A.	MSG	USA	Co A, 7th SFG
BRITT, EDGAR C.	MSG	USA	Co A, 6th SFG
RAUSCHER, BERNARD L.	MSG	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
ABRAMSKI, FRANKLIN B.	SFC	USA	Co B, 7th SFG
BASS, JAMES A.	SFC	USA	HHC, 6th SFG
BATREE, ARCHIE JR.	SFC	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
DOBBS, ROBERT L.	SFC	USA	Co A, 7th SFG
ERWIN, CHARLES M.	SFC	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
GREEN, JAMES A.	SFC	USA	Co A, 6th SFG
HANSLEY, BOBBY R.	SFC	USA	Co B, 7th SFG
HENDERSON, ROSWELL D.	SFC	USA	Co D, 7th SFG
HUBEL, FREDERICK L.	SFC	USA	Co B, 7th SFG
HUGHES, BRUCE M.	SFC	USA	Co D, 7th SFG
JOPPAN, JOHN R.	SFC	USA	Co B, 7th SFG
FOUNDER, ERNEST R.	SFC	USA	Co A, 7th SFG
TOLSON, AARON L. JR.	SFC	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
TURNER, BURLEY W.	SFC	USA	Co D, 7th SFG
VINES, GRADY C.	SFC	USA	Co C, 7th SFG
ADAMS, ELMER D.	SSG	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
GRASS, RODGER D.	SSG	USA	HHC, 7th SFG
STROHMANN, LARRY G.	SSG	USA	Co A, 6th SFG
WILSON, DAVID L.	SSG	USA	Co C, 6th SFG
BOYD, BRIAN J.	SGT	USA	Co B, 6th SFG
GREEN, MICHAEL G.	SGT	USA	Co C, 6th SFG

OTHER ARMY SUPPORT PERSONNEL

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
HOB DY, ROBERT R.	SGT	USA	Sig Co, 6th SFG
LIPPERT, JOHN J.	SGT	USA	Co D, 7th SFG
OLSON, ARLIN L.	SGT	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
DEZURIK, WILLARD F.	SP5	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
ELLIOTT, LAWRENCE C.	SP5	USA	HHC, 6th SFG
GRIFFIN, GARY R.	SP5	USA	Co D, 6th SFG
CASEY, CHRISTOPHER	SP4	USA	Co B, 6th SFG
CLOSEN, FRANK J.	SP4	USA	Co B, 6th SFG

F-105 AIRCRAFT

FIREBIRD 1

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
KRONEBUSCH, ROBERT J.	LTCOL	USAF	388 TFW
FORRESTER, JOHN (NMI)	MAJ	USAF	388 TFW

FIREBIRD 2

REISENWITZ, ROBERT J.	MAJ	USAF	388 TFW
McADOO, RAYMOND C.	MAJ	USAF	388 TFW

FIREBIRD 3

STARKEY, WILLIAM J.	MAJ	USAF	388 TFW
FANSLER, EVERETT D.	MAJ	USAF	388 TFW

FIREBIRD 4

DENTON, MURRAY B.	MAJ	USAF	388 TFW
OBER, RUSSELL T.	CAPT	USAF	388 TFW

FIREBIRD 5

KILGUS, DONALD W.	MAJ	USAF	388 TFW
LOWRY, CLARENCE T.	CAPT	USAF	388 TFW

F-4 AIRCRAFT

FALCON 1

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
GARDNER, KENNETH L.	MAJ	USAF	13 TFS
HENRY, LARRY L.	CAPT	USAF	13 TFS

FALCON 2

LANDIN, JOHN D., JR.	CAPT	USAF	13 TFS
McKIBBEN, GEORGE E.	CAPT	USAF	13 TFS

FALCON 3

McCURDY, STUART B.	CAPT	USAF	555 TFS
COATS, GEORGE E.	MAJ	USAF	555 TFS

FALCON 4

GOLAS, MICHAEL T.	CAPT	USAF	555 TFS
LEE, HUBBARD W.	MAJ	USAF	555 TFS

FALCON 5

WRIGHT, RUSSELL G.	CAPT	USAF	13 TFS
MALANEY, JAMES C.	MAJ	USAF	13 TFS

FALCON 11

BAIRD, ORVILLE B.	MAJ	USAF	555 TFS
PALADINO, CARL (NMI)	CAPT	USAF	555 TFS

FALCON 12

BROWN, DOUGLAS P.	CAPT	USAF	555 TFS
SMITH, CHARLES E.	CAPT	USAF	555 TFS

FALCON 13

CANTWELL, JOHN L.	CAPT	USAF	13 TFS
HENRY, LARRY L.	CAPT	USAF	13 TFS

FALCON 14

HINTZE, RONALD M.	CAPT	USAF	13 TFS
PRESTON, JOSEPH R.	CAPT	USAF	13 TFS

FALCON 15

PETTYJOHN, JIMMY C.	MAJ	USAF	555 TFS
WAGNER, THOMAS A.	1/LT	USAF	555 TFS

MAINTENANCE

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
FAGGARD, LIONEL E.	CAPT	USAF	AFLC
CARROLL, GERARD M.	CAPT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
HOGAN, THOMAS E.	MSGT	USAF	1198 OE&T Sq
BROOKOVER, DAVID L.	TSGT	USAF	1198 OE&T Sq
CASEY, RONALD H.	TSGT	USAF	1198 OE&T Sq
CRISP, GERALD	TSGT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
DUFF, CHARLES W.	TSGT	USAF	1198 OE&T Sq
FREDRICK, BILLY R.	TSGT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
MOSELEY, TOMMY C.	TSGT	USAF	1198 OE&T Sq
WHITTIER, BRADLEY A.	TSGT	USAF	1198 OE&T Sq
YATES, RICHARD W.	TSGT	USAF	1198 OE&T Sq
BUTLER, GEORGE T.	SSGT	USAF	1198 OE&T Sq
CHALKLEY, RAYMOND L.	SSGT	USAF	1198 OE&T Sq
KENDALL, GEORGE R.	SSGT	USAF	1198 OE&T Sq
SKIDMORE, DONALD R.	SSGT	USAF	1198 OE&T Sq
CLEELAND, ROBERT W.	SGT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
DALTON, DALE E.	SGT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
DIERKING, DAVID N.	SGT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
ROTHMAN, ELLIOT L.	SGT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
RUUD, KENNETH A.	SGT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
WEBNER, ROBERT D.	SGT	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
BACON, RICHARD A.	A1C	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
GOODSON, STEPHEN P.	A1C	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
HOLDER, JAMES R.	A1C	USAF	Det 2, 1SOWg
MELCHER, JERRY D.	A1C	USAF	1198 OE&T Sq
FULLER, WALTER R.	CIV		Texas Instr
HESSE, GARRY L.	CIV		Hallicrafters
MILDRETH, HUBERT J.	GS-13	CIV	AFLC
PYLE, GENE L.	CIV		Texas Instr

SECURITY POLICE

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
BELL, WILBERT	SSG	USAF	464 SP Sq
BERG, STEVEN L.	A1C	USAF	464 SP Sq
CROUCH, STANLEY W.	AMN	USAF	464 SP Sq
JERNIGAN, JOSEPH T., JR.	AMN	USAF	464 SP Sq
RATCLIFF, CLARANCE A.	SGT	USAF	464 SP Sq

MUNITIONS

ROSE, GILES C.	TSG	USAF	1SOWg
MOWDER, WILLIAM H.	SGT	USAF	1SOWg
GOSS, TEDDIE R.	TSG	USAF	1SOWg

PART II

SECTION B - COMJCTG OPERATIONAL PLAN. (Attached Separately)

PART II

SECTION C - INTELLIGENCE

1. General.

a. Photo Intelligence. The photo intelligence effort during these phases consisted of coordinating the reconnaissance, photo interpretation, target material production, and aircrew/ground forces briefing. To accomplish this, the JCTG had two photo intelligence personnel assigned, and utilized the services of selected Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Photo Interpreters, the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), DIA Photographic Laboratory, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). One of the JCTG Interpreters stayed in Washington, D.C. during the training phase to effect coordination with the various Washington area agencies, assist in interpretation, product production and to ensure reconnaissance collection. The other interpreter deployed to the training site at Eglin AFB to accomplish photo interpretation at the site and to support the combat elements with detailed briefings and development of target materials. Key personnel in the various Washington area agencies were cleared for the project, and this greatly facilitated obtaining the necessary support.

(1) Reconnaissance. Considerable effort, both low altitude drone and high altitude SR-71 aircraft, was expended to obtain aerial photography of the objective, surrounding area and the infiltration/exfiltration route. Since both of these assets are national in nature, tasking was accomplished through DIA. Both the Ap Lo and Son Tay POW Camps were entered as national requirements and a priority drone coverage effort from Strategic Air Command (SAC) against these and other objectives was requested. In late September 1970, a series of seven drone tracks were drawn up by JCTG personnel and passed to SAC through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) channels in an attempt to increase the probability of obtaining the desired coverage. This effort

was terminated on 28 October 1970.

drone missions

had been scheduled, with [redacted] of these penetrating the target area and successfully recovered. These provided excellent coverage [redacted]

[redacted] were cancelled or lost due to weather, operational or maintenance problems, and [redacted] were lost to enemy action. An SR-71 effort was initiated during the latter part of the drone effort.

Initially, a reconnaissance package covering the proposed JCTG route through to the objective area and major threat areas was passed to SAC through the JCS. In late October 1970, an additional package of [redacted] tracks, comprising [redacted] missions, was developed for coverage/surveillance of all objectives and the JCTG infiltration/exfiltration route. This package, which like the first did not identify any specific installations, but requested large scale area coverage of a 10NM wide swath along each reconnaissance flight path on specific dates between 10 and 21 November 1970. The package was forwarded to SAC through JCS channels and subsequent discussions between a JCTG photo intelligence officer and SAC Reconnaissance Center personnel resulted in date and weather adjustments, except for missions scheduled for 20 and 21 November 70. These were to be flown regardless of weather unless delays were requested by COMJCTG. SAC was requested to fly the 20 and 21 November 1970 missions earlier than normal and reduce film handling/transportation times to ensure arrival of the film at Yokota AB, Japan, prior to 1700L on 20 November 1970. Further, SAC was requested to limit the reconnaissance coverage to that specifically requested by the JCTG, thus keeping the film processing/duplicating time within specific constraints. The 9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Kadena AB flew [redacted] SR-71 missions from Kadena specifically in support of the operation between 2 November and 21 November 1970. One mission on 18 November 1970 was forced by mechanical difficulties to recover in Thailand and as a result, the film did not reach Yokota AB, Japan, in time for interpretation prior to the operation.

Weather greatly hampered the collection effort throughout the September/October time period; however, all objectives were covered either by large or small scale photography. Good quality large scale coverage of the objective was not obtained during this period due to poor weather. The surrounding area and portions of the route were covered; however, it was not until the missions of 6 and 13 November 1970 that photography of the complete route from the NVN/Laotian border to the objective was obtained. Missions of 20 and 21 November 1970 were flown as requested. By reducing the sensor downloading time from over 2 hours to 45 minutes, and by using a KC-135 aircraft for film delivery to Yokota AB, the 9SRW fully met the JCTG imposed time constraints. Some difficulty was experienced in coordinating the JCTG reconnaissance requirements with the SAC Reconnaissance Center at Offutt AFB as none of the SAC personnel were cleared for this operation. It is recommended that in the future, if SAC Reconnaissance assets are used, one officer in the SAC Reconnaissance Center Intelligence Requirements Office be briefed on the operation. This office is responsible for flight line and camera action planning and a more intimate knowledge of the requirements would aid considerably in obtaining the desired coverage.

(2) Photo Interpretation. The initial interpretation was based on SR-71 and low altitude drone missions prior to June 1970. This initial interpretation revealed that the Son Tay Camp was fairly isolated, active, and fitted the description (from collateral sources) of the camp. The location, identification, and activity status of military facilities in the target area were identified along with civilian activity, crop patterns, road, and trail activity. Subsequent coverage enabled the JCTG and support photo interpreters to further refine and update this data base and to maintain surveillance of the area. These results also enabled the JCTG crews to select their landing zones (LZs) and holding points and to identify the major threat areas.

Throughout this period, a definite increase in truck/vehicle activity watershed improvement, industrial, and civilian construction activity was noted throughout the objective area. Toward the latter part of this period, crop harvesting was taking place and this, along with the construction, was considered an additional reason for the increase in truck activity. Some military construction activity was also noted at various military installations; however, none was considered significant or related to the operation. A CIA Photo Intelligence Study completed in August 1970 of the general area substantiated the information developed by the JCTG Interpreters. Numerous detailed photo reports were produced at the training site and in DIA to support both ground and air requirements. Lack of good quality large scale photography hampered further interpretation of the Son Tay POW Camp, although additional information on placement of windows/doors was developed and activity patterns within the camp were followed. There was an apparent decline in track activity within the compound from 6 June through 3 October 1970 at which time the highest activity was noted. Photography of 2 November 1970 showed a definite increase in activity which was also apparent on 13 November 1970. The decline in activity was attributed to the probability that the US POWs were being kept in their cells for extended periods of time. The 2 November increase was considered the result of letting the prisoners have more freedom outside their cells. Post operation information revealed that the 2 and 13 November 1970 activity was probably associated with planting of row crops.

(3) Target Material Production:

(a) Numerous target materials, briefing aids, and special notifiers to support the operation were developed and produced from aerial photography by JCTG and DIA photo interpreters. The DIA Photo Lab was utilized for the production of all photographic products. A special work order number was established for this work, and it was tasked on a priority basis.

(b) Large and small scale photo mosaics, using current photography, were produced from the objective area to west of the Black River. Several additional mosaics, using older materials, were made covering other segments of the route. Books containing photographs of the turning points were developed and used by the crews. In addition, a large scale mosaic (covering the Pre-IP to the objective) was made from drone photography for use by the C-130 Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) Operator. This mosaic was produced at the approximate scale that the FLIR operator would see the ground imaged on his scope. Mosaics of the immediate objective area, with 100 and 200 meter grid squares, were developed for joint use by the ground forces and ground support air units.

(c) Scale models of the objective and bridge to the north were built by the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). The request had been channeled from the JCTG, through CIA; however, a JCTG photo interpreter was required to coordinate their construction with the NPIC. The models proved to be an extremely useful training aid for both the aircrews and ground forces.

(d) A limited set of identical 1/50,000 objective area maps, containing coded reference points and area intelligence, were made for JCTG use. A code word list for specific actions and items which could be determined from photography was produced for use along with the maps. These words were developed to provide secure classified message or in-the-clear voice transmissions of intelligence. COMJCTG, SACSA, AFIN, DIA and the JCTG photo interpreters each had a copy of the map and code word list. Secure message procedures were established utilizing AFSSO facilities from Yokota AB, Japan, direct to Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters United States Air Force (ACS/I) for subsequent passing to SACSA, DIA, or the NMCC (during mission execution).

(4) In-Theater Coordination. A JCTG photo interpreter deployed on 12 November 1970 to the 67 Reconnaissance Technical Squadron (RTS), Yokota AB, Japan, where processing and exploitation of the SR-71 missions is normally accomplished. The 67 RTS Commander and Operations Officer were informed that the JCTG interpreter was on a special mission for the JCS and requested the full support of the squadron. Other personnel involved were informed that a test was being conducted on the responsiveness of the SR-71 to special requirements. The 67 RTS was required to radically change the film processing, interpretation, and computer support procedures to meet the stringent time constraints required by the JCTG. At this time, it was decided to initially process and duplicate all large scale coverages and use only one small scale camera if the programmed track was flown as requested. The 67 RTS photo interpreters were tasked to perform interpretation of coverage outside of the objective area for SAMs, AAA, EW/GCI sites and air order of battle (AOB). The objective and the surrounding area were to be interpreted by the JCTG interpreter. Interpretation results, film and briefing materials developed from missions flown on 8 and 13 November 1970 were handcarried on 17 November 1970 to Takhli RTAFB where aircrews and other JCTG personnel were briefed. Current electronic order of battle (EOB), AOB, and missile order of battle (MOB) were obtained from Seventh Air Force and transmitted via message to Takhli RTAFB on 19 November 1970.

(5) In-Theater Interpretation. Reconnaissance missions flown on 8 and 13 November 1970 provided the first clear, large scale coverage of the route from the Laotian border to the objective. This resulted in the identification and plotting of all civilian and military activity along that segment of the route. Recovery/emergency LZs were located, turning points were verified, and no additional EW, AAA or SAM threat to the force was identified. The objective area appeared normal, all known defensive weapons were at their previously identified locations, and no additional threat to the operation was identified. The results of

this interpretation were transmitted to USAF ACS/I in addition to being handcarried to Takhli RTAFB. A mission flown on 18 November 1970 was forced, by equipment problems, to land in Thailand, and the film did not arrive at Yokota AB until the evening of 20 November 1970. As a result, it was not processed until after the missions flown on 20 and 21 November 1970. Final coverage before the operation was taken on two passes over the objective area late the morning of 20 November 1970. The objective itself was partially covered with clouds and in shadows, while the surrounding area was 60-70 per cent cloud covered. Both flights combined provided 60 per cent clear coverage of the target area. The route from the NWN/Laotian border to the Pre-IP was 100 per cent covered with clouds. A determination was made that the camp was active and that activity was normal throughout the objective area. All known AAA/AAW weapons and SAMs in this area were accounted for, all LZs were clear and no indications were noted of either troop or weapon redeployment. No indications were seen of any enemy activity which would adversely affect the mission. All known occupied SAM sites, except VN159, which were within range of Son Tay were covered and reported as operational. The major airfields were covered and no significant changes to the AOB were seen. The pertinent information in coded form was passed to COMJCTG via AFBOMN at 20/1300 November 1970. After further analysis of the area to the east and southeast of the objective was conducted, a message on the results was sent to the IMCC, through USAF ACS/I, at 20/1600Z November 1970. Analysis of the area continued through H-hour, but no changes were noted to the original interpretation.

(6) Post Operation Intelligence Analysis Photo Intelligence.

The objective and surrounding area were covered on good quality large scale and small scale Sr-71 photography from two flights of 21 November 1970. The coverage taken during the morning of 20 November 1970 showed considerable activity at both the Son Tay Prisoner of War Camp and the military installation located approximately 400 meters to the south. In the section, two main rotor blades, and burned out wreckage of the

HH-3 were visible within the POW compound. Roof damage, evidently caused by debris from the exploding HH-3, was evident on building 5D and 5B within the compound. One guard building (8C) was gutted by fire and the southern guard quarters (7B) showed roof damage from mini-gun fire. Numerous personnel were seen on the N/S road east of the camp and within the camp on both flights. Several 3/4 ton vehicles were also noted on the road. Several personnel and a 3/4 ton vehicle were at the transformer station which had been damaged by the US Ground Forces. Many personnel were noted in and around the military installation south of the POW camp, with a group of about 15-20 at the initial landing site of APPLE 01 (HH-53). Activity appeared normal in the objective area. No evidence of high interest levels could be detected at any of the helicopter holding LZs. Confirmation of Shrike damage to SAM sites could not be determined. A class was being conducted by one of the SAM launchers (missile loaded) at the SAM training facility 2.7 NM south of the objective. The results of the post operation photography were transmitted via coded message to USAF AOS/I at 22/0145Z November 1970. The photography was couriered to Washington arriving on 22 November where further interpretation was accomplished. The results were provided to DIA and SACSA on 23 November 1970.

B. Objective Area Operations:

(1) Assault group personnel entered and searched all the buildings within the walled compound in the Prisoner of War Camp (See Fig C-1). The information they obtained confirmed buildings 5B and 5E as cell blocks while 5A was possibly a group confinement area. The functions of 5C and 5D, previously believed to be POW cells, could not be determined. Though constructed in late 1969, they gave the appearance of probably not having been used. Building three (3) was confirmed as a latrine and number four (4) as a washhouse.

(2) Cell block 5B contained six cells (five estimated at 6' x 8' and one 8' x 10'), each secured by a steel door (with peep slits) and a

metal shuttered window (See Fig C-2). Correlation of the estimated cell size with the known dimensions of the building indicates the cells were slightly larger, probably 8' x 14' for the smaller rooms and 12' x 14' for the larger rooms. The overall size of the building is 55' x 30' and allowing space for hallways on both sides plus roof overhangs, the larger dimensions would better equate to the building size. Some of the cells had cut electric wires hanging from the ceilings. The rooms were bare except for the two being used as living quarters by NVA personnel. There were six bunks in the larger cell and three in the smaller ones. The bunks were all makeshift of wood with a piece of blanket and mosquito net. The only other items in the two cells were some sauce bottles and Vietnamese type shower shoes.

(3) Other characteristics of cell building 5B are as follows:

(a) The inside floors and walls were constructed of concrete. The walls were at least 6" thick.

(b) The outside of 5B was constructed of masonry with a concrete outer cover. The outside doors were constructed of 1/4 inch steel and painted green. The outside windows had iron bars imbedded in the window sash.

(c) The inside cell doors were steel with hasps welded on them. These cell doors had small peep slits in them at eye level. There were also small slots at the base of the doors that were probably used to push bowls of food through. All the doors were encased in a steel door frame.

(d) The inside cell windows had steel shutters on them. Each had a steel hasp welded to them.

(e) All cells had approximately 10' high plaster ceilings.

(f) The cells had about a 6" concrete step leading up to the cell door.

(g) Cells 1-5 had, in the left corners (front and rear), a small 10" platform of concrete with a groove in the center. This was believed to be a bunk support.

(h) There were no signs of any leg or arm shackle anchors.

(4) Building 5E had four cells (two 8' x 20' and two 8' x 8') in addition to a non-secured open room 8' x 20' (See Fig C-3). Each of the larger cells had a raised 6' x 20' concrete platform on one side while the two small cells each had two raised platforms, each 2 1/2' x 8'. Three of the cells were currently being used for storage while the fourth cell and a fifth non-secure room were empty. Correlation of the overall building size with the number of rooms indicates that the rooms are probably slightly larger than estimated. The two smaller cells may have been for maximum security or possibly two POWs. The size of the other rooms indicate that as many as eight POWs could be kept in each of the two cells.

(5) Further characteristics of building 5E are as follows:

(a) Each cell had a 3/8 inch steel door, swinging outward, steel door frame with steel hasps welded to the door.

(b) Each door contained a peep hole at eye level and was secured with a well made padlock.

(c) All windows were barred with 1/4 inch steel screen or 1 to 2 inch squares. The screen was bolted to the outside of the window.

(d) All rooms were constructed of 6 to 8 inch good grade concrete and had 12 foot ceilings.

(e) No evidence of shackles, posts, or restraining devices was noted.

(f) Rooms 1 and 2 each had a 2-1/2 foot wide walkway with a concrete shelf on each side. Each shelf was 2-1/2 feet wide, 8 feet long and 2-1/2 feet above the floor. These rooms were being used for

storage.

(g) Rooms 3 and 4 each had a 2-1/2 foot wide walkway leading to a 3 feet x 3 feet cubicle. This cubicle which was probably a wash area or latrine had a doorway with a 6" step and a drain in the center. To the right of the walkway was a concrete sleeping shelf 2-1/2 feet high, 6' wide and running the length of the room. Room 3 had approximately 100 bags of concrete on the shelf, and room 4 was empty.

(h) Room 5 had a concrete floor, walls, and ceiling. There were no doors and the room was empty.

(6) The possible group confinement building (5A) was constructed of brick or masonry with a cement finish and contained one large room with two raised concrete platforms running almost the full length of the building (See Fig C-4). Each platform, on either side of a 4 foot walkway, was 2-1/2 feet high approximately 6 feet deep and 50 feet long. An open probable wash area or latrine was noted in the northeast corner of the building. The doorway had a thatched straw door with no casement and the windows were barred with six 1/2" steel bars in an upright position. The building appeared old and no evidence of shackles, posts, or, restraining devices was noted. There was no evidence that the building had been recently used.

(7) Both buildings 5C and 5D, which were constructed September - December 1969 and previously considered as cell blocks, were empty and did not have the appearance of being used as cells (See Fig C-4). Each building was constructed of concrete, had no door casement or door, and consisted of one room with barred windows similar to building 5A. Building 5C had recently been refurbished, however, 5D appeared to be in the advanced stages of deterioration and gave the appearance of having never been occupied.

(8) Only those buildings on the southern edge of the administration/ mess area (8A, 8E, 8D, 8F, and 7B) were entered by US Forces (See Fig C-1). As expected, buildings 8D and 7B proved to be guard quarters; 8E

contained livestock and limited living quarters, while 4A and 8F were animal pens. The NVA personnel billeted in building 7A did not have bunks but merely the normal Vietnamese type roll up sleeping mats. They did not appear to be as well equipped as those personnel encountered at the military installation to the south.

c. Air Defense Reaction (Crew Debrief).

(1) Mission Narrative. The central and western NVN Air Defense System operated at near normal night time levels until approximately five minutes after the Assault/Strike Force time over target (TOT) of 20 November 1970 despite the presence of four F-4 and four F-105 aircraft on-station 10 minutes prior to the TOT. The northeastern (Phuc Yen Control) radar sector became more active at 1904Z (15 minutes prior to TOT) apparently in response to the Navy diversion. While the sector was concentrating on the USN diversionary forces, it detected the ingressing MEG CAP and SAM suppression forces on their way to their station orbit. From 1904Z until 1924Z, the NVN Air Defense System was in the process of increasing alert and establishing targets. At approximately 1924Z the SAM/AAA Radar Systems (FireCan/FanSong/Spoonrest) became active. However, the sites along the north through southwest edge of Hanoi showed no evidence of missiles 'hot' at this time. These were the sites which subsequently engaged the F105Gs. By 1931Z, when two F-105Gs fired the first two Shrikes, the hostile environment consisted of two FireCans (AAA) and four FanSongs (SAM). During the next six minutes, the number of FanSong radars active increased to seven, with four south of the Red River and three to the north. By this time, at least four battalions were 'hot' (VN 271, 002, 019 and 159) and began launching their missiles. The primary radar targeting data apparently was supplied to the two SAM regimental headquarters by the Phuc Yen and Ha Dong Flat Face (low altitude, high resolution acquisition) radars. At approximately 1932Z the battalions at VN-002 and VN-019 and probably VN-159 launched two missiles each, with one of VN-019's (or VN-159's) missiles damaging the F105G. At approximately 1940Z the SAM battalions in the Phuc Yen Area and VN 159 went missiles 'hot' and activated their AAA (57-85mm).

At this time VN-271 launched two missiles, again at the tight race-track orbits of four F-105Gs. During the next two minutes the battalions at VN-019 and VN-234 each launched a single missile, (for a total of eight to ten missiles fired in six minutes, probably all at F-105s). During the next five minutes, (1942Z-1947Z) as the assault helicopters were departing the objective, four missiles were launched at F105Gs (two each from VN-159 and VN-234). One of the missiles from VN-159 damaged F-105G FIREBIRD 05's fuel tanks causing bailout over Laos near Channel 103. At 1948Z as the Strike/Assault Force was completing egress across the Black River, the battalion at VN-271 launched two missiles at an F-105G on its final pass through the target area. By 1955Z the area SAM system began to relax with the F-105 and F-4 forces in the process of completing their final passes and egressing the area. The radar system remained active throughout the egress with at least eight sites tracking the MIG CAP, SAM suppression, helicopters, tankers, and C-130E DF steer forces. At no time during the mission did intelligence resources indicate definite MIG activity.


(2) Summary.


(a) Based on reported active radar levels, the NVN radar activity directed against USAF forces took approximately 20 minutes to reach alert status (after initial detection of F-4/F-105s over North Vietnam).

(b) From initial radar detection, the NVN SAM System took approximately 27 minutes to go 'hot' at four battalions and 38 minutes to go 'hot' at an additional 2-3 battalions. In approximately 13 minutes of peak activity, these six to seven battalions launched a total of 16 missiles. Fourteen, possibly all 16, missiles were launched at the F-105G force. Launches occurred in pairs with an approximate six second separation between missiles. All launches were accomplished when the F-105Gs were between 5 and 15 thousand feet and approximately 6-15NM from the launch site.

(c) MIG activity could not be positively identified.

2. Special Intelligence Annex provided under separate cover.







- 13A. FAMILY HOUSING (GUARDS)
- 13B. FAMILY HOUSING GUARDS)
- 13C. FAMILY HOUSING GUARDS)
- 13D. FAMILY HOUSING GUARDS)
- 13E. FAMILY HOUSING (GUARDS)

NOTE:
 ALL STRUCTURES ARE OF MASONRY
 CONSTRUCTION UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

(E) = CONCRETE LINE POLE (POWER)



(T) WOODEN PROBABLE TELECOM POLE




←←←← PADDY DIKES

LEGEND

- 1. COMPOUND 185' x 140' x 110'
- 2A. GUARD TOWER
- 2B. GUARD TOWER
- 2C. GUARD TOWER
- 3. LATRINE
- 4. LATRINE
- 4A. LATRINE
- 5A. PW CELLS 55' x 25'
- 5B. PW CELLS 55' x 30'
- 5C. PW CELLS ISOLATION 16' x 16'
- 5D. PW CELLS 16' x 37'
- 5E. PW MESS/INDOCTRINATION 50' x 30'
- 6. OLD BLDG FOUNDATION
- 7A. ADMIN AND COMM 40' x 27'
- 7B. GUARD QUARTERS 60' x 25'
- 8A. SUPPORT 25' x 20' (THATCH)
- 8B. SUPPORT 17' x 22' (THATCH)
- 8C. SUPPORT 25' x 25' (THATCH)
- 8D. SUPPORT 35' x 22'
- 8E. PROBABLE WATER STG 12' x 35'
- 8F. PROBABLE LAUNDRY 12' x 12'
- 9A. WELL
- 9B. WELL
- 10. GUARD SHACK AND MAIN GATE
- 11. KITCHEN 20' x 24'
- 12. FOOD STG/GUARD MESS 27' x 23'
- 13A. FAMILY HOUSING (GUARDS)
- 13B. FAMILY HOUSING (GUARDS)
- 13C. FAMILY HOUSING (GUARDS)
- 13D. FAMILY HOUSING (GUARDS)
- 13E. FAMILY HOUSING (GUARDS)

NOTE:
ALL STRUCTURES ARE OF MASONRY CONSTRUCTION UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

- (Γ) = CONCRETE LINE POLE (POWER)
- (A) 15'-18'
- (T) WOODEN PROBABLE TELECOM POLE
- (T) 17'-18'




INTERMITTENT POND

SUBJECT TO INUNDATION

SON TAY PW CAMP N-69

21 08 36N 105 30 01E



SONG CON

CONCERTINA WIRE ON WALL

AW POSITION

TRENCH

WIRE ON WALL

6 STEPS

CLOTHES LINES

TREES 40' HIGH

LADDER

AW POSITIONS

FILL

TRENCHES

BAMBOO GATE


GARDENS

FISH POND

STEPS

N

BUILDING 5-8 / OUTSIDE VIEW (South Side)



BUILDING 5-8 TOP VIEW





FIGURE 2

BUILDING 5-E / TOP VIEW



BUILDING 5-E / OUTSIDE VIEW (West Side)
(EPIB TEST AREA EXISTING - E-5 GRITTING)






FIGURE 3


BUILDING 5-A / TOP VIEW



BUILDING 5-D / TOP VIEW



BUILDING 5-C / TOP VIEW



C-18

FIGURE 4

PART II

SECTION D - PLANNING. Medical:

1. Selection of Personnel:

a. In the process of selecting 15 officers and 88 enlisted men for special duty, over 300 were interviewed. Present at each interview was the Commander of the Ground Forces, the JCTG Surgeon and two Sergeant Majors.

b. Many of the volunteers were not acceptable due to attitude, family problems, pregnant wives, and physical deficiencies.

c. All personnel assigned to COMJCTG during the training and deployment phases had their records reviewed by the JCTG Surgeon with negative results.

2. Prisoners of War:

a. A complete medical profile on the health of the previous nine POW returnees was compiled, listing expected health problems to be encountered.

b. Air Force and Navy plans for handling a large number of POWs were reviewed.

c. Medical facilities in Thailand, especially at Udorn RTAFB, were thoroughly reviewed.

d. A complete review of all available information concerning suspected internees in North Vietnam was accomplished. A profile was developed for the POWs from pre-internment, internment, and post liberation studies.

(1) Pre-Internment. Based on medical records of suspected internees in NVN, the average POW had the following statistics:

	<u>MEDIAN</u>	<u>MODE</u>	<u>RANGE</u>
Weight	171 lbs	160-180 lbs	135-215 lbs
Age	33 yrs	30-34 yrs	27-46 yrs
Height	70 inches	70 inches	64-74 inches

(2) Internment. Estimates of body weight, disease, and psychological state were made. It is estimated that the average weight loss would be 20%. The average weight loss in World War II prison camps was 32%. This included Japanese prison camps where there were severe problems. In World War II, the major categories of health problems after liberation of POWs were:

malnutrition,
disease,
wounds or injuries,
skin disease, and
respiratory disease.

A sample of 60 was structured to represent typical POW internees. It was estimated on that basis that the following diseases will be found:

<u>DISEASE</u>	<u>NO. OF CASES</u>
Malaria (Have had or have now)	25
Intestinal Parasites	35
Goiter	4
Malnutrition, Primary	40
Peripheral Neuritis	12
Active "Dysentary"	15
Tuberculosis, Active	12

A psychological profile based on interrogations of returning POWs was constructed to prepare for prisoner handling problems. The profile follows:

The POW has heard very little noise, has had very little physical exercise, and lives in dimly lit rooms. He eats two meals per day, usually consisting of cabbage soup plus bread or rice. Fish and pumpkin occasionally supplement the diet with less than two ounces of meat per week. Sometimes a banana or some other fruit is provided. Flour and sugar cookies are rarely given to the POW. Restriction of total protein intake plus physical inactivity will cause marked muscular atrophy plus a slow reaction to stimuli.

A few POWs will maintain a strong hope for liberation, and some will have given up all hope, but the majority are probably unsure and live day to day driven only by a natural desire to survive. Therefore, for most, the sudden realization that "liberation is here" will be shocking.

3. Post Liberation. Army ground forces will see stunned individuals managing a weak smile. There will be no yelling on their part. The POW will be easily fatigued, having lost so much weight and muscle mass. His night vision will be poor. There will be lesions at the angles of the mouth. The skin on the arms and legs will irritate and bruises will be evident. There may be a slight swelling of the thyroid (neck) area, and the tongue will be somewhat swollen. Speech will be slow and somewhat slurred. He will complain that his feet burn. He will bruise easily, walk unsteady, and may be emotional and prone to some display of tears.

4. Medical Logistics:

a. A special M-5 medical kit was prepared containing a Duke Inhaler Set for use with Penthrane, a non-flammable inhalation anesthetic agent; Ketamine HCL, a rapid acting general anesthetic agent; scissors and canulas for cricothyroidectomies; hemostats, airways, various sizes of bandages; and inflatable splints.

b. After several meetings with the Army Natick Laboratories, Natick, Massachusetts, the following equipment was devised:

(1) Unlined camouflaged ponchos were procured, plus specially made ponchos lined with one-half of a poncho liner necessary to keep the POW warm. The ponchos were 82 x 60 inches and weighed approximately one pound. The specially lined ponchos were vacuum packed to conserve volume on the egress helicopters.

(2) Using a Bata comfort shoe as a base, a specially devised olive drab sneaker with high rise eyelets and reinforced firm sponge insoles was designed.

(3) Heinz rice baby food, selected for its palatability and consistency, was packaged in plain sealed foil for security reasons.

(4) Canned survival food, consisting of a high carbohydrate, low protein meal, was procured for use by operational personnel in the event of an E&E situation. In addition, canned water was obtained.

(5) Three other M-5 kits were readied for prepositioning on rescue helicopters. These were in addition to the routine medical kits carried by the rescue helicopters.

(6) One hundred sets of pajamas and bathrobes were sent by the Army Surgeon General from Valley Forge Headquarters to Eglin AFB, Florida. These were to be worn by the returnees on their trip to CONUS.

PART II

SECTION E - TRAINING:

1. GROUND FORCES:

a. Organization:

(1) Pre-Mission Selection:

(a) The Army Element was organized into a three platoon concept at Fort Bragg from a one "B" and five "A" Detachment concept. The three platoons were equally strong in personnel by rank, MOS, and special qualifications. During this phase, strong emphasis was placed on individual leadership traits and physical stamina. Personnel lacking in either category at the completion of Phase I, were eliminated from the unit. Training in the MOS skills of demolitions, weapons, and communications was conducted to identify individual qualifications for future selection. Interviews were conducted to identify personnel skilled in SCUBA, HALO, rappelling, photography, chainsaw operation, torch operation, pathfinder, and forward air guides. Additional training was conducted in small unit tactics, with emphasis on evasion, escape, and patrolling techniques. Individual weapons were zeroed and familiarization training on all Force weapons was conducted. Aircraft orientations were held on the A-1E Skyraider aircraft, the UH-1H, HH-3, and HH-53 helicopters. These orientations included loading and unloading procedures on the aircraft to be used.

(b) The selection of personnel for the Ground Force was effectively accomplished and minimum changes were necessary during subsequent phases.

(2) Mission Selection:

(a) The Army Element was re-organized into a ground force structure on 17 September 1970 for the purpose of fulfilling the mission requirement which called for three Groups (ASSAULT, COMMAND, SUPPORT). Fifty-one primary personnel and ten backup personnel were selected on the basis of their performance during Phase I training with special emphasis

placed on leadership, MOS, rank, physical stamina, special skills, and other attributes. The ten backup personnel were distributed equally among the three Groups to provide immediate replacements or substitutes. Personnel not selected were returned to the support detachment. Realizing the Assault Group was unique in its mission, heavy emphasis was placed on the selection of the more experienced, skilled, mature personnel. The Deputy JCTG Commander selected the Ground Force Commander who in turn selected the leaders for subordinate groups and one MACO (Marshalling Area Control Officer). The Assault Group Leader selected the three officer element leaders who in turn selected personnel to fill their elements. The Support Group Leader selected two officer element leaders who selected their members. The Ground Force Commander further selected four radio operators. Two were assigned to the Ground Force Commander and two to the JCTG Deputy Commander. (See Inclosures 1 and 3). Further evaluations of individuals were made within each group for selection of required special skills, i.e., photographers, chain saw operators, helicopter machine gunners, special demolitions, and pathfinders. This selection was accomplished by the Group Leaders with the aid of comprehensive worksheets derived from screening of 201 files and through personal interviews concerning requisite skills desired.

(b) The reorganization was completed by housing all personnel (officers and EM) in assigned group barracks under the control of the Group Leader. All individuals were briefed on the reorganization and a modified cover story was announced in the interest of security and to satisfy the curiosity of the Force members. Difficulty was encountered in maintaining positive and smooth coordination with the Support Detachment due to lack of their knowledge of the true mission. Special ranges and a ground "mock-up" were constructed by the Support Detachment without explaining the why - only the where and the what were given. Example, construction of the mock-up posed even more problems peculiar to this situation. Distinct and concise guidance had to be given to the Support Detachment stifling any allowance for individual

initiative. Experienced and mature individuals suffered a sense of frustration and a feeling of being left out of the total training objective. All of these difficulties were eventually overcome by the leaders of the Ground Force.

RANK/NAME	JOB TITLE	OFF	NCO	COMM		DEMO		MED		FAG	MACO	PATH-FINDER	PHOTO	SAM	TORCH	M-79	M-72 (LAW)	M-60	M-16
				1	2	1	2	1	2										
LTC BYDNOR	Ground Frc Com	(X)			X														X
SFC HOWELL	RTO		(X)	X															X
SSG POOLE	RTO		(X)	X															X
LTC CATALDO	Doctor	(X)						(X)											X
CPT MC CLAM	MACO	X			X				X	(X)			X						X
CPT TURNER	Com Gp Ldr	(X)			X														X
SGT BUCKLER	RTO		X	(X)															X
MSG SPENCER	Sec Elm Ldr		(X)		X		X												X
SFC MURRAY	M-79 Gunner		X					X							(X)				
SFC QUEZADA	M-16 Rifleman		X				X												(X)
SFC HILL	Photo		X									(X)							X
SSG YOUNG	Torch		X										(X)						X
MSG LUPYAK	Sec Elm Ldr		(X)		X				(X)							X			
SFC MARTIN	M-60 Gunner		X					X		X								(X)	
SFC ADDERLY	M-79 Gunner		X							X					(X)	X			
SFC BLACKARD	Sec Elm Ldr		(X)		X				(X)										X
SFC MC GUIRE	M-79 Gunner		X						X						(X)	X			
SFC BOSS	M-60 Gunner		X					X		X								(X)	
SFC MATSEN	Pathfinder		X		X		X			X		(X)							X
SFC STRAHAN	Pathfinder		X			X				X		(X)							X

X= Current Experience

O= Assignment/Task

E-5

RANK/NAME	JOB TITLE	OFF	NCO	COMMO		DEMO		MED		FAG	MACO	PATH FINDER	PHOTO	SAW	TORCH	M-79	M-72 (LAW)	M-60	CAR-15
				1	2	1	2	1	2										
CPT MEADOWS	Assault Gp Ldr	(X)		(X)															X
MSG MOORE	Demo/Maco		(X)		X	(X)			X					X					X
SFC DODGE	NTO			(X)			X												X
CPT McKINNEY	Element Ldr	(X)		(X)											X			(X)	X
MSG KITTLESON	Member		(X)				X											X	X
SFC ROBBINS	Member								X										X
SGT ST CLAIR	Member																		X
CPT JAEGER	Element Ldr	(X)		(X)															X
SFC TAPLEY	Member		(X)						X					X					X
SSG McMILLEN	Member																		X
SSG ERICKSON	Member																		X
1STLT PETRIE	Element Ldr	(X)		(X)			X								X				X
MSG KEMMER	Member		(X)																X
SFC WINGROVE	Member								X										

X = Current Experience

O = Assignment/Task

NAME/RANK	JOB TITLE	OFF	NCO	COMM		DEMO		MED		FAC	MACO	PATH FINDER	PHOTO	SAB	TORCH	M-79	M-72 (150)	M-60	M-16
				1	2	1	2	1	2										
CPT WALTHER	Support Gp Ldr	(X)			X					X									X
SFC SUAREZ	RTO		X	(X)															X
SFC JURIGI	Chainsaw		X					X						(X)	X				X
SSG NELSON	Torch		X											X	(X)				X
SGT KEEL	Photographer		X										(X)						X
SGT ROE	Demo		X				(X)												X
SFC LAWSON	Rifleman		X						X			X							(X)
CPT ROUSE	Demo Ele Ldr	(X)			X		(X)										X		X
SFC BLEACHER	Demo #1		X				(X)												X
SSG RODRIGUEZ	Demo #2		X				(X)										X		X
SGT MEDENSKI	Demo #3		X				(X)										X		X
SGT THOMAS	Rifleman		X		X				X	(X)							X		X
SFC JAKOVENKO	Machine Gunner		X															(X)	
SFC CARLSEN	M-79/RTO		X		X					X						(X)			X
CPT NELSON	Sec Ele Ldr	(X)			X					X			X				X		X
SFC JOPLIN	Rifleman		X		X				X	(X)							X		X
SSG POWELL	Demo/M-60		X				(X)											X	
SFC VALENTINE	Rifleman/MACO		X		X						X	X							(X)
SFC TAAPKEN	M-79		X													(X)			X
COL SIMONS	JCTG-DCO	(X)			X														X
SSG NICKERSON	RTO		X		(X)														X
SSG MILLER	RTO		X		(X)														X

X = Current Experience

O = Assignment/Task

b. Facilities (US Army):

(1) As Eglin AFB had been chosen as the CONUS Training Site, immediate action was taken to select a definite billeting and training area for the Army Element. Accordingly, on 12 August 1970 representatives from JCTG proceeded to Eglin AFB to make this selection. After inspecting the facilities at Auxiliary Field 3 on 13 August 1970, it was determined that this area was suitable for the Army requirements. The cantonment, recently vacated by AFROTC Summer encampment consisted of:

- (a) Six barracks for troop billets.
- (b) Space for class room.
- (c) One building with barred windows for the TOC.
- (d) PX and Snack Bar.
- (e) Theater.
- (f) Messing facilities.
- (g) Motor Pool.

(2) The area was essentially isolated and nearby apron space was suitable for helicopter training.

(3) After selecting Auxiliary Field 3 and evaluating logistical support facilities a decision was made to send a representative to Eglin AFB to make arrangements for required support:

(4) On 19 August 1970, a representative traveled to Eglin AFB to arrange an interservice agreement. Liaison was made with SOF personnel to arrange for more immediate logistical support while Base Logistical Planners were contacted to arrange for requirements such as:

- (a) Messing.
- (b) Barracks space.
- (c) Transportation support.
- (d) Medical facilities.

(5) The initial estimate of funds to be placed within the Base Supply System computer at Eglin AFB was \$11,300.00 based on prior experience

with Cabin Light Exercises, Exotic Dancer III and guidance provided by the Deputy Commander, JCTG.

(6) During the feasibility study it became apparent that a full scale mock-up of the objective would have to be used to train and rehearse the assault force. This concept was later carried over into the training phase and a full scale model of the compound constructed on Range C-2, Eglin AFB. Several plans for this construction had been discussed early in the program. A complete, realistic construction was dismissed as this would be impossible to conceal from casual observers and would give a definite indication of the target area because of building characteristics. It was pointed out that a Russian photographic satellite was programmed over Eglin AFB and a mock-up might be discernible on photos taken from this satellite. Accordingly, this plan was modified to permit dismantling of the mock-up during the hours of daylight.

(7) During the planning phase, it was decided that construction would be of target cloth and 2" X 4" lumber. Accordingly, some 1500 yards of target cloth and seven hundred-ten (710) six foot 2" X 4"s were requisitioned and stored in the C&E yard at Auxiliary Field 3. The use of target cloth would allow the "rolling-up" of each wall and facilitate the storage of the mock-up. Post holes were to be covered by lids so as to conceal the outline. The survey and layout of the mock-up, which was referred to as a village for cover purposes, began on 7 September 1970 and was maintained on a continuous basis.

(8) The Support Detachment SQM was the project NCO on building the mock-up, normally using eight to ten personnel during the morning hours. Training conducted in the afternoon and evening in the vicinity of the mock-up limited work to four hours a day.

(9) The method of construction involved pre-assembling the mock-up in the cantonment area, fabricating each building mock-up separately. The trees inside the compound were simulated by simply transplanting trees into the compound. Landing areas around the compound were cleared, and gates and windows either painted or constructed in frame.

(10) The first insert (landing) within the compound was made on 14 September 1970. Results were satisfactory using both the HUEY and the HH-3 with the pilots, in both cases, expressing concern and amazement at the small space allowable for landing.

(11) The tendency of the target cloth to whip and tear in the prop blast from the helicopters was a problem. This was solved by cutting holes in the cloth, thus reducing the "sail effect" of the stretched cloth.

(12) The mock-up became the center of all training activity with insertions practiced under a variety of conditions; day and night, dry and live fire.

(13) On 24 September 1970, the schedule of the satellite was supplied and it was determined that there was virtually no possibility that the mock-up could be interpreted through aerial observation and identified as a POW Compound, much less the specific objective.

c. Support and Logistics:

(1) The Support Detachment and five Operational Detachments were formed, for administrative reasons, at Fort Bragg on 26 August 1970 and were deployed to Eglin AFB, Florida in two increments. The advance party, consisting of a small administrative force, departed on 1 September 1970 with the main body following on 8 September 1970. The unit was reorganized for training on 9 September 1970 into three platoons and a support detachment. The mission of the support detachment was to:

(a) Provide all administrative and logistical support to the operational platoons.

(b) Furnish back-up personnel for the operational units.

(c) Maintain a training program to cover the deployment of the operational element, thereby giving the appearance of continued operations in the Eglin AFB area.

(2) The original thought concerning the Support Detachment was that it would be modeled after the basic structure of a "B" Detachment and was designed to relieve the Ground Commander of all burdens concerned with administration, supply, messing, and coordination with other units including the Air Force, in order to free him exclusively to train his force.

(3) The Detachment was to consist of:

(a) The "B" Detachment and Conventional Staff Sections.

(b) A Mess Section.

(c) A Security Section of six guards.

(4) All personnel were briefed at 1300 hours, 26 August 1970, as to administrative and logistical actions to be accomplished prior to departing Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

(a) Appointments were made at CIF for issue of clothing and equipment.

(b) Appointments with JAG for Wills and Power of Attorney.

(c) A shakedown was conducted to ensure that all required equipment was in the possession of each man.

(d) Unit personnel officers were alerted of personnel actions needed and the priority required.

(5) On 1 September 1970, the advance party of twenty-eight officers and enlisted men were processed and departed for Auxiliary Field 3, Eglin AFB, Florida. The following week the remainder of the unit completed

all processing, and departed on 8 September 1970. No problems were encountered in the preparation of personnel for movement to Eglin AFB. Upon arrival at Eglin AFB, the Support Detachment was reorganized to three officers and twenty-three EM. The following is an organization of the Support Detachment:

- (a) Commanding Officer, Major.
- (b) S-4 Officer, Captain.
- (c) Surgeon, Captain.
- (d) Detachment SGM.
- (e) S-2/S-3 NCO, MSgt.
- (f) One Admin Supervisor.
- (g) One Assistant Admin Supervisor.
- (h) One Heavy Weapons Leader.
- (i) One Light Weapons Leader.
- (j) One MSgt as S-4 Sergeant.
- (k) One Supply Sergeant.
- (l) One Radio Supervisor.
- (m) Two Radio Operators.
- (n) One Medical Supervisor.
- (o) One Medical Aidman.
- (p) Four Cooks.
- (q) Six Security Guards.

(6) In addition to normal administrative and logistical support, the Detachment provided:

- (a) Medical coverage.
- (b) Communication support during all phases of training.
- (c) Weapons assistance during range firing.
- (d) Construction of ranges and mock-up.
- (e) Security for ranges during training.
- (f) Security of Tactical Operations Center.
- (g) Transportation support to ranges and training sites.

(h) Personnel for various details.

(7) The staff sections were organized as follows:

(a) The S-1 Section consisted of one officer and two enlisted men whose primary duty was to perform purely routine administration for all personnel involved.

(b) The S-2 was to maintain routine intelligence paperwork.

(c) The S-3 was primarily a coordinator for instruction and training of the Operational Detachments, drawing instructors from within the "B" Detachment and arranging for Air Force Instructors when necessary.

(d) The S-4 was to perform the normal functions of an S-4 with the assistance of two supply sergeants.

(8) During the entire exercise very few personnel actions were required due to the temporary duty status of all individuals. Actions that were of a routine nature were held by unit personnel officers of the man's parent unit and no priority actions were necessary. There was a small amount of typing required by the supply section, however, it did not interfere with normal administrative functions. During the training phase six personnel were released on emergency leave, varying from three to fifteen days, beginning the day the individual departed the training site and terminated on his return. The DA Form 31 (Request and authority for Leave) was mailed to the officer or EM's UFO.

(9) Mess Hall No. 5 had to absorb the additional messing-strength, and it became necessary to hire additional cooks and mess attendants. The small mess section in the Support Detachment was to operate the mess hall primarily for meals beyond the regular schedule, and were unable to aid the mess hall in its normal scheduled meals and contribute to the expanded kitchen force requirement. Coordination with Eglin Food Service revealed the amount of \$8,500.00 would be necessary to pay this force. Accordingly, this amount was requested from Fort Bragg to be used by Eglin Food Service for attendants and cooks.

(10) It was decided that a late evening meal was needed when conducting night training. Food was prepared by mess personnel assigned to

the unit and consisted of breakfast type food. It was normally fed at 2200-2400 hours and enabled operational personnel to sleep beyond breakfast the following day.

d. Logistics:

(1) Logistical actions at Eglin AFB during the training phase are categorized as follows:

(a) Actions taken by supply personnel at Fort Bragg prior to movement of the main body. This began when, in accordance with the initial equipment list, supply requisitions were submitted and equipment - hand receipted from units at Fort Bragg.

(b) Support and services necessary to maintain the Army component at Auxiliary Field 3, such as billeting, messing, laundry, munitions storage, telephone service, transportation, helicopter shop support, medical, and civil engineering. These were accomplished by liaison with Logistics Plans Branch, Test Programs and Requirements Office, Headquarters, 3246th Test Wing and formalized by published Project Directive Number 9765035, Ivory Coast.

(c) The establishment of an organizational supply account and the acquisition of equipment for both the training and operational phases of the mission was necessary. This supply account was utilized to secure items of common supply, exclusively Air Force equipment, local purchase items, expendables and Army equipment available by "transceiving" through Air Force computer channels.

(d) Supply Branch, G-4, USAJFKCENMA provided direct support for locally available supplies, primarily ammunition, pyrotechnics and exclusively Army material.

(e) Direct contact with Depot, CONARC and item managers for those items deemed necessary for the success of the operation where time or scarcity precluded requisition through normal supply channels.

(2) The very nature of the mission dictated that peculiar special equipment items be obtained for the Force. This equipment was primarily to be used to remove those devices that were expected to be used to secure POWs. Guidance from debriefings of previously freed POWs indicated that stocks, metal hasps, and a variety of locks would be encountered. During the planning stage, provision had been made for the inclusion of these items in the equipment list but the actual procurement of these items, in many cases, proved to be involved and difficult.

(a) Two oxygen-acetylene emergency cutting outfits, FSN: 3433-026-4718, were obtained through Supply Department, NAS, Pensacola, Fla., after search of the commercial market determined that such an outfit was unavailable through civilian sources. The criteria for selection included a comparative light weight, a burning time of thirty minutes and simplicity in operation. Oxygen and acetylene were procured through local civilian sources.

(b) Six commercial chain saws, GED, with 16" drive, Skill Models 1631 and 1645 were acquired through local purchases. Again, the criteria included a light weight and simplicity and ease of operation.

(c) Bolt cutters, angular cut, rigid head 36", FSN: 55-0-22-7057 were acquired after training experience revealed that other models had soft metal jaws that failed upon cutting metal links of the type expected within the compound. The selected model was the type used by Air Force Fire Fighters.

(d) The 35mm Pen-EE cameras originally planned for the Force were unavailable through normal supply channels. Search for a suitable substitute revealed that the Kodak Model S-20 Instamatic Camera had the desired ruggedness and simplicity. Six of these were purchased through Eglin AFB PX and operators trained in their use.

(e) The electrical head lamps, FSN: 6230-643-3562, utilized by the force are a standard item available through GSA sources. Training experience proved the inadvisability of wearing the lamp on the head and, in most cases, it was worn on the load-bearing-equipment harness.

(f) EZE Equipment (Page D-5-2, JCTG OPLAN) was modified from the original plan as further requirements became identified. In lieu of the indigenous and INRP rations, regular survival rations for the force and special rice food for the detainees was acquired. The water mentioned was can, water, military, FSN: 7240-242-6153 and was obtained through commissary channels. In addition, each individual carried one survival kit, tropical, wet climate and a survival sheath knife.

(g) Fifteen rucksacks, similar to the indigenous rucksacks used by the CIDG personnel in the Republic of Vietnam, were made by the fabric shop of the Special Operations Force at Hurlburt Field, Fla, for the purpose of EZE for individuals of the assault platoon.

(h) To offset the danger of fire inherent in the landing of the assault helicopter, three extinguishers, fire 9076, FSN: 4210-595-1782 were acquired for this helicopter. However, they were not needed as the helicopter did not burn.

(i) As training continued, a need for some sort of ear protection for the force became apparent. Twenty ear protectors, P80-14/P were sent through normal Air Force channels for those individuals in close proximity to demolitions. For the remaining members, standard ear muffs were made available to reduce helicopter noise.

(j) It became necessary to modify the M-79 grenade protection vest, FSN: 6105-141-0926, because of the difference in ogive shape between the newer round issued and round for which the vest was originally designed. This consisted of the moving the strap securing the vest to each individual pocket and was performed by the Eglin AFB Fabric

(k) Acquisition of the Amalite Single Point Sight posed problems of yet another sort. After recognizing the usefulness of this particular item, a call was placed to Costa Mesa, California on 15 September, inquiring as to the availability of the sight. On 18 September, one sight was airmailed to the project with a mount that was the only model available to the JCTG during the requisite time frame of the problem. After testing the sight under field conditions, it was decided to purchase an additional 49 sights for use by the operational detachments. A local purchase agreement was subsequently entered into and 27 sights, with mounts, were immediately forwarded at a cost of \$49.50 each. Upon arrival, these sights were zeroed under daylight conditions and used in an assault situation during the next night insert. Problems arose due to the looseness of this particular mount, but a generous use of black electrician's tape prevented breakage or loss of these items. Target hits increased greatly and groupings of hits were smaller, resulting in more confidence in the individual weapon. On 21 October the remainder of the sights arrived, were used, and a proper zero established.

(l) Loss of night vision due to the sudden illumination of a flare received a great deal of study. Dark lens goggles, obtained from Air Force stocks, proved inadequate as the amber and green lens failed to provide sufficient protection. The use of radiological glasses was considered but these proved to be too hard to use. The solution was to coat clear lens with red chart pak pressure sensitive tape (TC 1-2) which provided sufficient protection from sudden flare light.

(m) It was determined, during training, that a requirement existed for a knife similar to a machete but with a heavy blade and a sharp point usable for prying open doors or barricades. The machete produced by Natick Laboratories and tested by the Ranger Department some time earlier appeared to be the solution. However, upon investigation, it was found that it would take sixteen weeks to produce the needed quantity. Accordingly, a local purchase request was made through Eglin AFB to buy a similar knife

locally, Again, this was found to be an extremely lengthy process. It then became necessary to alter regular government machetes to provide the desired blade. This was done through Eglin Machine Shop which produced the necessary numbers in a matter of days.

(n) Eighty-four pair of summer flying gloves, FSN: 8415-935-6330, were acquired from the Eglin Supply Squadron. These gloves were used by force personnel to prevent injury to hands while locating locks to be cut. The gloves were a tight fit to the hands, and items of equipment could be operated without having to remove the gloves.

(o) Two-hundred-fifty 30 round magazines for the M-16 were acquired directly from the Colt Arms Company through coordination at DA as magazines were not available through the normal supply channels. A problem with the magazines was that there are no ammunition pocket for carrying these on the Load-Bearing-Equipment, however, another carrying means, a modified Claymore mine bag was developed.

(p) Six single cut fire axes were acquired through the Eglin AFB Supply System. Although weighing eight pounds, these axes proved to be the best available for the mission, providing the necessary flexibility and utility. It was planned to use these axes for breaking doors and locks.

(q) An alternate plan called for the use of a scaling ladder by the assault platoon. The fourteen-foot fireman's roof ladder was determined to be the best for the job. Accordingly, this item was acquired through Eglin AFB supply channels.

(3) Problem Areas:

(a) Problem areas encountered during the operation were primarily related to the unique nature of the operation, competition for resources by other exercises, and a reluctance by some to support the operation as stringent security requirements prevented explanation of its priority.

(b) Critical problems encountered in the ammunition area were as follows:

1. Shortly after the ammunition arrived at Eglin, a phone call from Mr. Thomas, Fort Bragg Ammunition Dump, revealed that one lot number of the IAW's was suspended. This lot was later released "For Training Only". A call to Field Service Division, Joliet Arsenal revealed that 250 IAW's were available at Lone Star Arsenal and would be diverted from South East Asia upon requisition. This was accomplished through Fort Bragg.

2. One thousand non-electric blasting caps were requested through Fort Bragg and were shipped from Fort Benning. During the demolition training phase there was a 22% misfires with non-electric caps received from Fort Benning. The S-4 officer submitted a report to the G-4 USAJFKCEMA requesting the Fort Bragg ammunition officer be notified of the problems with these blasting caps. Mr. Thomas, from the Fort Bragg Ammo Dump, contacted the ammunition officer of Fort Stewart and requested 100 non-electric caps be shipped to Project Ivory Coast. A subsequent test was conducted on the caps received from Fort Stewart, and no misfires experienced.

3. As Forward Air Guide training progressed in scope, a suitable system of marking targets had to be developed. Ground action would be characterized by sharp rapid action and the force would be completely dependent on air support. Several methods of target marking were tested including 5.56 tracer, .45 tracer, M-79 HE and White Star Cluster (WSC). .45 caliber tracer, controlled item, was secured from Aberdeen Proving Grounds after coordination with the item manager at Joliet Arsenal. A search developed for a 40 mm white phosphorus round to fulfill the requirement for a "spotter round" through ammunition channels up to Department of the Army, and the CIA with no success. As experiments with the 40 mm WSC were, perhaps the most successful, it was determined that this would be the primary marking round. Experimentation and training had quickly exhausted the local supply and action was taken to acquire more from Fort Bragg. As these items were in extremely short supply, a call to DA produced a contact at COMARC to ship 250 40 mm WSC from Depot to the project.

(d) Acquisition of the auxiliary fuel equipment kit, FSN: 1560-073-3300, for the UH-1H helicopters involved considerable coordination with Fort Rucker, Alabama; these items are uncommon in the supply system and were not available at Fort Bragg. Kits were essential to increase the range of the UH-1H in the event it became the primary means of insertion.

(e) It is recommended that, in future operations, if the use of helicopters of this type is envisioned, that PLL, spare parts and necessary test equipment be identified, earmarked and made immediately available at the training site.

(4) Lessons Learned.

(a) All sources, both military and commercial, must be investigated for peculiar items of equipment. Sears Roebuck, sport shops and other firms publish catalogues useful in obtaining specifications and often give valuable information on their products which is of use to supply personnel.

(b) Future operations of this nature must include sufficient supply personnel to insure prompt reaction to sudden requirements. The original concept of one supply officer and two supply sergeants did not provide sufficient flexibility. A solution is to provide, in addition to the personnel mentioned above, an armorer, an ammunition specialist and a light truck driver/clerk. In addition, an Air Force supply liaison sergeant well versed in Air Force supply procedures and forms would have been invaluable.

(c) Direct coordination with DCSLOG agencies during the Planning Phase proved to be invaluable in the acquisition of initial equipment. The planner of any future operation should make a definite attempt to achieve and maintain this coordination.

(d) The Air Force computerized supply system proved to be a rapid means of acquiring supplies and equipment. Every advantage must be taken of this asset and future training sites should possess this valuable system.

(e) Local purchase could have been greatly expedited and facilitated if a Class "A" Agent could have been appointed on orders and a suitable amount of cash made available for direct local procurement. This amount, based on experience gained in this operation, need not have been over \$4000.00. The additional aspects of bonding and accurate accounting would have outweighed the administration of local purchase through the Eglin Supply System and attendant time loss.

(f) Establishment of a Property Book Account Number for the operation would have been of immense value. Supplies and equipment hand receipted from units at Fort Bragg could have been laterally transferred to the the Task Group allowing losing units to requisition replacement items. This particular course was recommended by DA where it was determined by the DA Staff that because of the high level of the exercise it was not necessary to maintain formal property accountability. On future operations of this nature, a property account should be established at the highest level to expedite the acquisition of vital supplies and equipment. Formal accountability should be maintained as outlined in AR 220-1, AR 735-35, and USCONARC Regulation 700-11.

e. Special Equipment Development: The nature of the mission assigned to the ground force, that of forcibly removing the POW's from the compound cells, led to the examination and selection of many special items of equipment.

(1) Shotgun (12 gauge duck-bill):

(a) Purpose: To provide an area-type weapon which insures positive kills while being utilized in building clearing procedures.

(b) Manner. The original 12 gauge pump shotguns were not suitable due to the small shot pattern received at 20 meters. When the

automatic (5 shot) duck-bill shotgun was tested the shot pattern at 25 meters covered a six (6) foot area and ensured positive kills.

(c) Outcome: The 12 gauge, duck-bill shotgun was used with great success in the objective area.

(2) Acetylene Torch: A light weight acetylene torch was required to cut locks, shackles or other restraining devices. Training was conducted extensively. Personnel carrying the torches were highly proficient in their use. Due to the absence of prisoners at Son Tay Prisoner of War Camp, the torches were not used.

(3) Ax (Fire): The requirement for a tool for breaking down doors or knocking off locks was resolved by the selection of a fire ax. The ax was heavy and effective in gaining entrance to buildings.

(4) Bolt Cutters: The primary tool used by the Assault Group to open and provide quick entry into cell blocks and cells, secured by means of padlocks, was the medium size bolt cutter. Three sizes were carried which would cut any known size padlock and metal bar up to 3/4 inch in diameter. Three bolt cutters of each size were carried by the Assault Group and back-up bolt cutters were carried by the Support and Command Groups for employment in alternate plans.

(5) Goggles: Goggles were used originally to preserve night vision. As training progressed, it was determined that the value in the use of goggles was not in the preservation of night vision, but in the protection they afforded from flying debris created by the rotor wash of the HH-53 helicopter. Goggles were effectively used at the Son Tay Prisoner of War Camp.

(6) Chain Saw: Chain saw was not used at the objective, however, training was conducted with intended usage in clearing the landing zone of wooden obstructions and as a stand-by tool should the Assault Group need it while releasing POW's.

(7) Megaphone, Hand Held/S-197: The megaphone was used to control ground force personnel during heliborne training, by the Assault Group in issuing instructions to Assault Group personnel within the assault helicopter, and to issue other instructions within the compound.

(8) Night Vision Device: Group and Element Leaders were provided the device early in Phase IV. Its limitations and capabilities were explained to each individual. Use of the device was then demonstrated in a practical application exercise. During the mission, the device was used to adjust M-79 fire on a target. It was also used to identify two armed enemy personnel at approximately 80 to 100 meters distance. In another incident two enemy personnel were sighted moving on a road at approximately 300 meters distance.

(9) Single Point Sight: The sight is designed to military specifications and can be dropped eight feet on to concrete without altering the zero. Length 6-3/4 inches. Diameter 1 inch. Weight 7 ounces.

(a) Mounting: The sight was mounted with standard one inch rings on a bar base. The base was then secured in the recess of the M16-15 carrying handle. The eye relief was somewhere between two and five inches from the eye when in the firing position, with the elevation adjustment upwards and the windage adjustment facing right as seen by the firer.

(b) Sighting: The sight is designed to make full use of the amazing automatic reflex characteristic of the human eyes and brain. The sight blanks out the view of the target with one eye and substitutes the aiming point which appears at infinity. The other eye has a clear view of the target and the output from each eye is passed via the optic nerves to both sides of the brain. The brain collates the two sets of information and the natural process of binocular vision gives the shooter an aiming point apparently projected out in the target area. The shooter's eyes focus on the target.

The sight gives all round vision apart from a small blind area. The eye in front of the lens becomes a gathering source, and as it does not see the target, eliminates the problem of master eye. The other eye sees the aiming point projected onto the target. The sight makes full use of both eyes and the shooter's natural reflex action makes it fast and simple to use.

(c) Problem Areas:

1. Learning to shoot with both eyes open.
2. Not tightening the rings and base enough.
3. No tool to tighten the mount rings.
4. Stripping the bolt on mount rings.
5. Lack of confidence in the sight.
6. Tendency to shoot lower at night.
7. Concentrating on dot too long.
8. Concentrating on the dot instead of the target.

(d) Results: After one sight and several parts were lost, a proper degree of tension was found for all bolts on the sight. This can only be found through experience and common sense. In order to get further stability and prevent the sight from being lost if the bolts come loose, tape was placed around the sight and weapon at strategic points. A large 12 inch screwdriver can be notched to fit the configuration of the mount screw. Shooting with both eyes open required from 30 minutes to two hours of practice. All shooters found that this gave a wide angle view and true picture of the target area. This also enabled the shooter to switch from one target to another more rapidly and accurately, with a clear view of the target after firing. All shooters were constantly reminded to shoot rapidly. This stopped them from concentrating on the spot and causing it to blur, and shifted the concentration to the target. The correction of these problem areas produced a complete confidence in the single point sight. An average of one out of twenty could not learn to use the single point. This number decreased to one out of a hundred with time.

(e) Accuracy: At a distance of 25 meters, the poorest marksman could place all rounds in a 12 inch circle at night. At a distance of 50 meters, the same shooter could place every round in an E type silhouette both day and night. The only advantages found in day shooting were speed in engaging the target and shifting fire. The single point could not compare with open sights for accuracy. At night the situation reversed. Shooters could engage targets and shift fire just as rapidly as in day fire with the same amount of accuracy. Open sights would have produced only a fraction of this speed and accuracy.

(f) Use of Sling with Weapon and Sight: It was learned that the rifle sling as described in Para (10), had the same advantages with the single-point sight as with the open fixed sight.

(g) Summary:

With the proper training, the Single Point Sight is an invaluable aid to the infantry rifleman. There are no liabilities to the sight other than additional weight. The key to the sight is the fact that the open sights are still clear, giving the shooter an option of sights depending on time and illumination.

(h) The above information was gathered from several unofficial sources and is not in any form or fashion intended to be a substitute for full scale tests to determine its value to the military as a whole. It is considered fully suitable for the precise use to which it was put and under the conditions which it was used.

(10) Weapon Sling: It was determined that a fabric sling, attached to the front sight post and rear of the carrying handle enabled the firer to assume a good firing position and better stabilize his weapon. This also gave the firer a constant sight picture, with his eye always the same distance away from the open sight or the single point sight eye-piece.

With the sling looped over the neck the weapon could instantly be put into firing position, enabling the firer to free both hands at any time desired.

(11) Demolition Charges:

(a) Satchel charges:

1. Five pound satchel charge: Four (4) five pound satchel charges were carried to destroy the concrete power tower located south of the target. These charges were carried by the Command Group.

2. Thirty pound satchel charge: Four thirty pound satchel charges were carried by the Support Group. These items were heavily overcharged in order to minimize personnel exposure and to ensure destruction of the target.

(b) Special Demolition Charges:

1. Three pounds of C-4 were used to blow a hole at the southern end of the east wall of the compound.

2. A three pound mixture of C-4 and Thermite, in a thirty inch length of four inch fire hose was used to destroy the MH-3. This was placed under the floor in the bilge sump between the fore and aft fuel tanks, and secured by metal cover and padlock. The charge was designed to insure positive destruction of the MH-3 helicopter. Detonation was ensured by dual priming a 10 minute time fuse.

f. Tactics and Techniques: The special tactics and techniques employed by the ground force during the training period and the actual operation were the employment of the helicopter as a gun platform, techniques for POW cell search, specially adapted hand and arm signals and the bridge demolition plan.

(1) Helicopter Platform Firing:

(a) Purpose. A need was recognized for additional skills in firing machine guns and shoulder weapons from the assault helicopter in flight during its landing phase. The techniques developed would be necessary to provide fire power on the Son Tay Prisoner of War Compound during the insert.

(b) Manner. The two helicopters employed and provided for the Army UH-1H helicopter and the Air Force HH-3 helicopter. Each was put through strenuous tests from which comparable data was kept, including number of personnel, weights, and type weapon that could fire from each type helicopter. During the test many changes were made in individual firing positions in order to arrive at a system that would allow maximum number of rounds placed on the high threat areas (the gate and R/W tower). With this consideration in mind, left hand firers were placed in position to give greater accuracy and longer engagement period. The UH-1H helicopter platform allowed four shoulder weapons (CAR-15) to fire from the right side and two from the left side. The UH-1H proved to be much faster than the HH-3 on insert which reduced the time and number of rounds delivered on the target. Approximately two 30 round magazines could be fired by each firer. The HH-3 helicopter allowed one 7.62 Cal Machine Gun mounted in the left front window and ten shoulder weapons positioned in the windows, right front door and on the ramp to be fired. This system provided excellent accuracy and 360 degree target coverage. The approach into the target was slower allowing approximately one hundred 7.62 Cal rounds to be fired from the mounted machine gun and three 30 round magazines from the CAR-15s prior to touchdown. All ammo used during this period of firing was tracer aiding the machine gun in maintaining accurate fire on its target, as well as the added psychological impact the tracers create. Tracers were not necessarily useful for the CAR-15s as the single point sight was used with great accuracy, but did not hinder the night firing.

(2) Cell Search:

(a) Purpose. To acquaint the assault group with techniques of clearing and searching cell blocks cells, releasing and securing POWs within.

(b) Manner. Field 1, an abandoned auxiliary air field, was used for this purpose. Condemned buildings with hallways and small rooms were selected. Doors were equipped with padlocks. Shackles were positioned in the simulated "cells". Personnel were positioned in the cells with instructions to act out a part to simulate a prisoner of war; i.e., sick, wounded, in state of shock, etc.

(c) Outcome. This training was invaluable as it brought out many problems that had not been anticipated.

(3) Hand and Arm Signals/Battle Formations:

(a) Purpose. To establish an SOP within the Force - a list of simple, easy to learn and effective hand and arm signals/battle formations in which a small unit leader can control his men.

(b) Manner. Due to the caliber and background of personnel within the Force, many systems concerning small unit hand and arm signals/battle formation were in effect. However, a standard list was drawn up and approved for use. (Para b (3)).

(4) Bridge Demolition Plan. Special emphasis was given to the swift removal of the vehicle bridge 120 meters north of the Prisoner of War Compound. The satchel charge method of demolition was chosen in the interest of swift placement and reduced personnel exposure time at the bridge site. Two 30-pound charges (with two similar back-up charges) were fabricated in individual ruck sack carriers. These charges were designed to be placed, one each over the two metal stringers under the treadways. The charges were expanded to ten times the formula-computed composition to insure positive effect. A related one and one-quarter pound charge for the communications cable crossing the bridge was to be initiated with the main charge.

(5) Standard Arm and Hand Signals:

- (a) Thumb down - DANGER - enemy or no good, prepare weapons for action.
- (b) Hand in front of face waving back and forth, thumb near face - NO!
- (c) Thumb up - YES!, all clear, prepare to move out, O.K., good.
- (d) Thumb up, point in any direction - Move in that direction.
- (e) Thumb down, followed by two fingers moving and point in that direction - Enemy in sight in that direction.
- (f) Thumb down and both hands forming a roof - ENEMY STRUCTURE.
- (g) Hand over eyes and point in a direction - Hide there at that location.
- (h) Left hand forming a fist - Odd number element/team.
- (i) Right hand forming a fist - Even number element/team.

NOTE: IF THE GP LDR FORMS THE ELEMENT/TEAM SIGNAL, AND SWINGS HIS ARM FORWARD, THEN THAT ELEMENT/TEAM MUST MOVE INTO POSITION IMMEDIATELY.

(j) One hand forming fist and pumping from belly to extension of arm - AMEUSH POSITION. Move away from the fist and take up a position immediately. If leader gives grabbing signal, then the team will secure the enemy on his command.

(k) Hand waving as if to say "GOOD BYE," indicates "COME HERE."

(l) Both fists formed as if breaking a stick - TAKE A BREAK

(m) Two fingers formed as chop sticks and the other hand as a dish, two fingers move from the dish to mouth rapidly - EAT CHOW. This is normally given in conjunction with the break signal.

(n) The break signal with the fist to the ear - BREAK FOR RADIO CONTACT.

(o) Hand rotating over the head with finger pointing upward - FORM THE CLOCK DEFENSE.


(p) Three sounds of any fashion - DESIRE TO CONTACT.
Two sounds of any fashion - DESIRE TO RECEIVE. i.e., snapping of the thumb and finger three times means ATTENTION, Desire to contact. The answer would be two snaps of the thumb and finger to receive. This is used normally when the team leader wishes to contact the team members to give a signal. At this time, no reply is necessary, only look his way. Also, when a team member is lost and believed close to a rallying point, this is a good signal which is much better and quieter than verbal noises such as shouting names, etc. (especially good at night.)

(q) Place the hand on top of the head and point to one's self, means COVER ME.

(r) Pointing to a team member and then to one's self and in a direction means, YOU AND I WILL MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION.

(s) Point to a team member, then to the eyes and in a direction means TO COVER THAT AREA.

FORMATION FOR A 5 MAN TEAM (System will be used in all size Group, Elements or Teams)




NOTE: RESPONSIBILITIES for Buddy Tm or Indiv Applies To Any Size GP, ELM Or TM.

1. Navigation, security and leadership to front
2. Security to flanks, PW's and medical problems..
3. SECURITY to the rear.

SITUATION:


1. Trail Search.



GP / ELM / TM # 2 HAS THE AREA TO THE RIGHT TO CLEAR, GP/ELM/TM #3 HAS THE AREA TO LEFT TO CLEAR. THESE GPS WILL NOT GO BEYOND 400 METERS. GP/ELM/TM # 1 WILL CLEAR THE AREA ACROSS THE TRAIL FOR A DISTANCE OF 100 METERS WIDE BEFORE CROSSING.


SITUATION: CLOCK DEFENSE.

1. Radio Contact
2. Eat Chow
3. Sleep
4. If Surrounded
5. Rallying Point
6. Prepare for Pick up
7. While securing a PW or Wounded




SITUATION:

1. AMBUSH from the right, TM must break contact immediately. GP/ELM/TM # 1 will move behind and in direction TM LDR gave. 3 O'clock directly into enemy, 9 O'clock directly away or 6 O'clock in rearward direction. The change direction for escape time to break contact: APPROXIMATELY THREE (3) MIN.



SITUATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION AND GP/ELM/TM ACTION, BASED ON A 7 MAN TM.



SITUATIONS:

1. CONTACT W/ENEMY IF DESIRED
2. ARRIVE AT DANGER AREA
3. ROAD WATCH FOR SHORT PERIODS
4. HASTY AMBUSH
5. TO RECOVER A WOUNDED SCOUT

"TIME TO FORM INTO THIS FORMATION, APPROXIMATELY THIRTY (30) SECONDS."

HELICOPTER LANDING POINT
(HH-53)

LITE
PANEL (SECURED)

25 METERS

LITE
PANEL (SECURED)

POSITION OF
PATH FINDER

CO-PILOT


PILOT

CARGO
PASSENGERS

40 METERS


APPROACH

LITE OR PANEL
(SECURED)




PHOTOGRAPHS OF EQUIPMENTS

- A. SATCHEL CHARGES
- B. DUAL IGNITION SYSTEM
- C. AUDIO HAILER MICROPHONE
- D. SIGNAL MARKER
- E. SIGNAL, DISTRESS
- F. GOGGLES, TINTED LENS
- G. RIFLE, US, 5.56MM
- H. SIGHT, SINGLE POINT
- I. CUTTER, BOLT
- J. WIRE CUTTER
- K. AXES
- L. TORCH, CUTTING




Two 30 lb Satchel Charges




Det Cord, 8 Strand, Knots Every 18",
w/Ignition System


E-35b




Two 30 lb Satchel Charges w/Branch
Line and Dual Ignition System




Dual Ignition System w/Securing
Shot Bag Weight




Microphone, Audio Hailer, S-120




Signal Marker, Ground to Air



Signal, Distress (Strobe Light)




Goggles, Tinted Lens
Aural Protectors




Rifle, US 5.56mm, CARR 15 w/Scope

E-35f




Sight, Day/Night, Single Point




Sight, Day/Night, Single Point

E-35g




Cutter, Bolt, 36"




Wire Cutter w/Insulated Handle 20,000V Rated


E-35h




Chain Saw, GED, 18" Cut



Axe, Fire, Single Cut
Axe, Chopping. Single Cut



Torch, Cutting, Portable



E-35j

g. Individual and Unit Training (Phase I-IV). Individual and unit training were combined throughout the entire training period. Joint training was the major theme of Phases III and IV. A detailed break out of each phase follows:

(1) Phase I: (9 September to 16 September 1970) A general review of military subjects. Personnel were evaluated during this period with the purpose of selecting primary and alternate group members at the completion of Phase I.

(a) Physical Training. Each morning before breakfast, each of three platoons and the "B" Detachment executed six repetitions of Army Drill I, then ran two miles -- running three minutes, walking one -- advancing to eight repetitions and a continuous two mile run. On the days that training was completed before the last hour, organized athletics were scheduled for all personnel.

(b) Medical Training (Psychology). Personal hygiene and preventive medicine was presented by the JCTG Surgeon in preparation for the psychological aspects of evasion and escape training.

(c) Map and Compass Review. Basic techniques of map reading, use of compass, and orientation methods were presented in conjunction with land navigation training.

(d) Communications Procedures. Lectures and practical exercises in short range nets, communications checks and maintenance of equipment were presented.

(e) Radio Sets (AN/PRC 77, 25, 41, 90 and URC 10). Introduction to operating procedures and familiarization classes on each radio was presented in conjunction with practical exercises.

(f) Helicopter orientation (HH-3, HH-53 and UH-1H). Introduction to each type of helicopter with loading and unloading procedures and aircraft capabilities. Each platoon was landed several times at the training LZ. Rapid loading and unloading in tactical situations was practiced for aircraft familiarization.

(g) Demolition methods and techniques. Basic introduction to non-electric charges included preparation of charges, testing of time fuze, safety precautions and placement of charges. Each man initiated one one-quarter pound charge.

(h) Evasion, escape and survival. Basic techniques of survival, snares, traps, and water collecting were of primary interest.

(i) Patrolling techniques. Short lectures and practical exercises in small unit tactics, movement in hostile territory, and hand and arm signals were conducted.

(j) Range firing (M-16, M-79, M-60 and .45 pistol). All personnel zeroed M-16 rifles and fired the M-79 Grenade Launcher, M-60 machinegun and caliber .45 pistol for familiarization. Firing at known and unknown distance targets was conducted. Special neck slings for M-16 rifles were constructed and fitted for each individual.

NOTE: This relaxed schedule of approximately seven hours per day was designed to allow the individual Ground Force member sufficient time to adapt to the strenuous PT program and to become acclimated.

(2) Phase II (17 September to 27 September 1970) included a continuous review of basic skills with the addition of special training appropriate to the operation. More emphasis was placed on night activity during this period.

(a) Medical training included a general review of the five life-saving steps associated with treatment of battle wounds, fractures, and shock. The use of serum albumin and morphine was discussed and demonstrated.

(b) Night range firing. Familiarization and firing of the M-16 rifle, caliber .45 pistol, M-60 machine gun, and M-79 grenade launcher. (Same as day firing, minus zero of M-16 rifle)

(c) FAC/FAG training. An orientation on selected close air support aircraft was followed by a series of day and night practical exercises. (See para (4)(j))

(d) Cross country movement. The emphasis was on small unit tactics, crossing of danger areas, hand and arm signals, and land navigation with map and compass. The training was exclusively night oriented.

(e) Raid and immediate action drills. The emphasis was on small unit tactics with each element practicing and perfecting approved techniques.

(f) Day/night aerial platform fire techniques. Development of assault platoon firing techniques from HH-3 and UH-1H helicopters.

(g) Village surveillance, house search, demolition placement. Emphasis on perfection of techniques and unit coordination reoriented toward separate unit missions.

(h) Medical training. A review of treatment for battle wounds, shock, and fractures was conducted in greater detail.

(i) Night firing and target recognition. Small unit movement and firing techniques for engagement of targets at unknown distances were emphasized.

(j) House and way-station clearing (day and night). Each group and its subordinate elements developed and perfected proper techniques and team work required for future mission requirements.

NOTE: Raids, immediate action drills, target surveillance and house clearing operations received extensive attention during day and night problems. To add realism, abandoned buildings on Field 1 were used as a training aid.

(3) Phase III (28 September to 6 October 1970). Joint training was begun in earnest during this period. For the first time,

the Ground Force units were married up with their Assault Force aircraft to begin development of detailed insertion and extraction phases of the ground plan. The period was broken into separate sections when live firing by assault elements was conducted. Dry firing landings were rehearsed extensively prior to live fire conduct. The period culminated with a series of "profile" flights. The last profile was flown was flown full-time to include a one hour flight simulating the flight from staging base to launch site. (See Schedule.)

(a) Rehearsals. Three inserts (landings) by helicopter were made during each daylight period and three during each period of darkness. Dry runs and live fire inserts were conducted, FAG's worked with A-1Es.

(b) Weapon training (range firing). Selected M-60, M-79 and M-72 gunners were given extensive training with these weapons. The single point sights were issued and weapons were zeroed with the sight mounted.

(c) Search and rescue training. Introduction to search and rescue (SAR) procedures and SAR capabilities were followed by practical exercises with each individual riding the "jungle penetrator" mounted on the HH-53 helicopter.

(d) Medical aspects of evasion and escape. Each individual was given one survival ration for evening meal with no other food to be eaten that day. The benefits of the ration were explained in detail.

(e) Range firing (night). Using the single point sight, night firing techniques were practiced and refined.

(4) Phase IV (6 October to 13 November 1970). Following the completion of Phase III, a period of continuation training was

directed. This period, Phase IV, was designed primarily to maintain Force readiness; to improve skills and techniques of operation and to develop and rehearse alternate plans. The period was open-ended as the deployment date had not yet been fixed. Individual training with special equipment was conducted with primary emphasis on rehearsals of the basic and alternate plans.

(a) Dress rehearsals. Numerous day and night rehearsals were conducted to refine techniques and to cut down the time required in the target area.

(b) IAD, house-to-house fighting (live fire). A review of earlier training was given in live fire and movement by individual units.

(c) Medical training. All individuals practiced giving and receiving injections.

(d) Specialized training. Individuals were given instruction in:

1 FAG procedures, live fire (A-1Es). Review of air strike techniques with practical application periods following.

2 Demolition training. Electrical and non-electrical systems were emphasized.

3 Chain saw. Operation and care and cleaning were reviewed.

4 Acetylene torch. Proper techniques of use were covered.

(e) House clearing (day and night). A live-fire exercise with primary emphasis placed on group fire and movement and fire and movement by elements of the groups.

(f) E&E/SAR exercise. A lecture in methods and techniques used in a hostile environment to rescue personnel by helicopter was followed by a three day E&E exercise culminating with an actual extraction by UH-1 helicopter on the last day.

(g) Rehearsal of alternate plans. Each group was familiarized with applicable alternate plans. Numerous dry and wet firing runs to develop and refine individual portions of these plans were extensively conducted.

(h) Issue and zero of CAR-15. All individuals not carrying CAR-15s, but desiring them, were issued a weapon. The weapons were zeroed, without and then with the single point sight, during daylight and at night. At a later date all individuals reconfirmed the weapon zero.

(i) UH-1 Gunship platform firing. The Assault Group rehearsed firing from the helicopter while making insertions into a landing zone in simulated tactical situations.

(j) FAG training (A-1E live fire). All personnel acting as FAGs were given the opportunity to call-in several live fire strikes on selected targets.

(k) Cell-clearing and search. Support and Command Groups acted as POWs in confinement as Assault Group carried out its mission of releasing the POWs in mission-type situations.

(l) EGE/SAR FTX. Each group practiced land navigation and evasion and escape techniques. On the final night of the exercise each group was extracted by HH-53 helicopter in a simulated tactical situation.

(m) Pistol firing and hand grenade training. Each Force member activated one fragmentation and one concussion grenade. Pistol firing at targets of various distances both day and night was conducted for all members.

(n) Night vision device. Capabilities of the device and its proper use was explained to all personnel who were assigned a device for use during the mission.

(o) Target study. Each group was given the opportunity to study the mock-up and to examine the latest photos of the objective area during scheduled periods and upon request. One USAF photo interpreter was available on call to answer questions.

h. Signal:

(1) General:

(a) Joint communications training was conducted concurrently with joint operational training as the complexity of the operations and the number of diverse elements involved made stringent communications discipline and responsiveness an operational necessity.

(b) The primary means of coordination and direction of joint communications training was through preparation and publication of Ground Force Signal Operating Instructions (SOI) based on Annex K, Communications Electronics JCTG OPLAN. The Ground Force SOI established radio telephone, audio and visual communications means to be employed, radio net structure and procedures, and assigned training call words and frequencies. The SOI was modified in each successive training phase to reflect new operational requirements and procedures which had been identified in training as best supporting effective mission execution. Extracts of the Ground Force SOI were issued to each ground and air operating element and became in effect a fragmentary communications training order.

(2) Assault Force Communications Training:

(a) Phase I:

1 Training emphasis during Phase I was placed on classroom instruction in operation and maintenance of communications equipment, radio telephone procedures, and net discipline. Reduced distance radio nets were established to insure that every member of the Ground Force could set up and operate each type radio to be employed.

2 Joint training during Phase I was limited by a problem encountered in clearing the required training frequencies for use in the Eglin Air Force Base Complex. Approval for air-to-air and air-to-ground frequencies was obtained by action at Department of the Air Force level. The Ground Force FM frequencies were restricted to the mission crystals requisitioned during planning phase. Accordingly, formal approval for Ground Force FM frequencies was not obtained. An informal understanding with the local Eglin Air Force Frequency Coordinator permitted the Ground Force to utilize FM frequencies on a low-power noninterference basis.

3 The organization for storage, issue and maintenance of Ground Force Communications equipment was an important activity during Phase I training. Two complete sets of communications equipment were on hand, one set on loan from US Army CONARC to be used for training and one set on loan from the US Army Depot System to be used for mission execution. The total number of radios on hand was 234. The JCTG ARCOM Communications Supervisor obtained a complete electronic repair shop from US Air Force at Eglin AFB Auxiliary Field 3. The use of this facility enabled the Communications Supervisor to effectively manage the Ground Force Communications Supply and Maintenance support of training activities with the full time assistance of one noncommissioned officer and periodic assistance from four Ground Force radio operators.

(b) Phase II:

1 Joint communications training during Phase II moved out of the classroom and off the parade field into actual communications support of joint operational training at realistic distances under specific operational conditions.

2 Joint communications training during Phase II identified two problem areas:

a The Phase II training SOI did not assign new training call signs to Air Force operating elements. The call signs assigned were those used by Air Force elements in both the normal training at Eglin Air Force Base and in SEA operations. The use of these call signs presented a security problem as they were traditionally associated with a specific function (close air support/Rescue and Recovery). The presence of a Russian trawler off the coast of Florida with a signal intelligence capability indicated that a security threat existed. Analysis of electronic transmissions could result in association of call signs with operational functions and a logical reconstruction of the type mission for which training was being conducted. The decision was made to assign new and unrelated call signs for all Assault Force elements in Phase III training.

b The Phase II Ground Force SOI prepared by the ARCOM, JCTG, and issued to key Air Force operating elements was not initially coordinated with the Air Force planning and operating staff and consequently was not included in Air Force mission briefings. This resulted in confusion in joint operational training as the ground and air elements arrived in the training area with different frequencies for use on key nets. This problem was resolved by the decision to prepare and coordinate the Phase III Ground Force SOI at joint staff level.

3 The principal value of Phase II joint communications training was in developing confidence in radio equipment, familiarization with air-ground SOI communications procedures and the details of arranging communications equipment on Ground Force personnel so as to avoid damage while entering and exiting aircraft.

(c) Phase III:

1 Joint communications training during Phase III was concentrated on placing a realistic traffic load on the Assault Force communications system during full mission profile training. A continuing evaluation was made of the communications system to determine its responsiveness and effectiveness in meeting actual operational requirements.

2 Joint communications training during Phase III resolved several problem areas as follows:

a Radio Net Discipline and Procedures. The Phase III Ground Force SOI was still deviated from with respect to radio telephone call signs, frequencies and procedures. This resulted in delay and confusion in the transmission of critical command and control messages. A Ground Force SOI was established as the single authoritative document for communications within the joint Assault Force. Deviations from the SOI required joint coordination and command approval.

b Visual Signals. The basic JCTG OPLAN had been published without an appendix establishing visual signals and ground beacon signals as it was planned that these be worked out in training and published in the OPLAN at a later date.

(1) Night Markings. During Phase III joint training, the type, color, and arrangement of lights to be used for night marking of ground obstacles and helicopter landing zones was developed and tested on a joint basis and published in the Phase III Ground Force SOI.

(2) Visual Signals. During Phase III joint training the type, color and number of star clusters to be used for emergency recall of helicopters and Ground Force elements was developed and tested on a joint basis and published in the Phase III Ground Force SOI.

(3) Ground Beacons. During Phase III joint training, it was jointly determined that the planned low frequency beacon (AN/TRN-25) and ultra-high frequency beacon (AN/URC-33) to be positioned by the Ground Force Pathfinders on the landing zone in the objective area were not required. A more effective procedure was worked out and published in the Phase III Ground Force SOI, which enabled the Ground Force to provide a beacon signal by keying the AN/PRC-41 radio on the air/ground net (UHF). This procedure met the air support and air lift requirements without requiring the ground force to carry additional communications equipment into the objective area.

c Forward Air Guide Net. The initial communications plan, in order to provide maximum operational information to the Ground Force Commander and reduce the weight and number of radios carried by Ground Force elements, provided for Forward Air Guides to coordinate and direct close air support operations on the Ground Force command net (FM).

(1) This concept proved to be impractical in actual operational training as the amount of traffic required to direct close air support precluded the Ground Force Commander controlling ground operations on the command net.

(2) A separate Forward Air Guide net was established to provide a primary means for command and control of close air support strikes. Ground Force Forward Air Guides utilized the squad radio on this net and the close air support aircraft (A-1Es) entered the net, on direction of the Ground Force Commander, utilizing organic aircraft radios.

(3) Stringent control was required on establishment of the Forward Air Guide net as it required the close air support aircraft to make a frequency change in flight and leave the

Ground Force command net (FM). The Ground Force Commander continued to exercise command and control of the close air support aircraft on the air/ground net (UHF) and by monitoring the Forward Air Guide net with an additional radio.

d Mission Equipment. All new communications equipment on loan from US Army depots was issued to the Ground Forces for use in the final Phase III full mission profile training. This action ensured that all new equipment was checked out during training and that no equipment failures adversely affected accomplishment of the full mission profile training.

3 The principle value of Phase III joint training was in testing the overall Assault Force communications system under simulated mission conditions. Adjustments to procedures and equipment were required, identified and made.

(d) Phase IV:

1 Joint communications training during Phase IV was directed toward detailed refinement of the Assault Force communications system to support not only the basic plan but also four separate plans. Adjustments continued to be made in net structure, equipment distribution, and configuration in relation to Assault Force mission requirements.

2 Joint communications training during Phase IV required the following adjustments in preparation for actual mission execution:

a The Ground Force Phase IV SOI was expanded to include the COMJCTG and COMARCOM in the radio net structure with appropriate call signs. Operational procedures were worked out for relaying COMARCOM situation reports from the objective area to COMJCTG in the Tactical Air Control Center-North Sector utilizing the A-1E aircraft in a primary relay role.

b A Ground Force emergency net was established to provide each individual element and member of the Ground Force a means to communicate directly with the Ground Force Commander on an emergency basis without cluttering the primary Search and Rescue (SAR) net frequency. This emergency net was established without the addition of any communications equipment by utilizing the previously issued individual SAR radios (AN/PRC-90) on the alternate SAR frequency. The Ground Force command party now guarded both the primary and alternate SAR frequencies.

c Complete communications equipment lists were prepared identifying each item of communications equipment carried by Ground Force personnel and the radio net or function in which it was to be used. This list was used in final checks of full equipment layouts by each Ground Force element.

d Spare headsets, handsets and earphones were issued to Ground Force personnel as required and spare radios were identified as primary radios in appropriate alternate plans.

e Operational code words for internal use of the Assault Force were refined and published as a part of the Phase IV SOI.

3 The principle objective and value of Phase IV training was in accomplishing final refinements to the basic communications plan and rehearsing the communications adjustments required in execution of the four alternate plans. The actual Ground Force mission SOI was prepared directly from the Phase IV Ground Force SOI and after in theater coordination was implemented with minimum change. The value of one document such as the Ground Force SOI to guide and direct joint communications training was repeatedly demonstrated and in fact is considered essential to successful joint communications training.

c. Equipment lists and signal operating instructions (SOI) communications equipment lists and SOI used during training are contained in Part III, Section P.

2. Air Force Training:

a. General Training Requirements. The rescue mission required precision night formation flying at low AGL altitudes over mountainous terrain. The formation composition complicated the above task because some of the aircraft were required to perform at the extremes of their capabilities. This demanded the installation and use of special equipment as well as the development of new tactics and procedures before the Task Group could become mission ready.

b. Task Group Composition. Two COMBAT TALON C-130s were selected to provide precise navigation to the target area. One C-130E was programmed to lead the Assault Force composed of five HH-53s and either one HH-3 or UH-1H. The other C-130E became the lead ship of the Strike Force which consisted of five A-1Es. The C-130 crews trained to perform both lead roles and practiced switching formation leads enroute to the objective area.

c. Method of Training. The training was conducted in four phases: Phase I, Preparation; Phase II, Specialized Training; Phase III, Joint Training; and Phase IV, Follow-on Training.

(1) During the preparation phase, personnel were selected for the operation, augmentation personnel were deployed to the Eglin Complex and certain preliminary formation training was accomplished. Tactics and material development continued throughout all four phases.

(2) During the specialized training phase, UH-1, HH-3, and C-130 aircraft conducted formation training. Day and night formation, rendezvous and mission profile missions were flown.

(3) During the joint training phase, objective area operations were practiced. Aerial and ground rescue operations, objective area tactics, recovery, emergency procedures, and complete mission profiles were perfected.

(4) The delay in execution from October to November provided time for follow-on training not included in the training plan and was considered "Phase IV" training.

d. Special Equipment.

(1) Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) was installed aboard each C-130E aircraft to aid in precision navigation, and an additional navigator was added to the crew.

(2) Ground Acquisition Responder/Interrogator (GAR/I) of the C-130 was used

e. Tactics and Techniques.

(1) Formation Flying. Formation training for the Assault Force was particularly challenging because, in this case, the C-130 and the HH-3 or UH-1H were required to exceed their normal limits. Both helicopters, flying in draft position, had to maintain their maximum speeds of 105 KIAS to keep up with the C-130 which, flying with flaps at 70%, was operating approximately 10 knots above its power-off stall speed. Leading the flight of A-1E aircraft presented no problem for the C-130E flying at 145 KIAS; however, grossed out A-1Es had some difficulties keeping up with the lead aircraft during turns.

(2) Special Rigging and Airdrops. The C-130E crews had to be trained in special rigging and drop procedures for the BLU-27/B fire bomb markers, flares, ground marker log flares, and fire fight simulators. Objective area maneuvers for these drops were designed and practiced.

(3) Night air-to-ground gunnery for helicopters was introduced during the latter part of training and one HH-53 was designated a Gunship.

(4) The A-1E trained in night low-level ordnance delivery and tested the effectiveness of the Rockeye bomb.

f. Task Group Crew Training. The mission of each aircraft of the Task Group was quite specific. All aircrew personnel were highly qualified in their respective aircraft but required varying degrees of training to become proficient in new and unconventional procedures and maneuvers. The phases of training, planned sorties and times, as well as actual sorties and times flown, for each aircraft type are shown in Tables I and II. The following is a detailed breakdown and description of each aircrew's training:

(1) C-130E Training (See Tables I and II):

(a) Navigational Training:

1 Missions devoted exclusively to navigational training were flown combining, where possible, several types of practice. Several sorties were devoted to familiarization and practice with the Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) system which was installed on the C-130 aircraft for this mission. After equipment familiarization, procedures to integrate FLIR inputs into the navigational solution were developed and practiced. Targets with IR signatures similar to those in the mission objective area were located and sorties were planned to exploit these target resources.

2 A variety of low-level navigation routes were identified, surveyed, as required, and used for training. Routes in the mountains of Georgia/Tennessee, as well as areas of land/water contrast, simulating mission terrain, were flown. Over-water navigational legs were flown to satisfy command standardization/evaluation requirements.

3 Navigational missions accounted for 13-1/3 sorties (multiple tasks account for fractional sorties) and 71.8 flying hours.

(b) Ordnance Test and Delivery Development.

Where possible, sorties were flown with delivery personnel from both C-130 crews. Sorties were required to certify the special BLU-27/B for the C-130 and to provide an adequate controlled sample to assure munitions reliability. Fire fight simulators were packaged in accordance with mission training requirements and delivery phasing with other mission ordnance was practiced. Five and one-half sorties and 12.2 hours were flown. (See Part III, Section O, for further description of ordnance development problems.)

(c) QRC-128 Test Support. Verification of effectiveness of mission communications, A-1 equipment compatibility and safety considerations required several sorties in support of this test. Missions were flown over the Gulf of Mexico early in the morning, requiring a chase C-130. Three and one-third sorties and 9.9 hours were flown. (See Part III, Section O, for further description of QRC-128 test.)

(d) Aircraft Ferry. Maintenance problems (requiring home base support), such as fuel leaks and phase inspections, generated ferry sorties. Other sorties were required to exchange a cargo version for mission equipped C-130. Special airlift missions accounted for the remaining sorties. Ten sorties and 33.2 hours were flown.

(e) Pilot Proficiency. Early in training, 1-1/3 sorties and 5.9 hours were devoted to pilot proficiency and standardization/evaluation requirements.

(f) Performance Check. As mission C-130 aircraft became available, individual aircraft low-speed characteristics such as slow flight, stall and engine-out performance were thoroughly investigated and practiced. One and one-half sorties and 2.2 hours were flown.

(g) Pictures. One sortie and 3.6 hours were flown to provide pictures of mission aircraft in flight.

(h) Flare Test. Flares were normally dropped on sorties included in phase training. A run of dud flares required re-evaluation of all aspects of flare delivery procedures, such as speeds, altitudes and type flare. Ultimately, the cause of the problem was identified as a bad lot. Flares from a new lot were obtained and two sorties and 3.5 hours flown, testing them for required confidence.

(i) ECM training included work against a radar bomb scoring site, fighters and chaff training was accomplished.

(j) UH-1 Performance. Sorties flown to demonstrate the long range capability of the UH-1 have been included in phase training.

(2) Lessons Learned in C-130 Training.

(a) Navigation.

1 Integrating multiple sensors in navigation training requires considerable time to develop crew coordination as well as proficiency with new (FLIR) equipment.

2

3 Aircraft attitude at slow speeds causes bore-sight alignment problems which cannot be compensated by mechanical adjustment.

4 Doppler reliability at slow speeds is a source of potential error which must be evaluated frequently to preclude error.

5 The FLIR equipment is an excellent navigational aid where land/water contrast along a route can be exploited.

6 Navigation requirements for unconventional warfare missions fully justify follow-on modification programs for the COMBAT TALON force C-130E aircraft. These should include an inertial navigational capability, improved navigational radar, and a FLIR system.

(b) Rendezvous.

1 Aircrew survival strobe beacon is a good visual air-to-air rendezvous aid. Shielding is necessary to avoid detection from the ground.

2

3 FLIR can be used as a rendezvous aid (no range capability). The engines of C-130 and HH-53 and the rotor of the UH-1 show well.

(c) Performance.

1 The C-130 at 105 KIAS is extremely sensitive to fly; however, the tactics of drafting with HH-3 and UH-1H have been proven and can be applied in future plans.

2 Depending on aircraft weight, the C-130 has marginal flying characteristics at 105 KIAS with outboard engine failure. Recovery procedure is accelerate straight ahead to safe airspeed; e. g., 180 KIAS.

3 Use of the autopilot at 105 KIAS is unstable with 70% flaps; caution must be used making power changes or during roll-in and out of turns.

4 Level off from descent is a critical maneuver which must be led with gradual addition of power and control force to preclude acceleration or stall.

(d) Ordnance Delivery.

1 Delivery of loads/packages from ramp and troop doors requires extreme care due to high noise levels and intense wind blast inside the cargo compartment. If possible, avoid opening troop doors.

2 Use of airstream deflectors reduces turbulence within the cargo compartment but creates a problem (light turbulence) for UH-1H aircraft.

3 Light bundles must be handled very carefully since they tend to float back into the cargo compartment with doors and ramp open. They must be held firmly and ejected positively from the lower position of the doorway, preferably by two men.

4 Loadmaster harnesses must be carefully rigged with minimum extension required and no loose ends.

(3) C-130 Training Conclusions. Although training in excess of that planned was required to prepare C-130E crews for their role in the JCTG mission, both crews were declared mission capable at the conclusion of Phase III.

(4) HC-130 Training (See Table I).

(a) Regular HC-130 sorties were scheduled to include JCTG training as only a portion of their mission. Accordingly, actual hours reflect only that dedicated flying time. Mission C-130 aircraft took over the HC-130 formation lead role as soon as crews were proficient in helicopter formation flying.

(b) The ability of the HC-130 to refuel HH-3 and HH-53 aircraft gives this force package an excellent long range penetration capability which can satisfy several unconventional warfare missions along with an integral worldwide mobility capability.

(c) No extension of current HC-130 tactics or procedures was necessary to satisfy mission requirements.

(5) HH-53 Training (See Tables I and II).

(a) Analysis of Growth of Training.

1 Phase I was underflown since required levels of proficiency were quickly reached by crews who had been performing substantially the same tactics.

2 Phase II growth was anticipated by the training plan in authorizing HH-53 elements of one to three aircraft, depending on development of the requirement. Introduction of TDY personnel not proficient in night mission tactics also caused growth.

3 Phase III growths can be attributed to flying five HH-53s on profile missions rather than only three as planned, confirming mission tactics for the entire force. Use of five aircraft allowed practice of complex enroute emergency procedures as well as proof test of flaeship tactics. Crews were declared mission capable at end of Phase III.

4 Phase IV was flown almost exclusively in support of ground force play in the objective area. Two profiles involving the entire force were flown which provided an average sortie length for this phase well in excess of the earlier phases. Additional missions were generated in development of the Gunship capability.

(6) Additional Programs.

(a) Gunship Training. During Phase IV, a decision was made to develop a Gunship capability for the HH-53 in which the first aircraft through the objective area would neutralize the critical points of enemy reaction; i. e., the guard towers and guard living

quarters. Range preparation and gunnery practice required two sorties and 5.3 hours.

(b) Search and Rescue Training. A simulated SAR effort was practiced with the ground force on one sortie using 1.7 hours.

(c) Flareship Training. During Phases III and IV the advantages of a backup flare aircraft for the C-130 became apparent. Flare training was integrated into Phase IV training.

(7) Lessons Learned in HH-53 Training.

(a) Aircraft Preparation. Experience in training demonstrated the importance of attention to detail in aircraft preparation not only for comfort but primarily for safety. Items such as positions of seats, litters and doors/windows; location and serviceability of headsets; oil spills on decks; weight and balance of on and off-loading troops; security of personnel in the passenger compartment; care in loading heavy and sharp equipment; and inadvertent use of aircraft wiring/tubing as handholds.

(b) Gunship. Problems which emerged in developing this capability dealt with ammunition alignment, use of flash suppressors to minimize impact of muzzle flash on night vision, use of night vision devices for target acquisition, care in positioning cables from control boxes to guns, and practice to develop judgment of ground speed and elevation for accuracy.

(c) Night Observation Devices. Electronic binoculars were tested for pilot use but were found unsatisfactory due to high levels of ambient cockpit lights. They were useful as an aid to vision behind the helicopter when used by a flight mechanic or para-medic. Starlight scopes were found useful to assist gunners in observing the

surrounding area while the helicopters were on the ground awaiting recall to the objective area.

(d) Lights. Extensive time was devoted to determining the best setting for internal and external lights. Minimum cockpit lights are desired to reduce glare on windshields and improve air-to-ground visibility. External lights were set, masked, or disconnected to minimize ground-to-air visibility yet provide sufficient air-to-air visibility.

(e) Miscellaneous: Aircrews must beware of flashes from ground operations (flares/explosions, etc.) which might temporarily blind a pilot and either pilot must be prepared to maintain aircraft control.

(8) HH-53 Training Conclusions. A heliborne assault force with a long range heavy lift capability provides a desirable addition to general purpose force capability, particularly for unconventional warfare operations.

(9) HH-3 Training.

(a) Analysis of Growth of Training.

1 Phase I growth was due to a decision to start training as soon as possible.

2 Phase II growth was due to an underestimation of the difficulty of flying a fully loaded HH-3 at its upper performance limit and of the difficulty of making an assault landing into an extremely small landing zone.

3 Phase III training underflew planned training after solution of initial problems and by sharing missions with the UH-1 which slightly overflowed the planned schedule.

4 Crews were judged mission capable following Phase III.

(b) Lessons Learned in HH-3 Training.

1 Weight control of the HH-3 was an area of importance. Because of the narrow operating envelope with the C-130, only mission essential fuel and equipment could be carried. Growth of the assault team shaved the improvements in weight reduction necessitating continuing attention to this problem.

2 HH-3 pilots required high intensities of C-130 lighting to maintain formation position.

(c) HH-3 Training Conclusions.

1 Planned sorties and flying hours were adequate to prepare the HH-3 crew for its role in the mission.

2 Even though the UH-1H appeared to be better suited to land within the confines of the prison compound, training proved that the HH-3 had decided advantages in firepower, load weight and space, and refueling capability.

(10) UH-1H Training:

(a) Analysis of Growth of Training:

1 Phase II growth can be attributed to under-estimation of the difficulty of mating the UH-1 and C-130 in formation flight at maximum performance of both aircraft. Initially the problem was to develop high proficiency in day/night formation flight with a fixed wing aircraft. With no precedent in Army experience and no documentation which would serve as a guide, progress was made in small, controlled increments in what was substantially a test program. This program would have proceeded with greater confidence, though at a less vigorous pace, in a test environment. Developing this high level of proficiency in both a primary and reserve crew was also a source of growth although maximum training of both crews on the same sorties was initially scheduled. Security further constrained the training since the crews were not briefed on the exact nature of the mission and could not bring their experience and knowledge to bear on the problem. Subsequently, they were able to recommend changes in the UH-1 profile based on reducing the operating weight by removal of non-mission essential equipment and extension of range by addition of internal auxiliary tanks. In areas in which they were experienced, such as low-level navigation (pilotage), assault landing and air-to-ground gunnery, the UH-1 crews were able to make substantial inputs to mission training and capability. An additional source of training growth was use of the UH-1 as a light ship to provide artificial moonlight, using a spot light obtained from Fort Rucker, and as a flare ship to provide a more economical vehicle than use of mission C-130s.

2 Phase III training proceeded substantially as planned although it should be noted that during this period greater confidence in use of the UH-1 as an assault vehicle developed based

both on intelligence inputs and growth of crew proficiency. This resulted in less emphasis on the UH-1 for mission use. Additional sorties were flown in the lightship role. At the conclusion of Phase III, both UH-1 crews were judged mission qualified.

(11) Lessons Learned in UH-1 Training:

(a)

(b) In the judgment of the UH-1H mission commander, ability to fly the UH-1H in formation with a C-130 is not within the capability of the average Army aviator. No Army training specifically serves to prepare pilots for this task nor is there any routine capability which would serve as a basis for selecting pilots who could successfully perform this most difficult mission.

(c) Only a UH-1H in the highest state of maintenance, particularly in terms of rotor linkage adjustment, should be used for this mission.

(12) UH-1 Training Conclusions: A test program should be initiated for certification of UH-1/C-130 formation operations.

(13) A-1E Training (See Tables I and II):

(a) Analysis of Growth Training:

1 Phase III sorties and hours grew from the number planned to provide for Forward Air Guide (FAG) training with selected members of the ground force, and in response to the decision to fly the ground spare aircraft. The training plan provided for three ship training sorties. Four and five ship sorties were flown to exercise

the entire force in the event there were no air aborts into the target area.

2 Phase IV sorties and hours were devoted to FAC training in support of the ground force. The A-1 crews were judged ready for the mission following Phase III.

(14) Additional Programs:

(a) Transponder Test: Early in formation training, it was apparent that some electronic aid would be desirable to enable the A-1s to station keep on their lead C-130. A device using an X-band transponder and an R/T unit with cockpit indicator was tested for possible use. The tests were satisfactory, however, the vendor retrieved the test equipment for his own purposes following the test. Excessive production lead times for additional equipment resulted in deletion of this equipment as a mission requirement. Five sorties and 6.2 hours were flown.

(b) QRC-128 Test: The JCTG OPLAN required the development of a capability for A-1 VHF communications jamming. (See report of testing in Part III, Section O.) Five sorties and 13.1 hours were expended in the evaluation of the QRC-128.

(c) Rockeye Test: A mission was flown to evaluate the desirability of including the Rockeye bomb in the A-1 ordnance package. The test was successful. Two sorties and 2.6 hours were flown in support of this evaluation.

(d) Pictures: A mission was flown so that pictures could be taken of the mission formation. Four sorties and 7.0 hours were flown in support of this requirement.

(15) Lessons Learned in A-1 Training:

(a) Airspeed Incompatibility:

1 The most serious problem which developed during the training phase resulted from the incompatibility between the cruise airspeed of a loaded A-1 and airspeed of the remainder of the original primary force.

2 The OPLAN provided for a primary and reserve force both composed of C-130s, helicopters, and A-1s proceeding to the objective area approximately ten minutes apart. However, the maximum airspeed of the HH-3 was determined to be 105 KIAS, and the A-1 was unable to fly at this slow airspeed, especially under high drag conditions. Therefore, circling or S-turn tactics were necessary to remain in contact with the C-130 led helicopter force. This fact, among others, resulted in a decision to partition the mission aircraft into assault and strike forces, rather than primary and alternate forces. Instead of two formations composed of a lead C-130 with helicopters and A-1 elements, the formations were divided according to mission function, i. e., assault and strike. The assault force was composed of helicopters and flew at 145 KIAS. The tracks of the two forces crossed in such a way that the strike force was close enough to the assault force so that the C-130s could change lead in the event of an air abort of the assault force leader.

(b) Station Keeping Capability: Initially, pilot confidence in mission accomplishment would have been enhanced if the A-1 aircraft had been equipped with some form of rendezvous/station keeping equipment. As experience was gained, however, the crews began to rely on the navigational capabilities of the C-130s, and procedures were devised which provided for loss of visual contact.

(c) Forward Air Guide Training: Extensive unanticipated sorties were generated to develop a sufficient quantity of well trained ground personnel to direct A-1 aircraft. (See Part II,

Section E, for a description of MAC training.)

(d) Formating: The most desirable procedure for A-1/C-130 joinup was for the C-130 to fly under the A-1s which had already joined up. The A-1s would then descend and complete the joinup with the C-130.

(16) A-1 Training Conclusions:

(a) Planned sorties and flying hours were adequate to prepare A-1 crews for their role in the JCTG mission.

(b) Planning did not adequately provide for development of fully qualified Forward Air Guides.

TABLE I
IVORY COAST FLYING TRAINING PROGRAM

AIRCRAFT	PHASE I		PHASE II		PHASE III		PHASE IV		TOTALS											
	PLAN SOR- TIES	ACTUAL HOURS TIES	PLAN SOR- TIES	ACTUAL HOURS TIES	PLAN SOR- TIES	ACTUAL HOURS TIES	PLAN SOR- TIES	ACTUAL HOURS TIES	PLAN SOR- TIES	ACTUAL HOURS TIES	PLAN SOR- TIES	ACTUAL HOURS TIES								
C-130E	--	--	--	--	6	16.0	10	35.2	9	26.0	8	27.9	0	0	10	41.3	15	42.0	28	104.4
HC-130	5	13.0	3	6.0	1	5.0	2	3.0	3	9.0	1	5.3	0	0	2	7.0	9	27.0	8	21.3
HH-53	15	39.0	11	21.4	7	26.0	16	50.2	25	80.0	29	96.1	0	0	28	113.5	47	145.0	84	281.2
HH-5	--	--	3	6.4	4	8.0	6	17.2	14	35.0	11	24.1	0	0	10	50.4	18	43.0	30	78.1
UH-1H	--	--	--	--	4	10.0	12	23.8	18	46.0	24	50.4	0	0	8	19.1	22	56.0	44	95.3
A-1E	11	22.0	9	16.5	8	24.0	14	35.2	14	44.0	35	76.7	0	0	32	87.2	33	90.0	90	215.6
TOTALS	31	74.0	26	50.3	30	89.0	60	164.6	83	240.0	108	280.5	0	0	90	298.5	144	403.0	284	793.9

PHASE I - PRELIMINARY TRAINING (15-31 AUGUST 1970)
 PHASE II - FORMATION AND PROFILE (1-14 SEPTEMBER 1970)
 PHASE III - JOINT TRAINING (15 SEPTEMBER-13 OCTOBER 1970)
 PHASE IV - FOLLOW-ON TRAINING (13 OCTOBER-7 NOVEMBER 1970)

TABLE 11

IVORY COAST PREDEPLOYMENT FLYING

		C-130E	HC-130	HH-53	HH-3	UH-1H	A-1E	TOTALS
PHASE TRAINING	SORTIES	28	8	84	30	44	90	284
	HOURS	104.4	21.3	281.2	78.1	93.3	215.6	793.9
NAVIGATION	SORTIES	$13 \frac{1}{3}$	---	---	---	---	---	$13 \frac{1}{3}$
	HOURS	71.8	---	---	---	---	---	71.8
ORDNANCE TESTS	SORTIES	$5 \frac{1}{2}$	---	---	---	---	2	$7 \frac{1}{2}$
	HOURS	12.2	---	---	---	---	2.6	14.8
QRC-128 TEST	SORTIES	$3 \frac{1}{3}$	---	---	---	---	5	$8 \frac{1}{3}$
	HOURS	9.9	---	---	---	---	13.1	23.0
FERRY/AIRLIFT	SORTIES	10	---	---	---	17	---	27
	HOURS	33.2	---	---	---	31.7	---	64.9
PILOT PROFICIENCY	SORTIES	$1 \frac{1}{3}$	---	---	---	---	---	$1 \frac{1}{3}$
	HOURS	5.9	---	---	---	---	---	5.9
PERFORMANCE AND FLARE TESTS	SORTIES	$3 \frac{1}{2}$	---	---	---	---	---	$3 \frac{1}{2}$
	HOURS	5.7	---	---	---	---	---	5.7
PICTURES	SORTIES	1	---	2	1	1	4	9
	HOURS	3.6	---	3.0	1.5	1.5	7.0	16.6
GUNSHIP	SORTIES	---	---	2	---	---	---	2
	HOURS	---	---	5.3	---	---	---	5.3
SAR	SORTIES	---	---	1	---	2	---	3
	HOURS	---	---	1.7	---	3.5	---	5.2
TRANSPONDER	SORTIES	---	---	---	---	---	5	5
	HOURS	---	---	---	---	---	6.2	6.2
MAINTENANCE	SORTIES	---	---	---	---	4	---	4
	HOURS	---	---	---	---	3.9	---	3.9
TOTALS	SORTIES	66	8	89	31	68	106	368
	HOURS	246.7	21.3	291.2	79.6	133.9	244.5	1017.2

TABLE III

C-130E DEPLOYMENT

PLAN		ACTUAL	
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
10	80.0	11*	81.0

*CHERRY 02 air aborted one hour out of Norton and returned for engine maintenance.

TASK FORCE EMPLOYMENT

	PLAN		ACTUAL	
	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
C-130E	2	12.0	2	11.9
HC-130	2	12.1	2	13.7
HH-53	5	30.5	5	33.9
HH-3	1	3.0	1	3.0
A-1E	5	22.8	5	23.0
TOTAL	15	80.4	15	85.5

C-130E REDEPLOYMENT

PLAN		ACTUAL	
<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
8	60	8	58

PART II

SECTION F

(NOT USED)

PART II

SECTION G - THEATER COORDINATION. The following commands and organizations were briefed and/or requested to support COMICEG:

1. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC).
 - Briefing
2. Commander, Military Assistance Command - Vietnam (MACV).
 - Briefing
3. Commander, Seventh Air Force (COM7AF).
 - Briefing
4. Commander, Task Force 77 (CTF-77).
 - Briefing
5. Commander, Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force (COM7/13AF).
 - Briefing
6. 56th Special Operations Wing, Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand
 - Obtained the use of five A-1E/A-1G aircraft.
7. 307th Strategic Wing, U-Tapao RTAFB, Thailand.
 - Obtained use of ten KC-135 tanker aircraft.
 - Obtained use of one KC-135 radio-relay aircraft.
8. 376th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Kadena AB, Okinawa
 - Obtained use of two RC-135M (COMBAT APPLE) aircraft and required tankers.
9. 388th Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat RTAFB, Thailand
 - Obtained use of five F-105G WILD WEASEL aircraft for SAM/AAA suppression.
 - Arranged housing for deployed EC-121T aircraft (COLLEGE EYE) crews.
10. 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
 - Obtained use of ten F-4D aircraft for MIG CAP.
 - Arranged for one RF-4C weather reconnaissance mission.

11. 3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group, Tan Son Nhut AB,
Vietnam
 - Coordinated use of seven HH-53 and two HH-3 helicopters.
 - Coordinated use of three HC-130P tanker aircraft.
12. 355th Combat Support Group, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand
 - Arranged for housing and other support for the Task Group
13. 505th Tactical Control Group, Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam
 - Coordinated use of in-country Tactical Air Control System facilities and equipment
14. 1964th Communications Group, Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam
 - Coordinated/obtained use of additional communication frequencies.
 - Obtained temporary loan of three KY-8 cryptographic equipments for use in the C-130E aircraft.
 - Coordinated installation of two dedicated voice circuits between the Tactical Air Control Center-North Sector, Monkey Mtn, Vietnam and the National Military Command Center (NMCC).
15. 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Da Nang AB, Vietnam
 - Obtained use of two HH-3 helicopters
 - Coordinated rescue alert status
16. 39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Cam Ranh Bay AB,
Vietnam
 - Obtained use of three HC-130P tankers for refueling the helicopter assault force.
17. 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Udorn RTAF AB, Thailand
 - Obtained use of five primary mission and two backup HH-53 helicopters.
18. 67th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, Yokota AB, Japan
 - Coordinated aerial photo requirements
 - Accomplished required photo interpretation
19. 620th Tactical Control Squadron, Da Nang AB, Vietnam
 - Coordinated use of the TACC NS as the COMJCTG Command Post
 - Coordinated COLLAGE EYE digital data link tests

20. 621st Tactical Control Squadron, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand
- Coordinated use of alternate TACC-NS
 - Coordinated COLLEGE EYE digital data link tests
 - Coordinated/tasked Control and Reporting Center to aid in tanker hookups and provide radar control as required
21. 6010 WILD WEASEL Squadron, Korat RTAFB, Thailand
- Obtained use of five F-105G SAM/AAA Fire Suppression Aircraft.
22. 6924 Security Service Squadron, Da Nang AB, Vietnam
- 23.
- Coordinated airborne requirements
24. COLLEGE EYE Task Force, Korat RTAFB, Thailand
- Coordinated support of deployed EC-121F aircraft
25. Southeast Asia Detachment, Defense Communications Agency, Da Nang AB, Vietnam
- Coordinated installation of two dedicated voice circuits between the TACC-NS and the NMCC.
 - Installed a secure teletype circuit at Takhli RTAFB, Thailand, for use by COMJCTC.
26. Thailand Airlift Control Element, U-Tapao AB, Thailand.
- Obtained use of three C-130E airlift aircraft for personnel deployment to staging bases.

PART II

SECTION II DEPLOYMENT PLANNING (US ARMY)

1. Army Component deployment planning began on 20 September 1970, with a staff conference to determine what personnel, supplies and equipment were to deploy and the formulation of an initial ammunition basic load.

2. Based on these determinations preliminary planning figures, including cargo weights and cubes, were discussed with MAC planners. The shipment of such sensitive items as blasting caps, battery acid, and acetylene gas was also addressed and guidance received on how to prepare them for shipment.

3. As time of deployment neared, a more concrete formulation of the basic ammunition load became necessary. This ammunition was identified, marked, segregated, and placed on pallets to facilitate shipment. Based on security, training schedules and availability of rigging equipment, the following packing schedule was implemented:

a. Monday, 9 Nov 70:

(1) Oxygen-acetylene rigs packed for shipment on first aircraft.

Six spare acetylene and four spare oxygen cylinders were prepared.

(2) Radios cleaned, batteries packed, squad radios aligned.

b. Tuesday, 10 Nov 70:

(1) Platoon leaders determined how platoon equipment was to be packed and platoon boxes packed.

(2) Personal equipment shortages identified by platoons.

(3) PRC-77s, test equipment, and squad radios packed.

(4) Models packed.

c. Wednesday, 11 Nov 70:

(1) Demolitions material packed.

(2) Platoons prepare final equipment lists.

(3) Final check of communications equipment.

(4) Loose ammunition recovered and turned in.

d. Thursday, 12 Nov 70:

(1) Weapons cleaned, tagged and packed in crates.

(2) Platoon boxes packed.

(3) Medical equipment packed.

e. Friday, 13 Nov 70:

- (1) Communications equipment packing completed.
- (2) Flat bed truck arrived.

f. Saturday, 14 Nov 70:

- (1) Ammunition packed and palletized.
- (2) Personal clothing list issued, clothing and equipment prepared.
- (3) All boxes banded and palletized, cubes and weights recorded.

g. Sunday, 15 Nov 70:

- (1) Flat bed truck loaded.
- (2) Movement to aircraft.
- (3) Loading.

4. As each individual box was packed, it was banded, weighed, a cube determined, and the box placed on a pallet. Sturdy cardboard boxes were provided to each platoon for their use in packing load bearing equipment.

5. Communications equipment was carefully packed under competent supervision to forestall damage. The BA 341, wet cell batteries, were hand-carried aboard the aircraft by designated personnel.

6. Prior to deployment, the shipping and crating section of the 3210th Supply Squadron had fabricated wooden boxes for the shipment of weapons. The boxes for the sub-machine gun 5.56mm, and rifle 5.56mm M-16A1 had to be constructed in such a fashion so as to prevent damage to the single point sights. Each box contained ten weapons, weighed 117 pounds, and measured 13.5 cubic feet. The M-60 machine-guns were packed separately due to the length of each weapon. By packing these weapons separately, it reduced the weight of each box to 47 pounds and cubic feet to 6.5 cu ft.

7. As acetylene gas presents a peculiar problem in transport, the oxygen-acetylene outfits were packed early and sent forward on the first C-130.

8. Personal baggage was limited and was planned not to exceed twenty-five pounds. In the interest of security, berets were collected before deployment and transported under cover to the forward base.

a. Required Items:

- (1) Jungle Boots, 1 pair
- (2) Socks, 4 pair
- (3) Sterile Jungle uniform, 2 each
- (4) Towel, 1 each
- (5) Shaving gear
- (6) Laundry bag
- (7) Undershirts, 3 each

b. Additional Items:

- (1) Jungle Uniforms
- (2) Underwear
- (3) Jungle Sweater
- (4) Reading Material
- (5) Small personal items such as radios, cards, etc.

9. By Sunday, 15 November, all equipment was packed, palletized and loaded on a flat bed truck ready for movement to the aircraft. Equipment and ammunition was moved to Eglin Main and was loaded on the aircraft by 0250 hours, Monday, 16 November. Concurrently with the packing schedule, the UH-1 was prepared for shipment and loaded on the same aircraft. Also by this time, personnel had been prepared for movement, briefed and ready to move. Breakfast was served at 2400 hours, and personnel departed Field 3 at 0200 hours. The plane-side check-in went smoothly and the aircraft departed at 0300 hours from Hurlburt Field.

PART II

SECTION I EMPLOYMENT

1. U.S. Navy Operations. CTF-77 was briefed and tasked by COMJCTG to carry out a diversionary effort without going through the usual chain of command for security reasons. The following operations order was prepared by Admiral Bardshar (CTF-77) to carry out the diversion effort and was handcarried to the appropriate subordinate commanders:

a. General. A special operation will be conducted by a Joint Contingency Task Group in the near future. It will be supported by elements of TF-77 whose function is to create a diversion in order to assist in the successful execution of the basic mission. Security considerations prohibit full disclosure of the exact nature and timing of the operation. However, the guidelines listed herein are sufficient for you to perform your assigned function. Should any questions arise concerning the conduct of this operation, they will be directed to me personally by courier whenever possible. Electrical transmissions of messages concerning this operation are discouraged.

b. Background. Experience has shown that a large naval air attack in the Haiphong and northeastern NVN area can confuse and saturate the enemy's air defense organization and draw MIGs in a defensive reaction to the apparent attack.

c. Concept of Operations. The primary purpose of this operation is diversion. It is therefore doubtful that political considerations will permit the expenditure of air-to-ground ordnance other than flares. Within these limits, the objective is to create as much confusion in the NVN Command and Control System as possible. In order to accomplish this objective, the Navy effort will consist of two waves of approximately fifteen strike aircraft, each wave conducting simulated missions over NVN while other Task Force 77 aircraft are positioned for force defense, EW support, and in-flight refueling as required. Details of the operation are as set forth below: I-1

d. FORCES REQUIRED.

(1) RANGER

2 EKA3B ECM/Tanker on station H minus 25, Off station H plus 30.

1 ELB FORCECAP Back up control and manual relay of Navy Red.

On station H minus 25 to H plus 1 hr and 20 mins.

4 F4 MIGCAP on station H minus 25, off station H plus 35.

2 F4 TARCAP/MIGCAP on TARCAP station H minus 12, off TARCAP Station H minus 02, on MIGCAP sta 3 H plus 10, Off MIGCAP sta 3 H plus 35.

8 A6 Strike, Coast in H plus 10, coast out H plus 25.

6 A7 Iron Hand, on station H plus 10, off station H plus 25.

2 A6 Tanker on station vicinity parent CVA H minus 15 to H plus 1 hr and 40 min.

4 A7 RESCAP on station 090 degrees/20NM NSAR H minus 25 to H plus 35.

1 KA3 Tanker launched from DaNang for Ranger Control to arrive overhead in time to top off one section of F4s enroute to CAP station.

2 F4 in Alert 5.

2 F4 in Alert 15.

2 A7 RESCAP in Alert 15.

1 A6 Tanker in Alert 15.

1 ELB in Alert 15.

(2) ORISKANY

1 ELB AEW Voice Call Tango for flight following strike aircraft at turn point Schlitz and Manual Relay of Navy Red. On station H minus 25, Off station H plus 35.

2 EKA3B ECM/Tanker on Station H minus 25, off station H plus 30.

14 A7 Strike, Coast in H minus 20, Coast out H plus 05.

4 A7 Tankers on station vicinity parent CVA H minus 45
to H plus 1 Hr and 15 mins.

2 F8 BARCAP.

4 F8 FORCECAP, on station H minus 25, off station H
minus 35.

2 F8 Alert 5.

2 F8 Alert 15.

2 A7 Alert 15.

1 E1B Alert 15.

(3) HANCOCK

2 EKA3B Tankers; Launch from DaNang for Ranger Control to
arrive overhead in time to top off two sections, F4s enroute CAP Sta.

2 F8 Alert 5.

2 F8 Alert 15.

2 A4 RESCAP Alert 15.

1 E1B Alert 15.

e. FORCE DISPOSITION.

(1) CVAS/Escorts.

Ranger, CRAIG, KEPPLER - SECTOR OSCAR

ORISKANY, ROGERS, LLOYD THOMAS, ANDERSON - SECTOR QUEBEC

HANCOCK, KNOX, PERKINGS - SECTOR PAPA

(2) NORTH SAR (TU 77.0.1)

JOUETT/STODDERT, 5NM Radius of 19-50N, 107-20E.

(3) PIRAZ (TU 77.0.2)

WAINWRIGHT/AGERHOLM 5NM radius of 19-00N, 106-35E

CHICAGO will join 21 Nov.

(4) MIGCAP/TARCAP

STA NO	LAT/LONG	ALT	CONTROL	FREQ
1	20-45N/107-40E	16M	OSWALD	Ranger FAD 1 (233.8MHZ)
2	20-35N/107-05E	14M	OSWALD	Ranger FAD 2 (337.8MHZ)
3	20-15N/107-00E	26M	OSWALD	Ranger FAD 3 (350.6MHZ)
TARCAP	21-30N/106-35E	21M	OSWALD	ORISKANY ATTACK PRIMARY (265.1MHZ)

Note: RED CROWN will provide back up control for the above CAP stations.

(5) FORCECAP

4 19-00N/106-00E 12M UNIFORM ORISKANY FAD 1 (382.7MHZ)
5 19-00N/107-20E 12M RANGER ORISKANY FAD 2 (271.4MHZ)

(6) BARCAP

Flown along the Combat Apply track under Stoddert control on button 4 (354.6MHZ) Alt. 34M.

(7) AEW

TANGO vicinity 20-30N, 107-40E, altitude as required to flight follow strike aircraft at turn point SCHLITZ and will be under STODDERT control on button 10, attack primary (265.1MHZ). Uniform vicinity 19N, 107-00# 9M under parent CVA Control.

(8) AF TANKER

All AF KC135 augment tanker will be in the Gulf of Tonkin (GOT) from H minus 75 mins to H plus 50 mins and will monitor PIRAZ freq (386.6MHZ). Red Crown will direct this tanker to take station between PIRAZ and NSAR at 25M. When required, USN tanker aircraft will refuel from the KC-135 in order to maintain satisfactory give away fuel. Although KC-135 crews will be briefed on Navy aircraft refueling limitations, all tanker aircraft (EKA4B) requesting fuel from the KC-135 will ensure the KC-135 fuel delivery pressure is within proper limits.

f. STRIKE PLANS AND ROUTES.

(1) The Strike Plan consists of two waves of aircraft divided into three tracks and three Iron Hand orbits. Each track will consist of three or four A7 sections or eight single A6 aircraft as set forth below. Each Iron Hand orbit consists of two A7 aircraft.

(2) Strike timing requires the first section of the first wave over the coast-in-point (CIP) at H minus 20 minutes and the last section of the first wave over turn-point four at H plus 5 minutes. The first aircraft of the second wave will be at turn-point Mary at H plus 10 minutes. The last aircraft of the second wave will be outbound at H plus 25 minutes.

(3) FORCE COMPOSITION.

(a) Wave One: 14 A7 (Seven Sections)

(b) Wave Two: 6 A7 (Three Sections)

(4) NAVIGATION DATA.

(a) Wave One.

1. Track Alpha: Four sections of A7 aircraft. Two minute separation between sections. Speed 420KTAS. The first section will be at 8,000 ft. Succeeding sections will be at 9,000, 10,000 and 11,000 ft respectively.

POSITION	LAT/LONG	TIME
NSAR	19-50N/107-20E	H Minus 28 Min
CIP	20-44N/107-94E	H Minus 20 Min
TP-1 (SCHLITZ)	21-00N/107-45E	H Minus 14 Min
TP-2	21-12N/107-36E	H Minus 11 Min
TP-3	20-44N/107-04E	H Minus 04 Min
TP-4	20-48N/107-25E	H Hour
BUDWEISER	19-00N/106-20E	H Plus 17 Min

NOTE: All times are for lead section. Flares dropped at time H minus 04 Min.

2. TRACK BRAVO: Three sections of A7 aircraft. Two minute separation between sections. Speed 420KTAS. First section will be at 17,000 ft with succeeding sections at 18,000 and 19,000 ft.

POSITION	LAT/LONG	TIME
NSAR	19-50N/107-20E	H Minus 30 Min
CIP (SCHLITZ)	21-00N/107-45E	H Minus 20 Min
TP-ALPHA	21-32N/106-45E	H Minus 11 Min
TP-BRAVO	21-01N/107-22E	H Minus 03 Min
TP-CHARLIE	20-43N/107-28E	H Hour
BUDWEISER	19-00N/106-20E	H Plus 18 Min

NOTE: All times are for lead section. Flares dropped at time H Minus 08 Mins.

(a) TRACK CHARLIE: Eight single A6 aircraft. Two minute separation between aircraft. Speed 420KTAS. Altitude 4,000 ft maximum. These aircraft are to simulate laying a minefield along the below listed

track and may adjust flight profile accordingly.

POSITION	LAT/LONG	TIME
NSAR	19-50N/107-20E	H Plus 03 Min
TP-MARY	20-37N/107-13E	H Plus 10 Min
TP-ALICE	20-41N/106-59E	H Plus 12 Min
BUDWEISER	19-00N/106-20E	H Plus 27 Min

NOTE: All times are for lead aircraft.

(b) Zulu Orbits (Iron Hand): Three sections of A7 aircraft. Altitude for Zulu One is 28,000 ft, Zulu Two 30,000 ft and Zulu Three 32,000 ft.

ORBIT POINTS	LAT/LONG	TIME
Zulu One	20-52N/107-07E	H Plus 10 Min to H plus 25
Zulu Two	20-35N/107-00E	H Plus 10 Min to H Plus 25
Zulu Three	20-20N/106-55E	H Plus 10 Min to H Plus 25

g. ECHO ORBIT: Will be used as an alternate orbit in the event decision is made not to use the Bravo Track. The Echo Orbit is defined as holding inbound on the NSAR 342 Deg Radial between 47 and 27NM with right hand turns. Altitudes will remain 17M/18M/19M ft.

h. TARCAP will consist of two F4 acft on station (21-30N/106-35E) at 21M from H Minus 12 to H Minus 02. Considering the high density of support aircraft in the GOT, TARCAP will be required to cross NSAR and CIP at 26M. Descent to 21M will commence after crossing CIP. TARCAP will climb after H minus 02 to enable crossing the COP at 26M and will arrive CAP sta 3 by H Plus 10 and depart CAP Sta 3 at H Plus 35.

POSITION	LAT(N)/LONG(E)	TIME
NSAR	19-50 107-20	H Minus 27
CIP	20-48 107-20	H Minus 20
TP	21-00 107-20	H Minus 18
TARCAP STA	21-30 106-35	H Minus 12
TP	21-00 107-20	H Plus 04
COP	20-48 107-20	H Plus 06
MIGCAP STA 3	20-15 107-00	H Plus 10

i. INGRESS/EGRESS: All aircraft will proceed to station at their assigned altitudes via the NSAR. PIRAZ check in will not be made. Oriskany attack primary frequency (265.1MHZ) will be used by all strike aircraft. Egress will be at assigned altitudes via Pt Budweiser. Prior to reaching PT Budweiser all aircraft will check in with Red Crown on Button Nine (386.6MHZ) for identification. Low state aircraft may proceed direct to their parent CVA, however, they will confirm position with Red Crown.

j. SEARCH AND RESCUE:

(1) CTU 77.0.0, Call sign Harbormaster located at NSAR will coordinate Navy SAR efforts in the Gulf of Tonkin and over land in NVN.

(2) SAR efforts over land in NVN are authorized (the SAR on-scene Commander will make recommendations to Harbormaster). In all cases permission is required from CTG 77.0 prior to vectoring SAR Forces over land.

(3) Commencing at H minus 70 minutes NSAR and PIRAZ units will have one SH3 Helo Alert 5 with the UH-2s in Alert 15; at H minus 20 the Alert 5 Helos will be launched to remain in the vicinity of their respective units.

(4) Ranger will provide 4 A-7 acft for RESCAP, stationed 090 degrees T, 20NM from NSAR at 7,000 ft. These aircraft will be on station from H minus 25 until H plus 35. These aircraft will be armed with Rockeyes and 20mm and are authorized to expend this ordnance in support of SAR efforts.

k. ELECTRONIC WARFARE.

(1) The following DECM equipments are required by all aircraft entering a SAM/AAA threat environment:

APR 25/30

APR 27

ALQ 100

ALE 29/18

(2) All DECM equipment will be checked with appropriate line test sets within twenty four hours of launch time for proper operation. Each equipment with a self test feature will be checked by the flight crew prior to launch for proper self test indications. Any aircraft with equipment which does not perform proper self test will not launch.

(3) Flight crews will be briefed on latest counter tactics against the NVH SAM/AAA threat environment in order to insure proper utilization of all DECM equipments.

(4) The ECM orbit will be from 20-00n/107-00E to 20-30N/107-30E. Ranger ECK3B flight leader will coordinate the orbit to effect proper spacing along the track on jammer control Freq 281.2 MHZ. Altitudes are as follows:

Ranger aircraft 21M/22M

Oriskany Aircraft 23M

Hancock Aircraft 24M

(5) Radar jamming will be directed against the Haiphong Area and will be IAW the following priorities.

(a) FanSong /

of any FanSong radar detected. If a SAM warning in the Haiphong area has been given by Big Look (Navy EC-121) and has not been detected by the EKA3B ESM equipment, all EKA3Bs will commence jamming between [redacted] directed against the Haiphong area.

(b) In the absence of FanSong activity, AAA fire control radars will be jammed.

(c) / will be jammed when directed.

(6) Jamming coordination between EKA3Bs will be maintained by using jammer control frequency 281.2 MHz.

Jamming will be initiated when directed by the FAAWC or by Big Look.

Big Look will pass by Code Word on Jammer

Control Frequency Example: Jammers, Jammers, ALPIA -

Deep Sea 31. Jamming will continue until told to stop by the FAAWC.

(7) support will be provided by an EP3 Big Look aircraft from H minus 2 hours 55 mins to H plus 1 Hr 30 Min. One EC-121 will be available as back up at DaNang. One airborne EA38 positioned overhead the CVA force at H minus 1 hr will provide relay as required and airborne back up for the EP3 in case of airborne abort.

(8) Strike aircraft will use Chaff when necessary to break fire control lock on. Additionally, A6 aircraft will dispense chaff between TP Mary and TP Alice.

(9) /

1. Rules of Engagement. The following rules of engagement are in effect once forces have actually been committed in support of this operation and until it has been terminated or cancelled.

(1) Any aircraft over NVN or the GOF attacking or acting in a manner which indicates with reasonable certainty an intent to attack friendly forces in this operation will be engaged. All detected tracks over NVN North of 20N which meet this criteria will be classified as 'confirmed Hostile'. Current rules of engagement will apply for those air contacts detected south of 20N.

(2) No pursuit is authorized into the territorial seas or airspace of Communist China.

(3) USN aircraft, CAP or Strike, will, under no circumstances, proceed west of 106-10E when north of 20-00N.

(4) No air to ground ordnance is authorized with the exception of the flares carried by Strike aircraft and the Rockeyes/Guns carried aboard RESCAP. (Later modified to permit firing of Shrikes at SAM and AAA Radars.)

(5) With the exception of the above, all other rules of engagement will be IAW current directives.

m. Command and Signal.

(1) Commander, Joint Contingency Task Group, under the operational command of CINCPAC, and located at Monkey Mountain has overall authority for the conduct of this operation.

(2) CTG 77.0 is CCD-7 in USS Oriskany.

(3) CTF 77 located in USS Oriskany will exercise overriding authority for the conduct of the Navy diversionary effort as directed by CJCTG.

(4) FAAWC is CCD-7 in USS Oriskany.

(5) Alt AAWC is CCD-9 in USS Ranger.

(6) All other assignments IAW current YF RECAP.

(7) For this operation, Yankee Station communications remain IAW Green two and Red three. In addition to regular net members, CJCTG and Alt-TACC-NS (HOTEL ALPHA) may join the AC/CID nets and the secure TDS coordination net (CKT 616).

(8) Red Rocket procedures will be used to deliver mission approval/delay/cancellation messages to selected addressees. Afloat commanders will receive messages via the broadcast, the Fleet Flash net (South) (FFN-S) and/or the CINCPACFLT HICOM voice net. Addressees will submit acknowledgement report IAW CINCPACFLT 002300.11. (Red Rocket requirements below CJCTG were subsequently cancelled.)

n. ADMINISTRATION AND SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) Once this plan is opened by the designated addressees, disclosure of such portions as necessary to accomplish your assigned mission is authorized. Such disclosure will be restricted to those with an absolute need to know and will be accomplished as late as possible in order to minimize the chances of compromise. Once this plan has been opened, no personal mail will leave your unit and personnel will be transferred only in emergency cases until the operation has been terminated or cancelled.

(2) Scheduled D-Day and H-Hour are ----- at -----Z. These will never be transmitted electrically. COMJCTG will make a preliminary GO/NO GO decision at H minus 9 hours and a final decision at H minus 5 hours. These decisions will be relayed to all participants via Air Force Green (CKT 616).

(3) The mission may be delayed by as much as two hours by the mission commander or it may be rescheduled for subsequent days should circumstances prohibit its execution on a given day. In case of delay/rescheduling, H hours will remain the same for D plus 1 and D plus 2. On D plus 3 and D plus 4, H hour will be one hour later. On D plus 5 and subsequent, H hour returns to the originally scheduled time.


(4) USAF aircraft will be operating in the Gulf of Tonkin and over NVN during this time frame. Air Force aircraft over the Gulf of Tonkin will consist of the Luzon RR relay, Combat Apple, a KC-135 tanker, and two College Eye EC-121 aircraft in the vicinity of 19-30N/106-40E. Additionally, USN aircraft will have IFF on at all times. Therefore an inoperable IFF is cause for aircraft abort.

(5) No public statements regarding this operation are permitted even after its completion, unless specifically authorized by CTF-77 IAW directives received from higher authority. Additionally, press and other visits to units involved in this operation are to be discouraged whenever possible, provided that such incidents will not lead to unnecessary speculation. Refer all decisions on these matters to CTF-77.

(6) Abort orders during the execution phase of this operation will be issued on guard channel utilizing the appropriate code word from paragraph 10. Upon receipt of the abort code word, all Navy aircraft over land in North Vietnam will come to Heading 135 degrees True and exit the NVN land mass remaining at assigned altitude.

(7) The requirement for accuracy of navigation must be emphasized to all concerned. Such factors as accurate DR, Terrain orientation, precise NSAR stationing, EMB navigation assistance and cross checking of instruments including reference to both TACAN channels on NSAR are mandatory.

(8) Upon termination of this operation, this OPORD will be destroyed. Message report to originator stating that destruction has been accomplished is required.



2. Task Group Navigation:

a. Task Group Composition. Two COMBAT TALON C-130Es were used to provide precise navigation to and from the target area. One C-130 (Cherry 01) escorted the helicopters and the other, (Cherry 02), the fighters on the inbound route. Both C-130s provided only DF steer assistance on the return route.

b. Navigator Crew Duties. Because exceptional navigational accuracy was required, FLIR (Forward Looking Infrared) was installed on both aircraft and an additional navigator was added to the crew. Navigational duties were assigned as follows:

(1) Radar navigator operated the APQ-115 radar and doppler and maintained the inflight log.

(2) FLIR navigator verified the checkpoints and turning points, provided the necessary precision doppler updates and was the primary crew member for calling the drops over FLIR identifiable targets.

(3) Map reading navigator updated the doppler by visual means and was the secondary crew member for calling drops over visually identifiable targets. The third pilot assisted in map reading from the left-hand side of the cockpit.

c. Inbound Navigation:

(1) Formation Airspeeds. Cherry 01 flew a controlled 105 KIAS which was the fastest airspeed the slowest helicopter (HH-3) could maintain during inflight drafting. Cherry 02 flew a controlled 145 KIAS, which was the maximum cruise A-1E airspeed.

(2) Formation Routes (see attached flight plans). Both C-130s flew separate flight plan routes to the common IP. Cherry 02 had to be prepared to take over the helicopter lead in case Cherry 01 dropped out for some reason. Because of this requirement, the two separate routes were laid out in such a way that the two formations were within 10 minutes of each other at the time Cherry 01 assumed helicopter lead from the HC-130

tanker (Pt 4). Thereafter, Cherry 01 and 02 flight plan separation decreased to two minutes at the IP. Because it was thought to be impractical to change lead once a descent to the objective area had begun, no change of lead was to take place once Cherry 01 and its helicopter formation crossed the North Vietnamese border. If the switch in lead was to occur, the fighter formation was to proceed on the flight plan course to the objective area alone. Some circumstances were envisioned under which Cherry 01 could take up the strike formation lead after relinquishing the assault formation lead to Cherry 02.

(3) Formation Timing. There was no firm control time of arrival over the objective area; however, it was mandatory that the strike formation arrive at the IP two minutes behind the assault formation. The time of arrival at the IP depended on the speed with which Cherry 01 could get there, even after experiencing undesirable loss of visual contacts with its helicopter formation and subsequent rejoin maneuvers. Because of this possibility and because the flight plans were computed on true airspeeds (no-wind ground speeds), it was necessary for Cherry 01 to make three assault formation progress timing calls to Cherry 02 to insure that proper timing separation at the IP was attained. Cherry 02 could then either lose time by circling or doglegging or gain time by cutting corners or complete flight plan legs. The following timing calls were scheduled and made:

(a) Anticipated time ahead or behind flight plan

ETA for Point 7, reported after assumption of formation lead from the tanker.

(b) Ahead or behind at Point 10, reported at Point 7.

(c) Ahead or behind at the IP reported at Point 10.

d. Outbound Navigation. Both Cherries departed the objective area and returned by separate routes. Helicopters and A-1s used the same exit route to Point 4 obtaining DF steers from Cherry 01 at the North Vietnamese border. The helicopters joined up with their tankers at Point 4 and after their refueling they proceeded to Cherry 02 orbit north of TACAN channel 103 obtaining DF steers. The A-1s flew directly from Cherry 01 orbit to Cherry 02 orbit.

c. Navigational Aids. As was foreseen, because of weather conditions, radar was the primary means of navigation over most of the route. Both formations were able to stay within one-half mile of track during doppler updating by radar. FLIR and map reading doppler updates were limited until descent to the objective area began. Thereafter, map reading became the primary means of navigation.

f. Navigational Problems:

(1)

(b)

(c) Mapping Modes. Airspeeds which cause higher than 1.5° up pitch attitudes will affect the antenna sweep in the same manner as in TAO. Targets left and right will point brighter than those along the centerline of projected track.

(d)

(e) GAR/I. Used as [] was good. (See Section A-5)

(f) Conclusions - Lessons Learned. In spite of all the slow speed limitations, because of its adverse weather capability, the radar must be considered as the primary navigational aid in flights over mountainous terrain. On a moonless night, when visual map reading is restricted, the FLIR becomes radar's best backup.

(2) Doppler. Slow flight had adverse effects on doppler operation. In spite of excellent maintenance, it produced substandard

performance. The following problems were encountered.

(a) Occasional memory operations (break locks) during straight and level flights.

(b) Very frequent break locks during turns, power reductions or applications and pitch adjustments.

(c) Doppler drift was almost always too excessive, indicating 2-3° higher than actual. This affected not only the computer crosstrack but also the radar antenna stabilization.

(d) Doppler computer responded sluggishly to heading changes. The crosstrack had a noticeable lag with a tendency to run away or overshoot.

(e) CDI was also sluggish during slow flights and would not respond readily to heading changes.

(3) FLIR. This new equipment performed well. Because the FLIR is not gyro stabilized, its look angle calibration was affected by excessive pitch up attitude during slow flights.

g. Recommendations for future operation utilizing COMBAT TALON aircraft: [

TRIP C-130E

COMBAT TALON LOW LEVEL FLIGHT PLAN AND LOG

18 Dec 70

		NAVIGATOR			ACFT MOD		ACFT NO		T O. WEIGHT			20 MIN		10 MIN		STATIONS		START ENGINES		TAXI		TAKOFF P	
		TAKOFF TIME A			FROM			TO			6 MIN		2 MIN		1 MIN		TOT		RECOVERY		LAND A		
		ETA	PTA	MSA	IC	ZONE	ZONE	TOTAL	DIST TO SD	TOTAL	ALT	IAS	TC	W	V	TH	VAR	MIN	GS	NAV	R	COORD	REMARKS
		ATA		ESA		DIST	TIME	TIME	FUEL	DIST	TEMP	TAS		DC						A/D	D		
	NKP	1651	1647			053.2	283	1:30		283	A/R		063.0				4.2						
1A	MEKONG	1726	1726	7000		306.4	99.7	:39		382.7	7000	112	306.0				4.4						1821.50 163 14.50
2A	SKYLINE	1748	1745	7000		338.7	52.1	+19		434.8	+10	166	338.2				+5						19 12.11 143 54.5
3A	RIVER CONFL	1758	1746	7000		330.8	31.5	+11		466.3	+10	164	330.3				+5						17 17.37 104 57.00
4A	RIVER CONFL	1821	1821	7000		358.7	66.4	+24		532.7	+9	164	358.2				+5						18 07.00 104 57.00
5A	RIVER CONFL	1827	1827	6800		012.5	17.4	+06		550.1	+10	163	011.9				+6						18 07.00 104 57.00
6A	RIVER CONFL	1833	1833	6800		046.4	16.3	+06		566.4	+10	163	045.8				+6						18 07.00 104 57.00
7A	RIVER CONFL	1839	1839	6800		103.4	14.2	+05		580.0	+10	163	107.8				+6						18 07.00 104 57.00
8A	RIVER CONFL	1844	1844	6800		060.1	13.1	+05		593.7	+11	162	060.0				+6						20 18.00 104 57.00
9A	RIVER CONFL	1849	1849	5900		347.5	12.9	+05		606.0	+13	161	346.9				+6						18 07.00 104 57.00
10A	RIVER CONFL	1856	1856	6000		060.7	19.2	+07		625.8	+13	161	060				+7						21 05.11 104 57.00
11A	RIVER CONFL	1905	1905	5300		068.8	24.8	+09		650.6	+14	160	068.1				+7						21 17.37 142 59.60
12A	E END OF LAKE	1913	1913	3900		114.6	20.4	+08		671.0	+21	152	113.5				+7						
13A	TURN OFF	1916	1916	800		077.5	6.9	+03		677.9	+23	149	076.9				+7						
14A	DROP	1919	1919	2000		270.7	5.5	+02		683.4	+22	135	R										

DRY RPT TO

ZONE TIME GS

SIGNATURE OF NAVIGATOR

COMBAT TALON LOW LEVEL FLIGHT PLAN AND LOG

ASSAULT C-130

		NAVIGATOR		ACFT NOS		ACFT NO		T.O. WEIGHT		20 MIN		10 MIN		STATIONS		START ENGINES		TAXI		TAKEOFF				
		15 55/1618		FROM TAKHLI				TO UDORN				5 MIN		2 MIN		1 MIN		TOT		RECOVERY		LAND		
TO	ETA	PTA	MSL	HC	ZONE DIST	ZONE TIME	TOTAL TIME	DIST TO SD	TOTAL DIST	ASCALT	IAS	TC	V	V	TH	VAR	HH	CS	HAV AID	R	D	COORD	REMARKS	
	ATA		SEA					FUEL		TEMP	TAS		DC				V							
UDORN	1655	1655	A/R	049.0	192.0	1:00	1:00		192.0	A/R		049.0				0							17 58.8 N	
1 MEKONG	1703		A/R													+3							102 53.5 E	
RA SKYLINE BCN	1706	1706	A/R	009.3	35.3	+11	1:11		227.8	400	180	009.0											19 10.0 N	
RIVER CONFL.	1711 1/2									6500	180					+4							102 54.0 E	
RIVER CONFL.	1727		7600	000.7	71.1	+21	1:32		298.9	7000		000.3											19 42.8 N	
RIVER CONFL.	1730 1/2		7000							7000													102 56.3 E	
RIVER CONFL.	1738	1738	6500	333.3	37.0	+11	1:43		335.9	6500	180	332.9				+5							20 25.2 N	
RIVER CONFL.	1743		6500							6800	180												103 44.3 E	
RIVER CONFL.	1815	1815	6800	057.4	76.9	+37	2:20		412.8	6800		057.8				+6							20 35.9 N	
RIVER CONFL.	1816		6500							110													103 52.5 E	
RIVER CONFL.	1822	1822	6500	136.4	13.3	+07	2:27		426.1	124	118	035.8											20 42.0 N	
RIVER CONFL.	1827 1/2		7300							105													104 12.4 E	
RIVER CONFL.	1832	1832	6800	072.8	19.6	+10	2:37		445.7	600	105	072.2				1.6							20 52.4 N	
RIVER CONFL.	1832 1/2		6500							115	117												104 17.5 E	
RIVER CONFL.	1838	1838	5400	025.3	11.8	+06	2:43		457.5	5400	105	024.7											21 01.4 N	
RIVER CONFL.	1838 1/2		6000							114	117												104 35.7 E	
RIVER CONFL.	1848	1848	5900	064.0	19.2	+10	2:53		476.7	6000	105	063.3											21 01.3 N	
RIVER CONFL.	1848 1/2		6000							105													104 53.0 E	
RIVER CONFL.	1856 1/2	1856 1/2	5500	091.0	16.2	+03 1/2	3:01 1/2		492.9	5500	105	090.3											21 04.2 N	
RIVER CONFL.	1857 1/2		5400							112	116												105 06.3 E	
RIVER BEND	1904 1/2	1904 1/2	5500	053.8	14.7	+08	3:09 1/2		506.6	4000	105	058.1											21 06.0 N	
RIVER BEND	1905 1/2		5500							117	114												105 13.6 E	
END OF LAKE	1911 1/2	1911 1/2	2300	105.7	12.2	+07	3:16 1/2		518.8	1500	105	105.0											21 06.0 N	
END OF LAKE	1912 1/2									122	109												105 13.6 E	
OBJECTIVE POINT	1918	1918	1500	077.7	10.9	+06 1/2	3:23		529.7	800	105	077.0												
OBJECTIVE POINT	1919									124	103													
DROP TURN	1920 1/2		1500		5.0	+02 1/2	3:25 1/2		534.7	1000	130													
DROP TURN	1921 1/2	1920 1/2								123	135													
LAKE DAM	1921 1/2	1921 1/2		305.7	2.5	+01	3:26 1/2		537.2	A/R		305.0												
LAKE DAM	1922 1/2																							

ZONE TIME GS

FROM RPT TO

SIGNATURE OF NAVIGATOR

5. US Army Operations:

a. Attachment 2 provides a schedule of ground force events in the staging area to include amplifying equipment lists.

b. Attachment 3 provides a schedule of ground force events in the objective area.

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS - GROUND FORCE

18 Nov (D-3)	0600-1400	Rest & Recover from Travel	Billets	Plat Ldrs
	1400-1430	Briefing	Theater	Gen Manor & Col Simons
	1430-1500	COs meeting	Theater	LTC Sydnor
	1500-1700	Read Plan (by Plat Ldrs)	Billets	Plt Ldr
		Unpack Personal Equip & Web Gear	Hangar	Plat Ldrs
	1700-1800	Chow	Dining Rm	
	1830-1900	Staff & Plt Ldrs Meeting	Theater	LTC Sydnor
	1900-2000	*Plat Ldrs & El Ldrs Question Pd & Briefback	Billets	LTC Sydnor
	2030	Movie	Theater	Base, CO

19 Nov (D-2)	0600-0700	Chow	Dining Rm	NA
	0700-0900	*Plat Ldr Time	-----	Plat Ldr
	0900-1100	Ammo Issue & Prep	Billets	Supply NCO
	1100-1200	Chow	Dining Rm	NA
	1230-1330	SAR Briefing	Theater	SAR Unit, CO
	*1330-1515	Range Firing 2nd Plat 1300-1345 3rd Plat 1345-1430 1st Plat 1430-1515	Range	CPT Meadows
	1515-1700	Wpns Cleaning Draw Demo Chgs	Billets/ Annex	Plat Ldr Sel Pers
	1700-1800	Chow	Dining Rm	NA
	1800-1900	E&E Briefing	Theater	Mr. Morton
		*Commo Issue - Ready at 1330 (Coord w/SFC Erwin)		

20 Nov (D-1)	0600-0700	Chow	Dining Rm	NA
	0700-1100	Open (Issue Night Devices and I/R Devices)	Hangar	LTC Bailey
	1100-1200	Chow	Dining Rm	NA
	1200-1210	Issue Sleeping Pills	Billets	LTC Cataldo
	1210-1700	Rest	Billets	Plt Ldrs
	1700-1800	Chow	Dining Rm	NA

20 Nov (D-1) con't	1800-1845	Final Briefing	Theater	COL Simons LTC Sydnor
	1845--	Adv Party Departs		
	1845-1915	Move to Hangar (by closed van)	Route	Plt Ldrs
	1915-2100	Equipment Checks	Hangar	Plt Ldrs & CO
	2100-2110	Marshall	Apron	MSG Britt USAF Rep
	2110-2120	On-Load	Apron	MSG Britt USAF Rep
	2125-	Take-off for Staging Area		
	2225-	Arrive Staging Area		
	2225-	Marshall	Staging Area	MSG Gann
	2256-	Depart		

ALL DATES 0715

Daily Staff Briefing

Theater

LTC Sydnor
& Staff

GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT LIST

	COMMAND GROUP	ASSAULT GROUP	SUPPORT GROUP
M-16	2	0	0
CAR .15	14	14	20
.45 PISTOL	16	14	21
M-79 & Vest	2	0	2
M-60	2	0	2
SHOTGUN	1	0	1
RUCKSACK	5	0	4
MACHETTE	5	6	6
CHAIN SAW	1	0	1
CUTTING TORCH	1	0	1
BATONS (LIGHTS)	2	0	2
BEAN-BAG LIGHTS	7	0	7
CAMERA	1	0	1
GOOGLES	20	14	22
ROPES	1	5	1
BOLT CUTTERS	2	7	2
AN-PRC-88	9	5	10
AN-PRC-77	5	2	3
AN-PRC-41	1	0	1
AN-PRC-90	20	14	22
AX	5	5	1
HEALSHET	1	0	1
WIRE CUTTERS	3	6	3
MINERS LAMP	10	14	10
WATCH	20	14	22
Night Vision Dev	4	1	1
HAND CUFFS	1	5	0
SHOULDER HOLSER (.45)	9	14	20
KNIFE	20	14	22

	COMMAND GROUP	ASSAULT GROUP	SUPPORT GROUP
CROW BAR	0	5	0
PEN FLARE	20	14	22
BULL HORN	2	3	0
INFRA RED FLASHLIGHT	2	2	2
INFRA RED HOOD FOR STROBE	2	2	2
EQUIPMENT BAG (M-60)	0	5	0
SINGLE POINT SIGHT	16	13	18
E&E RUCKSACK	0	14	0
PONCHO & LINER	0	14	0
CANTEEN, 2 QUART	0	14	0
LRPPS	0	56	0
HAMMER & NAILS	0	1 set	0
14' LADDER	0	1	0
CRACK HATCHET	0	2	0
FIRE EXTINGUISHER	0	4	0
IBE & SURVIVAL KIT	20	14	22
STROBE LIGHT	20	14	22
GLAWE - AVIATOR	20	14	22
COMPASS - M-2	20	14	22
PEN LIGHT	20	14	22
EAB PLUGS	20	14	22

GROUND FORCE MUNITIONS LIST

MUNITION	COMMAND GROUP	ASSAULT GROUP	SUPPORT GROUP
1. 5.56			
a. Ball	6851	3338	6024
b. Tracer	180	1640	404
2. .45 Caliber			
a. Ball	336	287	483
b. Tracer	21	7	28
3. Grenades, Hand			
a. Fragmentation	20	0	53
b. Concussion	50	28	53
c. Smoke	0	0	8
d. Incendiary	0	0	1
4. Claymore Mines	6	6	3
5. Special Demo Charges			
a. 30 lbs	2	0	2
b. 10 lbs	2	0	2
c. 5 lbs	1	0	1
d. 3-1/4 lbs	0	1	0
6. 40mm Grenades			
a. HE	120		70
b. WSC	17		12
7. Flares (Hand-Held)	17		34
8. M-72 (IAW)	12		12
9. 7.62 Ball (4/1) MLB	3000		2500
10. #1 Shotgun Shells	50		50

Medical

1. Approximately 2690 lbs of medical supplies were procured for the conduct of this operation. On each evacuation helicopter was placed:

- 150 Cans of Water
- 100 Cans of Survival food
- Special sneakers, olive drab
- Ponchos, camouflages
- Ponchos, lined
- Baby food, packaged, plain
- Ear plugs
- M-5 Medical kits

2. Prepositioned at the Base Hospital, Udorn, Thailand, for immediate employment were:

- 100 sets of pajamas
- 100 sets of bathrobes
- Cameras (to photograph POWs)
- Delousing material
- Additional plain package Baby Food

3. The hospital activated its Mass Casualty Plan at H Plus 2 hours, however, deactivated upon return of the first helicopter.

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS - GROUND FORCE OPERATIONS

TIME* (LOCAL)	FORCE CMDR (WILDROOT)	GROUND ELEMENTS			AIR ELEMENTS		
		COMMAND GROUP (REBWINE)	ASSAULT GROUP (BLUEBOY)	SUPPORT GROUP (GREENLEAF)	HH-3 (BANANA)	HH-53 (APPLE)	AI-E (PEACH)
H+Hour (210219 Nov)							
H+30 Sec		Fly By	Insert in Target Area	Insert 400M S of Target Area	01	01	Orbit Area
H+2'30"		Insert (Plan Green)	Clear & Search	Combat Assault	02		
H+2'45"	Execute Plan GREEN	Clear, Search, Plan GREEN (-) EI #2	Clear & Search	Begin disengag- ment, Secure LZ			
H+3'00"	Request Air Strike	Clear, Search, Plan GREEN (-) EI #2	Search	Prep for extract- ion			ATK on Foot- bridge
H+9'00"		EI #2-SE Road block	Search	Extraction (Underfire)		01	
H+9'30"	Execute Basic Plan	Basic Plan EI #3 receive GREENLEAF	Search	Insertion - Pass thru RW EI #3		01	
H+10'00"		Basic Plan Reorient EI #3	1st Neg Item Report	Assume Basic Plan role			
H+11'00"	NET CALL Prep to Extract		Search Complete "NEG ITEMS"				
H+12'30"	Withdrawal "Normal"	Prep to W/D Secure LZ (W)	Prep to W/D	Prep to W/D			
H+17'30"	Command & Cen- tral "Exit on	Regroup for Extraction	(-) HqEI Re- group on LZ	Secure LZ			Strafe Main Bridge
H+18'50"	Initiate Mark- ing Flare	Load (-) EI #3	Load (-) Hq EI	Secure LZ		01 Land	

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Atch 3

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS - GROUND FORCE (CONT)

TIME* (LOCAL)	GROUND ELEMENTS				AIR ELEMENTS		
	FORCE CMDR (WILEROOT)	COMMAND GROUP (REDWINE)	ASSAULT GROUP (BLUEBOY)	SUPPORT GROUP (GREENLEAF)	H-3 (BANANA)	H-53 (APPLE)	A1-E (PEACH)
H+21'30"	APPLE 1 Cleared out	Extracted (-) E1 #3, MACO, P/F	Extracted (-) Hq E1	Reposition for LZ Security		01 clear- ed out	
H+22'00"	APPLE 2					01 clear- ed out	
H+23'00"	"Marry Up" Transmission					02 clear- ed in	
H+25'00"	MACO Count		Marry Up Set Demo Charge, Depart	Execute W/D Plan	Demo Charge		
H+25'20"	Command and Control	REDWINE reported "23 Aboard"	Move to LZ. Load	Load (-) E1 #2		02 Land	
H+27' (?)	EXTRACTION 2 Hc E1 -(6)	EXTRACTION EL#3 PF, MACO	EXTRACTION Hq E1 -(3)	EXTRACTION			
H+27 (+)	Report to APPLE 2 "Cor- rect Count-33"					02 Pass Count	
H+33(?)			Observed Detona- tion of H-3 Heli- copter (Estimate)		Destroyed		
H+2(?)	Corrected count -34	Corrected count -25				01-25 02-34	

*All times are approximate - based on UHF and FM radio net tapes.

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Arch 3

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - COMMAND GROUP

TIME	HQS ELEMENT	SEC ELE 1	SEC ELE 2	SEC ELE 3	PATHFINDER
H+2'30"	Debarked	Debarked	Debarked	Debarked	Debarked
H+3'	Initiated Plan GREEN	Initiated Plan GREEN	Engaged Power Station with M-72 LAW	Initiated Plan GREEN	Initiated Plan GREEN
H+5'		Assaulted Bldg 8D, 4A, & 8E	Set up in Road block Position	Assaulted Bldg 7B	Cleared Pump Station, Set Chgs on Tower
H+9'		Cleared Bldg 8D, 4A, & 8E. Passed torch & Camera to Assault Group	Engaged Enemy near position. Cleared Power Station	Cleared Bldg 7B	Blew Tower
H+10'	Revert back to basic plan	Engaged Target across river		Engaged Enemy in Bldg 7A	Set up primary LZ
H+11'				Relieved at position by support group	
H+12'	Received word to withdraw. Informed Elements.	linked up with Assault Gp 2 Withdrew to LZ	engaged convoy with M-72 LAW then withdrew to LZ	moved to Pump Station Set up in Security Position	Set up Alternate LZ
H+18'	Boarded Apple 1	Boarded Apple 1	Boarded Apple 1		Received word to Board Apple 2
H+24'					Boarded Apple 2
H+25'				Moved to LZ & Boarded Apple 2	

1-30

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS - SUPPORT GROUP

TIME	HQs ELEMENT (GREENLEAF)	ELEMENT #1 (GREENLEAF 1)	ELEMENT #2 (GREENLEAF 2)
H Hour (010019 Nov)			
H+1	Insert 450m south of Target area	Same HQs	Same HQs
H+2	Penetrate & clear compound		Road clear 150m North
H+3		Extraction LZ secured	Instructed to close on LZ
H+5	Aircraft inbound		Closed on LZ
H+6	Began movement to LZ		
H+7	Support Group closed on LZ awaiting extraction		
H+9	Extraction	Extraction	Extraction
H+9'30"	Insertion into tgt area	Same HQs	Same HQs
H+10	Cleared bldgs 7B & 8F Linkup with Command Gp Element #3	Secure 15m South/Bldg 7B	Assaulting Bldg 13B
H+11	Rcd net call "neg items, prepare to withdraw"	Net call relayed	Bldg 13B cleared & net call relayed
H+12'30"	Prepare to withdraw & secure LZ	Movement to LZ security	
H+13			Instructed to break contact & secure LZ
H+14		Established LZ security	
H+17	Broke contact & closed on LZ (Notified Wildroot)		Closed on & secured LZ
H+23	APPLE 2 landed		
H+25'30"	Boarded Aircraft	Boarded Aircraft	Boarded Aircraft
H+26			
H+26'30"	Support Group accounted for with negative casualties		
H+27	Extraction		

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SCHEDULE OF EVENTS - ASSAULT GROUP

TIME	HQ: ELEMENT	ACTION ELEMENT 1	ACTION ELEMENT 2	ACTION ELEMENT 3
H+1	Debark	Debark	Debark	Debark
H+1'30"	Clears Bldg #3	Cleared Cell Block 5A	Clears Front of Cell Block 5E	Moves to Gate
H+2	Clears S/W Tower	Cleared Cell Block 5A		Clears Gate
H+2'30"	Broadcast message Places wall charge	Cleared N/W tower	Entered, Cleared & searched Cell Block 5E	
H+4	Answered Ground Force net call	Answered Assault Group net call	Same action Element 1	Same action Element 1
H+5	RCD ACD clear FM Blueboy 1	Cleared Cell Block 5C 5D		Entered, Cleared & searched Cell Block 5-3
H+9	RCD "NEG ITEMS" FM Blueboy 1 REC "NEG ITEM MAX security area and 5B FM Blueboy 3 REC Torch and photographer FM Redwine			
H+10	Transmits "NEG ITEMS" to Wild Root REC NEG ITEM FM Blueboy 2	Moved to hole		Moved to hole
H+11	Transmits "NEG ITEMS COUNT COM- PLETE" to Wildroot		Moved to hole	
H+14	PREP BANANA demo charge			
H+15	Dispatched 1st package		Moved to LZ	Moved to LZ

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Atch 3

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS - ASSAULT GROUP (CONT)

TIME	HQs ELEMENT	ACTION ELEMENT 1	ACTION ELEMENT 2	ACTION ELEMENT 3
H+16	Dispatched 2d package	Moved to LZ		
H+23	Request permission to "MARRY UP"			
H+23'30"	RCD "MARRY UP" Initiated demo charge and fire fight simulator			
H+25	Moved to LZ			
H+33	OBSV EXPL OF BAKANA			

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PART II

SECTION J COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Tactical Air Control Center-North Sector. The Tactical Air Control Center-North Sector (TACC-NS), located at Monkey Mountain, RVN, served as the Command Post for COMJCTG. It provided the Commander with real-time air situation data obtained from the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS), [REDACTED] and the two in-country radars located at Udorn, Thailand, and Monkey Mountain, RVN. It was planned to use COLLEGE EYE aircraft (airborne radar platforms) to provide low level coverage west of Hanoi; however, the aircraft had equipment failure and was unable to track friendly aircraft at extended ranges.

2. COMJCTG controlled his forces through the existing air-to-ground communications network. To provide communications with the National Command Authority, two special circuits were terminated at the TACC-NS. The primary circuit, through CINCPAC, was satisfactory throughout the period of the operation and the alternate circuit was not utilized. Through the use of a radio-relay aircraft operating over the Gulf of Tonkin, COMJCTG had direct UHF communications with the Task Group and the Navy Command Post afloat. In addition, COMBAT APPLE monitored the force enroute FM frequency and relayed appropriate information to the TACC-NS and elements of the force when contact on UHF was impossible. To insure that inoperative radio equipments would not degrade the operation, backup equipments were operational at the TACC-NS. In addition, COLLEGE EYE and the radio-relay aircraft monitored the primary and alternate UHF force frequency. COLLEGE EYE also monitored the primary HF/SSB frequency.

b. The TACC-NS computerized equipments and display consoles were operational throughout the entire mission. The normal operational crew was responsible for maintaining the air situation and monitoring all of the Task Group radio frequencies. Three of the six display consoles were allocated to COMJCTG and his staff to enable them to monitor the Task Group operation. Communication terminations were realigned to meet COMJCTG requirements. The on-site operations personnel retained their normal air defense responsibilities. The Commander of the TACC-NS personally selected the operational crew that supported COMJCTG.

c. In addition to the COLLEGE EYE equipment failure, the digital link (Link-11) between the TACC-NS and NTDS was periodically inoperative, thus depriving COMJCTG with a current real-time air picture derived from Navy sensors. Because of the incompatibility of the Air Force and Navy automated systems, a USMC-operated computer buffer is utilized to pass air situation data between the two systems. Periodic power failures at the buffer site interrupted the flow of real-time data. During these power failures, the backup computer driven teletype system (Link-14) was activated. A teletype input delays the display of air situation data approximately one to two minutes.

d. The COLLEGE EYE equipment failure (IFF/SIF) negated a capability to control the MIG CAP below 7,000 feet over and west of Hanoi. If MIG aircraft would have attempted an intercept of the F-105 WILD WEASEL and F-4D MIG CAP aircraft, intercept control would have been transferred to RED CROWN (Navy Command and Control Ship). MIG aircraft operating below 7,000 feet would have to be intercepted using only the airborne intercept radar of the MIG CAP aircraft. COLLEGE EYE equipment, was operational.

and would have provided MIG positions to the MIG CAP using a range and bearing from Hanoi (BULLS EYE). In addition, Navy BAR CAP aircraft were available

e. In-country identification procedures were modified to permit all Task Group aircraft to be tracked and identified using their MODE II SIF codes.

f. The following communications were available to COMJCTG:

(1) Ground-to-air (UHF). Task Group, COLLEGE EYE, COMBAT APPLE and Naval Forces.

(2) Point-to-point (HF/SSB). C-130E aircraft, COLLEGE EYE and Navy Command and Control Ship.

(3) Point-to-point (DCS). NMCC, CINCPAC, 7AFCC, 7/13AFCC, alternate TACC-NS and other elements of the SEA TACS.

g. Lessons Learned:

(1) To conduct such an operation, a computerized system is required to integrate (fuzer) all sources of data and display them in real-time. Communications are extremely vital for positive control of similar types of operations. The use of an Airborne Command and Control platform, with the capabilities of the TACC-NS and operating in the vicinity of the operation, could have simplified the communication links, improved detection capabilities and provided positive radar control of the entire force. The number of elements could have been reduced, thus minimizing the risks involved in using a multiple element Command and Control System.

(2) The lack of airborne MIGs simplified our problem.

However, airborne MIGs could have amplified our deficiencies; i. e., lack of an airborne radar capable of detecting airborne targets over a land mass. Complete reliance on a "cooperative" enemy

a risky business. For a smaller operation, not requiring the extensive use of other sensor systems, a helicopter borne radar (similar to the one now undergoing testing) accompanying the Task Group could have satisfied the Command and Control requirements. In addition, communication procedures should be coordinated with in-country forces in sufficient time to introduce them into the training program.

2. Airborne Radar Platform:

a. Two EC-121T airborne radar platforms (COLLEGE EYE) were scheduled to operate over the Gulf of Tonkin. The aircraft departed Korat RTAFB on time and all equipments were brought to an operational level prior to passing DaNang. The primary aircraft broke an oil line and lost #2 engine while proceeding up the Gulf of Tonkin. It returned safely to DaNang. After reaching altitude in the Gulf of Tonkin, #2 aircraft experienced IFF/SIF equipment failure and was unable to receive IFF/SIF returns at extended ranges. A spare unit was installed, however, with negative results. Without the IFF/SIF capability, the platform operated primarily as a MIG warning agency and a radio-relay. Voice contact with the MIG CAP was impossible, the normal 7th Air Force MIG warning procedures would have been utilized in the event MIGs became airborne; i. e., range and bearing from Hanoi (BULLS EYE). [

b. A post flight inspection of the defective IFF/SIF equipment on #2 aircraft revealed no defective equipments. While the aircraft was on station, interference was encountered on the IFF/SIF frequencies. Prior and during the duration of the interference, IFF/SIF returns could not be reliably received beyond 30-40 miles. When the aircraft departed the station, the interference disappeared. On the next flight, with no

maintenance performed, the system was again checked, and the system was operational. There is no adequate explanation for the interference or lack of IFF/SIF returns at the time of the writing of this report. It must be noted, however, that the Navy was jamming NVN radars at this time.

c. Lessons Learned. Complete reliability on non-radar equipments and a "cooperative" enemy for detecting and tracking aircraft is a high risk. An airborne radar capable of overland operation would reduce this risk considerably. In addition, an airborne platform capable of fusing all source data would greatly reduce the reliance on a long-haul sophisticated communication system and the number of command and control elements involved in this operation.

3. Radio Relay Aircraft:

a. Radio-relay aircraft were operational over the Gulf of Tonkin during the entire period of the operation. It was planned to add four additional UHF channels to the existing four channels for a total of eight channels. The aircraft was designed (Group A) for eight channels; however, their normal day-to-day operation only required four channels. When queried prior to this operation, Headquarters Strategic Air Command (SAC) personnel advised the additional equipments were in Southeast Asia; however, the in-country personnel had no knowledge of their location. This change in capability required the increasing of the number of users on the existing four channels and prevented COMJCTG from monitoring all of the discrete frequencies of the various elements of the supporting force. Because of the phase-down of the Southeast Asian conflict, airborne radar platforms were returned to the CONUS and the digital relay equipments required to link these aircraft with the TACC-NS had to be reinstalled in the aircraft. To insure compatibility of the newly installed equipments, several airborne tests were required prior to the operation.

b. Lessons Learned. Authorized [] components of in-being systems should be retained and be available to the user for short notice requirements.

4. [] over the Gulf of Tonkin for the entire period of the operation. An Airborne Mission Coordinator, fully cognizant of the entire operation, was available aboard this aircraft to assume control of the operation in the event that the TACC-NS became inoperative. COMBAT APPLE performed as expected and had direct secure UHF communications with COMJCTG. In addition to its normal functions, it monitored the Task Group's FM frequency and relayed pertinent information to COMJCTG. []

A backup RC-135M was also launched with an Alternate Airborne Mission Coordinator on board, and flew a southern COMBAT APPLE orbit. []

5. Mission Control Messages.

18 Nov 70 A message was hand carried to CTF-77 that provided rules of engagement and coordinating procedures.

182030Z Red Rocket One message from JCS, "Final go."

182225Z COMJCTG advised CTF-77, "NCA approval received."

182355Z COMJCTG advised COM7AF, "NCA approval received."

190911Z COMJCTG advised CINCPAC and NMCC that the Task Force was ready. Also advised that a delay due to weather was possible.

200310Z COMJCTG advised CTF-77 of a "preliminary
go."
200856Z COMJCTG advised CINCPAC and NMCC of
"final go" decision and that the operation would be advanced 24 hours.
200926Z COMJCTG advised CTF-77 of "final go" decision.
201345Z COMJCTG advised NMCC and CINCPAC he was
in position at his Command Post at the Tactical Air Control Center -
North Sector, Monkey Mountain, RVN.

6. Pertinent Activity Report Messages:

COMJCTG advised the NMCC and CINCPAC of the following
information:

171030Z COMJCTG was in place at Takhli RTAFB.
172000Z Task Group arrived at Takhli RTAFB.
201545Z C-130E #1 off Takhli at 1532Z.
201625Z C-130E #2 off Takhli at 1613Z.
HH-3 off Udorn at 1618Z.
HH-53s off Udorn at 1618Z.
201704Z HC-130s and A-1Es off on time.
201743Z Situation satisfactory.
201823Z Navy diversion launched.
201827Z Refueling complete.
201840Z Task Group crossed NVN border at 1838Z.
201908Z Situation satisfactory.
201928Z MIG threat.
201929Z Landed in the objective area safely.
201932Z MIG threat all clear.
201935Z Situation satisfactory.
201950Z All aircraft departed objective area.

202015Z Task Group crossed Laos border (egress).

202027Z SAR effort required. F-105 down.

202035Z Possibly negative PWs. Leaving TACC-NS for

Udon.

210215Z NMCC provided with "Initial Summary of

Operations."

PART II

SECTION K

(NOT USED)

PART II

SECTION L

(NOT USED)

PART II

SECTION M - SECURITY

I. Planning:

a. On 10 August 1970, the Security Staff Section was organized with one USA Area Intelligence/Counterintelligence Officer, Chief of Section, one USAF Counterintelligence Officer (Special Agent) from the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and one Hq USAF officer from the Directorate of Operations with the responsibility of Operations Security and Cover and Deception. This minimal staffing for security planning and operations complied with the strict compartmentation procedures established and maintained throughout all phases of the operation. The Security Staff performed the unique and complex role of supervisor/operator over a broad area in a limited time frame without additional Special Agent support for counterintelligence operations or enlisted intelligence administrators. Advanced security planning began on this date and immediate security and counterintelligence measures and procedures were instituted. An access list was established and subsequently maintained of all personnel who had been provided knowledge of the essential elements of the project. The authority for disclosure and dissemination of classified information pertinent to the operation was established. All personnel assigned to the project on a permanent or temporary basis were given a thorough security briefing. Procedures for safeguarding classified information and material were published and disseminated in a letter of instruction and briefed to all personnel. The procedures outlined individual responsibilities; classification and marking; control of defense information and material; transmission, storage and security of working areas and containers; and destruction of classified material. Security Control Officers, Top Secret and alternate Top Secret Control Officers and Couriers were formally appointed for all locations and properly instructed in their duties relating to accountability, identifiability, reproduction, dissemination, storage, and destruction. Security clearances of all project personnel were verified and files and dossiers reviewed as appropriate. Selected working and storage areas were subjected to a technical

security survey and secured against espionage, unauthorized disclosures, or access by unauthorized personnel.

b. Oral security debriefings were prepared with appropriate wording, and security termination and debriefing certificates prepared for the period up to redeployment and upon termination of the operation.

c. A cover and deception plan was developed and credible cover stories were utilized as required in coordinating activities within DOD (Annex M to COMJCTG OPlan).

d. The Security Staff also developed the Counterintelligence Annex to the COMJCTG OPlan which tasked organizations to provide specialized assistance in collecting information concerning possible organized threats to the mission of the project.

2. Training:

a. Actual preparations for opening and securing working and training locations at Eglin AFB were initiated well in advance of the actual start of training. The Washington planning location was secured. All working and training areas at Eglin AFB were secured, appropriate technical security surveys were conducted and a security guard from the USA Special Forces was posted at the Army component maximum security building and, when required, at the controlled access points to the field training site. A counter-intelligence study was conducted which indicated that no known Communist Party (CP) USA members reside in the ten counties of Florida which surround Eglin AFB and no CP sympathizers or active CP supporters were known to be in the area. Operational data for Eglin AFB and the surrounding area was collected and analyzed. A survey of the field training site, Range C-2, at Eglin AFB was conducted prior to construction of the Son Tay POW training complex by examining the area from the ground and the air, and by checking maps, airline schedules, flying charts, satellite orbiting schedules, local military and civilian traffic habits, and fishing and hunting regulations. All security clearances of new personnel were verified and the files and dossiers reviewed as required. All newly assigned personnel were given a thorough security

briefing and personnel departing the project, either permanently or temporarily, were given a thorough oral debriefing and required to execute a security termination and debriefing certificate.

b. Once actual training began, planned early warning measures for ascertaining unauthorized disclosures and possible espionage activities were initiated. They consisted of the employment of unwitting informants, systematic elicitation of civil population and military personnel, monitoring news media, analysis of intelligence reports, and screening of civilian labor and vendors. Limited counterintelligence support was obtained through liaison with OSI, USA counterintelligence organizations, Security Police, and local civilian authorities. Extensive cover and deception measures were used in the actual construction of the mock-up of the POW camp. Walls of buildings were simulated by the use of panels of target cloth stretched between upright poles. Trees were simulated by tall poles with pennants attached. Some buildings were outlined in two dimensions by stakes and narrow tape. Only portions of the three prison walls were erected, again by using panels of target cloth stretched between upright poles. The field training site containing the prison mock-up was cleared by the Security Guard prior to each training period and the area was secured from outside ground observation continually during use. The Security Staff Section conducted systematic and periodic surveys of the field training site as well as all other working areas and locations for adherence to security requirements and regulations as well as to ascertain security by observation.

c. All operations, ground and air, were observed by the Operations Security Officer to determine if significant intelligence was being revealed by the manner in which training was being accomplished. Patterns of ground activity, aircraft flight composition and tactics, as well as ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, and air-to-air communications were monitored and analyzed to insure that security was being maintained. Personnel from the

USAF Security Service provided continuous radio and telephone monitoring and analyzing services from training through redeployment. The periodic reports submitted by this group assisted the Security Section in assessing the security status of the project and in recommending improved security measures to the COMUSCTG. Weekly training schedules were developed within the context of maximum operations security. Specific actions were taken to maintain the security of JCTG training by monitoring and analyzing pertinent intelligence information and by the application of prompt corrective actions when required. Counterintelligence psychological operations utilizing rumors, timely disclosures of false and/or misleading information, deceptive documents, photographs, maps, charts and diagrams were conducted to insure the security of the training.

d. As the training progressed, elements of the actual mission were disclosed to operating personnel through the use of cover stories and deception so that mission knowledge was systematically developed. This technique contributed significantly to security and integrity while maintaining high morale within the force.

e. On 2 September 1970, the Security Staff Section discovered the possibility of a significant unauthorized disclosure of classified information by a former member of the feasibility study group and the Security Section was directed to conduct a preliminary administrative inquiry which was concluded on 21 September 1970. During this period, the individual suspected of the violation was thoroughly debriefed and personnel suspected of being recipients of the information were located and all determined to be highly responsible military personnel with Top Secret clearances. Through discreet elicitation, they were queried as to the extent of their knowledge of the project and through the disclosure of deceptive information convinced the project was designed for special operations in the Middle East.

3. Theater Coordination. A counterintelligence study was conducted to assess the insurgent threat to the USAF bases in Thailand. It was determined that no hostile threat existed to the bases that were scheduled to be used in Thailand and that no known hostile agents were in the Takhli RTAFB area. A system was established to alert the Security Staff Section if MACTHAI/JUSMAG, Controlled American Source-(CAS) in Bangkok, and/or OSI in Thailand received any information concerning a possible hostile threat to the bases in Thailand. The OSI in Bangkok was requested to provide technical security surveys at the appropriate sites at Takhli RTAFB and Udorn RTAFB. Secured facilities at Takhli RTAFB were obtained to billet and brief operational personnel.

4. Deployment:

a. In the period immediately preceding and during deployment, the Security Staff Section increased their security and counterintelligence measures and psychological operations. A credible cover story was developed to show the force moving to Norton AFB for an advanced phase of mobility training, testing, and evaluation. This cover story was utilized to prevent espionage or sabotage from interfering with the movement of the force to Takhli RTAFB, to insure the element of surprise, and to deny information regarding the movement, its purpose, implications and organization. The Security Staff Section also acted in an advisory capacity in the preparation of the deployment schedule. The section conducted surveys and inspections, recommended measures for maximum secrecy, and provided instructions to unit personnel concerning movement security. The section observed the move to prevent, report, and investigate security violations and other security threats, and to initiate corrective action.

b. The following additional movement security measures were implemented:

(1) False information was disseminated designed to deceive or mislead as to the actual intentions of the move.

(2) Identifying marks and insignia were removed from clothing and equipment.

(3) Surveillance of areas and facilities which personnel frequented during off-duty hours was increased.

(4) Material and equipment was crated, covered, and guarded to conceal identity and provide protection from unauthorized disclosure.

(5) Physical security hazards at Takhli RTAFB and Udorn RTAFB, Thailand, were evaluated.

(6) Curfew hours and restrictions were established.

(7) Security guards were posted at aircraft containing classified equipment and loading areas.

(8) Departed areas were examined to insure no information of intelligence value had been left behind which might disclose the destination, identity, and mission of the force.

(9) A stay-behind support group occupied the facilities formerly used by the operational force and continued deception activities utilizing telephone and radio communications and personnel movement. Joint Army and Air Force training continued but on a reduced scale.

c. Upon departure from Norton AFB, another cover story was developed to indicate the force was continuing mobility training to test and evaluate human fatigue factors in relocating to SEA. This cover story was disseminated during debarkation at Elmendorf AFB and at Takhli RTAFB.

d. All military personnel participating in the mission and Thai nationals at Takhli RTAFB and Udorn RTAFB were given appropriate cover stories or security briefings.

e. A technical security survey was conducted at Takhli RTAFB and Udorn RTAFB and secure working areas were established and maintained. Counterintelligence inspections were conducted to insure that all personnel were practicing the highest degree of security.

5. Employment. During employment of the force, the Security Staff Section continued to maintain the secure working areas at Takhli RTAFB and Udorn RTAFB to insure that all personnel practiced the highest degree of safeguarding classified information and material, particularly in handling, transmitting, storage and destruction. Strict radio silence was maintained during refueling and ingress, and electromagnetic emission control procedures were practiced throughout the mission.

6. Redeployment. During this phase of the operation, the Security Staff Section continued to implement the established security procedures developed during the planning phase. Pertinent movement security measures were again used. Security briefings were given to the aircrews flying redeployment missions and actions taken to prevent unauthorized press releases.





7. Post Operational Activities:



a. All JCTG personnel were given a thorough oral debriefing and subsequently executed a security termination and debriefing certificate. Secure working areas at Eglin AFB were established as necessary for the post operational activities. Additional civilian administrative personnel were obtained for the preparation of the after action report. Security clearances of these civilians were verified and they were given security briefings and debriefings upon conclusion of their participation in the operation. The Security Staff Section continued to implement safeguarding procedures for classified information and material developed during the operation, and to advise the JCTG staff personnel in classification management.



b. The Security Staff Section was directly responsible for the planned and systematic establishment and maintenance of the maximum secrecy of the operation. This accomplishment was a significant contribution to a successful mission, which was carried out with complete surprise and resulted in the safe return of all air and ground personnel.




SON TAY











DIRTY BIRD ANNEX



PHO PHAM HONG THAI STREET

DIRTY BIRD ANNEX




PHO PHAM HONG THAI STREET





ROCKPILE



RED RIVER

GRAND CANAL

Red River
Road and railroad

HANOI (HANOI)

HANOI

20

30

28

26

24

22

24

APPROXIMATE

Nhai Tan
Hue Dinh
X. Thuan
Quang Bac

Quan La So
Thung Hoa
X. Mau
Tay Ho
Nghi Tam
X. Cong

Trich Sai
Vong Thi
Ho Khau
Yen Phu
LAC

Thuy Khue
Dai Yen
Kim Mo
X. Thuan
Cong Vi
Thuan

Thinh Hoa
Hoang Cau
Thinh Quang
Nhuoc Cong
Nam Dong

Thinh Quang
Thai Ha Ap
Khung Thuan
Cu Lac

Ho Dinh
Khoang Dinh Ha
Phuong Liet

Khung Dinh
Dinh Cong Thuan
Dinh
Giap Bai

Van Phuc
Xuan Trach
Som Bai
Thuong Thon

Trung Thon
Ho Thon
Dong Ngan
Co Xa

Bong Lai
MI Instal
Thuong Tri

Co Xa
Phuc Than

Van Ho
Van Ho

Thanh Nhan
Luong Yen
Quinh Lo

Thuan Dong
Mai
Hoang Mai

Thuan Dong
X. Ban Lu
Tan Khai

Lai Bo Trai
Lang

Thung Cai
Gia Thuan
Mil Instal

Gia Quat Thuan
Gia Odat Ha
X. Pao
Yen Tan

Phu Vien

Lam Du
Thach Cau

Dong Nhan
Lang Yen
Lac Trung

Mil Instal
Quinh Loi
Giap Tu

Mal Dong
Thuan Dong
X. Ban Lu
Tan Khai

Thi Thon
Dong Tru

Thung Cai

Gia Lam Thuy
Phu


Ngoc Lam
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Dinh Tu

Vinh Tuy

Mil Instal
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Dau Thon
Thanh Tri

Dong Phu
Nam Du Thuan




ROCKPILE

HANOI HILTON







ZOO



CAMP FAITH



PLANTATION



BRIARPATCH





ALCATRAZ

PLANTATION



ALCATRAZ




DOGPATCH


FARNSWORTH



MOUNTAIN COUNTRY







SON TAY POW CAMP
(POST-ASSAULT)

BRIDGE INTACT

ROOF DAMAGE

HELICOPTER
AFT SECTION

BURNED OUT
GUARD QTRS

MAIN ROTAR BLADE

PERSONNEL

ADMIN/QTRS BLDG

ROOF DAMAGE


LZ


LZ

BLOWN POWER POLE

TRANS STATION

AERIAL VIEW SON TAY POW CAMP, 2 NOV 70








NOTE: THIS IS AN UNCONTROLLED AREA. DISTANCES
AND BOUNDARIES SHOULD BE PRECISELY MEASURED




NAUTICAL MILES
AVERAGE SCALE 1:12,000











BRIDGE

This is a high-contrast, black and white aerial photograph of the Son Tay POW Camp and its surroundings. The image shows a complex network of roads, buildings, and a river. A prominent road runs vertically through the center, with several bridges crossing it. The Son Tay POW Camp is located in the upper right quadrant, and the Son Tay City is visible in the lower right. A secondary school and light industry are also labeled. A small inset box in the upper left shows a magnified view of a specific area. The overall scene is a detailed map of a military installation and its urban environment.

SON TAY POW CAMP
(POST-ASSAULT)

PHOTO #1

SON TAY POW CAMP


SON TAY CITY

U/I LIGHT INDUSTRY

SECONDARY SCHOOL


FOOT BRIDGE
























COMPOUND











AERIAL VIEW SON TAY POW CAMP, JUN 70



