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HISTORY OF THE
JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF

SIOP-4 H/I, July 1970 - June 1971

(Unclassified Title)

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6 January 1972

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FOREWORD

This is the ninth history of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) since its establishment on 16 August 1960. It covers the period of July 1970 through June 1971, for Revisions H and I of SIOP-4. It has been prepared in accordance with Joint Administrative Instruction 210-1, 15 March 1967.

The classification of Top Secret/Restricted Data/Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals/Group 1 is assigned to conform with the classification of the source documents.

This history was prepared for the JSTPS by Miss M. E. Hayes, of the Strategic Air Command Historical Staff.



F. H. MICHAELIS
Vice Admiral, USN
Deputy Director

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Introduction

(TS) (Gp 1) The Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) was formed in 1960 to select targets for attack in event of nuclear war and to prepare a plan for use of committed forces of the unified and specified commands on those targets. These requirements involved preparation of the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Guidance for preparation of these documents came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP).¹

(TS) (Gp 1) The JSTPS was also responsible for preparation of the Coordinated Reconnaissance Plan (CRP) for use of committed reconnaissance forces to determine strike results in the trans- and post-SIOP periods. This required compilation of the National Strategic Reconnaissance List (NSRL) which identified locations that would require coverage to determine damage assessment and a Coverage Summary integrating command reconnaissance plans.

(U) This history covers preparation of SIOP-4 and CRP-4, Revisions H and I, which were in effect during Fiscal Year 1971 (FY-71).

SIOP Preparation

Review of the NSTAP

(TS) (Gp 1) In November 1970 the JCS asked for a review of the

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NSTAP "Guidance for the Preparation of the SIOP," that had been written in 1964 and revised in 1969. This was considered necessary since the use of nuclear forces in strategic attacks was under scrutiny which was expected to continue, and to increase in intensity.²

(TS) (Gp 1) Two changes were recommended by JSTPS. One concerned Appendix A which established the aims of the SIOP, and where the name of a United States Navy (USN) missile "Polaris" was used rather than the more descriptive term "submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM)." Since a second USN missile, "Poseidon," had been added to the weapon inventory for use in SIOP planning, it was suggested that the word Polaris be dropped, and the term SLBM, or FBM (fleet ballistic missile) be substituted.

(TS) (Gp 1) The other suggested change called for deletion of Appendix B which defined nuclear damage criteria. This information was out of date, having been superseded by new definitions prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1967,³ approved by the JCS, and in use since that time.⁴

(TS) (Gp 1) Four other changes were considered by JSTPS, but after staff discussions were not submitted to JCS. One was for inclusion of "deterrence" as a major objective of the SIOP by revision of the following paragraph:⁵

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(S) (Gp 1) US plans for nuclear offensive operations in the event of SIOP execution will be designated to achieve [in concert with other US and allied offensive and defensive operations, the objective of defeating the Soviet Union alone or in combination [REDACTED] . . . as required to terminate hostilities on terms advantageous to the United States. TS

to: 6

(TS) (Gp 1) The primary objective in nuclear war planning is to support the national objective of deterrence. If deterrence fails the objective is to defeat the Soviet Union alone or in combination . . . as required to terminate . . . advantageous to the U.S.

However, since the SIOP was a capabilities rather than an objectives plan, inclusion of deterrence as an objective was considered inappropriate in this paragraph. 7

(TS) (Gp 1) Another change considered was in the same paragraph as above: that of adding [another targeting category. This would consist of [REDACTED] S


[REDACTED] This was not included in the recommendations to JCS as the staff felt that such [targets should be in contingency plans since strikes against them would attain only limited objectives. 9 S

(TS) (Gp 1) The third change recommended an adjustment in one of the three SIOP tasks. These tasks were: 10

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4 However, this was not recommended to JCS since SIOP weight of effort against defenses was explained in briefings, and, in addition, it was unlikely that execution of a "defenses only" plan would be required. 12

(TS) (Gp 1) 2 The last suggestion considered was to change a sentence in the NSTAP from: 3



to read: 14




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The reason for this proposal was to identify




Planning Manual Changes

(TS) (Gp 1) A planning manual was prepared for each revision of the SIOP and contained procedures and pertinent planning factors. It was prepared by the JSTPS in conjunction with representatives of the unified and specified commands who participated in preparation of the SIOP. The major changes for both Revisions H and I were in the section on computing the probability of arrival of nuclear weapons on target, as part of the chapter on SIOP planning factors.

(TS) (Gp 1) In Revision H a method of computation was included



By late 1970 the Soviets were credited with early warning and limited airborne control of intercepts at high altitude in two orbits in the Barents and Baltic Sea areas in the north, and one orbit in the Black Sea area in the south. ¹⁸ Also included in Revision H were



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~~(TS)~~ (Gp 1) For Revision I the title of the section ["penetration probability" was changed to "penetration analysis,"] and was expanded from brief paragraphs describing development [of attrition curves to inclusion of mathematical formulae for development of factors such as the probabilities of enemy defenses destroying arriving weapons through ABM, anti-aircraft fire (AAA), and use of fighters. This was ". . . accomplished by quantifying components of enemy defense systems, developing equations and tables, then computerizing these components for speed and mathematical accuracy."] 20

~~(TS)~~ (Gp 1) Pre-launch survivability (PLS), weapon system reliability (WSR), and weapon system accuracy mathematical factors were submitted by the commands to the JCS who adjusted and/or approved them for use by JSTPS. These factors were published in the planning manual.

~~(TS)~~ (Gp 1) PLS was the probability that a delivery vehicle would survive an enemy attack under established conditions of warning. The only major change made was in the estimate of the survivability of the

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surface-to-surface guided missile, Pershing, located in the European theater. The survivability factor [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] from Revision G to H, in event of retaliation; under preemption tactics it [REDACTED]. A table of factors used for SIOP preparation may be found in Appendix A, this history. ²¹


(TS) (Gp 1) WSR, the probability that an aircraft could deliver a weapon, and a missile a warhead, with detonation as planned, was based on the reliability of the delivery vehicle and the weapon/warhead system, excluding effects of enemy action. The major changes were increases for various types of missiles: the Minuteman B and F, the Pershing, and the AGM-28 (Hound Dog). A compilation of the data from the planning manuals may be found in Appendix B. ²²

(TS) (Gp 1) Accuracy was measured as the circular error probable (CEP), which was the radius of a circle in nautical miles whose center was the desired ground zero (DGZ), and within which 50 percent of the weapon detonations could be expected to occur. The CEPs for three land-based missiles improved: The Titan II, Minuteman B and F, as may be seen in the data included in Appendix C. ²³

(TS) (Gp 1) The changes for Revision H also included, in Chapter 4, "Target Development," the addition [REDACTED]


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(TS) (Gp 1) In Chapter 6, "Development of the Operational Concept," the force generation levels [for SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe)] were changed for Revision I. They are shown in a table at the top of the following page. Another [SACEUR change, in the same chapter, was to




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(~~T~~S) (Gp 1)

TABLE 1 ²⁵

FORCE GENERATION LEVELS, SACEUR
Revisions H, 1



DGZs and Available Weapons

(~~T~~S) (Gp 1) Preparation of the NSTL began with inspection of DIA's Target Data Inventory (TDI) which provided standardized target data in support of the requirements of the JCS and the unified and specified commands. From the TDI the National Strategic Target Data Base (NSTDB) and the National Strategic DGZ List (NSDL) were developed. The NSDL formed the basis for development of pre-planned

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damage expectancy and application of available forces, leading to the end product, the NSTL, which was published as Annex C to the SIOP. It was "a listing of all installations which may require

attack in the execution of the SIOP, DGZ's to which these installations are objective, weapon assignments to these DGZs, and finally, the damage expectancy against each of the installations."²⁷

(TS) (Gp 1) The targets in the NSTDB were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The DGZs were grouped into the ALPHA, BRAVO, and CHARLIE tasks defined on page 4.

(TS) (Gp 1) The number of DGZs [REDACTED] during FY 71,

[REDACTED] as may be seen in the table on the following page.

Primarily this reflected the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] For example, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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
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TABLE 2³⁰

SIOP PREPARATION
DGZs, Available Vehicles, Weapons
Revisions, G, H, I

Category	Revision			Change
	G	H	I	



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(TS) (Gp 1) A change to the TDI proposed by JSTPS in FY-70 became a reality in FY-71.²⁹ This was identifying launch control facilities for missiles by their own encyclopedia numbers instead of using the letter "C" or "E" after the target category number, and was required for weapons application and damage assessment. The original request to DLA for these had been refused since all commands did not approve such a change. However, JSTPS considered this item of sufficient importance to pursue it further, and provided additional rationale which convinced all concerned commands that the change was necessary. After the concurrence of all commands was received, launch control facilities were given their own identity numbers before the end of FY-71.³¹

(S) (Gp 1) In the spring of 1971 personnel from JSTPS visited the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (ACIC), St. Louis, Missouri, to discuss the requirement for ~~graphic coordinates for~~ ~~the NSTDB~~.³² These were required for preparation of missile target data for the newly introduced multiple reentry vehicles of the Air Force's Minuteman G and the Navy's Poseidon missiles. Involved were approximately 15,000 entries in the NSTDB, with an estimated net growth of about 170 entries and as many as 130 changes per month.³³ As this would necessarily be a

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long term project, JSTPS agreed to furnish ACIC with priorities for specific sets of coordinates. This would insure that JSTPS would receive geodetic information at the earliest possible times on installations being considered for SIOP coverage.³⁴

(TS) (Gp 1) A change to the NSTDB/NSDL was requested by the SACEUR representative to the JSTPS in April 1970 when a list of [REDACTED] was submitted for inclusion in those documents.

The reason for this request was to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and explained to the JCS that doing so would establish a precedent in handling non-SIOP targeting requests.³⁵ USCINCEUR (United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe) explained to the JCS the problems encountered by SACEUR in coordinating their General Strike Plan (GSP)* with the SIOP, and JCS asked JSTPS to reassess its position.³⁶ Then, in July members of JSTPS' Targets Branch met with personnel from JCS' Operations Directorate to discuss the matter.

* (U) The GSP and TSP of SACEUR are defined in Appendix J.

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further. At that time [redacted] were considered. It was found that while [redacted] already in the NSTDB, the remaining [redacted] did not qualify for inclusion as [redacted]


(TS) (Gp 1) Although the DGZs had [redacted]

[redacted] outside the

SIOP, and budgetary cuts reduced the numbers of both carrier and land based aircraft. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) lost B-52s, but the introduction of the FB-111A into their inventory during Revision H provided some relief. The A-7E was added to the resources in both the Pacific and Atlantic areas in Revision I. Also in the Pacific area the loss in forces was partially offset by increasing the number of CINCPAC dual carriage aircraft.] Another gain was through introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) for missiles.

The [redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~Damage Expectancy

(TS) (Gp 1) The results of application of SIOP weapons to targets were expressed in percentage as damage expectancy, and were developed as a product of the probability of arrival of the weapon and the probability of damage to the target.³⁹ As may be seen in Table 3 on the following page, there were increases in several target categories for damage, primarily as the result of improvement in missile reliability and accuracy.

Vulnerability of Missile Launch Facilities

(TS) (Gp 1) The DIA supplied vulnerability numbers, i. e., index numbers indicating hardness, for SIOP targets. These were used when determining the degree of damage that could be accomplished by the various weapons. In estimating the results the terms severe, moderate, and short term were used.

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(TS)

TABLE 3⁴⁰

PER CENT DAMAGE EXPECTANCY
SIOP-4, Revision G to I

Target	ALERT SIOP				Total SIOP			
	Preemp		Retal		Preemp		Retal	
	G	I	G	I	G	I	G	I



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\$ [REDACTED]

This latter category had been introduced early in 1970, ⁴¹ and study for its application on missile launch facilities continued into FY-71.

(TS) (Gp 1) The JSTPS' Scientific Advisory Group (SAG) was asked to consider this subject on the basis of two-pronged attacks on missile sites, and to identify missile and silo features that were susceptible to nuclear effects for further study. In those targeting actions the

ICBM/MIRV,

\$ [REDACTED]

(TS) (Gp 1) The Group felt that such

\$ [REDACTED]

The DIA representative briefed the SAG on their studies which had included surveys of missile structures, techniques of missile installation, silo structures, and command control areas. They felt

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[redacted] were the most promising area for future study, but that they had not yet found specific items that could be considered for evaluation under the short term damage concept. ⁴³

(S) (Gp 3) In addition to the above, the JSTPS later asked DIA to also consider [redacted]

[redacted]

(S) (Gp 3) The method of preparing [vulnerability numbers for short term damage had not yet been determined] by the end of FY-71, as it was considered that there was not sufficient data to construct them. ⁴⁵

[Constraints] ^c

(TS) (Gp 1) The JCS had established limits on [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

Anticipated dosages are listed in Appendices E and F, and the locations of monitoring areas are listed on the map on the following page. At only [REDACTED] was the anticipated dosage above the JCS approved limit. This was the result of targeting requirements against [REDACTED]⁴⁷

(TS) (Gp 1) Fall-out shielding factors were determined by JSTPS based on geographical and construction factors of the monitoring points, for use in determining dosages. It was submitted to the JCS for approval and published by them in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).⁴⁸

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as may be seen in the map on the following page.⁴⁹

Consequences of Execution

(TS) (Gp 1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SHIELDING FACTORS, STOP-4, REVISIONS G, H/I

MAP

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
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(TS) (Gp 1) If the Soviets attacked the United States with 20 percent of their effort against the cities and 80 percent against military targets, it was estimated that 130 million fatalities would result with 63 percent damage to the economic worth, in Revision I. 51

Coordinated Reconnaissance Plan


(TS) (Gp 1)




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(28)

TABLE 4⁵⁶

COMBATED RECONNAISSANCE FORCES
Revisions G, H, I



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(TS) (Gp 1) The JSTPS was asked by JCS to assist in preparation of data for use at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). In one request the JCS asked that a representative visit the joint staff to discuss studies on assessment of strategic force levels and to participate in analysis of strike capability under the SAL proposals being considered in the third phase of the talks.*⁵⁷ Vice Admiral F. H. Michaelis, Deputy Director, JSTPS, then met with JCS representatives from the Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) and the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency (SAGA) in early November. It was decided that SAGA would carry out war gaming of the proposed force, and that JSTPS personnel would be available as consultants.⁵⁸

Another request was for data on bomber penetration and the degradation following Soviet introduction of airborne warning and control.

S In this case, the JSTPS furnished the penetration values and discussed AWAC effects, stating that countermeasures against the control system were developed by the commands concerned in placing weapons in those areas.⁵⁹

* (U) The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were between the Soviet Union and the United States. Meetings have been held in Helsinki, Finland, and Vienna, Austria: 17 November - 22 December 1969, Helsinki; 16 Apr - 4 August 1970 - Vienna; 2 November - 18 December 1970, Helsinki; the fourth session started 15 March 1971 and had not ended by the closing date of this history, i. e. 30 June 1971.

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(TS-NOFORN) (Gp 1) The first of these two items was cited by General Bruce K. Holloway, Director, JSTPS, when commenting on JCS requests to advise on force structure. Reference was also made to another message from JCS asking for comments on Polaris assignments to the Pacific area.⁶⁰ He stated that "questions of this type should be referred to the services and the CINCS (commanders-in-chief) who provide these forces. My task is to build an optimum war plan using nuclear forces committed by the individual CINCs." General Holloway said he felt that the effectiveness of the JSTPS over the years had been possible because it had operated within its charter, and had not become involved in force discussions.⁶¹

War Gaming

(S) (Gp 1) A major war gaming analysis was made of the SIOP to examine the ability of Revision I to achieve JCS objectives and the circumstances to which the plan is most sensitive. Approximately 30 scenarios were postulated concerning possible SIOP execution options coupled with variations in the hypothetical, JCS produced, Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan (RISOP). All scenarios were played through a large-scale, detailed computer war game model which simulated the execution of each sortie and weapon contained in the

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opposing plans. The simulation results and analysis were presented in a comprehensive briefing to the JCS, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC beginning in June 1971.

(S) (8) (Gp 1) Several highly technical [nuclear engagement effects models were used to study, among other things, the details of radar degradation phenomena, dust fratricide, and ballistic missile defense effectiveness.]

(U) JCS asked JSTPS to furnish information on war gaming and related computer use. The data was needed by the General Accounting Office for use by the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations.*⁶²

(U) JSTPS replied that SIOP war gaming was done by their SIOP Simulation and Analysis Branch in conjunction with the Strategic Air Command's Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, using International Business Machine 7090, 1460, and 7094 computers. The first of

* (U) War gaming was defined in the JCS message as "a simulation, through use of automatic data processing equipment, that may or may not include interruption for human decision-making, or a military operation involving two or more opposing forces engaged in conflict which is conducted using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life battle situation without paying real world penalties."

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these was used on an average of 1450 hours; the second, an average of 850 hours, while the third was used occasionally, in the development, testing and production of a typical war game.⁶³

Scientific Advisory Group Meetings

(TS) (Gp 1) The Scientific Advisory Group (SAG), which had been formed in 1968, held three meetings in FY-71. Subjects considered at those meetings were as follows:⁶⁴

Ninth Meeting, 12-13 October 1970: (1) Short Term Damage; (2) SA-5 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Capability.

Tenth Meeting, 24-25 February 1971: (1) Soviet Firing Doctrine (ICBM and SLBM); (2) High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse Effects; (3) SA-5 Anti-Ballistic Missile Capabilities.

Eleventh Meeting, 9-11 June 1971: Evaluation of Vulnerabilities of Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Systems to leak, saturation, and/or exhaustion; (2) SA-2 ABM capabilities; (3) Command Control Communications Computer Codes.

Organization and Personnel

(U) The basic organizational structure of the JSTPS consisted of the Director, Deputy Director, four Senior Service members, a Secretariat, and two divisions (National Strategic Target List Division and Single Integrated Operational Plan Division). In addition, there were liaison representatives from CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCSAC, SACLANT, and SACEUR, including officers from four European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. An organization chart

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
of the JSTPS may be found on the following page.

(C) (Gp 3) Organizational changes for FY-71 consisted of the forming of the Integral Analysis Branch and the Computer Programs Branch under the NSTL Division. The first of these had the function of developing, maintaining, and publishing analytical studies associated with SIOP Preplanned Damage Expectancy and SIOP force penetration. The second was to develop and maintain computer programs and data for compilation of the NSTL, NSDL, NSRL, and SIOP Analysis Summary tables and to perform other computer work as required. This Branch had three sections: Data Base, Damage Analysis and Operations.⁶⁵

(C) (Gp 3) The JCS manpower survey team that worked with the JSTPS on the above reorganization also recommended deletion of the senior service member positions, with two related administrative spaces. This was to be offset by establishment of a position for a chief of staff, with an executive officer and secretary. JSTPS did not concur with this as it considered essential the retention of the service members as service oriented advisors for JSTPS and service connected matters. It was not felt that the chief of staff position was required as it would be but another layer of command between the two division chiefs and the director/deputy director. The JCS agreed with JSTPS

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CHA 1 JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF



1 July 1970

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and did not approve the change.⁶⁶

(S) (Gp 3) Manpower authorizations increased by 32, from 292 in FY-70 to 324 in FY-71. Allocation of personnel among the various services changed as may be seen in the table at the top of the following page.⁶⁷

(U) The reduction from 12 to 6 "no service specified" positions will be seen in the table. Those authorizations had been established by JCS guidance in 1961 in the NSTL Division to provide for placing the best qualified individuals in positions at division, branch and section supervisory levels. At the time of this survey it was considered that the section supervisors should be eliminated from this category as it would ease Service programming problems and insure availability of qualified programmed replacements on a timely basis.⁶⁸

(U) The Manpower Survey Team also reviewed the "dual status" designation which applied to SAC personnel who performed additional duty with the JSTPS, and recommended that the next manpower survey of JSTPS be augmented by appropriate simultaneous Air Force addressal of SAC manning in support of JSTPS.⁶⁹

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(U) TABLE 5 ⁶⁷			
JSTPS PERSONNEL CHANGES, FY-71			
Service	Rev G	Revs H/I	Change
Air Force			
Single Status	70	79	+ 9
Dual Status	134	157	+23
Army	19	22	+ 3
Marine	3	4	+ 1
Navy	54	56	+ 2
No Service Specified	12	6	- 6
Total	292	324	+32
Officers	194	219	+25
Enlisted	73	80	+ 7
Civilians	25	25	0

(TS) (Gp 1) When the JCS reviewed the manpower survey they recognized the expanding manpower requirements to support targeting activities associated with the Minuteman G and the Poseidon missiles that had been introduced in SIOP-4, Revision H and I, respectively. Thus, they stated that this could "result in a continuing need, not fully defined at present, for additional personnel in future years."⁷⁰


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(U) General Bruce K. Holloway remained as Director, JSTPS, and Vice Admiral F. H. Michaelis, as Deputy Director. However, there were four key personnel changes. Capt. E. R. Barrett, US Navy Senior Service Member, was replaced by Capt. W. M. Adams, Jr., in September 1970. Three of the five commands changed liaison officers. CINCPAC's Capt. C. K. Ruiz, USN, was replaced by Capt. L. B. Lampman; CINCSAC's Maj Gen. S. F. Martin, USAF left and Maj. Gen. P. N. Bacalis, USAF, replaced him; and SACEUR's Brig. Gen. J. Myers, USAF, was replaced by Brig. Gen. D. L. Carter. A roster of key personnel is included as Appendix H.

Summary

(TS) (Gp 1) The number of delivery vehicles and weapons committed to SIOP-4, Revisions H and I, decreased. This resulted primarily from two causes:



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(TS) (Gp 1) Damage expectancy percentages improved slightly with increased reliability and accuracy of missiles. The study of short term damage continued but sufficient data to construct vulnerability numbers was not available.



(TS) (Gp 1)



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GLOSSARY

AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACIC	Aeronautical Chart and Information Center
CEP	Circular Error Probable
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCEUR	Commander-in-Chief, Europe
CINCLANT	Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CINCSAC	Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command
CRP	Coordinated Reconnaissance Plan
DGZ	Desired Ground Zero
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
FBM	Fleet Ballistic Missile
FY	Fiscal Year
GSP	General Strike Plan
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSTPS	Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle
NSDL	National Strategic DGZ List
NSRL	National Strategic Reconnaissance List
NSTAP	National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy
NSTDB	National Strategic Target Data Base
NSTL	National Strategic Target List
PLS	Pre-Launch Survivability
PSP	Priority Strike Program
RAP	Route Assessment Program
RISOP	Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan

SAC Strategic Air Command
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAG Scientific Advisory Group
SAGA Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency
SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SSBN Submarine Ballistic Missile Nuclear Powered

TDI Target Data Inventory
TSP Tactical Strike Program

USCINCEUR United States Commander in Chief, Europe
USN United States Navy

WSR Weapon System Reliability

NOTES

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- 8 Memo (TS), Vice Adm. F. H. Michaelis, JSTPS to JP, JL, "Review of NSTAP (U)," 16 Nov 70 (70-J-1985).
- 9 Memo (TS), Maj. Gen. W. R. MacDonald, JSTPS (NSTL), Brig. Gen. Robert E. Huyser, JSTPS (SIOP), to JDD, "Review of NSTAP (U)," 24 Nov 70 (70-J-2022).
- 10 Memo (TS), Capt. J. E. Mansfield to C/S Army, et al, "Guidance for the Preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) (U)," 5 Dec 64 (70-J-0771).

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- 23 Doc (TS-NF-FRD), JSTPS, "Planning Manual for SIOP 4G (U)," 1 Dec 69 (69-B-2503), p. 32; doc (TS-NF-FRD), JSTPS, "Planning Manual for SIOP 4H (U)," 1 Jun 70 (70-B-0982), p. 34; doc (TS-NF-FRD), JSTPS, "Planning Manual for SIOP 4I (U)," 1 Dec 70 (70-B-2510), p. 40.
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- 31 Memo (TS), Maj. Gen. W. R. MacDonald, JSTPS (JLTD) to SAC (IN), "ICBM Launch Control Facilities (U)," 22 Oct 70 (70-J-1841); msg (TS), Brig. Gen. H. Cordes, SAC (IN) to DIA, "ICBM Launch Control Facilities (U)," 03/2125Z Nov 70 (70-B-2511).
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
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PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY
Revisions G, H, I

Weapon System	Revision					
	Preemption			Retaliation		
	G	H	I	G	H	I



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Weapon System	Revision		
	G	H	I

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MISSILE WEAPON SYSTEM ACCURACY
Circular Error Probable (CEP)
SIOP-4, Revisions G, H, I

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System	Revisions		
	G	H	I

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ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF
 OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE
 NEBRASKA
 68113

REF ID: A67121

6 JUL 1970

JP

MEMORANDUM FOR: JS

SUBJECT: Information for the SAC Historian to use in preparation of the SIOP-4 History (U)

REFERENCE: JS Memo, 20 Apr 70, Subject as above

(TS) In accordance with paragraph one, referenced message, the following information is submitted.

1. (TS) DELIVERY VEHICLES.

	<u>ALERT</u>	<u>NON-ALERT</u>	<u>TOTAL VEH</u>
[REDACTED]			

2. (TS) WEAPONS.

	<u>ALERT</u>	<u>NON-ALERT</u>	<u>TOTAL WENS</u>	<u>TOTAL MT</u>
[REDACTED]				

7

John E Ford
JOHN E. FORD
 CAPTAIN, USN

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APPENDIX 2

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE
NEBRASKA
68113

REVISIO 2

JP

19 JAN 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: JS

SUBJECT: Information for the SAC Historian to Use in Preparation of the SIOP-4 History (U)

REFERENCE: JS Memo, 5 Jan 71, subject as above

(TS) (U) In accordance with paragraph two, referenced memo, the following information is submitted.

a. (TS) <u>Delivery Vehicles.</u>	<u>ALERT</u>	<u>NON-ALERT</u>	<u>TOTAL VEH</u>

b. (TS) <u>Weapons.</u>	<u>ALERT</u>	<u>NON-ALERT</u>	<u>TOTAL WPNS</u>	<u>TOTAL MT</u>

Richard H. Mills

RICHARD H. MILLS
Captain, USN

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APPENDIX "E"

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE
NEBRASKA
68113

REVISION 3

SEP 9 1970

JL

MEMORANDUM FOR: JS

SUBJECT: Information for the SAC Historian to
Use in Preparation of the SIOP-4
History

REFERENCE: JS Memo 0541 dtd 20 Apr 1970

1. Attachments 1 and 2 are forwarded as requested by reference for use by the SAC Historian.
2. When attachments 1 and 2 are withdrawn this correspondence may be downgraded to Unclassified.

R G Bagby

R. G. BAGBY
Captain, USN
Deputy Chief
NSTL Division

2 Atchs

1. Cy 1 TS DOC, Subj:
SIOP-4H Historical Data
for SAC Historian - Damage
Expectancies (1 Jul 70) (U)
2. Cy 1 TS DOC, Subj:
SIOP-4H History - Constraints
Monitor Points AO-2C-AR (U)

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
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SIOP-4H HISTORICAL DATA FOR SAC HISTORIAN
DAMAGE EXPECTANCIES (1 JULY 1970)

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>ALRT MSLS</u>		<u>ALRT SIOP</u>		<u>TOT SIOP</u>	
	<u>P</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>R</u>




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SIOP-4H HISTORICAL DATA FOR SAC HISTORIAN (Cont'd)

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>ALRT MSLS</u>		<u>ALRT SIOP</u>		<u>TOT SIOP</u>	
	<u>P</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>R</u>



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ATCM 1

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
SIOP REV H

BACK UP DATA

CONSTRAINTS MONITOR POINTS (CONTD)

A0-2C-AR

<u>MONITOR POINT</u>	<u>SIOP LIMIT RADS</u>	<u>EXPECTED SHIELDED DOSE RADS</u>	<u>EXPECTED FATALITIES %</u>	<u>EXPECTED CASUALTIES %</u>
----------------------	------------------------	------------------------------------	------------------------------	------------------------------



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~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

70J 166

Atch 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX 1



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE
NEBRASKA
68113

REVISION I

12 April 1971

JLA

MEMORANDUM FOR: JS

SUBJECT: Information for the SAC Historian to Use in
Preparation of the SIOP-4 History (U)

Reference: JS Memo 238, same subject, dated 2 Apr 71

1. (U) Information requested in reference is forwarded
as attachments 1 and 2.

2. (U) The format of attachment 1 is the same that was
used for constraints input to the Revision G and Revision
H histories. It has been established through informal
coordination with JSM-A, the OPR for Revision I history,
that the format of attachment 1 is acceptable, and that
the format specified in referenced memo is not required.

SL Furthermore, constraints information is only available
for attack against the USSR. It is recommended that
this information be included in the SIOP-4I Historical
Data for SAC Historian Damage Expectancies (U), dtd 5 Apr 71
to specify the
format of attachment 1 to this memorandum.

3. (U) This memorandum may be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
upon removal of attachments 1 and 2.

R. G. Bagby
R. G. BAGBY
CAPTAIN, USN
DEPUTY CHIEF
NSA DIVISION

- 2 Atch
- 1. Cy 1 of TS Document,
Subj: SIOP Rev I Constraints
Info (U), undated
- 2. Cy 1 of TS Document,
Subj: SIOP-4I Historical
Data for SAC Historian Damage
Expectancies (U), dtd 5 Apr 71

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after 13 years

~~TOP SECRET~~

after 13 years

~~TOP SECRET~~

SIOP REV I


CONSTRAINTS INFORMATION (U)

ATTACK OPTION 2C-AR

MONITOR POINT

SIOP
LIMIT
(RADS)

EXPECTED
SHIELDED
DOSE RADS



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ATTACHMENT 1

GROUP-3

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71-5-0681


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APR 5 1971

SIOP-4I HISTORICAL DATA FOR SAC HISTORIAN
DAMAGE EXPECTANCIES (1 JAN 1971) (U)

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>ALERT MSLS</u>		<u>ALERT SIOP</u>		<u>TOT SIOP</u>	
	<u>P</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>R</u>



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71-5-0681

ATCH #2

~~TOP SECRET~~ 71-5-0681 CY1

~~TOP SECRET~~

SIOP 4-I HISTORICAL DATA FOR SAC HISTORIAN (Cont'd)

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>ALERT MSLS</u>		<u>ALERT MSLS</u>		<u>TOT SIOP</u>	
	<u>P</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>R</u>
[REDACTED]						

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71-5-0681

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~~71-5275-63~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~71-5275-63~~

ROSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL, JSTPS
30 June 1971

Organization	Name	Service	Dates	
			From	To
Director	General B. K. Holloway	USAF	1 Aug 68	
Deputy Director	Vice Admiral F. H. Michaelis	USN	1 Sep 69	
NSFL Division	Maj. Gen. William R. MacDonald	USAF	30 Jul 69	
SIOP Division	Brig. Gen. R. E. Huysler	USAF	1 Feb 70	
<u>Senior Service Members</u>				
US Army	Col. C. R. Suplee	USA	29 Jun 69	
US Navy	Capt. E. R. Barrett	USN	12 Jun 69	27 Aug 70
	Capt. W. M. Adams, Jr.	USN	11 Sep 70	
US Air Force	Col. S. G. Desens	USAF	1 Feb 70	
US Marine Corps	Col. W. Biehl, Jr.	USMC	2 Sep 69	
<u>Commands</u>				
CINCLANT	Capt. R. E. Crispin	USN	18 Aug 69	
CINCPAC	Capt. C. K. Ruiz	USN	5 Apr 68	5 Jun 70
	Capt. L. B. Lampman	USN	21 May 70	
CINCSAC	Maj. Gen. S. F. Martin	USAF	26 Jul 63	9 Apr 70
	Maj. Gen. P. A. Bacalis	USAF	9 Apr 70	

Organization	Name	Service	Dates	
			From	To
SACEUR	Brig. Gen. J. Myers	USAF	1 Aug 69	30 Sep 70
	Brig. Gen. D. L. Carter	USAF	15 Sep 70	
SACLANT	Capt. R. E. Crispin	USN	18 Aug 69	
<u>NATO Representatives</u>				
Germany	Col. F. Schroter	Air Force	10 Jan 69	
Italy	Col. Sergio Mazzerelli	Air Force	2 Dec 69	
United Kingdom	Gp. Capt. D. G. L. Heywood	Air Force	8 May 67	Unknown
	Gp. Capt. R. Hampton	Air Force	7 Jan 71	
Belgium	Maj. L. E. Coupez	Air Force	15 Sep 66	Unknown
	Lt. Col. L. V. Peeters	Air Force	3 Apr 70	

~~SECRET~~

COMPUTER INFORMATION FOR THE
SAC HISTORIAN IN PREPARATION OF THE SIOP-4 HISTORY (U)

1. (C) Computers continued to play a very important role in the development and analysis of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), Revisions H and I. The introduction of Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) in the inventory has resulted in an increase in the number of weapons as well as an increase in the number of DGZs required to efficiently utilize these new weapons. New equipment (hardware) was installed as well as new computer programs (software) were developed to provide responsive support in the development of the SIOP.

2. (C) (U) In the area of hardware:

a. (C) The IBM 1410 computer was replaced with a newer, faster, third generation system, the IBM 360/50. As a result, more complex mathematical programs were executed on the system thereby increasing the sophistication and efficiency of the plan. The installation of the new system allowed for an increase in the number of revisions that could be maintained on-line at any one time from two to four. In addition, the greater amount of storage available enabled JLP to implement the previously initiated restructuring of the Weapon/DGZ Files to include the additional fields necessary to support MIRV applications.

b. (U) At the start of Revision I, the IBM 7094 computer was removed from the premises and all processing relegated to the fully operational IBM 360/85. As a consequence, the bulk of the damage analysis processing was transferred to the newer, faster computer system. Increased sophistication in the existing damage assessment computer programs as well as the adaptation of MIRV supporting programs for use in the preplanning, application, and analysis phases of the development of the SIOP were made possible.

OPR: JLP
Date: 17 Aug 71

GROUP-3

Downgraded at 10 year intervals;
Not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

Not automatically declassified.

3. ~~(S)~~ (U) In the area of software:

a. (U) All IBM 1410 and 7094 programs had to be rewritten to efficiently utilize the new systems. At the end of Revision I approximately 75% of this task was completed and work is progressing most satisfactorily. Several old software packages were combined during the rewrite phase to provide more powerful programs, eliminating possible costly duplications and redundancies of automated intelligence output.

b. ~~(C)~~ A new Visual Analysis Sub-System (VASS) program, the Batch Processor, provided JL planners with increased DGZ optimization capabilities. Prior to this only one DGZ at a time could be optimized. Now as many as 74 can be serially processed without analyst intervention.

c. ~~(C)~~ An updated production program, the Compounder, continued to compute related target damage within the SIOP as well as to support studies concerning preplanned damage expectancy. It also was updated to reflect current philosophies of MIRV applications. Its output provides the Force Application Team with increased capabilities in detailed options and alternatives. The program can accommodate any weapon in the inventory.

d. ~~(C)~~ A new Probability of Damage (POD) routine, central to numerous assessment programs (SABER, COBRA, CRUSADER, ADEM, OPTIMIZER), was written and incorporated in the subject programs to reflect the latest changes in the DIA Physical Vulnerability Handbook published in June 1969.

e. ~~(C)~~ A new aiming point selection program (CRUSADER) was developed to reflect a new targeting philosophy. This program was used to develop aiming points for Revision I.

f. ~~(S)~~ Numerous and extensive modifications to SABER, the primary JSTPS assessment model, were required to reflect new methodologies in computing damage required because of the introduction of MIRVs in the weapons inventory.

SACEUR PLANS

(TS) (Gp 1) The mission of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was to deter aggression and preserve or restore the security of Allied Command, Europe.

[REDACTED]

(1) (TS) (Gp 1)

[REDACTED]

(2) (TS) (Gp 1)

[REDACTED]

GROUP 1
EXCLUDE FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION