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SUMMARY STUDY  
OF  
NINE WORLDWIDE CRISES

REGRADED Declassified  
DATE 10 JULY 1998  
AUTHORITY Joint Staff  
REASON: 87-F-2198(A)

Historical Division  
Joint Secretariat  
Joint Chiefs of Staff  
25 September 1973

CLASSIFIED BY SECRET-FY, JCS  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
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	<u>Tab No.</u>
→ Berlin Crisis, 1948-1949	1
→ Berlin Crisis, 1958-1959	2
→ Berlin Crisis, 1961	3
Cuban Missile Crisis, October-November 1962	4
→ Czechoslovakia, 1968	5
Dominican Republic Crisis, 1965	6
→ Hungarian Crisis, October 1956	7
Korea, June 1950	8
- Lebanon Crisis, July 1958	9

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Berlin Crisis, 1948-1949

Question: What overt action was taken to precipitate the "crisis" situation?

Answer: Over a period of time, the Soviet Union took steps to restrict the freedom of access of the Western Powers through East Germany to their occupation sectors in Berlin. The process began in January 1948, when the Soviets limited (and later virtually prohibited) the travel of German nationals from Berlin through the Soviet Zone. On 1 April they demanded that US military personnel and freight be cleared by Soviet officials. On 2 April they requested that the US Aid Station on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn be closed. International train service was suspended on 23 April. On 19 June, one day after the Western Powers had instituted a currency reform throughout their occupation zones in Germany, the Soviets suspended all passenger railroad and road traffic into the eastern zone. Three days later the Western Allies announced their intention to extend the currency reform into the western sectors of Berlin. In reply, the Soviets suspended rail freight and barge traffic and prevented the transmission of electric power into the western sectors. The blockade became complete on 24 June, when the distribution of supplies from the Soviet Zone to the other sectors was forbidden.

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Question: What prior knowledge, if any, did we have that the crisis was pending, developing, and of the forthcoming precipitate act (in terms of time and reliability)?

Answer: The gradual development of the blockade of Berlin provided forewarning of the crisis. As Soviet restrictions increased in severity, the Western Powers discussed the possibility that a total blockade might eventually be imposed; however, there was no specific intelligence forewarning of any of the Soviet steps. On 5 March 1948 General Lucius Clay, commander of US occupation troops, warned Washington that he had noted a "subtle change in Soviet attitude," which led him to fear that war might "come with dramatic suddenness."<sup>2</sup>

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Question: What did we do militarily and diplomatically from the time intelligence of the pending crisis began to develop--through the crisis--to the solution?

Answer: In the early stages of the blockade, US military forces refused to submit to the Soviet demand for inspection as a condition for travel across the eastern zone to Berlin. The Western Powers continued their plans for the organization of their zones of occupation independent of the USSR. On 7 June 1948 the six-power London Conference announced that the Western Allies were proceeding to establish a separate German political entity in their zones; on 18 June, as already noted, the three occupying powers introduced currency reform in their zones and on 23 June extended it to Berlin.<sup>3</sup>

After the blockade became a fact, General Clay on 24 June assigned every available aircraft to carry supplies to Berlin, and two days later President Truman put the airlift on a regular basis. General Bradley ordered four squadrons of C-54 transports to Germany, and the President authorized the deployment of B-29s to Britain and Germany. The President decided that the United States would remain in Berlin and rejected consideration of any alternatives.<sup>4</sup>

The National Security Council considered the Berlin question on 22 July. The members reiterated the President's determination to stay in Berlin "in any event" and approved a substantial enlargement in the airlift.<sup>5</sup>

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The United States, along with Britain and France, made its first attempt to secure a diplomatic settlement of the crisis on 6 July. The three governments offered to negotiate any aspect of the Berlin situation as soon as access was restored. The Soviet Union, in reply, accused the Western Powers of violating agreements regarding Germany; discussion of Berlin could not be separated from the German question as a whole, in the Soviet view, and there must be no preconditions to negotiation. In subsequent meetings of the three Western ambassadors with Stalin, some hope was offered for a peaceful solution, but when the problem passed on to the Allied Control Council it became clear that the Soviets were unwilling to continue negotiations and were pressing for ultimate Western withdrawal from Berlin.

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The United States, United Kingdom, and France together placed the Berlin question before the United Nations in September. The USSR succeeded in preventing the adoption of a Security Council resolution that clearly implied censure of the USSR.

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The Berlin blockade gradually passed out of its crisis stage as the success of the airlift became apparent through the autumn and winter. Air tonnage steadily increased; it became clear the Western Powers could, barring overt Soviet interference continue to supply Berlin indefinitely. Moreover, there was every indication that they intended to do so.

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In January 1949 Premier Stalin hinted that negotiations over Berlin would be a possibility. However, no agreement was reached and the blockade was lifted.

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Question: What military options were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer: [ During the initial formulation of policy to meet the crisis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted as individuals but not as a body. Contingency planning for a possible Soviet attempt to force the Allies from Berlin had been done by the Army (an Army Staff study completed in January 1948 concluded that supply of the city by air alone would be impossible). Following the onset of the blockade, the initial US decision to stay in Berlin at any cost was made by President Truman on political grounds, after he had consulted his military and civilian advisors. In conferences with the British Chiefs of Staff on 30 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with their British colleagues in rejecting any attempt to fight through to Berlin on the ground, owing to the weakness of US and UK forces; however, both sides favored strong measures against any interference with the airlift (such as the use of fighter aircraft to shoot down any balloons put up by the Soviets in the air corridors).<sup>10</sup>

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Shortly after the NSC meeting of 22 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally advised the Secretary of Defense that the airlift could be continued indefinitely, but only at the cost of a serious effect on the nation's war readiness. They warned that any attempt to supply Berlin by armed ground convoy might lead to major war and should be undertaken only with full realization

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views were merely noted by the National Security Council, which had already rendered its decision.<sup>11</sup>

In August 1948, at the suggestion of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consulted the British regarding the possibility of bilateral contingency planning for the use of armed convoys into Berlin. When the British declined even to consider this dangerous alternative, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed USCINCEUR to develop a plan for composite US-UK-French convoys, but not to discuss it with the British and French commanders.<sup>12</sup>

In October 1948, when the National Security Council again considered the problem of Berlin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while recommending an enlargement of the airlift, warned that it was not a permanent solution to the problem and again pressed for an immediate decision on whether or not the United States regarded the Berlin issue as one over which it would be willing to go to war, if necessary. The President and the National Security Council reached no conclusion on this question, however, and continued to rely on an expanded airlift until the blockade was finally lifted.<sup>13</sup>

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Berlin Crisis, 1958-1959

Question: What overt action was taken to precipitate the "crisis" situation?

Answer: On 27 November 1958, the Soviet Union in notes to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France repudiated the World War II agreements on Berlin and demanded negotiations to terminate the four-power occupation of that city. The Soviet Union also proposed that West Berlin become a demilitarized free city and, if the Western powers did not agree, the Soviet Union threatened to turn over its rights in Berlin to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The Soviet Union would proceed with this plan at the end of six months unless favorable developments occurred before that time.<sup>1</sup>

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Question: What prior knowledge, if any, did the United States have that the crisis was pending, developing, and of the forthcoming precipitate act (in terms of time and reliability)?

Answer: The division of Germany and the status of Berlin had troubled US-Soviet relations since 1944, and in the years 1956 through 1958, there were repeated minor incidents of Soviet harassment of Allied access to West Berlin. But, other than this general awareness of the tension with the Soviet Union over Berlin, the United States apparently had no prior knowledge of the Soviet intentions as expressed in the 27 November 1958 note.<sup>2</sup>

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Question: What did the United States do militarily and diplomatically from the time intelligence of the pending crisis began to develop--through the crisis--to the solution?

Answer: The Soviet note of 27 November 1958 created more of a diplomatic crisis than a military one. The United States proceeded at once on the diplomatic front, while military action was restricted primarily to planning for possible contingencies in Berlin. Fortunately, the diplomatic action eased the crisis atmosphere, and there was no need to carry out military plans.

The US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, met with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany on 14 December 1958, the eve of the regular NATO Council meeting, and they jointly issued an unqualified rejection of the Soviet proposals. The three occupying powers, their ministers declared, would not abandon their rights in Berlin nor would they accept the Soviet Union's unilateral repudiation of its obligations. The full NATO Council endorsed this position two days later, adding that the member states could not approve a solution that jeopardized the right of the three Western powers to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities required them to, that did not assure free access to the city, or that failed to resolve the question of Germany as a whole.

The position expressed at the NATO meeting provided the basis for a formal US response to the Soviet note on 31 December 1958. The United States reaffirmed its earlier statement and made the

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the Berlin issue within the framework of negotiations on the broader German problem and European security, but only "in an atmosphere devoid of coercion or threats." Subsequently, the Soviet Union renewed a proposal of long standing for a conference to draft a peace treaty with both Germanies and repeated its insistence that unification was an internal German problem and outside the competence of the occupying powers. However, the Soviet Union suggested that a general peace conference should discuss the Berlin question as well. The latter formula and a Western proposal for a Four-Power Foreign Ministers conference eventually led to such a conference at Geneva beginning on 11 May 1959.

The Geneva foreign ministers conference lasted intermittently until 5 August 1959, but it produced no settlement of the Berlin question. Although the Western powers offered significant concessions, the Soviet Union refused to match them. The Soviets had long maintained that the Berlin problem could only be solved by a meeting of the Heads of Government, and on 3 August 1959, President Eisenhower invited Premier Khrushchev to visit the United States. This visit, which took place during September 1959, did not resolve the Berlin problem, but it did relieve the crisis situation. In discussions at Camp David, President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev agreed that "all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peaceful means through negotiation." Specifically, with regard to Berlin, they agreed to reopen negotiations, airing

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at "a solution which would be in accordance with the interests of all concerned and in the interest of the maintenance of peace." This action in effect removed the threat of a resort to force to resolve the status of Berlin.

To be prepared in the event diplomatic efforts did not solve the Berlin crisis, the United States had also begun military planning with the United Kingdom and France following the receipt of the November 1958 Soviet note. On 11 December 1958, the United States proposed to its two allies that they jointly take certain actions in case East Germany assumed control of the access to Berlin. Neither the United Kingdom nor France agreed to the portion of the proposal that called for the use of military force to reopen surface access before resort to an airlift was considered. In a new approach on 18 February 1959, the United States suggested that the three powers take quiet preparatory and precautionary measures that could be detected by Soviet intelligence but would not cause public alarm; if the Allied efforts to maintain the access routes were obstructed and if more open measures of readiness did not elicit a favorable Soviet response, the three powers should then decide whether to apply greater military pressure by employing additional forces. This proposal was submitted merely as a basis for further planning.

On 4 April 1959, the three powers agreed on a basic policy. The US proposal of 18 February was accepted, and it was further agreed that more elaborate, and hence clearly visible, measures should be planned. These measures would be implemented after the Soviet Union had turned its control functions over to East

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Germany or after Allied traffic had been forcibly obstructed.

Among the specific courses of action for which tripartite plans were to be drafted were an "initial" probe to determine Soviet and East German intentions, economic and other nonmilitary measures appropriate to the occasion, and steps to maintain air access to Berlin.<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile, machinery for tripartite planning was established. On 1 April 1959, the United States with British and French consent authorized USCINCEUR to establish a small three-power planning staff attached to his headquarters. This staff was designated LIVE OAK.<sup>8</sup>

The first LIVE OAK plan was completed on 18 April 1959 and enumerated the "quiet preparatory and precautionary measures" called for in the basic agreement. In the course of the next six weeks, the three allies approved the plan, although the United Kingdom rejected the proposal to appoint a single military commander in Berlin.<sup>9</sup>

The LIVE OAK staff next prepared a plan for the "initial probe of Soviet intentions," outlining three alternative courses of action. In approving this plan, the United Kingdom maintained that a decision to implement the probe and the choice of actions would have to be made by the three powers in light of the situation at the time; likewise, France reserved the right to recommend its choice of the three options at the "appropriate time." On the basis of this qualified approval, the field commanders were directed to proceed with detailed operational planning.<sup>10</sup>

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As a result of the stalemate at the Geneva Conference, the LIVE OAK staff completed on 5 August a study of "more elaborate military measures." This study outlined a wide range of measures, short of nuclear war, that could be employed to improve the readiness of Allied forces, to counteract Soviet pressure, to support general alert measures, to maintain air access to Berlin, and to reopen highway access by the use of Allied ground forces.

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Meantime, the United States had also been preparing unilateral plans for possible action in Berlin. When the Soviet note of 27 November 1958 precipitated the crisis, the United States had already a number of existing unilateral emergency plans for Berlin, and in late 1958 and during 1959, these plans were revised and updated. By the end of July 1959, twelve or thirteen revised versions of older plans or newly drafted plans had been prepared. An Army plan for reopening the highway access to Berlin by the employment of a force ranging in size from an infantry company to a tank-infantry battalion task force was expanded to provide for various additional forces, including an entire armored division. An Air Force plan, issued on 10 April 1959, provided for maintenance of air access to Berlin.

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In addition to the preparation and revision of plans, the United States also took some specific military actions during the Berlin crisis of 1959. It deferred any reduction of US forces in Europe, and on 20 March 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered USCINCEUR to be prepared to accept additional TAC units and to maintain a force of 100,000 troops in Europe.

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[ sea. [ USCINCEUR was also ordered to begin surveillance of Soviet and Egyptian submarine departures from Egypt and Albania and to expedite the dissemination of reports from the fixed surveillance system in the Baltic exits. Precautionary anti-submarine measures were ordered for CINCLANT and increased submarine activities for CINCPAC.] (These orders were subsequently rescinded on 22 April 1959.) On 27 March and again on 15 April, the United States flew round-trip military transport flights to Berlin at high altitudes (over 10,000 feet) to indicate that it did not accept recently advanced Soviet regulations forbidding Western aircraft from flying over East Germany at those altitudes. Both flights were harassed by Soviet planes and protested by the Soviet Union; the United States rejected these protests, but did not conduct further flights of this type, considering that its position had been adequately demonstrated.<sup>13</sup> ]

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Question: What military options were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer: The Berlin crisis of 1958-1959 was primarily political and diplomatic, and the JCS role was largely one of commenting on the military aspects of US positions for diplomatic negotiations and reviewing contingency plans, both combined and unilateral. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did consider various military options. With JCS concurrence, the Acting Secretary of Defense recommended to the Secretary of State on 9 December 1958 that the United States take immediate positive action in view of the Soviet note of 27 November 1958. Among other things, the Acting Secretary proposed: an approach to the United Kingdom and France to revise tripartite contingency plans to eliminate all dealings with GDR officials at highway and railway checkpoints; instruction to US officials not to accept controls on the Berlin access by East German personnel; and obtaining of Presidential approval to test GDR and Soviet intentions, if checkpoints were turned over completely to GDR control, by despatching a convoy supported by appropriate forces.<sup>14</sup>

In response to a request by the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended on 13 January 1959 military preparations, courses of action, and the timing for these actions to demonstrate the firm Allied intention to maintain the right to surface access to Berlin. They proposed a series of actions ]

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to be implemented at monthly intervals in the four months preceding an East German takeover of the control of access to Berlin. These actions were: a tripartite agreement, with West German and other NATO support, for a course of action to maintain Allied access to and in Berlin; readying of US and Allied forces to undertake military actions up to and including general war; gradually increasing military activities in and adjacent to Berlin to demonstrate the Allied determination; gradual initiation of the appropriate degree of military alert and national mobilization; replenishment of the Berlin stockpile; and initiation of a public affairs program to convince Allies, neutrals and Soviet satellites of US determination with respect to Berlin. On 2 February 1959, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted substantially these same options to the Secretary of Defense to answer a Department of State request for a list of actions appropriate to the developing Berlin situation.<sup>15</sup>

On 11 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that the Administration immediately authorize certain additional measures. These included: a deferral of approved reductions in US military strength in Europe; acceleration of training and movement of personnel replacements for the 3d and 4th US Armored Divisions in Europe; immediate reinforcement of USAREUR if it became necessary to shift forces to North Germany in preparation for an attempt to reopen ground access to Berlin; certain naval deployments and the conduct of submarine surveillance operations as

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[well as preparation for anti-submarine operations; preparation to deploy additional tactical air squadrons to Europe; and a major effort to alert the US public to the dangers of the Berlin situation.]<sup>16</sup>

Following the two high-altitude military transport flights to Berlin on 27 March and 15 April 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff twice recommended resumption of such flights in the Berlin air corridor for political reasons as well as for operational necessity. High-altitude flights were not resumed, however--initially, for fear of disrupting the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, and later because of the visit of Premier Khrushchev to the United States.<sup>17</sup>

In response to a Department of State request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late July 1959 again reviewed additional military preparatory measures that might be taken to impress the Soviets with the seriousness of US intentions. The actions proposed, most of which had been previously suggested, included: deployment of additional US tactical air units to Europe; air and/or [naval patrols off the Albanian coast]; routine high-altitude flights in and out of Berlin; [increased air activity along the USSR radar barrier]; provision of replacements for any USAFUR forces moved to North Germany in the event of action to reopen ground access to Berlin; raising of USAREUR combat and logistics elements to full strength, and diplomatic action to arrange US access to foreign ports, staging areas, airfields, and the like.<sup>18</sup>

The United States, as already noted, undertook [tripartite planning (LIVE OAK) with the United Kingdom and France], and the  
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planning (LIVE OAK) with the United Kingdom and France], and the

Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed US positions for this planning and the resulting plans. On 11 March 1959, they commented on the US proposal of 18 February for precautionary planning and suggested certain minor additions. On 22 May 1959, they reviewed the [LIVE OAK plan for an initial probe of Soviet intentions in Berlin. The plan presented three alternatives to test Soviet obstruction of ground access to Berlin: (1) an unarmed test convoy, composed of forces of the three Allies, would attempt highway movement through East Germany to Berlin, but would accept any Soviet obstruction; (2) the same as (1) with the addition of armed forces to demand the removal of any obstruction, but without the use of force; (3) the same as (1) and (2) with positive action to breach any obstruction, but without the use of weapons except in self-defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff found the second and third alternatives acceptable, but considered the first unlikely to elicit a reaction indicative of Soviet intentions. They also recommended that USCINCEUR be designated the overall commander of Allied operations in Berlin. On 31 August 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered a LIVE OAK study of "Berlin Contingency Measures: More Elaborate Military Measures," which they found to be in consonance with US and tripartite policy on Berlin. 19]

During the course of the Geneva Conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted to the Secretary of Defense a new proposal concerning Western access to Berlin. They suggested that the Allies relinquish two of their three air corridors to Berlin in  
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[ exchange for an agreement guaranteeing the Western Powers absolute control of a suitable single surface and air access corridor including related air space. But this proposal was never presented at the Conference.<sup>20</sup>

In July 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also opposed a suggestion by the Department of State that Allied military strength in Berlin be reduced in order to bring about a concession by the USSR and lead to a summit meeting. A minor "symbolic" reduction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, would not significantly affect the capability of the Allied force, but would be morally and psychologically damaging. Moreover, the current force had been carefully tailored to the mission assigned and could not be changed without a commensurate readjustment of mission responsibilities.<sup>21</sup> ]

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Berlin Crisis, 1961

Question: What overt action was taken to precipitate the "crisis" situation?

Answer: On 4 June 1961, Soviet Premier Khrushchev informed President Kennedy that the Soviet Union intended to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany unless the four occupying powers and the two German states could agree on a single treaty within six months. Under the Soviet treaty, Berlin would become a demilitarized free city. Occupation rights deriving from the World War II agreements would end, and access to the free city, while still guaranteed by the signatories of the new treaty, would respect and observe the sovereign rights of East Germany. The Soviet ultimatum sought by a unilateral denunciation of earlier agreements to alter the basic status of Berlin in relation to East Germany. It constituted a serious threat not only to the rights and position of the Western Powers in Berlin, but to the balance of power between the Free World and the Communist Bloc.<sup>1</sup>

The situation took a startling new turn on 13 August 1961. While Soviet divisions surrounded Berlin, East Germany closed the boundary between the Eastern and Western sectors of the city and established rigid controls over transit by inhabitants of East Berlin or East Germany. The evident purpose was to choke off the flood of refugees who had been crossing into West Berlin

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in increasing numbers. Subsequently, the East Germans created an actual physical barrier by throwing up a five-foot wall running most of the 25-mile length of the boundary between East and West Berlin.<sup>2</sup>

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Question: What prior knowledge, if any, did we have that the crisis was pending, developing, and of the forthcoming precipitate act (in terms of time and reliability)?

Answer: The Western control of most of the city of Berlin was a serious, long-standing problem for Communist officials, and changes in the status of Berlin were never far from consideration by either side. On 17 February 1961 the Soviet Ambassador to West Germany broached with Chancellor Adenauer the subject of a separate peace treaty and its allied issues. The Warsaw Pact nations declared in March that it was absolutely necessary to "eliminate the remnants of World War II by concluding a peace treaty with both German states and . . . render harmless the seat of danger in West Berlin by converting it into a demilitarized, free city." Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who had undertaken a study at the request of the President, reported in April that a crisis in Berlin during 1961 was likely. At the end of May East German leader Walter Ulbricht asserted that if the Western Powers did not recognize East Germany and refused to sign a peace treaty with the two Germanies, the East Germans and the Communist Bloc would conclude a separate treaty. Four days later Premier Khrushchev, as already noted, repeated this statement to President Kennedy and in effect converted it into an ultimatum.<sup>3</sup>

Erection of the Berlin wall caught the Western countries by surprise. They had expected that any attempt to implement the

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to Berlin. Moreover, Premier Khrushchev had intimated that no drastic action would be taken before the end of 1961.<sup>4</sup>

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Question: What did we do militarily and diplomatically from the time intelligence of the pending crisis began to develop--through the crisis--to the solution?

Answer: Preparations for a crisis in Berlin had been nearly continuous since the breakdown of the summit meeting in 1960. The Four Power Working Group on Germany had been considering possible courses of action in the event that the USSR attempted to conclude a separate peace treaty. This groups recommended in February 1961 that such a treaty be regarded as null and void. The policy of the Allies should be to maintain the status quo in Germany until reunification was possible. Mr. Acheson's detailed report on Berlin advised the President in March that the issue over which the United States should fight in Berlin ought to be no less than a persistent physical interference with Berlin traffic. The North Atlantic Council of Ministers reiterated in May their determination to maintain the freedom of West Berlin. Presidents Kennedy and de Gaulle agreed on 2 June that there should be no modification in the status of Berlin or Germany at that time.<sup>5</sup>

American response to the 4 June Soviet declaration began at once at the diplomatic level when President Kennedy cautioned Khrushchev that the United States would not surrender its contractual rights. Vital American interests were involved; denial of those rights would be considered by the United States as a belligerent act. On 17 July the United States, France and

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France delivered formal notes to the Soviet government categorically rejecting Khrushchev's demands.<sup>6</sup>

[ By 19 July the US Government had evolved a plan for a stronger response to the Soviet challenge, to be applied in the event of a new Soviet blockade of Berlin. In essence this response would be to advance a force of division size or larger into East Germany to demonstrate Western determination to stay in Berlin. The objective would not be to fight through to Berlin but to impress on the Soviets the extreme seriousness of the situation in the hope that a solution could then be negotiated.<sup>7</sup>

The same day the President made a decision to call up reserves and to increase inductions under the draft. The purpose was to develop the capability to deploy six divisions and supporting air units to Europe after 1 January 1962. The first reserves were called up on 25 August.<sup>8</sup> ]

[ Other elements of the US program were economic sanctions in the event of a blockade and a buildup in the strength of NATO forces to 29 divisions in the Central Region. The response of [the Allies, however, was disappointing. Eventually the North Atlantic Council agreed that denial of overflight and landing rights to Communist Bloc aircraft would constitute an appropriate response to partial interdiction of NATO traffic to West Berlin. However, the force target (to be achieved by the end of 1961) was set at only 24-1/3 divisions for the Central Region]<sup>9</sup> ]

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As a solution to the dispute, the Secretary of State and the British, French, and West German foreign ministers agreed to offer the essentials of the Western Peace Plan of 1959, calling for reunification through free elections.<sup>10</sup>

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met with Secretary Rusk and President Kennedy in September and October. The two sides appeared to be as far apart as ever. Gromyko did not deviate from the 4 June position, and Rusk and Kennedy reiterated unequivocally the determination of the Western Powers to stand on their rights in Berlin. But on 17 October the Soviet threat to sign a separate peace treaty passed out of the crisis stage when Premier Khrushchev announced that "If the Western Powers display readiness to settle the German problem, the question of the time limit . . . will not be so material; we shall not insist that the peace treaty be signed by all means before Dec 31, 1961."<sup>11</sup>

The Western Powers issued their protest against the erection of the Berlin wall on 15 August, but took no other action. In their eyes, the important issue was West Berlin and their right of access thereto; communication between the two Berlins was of secondary importance. On 17 August the White House announced that Vice President Johnson would leave for Berlin to reassure West Berliners of US determination to preserve their freedom. [ The following day the President directed an increase in the US garrison in Berlin, and one battle group was added to US forces there. The Joint Chiefs of Staff told USCINCEUR on 25 August that ]

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"While we consider the US right of access to East Berlin to be important, we do not consider it so vital that it must be maintained by the use of force, except that required for self-defense." Neither the United States nor the West German Government seriously challenged the imposition of the Berlin wall.<sup>12</sup>

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Question: What military options were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer: The Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted routine reviews of Berlin contingency plans in the winter and spring of 1961.

[ In April they began to prepare a study for the President on the effects of attempts to reopen access to Berlin in the face of opposition. They advised that extensive preparations must first be undertaken, and even the a ground attack against determined opposition was not militarily feasible. Similarly they doubted Allied ability to maintain an airlift against opposition. When asked to submit a study of the forces required to restore ground access to Berlin against solely East German opposition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought the hypothesis invalid because the USSR would never permit an East German defeat. Nonetheless they estimated that [7 divisions and 4 tactical air wings] would defeat the East Germans alone. But, they added, such a course of action should be adopted only if it had been determined that the objective was worth pursuing at the risk of general war, and only after preparatory mobilization.<sup>13</sup> ]

[ In June 1961 the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided advice to Mr. Acheson in the course of his study. They recommended military deployments that, in their view, would convince the Soviet leadership of the US willingness to employ nuclear weapons in a Berlin crisis. They [estimated that 50 divisions] would be required to reopen Berlin access against the available Soviet and East German ]

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[ forces, which could reach 128 divisions within a month after D-day. Recognizing the desirability of alternatives to general war, they recommended consideration of measures short of all-out conflict in order to demonstrate on a rising scale US determination to restore access to Berlin. One such measure, they said, would be the use of nuclear weapons on selected military targets.<sup>14</sup> ]

[ The National Security Council, after hearing Mr. Acheson's report, asked the Secretary of Defense to determine what preparations would be needed for a range of possible responses: an airlift to Berlin, harassment and blockade of Communist Bloc shipping, a large-scale nonnuclear ground action, and maximum long-term readiness of the Strategic Air Command. The Secretary was also asked to recommend the size and character of a permanent increase in the US defense establishment in a period of heightened tensions. These questions were passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who recommended retention of units scheduled for deactivation and mobilization or reactivation of certain reserve and National Guard units.<sup>15</sup> ]

[ President Kennedy determined upon a partial mobilization to strengthen US forces in Europe. He asked the Secretary of Defense for a military operations plan to be used if Berlin were blocked, together with recommendations concerning the contributions that would be needed from US allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a plan calling for the use of a ground force up to the ]

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strength of an Army corps, [limited employment of tactical nuclear weapons], and an airlift to Berlin, depending on the Soviet response. The plan would require [43 NATO divisions and 3,018 tactical aircraft by M+6 months.] But the Joint Chiefs of Staff again warned that the United States must decide whether it wished to maintain its position in Berlin at any cost, and must make its intent clear to the Soviet Union. Moreover, it was necessary to initiate prompt measures that would deter the Soviets from interfering with the US position in Berlin. <sup>16</sup> ]

By 20 July, the President had decided on his course of action and had begun to enlist NATO support. On 25 July he announced his Berlin policy to the nation. He called for a \$3.2 billion increase in defense spending, a call-up of reserve forces, an increase in the draft, and extension of active duty tours.<sup>17</sup>

[ The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in planning for Berlin did not end with the public announcement of the new defense posture. They were almost immediately asked by the Secretary of Defense to comment on a paper entitled "Military Planning and Preparations toward a Berlin Crisis," with which they concurred with some modification. On 3 August they submitted their own "Outline Plan on Berlin," which called for increasingly stronger responses if previous measures failed, up to the decision to use nuclear weapons or wage general war. From July to September the JCS presented and defended a [proposal to use special forces and support popular uprisings in East Germany.<sup>18</sup> ]

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[ In September the President asked a series of questions about the effectiveness of the planned movement of 6 divisions to Europe and the other attendant changes in the US defense effort. In their replies, the Chairman and the Chief of Staff of the Army strongly supported these moves. On the other hand, the Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps concluded that the planned reinforcement in Europe would not seriously deter the Soviets, and, unless accompanied by a like increase in nuclear forces, might demonstrate weakness rather than strength.<sup>19</sup> ]

[ In October the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a "Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Conflict," as an alternative to a State-Defense paper on the same subject. The sequence, to which non-military actions could be added as appropriate, was designed to improve the credibility of US policy and deterrent posture; to place the US in a better position to undertake selective military operations; to induce the Soviet Union to enter negotiations on terms favorable to the United States; and to engender maximum participation of the NATO allies. If properly timed, the JCS sequence would furthermore have placed the onus for initial attack on the Soviets.<sup>20</sup> ]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff continued to consider options on Berlin policy, but after October, the crisis stage of the continuing Berlin problem for a time was past.

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Cuban Missile Crisis, October-November 1962

Question: What overt action was taken to precipitate the "crisis" situation?

Answer: During 1962 the Soviet Union began clandestinely importing mid-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) into Cuba. These MRBMs were first identified on 15 October through analysis of US aerial photographic intelligence. Further examination of the same photographs on the following day confirmed the presence of an MRBM site, together with missile trailers. It was the positive identification of MRBMs in Cuba that triggered the crisis.<sup>1</sup>



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Bloc, had reached Cuba since July. On 6 and 9 October DIA pinpointed additional missile sites. On 10 October photographic reconnaissance indicated that IL-28 aircraft were being delivered to Cuba by ship.

On 12 October, the Department of Defense assumed operational responsibility for reconnaissance flights over Cuba, and the SAC was instructed to prepare for U-2 overflight of Cuba. The first SAC overflight of Cuba occurred two days later. It consisted of a single pass across the western end of the island; there was no reaction from Cuban air defenses. On 15 October, DIA reported that the preceding day's reconnaissance revealed six or seven cylindrical objects that appeared to be 700- or 1,100-nautical-mile ballistic missiles in the Pinar del Rio area west of Havana.

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Question: What did the United States do militarily and diplomatically from the time intelligence of the pending crisis began to develop--through the crisis--to the solution?

Answer: When aerial photographs revealed the presence of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba, the United States had already taken certain preparatory actions. The US Congress passed a joint resolution on 26 September 1962 affirming US determination to prevent, by force of arms if necessary, aggression by Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. The President had already requested and Congress approved on 3 October authorization to call 150,000 reservists to active duty. On 4 October, DIA set up a 24-hour Cuban Situation Room. The Department of Defense, as already noted, took over responsibility for reconnaissance flights over Cuba on 12 October.<sup>3</sup>

Evidence of the Soviet MRBMs in Cuba was presented to the President on the morning of 16 October. He met with the "executive committee" of the National Security Council (NSC) and they considered the alternatives of invasion, air strikes, or a blockade of Cuba. The only decisions made at this meeting were to intensify aerial surveillance and to act as quickly as possible after public disclosure of the Soviet build-up in Cuba. Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the reinforcement of Guantanamo Naval Base and the air defenses of the southeastern United States. On 20 October they cancelled a

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combined Navy/Marine amphibious exercise, the units of which were later used in the blockade.

The President decided on a blockade of Cuba on the afternoon of 20 October. The President announced the blockade in a nationwide television address on 22 October, and US forces worldwide were placed on DEFCON 3 effective 222300Z.

The President signed the proclamation of the quarantine on 23 October. The quarantine prohibited the delivery of weapons to Cuba. It entered into effect on 24 October and was enforced under CINCLANT by Task Force 136, consisting initially of some 30 ships (one carrier, two cruisers, 24 destroyers, and three logistic support vessels).

While preparing for a quarantine, the United States also made ready for a possible invasion of Cuba. The required forces were alerted and prepositioned. Deployment of five Army divisions to staging bases began on 24 October and was complete by 10 November. Army logistic support units deployed between 23 October and 7 November. The Marine Corps deployed the II Marine Expeditionary Force, divided into Landing Groups West and East. The former, totalling about 10,900, embarked at West coast ports on 23 October and arrived in the Caribbean on 7 November.

The air defense of the southeastern United States was also reinforced. Between 22 and 31 October, two Army missile battalions and other air defense units moved to bases in Florida.

During these preparations, the United States continued aerial surveillance of Cuba and the surrounding waters. [ By the end of ]<sup>15</sup>

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[ October, 26 U-2 flights had been flown, and in November an additional 67 sorties were flown. ] CINCLANT carried out low-level reconnaissance of Cuba with RF-101s and F8Us; these missions began on 23 October. CINCSAC conducted surveillance of Atlantic waters in support of CINCLANT's quarantine operations beginning on 25 October, and B-52s in flight on their regular missions reported on shipping when flying over Atlantic waters.

Preparatory measures taken by CINCSAC began on 22 October when [ one-eighth of the ] B-52 bomber [ force (66 planes) ] went on airborne alert. Selected elements of the B-47 force [ (182 aircraft) ] began dispersal and completed their movement 24 hours later. Other aircraft were placed on ground alert. By 5 November, the airborne alert figure was increased [ to 75 ]. Additional measures included the deployment on 22 October of [ 61 ] KC-135s to Alaska, Spain, and the northeast US, and a further deployment on 29 October of [ 86 ] KC-97s to Labrador, Newfoundland, and the Azores. The B-47 reflex force in the United Kingdom, Spain, and North Africa was also increased [ by 22 aircraft ].

In addition to military actions and preparations, the United States also took certain diplomatic actions. The Department of State prepared 43 letters for the President to send to heads of government of nations in alliance with the United States and dispatched instructions to 60 US Embassies concerning the delivery of the President's 22 October address. All embassies and consulates were warned to take precautions against

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demonstrations and riots. On 22 October appropriate foreign nations and officials were informed in advance of the impending quarantine announcement. Both the President and the Secretary of State briefed congressional leaders. At 1800 on 22 October, the Secretary of State presented a copy of the President's speech with a covering letter to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington.

Also on 22 October, the United States requested a UN Security Council meeting and submitted a draft resolution calling on the Soviet Union to dismantle and withdraw its missiles from Cuba under UN verification. On the following day, the United States obtained the approval of the Organization of American States for the use of armed force to carry out the quarantine of Cuba.

On 28 October, the Soviet Union announced its decision to dismantle the arms in Cuba that the United States described as offensive and to crate and return them to Russia. The United States welcomed the Soviet action, but continued the quarantine and aerial reconnaissance until withdrawal of the Soviet missiles was complete. Subsequently, on 20 November the United States announced that the Soviet Union had promised to withdraw Russian IL-28 bombers from Cuba within 30 days and that it was lifting the quarantine. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized DEFCON 5 worldwide on 28 November.

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Question: What military options were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer: When firm evidence became available of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba, the United States began consideration of a number of possible actions. The military options included: air strikes of varying intensity, ranging from selective attack on the MRBMs to an all-out attack on MRBMs, SAMs, airborne fighters, and nuclear storage sites; a naval blockade; a full-scale air attack; and an amphibious and airborne invasion of Cuba. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed all of these options. A selective strike on MRBM sites would not remove the entire threat. In order to assure success, they favored a full-scale air attack combined with a complete naval blockade of Cuba. If a decision was made to remove the communist government of Cuba, they considered an invasion the preferable course.<sup>4</sup>

The Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained this position until 20 October, when the President decided on a naval quarantine. They presented their opinions to the President and the Secretary of Defense on several occasions. With the exception of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they also supported an invasion of Cuba. The Chairman did not go so far; he favored only US preparation for a possible invasion.<sup>5</sup>



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Once the President made his decision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acted to implement it, but they also continued to consider possible courses of action in the event the quarantine proved ineffective. Initially they favored a stepped-up blockade and review of the decision on a general attack against Cuba. The JCS position as finally presented to the Secretary of Defense provided for indirect, provocative, and direct actions. The indirect actions encompassed such actions as OAS measures, intensification of psychological warfare, and denial of landing and overflight rights to planes enroute to Cuba, while the provocative ones involved constant photo missions, air and naval harassment of Cuba and Cuban planes and ships, jamming of Cuban electronic emissions, and increased psychological warfare and [covert actions.] Direct measures were: day and night aerial reconnaissance; [covert action to sabotage missiles; placing of POL, or at least jet fuel, on the quarantine list; total sea blockade; air blockade (the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a separate air quarantine plan); offensive strikes; and full invasion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed only an air attack followed by an invasion would "surely" eliminate the offensive weapons threat. They recommended an invasion of Cuba not later than 29 October unless irrefutable evidence showed that the offensive weapons had been removed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff presented these options and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 28 October 1962--the day Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba.<sup>6</sup>

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announced the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba.<sup>6</sup>

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff also considered various other possibilities. In the event of a U-2 shutdown, they were prepared to recommend immediate retaliation against the most likely surface-to-air site as well as continuation of the U-2 flights. Later they proposed a full attack on all air fields and air defense weapons systems in Cuba and consideration of additional measures if the hostile attack was judged part of a deliberate program of resistance to US air surveillance.<sup>7</sup>

[The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to a Presidential directive that there would be no firing, without prior Presidential authorization, by JUPITER units in Italy and Turkey in the event of a Soviet attack on these units, but they were overruled by the Secretary of Defense. To be prepared for a Soviet attack on the JUPITERS in Turkey, the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed six possible responses by NATO: air attack with conventional weapons on selected satellite military installations; attack on Soviet installations; attack and destruction of Soviet submarines on the high seas; submarine warfare against all Bloc shipping on an opportunity basis; and closing of the Bosphorus, Dardenelles, and the Danish Straits to Bloc shipping. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also opposed an early offer by Mr. Khrushchev to remove the missiles from Cuba in return for US removal of the JUPITERS from Turkey. Such an exchange, they believed would be contrary to US security interests and would degrade an important part of NATO's defense.<sup>8</sup>]

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Czechoslovakia, 1968

Question: What overt action was taken to precipitate the "crisis" situation?

Answer: Months of tension between the Soviet Union and the "liberal" communist government of Alexander Dubcek in Czechoslovakia came to a head on the night of 20-21 August 1968. At that time, some 200,000 Soviet troops, including airborne, paratroop, and tank units, with token elements from other nations of the Warsaw Pact, moved into Prague and other cities of Czechoslovakia without opposition. Within a week<sup>1</sup> the strength of the occupation forces had risen to 650,000.

Question: What prior knowledge, if any, did we have that the crisis was pending, developing, and of the forthcoming precipitate act (in terms of time and reliability)?

Answer: It was known that the situation in Eastern Europe was highly unstable. In the months that followed Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalinism, as the Soviet regime relaxed its rigidity, the governments of the smaller countries of Eastern Europe had seized the opportunity to assert varying degrees of freedom and independence from Soviet rule. The process went farthest in Czechoslovakia, where the Dubcek government proposed a program of reform that would guarantee democratic rights to the people. This prospect was unpalatable to the Soviet Union, the more so as it appeared that other communist countries might seek to emulate Czechoslovakia. The world press duly chronicled the increasing hostility of the Soviet Government, as indicated by repeated official denunciations of Czechoslovakia's course of action. In June 1968 the nations of the Warsaw Pact held military maneuvers in Czechoslovakia; after the exercises ended, Soviet troops were retained in the country for a time, apparently as a part of a "war of nerves." By the end of July the possibility of Soviet military intervention had been widely discussed.<sup>2</sup> Hence the actual invasion did not take US leaders entirely by surprise, though there was no specific warning. According to President Johnson's account, published after he left office, the regular meeting of his advisers (the "Tuesday luncheon group") on 20 August discussed the

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that seemed the less likely in that, only the day before, the Soviet Union had accepted a US proposal to discuss the peaceful use of nuclear power. However, when the President was told that evening that Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin wished an immediate appointment with him, he suspected that the subject of the Ambassador's visit might be Czechoslovakia, as in fact it was.<sup>3</sup>

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Question: What did we do militarily and diplomatically from the time intelligence of the pending crisis began to develop--through the crisis--to the solution?

Answer: Planning for the contingency of a Soviet military move against Czechoslovakia or other countries of Eastern Europe had been undertaken by the Department of State in April 1968. [ In a paper titled ["Eastern European Contingencies," military action by the United States or its allies was explicitly ruled out, except as necessary to maintain order on the West German side of the border. Reaction should be confined to diplomatic action and public statements designed to mitigate the effect of the Soviet intervention on the country concerned and to minimize the adverse impact on other Eastern European countries. The statements should include a demand for Soviet withdrawal, although it was unlikely that the Soviets would comply. 4) ]

[ The State Department plans were discussed by the Senior Interdepartmental Group and, though not formally approved, were adopted by the Johnson Administration and put into effect insofar as possible before the event. The proposed courses of action were discussed with and approved by the member nations of NATO. Following discussions between representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed USCIINCEUR to maintain a continuous alert combined with a low profile. Avoiding any actions that would imply that the United States was preparing for military intervention in Eastern Europe. ]

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When the invasion came, the plans were put into effect. Immediately after learning from Ambassador Dobrynin of the impending Soviet action, President Johnson called the National Security Council into session, but the members quickly realized that US options were limited.<sup>6</sup> The Czech Government did not ask for assistance; the people of Czechoslovakia offered no resistance and there was no fighting, such as had taken place in Hungary in 1956. Hence the question of a US military response never arose, and the cautious policy adopted in advance of the crisis was put into effect. [ Within a few hours after the Soviet invasion, USCINCEUR requested permission to increase surveillance activities along the border; this request was approved only to the extent that CINCEUR was authorized to establish seven additional observation posts.<sup>7</sup> ]

The only action taken by the United States was to carry a complaint to the United Nations. A resolution condemning the invasion and demanding the withdrawal of the occupation troops was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The situation gradually eased; some Soviet troops were withdrawn in September. Under an agreement reached in October, obviously as a result of Soviet pressure, the Czechs undertook to rescind some of their reforms and to allow Soviet Bloc troops to remain in their country indefinitely.<sup>8</sup>

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Question: What military options were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer: [ Consideration of military courses of action had been ruled out well before the crisis broke. Subsequently, in the ensuing months, the Joint Chiefs of Staff embarked upon a long-range effort to strengthen US leadership in the Atlantic Alliance and to reverse the decline in the size and strength of the NATO forces. ] 9

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Dominican Republic Crisis, 1965

Question: What overt action was taken to precipitate the "crisis" situation?

Answer: On 30 May 1961 General Rafael L. Trujillo Molina, the Dominican Republic's dictator for 30 years, was assassinated. In February 1963 Dr. Juan Bosch, head of the leftist Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), became President but was overthrown by a military coup nine months later. A three-man junta took control of the country, and deported Dr. Bosch. In late December 1963 Foreign Minister Dr. J. Donald Reid Cabral was named head of the governing body. During the following 15 months a lagging economy, large-scale unemployment, stringent financial programs, and dissatisfaction within the military contributed to mounting unrest. There were signs that communist influence was growing on the island.<sup>1</sup>

The instability which had plagued the Republic since the fall of Trujillo erupted on 24 April 1965. An appeal for mass action against the Reid government, broadcast from two PRD stations signalled the beginning of a revolt. Later in the day, in an apparently well-planned move, a group of young military supporters of Juan Bosch captured the nationally-owned radio station and a leader of the PRD announced the "fall" of the government and the "restoration" of the 1963 constitution.<sup>2</sup>

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Question: What prior knowledge, if any, did we have that the crisis was pending, developing, and the forthcoming precipitate act (in terms of time and reliability)?

Answer: Before the revolt, intelligence sources reported indications of mounting unrest in the island republic. During March police and military units were forced to quell labor uprisings; President Reid received information that military officers were plotting against his regime; and the stringent economic policies that President Reid had imposed on the armed forces had promoted "an environment favorable for those who wish to stir up trouble."<sup>3</sup>

In April, evidence of anti-government plots became more definite and the accused plotters, military and civilian, were exiled. Intelligence reports told of increasing military pressure aimed at forcing President Reid to relinquish his position as Secretary of State for the Armed Forces and permit a military man to assume the post.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless the best intelligence available in Washington was that a coup would probably not be attempted until May or June. In preparation for such a development, the US Ambassador in Santo Domingo, Mr. W. Tapley Bennett, was instructed to return to Washington on 23 April for consultation. Thus the actual crisis on 24 April came as a surprise to the United States.<sup>5</sup>

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Question: What did we do militarily and diplomatically from the time intelligence of the pending crisis began to develop--through the crisis--to the solution?

Answer: Fighting between loyalist forces and the supporters of Juan Bosch began shortly after the announcement that the government had fallen. On 25 April the US Charge d'Affaires, at the direction of the Department of State, attempted to mediate the conflict. US intervention was in fact requested by both sides. An agreement to replace the Reid government with a military junta that would rule until elections could be held lasted only a few hours. Extremists from the PRD movement attempted to seize control of the junta. Joined by pro-Bosch military officers, they set up a provisional government with a PRD leader as its president. Fighting soon broke out between this group and the loyalists. During the next two days, the situation continued to deteriorate; the conflict became more intense and the rebel movement, in which communist elements were active, seemed likely to gain the upper hand. Embassy officers pressed for the formation of a provisional government and conveyed a message to Juan Bosch urging him to call on his countrymen to cease the conflict.

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Meanwhile the US Government had made preparations to evacuate US citizens. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the request of the Secretary of State on 25 April, directed CINCLANT to place vessels off the Dominican coast for embarkation purposes. Evacuation began on 27 April; by 9 May some 2,711 US citizens and 1,726 others had been evacuated.

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The possibility of US military intervention in the Dominican Republic had been foreseen earlier. In 1963 CINCLANT had prepared an operating plan for this purpose and had earmarked certain forces to be employed if necessary. On 26 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed an increased readiness status for these forces. 8

By 28 April, according to messages from the US Embassy, the situation in Santo Domingo was completely out of control; police and governmental authorities could no longer guarantee the safety of foreign nationals. On that day, therefore, the President, after consulting the Secretaries of State and Defense and meeting with Congressional leaders, ordered US troops to land on the island, in order to protect the lives of the remaining US citizens there and to aid in their evacuation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at once directed CINCLANT and other concerned commands to carry out the landing. On the evening of 28 April, the President was able to announce that 400 US Marines had already gone ashore. 9

On 29 April the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler emphasized to the officer in charge of the landing force (Task Group 44.9) that the sole mission of the US forces was to protect US citizens. However, he directed the commander to maintain close contact with the US Ambassador and to recommend expansion of his mission should the situation demand it. 10

Meanwhile the United States had carried the Dominican question to the Organization of American States. On 29 April the CAS Council requested the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo to seek a ceasefire. On the following day the CAS adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of an international zone of safety

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in the city. On 1 May they established a five-member committee whose goal was to obtain peace and a return to normalcy for the island.<sup>11</sup>

The Papal Nuncio acted promptly, and a ceasefire agreement was obtained on 30 April. On the same day a special envoy sent by President Johnson, former Ambassador John Bartlow Martin, arrived in the Dominican Republic and undertook an active role in the search for a political solution. Neither effort, however, resulted in an improvement in the situation. The ceasefire was widely violated; lawlessness and disorder mounted. The landing of US forces (Marines and Army) continued. On 14 May the UN Security Council called for a strict ceasefire and asked the Secretary General to send a personal representative to Santo Domingo.<sup>12</sup>

By 3 May US forces had established the International Security Zone (ISZ) and an LOC between Marine units in the western sector of Santo Domingo and airborne elements along the Ozama River in the east. After a corridor had been opened between the ISZ and the only airfield near the city, military convoys passed through safely. The week's fighting had brought severe hardships to the civilian population of the city. US forces began distribution of food supplies along the newly-opened corridor and set up hospital facilities.<sup>13</sup>

The United States again turned to the OAS. At the 10th Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American States (MFN) on 2 May, the United States proposed a resolution for a ceasefire.

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be established to help restore order. The proposal called for the American States to make available military contingents to assist the five-member OAS Commission in reestablishing peace. 14

On 4 May the rebel leader, LTC Caamano, was sworn in as Provisional President. On the following day the OAS Commission in Santo Domingo persuaded leaders of both sides to sign the "Act of Santo Domingo" which reaffirmed the 30 April cease-fire and guaranteed a zone of security. 15

In Washington on 5 May five Latin American countries and the United States agreed to a revised resolution to be jointly presented to the OAS MFM. They proposed that member governments make contingents of their land, naval, air, or police forces available to the OAS to form an Inter-American force to bring peace to the Dominican Republic. The OAS MFM approved the resolution on 6 May and the act establishing an Inter-American Force was signed on 23 May. A Brazilian officer, General Alvim, was named Commander of the force, with General Bruce Palmer, USA, as his deputy. 16

Meanwhile, in Santo Domingo the American Ambassador's efforts to establish a broad-based government composed of both military and civilian leaders finally succeeded. On 7 May the Loyalist junta resigned in favor of a Government of National Reconstruction (GNR), a five-man group, headed by Brigadier General A. Imbert Barreras and including three civilians. The American Ambassador recommended that the United States immediately recognize the new government. The Secretary of State replied that the United States welcomed the formation of the GNR, but regarded it only as an interim group that would assist in the establishment of an elected

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became relatively quiet. The worst of the crisis was over; there was now little danger that the PRD forces and their communist allies would take control.

With the military situation stabilized and the IAPF functioning, a large US occupation force was no longer needed. Most of the US troops were therefore withdrawn, beginning on 26 May. By the end of July, when the withdrawal was regarded as complete, there remained 9,801 US troops constituting the US contingent of the IAPF, to which five Latin American countries had contributed 1,786 men, as well as certain naval vessels.

Meanwhile on 18 June, the OAS Committee had presented a proposal for a political solution. Their plan, in essence, called for an immediate ceasefire; general elections under OAS supervision within six to nine months; and the formation of a provisional government to serve until elections were held. By 24 June, after both sides had presented counterproposals, agreement was reached for acceptance of a provisional government and the holding of free elections. Over the next several months, meetings between OAS Committee members, US officials, and leaders of the two sides took place to resolve opposing views. Finally, at the end of August both the GNR and the rebels accepted Dr. Hector Garcia Godoy as President of the Provisional Government, and the United States promptly recognized the new regime.

In the ensuing months Dr. Garcia Godoy returned his country to relative calm and in the elections held on 1 June 1966, Joaquin Balaguer won over his opponent, Juan Bosch. Withdrawal of the IAPF was completed on 21 June 1966. SECRET

Question: What military options were considered by the JCS?

Answer: On 2 May, following OAS success in obtaining a cease-fire, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered optional deployments of US troops to contain rebel forces in the event the cease-fire proved ineffectual. The alternatives they considered were: (1) an "in-close" perimeter sealing off the old quarter of Santo Domingo; (2) a perimeter linking airborne elements at the Duarte Bridge on the east with Marine forces maintaining the ISZ on the west (an initial step in the execution of alternative (1)); and (3) a perimeter farther out on a line to be selected by CINCLANT. The Joint Chiefs directed implementation of the second option on <sup>24</sup> 2 May.

On 8 May, while organization of an Inter-American force was under discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the USCOMDOMREP be designated the commander of the force, with a Latin American as his deputy. However, they indicated their willingness to accept a Latin American commander with a US deputy <sup>25</sup> (the arrangement eventually adopted).

On 13 May General Palmer suggested widening the LOC to seize the rebel-held Radio Santo Domingo which had been broadcasting inflammatory attacks against the regime and the United States. The Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disapproved the suggestion [but requested CINCLANT to prepare a plan for sabotaging rebel transmitters north of the LOC, assuming that the OAS failed to neutralize the station and political means. USCOMDOMREP submitted a plan, to be approved that the Joint Chiefs of Staff ]

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the plan or forwarded it to higher authority has not  
been received. In any event, GNR forces captured the radio  
station on 19 May.

On 17 May the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the United States take immediate unilateral military action to reduce the rebels' stronghold in northern Santo Domingo in order to confine them to one small sector of the city and reduce their ability to operate in the countryside. The Secretary of Defense replied on 21 May that this plan was being held in abeyance in fact, it had already been overtaken by events, since GNR forces had already captured the area in question.

On 18 and 19 May senior US and military officials in Santo Domingo, in an effort to break the stalemate, suggested that the United States should physically impose its forces between opposing Dominican factions in the northern sector of the city. CINCLANT objected to the plan because it could result in US forces having to fight both factions. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, replied that he agreed with CINCLANT about the disadvantages of the plan, but "on balance, the JCS considered that the governing factors in this chaotic situation are largely political rather than military." By evening, however, the proposal was no longer feasible because GNR forces had advanced up to the proposed interposition line in some places.

On 20 May the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the United States resist pressure to reduce US forces--pressure that would increase as Latin American

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forces arrived--until the Inter-American Force was fully capable  
of carrying out its mission without US forces. <sup>28</sup>

On 26 May, in view of continued rebel attacks on US troops, the Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted a protest to the OAS/UN representatives, warning them that the United States would "conduct appropriate retaliatory attacks." The Chairman concluded, however, that with the establishment of the IAF the proposal had  
been overtaken by events, and the message was not sent. <sup>29</sup>

On 27 May CINCLANT recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the US contribution to the IAF be limited to a three-battalion brigade and that General Palmer, as Deputy Commander, IAF, retain his status as USCOMDOMREP, a US commander with authority to employ US forces for such unilateral action as might be necessary.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, replied that since the United States had initiated the IAF concept, it "would be in an untenable position should we withhold any sizable troop elements from IAF commitments." The Chairman also noted that General Palmer, as IAF Deputy Commander, should have operational control of ground forces, or should be designated by the IAF Commander as Field Forces Commander. <sup>30</sup>

On 3 July, in response to General Palmer's 17 June request for the deployment of a platoon of 7 tanks to the Dominican Republic, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed CINCLANT that the JCS were "reluctant to introduce these weapons, particularly at this time." The Chairman added, however, that when further reduction in the Dominican Republic appeared appropriate, the desirability of deploying a tank platoon would be reconsidered. <sup>31</sup>

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Hungarian Crisis, October 1965

Question: What overt action was taken to precipitate the "crisis" situation?

Answer: On 23 October 1956, a mass meeting in Budapest demanded political reforms and withdrawal of Soviet troops. The situation got out of control and developed into a riot, when the demonstrators fought police. The fighting continued throughout the night and into the following day when Soviet forces, with tanks and artillery, entered Budapest and began firing on Hungarian citizens.<sup>1</sup>

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Question: What prior knowledge, if any, did the United States have that the crisis was developing and of the forthcoming precipitate act (in terms of time and reliability)?

Answer: There was continuing pressure in Hungary during 1956 for reform as the result of Premier Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in February 1956, and the Poznan riots in Poland in June 1956 increased the Hungarian dissatisfaction with their government. The drive for reform intensified in September 1956 with the opening of the new school term, and repeated demonstrations occurred in Budapest during mid-October. Other than an awareness of this growing unrest in Hungary as well as of the situation in Poland, where the Soviet Union had accepted a more liberal though thoroughly communist government only a few days previously, the United States had no prior knowledge that fighting would break out in Budapest on 23 October or that Soviet forces would enter the city on the 24th.<sup>2</sup>

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Question: What did the United States do militarily and diplomatically from the time intelligence of the pending crisis began to develop--through the crisis--to the solution?

Answer: [The United States never seriously considered intervening militarily in the Hungarian situation. Any such military operation would have required the support of the major European allies, and both Britain and France were involved in Egypt over the Suez Canal and could not have jointed the United States. In addition such an action would have risked a major confrontation with the Soviet Union. Consequently, US action in the Hungarian crisis was limited to diplomatic efforts. On 25 October, President Eisenhower made a public statement denouncing the Soviet military intervention and expressing sympathy for the Hungarian people.<sup>3</sup> On 27 October, the United States, together with Britain and France, requested the UN Security Council to consider the Soviet intervention in Hungary; the Council agreed by a vote of nine to one, with the Soviet Union opposed.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, the situation in Hungary had quieted somewhat. The more liberal and nationalist Imre Nagy replaced the Stalinist Erno Gero as head of the Hungarian government, and Nagy was able to arrange a ceasefire on 29 October and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. But pressure from the people forced Nagy to end the one-party communist rule, to bring representatives of three traditional parties into the government and to indicate that Hungary would withdraw from the

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Warsaw Pact. Since these actions were unacceptable to the Soviet Union, Russian troops reentered Hungary on 1 November. By 7 November the Soviet forces had subdued Hungary and strict communist rule was restored under Janos Kadar.<sup>5</sup>

Again the United States limited its reaction to the Soviet intervention in Hungary to diplomatic measures. On 3 November, the United States introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council calling on the Soviet Union to cease interference in Hungary and withdraw its military forces. The Soviet Union promptly vetoed this measure, and the United States then presented it in the General Assembly, where there was no veto power. The US resolution passed on 4 November by a vote of 50 to 8, with 15 nations abstaining.<sup>6</sup>

[On 19 November 1956, the President approved a new NSC policy paper on Poland and Hungary. With respect to Hungary, it provided for: maintenance of constant pressure in the United Nations and elsewhere on the Soviet Union for compliance with the UN resolution of 4 November 1956; initiation and support of UN action designed to achieve free elections in Hungary under UN auspices; and consideration, in the event of continued Soviet defiance of the UN resolution, of a UN trade embargo on the Soviet Union or a break of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union either in concert with other UN members or unilaterally. There was no provision in the NSC policy for consideration of military action.<sup>7</sup> ]

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Question: What military options were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer: [ Since the United States did not contemplate military action in Hungary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not asked to consider military options. During the crisis, the US Government did review its policy toward both Poland and Hungary and circulated a draft policy statement to appropriate departments and agencies. With regard to Hungary, this statement called for only political and diplomatic action.<sup>8</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the draft and took exception to two proposals: one, that the Soviet Union be given assurances that the United States did not look upon Hungary or the other Soviet satellites as potential allies; two, that the United States consider withdrawing some units from Western Europe in return for the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Hungary. The first, in the JCS view, would undermine any influence that the United States might have on the government established in Hungary and might operate to US "military disadvantage"; the second might be expanded by the Soviet Union into a proposal for the complete withdrawal of US forces from Europe.<sup>9</sup> ] The final statement, approved by the President on 19 November 1956 after the Soviets had crushed the Hungarian revolution, contained neither of the provisions to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff had objected.<sup>10</sup>

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Korea. June 1950

Question: What overt action was taken to precipitate the "crisis" situation?

Answer: Beginning about 0400 Sunday, 25 June 1950, Far East time, or the evening of 24 June in Washington, the North Korean People's Army, supported by artillery, tanks, and aircraft, launched an invasion of the Republic of (South) Korea all along the 38th parallel of latitude, which formed the boundary between North and South Korea. At 1100 the same day, a radio broadcast from North Korea announced that war had been declared against the "puppet" regime of South Korea.<sup>1</sup>

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Question: What prior knowledge, if any, did we have that the crisis was pending, developing, and of the forthcoming precipitate act (in terms of time and reliability)?

Answer: There was no specific warning. It was known in June 1950 that the border between North and South Korea was one of many trouble spots that might conceivably erupt into conflict at any time. Clashes along the border between the forces of North and South Korea had occurred more than once, and there had been frequent intelligence warnings of a possible invasion from the north. Several reports from the Far East suggesting various dates in 1950 for such an invasion were discounted by intelligence authorities of the Far East Command. A report forwarded to Washington from the Far East Command on 19 June 1950 told of troop movements and other military preparations along the 38th parallel; however, it was treated in routine fashion, perhaps because such reports from all communist countries were frequent at that time. No intelligence agency reported a definite date for the opening of hostilities in Korea or provided a clear-cut warning that an invasion from North Korea was imminent in June 1950.<sup>2</sup>

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Question: What did we do militarily and diplomatically from the time intelligence of the pending crisis began to develop--through the crisis--to the solution?

Answer: On 25 June the United States authorized the Commander in Chief, Far East Command (General Douglas MacArthur) to send military equipment to South Korea for the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, and to employ US air and naval forces to protect the evacuation of US nationals. Also, the US Seventh Fleet was moved from the Philippines northward to the Straits of Taiwan. An appeal was made to the UN Security Council, which enacted a resolution calling for an end to the fighting. This was ignored by North Korea, whereupon the Security Council passed another resolution two days later, requesting member nations to assist in repelling the North Korean attack.<sup>3</sup>

As South Korea's forces continued to retreat, the United States on 26 June ordered General MacArthur to use air and naval forces in support of the ROK Army south of the 38th parallel. This measure proved inadequate, and three days later, the United States authorized air and naval strikes north of the 38th parallel, together with the introduction of US troops into South Korea to protect the port and airfield of Pusan. Finally, on 30 June 1950, General MacArthur was given full freedom to use all the forces under his command in defeating the North Korean invasion. Subsequently, all US combat divisions in Japan were transferred to South Korea and

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additional forces were sent from the United States and from some other UN member nations. A United Nations Command (UNC) was established, headed by General MacArthur. There followed a three-year conflict between the forces of the UNC and those of North Korea (later reinforced by troops from Communist China), which was ended by an armistice on 27 July 1953.<sup>4</sup>

Question: What military options were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer: The decision to provide military support to prevent the overthrow of the Republic of Korea was made on political grounds by President Truman on the recommendation of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in meetings at which the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were present and raised no objection. The question was never formally submitted for JCS consideration. Following the initial commitment of air and naval forces south of the 38th parallel, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed their staff subordinates to consider further actions to be taken if the situation continued to worsen. Subsequent steps leading up to the final commitment of US troops were made on recommendation of these subordinates, endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and readily accepted by President Truman; they were in the nature of forced responses to the situation. Available evidence makes it clear that, at least as late as 28 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped to avoid the commitment of US ground forces, but they never formally transmitted this view to the President or the National Security Council.<sup>5</sup>

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Lebanon Crisis, July 1958

Question: What overt action was taken to precipitate the "crisis" situation?

Answer: Throughout the first half of 1958 the situation in Lebanon was highly unstable. Rising currents of Arab nationalism threatened to upset the precarious balance in that country between Moslem and Christian populations. The situation came to a head as a result of a coup d'etat in neighboring Iraq. In Baghdad, on 14 July 1958, a group of Army officers overthrew the pro-Western royal government, murdered the former rulers, and proclaimed a republic. Thereupon President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon asked the United States to intervene militarily within 48 hours to prevent the overthrow of his government. The United States at once agreed to this request.<sup>2</sup>

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Question: What prior knowledge, if any, did the United States have that the crisis was developing and of the forthcoming precipitate act (in terms of time and reliability)?

Answer: Forewarning was based on knowledge that the situation in the Middle East in general, and in Lebanon in particular, was highly explosive. The United States was concerned that the extreme Arab nationalists, with Soviet support, might successively overthrow the pro-Western governments that existed in several countries of the Middle East. Initial US planning for possible intervention to counter such contingencies began in 1957, when an extremist element gained control in Syria. In concert with Egypt, the new Syrian Government spread inflammatory propaganda against King Hussein's pro-Western regime in Jordan.

On 8 November 1957 the Department of State requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to [join with British military authorities in the urgent preparation of an operation plan "for possible combined U.S.-U.K. military intervention in the event of an imminent or actual coup d'etat in Lebanon and/or Jordan." During succeeding months, US and British staff representatives drafted such a plan.] Meanwhile President Eisenhower approved a NSC policy statement on the Middle East on 24 January 1958, it included an explicit undertaking to provide Lebanon with political support and with military assistance to meet internal security problems.<sup>2</sup>

Pressure on the Chamoun Government in Lebanon grew more intense after February 1958, when Egypt and Syria joined to form the United Arab Republic. In March and May 1958 the United States gave renewed assurances to the government in Beirut of its

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willingness to support Lebanon's independence and territorial integrity. In the latter month, a brief revolt broke out in Lebanon, sparked by the assassination of a newspaper editor hostile to Chamoun. The United States provided emergency deliveries of arms and police equipment and alerted its forces for possible intervention. On 22 May Lebanon placed before the United Nations a complaint that the United Arab Republic was interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon.<sup>3</sup>

Fairly serious fighting broke out in Beirut on 14 June, when opposition forces attempted to liberate political prisoners. The Lebanese Army curbed each attack, but the Lebanese Prime Minister warned the US Ambassador that the situation was getting out of control and that US intervention might become necessary. On the same day, a Special National Intelligence Estimate advised that the position of President Chamoun had deteriorated and that the country was in a state of civil war. On 15 June the US Ambassador in Lebanon was authorized to inform Chamoun that the US position on intervention had not changed. During the latter part of the month, Lebanon charged in the United Nations that weapons and personnel were being smuggled across the border from Syria in increasing numbers. However, the final development--the overthrow of the Iraqi Government--came without warning.<sup>4</sup>

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Question. What did the United States do militarily and diplomatically from the time intelligence of the pending crisis began to develop--through the crisis--to the solution?

Answer: When the United States assented to President Chamour's request for military intervention, preparations had already been made, as previously related. Military intervention took place in accord with the approved [US-British plan, although by agreement with the United States, the United Kingdom held back its forces for a possible need to employ them in Jordan or Iraq.] The United States sailed the Sixth Fleet to Lebanon, landed Marine amphibious forces, and airlifted a US Army battle group from Europe. The first US forces, a Marine battalion landing team (BLT), went ashore in Lebanon on 15 July, followed by a second Marine BLT on 16 July and another on 18 July. Units of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, airlifted from the United States, reached Lebanon on 18 July, and US Army forces (187th Airborne Battle Group) began arriving the following day. Another airborne battle group remained on alert in Germany. With the subsequent arrival of an Army tank battalion in Lebanon plus service support troops, the US force reached a peak strength of 14,357 (5,842 Marines and 8,515 Army) on 5 August 1958.

With the decision to send troops to Lebanon, the United States also initiated diplomatic actions. On the morning of 15 July, as the first US troops were landing in Lebanon, President Eisenhower announced the US action, taken in order "to protect American lives and . . . encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity." The United States had already requested an emergency session of the UN Security

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Council for 15 July. There the US spokesman stressed that the United States had acted in response to an urgent request of the Lebanese Government and that US forces would promptly withdraw as soon as the United Nations was able to ensure the country's continued independence. He introduced a resolution calling for several measures toward this end, including immediate cessation of illegal support of the Lebanese rebels. On 18 July, the United States proposed to the Security Council the despatch of a UN force to Lebanon, but this was vetoed by the Soviet Union. On 13 August, President Eisenhower addressed the UN General Assembly and called for UN efforts to assure continued independence and integrity of Lebanon, but the President's proposal brought no immediate response.<sup>6</sup>

Meanwhile, the United States had proceeded with action on its own to end its involvement in Lebanon. On 16 July, the President sent Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy to Beirut as his special political representative, and Mr. Murphy talked with both opposition and government leaders. His efforts helped to ease the crisis situation, and the scheduled Lebanese presidential election took place on 31 July. The election of a new president dispelled rebel fears that the United States would attempt to keep Chamoun in office, and the political situation in Lebanon calmed. Consequently, US forces began withdrawing from Lebanon on 13 August, and all had departed the country by 25 October 1958.<sup>7</sup>

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Question: What military options were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer: The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved on 17 May 1958 a combined US/UK contingency plan for intervention in Lebanon. As already noted, this plan was followed, except that additional US forces were provided to take the place of the planned UK contingent. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended the White House meeting on 14 July 1958 at which the President decided to send forces to Lebanon. Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the execution of operations in accordance with the approved plan. There is no indication that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered any other option for either more or less military action. On 5 August, they directed planning for the withdrawal of US forces from Lebanon; on 11 August they approved the first stage of withdrawal, which began two days later.<sup>8</sup>

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