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1965

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2 JUN 1966

MEMORANDUM

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TO: See Distribution

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2. Because of sensitive nature of the [illegible] contained in this annex, its distribution [illegible] those agencies considered to have an essential [illegible] it is requested that no further distribution be made [illegible] the express consent of this headquarters.

3. Regraded unclassified when separated [illegible] tied indicators.

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SOG CONTROL # 0001720-66

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

		PAGE(S)
	ANNEX N (Special Operations)	1 thru 3
SECTION		
I	ADMINISTRATION	I-1 & I-2
	TAB A - January 1965 Organization	I-A-1
	TAB B - December 1965 Organization	I-B-1
	TAB C - Key Officers	I-C-1 & I-C-2
	TAB D - List of casualties	I-D-1
II	OPERATIONS	II-1
IIA	AIRBORNE OPERATIONS	IIA-1 thru IIA-19
	TAB A - Operational Map	IIA-A-1
	TAB B - Reliability of Team BELL	IIA-B-1 & IIA-B-2
	TAB C - Loss of Sub-Team REMUS ALFA	IIA-C-1 & IIA-C-2
	TAB D - Camp Long Thanh	IIA-D
	Incl 1 - Training Activities	IIA-D-1-1 thru IIA-D-1-14
	Incl 2 - Facility Improvements	IIA-D-2-1 thru IIA-D-2-2
	Incl 3 - Summary of Operations	IIA-D-3-1
	Incl 4 - Problem Areas	IIA-D-4-1 thru IIA-D-4-3
IIB	SHINING BRASS	IIB-1 thru IIB-4
	TAB A - Operations/Airstrikes	IIB-A-1 thru IIB-A-2

		Page
VIC	AIR OPERATIONS	[illegible]
VID	MARITIME OPERATIONS	[illegible]
VIE	PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS	[illegible]
	TAB A - Service Organization	[illegible]
VII	COMMUNICATIONS	[illegible]
IV	INTELLIGENCE	[illegible]
V	PLANS	[illegible]
VI	LOGISTICS	[illegible]

ANNEX N (Special Operations) to
MACV 1965 Command History

(This annex summarizes the activities of the Studies and Observations Group (SOG), Hq. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) during the calendar year of 1965. Details of these activities are described in the appendix to this annex.)

1. General:

a. In general, during 1965 SOG continued and intensified its program of harassment, diversion, political pressure, capture of prisoners, physical destruction, propaganda, and acquisition of intelligence against North Vietnam.

b. In March, the additional mission of conducting cross-border operations into eastern Laos was assigned to SOG, and operations began in October.

2. Operations:

a. Airborne:

(1) Execution of small demolitions, disruption of lines of communication (LOC), and limited psychological warfare operations continued to be performed by indigenous personnel of varying ethnic origins. With the advent of US bombing of North Vietnam, the emphasis shifted to gathering of intelligence and establishing contacts with the local population to broaden the intelligence base for possible future exploitation.

(2) During the year, in-place teams were reinforced and two new teams were infiltrated, with a total of 83 personnel in place at the end of the year.

b. Cross-border (Shining Brass):

On 7 March COMUSMACV transferred the mission of conducting operations against VC bases in Laos from 5th Special Forces Group to SOG. After a period of planning and training, execution of operations were authorized on 29 September and initiated in October. A SOG section designated OP-35 was organized to direct Shining Brass Operations.

c. Air:

(1) Covert reinforcement and resupply of in-place teams were conducted by fixed wing C-123 aircraft during the year. A total of 22 successful missions were flown.

In support of the Psyops mission, Air Operations flew a total of 30 successful covert psyops missions dispensing more than 60 million leaflets and gift kits during the year.

The VNAF H-34 helicopters were used to infiltrate and exfiltrate Shining Brass teams into Laos and infiltrate team Romeo into PWN.

The increased logistical support for SOG units resulted in an increase of tonnage and flying hours for the C-123s. The C-123s flew a total of 3,647 hours, and airlifted 328 tons of equipment.

d. Maritime:

MT

(a) Six Nasty Class PTFs (Patrol Torpedo Boats, Fast) and three SWIFT boats were available at US Naval Advisory Detachment (USNAD) at the beginning of the year. Four more PTFs were assigned during the year to make a total of ten. However, six PTFs and two SWIFTS were normally all that were available for operations at any one time. This was due to the necessity for overhaul or repair which resulted from the expanded tempo and scope of operations.

(b) An average of 148 Vietnamese military or civilian, and Chinese civilian Landing Team personnel were operationally ready and in a constant state of training throughout the year.

(2) One hundred and fifty-five missions were conducted during 1965. One man was killed in action, eighteen were wounded in action, and one PTF was lost.

e. Psychological:

DATA

3. Intelligence:

SOG intelligence operations expanded during the year as

a result of the increase of teams in North Vietnam, the expansion of maritime operations, the assignment of the cross-border mission into Laos, and the acquisition of photo interpretation capability.

4. Plans:

With increased tempo of operations and the assignment of JUWTF mission and other long range plans, the need for a section to perform long range and contingency planning became apparent. A plans section was authorized by Change #1 to the SOG TD on 7 August, and staffed as personnel became available.

5. Logistics:

a. SOG logistical functions maintained pace with continually increased operations during 1965. While the major support effort was primarily routine in nature, considerable priority actions were required.

b. The US Forces build-up had the greatest effect on logistics operations. Normal supply support obtained from the CounterInsurgency Support Office (CISO) in Okinawa was shipped via Nha Trang utilizing two LSTs monthly. Loss of the use of the LSTs resulted in the requirement for commercial shipping. Losses and delays have been encountered because of lack of control over shipping.

c. Another major factor affecting logistics was the advent of the Shining Brass program. This program, implemented in an expeditious manner on relatively short notice, placed a serious load on the entire logistics capability.

Appendix I - 1965 SOG Historical Summary



* Augmented by TDY/TDY MTT's as required

TAB B (End 1965 Organization) to
Section I (Administration to 1965
SOG Historical Summary



* Augmented by TDY/TDY MTT's as required

Tab C (List of Key Personnel and Section Administrators)
to 1965 SOG Historical Summary

POSITION	DATES	INCUMBENT
1. Commander, SOG	1 Jan - 2 Jun	Col. C. R. Russell
	3 Jun - 31 Dec	Col. D. D. Blackburn
a. Deputy Commander	1 Jan - 30 May	NAME
	31 May - 31 Dec	NAME
b. Sp Abn Adv	14 Sep - 31 Dec	Col. A. D. Simons
c. Executive Officer	10 Sep - 31 Dec	Lt. Col. C. F. R. Banhard
2. Administrative Officer	1 Jan - 15 Jun	Capt. A. Abraham
	16 Jun - 31 Dec	Capt. E. Allen
3. Chief, Intelligence Branch	23 Feb - 31 Dec	Lt. Col. A. L. Hinkle
a. Chief Collection Section	3 May - 31 Dec	Lt. Col. W. Wentworth
b. Chief Target Section	1 Jan - 28 May	Maj. McCarthy
	29 May - 31 Dec	Maj. R. E. Grady
c. Chief, Security Section	13 Apr - 31 Dec	Capt. R. L. Wilson
4. Chief Operations Branch	1 Jan - 20 Jun	Col. J. E. Johnson
	21 Jun - 31 Dec	Col. J. J. Windsor
a. Chief MABOPS Section (34 A)	18 May - 31 Dec	Cdr. J. M. Seger
b. Chief Abn Opns/Section	1 Jan - 11 Jun	Lt. Col. E. A. Partain
	12 Jun - 31 Dec	Lt. Col. R. W. Woolard
c. Chief AIROPS Section	1 Jan - 14 May	Lt. Col. L. V. Grosshuesch
	15 May - 31 Dec	Col. R. A. Downey

	Dates	Name
[illegible] Section	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] Ann Opn (MPS Section	29 Sep - 31 Dec	Lt. Col. [illegible]
[illegible] Branch	[illegible] - 14 May [illegible] - 31 Dec	[illegible] Mr. [illegible]
[illegible] Section	[illegible] - 15 Nov 16 Nov - 31 Dec	Lt. [illegible] Lt. [illegible]
[illegible] Capacity Section	14 May - 31 Dec	CWO [illegible]
[illegible] Transportation Section	Vacant	
[illegible] Branch	[illegible] - 13 [illegible] 14 [illegible] - 31 Mar	Cdr. R. M. [illegible] Cdr. A. H. [illegible]
[illegible] Group	1 Jan - 25 Apr 26 Apr - 23 Oct 23 Oct - 31 Dec	Cdr. [illegible] Cdr. R. [illegible] Cdr. W. C. [illegible]
[illegible] Plans Tng Det	1 Jan - 15 Nov 16 Nov - 31 Dec	Lt. Col. W. C. [illegible] Lt. Col. W. [illegible]
[illegible] TRTSC Group	22 Jan - 31 Dec	Lt. Col. [illegible]
[illegible] MPOS Group (Flt Det)	1 Jan - 14 May 15 May - 31 Dec	Col. R. A. Downey Lt. Col. C. F. Dixon
[illegible] Plans Branch	3 Dec - 31 Dec	Lt. Col. V. W. Lang
[illegible] Comptroller Section	Vacant	

NAME	RANK	SS	STATUS
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible], Robert D.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible], [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible], Robert J.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible], Douglas D.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible], Thomas F.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible], George A.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible], [illegible] W.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

[illegible] Table of Casualties in Service I (Vietnam War) in
1968 [illegible] Historical Summary

SECTION I - ADMINISTRATION

1. Command: Colonel Donald D. Blackburn, 033734, assumed command of SOG effective 3 June 1965, replacing Colonel Clyde E. Russell, 032475, the original commander.

2. Organization:

a. On 1 January 1965 SOG began operating under the JTD of 1 January 1965 with an authorized strength of 63 officers, 2 warrant officers, 14 civilians and 67 enlisted men.

b. On 1 July 1965 SOG began operating under a new JTD of 1 July 1965 as a result of the semi-annual review required of the SOG structure. This gave SOG an authorized strength of 68 officers, 2 warrant officers, 11 civilians and 74 enlisted men.

c. On 7 August 1965 Change #1 to the 1 July 1965 JTD was submitted and approved. The significant changes were addition of an Executive Officer and an addition of the Plans Branch. This increased SOG authorized strength to 73 officers, 2 warrant officers, 11 civilians and 78 enlisted men.

d. On 29 September 1965 Change #2 to the 1 July 1965 JTD was submitted and approved. This change pertained to each section of the SOG; however, the most significant changes were:

(1) The addition of a special assistant for airborne operations (Grade O-6) to coordinate and supervise Shining Brass activities.

(2) The addition of a liaison officer (Grade O-5) to provide command liaison with the counterpart organization, Strategic Technical Service (STS) of the Army of Vietnam (ARVN).

(3) The upgrading and redesignation of the Chief clerk position to E-9, SMaj, and

(4) The addition of a civilian personnel officer (Grade W-2) to administer employment of local nationals, primarily in support of airborne operations, both 34A and Shining Brass.

e. On 15 October 1965 CINCPAC published a new JTD. This changed SOG authorized strength to 86 officers, 2 warrant officers, 15 civilians and 114 enlisted men.

f. JCS message 9525 DTG 292113Z Dec 65 approved establishing a comptroller section with a strength of 3 officers and 2 enlisted men. One of the officer spaces was to be obtained by converting an existing TD space (Para 03, line 03). The addition of the other four spaces resulted in an authorized strength of 88 officers, 3 warrant officers, 15 civilians and 113 enlisted men.

g. CG, FMFPAC directed by message DTG 250135Z Dec 65 that a Marine Recon Section be established with a strength of one officer and 3 enlisted men. This further increased the SOG authorized strength to 89 officers, 3 warrant officers, 15 civilians and 119 enlisted men.

h. The January and end 1965 organizations are shown at Tabs A and B respectively.

3. Personnel:

a. Tab C is a list of SOG key commanders and staff officers.

b. During CY 65 SOG suffered 1 KIA, 3 WIA, 2 non-battle deaths and 7 medical evacuees. See Tab D.

TABS:

A - January 1965 Organization

B - End 1965 Organization

C - List of Key Officers

D - List of Casualties

SECTION II - OPERATIONS

1. This section deals with operations under the following subheadings:

II A - Airborne

II B - Shining Brass (Laos - x Border)

II C - Air Operations

II D - Maritime

II E - Psychological Warfare

2. Although not exclusively devoted to Airborne training (34A), the Camp Long Thanh Historical Summary has been included as Tab D to Section II A.

SECTION IIA - AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

1. PLANNING AND POLICY:

a. A general reorganization of ground operations in NVN eventuated from a series of newly proposed concepts and intra-theater conferences. This revised policy emphasized the MT early warning observation team) mission, expansion of the intelligence base, and de-emphasized interdiction activity. Mentioned below are the significant policy/planning matters which occurred during CY 65.

b. Early Warning Observation Teams (EWOTS):

(1) Acting on a JCS query, CINCPAC msg DTG 272116Z Feb requested DATA comments on advisability of infiltrating 34A agents between the 17th and 19th parallels for early warning of any Chicom buildup.

(2) DATA It discussed the current capabilities of 34A assets which, in light of the magnitude of the JCS proposed mission, were meager, and requested that the Special Military Intelligence Activities Team (SMIAT) resources and operational teams in-place in NVN not be tapped for this mission. This message proposed that battle tested ARVN volunteers, specially trained by SOG in the EWOTS mission, be infiltrated by sea along the coastline from the 17th to the 19th parallel with the mission of penetrating to Highway 1, observing it for one week, and then exfiltrating overland to Laos, thus providing nearly continuous surveillance of Highway 1.

(3) CINCPAC msg DTG 110236Z Jun, a retransmission of a DIA message, emphasized to SOG the inadequacy of the intelligence data base concerning the infiltration of personnel and material into RVN, and presented a requirement for increased MT with the major effort on MT . SOG took the position on this requirement that the MT in NVN were inseparable, constituting one collection effort with SOG having primary responsibility with MACV. A detailed re-evaluation of the original EWOTS concept was undertaken in

view of possible improvement in infiltration techniques, bases and capability.

(4) MACSOG msg DTG 160712Z Oct '65 revised SOG's original EWOTS concept. It proposed that EWOTS MT operations be undertaken as a matter of priority in areas south of the 20th parallel and that subsequent reinforcement of teams be made to increase their viability and provide capabilities for an expanded intelligence collection effort. It further proposed that MT EWOTS missions north of the 20th parallel be undertaken as an additional task by in-place teams or teams scheduled for future infiltration, the scope of these operations to include surveillance over every major road from NVN into Laos. To minimize personnel losses, infiltration and reinforcement would be made by helicopter whenever possible, augmented by fixed wing aircraft, when required.

DATA

c. Heliborne Infiltration Concept:

(1) MACSOG msg DTG 070115Z Jun recommended that heliborne and/or overland infiltration be considered for team employment in selected areas in NVN.

(2) CINCPAC msg DTG 090335Z Jun stated that it had previously concurred to JCS with use of VNAF helicopter against NVN providing aircraft and crews were sanitized, but requested at this time a detailed and coordinated plan for employment of teams against selected routes in NVN.

(3) MACSOG msg DTG 160710Z Oct, replying to c(2) above, stated that: Staging of heliborne activities from bases in Thailand and Vietnam over Laos and DATA intermediate staging areas (ISA) in Laos is considered essential to an expanded program of operations in the NVN; fixed wing aircraft, lacking all weather capability and sophisticated electronic navigational equipment, cannot provide the accuracy nor sustain a resupply rate required for

expanded operations in NVN owing poor weather conditions in the area; helicopters are less affected by weather in the mountainous areas of operations and can emplace, reinforce, or resupply an operational team with great accuracy; operational teams could move from vicinity Saigon by C-123 aircraft to a launch base at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand

DATA

for refueling, or directly to an LZ in NVN or on the Laos-NVN border; if the latter, it was further proposed

DATA

, oriented on the terrain and situation, and pointed toward safe areas in NVN. The message also discussed resupply by military helicopters and C-123 aircraft and exfiltration of teams by helicopter.

d. Extension of Agreements on Use of Base at Nakhon Phanom:

(1) MACSOG DTG 091218Z Sep requested the American Embassy in Bangkok to secure Royal Thailand Government (RTG) agreement for staging 34A operational teams through Nakhon Phanom and Udorn. AMEMB Bangkok 110647Z Sep stated that the RTG-US agreements at present did not include permission for operations of this type, but agree to seek RTG permission if requested and if no other practical alternatives existed. By MACSOG 150853Z Sep, AMEMB Bangkok reiterated the request. AMEMB Bangkok DTG 211037Z Sep stated that Air Chief Marshall Dawee, CHULLASAPTA, Deputy Minister of Defense and C/S of the Supreme Command, agreed to extend earlier RTG permission to use of Nakhon Phanom, to include Op 34A missions involving transfer from unmarked C-123s coming from Vietnam DATA , for onward movement. He did not agree, however, to use of Udorn for these new type operations, because of the increased security problem at the location.

(2) This approval was a major step forward for SOG operations in that it gave SOG a greater degree of flexibility in choosing the best area for staging infiltration/reinforcement teams.

DATA

DATA

DATA

DATA

DATA

f. The total effect of the above approved policy matters was contained in CINCPAC msg DTG 300241Z Oct which stated the mission for the Airborne Operations Section. This mission is: "34A Guerrilla in-place teams and teams to be infiltrated into NVN will conduct intelligence, sabotage, psychological, and escape and evasion (E&E) operations. 34A teams are authorized to recruit and support local agents in NVN for intelligence and E&E nets. Physical destruction operations may be conducted against selected targets by 34A guerrilla teams providing security of intelligence and E&E nets is not jeopardized."

g. This general reorganization of ground operations as expressed in the mission statement further led to the development of a meaningful, long range program of activating operational areas around major routes leading from NVN into Laos, and has become the basis for all recruiting, training and planning in the Airborne Operations Section. (See TAB A for location of in-place and proposed team areas).

2. CHRONOLOGY OF TEAM OPERATIONS:

a. General: The Airborne Operations Section commenced operations in 1965 with six teams totaling 59 agents in-place in North Vietnam. (See TAB A for location of teams). The primary mission of all these teams originally was to conduct limited ambushes, target destruction, and psychological and harassing operations against designated targets. In October, the emphasis on target destruction decreased and the gathering of intelligence through the expansion of local contacts and the utilization of road-watch teams increased. To this end, two specially trained road/river watch teams were infiltrated, and four teams were reinforced by road/river watch trained personnel. Only one element (Sub-Team REMUS ALFA) of a team (REMUS) was lost during the year, and its three members are listed as missing and presumed captured. An additional six agents were killed and three more died of natural causes. Numerous targets were damaged or destroyed and a large number of intelligence reports were received and forwarded to the Intelligence Section for evaluation. The operational teams were resupplied/reinforced nineteen times during the year.

b. Team ANES:

(1) Background: This team consists solely of a singleton agent who was infiltrated by sea in April 1961. Control of his operations was switched from MAROPS Section to the Airborne Operations Section when resupply by sea proved to be impossible. His main function is to collect intelligence information through his own personal observation and those of his recruited sub-agents.

(2) March: Agent located a DZ in the KHE-BU Mountain range vic YJ 085365.

(3) April: Agent reported on village militia air defense training which included construction of air raid shelters in the villages.

(4) June: Agent reported an increase in the draft call in NVN, and provided information on populace reaction to allied air strikes.

(5) July: Agent submitted his plan to send a sub-agent to Haiphong and he discussed the possibilities of a sub-agent joining the army.

(5) September: The sub-agent travelled to Haiphong but did not locate his contact. He reported that the city streets were mostly deserted and that the State stores were closed. He noted that there were fewer ships in port than in the past.

(7) October: Agent provided description of Armed Public Security Force (APSF) cap and shirt collar insignia. He also reported airstrike results UONG BI. The sub-agent travelled to HA LONG BAY and reported on beach patrols conducted by APSF. On 26 October ARES reported that Haiphong City and Quang Ninh province capital populace were ordered to partially evacuate the city. Report also confirmed that the State stores were only open at night since the beginning of the airstrikes against NVN.

(8) November: Reported on village air defense incentives and rewards. He provided additional information on the intensification of coastal patrols in HA LONG and LAN HA BAY.

(9) December: Reported on North Vietnamese Army units deploying to villages to aid in air defense training for village militia. He also provided some post strike results.

c. Team BELL:

(1) February: The resupply aircraft with a reinforcing team aboard was hit by enemy fire in the vicinity of BELL DZ. The mission had already aborted due to clouds and fog obscuring DZ. The team reported hearing the aircraft but not the firing of weapons, although the aircraft crew placed the time of attack within 2 minutes of the time BELL DZ was overflown. Five personnel in aircraft were wounded; none killed. The aircraft returned to the staging area. (See TAB B). Two phony messages were sent to team to attempt to determine if they had been compromised. The team sent detailed target information on 2 bridges.

(2) March: No resupply effected. Sabotage plan to destroy one bridge was sent to Central. The team later said that the bridges reconnoitered are too dangerous to be sabotaged and Central changed their mission to that of train derailment. On 17-18 March the first attempt to destroy a bridge was unsuccessful due to the presence of bridge guards. BELL 8, 2 and 14 were sick and needed medicine.

UNREADABLE

(7) August: No resupply effected. Team in a survival status. Team states it has no relatives in Pride in operational area, however, conditions permitting, they will attempt to contact local population. 4 men were sent to report new safe area NW of present location in order to get out of the Salt ring. Remainder of team started move toward new safe area 2 days later.

(8) September: No resupply effected. Team arrived at the new safe area, VR 475280. On 5 September, most of the month was spent conducting railroad and river watch missions at VR 51034 and VR 55[illegible]. Team was directed to begin movement to a new safe area, VR 420380, on 10 September and to leave one agent behind to continue observation on railroad watch site. Because the team was in a survival status only 7 members departed and the remainder of the team searched for food.

(9) October: Team closed on the new safe area. An unsuccessful search was conducted for a downed USAF pilot. A new railroad/river watch site was established VR 438417. Team was directed to move out on the range of AA gun ring to a new safe area vicinity VR 274407. Team reports that EMM 2 is mentally ill.

(10) November: No resupply effected. Permission was granted for the team to move to a new safe area leaving 2 men behind to care for BELL 2. The team arrived on 30 November. DATA results continue to be reported.

(11) December: Because of medicine shortages BELL 2 and 8 died during the month from sickness. The team was granted permission to defer executing railroad/road/river watch until after the resupply was received. Because woodcutters in the vicinity of the team's safe area, the team moved its safe area to VK 265515. BELL 11 was reported to be sick and unless medicines were received by team, he would probably die. Team was given the task of attempting to locate where US troops and pilots are being held in NVN. Team also asked to report what controls have been established in team's area.

d. Team EAGLE:

(1) January: No resupply was effected. The death of EAGLE 6 was reported.

(2) February: No resupply was effected. A plan was devised to resupply ARES via a bundle drop to EAGLE, who would then set up a cache/dead drop for ARES.

(3) March: No resupply was effected. The location of a dead drop was reported at stream fork (Coord XJ 714443).

(4) April: No resupply was effected. An additional dead drop near stream fork (Coord XJ 866245) was established. The team reported that EAGLE 2 desired to return to his native village to seek the support of his relatives.

(5) June: No resupply was effected. The team was informed that resupply was impossible due to air defense artillery. They were instructed to search for food and to monitor all broadcasts while a new resupply system was worked out. (Abn and Air Ops began investigating high speed delivery of containers by prop or jet aircraft).

(6) August: No resupply effected. The team reported the names and villages of relatives near their operational area.

(7) September: No resupply was [illegible]. An exchange of messages resulted in the determination of [illegible] 2's uncle as the individual to be contacted by the team.

(8) November: No resupply was effected. However, work on a high speed [illegible] delivery [illegible] is in progress and a successful [illegible] has been completed. An unannounced [illegible] for a downed pilot [illegible] the team had to call off the search [illegible] survival kit. [illegible] returned from making a successful initial contact with chief 2's uncle. From the reports of the team upon their return from [illegible] 2's uncle's village, it appears that the team has good future civilian contacts and/or recruitment possibilities in this area.

(9) December: No resupply was effected. The team reported on various population and resources control measures in area.

e. Team EASY:

(1) January: EASY was resupplied with 7 bundles consisting of food and clothing.

(2) March: Three team members returned from a reconnaissance of a bridge at UJ 654834. They reported on security conditions at the site and gave a description of the bridge. Three other team members returned from contacting two local agents (EASY 9 and 10). EASY 9 and 10 reported on conditions in their villages and on the location of additional contacts, their cousins, who lived at UJ 468839.

(3) April: EASY was resupplied with 6 bundles and told to destroy the bridge. Silenced pistols were included in the resupply. Two team members returned from again contacting EASY 9 and 10. They reported on their cousins who were disenchanted with the VC and on 12 other possible agents in area.

(4) May: EASY was resupplied with 5 bundles and were reinforced with 5 additional agents. HORSE 5 was killed on the drop and EASY 19 was injured.

(5) June: EASY 19 recovered. A wire cutting team returned from cutting wires at UJ 8261 and UJ 8464. A 5-man vehicle demolition mission was aborted when a meeting engagement occurred with enemy. EASY 11 was killed.

(6) July: Two team members returned from contacting EASY 9 and 10 again. They met and reported on one of the cousins of EASY 9 and 10, results of airstrikes, and movement of some VC recruits.

(7) August: Team was resupplied with 5 bundles.

(8) September: Team was resupplied on 17 September with 4 bundles and reinforced with 9 agents (Team DOG/GECKO, later EASY ALFA). EASY was again resupplied with 9 bundles on 18 September. EASY 1 and 4 returned from contacting EASY 10 and meeting a prospective agent, NAME. Psyops radios were distributid on some trails and EASY 10 was given two radios to distribute to people friendly to our cause.

(9) October: Team GECKO/DOG was attached to EASY and instructions to this effect dispatched to each team. Ten bundles were dropped on 12 October followed by 7 bundles and 3 agents (remainder of GECKO team) on 18 October.

(10) November: Team was resupplied with ten bundles. The team was notified of a US pilot being downed in their area and ordered to search for him. (This was a spurious report. The purpose of this was to test the team's reliability).

(11) December: Search was abandoned for two missing bundles from the September/October drops. EASY accomplished the mission of establishing a cache with food to last one month for EASY ALFA.

f. Team EASY ALFA:

(1) Background: Team DOG/GECKO was infiltrated to team EASY in two increments; one on 17 September consisting of 9 men, and the second on 18 October consisting of 3 men. This team had the initial mission of teaching Team EASY MT techniques. Upon completion of that training they were instructed to establish a MT site overlooking the SONG MA River and National Routes 69 and 44A.

(2) October: Team DOG/GECKO redesignated Team EASY ALFA and activated as a separate team on 30 October.

(3) November: EASY ALFA established radio contact with Central on 5 November 1965 and reported being enroute to MT site. On 8 November three members of EASY ALFA became engaged in a fire fight with 3-4 enemy troops at UJ 610450. EASY 24 was killed and EASY 29 wounded. EASY 24's body and equipment were captured by the enemy. The remainder of the team broke contact and escaped. An exchange of messages determined that EASY 24 possessed an unmarked map when killed. In late November the team reached a MT and began looking for a MT site.

(4) December: EASY ALFA reported food carried on mission had run out. Team EASY was instructed to cache one month's worth of food for EASY ALFA vicinity UJ 8527. Personnel on the MT site (UJ 9413) reported that they had observed National Routes 44A and 69 but they were unable to locate any route running south into Laos.

g. Team REMUS:

(1) January: REMUS was resupplied with 4 bundles and 4 additional agents. REMUS 20 broke his leg on the infiltration jump and REMUS 16 died from a fractured skull. This reinforcement team has been trained in the employment of 4.5 rockets and were to be used to attack Dien Bien Phu airfield. 5 additional agents, who were scheduled to drop, did not infiltrate due to an alleged illness.

(2) April: REMUS was resupplied with 5 bundles containing supplies and equipment. 5 agents returned from a reconnaissance of Dien Bien Phu and reported locating a fair observation site. The team was discovered by enemy troops, but was able to break contact effectively.

(3) May: REMUS was resupplied with 5 bundles. REMUS 19 died on 11 May; suspected cause was malaria. Also on 11 May, REMUS ALFA (5 agents) began exfiltrating to Laos as instructed. (See TAB C). REMUS ALFA reported that REMUS 6 was ill and that they were leaving REMUS 5 behind to care for him.

(4) June: REMUS reported REMUS 1 was sick and REMUS 20 had difficulty in walking. REMUS ALFA (now 3 men) continued exfiltrating and reporting their location periodically.

(5) July. REMUS 1 and 20 were reported as still sick. The three agents dispatched in May from REMUS with the mission of guiding REMUS 5 and 6 back to the safe area returned. They brought back only REMUS 5, as REMUS 6 had died on 16 July. REMUS ALFA continued exfiltrating and reporting their location.

(6) August: REMUS was resupplied with 4 bundles. The team submitted information on approximately 14 relatives living in or near their operational area. On 21 August REMUS ALFA was last heard. They stated they were at TJ 785367, cashing their radio and heading for Vientiane.

(7) September: The team was resupplied with 9 bundles on 16 September and an additional 9 bundles on 17 September consisting mostly of food, demolition equipment and supplies.

(8) November: REMUS was resupplied with 9 bundles on 10 November and 9 bundles on 15 November. Six team members returned from a successful vehicle ambush. A new portion of Route 19 northeast of Dien Bien Phu was reported under construction and MT observations on this road were begun. Two team members returned from the search for downed pilot, but reported that they were unable to locate him.

(9) December: Team recovered all but one bundle from drop of 11 November but have not yet found any bundles from drop of 14 November. The initial contact was made with the brother-in-law of REMUS 1, who was recruited as support and intelligence agent. The team reported on security controls in the Muong Bang area and on post strike results in Dien Bien Phu. They also noted that a portion of Route 19 had been abandoned.

h. Team ROMEO:

(1) November: Team initially infiltrated into NVN by VNAF helicopter on 19 November to an LZ at XD 702897. The pilot reported seeing approximately 20 personnel about 3 km from LZ, but not sufficiently close, in his opinion, to endanger the team if they reacted as planned.

(2) December: No contact was made with the team until 10 December. Numerous communication procedural errors, lack of significant enemy information from team, inability to answer challenge questions and other indications, raises the possibility team is compromised. Team

reported that their food supply is exhausted and requested resupply.

i. Team TOURBILLON:

(1) January: The team reported that TOURBILLON 3 was sick. While moving on 11 January team had a meeting engagement with an enemy group. The team was split during their withdrawal from the engagement when another enemy group engaged them. Five TOURBILLON members and the COOTS sub-team (infiltrated to TOURBILLON as a reinforcement in May 1964) could not be located after the firefight. On 13 January TOURBILLON again ran into enemy patrol while moving.

(2) February: Contact made with separated element who reported TOURBILLON 2 and 4 were sick. The separated element (COOTS team) and the remainder of the team (TOURBILLON) were located a considerable distance apart. Accordingly, both were told to locate DZs in order that they could be resupplied.

(3) April: On 14 April COOTS was resupplied with bundles, 2 of which were for TOURBILLON. Poor weather over TOURBILLON's DZ prevented them from being resupplied. TOURBILLON was told to move to VJ 300070 to pick up their two food bundles, which had been cached by COOTS for them.

(4) May: TOURBILLON arrived at and located the food cache. Using elaborate security measures in the event either COOTS or TOURBILLON had been compromised while separated, elements from the two groups were linked-up on 28 May.

(5) June: The link-up of COOTS and TOURBILLON was completed on 3 June. The team was operational for the first time since January. Limited harassment operations were conducted against LOC during the period 19 June - 23 July by means of wire cutting vicinity VJ 475125 and a vehicle ambush at VJ 374223.

(6) July: The team was resupplied with 9 bundles. All bundles were recovered even though the drop missed the DZ. Two bundles, however, were badly damaged.

(7) August: A MT site was set up on Route 6 at VJ 572016 and reported 3 to 5 military vehicles moving each day in both directions during daylight. The

team observed some destroyed buildings at MOC CHAU during the period 3-7 October. The team was resupplied with 9 bundles, only seven of which were recovered. Again the drop missed the DZ.

(8) October: The team conducted a search for an actual downed pilot, but was unable to locate him. The team was resupplied with 10 bundles, 9 of which were recovered. Again the pilot dropped early and the resupply missed the DZ. The team set up caches, a DZ, and safe areas for VERSE who infiltrated on 7 November. The drop missed the DZ, but all 6 bundles and 8 agents were recovered.

(9) November: The two teams were resupplied with 10 bundles, 7 of which were recovered. For the third straight time the pilot missed the DZ. VERSE team began instructing TOURBILLON in MT techniques.

(10) December: Three members of TOURBILLON were reassigned to Team VERSE in order to set up MT site. On 21 December VERSE was detached from TOURBILLON and constituted as a separate team.

j. Team VERSE:

(1) Background: VERSE was an 8-man team, especially trained to perform a MT mission, who was infiltrated by parachute to team TOURBILLON on 7 November. VERSE's initial missions were two-fold. First, remain with and train TOURBILLON in MT techniques; second, upon completion of this training, to conduct MT on Route 68. COOTS, an element of TORUBILLON, made the initial reconnaissance of the VERSE operational area near Route 68 and conducted the initial MT in September and October. COOTS was given the mission of prestocking the MT with 30 days supplies and reporting on drop zones in the operational area.

(2) November: Team VERSE was infiltrated by parachute to a DZ located at VJ 476075 on 7 November 1965. Of the 8 agents infiltrated, VERSE 6 was apparently killed on the drop and VERSE 2 died 24 November of injuries sustained on the drop. VERSE 6's body was found on 15 November. VERSE made first radio contact and reported landing at VJ 453095, an extremely rugged forested area. All six bundles dropped with the team were recovered. VERSE began conducting MT training for TOURBILLON and reported an estimated completion date of 30 November.

(3) December: Both VERSE and TOURBILLON were instructed that VERSE would depart TOURBILLON's area to initiate MT of Route 68. Three TOURBILLON agents joined VERSE to provide an additional radio operator and team members since VERSE infiltrated with only one radio operator. Team was detached from TOURBILLON on 21 December, when they commenced move to their MT site.

3. RECRUITING:

a. Objectives: Until September recruiting was the direct responsibility of Strategic Technical Service (STS). In September the Airborne Operations Section undertook to develop realistic recruiting objectives based on projected operations. A detailed study was conducted to determine the DATA and quantity of recruits necessary to meet these forecasted needs. It was determined that 198 recruits were needed during the forthcoming seven months period. This figure included a 10% attrition factor for losses incurred during training.

b. Targeted Recruits: This detailed study also determined that the target of the recruitment program should be re-

MT

c. System Employed: A unilateral recruiting system was employed.

MT

(1) The leader MT was selected as the Chief Recruiter. He was selected primarily because

MT

(2) Recruitment started two months after the initial contact was made between the Chief Recruiter MT It consisted of a trip to the vicinity of Dalat for the purpose of re-establishing contact with the MT Five days after arrival a group of 26 candidates was recruited. Transportation was

[illegible] four days later the new recruits were picked up and airlifted to the training camp at Camp Long Thanh [illegible] where they were processed and began training.

(3) After the first recruitment trip it was felt that MT should be employed in each of the possible areas and kept in place. They would be directly under control of and communicate with the Chief Recruiter. These MT brought into Saigon. Here they received detailed instructions on their mission and were given MT They were then escorted back to their respective areas of operation to begin the steady flow of recruits into Camp Long Thanh. Some of the recruits were picked up by C-123 and transported to LT, others arrived via other modes of transportation.

(4) Thus, at the beginning of December, a complete recruiting net was in operation. The schematic organization of this net is as follows:



4. TRAINING:

a. The training of all agent teams scheduled for future employment in NVN (Op-34) is conducted under the supervision of the Senior Advisor, Camp Long Thanh (SALT), who is guided in these activities by a program of Instruction developed by the Chief, Airborne Operations Section. In general, all training of these teams is conducted in and around the area of Long Thanh, although some facilities of the THU DUC, ARVN Training Center are utilized for leadership training, and a special drop zone near Dalat for practicing tree drop procedures and techniques of assembly is presently being used.

[illegible] During the year [illegible] in [illegible] training and have either been infiltrated into NVN or were awaiting infiltration at the end of the year. In addition 116 agents were in training on 31 December with completion dates in the first two quarters of 1968.

c. It should be noted to avoid any possible errors in counting of trained agents that on 22 March a decision was made by Chief SOG to form the first five cross-border teams (Op-35) out of the existing Op-34A resources. Thus 41 trained agents were transferrdd from Op-34 to Op-35.

d. For a detailed discussion of the dates, numbers, ethnic composition and problems of the various teams in training at Camp Long Thanh, reference is made to that section of the Historical Summary pertaining to Camp Long Thanh. (TAB D)

5. PROBLEM AREAS. Three general problems areas continue to plague 34A airborne operations and have resulted in less effective and more restrictive operations.

a. Limitations on Aircraft (numbers and types):

(1) Airborne operations during the past year have been hampered by the limited numbers and the types of aircraft available for employment by this section. During any given launch period, no more than two C-123 aircraft are usually available at the same time. An additional four H-34 helicopters VNAF crews, currently supporting Shining Brass operations, are available for periodic employment in 34A programs. These helicopters however, are generally unsuitable to 34A operations because of range and cargo carrying limitations.

(2) In order to adequately support the present in-place teams, and to have the capability of introducing and supporting additional teams in NVN, a combination of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft are needed. The helicopters, with a suitable range and lift capability, will insure the relatively safe delivery of an intact operational team to a pre-selected point. A fixed wing aircraft with a greater allowable cargo load (ACL) than that of the C-123 aircraft, and possessing the capability of flying missions independent of the moon period will permit two or three resupply operations to be flown on one sortie.

[illegible] For a detailed discussion of the airlift presently available to SOG and the specific measures taken by SOG to solve this problem, reference is made to the Air Operations Section of the Historical Summary.

[illegible] Inadequate Base Rights.

(1) SOG C-123 aircraft are permitted to fly infiltration, reinforcement and resupply missions from Nakhon Phanom and Udorn by agreement with RTG.

DATA

[illegible] In addition, VNAF helicopters may be used to deploy teams into the NVN from bases in SVN.

DATA

[illegible] use of intermediate staging areas in Laos for refueling VNAF helicopters incident to infiltration of agent teams into NVN; use of US crews in support of 34A operations in the NVN; or use of Thai border station at BUNG KAN.

(2) Projected airborne operations during 1966 will place heavy demands on all available resources to emplace operational teams. Four new operational areas are scheduled for activation. Delivery techniques must offer the highest assurance of emplacing all team members in or near the operational area. Helicopter infiltration is considered the best method of doing this. Yet, all areas programmed for activation are beyond the limits of missions which can be flown in VNAF helicopters from bases in SVN. Additionally, all areas are beyond, or marginally close to, the practical limits of range and cargo capability of the H-34 helicopter operating from Nakhon Phanom. At the end of the year, consideration was being given to requesting CINCPAC views on expansion of base rights in Thailand and Laos.

c. Limited Coordination SOG Operations in NVN: DATA

(1) DOD DATA 062143Z Jul 65 states "that COMUSMACV is responsible for overall planning of all anti-NVN military or paramilitary operations within NVN and should be fully consulted during the execution of such operations".

DATA

DATA

DATA

DATA

DATA

TABS

A - Operational Map (Location of in-place and proposed team areas)

B - Reliability of Team BELL

C - Circumstances Surrounding the Loss of Sub-Team REMUS ALFA

D - Camp Long Thanh



LOCATION	[illegible]
[illegible]	1
[illegible]	2
[illegible]	5
[illegible]	12
[illegible]	10
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	10
[illegible]	11
[illegible]	9
[illegible]	[illegible]

CMAB B) to SECF 11a (Airborne Operations) 1965 SOS Tactical Summary

MT

1. A C-123 departed from Danang at [illegible] February to resupply/reinforce Team BELL. At 1415[illegible] February it passed over the DZ, which was obscured by ground fog although higher terrain clearly identified its position. Because of the fog, the MT was not seen. At this point the pilot cancelled the drop and started to turn right. Members of the infiltrating team were returning to their seats, and the ramp and ramp door were partially closed. Within two minutes of the DZ, the aircraft was hit by heavy bursts of machinegun fire, later believed to be 12.7mm, with indications some bullets were API. The aircraft initially went out of control, but after a few minutes the pilot regained control and managed to limp into DATA

2. Most of the occupants in the aircraft received minor lacerations from bullets or fragments, although only five personnel were hospitalized. The table navigator DATA was wounded in his thigh, the nose navigator DATA was wounded through the stomach, one Parachute Delivery Officer (PDO) had a finger shot off his left hand and another PDO was shot in the left leg. Finally, an MT from the reinforcing team was shot in the left foot and suffered headwounds.

3. At least 31 entries into the left side, rear and bottom of the aircraft, and 205 exit holes from fragments and bullets were found by investigators. The left nacelle tank was also hit. The rounds appeared to have been fired from below. The crew believes that the firing was from the ground, but the two PDOs both assert they saw a helicopter through the 20 inch crack between the closed ramp and the partially closed ramp door. Neither saw a gun firing, but both heard two machinegun bursts and both were familiar with the appearance of helicopters. The crew however, was positive that no other aircraft was in the area. It is possible that an armed helicopter, such as the H1-4, with speed rating of 150 knots, fired the bursts. It is also possible that the PDOs saw an armed propeller driven air-

craft. Although varied opinions have been expressed by personnel who examined the aircraft, the conclusion of technical intelligence personnel that the damage was caused by ground fire is considered valid.

4. Certain preliminary evidence seemed to indicate the Team BELL was DATA The team, when queried, reported that they did not hear any weapons fire, although the aircraft was reportedly within 4 nautical miles of the DZ. In the previous two years, BELL had never reported observing enemy units training in the area, therefore it was considered unlikely that a unit armed with caliber .50 weapons was coincidentally present. Since the aircraft was hit by a least two bursts, it was probably observed by the gun crews emplaced on the high ridges or peaks, rather than in the low terrain which was obscured by fog. Based on the ruggedness of the terrain, it appeared unlikely that the weapons would be so located DATA

In spite of that incident, no other evidence exists to indicate that the team is either DATA During the succeeding months, US and Vietnamese operations officers carefully examined all communications with Team BELL MT They have MT and have reported MT They have moved 50-60 kilometers to the northwest in accordance with instructions. They have attempted three sabotage missions, succeeding in cutting communication wires on two of these missions and only aborting the other mission, that of bridge destruction, when they were discovered by the guards and in the ensuing firefight suffered one KIA and one WIA.

To further MT a MT MT locate him. It was suggested that helicopter exfiltration might be arranged if the pilot was located. If the team were DATA it is felt that the MT BELL reported negative results in their search.

In retrospect, the C-123 incident MT than it did at the time of occurrence. While it may never be explained, it now seems probable that the aircraft, whether on or off course, flew over a transient NVN military unit, possibly moving during hours of darkness and therefore in alert status. Analysis of all available evidence leads this section to conclude that MT

(TAB C) to SECT IIA (Airborne Operations)
1965 SOG Historical Summary

CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE LOSS OF SUB-TEAM REMUS ALFA

1. Background: Sub-Team REMUS ALFA was the name given in May 1965 to the surviving original 6 members of Team REMUS (infiltrated in April 1962) who were given the mission of exfiltrating from NVN to Laos for pickup by DATA and return to the Saigon area for further use by SOG. This exfiltration was attempted for the following reasons:

a. Direct and immediate aid to the Airborne Operations Section.

b. Living proof to the new recruits at Camp Long Thanh (LT) that the mission is not a suicide mission.

c. Provide LT with some fully field experienced cadre.

d. Be a source for evaluating the training, equipment, delivery, support and operations of the operational teams deployed in NVN.

e. For use in Psy War broadcasts.

2. May: Sub-Team REMUS ALFA originally consisting of 5 men was given the mission on 11 May of moving to TJ 940900 to perform a dummy mission. The actual mission and ultimate destination were not made known to REMUS ALFA at this time, and they have never been known to REMUS. REMUS ALFA consisting of REMUS 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 commenced its move to the designated coordinates and Team REMUS (consisting of 10 men) began its move back to its previous safe area, where sub-Team REMUS MINUS (consisting of 3 men) was located. On 28 May, REMUS ALFA reported that REMUS 6 was ill and that they were ordering REMUS 5 to remain with him at TJ 901775 while the remainder of the team (now 3 men) proceeded to TJ 901275), the next specified coordinate. Team REMUS, when it arrived at its safe area, sent back 3 agents to assist REMUS 5 and 6 to return to the REMUS location.

3. June: REMUS ALFA reported on 2 June that they were located at TJ 901275; on 10 June at TJ 870743; on 17 June at TJ 848632 and on 23 June at TJ 815590. On 24 June REMUS ALFA was finally told that they were being exfiltrated to Laos for return to SVN.

4. July: REMUS ALFA reported on 1 July that they were located at TJ 830520; on 10 July at TJ 865470; and on 25 July at TJ 864380. During the month REMUS 2 became sick which held up the movement of the team. REMUS 2 recovered and the team continued its exfiltration. Some problems in commo developed during the month when REMUS 3 had to substitute for REMUS 2 as the radio operator. Team was sent the link-up plan with friendly forces in Laos. In the meantime, the 3 agents dispatched in May from REMUS with the mission of guiding REMUS 5 and 6 back to the safe area returned. They brought back only REMUS 5, as REMUS 6 had died on 16 July.

5. August: On 2 August the team was located at TJ 805375. Team was not heard from again until 19 August at which time they stated that they were at TJ 785367 and that their radio receiver was no longer operating. On 21 August, REMUS ALFA stated they were at TJ 715367 and were caching their radio prior to heading for Vientiane. This was the last contact SOG had with the team. SOG attempted to notify the team to remain in its present location and friendly personnel would be sent to meet them. A friendly team in Laos was dispatched to the last reported team location, but no trace was found of REMUS ALFA. This Laotian team remained in the area of TJ 7836 from 29 August until 3 September. Villagers in the area reported that 350 VC were based as security in and around TJ 7836. The Laotian team itself observed 50 VC in TJ 785363 area on 31 August.

6. September: The Laotian team reported that their guide, who was dispatched to contact villagers for information on the REMUS ALFA team, was captured by the VC on 3 September. The Laotian team then instructed all friendly villagers to be on the lookout for REMUS ALFA, but not to dispatch any additional contact parties to the TJ 7836 area. The reception team departed for home base on 5 September.

7. October: SOG transmitted blind to REMUS ALFA

DATA

REMUS ALFA was then terminated as an operational team.

TAB D (Camp Long Thanh) to Section II A
(Airborne Operations, 1965 SOG Historical Summary

4 Incl

1. Training Activities

2. Facility Improvements

3. Summary of Operations

4. Problem Areas

Inclosure 1 (Training Activities) to Tab D (Camp Long Thanh) to Section II A (Airborne Operations) 1965 SOG Historical Summary.

1. The following is a compilation of training activities at Camp Long Thanh for the Calender year 1965:

a. January 1965

(1) Student Status as of 7 January 1965

TEAM/GROUP	ETHNIC GP	STRENGTH	REMARKS
Bear A		3	Completed Tng
Commo	D	16	Completed Tng
Dog		8	Completed Tng
Horse	A	8	Completed Tng
Gecko		8	Completed Tng
Cat	T	8	Completed Tng
Marius		10	Completed Tng
Kern		7	Completed Tng
Group G	A	8	Completed Tng
Group F		32	Completed Tng
Bear B		7	Completed Tng
Group H		46	In Training
Group J		36	Commo Tng At Vung Tau
		197	

(2) During this month Groups F and H conducted training at Camp Long Thanh. Teams Horse, Gecko, Marius, Kern and Group C were put into Isolation. There was usually an average of 12 students AWOL during this

month. Group J was at Vung Tau receiving Communications Training. This was a result of an earlier decision to let ARVN train the radio operators.

b. February 1965

(1) Student Status as of 10 February 1965

TEAM/GROUP	ETHNIC GP	STRENGTH	REMARKS
Bear		9	Completed Tng
Cat		7	Completed Tng
Group F		21	Completed Tng
Commo		15	Completed Tng
Thang		46	In Training
Horse		9	Isolation
Gecko		8	Isolation
Dog		8	Isolation
Kern		7	Isolation
Marius		9	Isolation
Group G		1	Isolation
Group J		34	Commo Training
		179	

DATA

(2) During this month Training continued with Thang and Group J. The New Special Forces A Detachment commanded by Captain Joseph R. Maio arrived 17 February 1965. There was a one week change-over period before Captain Crawford's Detachment departed to Okinawa. The Average of AWOL's during the month was 17.

C. March 1965

(1) Student Status as of 10 March 1965

TEAM/GROUP	ETHNIC GP	STRENGTH	REMARKS
Bear		9	Completed Tng
Cat	D	6	Completed Tng
Group F		17	Completed Tng
Commo	A	15	Completed Tng
Thang		45	In Training
Danang	T	31	In Training
Group J		34	In Training
Dog	A	7	In Isolation
Horse		9	In Isolation
Gecko		3	In Isolation
Marius		6	In Isolation
Kern		7	In Isolation
		189	

(2) During this month Camp Long Thanh conducted a jump school for 31 people from MAROPS (Danang) which were VN Seal students. The Camp was also alerted for the possible cross border commitment. This occured about the middle of the month. On 22 March the first 5 XB (Cross Border) teams were formed out of existing Op 34A resources and a Sat Cong squad. One new group of students started training on 22 March. This group was later designated as Group M. There was an average of 18 students AWOL during this month.

d. April 1965

(1) Student Status as of 1 April 1965

TEAM/GROUP	ETHNIC GP	STRENGTH	REMARKS
Dog	DATA	6	Scheduled for Launch
Horse		9	Scheduled for Launch

Gecko	4	Scheduled for Launch
Marius	6	Scheduled for Launch
Kern	7	Scheduled for Launch
Commo	11	Completed Tng
Bear 2	9	Completed Tng
Trainees	47	In Training
Thang	40	In Training
Group J	21	Training in Vung Tau
Team G	3	Holdovers from Operational Tms
Bear 1	10	In Tng for XB Opns
K-1	8	In Tng for XB Opns
K-2	8	In Tng for XB Opns
Cat	13	In Tng for XB Opns

DATA

(2) Several coordination visits were made to Delta Project to gather information in methods and techniques of Recon Teams for the XB operations. The Commo Group (Group J) at Vung Tau was to have completed the training during this month, but due to a high AWOL rate (which is not reflected in the average AWOL rate since there are no records available for the daily status of the group) and disciplinary problems the course had to be extended. The Thang Group completed training and was broken into teams, and redesignated "H" Group with teams 1-7. The 11 man commo group at Camp Long Thanh was redesignated "M" Commo and projected as radio operators for the "H" Basic Group. One of the first major disciplinary problems occurred when there were members of the XB Teams, who did not qualify with weapons. These were to remain over the weekend of 11 April 1965 and requalify. This resulted in a large number of AWCL's and the elimination of between 10 to 15 students from the program.

e. May 1965

(1) Student Status as of 5 May 1965

TEAM/GROUP	ETHNIC GP	STRENGTH	REMARKS
D (Dog)		7	Scheduled for Launch
Kern		7	Scheduled for Launch
C (Commo)	D	11	Completed Training
G (Gecko)		9	Awaiting Mission
Marius	A	4	Awaiting Mission
M (Basic)		44	In Training
H (Thanh)	T	37	In Training
Group J	A	21	In Training
Team 1		10	XB Team Training
Team 2		10	XB Team Training
Team 3		10	XB Team Training
Team 4		11	XB Team Training

(2) During the month a special jump school was conducted for STS (Cadre from throughout the organization). Two XB Teams with US advisors were sent to Nha Trang to receive training by the Delta Project, however this never materialized due to friction between VNSF High Command and STS. Several US personnel were allowed to remain as observers, but the teams had to be sent back to Camp Long Thanh to continue their training. There was a daily average of 9 Students AWOL through the month.

f. June 1965

(1) Student Status as of 2 June 1965

TEAM/GROUP	ETHNIC GP	STRENGTH	REMARKS
Dog		7	Scheduled for Launch
Kern	D	5	Scheduled for Launch
G (Gecko)		9	Scheduled for Launch
Commo M	A	3	Awaiting Mission
M (Basic)		42	In Training
E (Thang)	T	43	In Training
C/B Jump School		29	In Training
Group J		21	In Training
Team 1	A	8	XB Team Training
Team 2		9	XB Team Training
Team 3		8	XB Team Training
Team 4		8	XB Team Training
Team 5		7	XB Team Training
Team 6		6	XB Team Training

(2) During this month Senior Advisor NAME NAME (SALT), Lt. Col. William C. Carper III, requested and received permission from NAME (CO STS) to use students with the Security Battalion to conduct combat operations against a VC complex. The XB teams and Group H participated in this operation, and it further served as a graduation exercise for these teams. Group J (Commo) returned from Vung Tau; it was determined that in 6 months of school at that location they had learned but very little. Their discipline and performance was far below normal. Action was taken to split up the group. The better students were put in with M Commo and the poorer put in a new group designated as Commo L. Further on in the month another group of new students were received and designated N Group.

The POI has been modified by Op 34A so that slow students could be recycled as necessary. A daily average of 4 students were AWOL during the month.

g. July 1965

(1) Student Status as of 1 July 1965

TEAM/GROUP	ETHNIC GP	STRENGTH	REMARKS
Dog		6	Scheduled for Launch
Kern	D	3	Scheduled for Launch
Gecko		9	Scheduled for Launch
Commo M		3	Completed Training
M (Basic)	A	22	In Training
H (Thang)		42	In Training
N (Basic)		40	In Training
Commo L	T	17	In Training
Commo 2		20	In Training
Loi Ho 1		6	On Leave
Loi Ho 2	A	6	On Leave
Loi Ho 3		5	On Leave
Loi Ho 4		6	On Leave
Loi Ho 5		5	On Leave
Loi Ho 6		4	On Leave

(2) During this month there was a change over in Senior Advisors. Lt. Colonel Carper rotated to CONUS and Lt. Colonel Norman, TDY from Okinawa, assumed the duties of SALT. Up to this time there was very little helicopter support for XB training. However, once helicopter support

same, it was reported that the crews were not "Special" and were rotated every year. The MT (EWOTS) concept was sent out to Camp Long Thanh and a POI was developed. The first group to receive this training was Group H. It was planned to give all XB students EWOTS training, FAC training, and live airstrike training.

There was a daily average of 5 students AWOL during the month.

h. August 1965

(1) Student Status as of 2 August 1965

TEAM/GROUP	ETHNIC GP	STRENGTH	REMARKS
Dog		5	Scheduled for Launch
Kern		7	Scheduled for Launch
Gecko		5	Scheduled for Launch
Thang 1		3	Scheduled for Launch
Thang 2		4	Scheduled for Launch
Comro M		3	Completed Training
Thang 2		5	Completed Training
Thang 3		5	Completed Training
Thang 4		6	Completed Training
Thang 6		5	Completed Training
Thang 7		4	Completed Training
Thang 8		5	Completed Training
Group N		38	In Training
Group M		22	In Training
Group J		14	In Training
Group M		18	In Training

DATA

Loi Ho 1		6	XB Team in Training
Loi Ho 2		6	XB Team In Training
Loi Ho 3		6	XB Team in Training
Loi Ho 4		6	XB Team in Training
Loi Ho 5		6	XB Team in Training

(2) During this month the XB teams received support in the form of 2 Delta Project helicopter and crews. Several full-scale FTX's were conducted in the vicinity of Camp Long Thanh. Along with the XB teams there were preparations for receiving the US Army personnel on TDY from Okinawa to support XB operations.

During this period there was a daily average of 12 students AWOL.

i. September 1965

(1) Student Status as of 1 September 1965

TEAM/GROUP	ETHNIC GP	STRENGTH	REMARKS
Kern		12	Scheduled for Launch
Gecko		8	Scheduled for Launch
Dog		5	Completed Training
Commo		2	Completed Training
H-2		5	Completed Training
H-3		5	Completed Training
H-4		5	Completed Training
H-6		5	Completed Training
H-7		4	Completed Training
H-8		5	Completed Training
Group M		22	In Training

Group N	D	27	In Training
Group J		14	In Training
Group L	A	19	In Training
Loi Ho 1	T	6	XB Team Training
Loi Ho 2		6	XB Team Training
Loi Ho 3	A	5	XB Team Training
Loi Ho 4		6	XB Team Training
Loi Ho 5		6	XB Team Training

(2) Two XB teams moved up to Khan Duc with advisors. During this period there was a daily average of 11 students AWOL.

j. October 1965

(1) Student Status as of 1 October 1965

TEAM/GROUP	ETHNIC GP	STRENGTH	REMARKS
Dog	D	1	Scheduled for Launch
Gecko		4	Scheduled for Launch
Kern	A	10	Completed Training
Commo		3	Completed Training
H-2	T	5	Completed Traingng
H-3		5	Completed Training
H-4	A	5	Completed Training
H-6		5	Completed Training
H-7		4	Completed Training
H-8		5	Completed Training

Group M		21	In Training
Group N		36	In Training
Group J		11	In Training
Group L		19	In Training
Loi Ho 1		6	XB Team Training
Loi Ho 2		6	XB Team Training
Loi Ho 3		6	XB Team Training
Loi Ho 4		6	XB Team Training
Loi Ho 5		7	XB Team Training
		160	

DATA

(2) During this month an intelligence FTX was conducted in the vicinity of Camp Long Thanh. During this FTX students moved into village and gathered intelligence on VC sympathizers.

During this period there was a daily average of 9 students AWOL.

k. November 1965

(1) Student Status as of 20 November 1965

TEAM/GROUP	ETHNIC GP	STRENGTH	REMARKS
Group N		34	In Training
Kern		13	Completed Training
Romeo B		13	Completed Training
Romeo C		7	Completed Training
Commo		10	Completed Training
Commo L		12	Completed Training
K/S I		16	In Training

DATA

K.S II	D	15	In training
Loi Ho 1		7	Dissolved
Loi Ho 2	A	8	Kham Duc
Loi Ho 3		8	Kham Duc
Loi Ho 4	T	7	Dissolved
Loi Ho 5		9	Kham Duc
Loi Ho 6	A	8	In Training
Loi Ho 7		7	In Training
Loi Ho 8		7	In Training
Loi Ho 9		7	In Training
		188	

(2) During this month there was a changing of names for teams and groups. Teams that had completed the normal training cycle were put into advanced training. New groups such as K/S I and K/S II were receiving pre-basic training, and processing prior to the starting of a regular basic course. Lt. Colonel Norman departed for Okinawa and Lt. Colonel Monger, TDY from Okinawa, assumed the duties of SALT.

During the period there was a daily average of 15 students AWOL.

1. December 1965

(1) Student Status of of 11 December 1965

TEAM/GROUP	ETHNIC GP	STRENGTH	REMARKS
Group N	D	32	In Training
Kern A	A	10	Isolation
Romeo B	T	12	Completed Training
Romeo C	A	17	Completed Training

Group L	18	Completed Training
Commo	8	Completed Training
Group O	32	In Training
Group P	35	In Training
Group R	17	In Training
Loi Ho 1	6	Kham Duc
Loi Ho 2	8	Kham Duc
Loi Ho 3	6	Kham Duc
Loi Ho 4	8	In Training.
Loi Ho 5	8	Kham Duc
Loi Ho 6	8	In Training
Loi Ho 7	8	In Training
Loi Ho 8	7	In Training
Loi Ho 9	6	In Training

(2) During this period there was a further reorganization of teams and groups. Kern B and Kern C were formed, as well as Niva C. Groups O and P commenced basic training and further provided personnel for the new commo group (Q). Group R continued processing and pre-basic training. Further details can be found in the weekly activity reports for the month.

During this period there was a daily average of 24 students AWOL.

2. STS Organization is reflected in STS Table of Distribution Part II Organization and Personnel Distribution for Airborne Base.

3. The US Advisors for Camp Long Thanh are organized along functional lines with an S1, S2, S3 and S4 sections. There is also an organization of training committees to handle the various subjects presented at Camp

Long Thanh. The following is a breakdown of these committees:

Intelligence/Psychological Operations

Map Reading, Land Navigation and Survival

Tactics

Demolitions

Weapons

Air Operations

Medical

4. The Program of Instruction (POI) has varied from ~~14 to 21 weeks~~, depending upon the needs at the time. In December 1965 a draft of a revamped POI was drawn up at Camp Long Thanh. It consisted of 21 weeks of training. An innovation in the program was a leadership evaluation program. This program is designed to assist in the future selection of team leaders.

5. Throughout the year Camp Long Thanh has also participated in Air Operations for SOG. This has primarily been in the form of providing DZ reception parties for air re-supply drops. Concurrently this has provided an additional training vehicle for the students who participate in the activities as the DZ parties.

Inclosure 2 (Facility Improvements) to Tab D (Camp Long Thanh) to Section II A (Airborne Operations) 1965 SOG Historical Summary.

1. The following is a list of construction and facility improvements at Camp Long Thanh during 1965:

a. Masonry

(1) Construction of 2 US Barracks 12m X 6m and 1 US Barrack 20m X 6m.

(2) Construction of 2 student barracks 24m X 6½m, 2 company latrines 12m X 5½m, 2 tile roofs 4m X 6m and a water tower for billets.

(3) Camp built nine reinforced concrete bunkers, three ammo bunkers, 8 mortar bunkers and 8 ammo mortar bunkers.

(4) For the camp electrical wiring, 44 electric poles of reinforced concrete (36 poles 6m and 8 poles 9m) were made.

(5) 1424 sections of trench pipe of varied sizes were produced for the camp's drainage system, and 189, 700 cement blocks were made for camp construction.

b. Carpenter work, in addition to that provided for the above construction included:

(1) Building of 2 mock doors for airborne training.

(2) Construction of storage facilities for parachutes.

(3) Construction of storage facilities for demolition supplies.

(4) Construction of storage facilities for supply room.

(5) Construction of rifle racks for the weapons supply room, and also for each of the security companies.

(6) Repair of the security battalion barracks.

(7) Erecting of 2 tent houses with barbed wire poles for the Nung company.

(8) Construction of 98 silhouette firing targets with poles for use on the range.

(9) Construction of messhall chairs, messhall tables, footlockers, desks, blackboards, wooden b benches, and instruction pointers.

(10) Various other types of construction to include normal repairs, partitioning of buildings, and extension of buildings as required.

2. Improvement was also completed on the ranges of the camp. This included a reaction firing course, and an ambush and counter-ambush site. However, due to the movement of the 2nd Brigade, 1st US Infantry Division into the 7 roads range area, revamping and replacing of ranges has been scheduled for the first part of 1966.

Inclosure 3 (Summary of Operations) to Tab D (Camp Long Thanh) to Section II A (Airborne Operations) 1965 SOG Historical Summary.

1. The following is a breakdown of operations conducted by the Security Battalion during the calender year 1965:

a. 23 search and destroy operations

b. 48 seven day security patrols

c. 74 fire support missions, fired in support of friendly troops

d. 10 operations conducted in conjunction with district forces

e. 2 scouting missions conducted for units of the 1st Division

f. 4,745 night ambushes conducted around camp

g. 317 night ambushes conducted on highway 15

h. 365 fifty man road clearing patrols

i. 1,825 ambushes conducted around airfield

2. Results of the above operations

a. Contact was made with the VC 30 times

b. Friendly casualties, 3 KIA's, 2 WIA's

c. Enemy casualties, 9 KIA's, 7 WIA's

d. 5 rifles were captured, 9 grenades were captured, 3 mines were neutralized on Highway 15 and 10 magazines were captured. 1,364 lbs of rice was also captured.

Inclosure 4 (Problem Areas) to Tab D (Camp Long Thanh) to Section II A (Airborne Operations) 1965 SOG Historical Summary.

1. Strategic Technical Service (STS)

The STS organization for Camp Long Thanh did not provide enough depth in instructor personnel, and in some cases, some of the Vietnamese Instructors were not qualified. Through close coordination between SALT and the Vietnamese Camp Commander, requests have gone forward through both U.S. and Vietnamese channels for additional qualified instructors. Those instructors who are not qualified to instruct have been placed in Assistant Instructor slots in order to allow them to learn their subjects.

2. Discipline

Throughout 1965 the program was continually hampered by the lack of discipline among the students. In the past, the Camp Commander did not have sufficient power to properly handle the cases of students who had committed offenses, and also the students status was that of a civilian. Action has been taken to correct this deficiency by setting up a new list of offenses with appropriate punishment which the Camp Commander can envoke at his level, and also Chief OP-34 is presently preparing a legal agreement which students will understand and sign before entering the program. The document will spell out, among other things, the powers of the Camp Commander, and punishment which can be applied for various offenses.

3. Security Administration

The rapid expansion of the 34A and 35A program generated administrative burdens that were not anticipated. It was originally intended that only a very limited amount of classified materials to be retained at this installation and those only on a temporary basis. However, the volume of classified material necessary to support the operation became so large that it was necessary to implement all of the classified control procedures and records administration required of a major headquarters. As there are no US clerical personnel available to attend to these functions, it fell to the S-2 officer and NCO, and detracted

from the time they were able to devote to the production of local intelligence and to their primary mission as instructional advisors. A request has been submitted for clerical support to SOG.

Although the original personnel assigned to this activity were previously cleared for DATA the majority of replacement enlisted personnel (PCS) had not been previously cleared for DATA . Obtaining the required DATA added to the administrative burden. However, progress is being made obtaining DATA for all personnel.

4. Interpreter Procurement and Retention

The rapid build-up of US Forces in Vietnam resulted in an acute shortage of interpreters, and interpreter procurement became highly competative. Although MACSOG interpreter pay scales compare favorably with other agencies, few competent interpreters would consider employment at Camp Long Thanh due to the unattractive location and demanding duty requirements.

All interpreters utilized by this activity were civilians, and as such they received no government recognition or credit toward their service obligation for duties performed regardless of how arduous or hazardous they may have been. Consequently, many were understandably reluctant to work in locations where they would have been subjected to enemy fire or participate in hazardous operational or training missions. The problem is particularly acute in the recon teams of the 35A program. SOG is aware of this problem and a search for qualified interpreters is constantly being conducted.

5. Procurement and Retention of Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Personnel

Due to inflationary trends in the Vietnamese economy, CIDG pay scales were no longer adequate to attract personnel, and recruiting efforts in the last months of 1965 were almost complete failure. Due to attrition and desertions, the Security Battalion was reduced to 70% of authorized strength. CIDG personnel were able to obtain employment as guards with other units and installations in the Saigon area with comparable pay and without the risks and discomforts of the Security Battalion. A recruitment

program is continually being conducted to enlist personnel in the CIDG ranks.

6. Air Support

Lack of air support in some instances caused a decline in training. Training was planned on numerous occasions which required infiltration and exfiltration by H-34 helicopter. In many cases, information would be received the day prior to scheduled training that a requested H-34 helicopter was not available, thereby hindering an important phase of training. Lack of C-123 aircraft at the required times greatly hindered the training of CP 34A students. Time and again the cancelling of aircraft on the day it was scheduled caused rapid revamping of scheduled training. See Section II C - Air Operations.

7. Logistical

a. Supply: A problem exists in Camp Long Thanh's limited storage facilities. However, through normal expansion of the camp, this problem should be overcome.

b. Motor Pool: A problem exists in getting and keeping capable drivers. At present the motor pool is short four (4) drivers. The diversity of vehicles assigned creates some problems in maintenance by requiring that only highly qualified mechanics be used.

The power generator is fast becoming incapable of furnishing the required amount of power. As the camp continues to grow, the need for a bigger generator will increase. A qualified technician has been requested to survey the camp wiring to make recommendations for changes.

c. Construction: Generally, construction is moving forward slowly. Occasional lack of cement caused projects to bog down. However, this is to be expected since there is a tremendous construction effort being conducted in this country.

SECTION IIB SHINING BRASS (CROSS BORDER) OPERATIONS

1 Summary of Operations:

a. Background. Initial Cross-Border operations into Laos were entitled "LEAPING LENA" and were comprised of US 5th Special Forces and ARVN personnel. LEAPING LENA operations were conducted with parachute drops of indigenous personnel only in Laos. These operations proved to be unsuccessful for numerous reasons; the absence of US advisor personnel was one of the main defects. On 7 March 1965 COMUSMACV transfered the responsibility for Cross-Border (Laos) to SOG and the program was designated SHINING BRASS. SHINING BRASS operations were operations directed against VC bases and infiltration routes within Laos, designed to initiate a series of graduated pressures against selected targets and LOC by conducting air strikes and ground operations. During the Spring and Summer months of 1965 continuous planning and coordination was conducted in preparation for the upcoming combined US/VN Cross-Border operations. This preparation consisted of the finalization of the concept of operations and the continuation of an intensified training program for the US/VN reconnaissance teams. Phase I was authorized for execution on 29 September 1965.

b. Present Concept of Operations:

(1) Phase I operations west of the Dak Prou an and Dak To areas to a maximum depth of 20 km from the SVN/Laos border in two operational areas. Intelligence collection, locating and validating targets, and direction of airstrikes is accomplished by recon teams consisting of 3 US and 6 to 8 VN personnel. Initial introduction of teams into Laos is made by ground infiltration utilizing helicopters to move to an LZ near the border. Subsequent resupply and evacuation of teams or replacement and addition of specialist personnel by air is authorized.

(2) Phase II operations visualize the exploitation of targets by raiding forces and by ever expanding ground probes of appropriately sized forces.

(3) Phase III operations will consist of increased ground/air raid activity and the development of guerrilla forces.

c. Training Activities:

(1) Recon teams are formed, equipped, and receive initial training at Camp Long Thanh, located 30 miles east of Saigon. Advanced training is conducted at the Kham Duc Forward Operational Base (FOB) and teams execute in-country training missions from there prior to cross-border operations. The in-country missions are conducted in the same manner as cross-border operations.

(2) Exploitation forces are formed and equipped at Camp Long Thanh and subsequently airlifted to Kham Duc for basic, advanced, and basic unit training.

d. Reconnaissance team operations conducted from FOB's located at Kham Duc and Dak To during the remainder of calendar year 1965 are as outlined below:

(1) SEPTEMBER: Two in-country training missions were launched for the two-fold purpose of confirming suspected enemy targets while simultaneously providing advanced training prior to employment on cross-border operations.

(2) OCTOBER: One in-country training mission was conducted resulting in the successful direction of a friendly airstrike completely destroying 6 - 8 buildings within the target area. Recon team made contact with the enemy and suffered 1 KIA.

(3) NOVEMBER:

(a) A SHINING BRASS operation was conducted on 2 November 1965 to Target ALPHA-1 (YB 834937) resulting in the confirmation of enemy activities and installations.

(b) Two in-country training missions were conducted resulting in negative enemy contact; however, the teams were able to detect evidence that previous enemy activity had occurred within the target areas. A third training mission was aborted due to intensified enemy activity within the Landing Zone area.

(4) DECEMBER:

(a) On 6 December 1965 one SHINING BRASS recon team infiltrated to Target KILO-1 (YC 703034). Team

was attacked by enemy force of undetermined size and later were exfiltrated. Two friendly VN members are MIA from this action.

(b) SHINING BRASS recon team launched on 9 December 1965 to Target INDIA-1 (YC 606104). Team made enemy contact resulting in one friendly VN team member KIA and one US member lightly WIA.

(c) On 16 December 1965 SHINING BRASS operation conducted to Target CHARLIE-1 (YB 673344). Team confirmed that target was of importance to the enemy.

(5) On 19 December 1965 SHINING BRASS operation conducted in the area of Target HOTEL-1 (YB 693290). Negative enemy contact or observation.

e. Operations/Airstrikes list:

See Tab A.

f. Proposed concept of modified Phase I operations submitted on 8 January 1966 to CINCPAC includes the following:

(1) Increasing the number of recon teams to 20 with 3 US members in each and reorienting recon teams to locate enemy weaknesses and suitable targets for raids and ambushes as well as air targets.

(2) Formation of 3 battalion sized ground or airmobile exploitation forces to be directed against weak points. Raids against installations, ambush of supply vehicles and carrying parties, and trail mining operations to add to enemy logistical burdens caused by airstrikes.

(3) Limit penetrations to present authorized 20 km, but extending area of operations to that of "TIGERHOUND" air operations making both operations mutually supporting.

(4) Conducting operations from 3 Forward Operational Bases located at Kontum, Kham Duc, and Khe Sanh.

2. Facility Improvement: Present facilities include a Command and Control Center at Danang operated by a modified SF C detachment and two Forward Operational

Bases located at Kham Duc and Dak To operated by a modified SF B detachment. Planned expansion envisaged the FOB at Dak To being moved to Kontum where security and ease of operations will be enhanced, and the establishing of a third FOB, possibly at Khe Sanh, to be used for operations in the northern areas. All FOB's to be operated by modified SF B detachments.

TAB A (AIRSTRIKES) TO SECTION IIB (SHINING BRASS) TO 1965 SOG HISTORICAL SUMMARY

SHINING BRASS OPERATIONS/AIRSTRIKES

RECON TEAM	TARGET	DATE INFIL	DATE EXFIL	SORTIES DATE	SORTIES NUMBER	BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
IOWA	TANGO-3 YC729083	8 OCT 65	10 OCT 65	10 OCT 65	4	8 bldgs dest, 3 huts and numerous sheds dest
IOWA	DELTA-1 YC598258	18 OCT 65	23 OCT 65	1 NOV 65	37	Numerous secd expl
ALASKA	ALFA-1	2 NOV 65	3 NOV 65	3 NOV 65	2	Not reported
				3 NOV 65	3	1 bridge dest, 6 bldgs dest, 2 bldgs dam, 2 secd expl
				4 NOV 65	12	Not reported
				5 NOV 65	53	30 struc dest, 18 struc dam, 2 caves dest, 4 emplacements dest, 8 secd expl
				10&11 NOV 65	18	Not reported
KANSAS	KILO-1	6 DEC 65	11/13 DEC 65		0	
IDAHO	INDIA-1	9 DEC 65	10 DEC 65		0	

RECON TEAM	TARGET	DATE INFIL	DATE EXFIL	SORTIES DATE	SORTIES NUMBER	BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
DAKOTA	CHARLIE-1	18 DEC 65	19 DEC 65	30 DEC 65	UNK	80% dest
	YB673344			31 DEC 65	10	100% dest
ALASKA	HOTEL-1	19 DEC 65	22 DEC 65	30 DEC 65	UNK	Bridge dest
	YB693290			31 DEC 65	10	1 struc dest
	ECHO-3			30 DEC 65	UNK	6 struc dest, 1 large seed expl
	YB683326			31 DEC 65	6	1 struc dest

SECTION IIC - AIR OPERATIONS

1. MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

a. OPLAN 34A:

(1) Resupply missions:

MONTH	SCHEDULED	CANX/ABORT	SUCCESSFUL
Jan	3	1	2
Feb	5	5	0
Mar	5	5	0
Apr	5	3	2
May	6	4	2
Jun	5	5	0
Jul	4	3	1
Aug	6	3	*2
Sep	6	2	4
Oct	9	4	**3
Nov	9	2	***6
Dec	0	0	0
TOTALS	63	37	22

* During August one unsuccessful mission was flown.

** During October two missions were considered unsuccessful.

*** During November one mission was unsuccessful.

NOTE: A total of four missions during the year were considered unsuccessful because of no drop due to weather over the DZ or due to ineffective delivery of bundles.

(2) Psyops:

(a) Psyops missions were conducted as follows:

MONTH	SORTIES FLOWN	MATERIAL DISPENSED
Jan	3	5,346,225 leaflets
Mar	1	4,145,453 leaflets
Apr	2	323,053 leaflets
May	3	4,207,300 leaflets 1 deception bundle
Jul	5	12,410,400 leaflets
Aug	4	8,132,700 leaflets
Sep	4	8,761,800 leaflets
Oct	4	7,226,800 leaflets
Nov	3	7,226,800 leaflets
Dec	1	2,436,000 leaflets
TOTALS	30	60,216,525 leaflets 1 deception bundle

(b) To improve the air psyops mission a concept using TACAN radials from Nakhon Phanom, Hue and etc, northward over North Vietnam where the C-123 aircraft orbits 8-12,000 feet for dispensing materials. Additionally, arrangements were made for staging at Nakhon Phanom, Danang and Udorn.

(c) A new concept was used in December to dispense psyops radios from A-1G aircraft. On the only mission operated in 1965, four-hundred radios were dispensed from two A-1G's. Three A-1H aircraft escorted the A-1G for fighter support. Smoke tanks have been procured to conduct leaflet drops from the A-1H simultaneously with radio drops from the A-1G.

(3) Several new delivery concepts were developed for delivery of resupplies to teams in NVN. A modified Zuni rocket launcher (SUU-25) system for high speed aircraft (F-4C, F-105) delivery was perfected. Two containers are hung on each aircraft. Each of the four tubes contains a specially designed, locally fabricated container and pilot drag chute which is ejected from the tube over the drop zone. This will give MACSOG a capability of resupplying teams in NVN that are now so heavily defended that a C-123 cannot be used because of its low survivability rate in a hostile area. Teams Bell, Eagle and Ares are to be resupplied using this system early in 1966.

The present high performance aircraft aerial delivery system described above has extremely limited cubic payload capacity. Accordingly, MACSOG has expended considerable effort to secure a larger container. At year's end M4A containers were being modified in the CONUS for priority air shipment to SVN for MACSOG use. This will give increased cubic payload and weight capability for F-4C or F-105 delivery.

During November 1965, VNAF H-34's were used to infiltrate Team Romeo into NVN. This was the first helicopter infiltration using helicopters by MACSOG. It was highly successful and plans are being formulated to use helicopters in future operations in 34A.

(4) The continuous gradual improvement in air defense in NVN is systematically degrading our C-123 capability to support the team delivery and resupply missions in NVN. The same gradual degradation of Psyops capability also applies. Activation of Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites, increased radar, ground control intercept (GCI) and anti-aircraft (AAA) weapons have seriously increased the odds against air survivability. At year end intelligence was reporting development of a MIG fighter interceptor threat. Accordingly, MACSOG is pressing hard for a more modern weapons system. The C-130 Sky Hook aircraft was recommended and is discussed in detail in paragraph 5, Aircraft Status, of this report.

(5) OPLAN 34A infiltration and resupply missions are flown in the C-123's during the moon period only with relative angle of 35 degrees or greater. This limits possible operations to ten days each month. Experience has taught that normally no more than four or five

nights during the moon period will be suitable weather-wise for low altitude flying. Four-eights cloud coverage is maximum acceptable. The drop zones (DZ) are in the mountains and invariably fog forms in the valleys after midnight which envelopes the DZ and renders it unsuitable for airdrop. Therefore, the last few days of the moon period are not normally mission flyable. This then becomes a limiting factor.

b. Shining Brass

(1) Missions are described in the Shining Brass operations portion of the history. Air operations supported the Shining Brass mission by operating six VNAF H-34 helicopters and 8 VNAF crews. A liaison officer was kept at the Command and Control Center, Danang Air Base, to supervise operation of the helicopters, their maintenance and crew scheduling. He also served as the primary contact for logistics airlift. Probably the most important single task of the liaison officer is effecting coordination between the Command and Control Center and the Corps TACC for close air support by fighter-bomber aircraft while teams are in the field. Additionally, his function is the primary office responsible for scheduling airstrikes against targets validated by Shining Brass reconnaissance teams.

(2) The helicopter is best suited to Shining Brass operations. SOG used VNAF H-34's during the period. Because of the shortage of crews and aircraft it has been difficult to obtain the needed resources. When they are procured it withdraws from the assets of the Corps areas. SOG is preparing a study to justify the assignment of a higher performance helicopter, the CH-3. It's longer range, greater payload capability and assignment under direct control of SOG would give the required capability to carry out the SOG mission.

(3) On 18 October 1965 the first Shining Brass mission was launched. One VNAF H-34 was lost with 8 VNAF aircrew members and one US Army Captain on board. Additionally, a USAF O-1 forward air control aircraft was lost. Captain Wade Sisson, USMC, assigned to MACSOG, was lost in the O-1 which was flown by a USAF Major. The primary cause factor for both aircraft losses was bad weather in the Kham Duc and Danang area. Neither aircraft were located nor was any further information attainable on where they may have crashed.

4 - 4

(4) In addition to tactical airlift support by VNAF H-34's and logistics support by SOG C-123's the USAF provides forward air controller support using O-1's. Initially, two FAC's staged at forward operating bases (FOB) at Khan Duc, Lak To or Kontum, as appropriate. They remained at the FOB during the day when teams were infiltrated and made the required radio contacts and called in airstrikes when needed. In December 1965 a new activity named "Tigerhound" under 2nd Air Division was established to step up air support of cross-border activities. FAC's and aircraft are now assigned to the FOB and give direct support constantly to Shining Brass. An Airborne Command Post remains within communications range of the FAC's and obtains Embassy approval for airstrikes in a fraction of the time previously required.

c. Logistics Airlift:

With initiation of Shining Brass operations airlift of supplies and passengers became "big business" for SOG. A construction project at Khan Duc to build billets, a mess and etc., was initiated. In addition personnel had to be transported between the training and staging bases at Camp Long Thanh, Danang and the FOB's. At year end SOG was moving three times as much cargo per month as it had before Shining Brass operations commenced. During December 1965 a total of 133,550 pounds of cargo and 425 passengers were airlifted by SOG C-123's as compared to 58,000 pounds during September before Shining Brass operations started. To direct the management of this expanded airlift requirement a special SOG directive was published as MACSOG Directive 700-1, December 1965.

2.

a. C-123

DATA

Three VNAF crews were CONUS trained. One was never used because of its political instability; another was lost operationally; the third has been completely ineffective since May 1965 due to duty not involving flying (DNIF) of the copilot. Two VNAF crews are scheduled for CONUS training starting 12 January 1966 DATA are scheduled to start training 12 March 1966. Negotiations are in progress to get a replacement copilot for VNAF crew V-2 and train him in-country.

b. Crew posture at year end was:

(1) DATA

(2) One VNAF crew, non-combat ready, with copilot DNIF indefinitely.

(3) Two VNAF crews are scheduled for training starting 12 January 1966 for 28 weeks.

(4) DATA

c. DATA

d. DATA

CINCPAC approved the request and passed action to CINCPACAF. At year end two VNAF crews were processed and ready for travel to the CONUS in January 1966. Negotiations were underway to obtain two more aircrews. DATA

e. On 15 February 1965 crew C-3 was severely hit by ground fire in the immediate vicinity of the Bell team DZ. The crew successfully flew the aircraft to Nakhon Phanom where it was crash landed. The navigator had been seriously wounded and was later released on disability.

DATA

DATA

loss occurred on 27 June 1965. The crew was flying a C-123 from Nha Trang to Tan Son Nhut. A USAF pilot Capt. NAME and a USAF maintenance technician SSgt Billy L. Roth were also fatalities. Narrative of flight follows:

(1) C-123 Whiskey Alpha was engaged in the emergency evacuation of Nha Trang Air Base, Vietnam, to Tan Son Nhut Airport, Saigon, based on intelligence that an attack by Viet Cong on Nha Trang Air Base was strongly suspected. Aircraft was on a VFR operational clearance. Crew established communications and radar contact with Saigon approach control and was vectored to final approach course for precision radar approach to runway 25. He was lost on the radar scope 13 miles out. Investigation revealed aircraft was hit by an estimated 20 to 30 rounds of 20mm ground to air fire. The aircraft caught fire in the right wing, entered a steep right spiralling turn and crashed. It contacted the ground in a 45-50 degree nose low attitude in a 20-25 degree right bank.

g. DATA 1 The crew was flying Duckhook aircraft Whiskey Foxtrot from Nha Trang to Taipei for purpose of periodic inspection input. The aircraft departed Nha Trang 310548Z 1227N 11013E (VN ADIZ) ETA 310620Z; 1600N 11230E (North Reef) ATA 310737H (last report) reporting operations normal. This was last known contact with aircraft and extensive SAR effort failed to develop any contact with missing aircraft or crew. Investigation concluded cause was unknown but that probably one of four events occurred:

(1) Aircraft was sabotaged

(2) Crew defected with aircraft

(3) Aircraft incurred severe weather and crashed.

(4) Maintenance malfunction that resulted in crash at sea.

h.

DATA

i. The C-123 aircrew support provided by the VNAF (Crew V-2) was entirely unsatisfactory throughout the year. Accordingly, the Chief SOG sent a letter on 26 May 1965 to Maj General Rowland, Chief Air Force Advisory Group, asking his support in assigning crew V-2 full time to the 1st Flight Detachment at Nha Trang and physically locating them there. It was explained that SOG could no longer live with dual and split leadership of Major NAME directing the VNAF crew from Saigon and the 1st Flight Detachment programming them tactical missions and training support. On 30 October 1965 a letter to Brig General NAME NAME, Chief of the Joint General Staff, was sent by Chief of Staff, MACV. This letter re-emphasized the problems previously stated and asked that V-2 be in place at Nha Trang 5 days before and during the entire moon period. It was further stated that future crews trained must be permanently assigned to the 1st Flight Detachment, Nha Trang. General NAME replied that Headquarters, Vietnam Air Force, had been authorized direct coordination with SOG to organize a meeting designed to solve obstacles pointed out by SOG and requested that SOG be directed to contact Headquarters, Vietnam Air Force, to discuss problems. On 18 December 1965 the meeting was held. Principals were Colonel Moore, SOG; Colonel Brannon, Air Force Advisory Group; NAME, Vietnam Air Force (A-3). Many minor problem areas were discussed and the following tentative agreements were reached:

(1) The VNAF 83rd Tactical Group would be activated soon and operations will be managed thru a special section of the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC).

(2) The 83rd Tactical Group, SOG, and Project Delta will be represented by air liaison officers in the TACC.

(3) It was agreed by the VNAF that aircrews could be located with the aircraft, i.e., C-123 crews at Nha Trang.

(4) The 83rd Tactical Group will have its own aircraft maintenance.

(5) Personal equipment will be normal VNAF except for special items SOG requires.

(6) Supply support will be normal VNAF except for special items SOG requires.

(7) Supplemental pay for special duty was discussed. A standardized contract agreement was sought. Per diem and penetration pay was agreed upon, i.e., 500 Vietnam piastres per day per diem for 12 hours or more away from home station and 3000 Vietnam piastres for each border crossing into NVN. The VNAF also wanted a 30,000 Vietnam piastre recruitment bonus each 12 months with a 5000 Vietnam minimum per month. This was unacceptable to SOG and the Air Force Advisory Group. The two items were set aside by NAME to be taken up with General NAME and General NAME if he deemed appropriate.

j. The loss of two aircrews and aircraft placed a critical strain on SOG to carry out its logistical airlift tasks. Accordingly, two 2nd Air Division USAF air crews were placed on six months TDY to SOG starting about 1 October 1965. These aircrews were averaging near 100 hours per month flying through 31 December 1965. A change to the manning document was being staffed in MACV to increase authorizations to include these positions.

3. Aircraft Status:

a. Two Duckhook aircraft were lost operationally as explained in paragraph 2, above. This created a shortage that has been partially relieved by assignment of two unmodified USAF aircraft used only in the logistics and training phases of SOG operations. Two additional C-123's

JCS - MACSOG

TASKER NUMBER SOG CONTROL # 000720-66

DUE DATE ASAP

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PAGE 10 OF 11

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(S) It has a capacity for expansion of ECM equipment to cope with the expanded air defenses in the NVN. The C-123 has enhanced its overwater capability due to limited payload capacity.

d. Notwithstanding the improved capability of C-130's, SOG considers the helicopter to be the only weapon system that can insure delivery of an indigenous operational team to a pre-selected point that can be fully operational almost immediately. (The USAF H-34 helicopters were used to infiltrate Romeo in November 1965 with complete success.) Additional missions are planned for 1966. The H-34 lacks the range and payload needed for extensive operations in Northern Laos or NVN. The CH-3B is considered an ideal weapon system for the present state of the art and a study was being prepared at the end of the year to justify assignment of these helicopters to SOG for 34A and Sihanouk Trail operations.

e. Announcement had been made of the deployment of a Composite Air Commando Squadron to Nakhon Phanom in early 1966. Of interest, however is the possibility that CH-3C helicopters might be made available to this unit. Originally, it was planned that 4 CH-3C's were to be part of its aircraft assets, but production is now being diverted to Vietnam. At the end of 1965 consideration was being given to requesting CINCPAC to task the Composite Air Commando Squadron to support 34A operations and to request that the unit be equipped with CH-3C helicopters.

JCS MACSOG

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PAGE 1 OF 19

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[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
11 Jan 65	Data	[illegible]
12 Jan 65	Data	[illegible]
20 Jan 65	Data	[illegible]
22 Jan 65	Data	17-31N
24 Jan 65	Data	17-05N
26 Jan 65	Data	17-42N
29 Jan 65	Data	17-31N
30 Jan 65	Data	17-09N
31 Jan 65	Data	17-09N

DATA

SUBTOTALS
Jan 65 11 Primary zone
10 Secondary zone

21

JCS MACSOG

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5 May 65	[illegible]
6 May 65	[illegible] 42N
7 May 65	[illegible]
7 May 65	[illegible]
8 May 65	[illegible] 3[illegible]
9 May 65	17-42N
10 May 65	17-42N
13 May 65	17-09N
14 May 65	17-09N
15 May 65	17-09N
18 May 65	17-15N
21 May 65	18-25N
22 May 65	17-32N
23 May 65	17-43N
26 May 65	17-52N
27 May 65	17-10N
29 May 65	17-09N
30 May 65	LY HOA 17-40N

SUBTOTALS
May 65 26 Primary Mate
4 Secondary Mate

DATA

DATE		[illegible]
2 Jun 65	[illegible]	[illegible]
2 Jun 65	[illegible]	[illegible]
5 Jun 65		[illegible]
5 Jun 65		17-09N
6 Jun 65		[illegible]
7 Jun 65		17-09N
8 Jun 65		17-10N
9 Jun 65		17-10N
10 Jun 65		17-09N
11 Jun 65		17-10N
13 Jun 65		17-11N
14 Jun 65		17-15N
15 Jun 65		17-08N
16 Jun 65		17-09N
17 Jun 65		17-10N
18 Jun 65		17-13N
19 Jun 65		17-10N
20 Jun 65		17-09N
21 Jun 65		17-08N
22 Jun 65		17-10N
23 Jun 65		17-09N

DATA

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
8 Jul 85	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
7 Jul 85	[illegible]	[illegible]	17-43N
9 Jul 85	[illegible]	[illegible]	17-42N
10 Jul 85	[illegible]	[illegible]	17-42N
12 Jul 85	[illegible]	[illegible]	17-42N
17 Jul 85	[illegible]	[illegible]	17-33N
19 Jul 85	[illegible]	[illegible]	19-18N
21 Jul 85	[illegible]	[illegible]	19-18N
25 Jul 85	[illegible]	[illegible]	19-18N

DATA

DATA

DATA

[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]
7 Aug 65		18N [illegible] 18-[illegible]N
8 Aug 65		17-09N
9 Aug 65		20N [illegible] 18-18N
7 Aug 65	DATA	18-23N
10 Aug 65		19-54N
11 Aug 65		18-23N
12 Aug 65		17-43N
14 Aug 65		19-38N
16 Aug 65		17-39N
20 Aug 65		17-16N

DATA

DATE		[illegible]
21 Aug 65		18-05N
24 Aug 65	D	SON TINH 18-16N
26 Aug 65	A	LOIN 17-53N
28 Aug 65	T	LA VAN 18-54N
30 Aug 65	A	SON TINH 18-16N

SUBTOTALS
Aug 65 15 Primary msns
7 Secondary msns

5 Sep 65		18-43N
5 Sep 65	D	17-30N
7 Sep 65	A	18-45N
8 Sep 65	T	18-45N
11 Sep 65	A	19-36N

DATA

DATE	OPERATION	LOCATION
14 Sep 65		17-28N
15 Sep 65		17-28N
16 Sep 65		17-28N
17 Sep 65		17-28N
17 Sep 65		17-28N
18 Sep 65		17-28N
18 Sep 65		17-28N
19 Sep 65		17-28N
20 Sep 65		17-28N
21 Sep 65		17-28N
22 Sep 65		17-28N
23 Sep 65		17-28N
27 Sep 65		LA VAN WF687877
28 Sep 65		MUI NAM GIA WF998403
30 Sep 65		RON WE565800

DATA

DATA

SUBTOTALS
Sep 65 — 20 Primary msns
11 Secondary msns

DATE	OPERATION	LOCATION
2 Oct 65		19-10N
10 Oct 65		18-55N
12 Oct 65	D	18-55N
22 Oct 65		18-55N
25 Oct 65	A	LACH CHAO 19-47N
27 Oct 65	T	THO SON 17-53N
29 Oct 65	A	LACH CHAO 19-47N
SUBTOTALS Oct 65	7 Primary ops 3 Secondary ops	
1 Nov 65		18-50N
3 Nov 65		18-52N
5 Nov 65	D	19-17N
13 Nov 65	A	18-55N
15 Nov 65		18-55N
17 Nov 65	T A	18-55N

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[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] Nov 65	[illegible]
[illegible] Nov 65	[illegible]
[illegible] Nov 65	[illegible]
SUPPORTING [illegible] Nov 65	[illegible]
3 Dec 65	18-55N
4 Dec 65	18-55N
5 Dec 65	18-55N
5 Dec 65	18-30N
6 Dec 65	18-55N
10 Dec 65	18-55N
10 Dec 65	18-55N
13 Dec 65	18-25N
14 Dec 65	20-00N
15 Dec 65	20-00N
22 Dec 65	[illegible] 19-42N

DATA

DATE	OPERATION	LOCATION
22 Dec 65	DATA	20-00E
24 Dec 65	STAND-DOWN ORDERED BY SECRET AUTHORITY	
SUBTOTALS Dec 65	12 Primary msns	
TOTALS CY 1965	155 Primary msns 80 Secondary msns	

DATA

f. General:

(1) The continually increasing readiness posture of North Vietnamese coastal defense forces made maritime operations either ashore or in close proximity to shore increasingly difficult during the year. Timely intelligence, careful briefing of operational personnel and thorough planning alleviated this problem to some extent. Unacceptably high sea states resulting from unfavorable weather and limited boat availability due to maintenance requirements also hindered operations. Nevertheless operations were vastly increased in tempo and scope. 155 missions were conducted during 1965 as compared to 80 for 1964. Results were proportionately improved. Missions were sent further and further north as the Vietnamese boat crews gained confidence and experience. By the end of the year, boat missions had been planned, approved and scheduled

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1. High state of training.

(2) Commander Pepper relieved Commander [illegible] as the Chief MAROPS on 18 May. Lieutenant Commander [illegible] relieved Lieutenant Commander Webster as Operations Officer, MAROPS on 15 June. Major [illegible] relieved Lieutenant Colonel Scharfen and assumed the duties of Plans Officer, MAROPS on 5 July. Lieutenant [illegible] relieved Lieutenant (JG) Peterson as Assistant Operations Officer, MAROPS on 1 August.

(3) Commander Way, Officer in Charge, USNAD was killed in a jeep accident on 29 October, and his duties were assumed by the Deputy Officer in Charge, Commander Hawkins. No relief was available, so Commander Hawkins performed the duties for both billets during the remainder of the year.

(4) On 12 August 1965, Lieutenant Carroll was assigned to duty as the Targeting Officer for MAROPS. His assignment expedited procurement of adequate intelligence for planning MAROPS missions and provided expert photo interpretation services on a prompt and continuing basis.

(5) An average of 11 PTF crews composed of Vietnamese Naval personnel were operationally ready throughout the year. 3 SSIXP crews of Vietnamese contract civilians commanded by Vietnamese Naval Officers were continually available. Landing team strength at the beginning of the year was 147, decreasing by the end of the year to 136. Larger numbers were available for most of the year, however, resulting in an average strength of 148. The teams continued to be composed of Vietnamese military and contract civilians.

DATA

(6) PTFs on hand at USNAD, Danang were as follows:

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1		1 Jan	
4	1 Jan	7 Feb	
7	2 Feb	7 May	
8	2 Feb	11 Mar	
5	17 Mar	26 Mar	
6	6 Apr	26 May	
1			
2			
4	30 May	17 Sep	
3	4 Jul	17 Sep	
9			16 Jul
10			16 Jul
7	19 Sep	23 Nov	
8	18 Sep	28 Nov	
3	8 Oct	28 Nov	
11			5 Oct
12			5 Oct
5	25 Oct	8 Dec	
6	25 Oct	8 Dec	

PTF and SWIFT operational readiness [illegible] varied from day to day, depending on the types and quantities of [illegible] casualties which resulted from operations or during training. The inventory at the beginning of the year consisted of 2 obsolete American built PTFs, 6 Nasty Class PTFs and 3 SWIFTS. At the end of the year 9 Nasty Class PTFs and 3

SWIFTS were on hand. An average of 6 Nasty Class PTFs and 2 SWIFTS were operationally ready throughout the year.

(7) The floating drydock at USNAD, in spite of all possible preventive maintenance, deteriorated to the extent that it was necessary to send it to the DATA Repair Facility. DATA It was overhauled and returned to USNAD on 27 October.

(8) Planning/coordination/liaison conferences and visits between MAROPS and USNAD personnel occurred frequently throughout the year with a resultant increase in proficiency, unity of purpose and effort.

(a) A conference was held at USNAD on 15 December by SOG and USNAD representatives to discuss renovation of the PHOENIX POW Camp on Cu Lao Cham Island; and to plan future PSYOPS/INTELL actions. Facilities on the Island were inspected and $3,500 authorized for maintenance and repairs. Conclusions regarding PSYOPS/INTELL future actions were promulagted for implementation.

(9) Unsatisfactory characteristics of various items of boat and landing team equipment imposed operational limitations. Corrective action was initiated and close supervision maintained. A conference was held at CINCPAC HQ during December which was concerned with this problem area. The Chief, Operations and Chief, MAROPS from SOG, and the Assistant Training Officer, USNAD attended this conference which dealt with the following:

(a) Funding

(b) Need for specific details regarding equipment characteristics or purpose, to aid R&D of certain items.

(d) Determination of on-shelf procurement vice R&D.

(d) Priority based on operational need.

(10) Provision of adequate logistical support of USNAD continued to be a problem; supply sources, transportation, long distances and items peculiar to MAROPS all being contributory factors. SOG Logistics was cognizant of, and continually devoted its best efforts to solving these

problems. Communications support was also [illegible] inadequate necessitating cancellation of [illegible] missions. For a detailed discussion of problems encountered and action taken, refer to the Logistic Section (Section VI) and the Communications Section [illegible] of this historical summary.

(11) Move everybody was placed in [illegible] an adequate cover story for Opian 34A, [illegible] mission be compromised. It was revised and appropriate action taken to provide for release, if necessary. When PTF-4 ran aground on 4 November, higher authority authorized release of the cover story dependent on North Vietnamese reactions, but release did not become necessary.

(12) Close coordination was continually effected with 7th Fleet and Naval Advisory Group regarding matters pertaining to Opian 34A, Market Time and Fleet operations. Close liaison was also maintained with Vietnamese counterpart personnel, with adjacent and supporting units.

(13) A civic action program initiated to aid destitute Vietnamese nationals in close proximity to USNAD facilities was gratefully received. The success of this program was such that it was placed on a continuing basis.

(14) The massive in-country build up of American personnel in the Da Nang area constituted a threat towards compromising the covert nature of MAROPS. Unauthorized infringement on USNAD security areas created innumerable problems, which were dealt with as they arose.

(15) Brigadier General NAME Chief of General Staff, RVNAF awarded the following citation, army degree, to the Vietnamese personnel of the Coastal Security Service at USNAD effective 24 September 1965:

"Since its formation on April first 1964, the Coastal Security Service has performed an efficient job and achieved 177 sea-commando missions behind enemy lines, inflicting heavy casualties:

- Destroying 51 military installations.

- Sinking two boats, 20 armed supply junks

- Killing 40 VC on the spot, capturing 75 and killing another number of them.

- Capturing a big haul of weapons, military equipment and ammunition.

Displaying an indomitable fighting spirit and a high sense of duty, the Coastal Security Service has effectively contributed to check the expansion of communism. The citation is accompanied by a gallantry medal with an oak leaf.

2. TRAINING ACTIVITIES

a. The standards of aggressiveness, professional competency, initiative and judgement which U.S. Armed Forces personnel are accustomed to accepting as a matter of course were not always apparent in our Vietnamese counterparts and operational units. Constant efforts were made to minimize problems of this nature by example, appropriate advisory action and constant training.

(1) Boat Crew Training. Refresher training was accomplished whenever operational requirements and boat availability permitted. Particular emphasis was placed on Vietnamese crew boat maintenance and underway repairs. Individual and multiple boat tactics and gunnery were also stressed.

(2) Landing Team Training. Landing teams were in a continual state of training throughout the year to perfect their across-the-beach techniques. They also received selective training in parachuting, underwater swimming and rubber boat use. Since it was believed that one of the primary factors for initial failures was the lack of VN officers-in-charge, officers were procured, trained and assigned to teams.

3. FACILITY IMPROVEMENT

a. Officer and enlisted quarters and messing facilities were constructed at Camp Fey, and all hands moved from their quarters in Da Nang to their new housing. This move, which was completed on 24 August was highly desirable from both security and operational readiness viewpoints, since it removed sensitive USNAD personnel from the immediate proximity of Vietnamese civilians and the numerous uncleared American forces personnel, and also put

them in housing only a few minutes [illegible] from their duty stations. Formerly, a lengthy [illegible] across a bridge and along poorly maintained roads had to be made [illegible] from quarters to duty station.

b. Three [illegible] and isolated [illegible] training camps scattered along China Beach from [illegible] to Marble Mountain were scheduled to be consolidated in a new facility constructed at Black Rock Bay. This consolidation was highly desirable due to the build-up of American forces in the area, as well as affording an opportunity for closer supervision of Landing Teams. Quarters were completed with the exception of installation of messing and sanitary facilities, so the consolidation had to be delayed until this was accomplished. Estimated time of completion is sometime during early 1966.

c. Continual efforts were made to improve the security and comfort of existing facilities. Windows in the Command Post were closed with concrete blocks, barbed fencing was installed, trenches and weapons emplacements were dug in all required areas, and numerous other projects were completed.

TASKER NUMBER JCS MACS06 Control # 0001720-66

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STATE

1. [illegible]

a. Standard communication procedures were established on all SOG [illegible]. Electronic transmission was utilized to [illegible] information and [illegible]. Standard operating procedures were reviewed and [illegible].

b. SOG staging [illegible] in Thailand [illegible] were unable to rapidly communicate with SOG [illegible] lack of secure circuitry to those locations. This problem was partially solved by providing staging officers with a USIS Operations Code (DAC-123) for use on the telephone circuit from Nakhon Phanom to Saigon. Voice cipher pads were also provided for use on telephone circuits to pass classified information.

c. Responsibility for the preparation of communication plans for OPLAN 34A air operations missions was transferred from SOG headquarters to First Flight Detachment, Nha Trang. After receipt of such plans by message and approval by SOG AIROPS section they are readdressed to DATA for action.

d. DATA was notified in September 1965 of new signal plan requirements which would allow for continuous guard by the base station. Plan FIJHG was developed as a result of this request and issued to teams VANEM and ROMEO. An improved version of plan FIJHG was introduced in December 1965 called GADAZ and will be issued to teams prior to infiltration and in resupply missions to teams already in the field.

2. CIRCUITRY. In 1965 three additional teletypewriter circuits were established:

a. Circuit SAK-SSG, KW-26, established February 1965, Clark AB, P.I. to SOG Headquarters.

b. Circuit 1K-92, KW-26, established March 1965, Danang to SOG Headquarters (SSG).

c. Circuit 1K-94, KW-26, established March 1965, Phu Bai to SOG Headquarters (SSG)

3. RADIOS

a. A SOG SSB net was established with AN/PRC-92 (KWM-2A) radios between SOG HQ, Long Thanh, Nha Trang and

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b. In support of Shining Brass operations AN/PRC-25 radios were acquired and issued to teams for ground communications. Production model AN/PRC-64's were obtained and issued to teams for field-base communications. Since no crystals for the new equipment were available, developmental models of this equipment which were on hand were cannibalized for their crystals. At the end of the year crystals for this equipment had not been received despite high priority requisitions and several follow-up messages. AN/PRC-64 was found to be more suitable than the RS-1 for Shining Brass operations. Only the first few teams took both types of equipment after which only the AN/PRC-64 was taken into the field.

c. RT-1 transceivers were obtained and issued to Shining Brass teams for air-ground communications. In addition, three sets of this equipment were issued to OPLAN 34A team ROMEO for DATA reporting by the team's observation posts back to the main team camp.

d. NAD Danang reported their attempts to maintain the AN/ARC-94 (618T) equipments operating in the PTFs were meeting with little success due to lack of repair parts, instruction books and trained repair personnel for this aircraft equipment. A major factor in failures of this equipment is its apparent inability to withstand the pounding which it takes when the PTFs are underway. Suggestions for better shock mounting or possible replacement with Navy TCS transmitters were made.

e. OPLAN 34A teams continued to use the RS-1 (AN/GRC-109) as the only dependable equipment for their long-term requirements, despite its relatively heavy weight.

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a. In September 1965 during a visit to SOG headquarters by the Deputy Area Telecommunications Officer from Manila, it was proposed to transfer CAS's Saigon radio station (Fourspanks) to SOG in order to consolidate all SOG tactical communications and to transfer OPLAN 34A conversations circuits (reams) from Clark AB because of prevailing and security limitations at Clark. Chief SOG concurred in general with the proposal and made certain changes and additions to Chief Bugs (ATC Manila).

b. In October 1965 CINCPAC was informed of the proposed station transfer to SOG, and of the proposed transfer of OPLAN 34A circuits to Saigon to meet SOG's requirement for a continuous guard by the base station rather than scheduled team contacts as at present.

c. In December 1965 Chief Bugs was advised of the requirement for a secure communications link between the Fourspanks station and SOG Headquarters if SOG circuits were to be transferred to Fourspanks. This requirement will require construction of a crypto vault at Fourspanks and twenty-four hour manning by SOG personnel of the cryptocenter at that location. DATA

A-5

At year's end, correspondence from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC was being originated requesting approval for such a transfer.

d. Throughout the year SOG communications was plagued with power failures of the generators in the MACV 2 compound. Although continuous liaison was maintained

with HSAS public works. Little relief was realized since new or replacement generators were not available. In December Chief SOG notified J6 of the problem which was becoming intolerable and requested MACV's assistance. Late in December, two new 60 KW generators were added to provide power for other than SOG users which had been drawing power from the generator providing power to SOG communications. However, this action still did not prevent a number of communications outages when the SOG generator failed or had to be secured for maintenance, since no reliable standby generator was available.

e. After one and one-half years of verbal agreements with various commands to provide maintenance support to SOG communication equipment, MACV J6 was requested in November to task appropriate commands to provide this support. As a result of this request, U.S. Army Vietnam tasked specific commands to provide maintenance support for SOG radio, teletypewriter and DATA equipment located at SOG Headquarters, NAD Danang, and First Flight Detachment, Nha Trang.

5. MATERIAL

a. Responsibility for providing OPLAN 34A teams with DATA DATA With arrangements with ASST DIRNSA, through MACV J2 and Army Field Issuing Office, Vietnam. SOG is provided with two series of Diana pads for issue to OPLAN 34A teams, Shining Brass operations and STS operations and training. In addition.

MT

b. Responsibility for the DATA of OPLAN 34A team messages was transferred to STS in December. This change appreciably cuts the time of DATA and translation of messages received from the field. Responsibility for of messages to teams in the field was retained by SOG communications.

6. SUBORDINATE TECHNICAL SERVICE

a. Continuous liaison was maintained between SOG S-6 (Major Lee) and SOG communicators during this period by several visits each week. SOG communications approved (originated SOG requests for additional communication equipment and material, provided crypto material in support of SOG's radio net and long-range operational planning.

b. SOG S-6 continued direct supervision of the communications training of agent team radio operators at Camp Long Thaub with the advice and assistance of MAS Comm Saigon and SOG Comm. During this period two groups of student radio operators were trained with a total of thirty one of thirty-two graduating two others having deserted.

7. PERSONNEL

There were no personnel shortages in the Communication Branch in 1965, however the teletypewriter repairman billet was not filled until late in December. The recurring problem of newly reporting SOG communications center personnel without DATA was again faced. SOG communications center personnel do not require DATA to operate SOG communication circuits, but required DATA because of the co-location of DATA with SOG teletypewriter and DATA equipment. MACV SSO agreed that if the SOG communications center and its personnel were physically separated from DATA would not be required. A meeting was held with DODSPECREP and plans were made for the exchange of communication spaces of SOG communications center and SSO after the first of the year, and the removal of SOG DATA equipment from its co-location with DATA

UNREADABLE

a. A NVN Coastal Shipping Interdiction Surveillance Study was initiated in late 1965 to determine current shipping patterns, high probability choke-point areas, and frequently used inland waterways in the transporting of supplies to NVN.

b. To support the Intelligence Collection Effort of SOG, a MARCOPS Collection Plan based on DIRI and COMUSMACV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) was published on 7 December 1965. The plan included the basic KEI and a standing operating procedure for interrogating prisoners obtained as a result of SOG Maritime Operations.

c. In June 1965, a spot reporting system was established to disseminate information in a timely manner. Based on data obtained from MARCOPS prisoners, the intel branch submitted the following reports to Higher Headquarters; 47 Interrogation Spot Reports and 53 Intelligence Information Reports (DD Form 1396). Reports described general conditions in the coastal provinces in North Vietnam.

2. Support for OPLAN 34A Operations. During the reporting period the intelligence branch prepared detailed DATA DATA DATA port of OPLAN 34A airborne operations.

a. An Intelligence Collection Plan tailored to airborne agent team intelligence gathering capabilities was prepared on 15 October 1965. Individual agent teams were tasked with specific intelligence requirements based on DATA from COMUSMACV and higher headquarters.

b. The intelligence spot reporting system was utilized beginning in September 1965 for disseminating in-

Unreadable

(2) From this intelligence 24 targets were validated for the RLIF target list.

(3) In addition, SOG recommended [illegible] areas for B-52 strikes. These targets were eventually approved.

4. Acquisition of Aerial Photography. During early 1965 SOG had a very limited photo interpretation capability and an insufficient amount of aerial photography. With the increase of photo interpretation personnel and subsequent enlargement of the overall SOG mission it was determined that an increase of aerial photography was necessary. Following an April review of then recently flown photo coverage available in SOG's area of interest, arrangements were made to have duplicate positives made reproduced at SAC PIC (SAKEN) and 13MM. By early August a suitable film library was established and strip film was plotted to start area PI studies. Subsequently, SOG requested that medium altitude 1-2 photography be flown of [illegible]

entire Laos panhandle area of interest. This was approved by JCS and SAC and was flown during the period September - November 1965. Arrangements were made for 5th RW and 10th RTS to furnish SOG with duplicate positives of certain photography flown over SOG Shining Brass and CIPLAN 34A areas of interest. Tables Four support the preceeding through 4-2. By year end aerial photography requirements were being fulfilled on almost an as needed basis. Weather was the only inhibiting factor.

5. (U) Photo Interpretation Equipment. The expansion of photo interpretation requirements created a serious shortage of equipment, primarily light tables. SOG had, up to this point, operated with two (2) light tables. Five (5) additional tables had been ordered in June 1965 but, due to shipping and warehouse problems, none were received until November (3 received). The other two were received in December. There was a shortage of photo interpretation personnel during the first half of the reporting period. Since June, the gradual increase of trained interpreters gave SOG an adequate photographic interpretation capability to support current operations.

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TITLE	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Chief	32162	[illegible]	[illegible]
Plans Officer	9087	[illegible]	[illegible]
Plans Officer	32162	[illegible]	[illegible]
Plans Officer	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Operations Sgt.	11B4S	[illegible]	[illegible]
Clerk Typist	71B2A	[illegible]	[illegible]

Prior to the approval of JTD Change No [illegible] planning functions had been performed on an additional duty basis by personnel of the various Branches/Sections. One officer was assigned to the plans section for a three month period (August - October) another for two months (October - November) and the Operations Sgt. reported for duty [illegible] August. The Chief and two Plans Officers report in December and the remaining officer is expected in January 1966. The Clerk Typist position is the only space not filled or forecast.

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS Initial manning [illegible] organization, requisitioning and procuring needed equipment, furniture, equipment, documents, publications, [illegible]. All required higher headquarters plans and directives are on hand and necessary supporting plans are being prepared. Our primary interest is the publication of a 10th [illegible] and the supporting JTD.

TASKER NUMBER JCS MACSOG SOG CONTROL # 0001720-66

DUE DATE ASAP

REDACT _____ DECLASSIFY X

DOCUMENTS REMOVED ~~BEING REVIEWED~~:

DOCUMENT REMOVED

SECTION VI

PAGE 1 OF 6

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e. The PsyWar Printing Plant, formerly located at House #10 was relocated in the VOF compound in a facility built for that purpose. The new printing plant was contracted for locally and erected within 45 days. Some difficulty was encountered in the finishing product due to lack of integrity on the part of the contractor. The contract called for payments at intervals during construction with a final payment at time of completion. Serious defects were uncovered after final payment was made. Corrective actions were accomplished after considerable efforts. Had the final payment been withheld for a period to allow for complete settling of the facility corrective action by the contractor would have been expedited.

f. Shining Brass construction at Khan Duc was accomplished to provide facilities for the operation.

g. The relocation of Shining Brass Command and Control Center Danang to Camp Fay, Danang East was in progress. The new facilities include an administrative building as well as additions to existing NAD BOQs and BEQs. Completion is estimated April - May 1966, dependent on materials availability.

h. Projects under way during the year, but not completed include:

(1) Additional facilities at Camp Long Thanh.

(2) Replacement of electrical generators at Camp Fay.

(3) Rehabilitation at Nha Trang.

2. PERSONNEL

a. The logistics portion of the Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) was increased to provide for new requirements as well as greater depth in the numbers and types of personnel. Notable was the addition of an Accountant, Motor Vehicle Supervisor, and additional supply specialists. Manning action for October 1965 changes was begun in December. Additional action was under way by the close of 1965 to provide additional personnel authorizations. These include:

Unreadable

c. In addition, logistics was achieved [illegible] port of the actual operations, including detachments [illegible] provided by non-US hire personnel, mostly Vietnamese. [illegible] persons were authorized for FY 1966 for OPLAN [illegible] additional requirement for Shining Brass. [illegible] provided a variety of support to include clerical [illegible] supply operations, vehicle operations, [illegible] aerial delivery, parachute repacking. The [illegible] resulted in performance of essential [illegible] as providing well trained technicians.

3. BUDGET AND FISCAL

a. FY 1965 funding problems arose during the month of June 1965. Increased unprogrammed expenditures arose leaving a close margin between funds and requirements. Expenses during June were new item conditions [illegible] due to overpayment for marine petroleum and supplies [illegible] through CISO. Carefully controlled expenditures and obligations were made for absolute essentials. [illegible] to include construction projects were delayed [illegible] funds were received.

b. $7,660,000 was requested and approved for FY 1966 for OPLAN 34A. Due to increased [illegible] requirements, pay (Vietnamese) and allowances [illegible] additional $896,000 in contingency funds was [illegible]

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d. DATA

Financial operation in FY 1965 was based on minimum funding restrictions. FY 1966 budget approval required control of funds by categories: Personnel; Travel; Operating and Maintenance; Major Equipment; Rentals; New Construction; POL. Variation between categories was limited to 5% without CINCPAC approval. This requirement, not originally planned for, was met.

e. The advent of Shining Brass generated the requirement to maintain separate books, one for OPLAN 34A, a second set for Shining Brass. Due to the nature of the operation, consolidation of funds through CAS Saigon, single supply, procurement, and storage facilities, additional procedures had to be developed and implemented to insure segregation of accounts for expenditure and financial reporting. Considerable difficulty has been encountered segregating the funds due primarily to unprogrammed work loads and frequent high priority requirements.

f. The FY 1967 budget was submitted in December 1965 on a relatively short notice requirement.

g. Breakdown by program:

(1) OPLAN 34A:

DATA — DATA — A-5

Appropriated Funds — 324,000

(2) Shining Brass:

DATA — DATA — A-5

Appropriated Funds — 20,000

h. Resupply activities supported Airborne and Psy War requirements. Bundles and supplies met flight schedules in an ever increasing tempo. New procedures and techniques were developed and employed during the year. Vietnamese (PDS) were trained in [illegible] specialties.

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State
JSSA pgm

1967
103 pages

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

COMMAND HISTORY
1967
ANNEX G

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MACSOG

3 Sep 68

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Annex G, 1967 Command History (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Inclosed is Annex G (Special Operations) to the 1967 Command History.

2. (U) Because of the sensitive nature of the information contained in this Annex, its distribution has been limited to those agencies considered to have an essential need-to-know. It is requested that no further distribution be made without the express consent of this headquarters.

3.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
as

SIDNEY GRITZ
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

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MACV	
1 - J5	21
1 - SJS History Br.	22
12 - MACSOG	23-34

TABLE OF CONTENTS - LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL i

TABLE OF CONTENTS - LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES ..... ii, iii

ANNEX G (SPECIAL OPERATIONS) to USMACV 1967 Command History G-1-G-5

APPENDIX I - Administration ..... G-I-1 - G-I-2

TAB A - Organization G-I-A-1

TAB B - Proposed Organization G-I-B-1

TAB C - Key Officers ..... G-I-C-1 - G-I-C-3

TAB D - Medical Evacuees G-I-D-1

APPENDIX II - Intelligence ..... G-II-1 - G-II-15

TAB A - Operational Organization G-II-A-1

APPENDIX III - FOOTBOY Operations G-III-1

Section I - Maritime Operations ..... G-III-1-1 - G-III-1-5

TAB A - Detailed Mission Summary ..... G-III-1-A-1 - G-III-1-A-9

TAB B - PTF Overhaul Schedule G-III-1-B-1

TAB C - PLOWMAN Operating Areas G-III-1-C-1

Section 2 - Air Operations ..... G-III-2-1 - G-III-2-4

TAB A - OP 32 Organization G-III-2-A-1

TAB B - Chronology of Significant SOG Air Operations G-III-2-B-1

TAB C - 1967 A-1G Psyops Support G-III-2-C-1

TAB D - 1967 A-1G Team Support G-III-2-D-1

TAB E - 1967 F4C Team Support G-III-2-E-1

TAB F - 1967 C-123, C-130 FOOTBOY Support G-III-2-F-1

TAB G - 1967 CH-3 Team Support G-III-2-G-1

TAB H - 1967 C-123, C-130 Total Sorties G-III-2-H-1

TAB I - PRAIRIE FIRE/DANIEL BOONE/NICKEL STEEL Support for 1967 ..... G-III-2-I-1

Section 3 - Psychological Operations ..... G-III-3-1 - G-III-3-3

TAB A - OP 35 Organization G-III-3-A-1

Section 4 - Airborne Operations ..... G-III-4-1 - G-III-4-28

TAB A - Agent Strength of in-place Teams G-III-4-A-1
TAB B - Location of in-place Teams G-III-4-B-1
TAB C - Recapitulation of Teams Resupplied G-III-4-C-1
TAB D - Recapitulation of in-place Agent Losses G-III-4-D-1
TAB E - Training at Camp Long Thanh G-III-4-E-1
Incl 1 - Student Status and Training Activities ..... G-III-4-E-1-1 - G-III-4-E-1-9
Incl 2 - Personnel Status ..... G-III-4-E-2-1 - G-III-4-E-2-3
Incl 3 - Facility Improvements ..... G-III-4-E-3-1 - G-III-4-E-3-3
Incl 4 - Combat Operations ..... G-III-4-E-4-1 - G-III-4-E-4-4
Incl 5 - CIDG Security Battalion G-III-4-E-5-1
Incl 6 - Problem Areas ..... G-III-4-E-6-1 - G-III-4-E-6-2

APPENDIX IV - Cross-border Ground Operations ..... G-IV-1 - G-IV-6
TAB A - Summary of PRAIRIE FIRE Missions G-IV-A-1
TAB B - Summary of DANIEL BOONE Missions G-IV-B-1
TAB C - PRAIRIE FIRE Area of Operations G-IV-C-1
TAB C - DANIEL BOONE Area of Operations G-IV-D-1

APPENDIX V - Joint Personnel Recovery Center ..... G-V-1 - G-V-15

APPENDIX VI - Logistics ..... G-VI-1 - G-VI-12
TAB A - FY 69 Program Budgets G-VI-A-1

APPENDIX VII - Plans ..... G-VII-1 - G-VII-3

APPENDIX VIII - Communications ..... G-VIII-1 - G-VIII-6

ANNEX G (SPECIAL OPERATIONS) TO MACV 1967 COMMAND HISTORY

1. GENERAL.

a. This annex summarizes the activities of the Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observation Group (MACSOG) during the calendar year 1967. Details of these activities are contained in the appendices to this annex.

b. During 1967 SOG continued, expanded and intensified its programs of harassment, diversion, intelligence collection, capture of prisoners, physical destruction and psychological operations against North Vietnam; combat operations in selected portions of Laos including interdiction of supply routes, destruction of supplies and equipment, acquisition of intelligence information and post air strike damage assessment and exploitation; and, in June, commenced cross-border operations in Cambodia for reconnaissance and intelligence collection and/or verification.

c. In 1967 SOG assumed responsibility for a portion of the Department of Defense sponsored anti-infiltration system. SOG's mission in support of the anti-personnel sub-system will be the precision emplacement of hand delivered intrusion sensors.

d. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) continued operations throughout the year.

2. ADMINISTRATION (APPENDIX I)

The authorized strength of SOG Headquarters for calendar year 1967 was 275 personnel.

3. INTELLIGENCE (APPENDIX II)

a. The Intelligence Branch was reorganized along functional lines to meet increased requirements for in-being operations and the anticipated requirements for expansion into new areas of operation.

b. As a result of reorganization, closer liaison and coordination with the MACV intelligence community and utilization of more sophisticated collection techniques, SOG intelligence production trebled during the year.

4. FOOTBOY OPERATIONS (APPENDIX III)

a. Maritime Operations - PLOWMAN

(1) One hundred and twenty-five PLOWMAN missions were launched in 1967 against the shores of North Vietnam for the purposes of maritime interdiction, prisoner capture and general disruption of NVN coastal areas. Maritime interdiction continued to be most profitable in terms of enemy craft sunk and numbers of prisoners captured as well as intelligence collection.

(2) Despite the added year of extensive operations, the hardening of NVN coastal defense sites and no respite from adverse weather, seven NASTY class PTFs and three SWIFT boats remained in the SOG inventory throughout the year.

(3) With continuous on-the-job training for boat crews and increased proficiency in boat handling, the utilization of PTFs improved to the extent that even with less boats in the inventory, more missions were completed than in years past. The casualty rate also declined appreciably: one VN KIA, three VN WIA and one VN MIA. There were no U. S. casualties.

b. Air Operations - MIDRIFF

(1) Air operations in support of the FOOTBOY program consisted of two types of missions: support of agent teams and Psyop leaflet, data During the year, 582 MIDRIFF missions were scheduled and 294 completed utilizing USAF, VNAF and SOG aircraft.

(2) In support of PRAIRIE FIRE/DANIEL BOONE operations, SOG averaged 40 missions per month at years end. Helicopter assets totaled 30 troop carriers and 20 gunships, quadrupling early 1967 figures. Aircraft lost as a result of PRAIRIE FIRE/DANIEL BOONE/NICKEL STEEL totaled 23.

(3) Both the number of missions scheduled by the Air Operations Logistics Section and the amount of cargo airlifted doubled the previous year's figures. Over 860 missions were fragged and over 10 million pounds of cargo airlifted by SOG C-123 and C-130 and DATA C-45 and C-47 aircraft.

c. Psychological Operations -- HUMIDOR

(1) Psychological Operations continued with the same type of operations as in 1966. However, all programs increased in scope, intensity and quality.

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primary emphasis during 1967 in an attempt to establish it as a significa threat to Hanoi.

(2) Leaflet, gift kit and radio drops continued and increased. Tl country letter production and broadcasts increased as much as 50 perce Project JENNY added significant impetus when BLUE EAGLE I commenced broadcasting over the Gulf of Tonkin on 1 June. Construction also was begun on a 200 KW transmitter site at Hue.

d. Airborne Operations - TIMBERWORK

(1) The Airborne Operations Section, in conjunction with their Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) counterpart personnel, continued to recruit, train, equip and infiltrate agent teams into NVN, and subsequently to resupply and reinforce these teams. The team missions were to collect intelligence, conduct sabotage and psychological operations, and render assistance to downed aircrews.

(2) OP-34 opened 1967 with seven in-place teams or a total of 76 agents. During the year, four new teams, two singleton agents and two STRATA teams were infiltrated. Four teams were lost, seven agents killed in action, one died of wounds, five died of non-hostile injuries and three died of disease. Operational teams were resupplied 28 times during the year. The year ended with 11 in-place teams and two singleton agents for a total of 71 agents.

(3) Significant accomplishments in the TIMBERWORK area included the infiltration of the first Short Time Roadwatch and Target Acquisition (STRATA) team, the use of PLOWMAN detainees infiltrated as normal returnees with a low level intelligence mission, and the first successful exfiltration of an agent team from North Vietnam. Additionally, diversionary operations were begun late in the year with the objective of diverting enemy resources to internal security roles. This was to be accomplished by the establishment of

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5. CROSS-BORDER GROUND OPERATIONS - DANIEL BOONE/ PRAIRIE FIRE (APPENDIX IV)

a. PRAIRIE FIRE operations continued in Laos throughout 1967. Increased recruitment and training afforded a 50 percent increase in team missions; and the establishment of a permanent radio relay site resulted in a significant increase in effectiveness. The SLAM concept was initiated providing intelligence for lucrative air strike targets and for PRAIRIE FIRE destruction missions.

b. Cross-border operations into Cambodia commenced in mid-year under the code name DANIEL BOONE. Although restricted in team numbers, areas of operation and combat capability; valuable intelligence on infiltration routes and enemy sanctuaries resulted from DANIEL BOONE reconnaissance missions.

c. OP-35 also assumed responsibility for SOG's portion of the MUSCLE SHOALS anti-infiltration system.

6. JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER (APPENDIX V)

a. JPRC's mission is to provide a capability within USMACV for personnel recovery operations subsequent to termination of search and rescue (SAR) efforts. In accomplishment of this mission JPRC was involved in 39 attempted recovery operations in 1967.

DATA

c. JPRC initiated a reward program for the return of missing/captured personnel or information concerning them, and supported this program with leaflet operations in North Vietnam and along the SVN/Cambodian border.

7. LOGISTICS (APPENDIX VI)

Logistics activities during 1967 featured an increase in personnel in areas, expansion in supply and service support to keep pace with incres SOG activities and new real estate procurement and the associated con-

struction. A revitalization in some areas along with new and more effective managerial techniques resulted in the adjustment to ever-changing situations and requirements.

8. PLANS (APPENDIX VII)

The Plans Section continued throughout 1967 to provide current, long-range and contingency planning for SOG and JUWTF operations, as well as providing input to the plans of higher headquarters.

9. COMMUNICATIONS (APPENDIX VIII)

The Communications Section expanded during 1967 principally because of the addition of DANIEL BOONE operations and the anticipated requirements in 1968 for the MUSCLE SHOALS program. Additional and more effective equipment was acquired, the improvement of security was undertaken on a daily basis, signal plans were improved and increased emphasis was placed on operator training.

APPENDIX I
ADMINISTRATION

1. COMMAND. Colonel John K. Singlaub, 037040, USA, commanded the Studies and Observation Group during 1967.

2. MISSION. The Administrative Division:

a. Interprets administrative policy and directives from higher headquarters, formulates and disseminates SOG administrative policy, directives and SOP's

b. Receives, processes and controls all incoming and outgoing correspondence and publications, including classified material; operates a distribution center including courier service for such material; and maintains central files and registry. Responsible for and operates printing facilities within SOG Headquarters. Appointed as Assistant Adjutant General for purposes of authenticating funded and nonfunded MACV travel orders as pertain to SOG personnel. Acts as the sole delegated agent of the Commander and Deputy Commander, SOG, for authenticating correspondence.

c. Recommends allocation and controls assignment of office space; procures and controls office equipment and supplies; and supervises maintenance and repair of office facilities to include janitorial services.

d. Provides or arranges personal services for headquarters personnel to include mail delivery and documentation of clearances; processes and publishes temporary duty orders; maintains duty rosters as required; processes all incoming and outgoing SOG personnel; and processes efficiency reports and requests for awards and decorations for all four services.

e. Provides a uniform pattern of personnel administration for local national employees of SOG forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Exercises administrative supervision over seven civilian personnel departments having a combined authorization of 7,657 civilians.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. During calendar year 1967, SOG Headquarters operated under the JTD of 15 October 1965, as changed, at an authorized strength of 275, broken down as follows: 108 officers, 3 warrant officers, 149 enlisted men and 15 civilians.

b. Due to the assignment of two additional major programs and the increased scope of current programs, a manpower increase was requested in a proposed JTD dated 30 October 1967. The manpower authorizations reflected in the proposed JTD are: 152 officers, 3 warrant officers, 251 enlisted men and 10 civilian personnel, for a total of 416.

c. The organization for 1967 is shown at Tab A.

d. The proposed organization is shown at Tab B.

4. PERSONNEL.

a. A list of key officers is shown at Tab C.

b. A list of SOG personnel medically evacuated during the year is shown at Tab D.



*Augmented by TDY MTTs as required

TAB A
ORGANIZATION 1967



TAB B
PROPOSED ORGANIZATION

TAB C

KEY OFFICERS, 1967

POSITION	DATES	INCUMBENT
1. Chief, SOG	1 Jan - 31 Dec	COL J K Singlaub
a. Special Assistant	1 Jan - 22 Mar 23 Mar - 31 Dec	N Ames
b. Spec Asst Abn Opn	1 Jan - 27 May 28 May - 31 Dec	COL B M Austin COL W F Johnson
c. Executive Officer	1 Jan - 14 Aug 15 Aug - 31 Dec	LTC H H Flather LTC I C Bland
2. Administrative Officer	1 Jan - 14 Aug 23 Apr - 15 Nov Vacant 11 Dec - 31 Dec	CPT E Buckson CPT D J Hutt CPT L E Young Jr
3. Chief, Intelligence Branch	1 Jan - 28 Jan 29 Jan - 31 Dec	LTC R L Fisher LTC C C Robinson
4. Chief, Operations Branch	1 Jan - 27 May 2 2	COL D P Casey stin ght
a. Chief, MAROP Sec (34A)	1 1	istie ler th Jr

C-I-C-1

KEY OFFICERS, 1967 (CONTD)

POSITION	DATES	INCUMBENT
b. Chief, Abn Opn Sec (34A)	1 Jan - 8 May	COL R C Mclane
	9 May - 6 Sep	LTC R C Kingston
	7 Sep - 31 Dec	LTC J D Carney
c. Chief, Air Opn Sec	1 Jan - 3 Jun	LTC E A Wahl
	4 Jun - 10 Dec	LTC G H Slover
	11 Dec - 31 Dec	LTC H C Vandyke
d. Chief, Medical Sec	1 Jan - 16 May	LT E J Jenrie
	17 May - 2 Nov	LT D A Youngblood
	3 Nov - 31 Dec	LT R Remuzzi
e. Chief, Abn Opns Sec (SB)	1 Jan - 6 Sep	LTC J D Carney
	7 Sep - 31 Dec	LTC L R Trapp
5. Chief, Logistics Branch	1 Jan - 26 Jan	LTC J R McCune
	27 Jan - 31 Dec	LTC L B Moore
6. Chief, Commo Branch	1 Jan - 1 May	CDR H W Marbott
	2 May - 31 Dec	CDR T E Vines
7. CO, MAROP Gp	1 Jan - 23 Apr	CDR W R Olson
	24 Apr - 31 Dec	CDR N H Olson
8. Senior Adv, Long Thanh Det	1 Jan - 2 Feb	LTC C T Hewgley, Jr
	3 Feb - 18 Dec	MAJ L Crawford
	19 Dec - 31 Dec	MAJ R E Dutton

KEY OFFICERS, 1967 (CONTD)

POSITION	DATES	INCUMBENT
9. Chief, PSYOP Gp	1 Jan - 21 Aug	LTC A V Mathwin
	22 Aug - 31 Dec	LTC T W Bowen
10. CO AIROP Gp	1 Jan - 23 May	LTC C E Kimble
	24 May - 31 Dec	LTC J Deas
11. Chief, Plans Branch	1 Jan - 17 May	LTC J Reus-Froylan
	18 May - 31 Dec	LTC C S Zoukis
12. Chief, Comptroller Branch	1 Jan - 1 May	LT J R Mutchler
	2 May - 22 Aug	LT J Kraus
	23 Aug - 31 Dec	LCDR T B Potter, Jr
13. Chief, JPRC	1 Jan - 15 Oct	COL A T Sampson
	16 Oct - 31 Dec	COL B S Keller

TAB D

MEDICAL EVACUEES FOR CY 1967

NAME	SERVICE NUMBER	RANK
ZWIENER, Robert C.	093827	2d Lt
ALGER, Russell W.	W2151675	CW3
QUINTANA, Eloy E.	1490397	SSG
FRANKLIN, William D.	RA23397559	SP5

(2) The majority of these spot reports provided information on military order of battle and coastal defense installations in NVN. Other subjects covered were:

(a) Para-military activities.

(b) Air defense

(c) Conscription

(d) Coastal sea transportation

(e) Lines of Communication data

(f) Identification of dissident groups

(g) Results of airstrikes and naval gunfire

(h) Military construction

(3) Special interest reports were submitted on:

(a) The effects of maritime mining operations.

(b) The downing and disposition of U. S. aircraft and pilots.

(c) NVN cadre interrogations and treatment of returned MAROPS prisoners.

(d) NVN defense measures against MAROPS activities.

b. Intelligence Information Reports.

(1) Based on interrogations of MAROPS prisoners, 296 Intelligence Information Reports were submitted.

(2) These reports primarily provided information on military and defense activities along the NVN coast. Other subjects covered were:

(a) Para-military activities.

(b) Air defense

(c) Conscription

(d) Coastal sea transportation

(e) Lines of Communication data

(f) Results of Air strikes and naval gun fire

(g) Political, economic and social activities

(h) Beach and hydrographic data

c. Studies, Estimates and Annexes prepared.

(1) Study on coordinated Patrol Boat Fast (PTF) procedures for NVN MIG pilot recovery.

(2) Intelligence Annex to OPLAN 37G-67 (SHOTGUN).

(3) Study on the effects of PLOWMAN operations on the fishing economy of North Vietnam.

(4) Intelligence study on the military, political effects of PLOWMAN operations on NVN.

(5) A study on the feasibility of inserting agents into NVN through the PLOWMAN program.

d. Target Development: A total of 25 targets were developed for MAROPS.

e. New Projects Initiated:

(1) Coastal Defense Printout

(2) Source Register

(3) Personalities Register

(4) Security and Militia Printout

(5) A new planning cycle for CADO missions.

f. Problem Areas Encountered:

(1) Timely receipt of prestrike aerial photography.

(2) Selection of lucrative CADO targets in areas along NVN coast which present acceptable risk to action teams and PTFs.

6. DANIEL BOONE Intelligence Activities.

a. Intelligence Information Reports (IIR):

(1) During the period 1 June to 31 December, 155 IIR's were submitted.

(2) Beginning in September, two IIR's were prepared on each DANIEL BOONE mission: one report on terrain; and the other on the enemy activity in the area.

b. Spot Reports: Nineteen spot reports were submitted by DANIEL BOONE to report the sightings of items of immediate interest to the Field Commanders

c. Studies and Annexes Prepared:

(1) Intelligence Annex for OPLAN 1-67 (General War).

(2) Two river studies (Tonle Sap and Prek Sathay).

d. Target Selection and Development: A total of 111 targets were selected and developed/updated.

DATA

f. Significant Intelligence Produced by DANIEL BOONE during 1967:

(1) 151 infiltration routes and trails were located.

(2) 76 enemy troop sightings indicated use of Cambodia by the VC/NVA.

(3) 99 active and inactive bivouac areas and way stations were located.

(4) 4 NVA communication wires were observed in Cambodia.

(5) Photographs were taken of roads, trails, bridges, storage eas, enemy fortifications and terrain.

g. Participation in Cambodian Study Group (submits weekly report to partment of State).

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS Intelligence Activities.

a. Spot Reports:

(1) 167 spot reports were submitted by the Intelligence Division ing 1967 based on information received from 9 teams.

(2) The majority of these reports provided road watch type infor- ion and general area observations. Other subjects reported on were:

(a) General NVN order of battle.

(b) NVN control of population and propaganda effects.

(c) Effects of draft on NVN labor force and economy.

(d) CHICOM troops and foreign technical assistance in NVN.

(e) Paramilitary and militia activity.

(f) Transportation and construction activities.

(g) Captured U. S. pilots.

(h) Results of friendly airstrikes.

(i) Food production and distribution.

(j) NVN election policies and local election results.

Studies, Estimates and Annexes Prepared:

(1) Specific EEI were prepared for

MT MT

(2) Submitted recommendations on wire tap mission for team Remus or team Easy.

(3) data

(4) Submitted two studies of NVN, selecting areas of high priority intelligence interest.

(5) Prepared area studies on three specific areas of operation for intelligence collection and sabotage missions in NVN.

(6) Prepared a list of general continuing EEI and OIR for all of NVN.

(7) Prepared studies of six notional target areas.

(8) Reviewed, modified, and updated existing operational plans in response to J2 requirements.

(9) Developed nine target areas which were approved by CINCPAC under the STRATA concept of operations

(a) Prepared EEI, reporting and debrief procedures.

(b) Expanded intelligence holdings and target studies in anticipation of expanded STRATA operations.

(10) Created ADP format and coding system for index and rapid retrieval of all intelligence holdings.

(11) Prepared order of battle and situation map.

8. AIR/ANTI-AIR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

a. The air/anti-air element of the Operations Section maintained all AAA, Air, Sam and EOB for Laos, NVN and Cambodia.

b. A graphic display of this information was maintained in addition to the manual OB files. The EOB file was converted to ADP cards for the purpose of providing listings in various sequences to give faster reference to requests for information. The daily ground fire report was adapted to ADP cards to keep better track of ground fire received outside of known AAA areas.

c. Support was provided to 1st Flt Det, ABNOPS, JPRC, MAROPS, PRAIRIE FIRE and DANIEL BOONE through the timely location and identification of enemy air and anti-air defenses in the areas of operations.

9. SECURITY ACTIVITIES.

The following lists major accomplishments of the Security Section during 1967:

a. Prepared the following directives:

(1) MACSOG Dir 614-1, Subj: Assignment and Travel Restrictions (U)

(2) MACSOG Dir 604-2, Subj: OP-35 Recruitment Records and Security Checks (U)

(3) MACSOG Dir 604-2, Subj: OP-34 Agent Records and Security Checks (TSLD)

(4) MACSOG Dir 381-1, Subj: Reporting of Biographic Data (U)

(5) MACSOG Dir 380-7, Subj: Military Security, Access to SOG Information (U)

b. Prepared a Passive Defense Plan for MACV I Compound.

c. Prepared cover story for Joint Translation Center.

d. Dossiers on Operational Personnel: In 1967, the Security Section implemented a new program in which dossiers are maintained on all operational personnel. During 1967, 1,473 such dossiers were established. These dossiers have proven valuable as approximately 15% of the Local Agency Checks revealed derrogatory information.

e. Biographic Files: Implemented a requirement for all U. S. personnel to establish a file on their counterparts. Information is collected through personal contact. All such files are maintained in the custody of the Security Officer.

f. Liaison: The Security Section continued to make liaison visits to the various intelligence agencies in the Saigon area.

g. Provided Technical Assistance to SOG with:

(1) DASE inspections and electronic sweeps.

(2) DAME service and support.

(3) Security surveys were conducted of Long Thanh and SOG facilities at Udorn and Nakom Phanon.

h. Safe Houses:

(1)

MT

MT

(2)

MT

i. Briefing Control Roster: The Security Section established a system of utilising the services of Data Processing to prepare and distribute monthly an IBM Roster of Non-SOG Personnel Briefed. This roster has saved many man-hours of labor for all branches of SOG and MACV J2.

j. Extended Security Coverage: In 1967, for the first time, every installation, camp, FOB, etc., of SOG was inspected by the Security Section thus contributing to the security posture of SOG and its elements.

k. Listening Systems: The Security Section installed two clandestine listening systems in classified locations.

10. PHOTO ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES.

a. Target folders:

(1) A new method of production of folders was developed. Annotated negatives and multiple copies of target photos were produced.

(2) During 1967, a total of 542 target folders were produced in support of PRAIRIE FIRE, DANIEL BOONE, PLOWMAN TIMBER-WORK and DUMP TRUCK.

b. Special Projects:

(1) A village study was completed for OP-35. Enlargement mosaics were prepared on approximately 40 villages.

(2) A complete interpretation and mosaic was prepared on the XE LANONG River for OP-35.

(3) A comprehensive readout of a large portion of the NVN coastline was accomplished in support of Operation SHOTGUN.

(4) Completed Project SOUTHPAW, a readout of all useable LZs in the SLAM III, IV and V areas.

c. Reconnaissance support and coordination through MACV J2 Recon Branch was increased and improved during the year.

d. Library Services:

(1) The library currently contains approximately 100,000 feet of film and is expanding at the rate of 10,000 feet of film per month.

(2) More than 1,000,000 feet of borrowed film was screened during the year.

(3) Over 10,000 map sheets are maintained by the library with a turnover rate of 1,000 sheets per month.



TAB A

OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION

APPENDIX III
FOOTBOY OPERATIONS

Appendix III contains the historical summaries of the operational aspects of the FOOTBOY program. These are presented in four sections:

Section 1 - Maritime Operations

Section 2 - Air Operations

Section 3 - Psychological Operations

Section 4 - Airborne Operations

SECTION 1
MARITIME OPERATIONS

1. ORGANIZATION. Maritime operations were conducted in 1967 by the Maritime Operations Group (cover name: Naval Advisory Detachment, Danang) in conjunction with the Coastal Security Service of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Staff cognizance of maritime operations was exercised through the Maritime Studies Branch, OP-31, at Studies and Observation Group Headquarters.

a. Naval Advisory Detachment, Danang. The strength of the Maritime Operations Group averaged 14 officers, 30 enlisted men and eight Filipino maintenance men. No serious problems were encountered in filling spaces.

b. Maritime Studies Branch. Strength of the Maritime Studies Branch remained at four officers and two enlisted men throughout the year with the exception of one brief period when contact relief for the Plans Officer was not effected.

c. Key Personnel Changes. Lieutenant Colonel W. O. Butler, USMC, relieved Commander F. J. Christie, USN, as Chief, Maritime Studies Branch on 9 April. Commander P. J. Smith, Jr., USN, was assigned as Plans Officer on 9 April, subsequently relieving Lieutenant Colonel Butler on 15 May. Lieutenant R. K. Bell, USN, relieved Lieutenant J. B. Batton, USN, as Assistant Operations Officer on 18 July. On 20 July, Major Robert D. White, USMC, assumed duty as Plans Officer. Lieutenant Commander D. M. Finley, USN, relieved Lieutenant Commander R. R. Rule, USN, as Operations Officer on 5 September. At NAD, Danang, Commander N. H. Olsen, USN, relieved Commander R. M. Terry, USNR, as Officer in Charge, Naval Advisory Detachment on 6 July. Major W. H. Rice, USMC, relieved Major J. H. Carothers, Jr., USMC, as Chief, Operations and Training, NAD, on 12 July.

2. OPERATION PLOWMAN

a. Maritime Operations.

(1).

MT

(2) Seven Nasty class PTFs and three SWIFT boats were in the inventory throughout the year. On the average, six PTFs were operationally ready throughout the year, with one PTF normally in Subic Bay, Philippines, for overhaul and repair.

(3) Twelve PTF crews and three SWIFT crews were operational throughout the year. Action team strength at the beginning of the year was 104, organized into four teams. At the end of the year this strength had decreased to 69, organized into three teams. Recruiting efforts were initiated towards the end of the year to attain an optimum organization of four twenty man action teams.

(4) A total of 151 PLOWMAN missions were launched during 1967. Of these, 125 were completed, 19 were aborted due to weather and seven aborted due to material or personnel casualties. One VN was killed in action, three were wounded in action, and one was missing in action. No PTFs were lost. No U.S. casualties were incurred.

3. PLOWMAN SUMMARY.

a. Missions conducted. PLOWMAN operations were conducted as follows:

(1) MINT Missions.

MT

MT

(2) LOKI Missions.

MT

(3) CADO Missions.

MT

(4) PSYHAR Missions. Five missions as defined above were conducted, but were further classified as PSYHAR since delivery of psyops leaflets All five missions conducted were MINT/PSYHAR.

(5) SPECIAL Missions. Three missions were conducted which were included in the PLOWMAN concept, but which did not specifically fall into one of the above mission categories. Two of these missions involved defections to South Vietnam of prisoners captured on previous PLOWMAN missions. The third was a special reconnaissance mission conducted on Buddha's birthday.

b. Detailed Mission Summary: See Tab A.

c. Operating Areas. (See Tab C) Prior to August, PLOWMAN operations were restricted to the area South of 19-30N so as not to expose PTFs to known operating areas of NVN aircraft. As a result of increased support provided by the SEVENTH FLEET, in August permission was granted by CINCPAC to extend normal operations to 20-00N. In addition, authorization was received to schedule LOKI missions North to 20-30N on a selected basis. A proposal was made by the SEVENTH FLEET in September to further divide the present operating areas, however, this was considered impractical and was not adopted.

d. Maritime Interdiction. The most effective maritime operations continued to be interdiction missions. An increased number of enemy craft were destroyed in comparison to 1966 with the number of prisoners captured increasing proportionately. A significant result was the increase in the number of intelligence and spot reports. The presence of PLOWMAN craft in NVN waters continually exerted pressure on enemy coastal defense efforts and the fishing industry. A considerable enemy effort was expended attempting to destroy PLOWMAN craft through the use of range marker sampans as lures in conjunction with coastal defense guns and "suicide" junks.

DATA DATA

e. Landing Team Operations. Cross-beach operations were unprofitable in terms of captured personnel and destruction of enemy equipment. However, on most occasions action teams were able to reach the beach and accomplish at least a portion of their assigned mission. In an effort to improve the quality of action teams, the Commander, Coastal Security Service, dismissed 59 ineffective action team members during the first

part of the year. Training operations with the participation of U. S. advisors were initiated during October in the Mekong Delta in support of the Mobile Riverine Force (Task Force 117). This was an effort to improve action team readiness and capabilities, and to provide worthwhile activities for the teams during the Northwest winter monsoon season when operations North of 17-00N are restricted. Southern training operations along the coastline in the vicinity of Danang were terminated upon initiation of Delta operations.

3. PTF AVAILABILITY. Seven Nasty class PTFs were in the MACSOG inventory throughout 1967. No boats were lost and no new boats were received. However, action was taken to obtain the force level of 14 PTFs in an effort to increase capabilities in terms of more missions and a more extensive coverage of operating areas.

a. Utilization. Utilization of PTFs continued to improve during the year due to increased proficiency in boat handling by VN personnel and superior maintenance conducted by the U. S. Mobile Support Team. The major cause of boat damage was generally considered to be the effects of weather and enemy action rather than from poor seamanship as had been the case in 1966. Although fewer boats were available in 1967, individual PTFs participated in a greater number of missions.

b. Overhaul. At least one PTF was continually rotated to the U. S. Naval Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay, Philippines, for overhaul with two scheduled during the winter monsoon season. The overhaul schedule shown in Tab B recaps the rotation of PTFs during the year.

4. TRAINING.

a. Boat Crew Training. Continuous on-the-job and refresher training was conducted for boat crews, stressing problem areas encountered during PLOWMAN missions. Emphasis was placed on damage control, fire fighting and communications, and, in December, ten selected VN crewmen commenced training in Napier-Deltic engine overhaul at Subic Bay. Crewmen attending this training will form the nucleus of the Vietnamese Boat Support Group proposed for 1968.

b. Landing Team Training. Southern training operations continued until October. At that time, one action team was deployed monthly to Dong Tam in support of Mobile Riverine Force operations in the Mekong Delta. Patrols were conducted with the assigned missions of reconnaissance, destruction and the capturing of selected prisoners. Considerable value was gained from Delta operations, as U. S. advisors accompanied the action teams on patrols. An opportunity to observe teams in action

resulted in developing increased team proficiency as well as improving the capability of the team leaders. Although the Delta deployment was designed primarily as a training for action teams during the normally restrictive winter monsoon season, operations during 1967 resulted in obtaining valuable intelligence for Mobile Riverine Force operations. The capture of one high-ranking Viet Cong was considered by higher headquarters to be one of the most important sources of information yet obtained in the Delta.

5. EQUIPMENT.

a. Backdrop System. This system, representing the program for expediting procurement and shipment of MACSOG materiel requirements for operations supported by the Navy, was expanded in 1967.

(1) A Backdrop equipment conference was held at Okinawa on 22 May in order to insure a complete understanding of COMUSMACV (MACSOG) materiel requirements. The conference consisted of a review and updating of the following:

(a) Status of replacement craft and tentative delivery schedules.

(b) Requirements for Navy participation.

(c) Requirements for field comments on new equipment.

(d) Ammunition procurement for FY 69.

(e) Current status of delivery of special material requirements.

(f) Navy personnel support.

6. FACILITIES. During the summer, 1967, U.S. SEAL and Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance Advisors were relocated from My Khe to the newly constructed camp at Black Rock, near Danang.

TAB A

DETAILED MISSION SUMMARY

1. 1967 MISSION SUMMARY.

Missions launched	151
Missions aborted - weather	19
Missions aborted - material	7
Missions completed	125
MINT	101
LOKI	4
CADO	12
MINT/PSYHAR	5
SPECIAL	3
Enemy Craft Destroyed	102
Enemy Craft Damaged	3
Enemy Craft Captured	3
Prisoners Captured	328
Prisoners Returned	329
Missions Coastal Defense Fire Received	54
Missions Aircraft Attacks received	0
Missions Surface Attacks received	2
Personnel KIA (VN)	1
WIA (VN)	3
MIA (VN)	1
Personnel KIA, WIA, MIA (US)	0

2. MONTHLY MISSION SUMMARY.

a. January.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
13	MINT	Green	None
20	MINT	Green	None
20	MINT	Blue	45 prisoners taken; 9 craft destroyed.
24	MINT	Green	None
25	MINT/PSYHAR	Blue	4 prisoners taken; 1 craft destroyed; dispensed PSYHAR material.
27	MINT	White	4 prisoners taken; 6 prisoners returned; 1 craft destroyed.
28	MINT	Purple	6 craft destroyed; 1 VN WIA.

January Recap:

Primary missions	7
Secondary missions	2
Prisoners captured	53
Prisoners returned	6
Shipping destroyed	17

b. February.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
7	MINT	Blue	21 prisoners taken
16	MINT	White	8 prisoners taken; 1 craft destroyed.
19	MINT/PSYHAR	White	10 prisoners taken; 1 craft destroyed; dispensed PSYHAR material.
20	MINT	Blue	None
21	MINT/PSYHAR	Blue	4 prisoners taken; 1 craft destroyed; dispensed PSYHAR material.
22	MINT	White	2 prisoners taken; 21 prisoners returned
24	MINT/PSYHAR	Blue	2 prisoners returned; dispensed PSYHAR material.

February Recap:

Primary missions	7
Secondary missions	5
Prisoners captured	24
Prisoners returned	44
Shipping destroyed	3

c. March.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
2	MINT	Blue	5 prisoners taken; 10 prisoners returned
4	MINT/PSYHAR	White	2 prisoners taken; PSYHAR material dispensed.
12	MINT	Blue	None
16	MINT	White	3 prisoners taken; 6 prisoners returned.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
18	MINT	Blue	1 prisoner taken.
19	MINT	White	2 prisoners returned. (mission aborted - not counted in recap)
21	MINT	Blue	None
22	MINT	Blue	None
23	MINT	White	2 prisoners taken; 14 prisoners returned.
24	MINT	Blue	1 craft destroyed; 1 craft damaged.
27	MINT	White	2 prisoners taken.
28	MINT	Blue	None
29	MINT	White	2 prisoners taken.

March Recap:

Primary missions..... 12
Secondary missions 4
Prisoners captured 17
Prisoners returned..... 32
Shipping destroyed/damaged..... 1/1

d. April.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
2	MINT	White	2 prisoners taken.
6	MINT	White	3 prisoners taken.
7	MINT	Blue	None.
9	MINT	Blue	None.
10	CADO	Green	None.
14	MINT	Blue	5 prisoners taken; 1 craft destroyed.
16	MINT	Blue	4 prisoners taken.
17	MINT	White	12 prisoners taken; 1 craft destroyed.
19	MINT	Blue	None.
22	LOKI	Red	None.
25	MINT	White	8 prisoners taken; 10 prisoners returned.
26	MINT	White	5 prisoners taken; 8 craft destroyed.
28	LOKI	Red	None.
30	MINT	White	None.

April Recap:

Primary missions	14
Secondary missions	2
Prisoners captured	39
Prisoners returned	15
Shipping destroyed	10

e. May.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
1	MINT	Blue	None.
3	~~MINT~~	Purple	1 craft destroyed.
8	MINT	Blue	None.
10	MINT	White	1 prisoner taken; 3 craft destroyed.
16	MINT	White	7 prisoners taken; 7 prisoners returned.
18	MINT	Blue	3 prisoners taken; 2 prisoners returned two craft destroyed.
18	MINT	Blue	3 prisoners taken; 6 craft destroyed.
22	SPECIAL	Red	None.
24	MINT	Blue	None.
24	MINT	Blue	1 craft destroyed.
26	MINT	White	5 prisoners taken; 11 craft destroyed.

May Recap:

Primary missions	11
Secondary missions	2
Prisoners captured	19
Prisoners returned	9
Shipping destroyed	24

f. June.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
1	MINT	Blue	None.
3	MINT	White	8 prisoners returned.
5	~~GADO~~	Green	6 prisoners taken; 1 craft destroyed.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
6	MINT	White	10 prisoners taken; 4 prisoners returned.
10	MINT	Blue	6 prisoners taken; 2 craft destroyed.
12	MINT	White	4 prisoners taken.
13	MINT	Blue	1 prisoner taken.
21	MINT	White	4 prisoners taken.
23	MINT	Green	None.
25	LOKI	Red	None.
28	MINT	White	24 prisoners returned.
29	MINT	White	4 prisoners taken; 7 craft destroyed.

June recap:

Primary missions..... 12
Secondary missions 2
Prisoners captured 35
Prisoners returned 32
Shipping destroyed 14

g. July.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
1	MINT	Blue	6 prisoners returned.
3	MINT	White	7 prisoners returned.
5	MINT	Blue	4 prisoners returned.
6	MINT	White	4 prisoners taken; 2 craft destroyed.
8	MINT	Blue	1 prisoner taken.
10	MINT	Blue	None.
12	MINT	White	6 prisoners taken.
15	CADO	Green	1 prisoner taken; 1 VN KIA.
16	CADO	Green	None.
18	MINT	White	3 prisoners taken; 15 prisoners returned.
20	MINT	Green	4 prisoners returned.
21	MINT	White	8 prisoners taken; 4 craft destroyed.
24	MINT	White	10 prisoners taken; 2 craft destroyed.
26	MINT	Green	3 prisoners taken.
29	MINT	Blue	None.
31	MINT	Blue	3 prisoners taken.

July recap:

Primary missions	16
Secondary missions	3
Prisoners captured	39
Prisoners returned	36
Shipping destroyed	8

h. August.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
4	MINT	White	7 prisoners returned.
6	CADO	Blue	None.
8	MINT	White	None.
10	MINT	Blue	2 prisoners taken.
19	MINT	Blue	None.
20	MINT	White	9 prisoners taken; 4 craft destroyed.
23	MINT	White	8 prisoners taken; 3 craft destroyed; 75 rice bowls distributed.
24	MINT	Blue	5 prisoners taken; 24 rice bowls distributed.
25	MINT	White	8 prisoners returned.
29	CADO	Purple	None.
31	MINT	White	3 prisoners taken; 1 craft destroyed; 20 rice bowls distributed.

August recap:

Primary missions	11
Secondary missions	2
Prisoners captured	27
Prisoners returned	15
Shipping destroyed	8
Rice Bowls distributed	176

i. September.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
1	MINT	Blue	4 prisoners taken; 4 prisoners returned; 1 craft destroyed: 4 rice bowls distributed.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
4	CADO	Green	None.
5	MINT	Blue	None.
7	CADO	Green	None.
8	MINT	Blue	6 rice bowls distributed.
9	MINT	Blue	5 prisoners taken; 1 craft destroyed; 50 rice bowls distributed.
11	MINT	White	None.
13	MINT	White	28 prisoners returned; 1 craft destroyed; 1 craft damaged.
21	MINT	White	2 prisoners taken; 33 boxes of toys distributed.
26	MINT	White	2 prisoners taken; 11 prisoners returned.
28	MINT	White	5 prisoners taken; 51 rice bowls distributed.

September recap.

Primary missions	11
Secondary missions	6
Prisoners captured	18
Prisoners returned	43
Shipping destroyed/damaged	2/1
Rice bowls distributed	144
Boxes of toys distributed	33

j. October.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
5	CADO	Purple	None.
6	MINT	Blue	9 prisoners taken; 2 craft destroyed; 42 rice bowls and MT MT
15	MINT	Blue	9 prisoners returned.
22	MINT	Blue	None.
23	MINT	White	8 prisoners taken; 9 prisoners returned; 2 craft destroyed; 32 rice bowls MT MT distributed.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
25	LOKI	Red	9 prisoners taken; 40 rice bowls and MT MT distributed.
26	SPECIAL	Purple	1 prisoner returned.
27	MINT	Blue	4 prisoners taken; 5 rice bowls MT MT distributed.
29	MINT	White	3 prisoners taken; 1 craft destroyed; 14 rice bowls and MT MT
30	CADO	Purple	None.

October recap:

Primary missions	10
Secondary missions	3
Prisoners captured	33
Prisoners returned	19
Shipping destroyed	5
Rice bowls distributed	133
MT	435

k. November.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
2	MINT	Blue	None.
7	MINT	Blue	4 prisoners taken; 4 prisoners returned; 1 craft destroyed.
9	MINT	White	3 prisoners taken; 25 rice bowls MT MT distributed.
11	MINT	White	5 prisoners returned.
18	MINT	White	7 prisoners taken; 5 craft destroyed; 51 rice bowls MT MT distributed.
20	MINT	Blue	9 prisoners returned.
27	MINT	White	8 prisoners taken; 4 craft destroyed; 58 rice bowls MT MT distributed.
29	CADO	Purple	None.

November recap:

Primary missions	8
Secondary missions	3
Prisoners captured	22
Prisoners returned	18
Shipping destroyed/damaged	9/1
Rice bowls distributed	134
mT	150

l. December.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
5	CADO	Purple	None.
17	MINT	White	2 prisoners taken; 12 prisoners returned; 6 rice bowls mT distributed.
19	MINT	Blue	14 prisoners returned.
21	MINT	White	5 prisoners returned.
23	MINT	Blue	8 prisoners returned.
26	MINT	White	19 prisoners returned; 2 craft destroyed.
27	SPECIAL	Purple	2 prisoners returned as defectors.

December recap:

Primary missions	7
Secondary missions	5
Prisoners captured	2
Prisoners returned	60
Shipping destroyed	2
Rice bowls distributed	6
	50

TAB B

PTF OVERHAUL SCHEDULE

BOAT	USNAD TO SUBIC OVHL/REPAIR	SUBIC TO USNAD
12	5 Dec - 26 Jan	4 Feb
3	15 Dec - 26 Jan	4 Feb
12 & 13	29 Dec - 1 Feb	4 Feb
5 & 7	4 Feb - 30 Mar	5 Apr
10	6 Apr - 18 May	24 May
11	24 May - 10 Jul	20 Jul
6	20 Jul - 20 Sep	26 Sep
12	26 Sep - 22 Nov	27 Nov
5 & 7	27 Nov -	
3	28 Dec -	

TAB C

PLOWMAN (C) OPERATING AREAS



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SECTION 2
AIR OPERATIONS

1. MISSION. The primary mission of Air Operations (OP-32) is to provide the necessary concepts and air assets to carry out clandestine air operations in Southeast Asia. A secondary mission is to provide logistics airlift for all SOG activities. (See Tab A for OP-32 organization).

2. GENERAL. During Calender Year (CY) 67, various types of aircraft were used to support the programmed SOG operation for the year. The following history for Air Operations is outlined in three distinct operational areas:

a. FOOTBOY : Operations in North Vietnam.

b. PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL/DANIEL BOONE: Counter-insurgency in Laos/SVN Border Area/Cambodia.

c. Logistics airlift for SOG activities: Note: A chronology of the significant Air Operations completed successfully in CY 67 is shown in Tab B.

3. FOOTBOY Air Operations: MIDRIFF

a. MIDRIFF missions during CY 67 were of two types:

(1) TIMBERWORK agent team support.

(2) HUMIDOR data

b. C-123, C-130, C-121, A-1, F4C, CH-3, 0-2, A-26 and T-28 aircraft were used for these missions. Air assets were provided by the USAF, VNAF and SOG 1st Flight Detachment. A total of 582 MIDRIFF missions were scheduled during FY 67 and 294 were completed.

c. The greatest limiting factor for the year was weather. As an example, 59% of all A-1G (VNAF) recce/resupply missions were cancelled for this reason.

d. Tab's C thru G provide mission data by type of aircraft employed for MIDRIFF missions during CY 67.

e. Significant Facts.

(1) C-130 (COMBAT SPEAR) Combat Loss: A Psyops overland leaflet drop MT , conducted on 29 Dec 67, utilizing one COMBAT SPEAR C-130 aircraft. The aircraft reported leaflet drop completed and was not heard from again. There were no indications as to the fate of the aircraft or crew. SAR and route reconnaissance, limited by inclement weather, failed to locate the aircraft or crew.

(2) Reduction of C-123 Assets. At the beginning of calender year 1967, MACSOG had four combat configured and two standard configured C-123 aircraft available for operations. The two standard configured aircraft were on loan from 7th Air Force. On 23 April and 18 June, respectivelly, the two aircraft on loan were recalled for entry into the jet engine modification program (K-MOD). These aircraft were never replaced.

(3) Project Jenny. On 8 March 67, JCS approved the Project Jenny concept. The concept of operations is such that a U.S. Navy EC-121 aircraft orbits over the Gulf of Tonkin, between 1100Z and 1700Z, and broadcasts selected psyops radio programs to the NVN mainland. The first operational mission was conducted on 1 Jun 67 and, as of 26 Dec 67, 144 missions have been flown. All missions launched and recovered at Danang AB, RVN.

(4) High Altitude Delivery System. During the month of April 1967 a program was initiated to develop a high altitude parachute delivery capability under adverse weather conditions. The system utilizes MT ground radar stations to position the aircraft, a C-123 or C-130, at a predetermined bundle release point. The tests were highly successful and the system is considered combat ready. No operational missions have been conducted to date.

(5) C-130 Replacement Aircraft. The four specially configured C-130 COMBAT SPEAR aircraft were scheduled for replacement during late 1967. Two aircraft were received on 7 & 8 December. There is no firm date of arrival on the other two aircraft but, they should arrive early in 1968.

(6) The 83d VNAF Group stationed in Saigon furnished A-1, H-34 and U-17 support for TIMBERWORK and PRAIRIE FIRE operations until 15 February 1967 at which time the 83d Group's personnel and assets were reassigned and transferred to the 41st VNAF Wing, Danang AB. The A-1G's were added to the existing 516th VNAF Squadron, the H-34's formed the nucleus of a new Squadron, the 219th, and the U-17's were integrated with the 110th Liaison Squadron. No noteable degradation of mission accomplishment resulted from the move of the H-34's and U-17's to Danang AB. The A-1G's aircrews suffered a marked decline in morale after their transfer which contributed to a serious decrease in the number of missions

the VNAF A-1G's were able to complete. An additional factor contributing to the decline in A-1G supported missions was the massive expansion of activities at DATA AB, Thailand. Maintenance support at DATA for VNAF aircraft consists primarily of routine transient maintenance. VNAF missions that require staging from DATA are further complicated by the requirement to gain DATA government approval for Vietnamese personnel to ente DATA

DATA

(7) A requirement to provide an operational small package pickup capability was submitted as SEAOR 156. At the same time a system was developed by OP-32 to provide the VNAF A-1G's such a capability as an interim measure until the results of SEAOR 156 are realized. SEAOR 156, when fulfilled, will give the F-4C and other appropriate aircraft the capability to recover small packages containing intelligence material from areas inaccessable to helicopters. Concept Lima was submitted in July 67 to provide the operational basis for small package pickup missions in TIMBERWORK PRAIRIE FIRE and NICKEL STEEL areas. CINCPAC subsequently denied blanket authority to carry out small package pickup missions and limited approval to an individual mission basis. 256 2443 Jul 67

(8) Helicopter (CH-3) support of TIMBERWORK operations required 38 sorties with an equal number of TAC AIR sorties during 1967. The first and only successful extraction of a SOG team in NVN was accomplished by helicopter on 28 September. Tab G shows the CH-3 support required for 1967.

4. PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL/DANIEL BOONE.

a. During the first 6 months of 1967, SOG missions averaged twenty per month in the DANIEL BOONE, PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL areas. The DANIEL BOONE area of operation came under SOG control in June of 1967. With the increased tempo of operation in PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL and the addition of DANIEL BOONE targets, the average missions per month have more than doubled for the last six months of 1967.

b. The helicopter assets used in this area of operation now total 30 troop carriers and 20 gunships. Comparing this to the assets used early in the year, the figures have quadrupled.

c. Significant Facts:

(1) The total PRAIRIE FIRE, DANIEL BOONE and NICKEL STEEL insertions for 1967 were 378 as compared to 137 in 1966. The increase has put a considerable load on TAC AIR requirements since an average of 4 TAC AIR sorties are required for each team inserted. (Tab I)

(2) Aircraft lost in support of PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL/DANIEL BOONE operations during 1967 are as follows:

8	H-34	Troop Carriers
3	UH-1	Troop Carriers
4	UH-1	Gunships
2	HH-3	SAR Aircraft
3	OIE	Covey - FACs
3	H-46	Troop Carriers

5. LOGISTICS AIRLIFT.

a. During CY 67, Air Operations Logistics Section fragged 867 missions in support of SOG activities. These were flown by SOG C-123 and C-130 and China Airlines C-45, C-47 and Beech C-45 Tradewind aircraft.

b. A total of 10,738,580 pounds of cargo and 25,016 passengers were airlifted during CY 67. Tab H shows the monthly airlift provided during 1967.

c. Significant Facts:

(1) Replacement of C-45 Aircraft. After numerous test flights and maintenance inspections, it was determined the C-45 CAL contract aircraft as unsafe for further flights. A modified DATA aircraft as contracted to replace the older C-45. The Tradewind aircraft is a twin engine turbo-prop aircraft and is superior to the older C-45 in many aspects, ch as speed and range. The effective date of the DATA aircraft contract was 1 September 1967.

(2) Free Fall Rice Drops. During the month of March 1967, a requirement was levied for the development of a free fall rice delivery system. A system was subsequently developed whereby the aircraft (C-123 C-130) drops triple-bagged rice from 1000 feet, with a loss of approximately three percent. The first successful delivery delivery was made Ban Houie Sane (BV-33) on 31 May 1967. The C-123 aircraft can deliver 00 pounds on each mission and the C-130 can deliver 16,000 pounds. ing CY 67, 184,000 pounds of rice were delivered to BV-33 via the fall system.

(3) Mortar Attack at Nha Trang. On 26 November 67, Nha Trang RVN came under enemy mortar attack. As a result of the attack one IBAT SPEAR C-130 aircraft was totally destroyed, two sustained major age and one sustained minor damage. Also, one HEAVY HOOK C-123 raft sustained major damage and two sustained minor damage. One 3 was at Taipei for maintenance at the time of the attack. The destroyed 0 was replaced on 7 December 1967.

TAB A

OP-32 ORGANIZATION



AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL

NUMBER	GRADE	RATED	SERVICE
1	05	Pilot	AF
2	04	Pilot	AF
1	04	Pilot	N
2	03	Nav	AF
2	04	Pilot	MC
1	03	Pilot	AF
1	E7	N/A	AF
2	E6	N/A	AF
1	E5	N/A	AF
Total 13			

TAB B

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT SOG AIR OPERATIONS

DATE	AIRCRAFT	MISSION
17 JAN	C-130	Resupply Verse
25 JAN	CH-3	Infil Hadley
25 JAN	C-130	Resupply Remus
26 JAN	C-130	Resupply Easy
27 JAN	C-130	Resupply Easy Alpha
28 JAN	CH-3	Resupply Hector
21 FEB	A-1G	Resupply Romeo
19 MAR	A-1G	Diversionary Resupply Hector
26 MAR	C-123	Resupply Romeo
27 MAR	C-130	Resupply Easy Alpha
27 MAR	C-130	Resupply Easy
27 MAR	C-130	Resupply Remus
29 MAR	C-130	Resupply Hadley
19 APR	C-123	Resupply Verse
22 APR	F-4C	Resupply Eagle
22 APR	CH-3	Infil Nansen
1 MAY	F-4C	Resupply Ares
12 MAY	F-4C	Resupply Eagle
1 JUN	EC-121	First Project Jenny Mission
17 JUN	A-1G	Recon Hector (Final)
21 AUG	C-130	Resupply Remus
22 AUG	C-130	Resupply Easy
22 AUG	C-123	Resupply Romeo
15 SEP	C-123	Resupply Easy
16 SEP	C-123	Resupply Tourbillon
24 SEP	C-123	Infil Strata V
28 SEP	CH-3	Exfil Strata V - First Exfil from NVN
21 SEP	C-130	Infil Red Dragon
13 OCT	C-130	Resupply Tourbillon
17 OCT	F-4C	Resupply Red Dragon
18 OCT	C-123	Resupply Romeo
18 OCT	C-130	Infil VOI
22 OCT	C-123	Resupply Hadley
23 OCT	C-130	Infil Strata I
3 NOV	C-130	Resupply Strata I
7 NOV	A-1	Resupply Strata I
9 NOV	A-1	Resupply Strata I
15 NOV	C-130	Resupply Easy
21 DEC	F-4C	Resupply Eagle
29 DEC	C-130	Acft Lost on Psyops and Notional Team
	G-III-2-B-1	Resupply Msn.

TAB C

1967 A-1G (VNAF CREWS) PSYOP SUPPORT (LEAFLETS, GIFT KITS AND RADIOS)

MONTH	MISSIONS SCHED	MISSIONS COMPL	CANCELLATIONS WX	CANCELLATIONS MAINT	CANCELLATIONS OTHER	MATERIAL DROPPED LEAFLETS (MILLION)	MATERIAL DROPPED GIFT KITS	MATERIAL DROPPED RADIOS
JAN	9	8	0	0	1	10.0	4,700	90
FEB	3	2	0	0	1	3.3	4,150	70
MAR	3	3	0	0	0	2.5	1,834	0
APR	5	5	0	0	0	4.0	1,320	150
MAY	9	8	0	1	0	1.2	1,800	600
JUN	3	2	1	0	0	.9	1,840	600
JUL	7	4	0	0	3	2.0	2,240	400
AUG	3	1	1	0	1	.5	600	100
SEP	10	2	8	0	0	1.5	1,250	0
OCT	5	2	3	0	0	1.8	0	0
NOV	0	0	0	0	0	.0	0	0
DEC	0	0	0	0	0	.0	0	0
TOTALS:	57	37	13	1	6	27.7	19,734	2,010
PERCENT:	100	65	23	1.5	10.5			

TAB D

1967 A-1G (VNAF CREWS) TEAM SUPPORT (RECCE/RESUPPLY)

MONTH	MISSIONS SCHEDULED	MISSIONS COMPLETED	CANCELLATIONS WEATHER	CANCELLATIONS MAINTENANCE	CANCELLATIONS NO TEAM CONTACT	CANCELLATIONS OTHER
JAN	14	1	11	1	1	0
FEB	10	3	4	2	1	0
MAR	27	*2	14	4	5	2
APR	8	1	4	0	3	0
MAY	10	2	7	0	1	0
JUN	3	0	3	0	0	0
JUL	0	0	0	0	0	0
AUG	0	0	0	0	0	0
SEP	1	0	0	0	0	1
OCT	6	1	3	0	1	1
NOV	28	4	15	0	7	2
DEC	10	0	8	2	0	0
TOTALS:	117	14	69	9	19	6
PER-CENT	100	12	59	7.5	16	5

* One Diversionary Resupply

TAB E

1967 F-4C (U.S. CREWS) TEAM SUPPORT (RECCE/RESUPPLY)

MONTH	MISSIONS SCHEDULED	MISSIONS COMPLETED	CANCELLATIONS WEATHER	CANCELLATIONS MAINTENANCE	CANCELLATIONS NO TEAM CONTACT	CANCELLATIONS OTHER
JAN	0	0	0	0	0	0
FEB	0	0	0	0	0	0
MAR	0	0	0	0	0	0
APR	4	1	1	0	2	0
MAY	2	1	1	0	0	0
JUN	0	0	0	0	0	0
JUL	0	0	0	0	0	0
AUG	0	0	0	0	0	0
SEP	1	0	1	0	0	0
OCT	5	1	3	0	1	0
NOV	0	0	0	0	0	0
DEC	1	1	0	0	0	0
TOTALS:	13	4	6	0	3	0
PERCENT:	100	31	46	0	23	0

TAB F

1967 C-123 /USAF Aircrews) C-130(USAF Aircrews) FOOTBOY Support-MIDRIFF

	C-123				C-130			
	PSYOP Sched/Complt		RESUPPLY Sched/Complt		PSYOP Sched/Complt		RESUPPLY Sched/Complt	
JAN	6	3	5	0	2	2	5	4
FEB	2	2	0	0	7	6	0	0
MAR	1	1	7	2	7	4	7	3
APR	2	2	1	1	6	5	0	0
MAY	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0
JUN	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0
JUL	1	1	3	0	3	2	3	0
AUG	3	3	1	1	8	6	5	2
SEP	5	4	5	2	6	2	0	0
OCT	1	1	10	2	10	5	6	1
NOV	6	5	0	0	6	5	4	2
DEC	1	1	0	0	8	3	0	0
TOTAL	28	23(82%)	32	8(25%)	67	44(65%)	30	12(40%)

	*INFIL Sched/Complt		CANCELLATIONS Other/	WX/	Enemy Activity/	Maint/	Neg Tm Cont
JAN	0	0	0	7	0	2	0
FEB	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
MAR	0	0	0	5	1	4	2
APR	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
MAY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JUN	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
JUL	0	0	0	2	0	0	5
AUG	0	0	1	3	0	1	0
SEP	1	1	0	5	1	1	1
OCT	5	2	0	14	1	3	11
NOV	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
DEC	0	0	0	1	3	1	0
TOTAL	6	3(50%)	1	42(24%)	8(4%)	12(7%)	19(11%)

* 8 Exfiltration missions were scheduled in October - None complete.
C-123 and C-130 acft delivered 213.2 million leaflets during CY 67 & 8,000 radios.

TAB G

1967 CH-3 (USAF CREWS) TEAM SUPPORT (RESUPPLY/INFILTRATE/EXFILTRATE)

MONTH	MISSIONS SCHEDULED	MISSIONS COMPLETED	CANCELLATIONS WEATHER	CANCELLATIONS MAINTENANCE	CANCELLATIONS NO TEAM CONTACT	CANCELLATIONS OTHER
JAN	6	2	1	0	3	0
FEB	1	0	0	0	1	0
MAR	0	0	0	0	0	0
APR	1	1	0	0	0	0
MAY	0	0	0	0	0	0
JUN	1	0	0	0	1	0
JUL	2	0	0	0	2	0
AUG	0	0	0	0	0	0
SEP	3	2	1	0	0	0
OCT	2	0	0	0	2	0
NOV	3	0	1	0	2	0
DEC	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL:	19	5	3	0	11	0
PERCENT:	100	26	16	0	58	0

TASKER NUMBER 819

DUE DATE

REDACT DECLASSIFY

DOCUMENTS REMOVED/BEING REVIEWED:

Section 3 & 4

DOCUMENTS REMOVED

NOT DECLASSIFIED

TASKER NUMBER_____

DUE DATE_____

REDACT_____ DECLASSIFY_____

DOCUMENTS REMOVED/BEING REVIEWED:

PAGE(S)

REMOVED

NOT Declassified
As per State Dept

G-III-4-6 thru
G-III 4-E-1-9

Inclosure 2 to TAB E

PERSONNEL STATUS

1. The following is a report on the personnel status of U. S. and VN Faculty/Advisors and Students during the year 1967.

a. The U. S. Advisors for Camp Long Thanh were organized along functional lines with an S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4 and S-5 sections. Also there was an organization of training committees with advisors assigned to present the various subjects available at Camp Long Thanh.

b. The following is a breakdown of the committees.

(1) FIELD OPERATIONS.

(a) Weapons
(b) Intelligence
(c) Tactics

(2) SPECIAL TECHNIQUES

(a) Medical
(b) Communications
(c) Demolitions
(d) Psychological Operations

(3) SPECIAL SUBJECTS

(a) Basic Airborne Course
(b) River Crossing
(c) EWOTS
(d) SKYHOOK
(e) Message Pickup
(f) HARDHEAD

c. U. S. Senior Advisor status for the year 1967:

(1) Major Leighton Crawford replaced LTC C. T. Hewgley as the Senior Advisor, Camp Long Thanh (SALT) on 15 January 1967. Major Roland E. Dutton assumed the duties of SALT on 15 December 1967.

(2) The following is the status of U. S. Advisor personnel Camp Long Thanh for the year 1967:

MONTH	ASSIGNED AS OF THE 1ST OF THE MONTH	LOSSES	GAINS	ASSIGNED AS OF THE LAST DAY OF THE MONTH
Jan	42	1	0	41
Feb	41	3	0	38
Mar	38	1	3	40
Apr	40	4	4	40
May	40	25	3	18
Jun	18	1	1	18
July	18	2	3	19
Aug	19	0	2	21
Sep	21	1	3	23
Oct	23	1	4	26
Nov	26	1	5	30
Dec	30	2	4	32

d. The Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) Organization is reflected in the STD Table of Distribution Part II, Organization and Personnel Distribution for Airborne Base.

(1) STD monthly status for the year 1967.

DATA

(2) The following is the status of VN cadre at Camp Long Thanh for the year 1967.

MONTH	ASSIGNED AS OF THE 1ST OF THE MONTH	LOSSES	GAINS	ASSIGNED AS OF THE LAST OF THE MONTH
Jan	60	2	1	59
Feb	59	4	3	58
Mar	58	4	7	61
Apr	61	6	2	57
May	57	6	0	51
Jun	51	1	1	51
Jul	51	2	2	51

MONTH	ASSIGNED AS OF THE 1ST OF THE MONTH	LOSSES	GAINS	ASSIGNED AS OF THE LAST OF THE MONTH
Aug	51	1	2	52
Sep	52	1	0	51
Oct	51	5	1	47
Nov	47	1	0	46
Dec	46	6	0	40

e. Students.

(1) Students ages ranged from 17 to 40 years. These students were lacking in military experience and also in most cases reflected a lack of discipline.

(2) The following is the status of VN Students assigned to Camp Long Thanh during the year 1967.

MONTH	ASSIGNED AS OF THE 1ST OF THE MONTH	LOSSES	GAINS	ASSIGNED AS OF THE LAST OF THE MONTH
Jan	147	24	25	148
Feb	148	10	1	139
Mar	139	18	8	129
Apr	129	35	16	110
May	110	16	20	114
Jun	114	24	0	90
Jul	90	7	9	92
Aug	92	11	1	82
Sep	82	12	0	70
Oct	70	8	0	62
Nov	62	14	0	48
Dec	48	16	1	33
	1231	195	81	1117

Inclosure 3 to TAB E

FACILITY IMPROVEMENTS

1. The following is a list of construction and facility improvements made at Camp Long Thanh during the year 1967. The fact to be born in mind is that construction and renovation was kept to a minimum as plans to relocate Camp Long Thanh to the Dalat area were being formulated throughout 1967.

a. January. Lining of all drainage ditches throughout Camp Long Thanh.

b. February.

(1) Lining of drainage ditches completed.

(2) Isolation Area "A" being renovated.

c. March.

(1) All construction at Camp Long Thanh was suspended due to the announced move of Camp Long Thanh to Dalat.

(2) All items of excess equipment were turned in to SOGLOG.

(3) Camp Long Thanh ceased maintaining a combat OP at the junction of the access road and Highway 15. The OP was destroyed.

d. April.

(1) No major construction was done at Camp Long Thanh due to the planned move.

(2) The Security Battalion dug grenade sumps in front of their firing positons and placed wire mesh over the firing apertures of the bunkers.

e. May. No construction was done due to the planned move.

f. June. The new camp site construction was started in Dalat.

g. July. Repair of CIDG billets was resumed.

h. August. No major construction was done at Camp Long Thanh.

i. September.

(1) No major construction was done at Camp Long Thanh.

(2) Limited preparation of the new camp site at Dalat.

j. October.

(1) Renovation of student barracks was completed.

(2) New firing range was completed.

(3) The sand bags covering the exposed concrete on the firing lines were replaced.

(4) The safe houses in the Dalat area were prepared with a more effective defensive system to include firing positions and wire and radio communications with the province headquarters.

k. November.

(1) The 81mm mortar positions were moved to the 4.2 inch mortar positions to make room for a helicopter landing pad inside Camp Long Thanh.

(2) Painting of all buildings was initated.

(3) Isolation Area "B" was renovated.

(4) Construction of the Dalat camp site was suspended due to the directive by MACSOG that Camp Long Thanh would not be relocated.

l. December.

(1) A helicopter landing pad was constructed inside Camp Long Thanh.

(2) Painting of buildings continued during the month.

(3) Drainage ditches were cleaned and repaired.

c. Air Support.

(1) On numerous occasions throughout the year air transportation or resupply was planned for an operation and was not available at the time needed. This resulted in unrealistic activities conducted for students who expected to infiltrate under realistic conditions in hostile areas. The many occasions that air support was planned resulted in plans made and then cancelled which caused serious deflation of student morale after being told that they would get all the support they needed.

d. Discipline.

(1) Students continued to go AWOL throughout the year. The Camp Commander attempted to solve the problem by confining students who go AWOL to a makeshift jail. No apparent success resulted through these measures.

(2) The majority of the problem stemmed from the fact that the students were civilians who were never exposed to real military discipline. A secondary reason for the high AWOL rate was the lack of a specific program of instruction and activities. The students became bored with constant refresher training. This problem should be partially solved with the revised POI.

Inclosure 6 to TAB E

PROBLEM AREAS

1. The following problems were encountered at Camp Long Thanh during the year 1967:

a. Logistics.

(1) In the motor pool at the closing of the year all VN vehicles except one were deadlined due to the lack of parts which had supposedly been requisitioned through VN supply channels for as long as six months. This caused a problem as VN personnel had to rely on U. S. vehicles for transportation.

(2) Theft of vehicle parts continued to be a problem during the year, but measures have been initiated to secure the motor pool in a more effective manner.

(3) The rate of construction at Camp Long Thanh continues to be slow by U. S. standards. In spite of close supervision it is difficult to impress on the civilian laborers the urgency of completion. While the quality of work is acceptable, efforts must be continued to achieve acceptable work rates. During the year plans were made for Camp Long Thanh to move to Dalat in July. As a result all work except that of extreme urgency was suspended causing the camp to be in a poor state of repair. Full scale repairs have been initiated to return the camp to a state of satisfactory repair.

(4) Operational Fund. Civilian overtime payments must be kept in check to prevent overpayment. Difficulties in gaining approval to expend funds from headquarters has also been a problem. Approvals and disapprovals are exceedingly slow in coming through channels.

b. Administration.

(1) During the early part of the year a TD was recommended and submitted to Headquarters reflecting a cutback of U. S. advisors because of the small amount of students being trained. The TD was approved and the advisory staff was cut. Since that time the Camp Long Thanh mission has expanded resulting in an overload for the U. S. advisors. A new TD has been submitted recommending an increase of U. S. personnel.

APPENDIX IV
CROSS-BORDER GROUND OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL.

a. Cross border ground operations into Laos and Cambodia continued (PRAIRIE FIRE) and were implemented (DANIEL BOONE) under the cognizance of the Special Assistant for CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS, Chief, OP-35. 1967 was marked by expansion in scope and in tempo of operations, the introduction of new concepts and the elimination of some restrictions which had previously impeded a full utilization of assets.

b. Results of PRAIRIE FIRE and DANIEL BOONE operations increased in proportion to the expansion. Monthly operations for each program are set forth in TABS A and B.

c. Areas of operation appear at TABS C and D.

2. PRAIRIE FIRE.

a. Summary of Operations. The PRAIRIE FIRE program, previously known as SHINING BRASS, continued throughout 1967 to conduct cross-border missions into Laos and in selected areas of South Vietnam. Increased recruitment and training of indigenous assets permitted PRAIRIE FIRE teams to conduct as many as 37 missions per month. Effective 1 March 1967, the name SHINING BRASS was changed to PRAIRIE FIRE.

b. Radio Relay Site: On 15 January a PRAIRIE FIRE team established a permanent radio relay site in the vicinity of target GOLF-5. The installation, subsequently improved to include defensive positions and communications bunkers, has continually proven an invaluable aid to operational PRAIRIE FIRE teams which previously depended solely on FAC aircraft for communications. Timely reports on enemy activity have been possible through the static radio relay site and have resulted in increased effectiveness of TAC air strikes directed on targets located by PRAIRIE FIRE teams.

c. SLAM Concept.

(1) On 29 January SLAM III was initiated and continued on into March. During this period PRAIRIE FIRE teams collected valuable intelligence which enabled concentrated air strikes to be placed on lucrative targets. In addition, numerous enemy cache sites and structures were destroyed by PRAIRIE

FIRE ground forces. Air strikes resulted in an excess of 300 secondary explosions, and over 100 enemy killed by air (KBA).

(2) The SLAM concept continued to be employed throughout the remainder of the year with encouraging results similar to those obtained from SLAM III. Of particular interest, the Ashau salient continually evidences intense enemy activity and is known to harbor enemy base areas.

d. Enemy Lines of Communication. PRAIRIE FIRE teams continued to exploit major enemy locations in the vicinity of routes 920, 922, 96 and 110. Due to the NVN determination to maintain these areas in an operational state, PRAIRIE FIRE teams were consistantly provided with lucrative targets.

e. Increased Indigenous Assets. Effective 1 July a revised Civilian Table of Distribution was authorized. This revision provided for two Exploitation Battalions (HAYMAKER Force) of 617 indigenous personnel each; four separate rifle companies (HAVOC Force) of 127 indigenous personnel each; and 30 Spike Teams with a total of 270 indigenous. Recruiting increased and by late August 85 per cent of the authorized strength was achieved. As more teams became operational, PRAIRIE FIRE operations increased proportionatly. During the last six months of 1967 the number of Spike Team missions nearly doubled.

f. Phase III Operations. Preparation for Phase III operations began early in the year and have continued, pending approval to implement the program. Teams have been trained and are conducting reconnaissance missions in search of areas suitable for implementation of Phase III.

g. Tri-border Area. Of particular significance during the second half of the year was the tri-border area of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Enemy traffic increased on motorable roads during this period to the extent that truck traffic could be detected along routes 96/110 virtually every night. The enemy's determination to keep these routes open is demonstrated by the fact that on numerous occasions PRAIRIE FIRE teams have been unable to enter the area due to intense enemy fire on all available Landing Zones.

3. DANIEL BOONE.

a. Background. On 22 May authority was granted by the JCS to commence cross-border operations into Cambodia under the code name DANIEL BOONE.

b. Restrictions. The following limitations were imposed:

(1) Operations were limited to Area 1, defined as that portion of Cambodia east of the line formed by the following grid coordinates: YB-500130 at the Cambodian/Laotian border to YA320580 thence along a line parallel to, but two kilometers north of the Southeast San River to YA-660280 at the Cambodian/RVN border.

(2) Reconnaissance teams, only, may be committed and may not exceed an overall strength of 12 men, to include not more than three U. S. advisors.

(3) Tactical air strikes and/or the commitment of exploitation forces are not authorized across the border.

(4) Infiltration and exfiltration of Cambodia will be by foot; exfiltration by helicopter is authorized only in emergency situations.

(5) Duration of infiltration will be held to the minimum time required for investigation of the target area.

(6) Teams will take all possible precautions to avoid contact with Cambodian military forces and the civilian populace of the area.

(7) Purpose of the operation is intelligence collection and/or verification.

(8) No more than three reconnaissance teams may be committed into Cambodia at any one time.

(9) The total number of missions could not exceed ten in any 30 day period.

c. Initial Results. During the month of June, 11 DANIEL BOONE recon teams (RT) were launched under the OPCON of MACSOG, but supported by the 5th Special Forces Group. Seven of these teams entered Cambodia. Results were seven enemy KIA and one enemy PW captured.

d. Change in Restriction. On 27 October a portion of the DANIEL BOONE limitations were lifted, however, the following restrictions remained in effect:

(1) The operational area was increased in depth to 20 kilometers from the Cambodian/RVN border from the tri-border area to the Gulf of Siam. Operations into Zone ALPHA could be conducted on a 48 hour intent message to CINCPAC.

(2) Operations increased from 10 to 30 missions per month.

(3) The limitation on the number of reconnaissance teams authorized in Cambodia at any one time was eliminated.

(4) Tactical air strikes and/or the commitment of exploitation forces were still not authorized in Cambodia.

(5) Five helicopter infiltrations were authorized per month not to exceed a depth of ten kilometers.

(6) Teams were to take all possible precautions to avoid contact with Cambodian military forces and the civilian populace of the area.

(7) Operations could be conducted on an individual basis in Zone BRAVO with approval from the JCS. A request to conduct operations into this zone had to be submitted 14 days in advance.

e. Six Month Results. During the period 1 July through 31 December, there were 99 DANIEL BOONE reconnaissance teams launched from the tri-border area south to the FISH HOOK area. These teams were launched from sites at Dak To, Duc Co, Ban Me Thout and Song Be. Sixty-three teams were successful in entering Cambodia. The breakdown of monthly operations shown at Tab B illustrates the rapid build-up of operations during the months of November and December.

f. Developments. The increase in operations mentioned above resulted from two notable developments. First, the increase in the number of missions authorized per month and second, Special Forces Detachments B-50 and B-56 were placed under the operational control of MACSOG on 1 November. Additionally, the expansion of the area of operations 20 kilometers deep from the tri-border area south to the Gulf of Siam contributed to the increased tempo and enabled DANIEL BOONE forces to attain the following:

(1) Enemy KIA - 42

(2) Enemy KBA - 61

(3) Enemy PWs - 2

g. Facilities. With the increased operating zones and assets, new facilities to support the DANIEL BOONE program were required. Construction was started at the following locations:

(1) Ban Me Thout - A camp large enough to accomodate a 1000 man forward operating base.

(2) Duc Co - A launch site large enough to accomodate 30 personnel.

(3) Song Be - A tactical operations center and communications bunker. Permanent living facilities were not required at this location.

4. MUSCLE SHOALS.

a. Background. In December, 1966, the Secretary of Defense directed that a system be developed and implemented to inhibit infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam and Laos into South Vietnam. This system was designated the MUSCLE SHOALS-DYE MARKER (MS-DM) anti-infiltration system. Breifly, MS-DM consists of two major anti-infiltration systems; the DYE MARKER strong point-obstacle system and the MUSCLE SHOALS air supported anti-infiltration system.

(1) DYE MARKER. Located entirely within South Vietnam along the DMZ, consists of a 23 kilometer fixed obstacle system in the eastern portion and a series of defile obstacles augmented by mobile forces in the western areas. Operation and control of the DYE MARKER system is a III MAF responsibility.

(2) MUSCLE SHOALS. The air supported system consists of two sub systems.

(a) MUD RIVER. An anti-vehicular system.

(b) DUMP TRUCK. An anti-personnel system.

(c) Both of these sub-systems will employ various types of seismic and acoustic sensors which detect enemy movement. When a target has been positively identified, TAC AIR will be called in to destroy it. Operation and control of the overall MUSCLE SHOALS system is a 7th Air Force responsibility and will be controlled from an Infiltration Surveillance Center located in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.

b. MACSOG Participation. Within MUSCLE SHOALS, MACSOG will directly support the DUMP TRUCK sub-system. SOG participation in DUMP TRUCK operations was scheduled to begin in January 1968, but has

been postponed due to technical problems with the sensors. Thirty-four PRAIRIE FIRE Spike Teams were authorized and are available for this program.

c. Mission. Operating with supporting helicopter assets, PRAIRIE FIRE teams will perform the following:

(1) Precision emplacement of Hand Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detectors (HANDSIDS).

(2) Ground reconnaissance to detect enemy penetration of the subsystems, and exploitation of targets thus detected by TAC AIR.

d. Summary. Since June, 1967, a major effort has been directed toward construction of team launch facilities and training of operational teams. One practice mission has been launched from Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. Results of this mission revealed a need for increased joint training to develop operational techniques. Other training missions are planned in early 1968.

TAB A

PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS

MONTH	SPIKE TEAM OPS	HORNET FORCE OPS
JAN	12	7
FEB	6	9
MAR	4	8
APR	11	6
MAY	15	6
JUN	17	1
JUL	27	1
AUG	13	0
SEP	16	2
OCT	24	13
NOV	22	8
DEC	20	7
Totals	187	68

TAB B

DANIEL BOONE OPERATIONS

MONTH	TEAMS LAUNCHED	TEAMS ENTERING CAMBODIA
JUL	7	4
AUG	7	2
SEP	11	8
OCT	12	9
NOV	19	15
DEC	43	25
TOTALS	99	63

TAB C

PRAIRIE FIRE AREA OF OPERATIONS



TAB D

DANIEL BOONE AREA OF OPERATIONS



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this coordination, JPRC provided 7th Air Force, DOOS, with material on JPRC doctrine and techniques to be used to update instruction at survival schools.

c. Production of PACAF E & E Training Film. In March a PACAF representative visited JPRC to get assistance in the preparation of a training film depicting the role of JPRC in E & E in Southeast Asia, as well as current E & E procedures. He was provided with VC and NVA uniforms, and a BRIGHT LIGHT team and Vietnamese personnel were sent to Clark and Thailand to participate in the production of the film.

d. SAFE Area Ratings.

MT

MT

f. Aircrew Briefings. During 1967, JPRC representatives presented 26 briefings on the JPRC mission, organization and personnel recovery capabilities to aircrews and E & E personnel of 7th Air Force, CTF 77 and Army aviation groups.

11. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

a. Reward Program. In May CINCPAC approved a reward program proposed by JPRC. This program called for immediate monetary rewards to any persons who helped U. S. airmen or missing personnel to return to U. S. control, or provided information or returned equipment or other evidence which revealed their status or disposition.

b. In order to disseminate information on the reward program, leaflets were developed from JPRC parameters by MACV-PD and JUSPAO. In July and August 36 million of these leaflets were dropped in North Vietnam and 3.5 million in Laos. In October an additional two million revised leaflets were dropped in North Vietnam. In December the Laotian leaflet program was discontinued at the request of the Royal Laotian Government. At the end of 1967 two other leaflet programs were under development; one for the Vietnamese-Cambodian border, printed in both languages, and one for selected areas of South Vietnam.

c. Word of Mouth Dissemination of Information on the Reward Program. Together with the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), JPRC is developing a program to inform selected elements of the South Vietnamese populace of the reward program through rumor or word of mouth. Target elements are individuals who live in the vicinity of suspected PW camps.

d. Reward Payments. In accordance with the provisions of the reward program, rewards were paid to the following individuals during 1967:

(1) Two Montagnard villagers near Pleiku for assisting SGM Jack G. Honeycutt in returning to U. S. control after he survived the crash of an OH-23 helicopter on 8 September. In addition, 4th Infantry Division provided gift boxes to each family of the village and a civic action team provided medcaps, repairs to the village school, dispensary and water pump, and built a new bridge into the village.

(2) A Chieu Hoi, SC a former VC interrogator, who rallied in the spring of 1967 was rewarded for identifying CPTs Walker and Versace, Lt Rowe and Sgts Johnson, Pitzer and Tadios as prisoners of the VC. This information was confirmed in November during the debriefings of Sgts Johnson, Pitzer and Jacksen who had been released by the VC in early November.

(3) In December a reward was paid to four Vietnamese fishermen who recovered and returned to U. S. control the body of a member of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade who had drowned during a combat operation.

(4) In December Montagnards near Pleiku were rewarded for returning the body of a 4th Infantry Division soldier who had been killed in action.

12. JOINT TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION.

a. The current JTD of JPRC is as follows:

TITLE	SERVICE	GRADE
Chief	AF	06
Opns & Plans	A	04
Opns & Plans	AF	04
Intel Off	N	04
Intel Off	A	04
Opns Sgt	A	E8
Intel Analyst	A	E6
Chief Clerk	N	E5

At the end of 1967 there were five officers and five enlisted men assigned. The two additional enlisted men were an E6 administrative specialist and an E5 intelligence analyst.

b. Based on experience gained in the past year, a slightly modified JTD was submitted to CINCPAC in November. The proposed JPRC organization appears below:



c. The proposed change adds two enlisted men, an E7 Intelligence Analyst and an E5 Stenographer. This is necessary to meet increased records maintenance requirements and intelligence inputs. Additionally, the officer structure has been altered. In the Operations and Plans Section, one officer position has been changed from an Operations and Plans Officer to an Intelligence Officer and has been downgraded from 04 to 03. The position of Chief, JPRC has been downgraded from an 06 to an 05.

APPENDIX VI
LOGISTICS

1. GENERAL.

a. 1967 featured increased workloads in all areas of the logistics section. As MACSOG expanded FOOTBOY and PRAIRIE FIRE Operations and added the DANIEL BOONE and MUSCLE SHOALS programs, the logisticians faced proportionate growing pains.

b. The variety of support required for the conduct of UW Operations continued with no additions in personnel and a complete turnover of experienced hands. Funding requirements for the year increased substantially from the previous year necessitating overhaul of management and fiscal policies.

c. The FY 68 budget is shown at TAB A.

2. PERSONNEL.

a. During 1967 a new Joint Table of Distribution was prepared increasing the authorized spaces from 28 to 61. Additional spaces were requested in each branch and a new branch entitled "Operations Support Branch" was established. Increases were requested to enable Logistics to keep pace with expanding operations.

b. Continued support was obtained from contract Eastern Construction Company employees. These personnel increased from 19 at the beginning of the year to 35 by December. Three additional spaces have been approved and requested from ECC as it is desirable to include at least one ECC employee at each operating facility to provide for generator/automotive maintenance.

c. Use of Vietnamese personnel increased from 105 authorized, 64 on board in January to 109 authorized, 95 on board in December. The turnover rate continues high due to a low pay scale when compared with the civilian economy. Limited skills and the requirement for close supervision makes employment of Vietnamese a marginal asset.

3. SUPPLY AND SERVICES.

a. The SOG Supply Section performs the following duties:

(1) Requisitions, receives and ships most material required by SOG units.

(2) Stocks a limited number of items of equipment, clothing, parts, expendables and medical supplies.

(3) Receives and disposes of unit turn-ins.

(4) Advises SOG components in supply matters.

b. An increase in Supply and Service personnel was justified on the basis of expanded operations within SOG; closer adherance to supporting agency logistical regulations; and controlling the document and material processing within the Supply Section so that more tested and approved procedures could be followed in providing support to customers.

c. An important development in 1967 was the adoption of a proposal to move House 240 (the Supply Section) from its present area at 240 Nguyen Minh Chau, Gia Dinh, to a new location, House 50, at 50 Nguyen Van Thoai (Plantation Road). The new property is approximately six times the area which is now available at House 240 and will permit the centralized location of all House 240 material and facilities; the clothing and expendables warehouse at House 10; about 250 tons of construction material and other bulk items stored at the Liaison Bureau; a half warehouse of approximately 6000 cubic feet of office furniture stored at Tan Son Nhut Air Base; and a varying number of vehicles (15 to 20) stored at the Liaison Bureau.

d. The new facility will provide for one large warehouse and office building which will centrally locate all shelf stock for clothing, medical, arms, expendables, communications, repair parts and general supplies and, will be adjacent to both the supply office and the shipping/receiving sections. All bulk material, vehicles and construction materials will be stowed in an adjacent lot.

e. Although the bulk quantity of material shipped through the Section in 1967 has increased from 70,000 to 100,000 pounds per week, the number of requisitions has remained constant at 500 per week. This is primarily because using accounts are more established and are able to order for stock on a scheduled basis rather than submit a separate request for every item that is needed.

f. Although interservice support agreements had been effected with Army and Navy facilities in Saigon, the ISSA concept was broadened to include Air Force in January and, eventually, to use the ISSA concept for accounts at any location if a logistical support agency was in the area. Support from the Air Force in Saigon has been meagre, but exceptionally useful at times for repair parts, expendables, paints and other general supplies. Also added to SOG's support list was the Philco-Ford organization which has a contract with the 1st Logistical Command to provide support for any commercial vehicle repair parts in-country. Previously, all parts had been ordered from CISO or locally purchased.

g. The warehouse section made significant progress during the year so that difficulties in meeting and loading aircraft have been all but eliminated. Additional drivers and trucks were obtained and pickup and delivery assignments made so that supplies are not so frequently lost by the depot because of untimely deliveries or pickups. Supplies are now palletized on Air Force aluminum pallets well in advance of aircraft arrival and an undated manifest typed for the pallet so that with 15 minutes notification, a truck can be loaded and readied for delivery to the Air Base.

h. One final improvement which will become fully operational in 1968 as a result of 1967 plans will be the program for inspection of, and assistance to the supply accounts who requisition from the Supply Section so that both ends of the internal SOG supply channel can be aware of the needs and abilities or service of the other.

4. FACILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION.

a.. At Danang, projects were initiated to repair the beat facilities, construct boat fuel storage for NAD, and include Camp Fay and Lower Base on the Danang East Central power system. All the above projects will be accomplished by the Seabees in Danang. A new administration building for CSS was completed by the NAD labor force. An FOB for STRATA operations will be built at Camp Fay when the new C & C headquarters is completed. The My Khe facility was vacated and the property turned over to III MAF. The new facilities at Black Rock Bay have been under construction for the entire year and were occupied when My Khe was vacated. The concept of an FOB at Danang was approved and real estate acquired at Marble Mountain. The Seabees were tasked with construction and work started on 31 October. The new FOB will be completed by 10 January 1968. C & C Detachment will move from its present headquarters at Camp Fay to new facilities that will be built at the FOB. This work will also be completed by the Seabees in the Spring, 1968.

b. At Danang Air Base a warehouse was built for C & C Detachment, and a transient facility was constructed for OP-32.

c. At Nha Trang a new well was dug for Jackson Hall, Due to the number of septic tanks in the area it was decided to drill a deep well to supply the entire compound.

d. Real estate was acquired at Nha Trang Air Base to construct a new operations building for 1st Flight and Detachment 1. A contract for the construction was let by SOG-LOG in November with work to be completed by May, 1968.

e. At Hue, the architect and engineer study for the new 200 KW transmitter site was completed and a contract awarded to Amtraco Construction Corporation in October. Work began in November and is to be completed in July, 1968. The construction contract is valued at .9 million with the total project value being in excess of 1.7 million.

f. In Saigon, a new office building was started for OP-33 at 7 Hung Thap Tu. In addition, various alterations and maintenance items were accomplished at the VOF site in Saigon. These included construction of a listening booth, a new studio control room, an engineer's room, screened room, renovation of the guards quarters and repainting the entire area. Also in Saigon, a photo laboratory was constructed at STD and the entire STD compound was rewired to permit installation of air conditioners.

g. A new site was acquired for relocation of the SOG-LOG Supply facilities. When completed in early 1968 there will be approximately seven thousand square meters of open storage area and 16,000 square feet of warehouse space including air conditioned areas for storage of arms, radio and medical supplies.

h. At Udorn, a fence was constructed around the HEAVY HOOK facility.

i. At Nakhon Phanom, the OP-32 facility was completed and occupied. The FOB 4 launch site was built by the Seabees with work being substantially completed in December.

j. At Kontum, a new mess hall was constructed and the Montagnard camp was completely rebuilt. Two new wells were drilled, one at FOB 2 and one at the Montagnard camp.

k. At Phu Bai, a well was drilled by the Seabees.

l. At Khe Sanh final approval was obtained to commence construction for DYE MARKER. Because of the tactical situation and the time frame involved, SOG Logistics accepted the responsibility of providing material. This involved purchases from NSA, Danang, RMK-BRJ, P. A. & E., 1st Logistical Command and NSA, Saigon. Out of country trips to Thailand and Taiwan were also required.

m. Construction was started by the Seabees in October with two bunkers and head and shower facilities being completed at Khe Sanh in December. The FOB began training troops in December. Due to problems of airlifting construction materials into the area, progress was slow and will probably continue as such until better weather arrives.

n. To assist in the increased construction requirements a Filipino technician was hired from Eastern Construction Company. A construction foreman was also added. To assist in the DYE MARKER construction an Army Civil Engineer Corps major was ordered in TDY from the 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa.

5. CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT REVIEW PANEL (CERP).

a. The CERP continued to function as envisioned at its inception in July, 1966. CERP meetings were held on 8 March, 14 June, 14 September and 14 December.

b. MACSOG Directive 700-3 was published in August covering the membership of the CERP procedures employed before, during and after the meeting, and a new evaluation form.

6. TRANSPORTATION.

a. In May a complete vehicle inventory was taken to include condition appraisal.

(1) The overall general condition of the fleet, with the exception of the Saigon area, was found to be appalling. Merely identifying some vehicles was a problem because the TN number in many cases was obliterated, or the data plate was missing, or both. This situation still existed at year's end, but not to the same extent as in May.

(2) During visits to the various locations, it was discovered that units were holding on to vehicles that very obviously should have been salvaged long ago. Not only were these vehicles unsafe to drive and of questionable utility, but as long as they were still on the books, Saigon would remain falsly content that all was well at the FOB's insofar as vehicle numerical strength was concerned. Antiquated assets are too expensive to maintain and their presence tends to delay much needed replacement.

(3) At the present time, there are salvage documents on 62 vehicles that have been turned in to PDO's all over the country, however, this salvage problem is a continuing thing and is an area that requires constant monitoring.

b. During the year the following quantities of vehicles were added to the SOG inventory:

(1) Jeeps - 41
(2) Ambulances -4
(3) Water trucks - 1
(4) Cargo trucks, 2 1/2 ton - 25
(5) Forklifts - 4
(6) Carryalls - 11
(7) Crew Cabs - 5
(8) Sedans - 10
(9) Pickup trucks - 35
(10) Cargo trucks - 1 1/2 ton - 4
(11) Cargo trailers - 12
(12) Tractors, 5 ton - 1
(13) Trailer, 40 ton - 1

Total - 154

c. The registration and subsequent licensing of new vehicles became a real problem in August. The Vietnamese Government decreed the revalidation of all vehicles in Vietnam bearing TN numbers. A new series of license numbers beginning with the prefix "T" was to be issued after the revalidation was accomplished. However, once the decision to revalidate was made, the continued issuance of TN numbers to new vehicles was terminated. This in effect made new registrations nonexistant because the requirements demanded by the VN Government for the issuance of "T" numbers were totally unreasonable and probably impossible to apply to a situation where the vehicles were brought in country by military transportation. MACV headquarters was called on for assistance and only

after sufficient pressure was applied was special permission granted to continue using TN numbers until the criteria for "T" numbers could be properly defined and complied with.

d. In the area of airlift, a total of 445 tons of construction supplies have been delivered to Khe Sanh. One hundred and sixty tons of the total delivered was air-dropped, the remainder landed normally. This cargo carried a combat essential priority which enabled SOG to arrange for the lift through MAC-J4. Completion was hoped for by 15 January 1968.

e. During the four month period, September thru December, organizational aircraft carried 1038 tons of cargo. Also during the same period, 1080 tons of cargo was carried by other than SOG aircraft, including the 445 tons of Khe Sanh construction supplies. Fifty-three tons of supplies were moved by sea from Saigon to Danang.

7. MAINTENANCE AND HOUSEKEEPING.

a. The Motor Maintenance Section was completely revitalized. A few personnel changes were made and some additional positions for mechanics were authorized to more adequately service assigned vehicles. However, to date SOG is short four mechanics, due primarily to the unavailability of qualified personnel.

(1) It has been determined that a well qualified mechanic can obtain employment on the local economy and draw a larger salary than could be paid by the U. S. military.

(2) In a few instances personnel have been hired as mechanic's helpers until they obtain the knowledge of American automobiles necessary for promotion to mechanic status. Upon promotion, and after gaining enough knowledge to qualify as a mechanic, they have resigned to seek employment on the local economy. A raise in the wage scale would do nothing to alleviate this problem since the local wages appear to fluctuate accordingly.

b. In the Utilities and Service Section considerable progress has been made.

(1) New shop facilities constructed for the Motor Maintenance Section include nine maintenance bays, two shop offices, a spare parts room and a covered gas and oil service area.

(2) Other buildings constructed during the past year include a new carpenter shop, laundry room and an office for third country engineers.

(3) A soundproof generator room was constructed for the alternate power supply system at House 10, and proper, complete renovation has been initiated. At years end the following has been completed:

(a) To eliminate the seepage of water into rooms on the ground floor, a combination of rock fill and concrete was utilized to elevate the floor level approximately five inches.

(b) The administrative office has been completed. The ceiling was lowered and soundproofed, walls panelled, built-in bookcases and a new lighting system installed.

(c) For transient personnel two shower stalls, a washroom, and latrine facilities have been constructed on the second floor joining the transient EM quarters. Currently, House 10 can accomodate twenty EM and officer transients. Mess facilities for transient personnel are not available.

d. The sleeping quarters and kitchen area for permanent party personnel at House 10 are currently under renovation. It is planned to lower all ceilings, panel all walls and install vinyl asbestos floor tile throughout.

e. During the past year, House 10 has assisted other sections within SOG by developing, constructing and testing the following:

(1) An aerial pickup device utilized by OP-32 for message pickup.

(2) Assisted by OP-80, an acceptable chain cutting device.

f. In addition to the above, House 10 contributed maintenance and utilities support to all sections of SOG within the Saigon area, and power generator support and technical assistance to appropriate sections in Saigon and throughout South Vietnam.

g. At the beginning of 1967 the number of vehicles maintained by this activity was approximately 25. At the present time maintenance is performed on over 125 vehicles. The type of vehicles maintained include both military and civilian of sizes up to five ton tractors and four and six thousand pound forklifts.

(1) Problem areas in connection with motor maintenance have not been too severe. At the beginning of 1967, and for approximately five

months thereafter, a lack of available spare parts resulted in excess deadline time for some vehicles. A Motor Maintenance Supervisor, upon assignment to the section, initiated the Army Requisitioning System and subsequently reduced deadline time to a minimum.

(2) Body and fender work continue to be a problem. With the traffic situation in South Vietnam it appears that extreme defensive driving measures are the only means of reducing this type damage. However, the problem of vehicles being damaged while parked still exists and any workable solution to eliminate or reduce this problem is unknown.

h. Until July, compound security at House 10 was somewhat lax as various items of clothing and equipment maintained in the warehouse were reported missing. Upon evaluation of guard personnel assigned at that time, and the knowledge that a close relationship existed between security guards and employees at House 10, it was decided to relieve all Vietnamese security guards and employ Chinese personnel. This has proven to be highly satisfactory.

8. COMPTROLLER.

a. MACSOG Operational Funds Directive 37-2 became effective 1 January 1967. The new manual was promulgated to serve as a guide for SOG agent officers, most of whom lack financial training, and to simplify the task of auditing monthly accounting reports submitted to the SOG Finance Officer. A two day training period was held in January to explain the new procedures to the agent officers.

b. SOG leasing procedures were revised to obtain greater participation by Vietnamese personnel. As new leases were made and old ones renewed, the role of lessee was assumed by STD or Liaison Service personnel and the lease forms executed entirely in Vietnamese. This program was instituted in February to provide better cover for SOG and to acquire future leases at lower costs than might be obtained if U. S. personnel were involved in lease negotiations.

c. An Eastern Construction Company accountant was assigned to the Comptroller Section in February. This enabled Comptroller personnel for the first time to obligate costs to the respective FOOTBOY and PRAIRIE FIRE programs.

d. The initial group of 1st Logistical Command billings prepared by SOG Comptroller personnel were accepted by the Finance and Accounting Officer, Fort Buckner, Okinawa, in March. The first payment of billings was made in April. These actions resulted from a December, 1966 agreement between the SOG Comptroller, the Finance and Accounting Officer at FAO, Fort Buckner, and the Comptroller, 1st Logistical Command. Under this agreement the 1st Logistical Command delivered its issue documents for issues made to SOG directly to the SOG Comptroller rather than to FAO. SOG personnel determine the appropriate charges, prepare the billing document (SF 1080), and forward the 1080 to FAO for approval. When approval is granted, payment is made to FAO. This procedure was established in order to facilitate timely liquidation of obligations incurred through 1st Log.

e. The SOG FY 68 budget was revised a second time during March. A decrease of $1,530,200 in FOOTBOY requirements and an increase of $2,888,400 in PRAIRIE FIRE requirements reflected changes to the FY 68 concept that had occured since original budget submission in October 1966.

f. In April, it became necessary to transfer $401,400 from the FOOTBOY budget to the PRAIRIE FIRE budget in order to fund the fourth quarter operations of the latter program. The continued increase in PRAIRIE FIRE operations necessitated the shift of funds.

g. One million dollars was transferred from FOOTBOY O & M funds to construction category and obligated for construction of the 200 KW transmitter at Hue. CINCPAC concurred in the transfer. The total cost of the project was not entirely programmed in the FY 67 budget, but the additional fund requirement was absorbed within the approved budget. OICC Vietnam assigned a project number in May.

h. Lt Jack Mutchler, (SC), USN, rotated to CONUS in May and was relieved as Comptroller by Lt Joseph Kraus, (SC), USN. Lt J. D. Fussel, (SC), USN, was relieved by Lt R. F. Price, (SC), USN, as SOG Finance Officer in June. In August, LCDR T. B. Potter, USN, relieved Lt Kraus as Comptroller with Lt Kraus assuming duties as Budget Analyst in relief of Lt B. R. Buchholz, USN.

i. On 1 July the procedure for billing from 1st Logistical Command was changed to a new concept whereby MMA, located in Hawaii, received the necessary information to produce a machine printout, which lists such items as ordering activity, document number, as well as the unit price,

quantity and total charge. As with any new system there are a number of problems which need to be resolved before the new system becomes effective, but in principle it is a vast improvement over the system previously discussed herein.

j. In April, a supplemental increase of 2.9 million dollars in PRAIRIE FIRE funds for FY 68 was requested from CINCPAC to cover the costs of expected expansion of the program. Expansion was not programmed or budgeted for in the original FY 68 fund request.

k. During the period 12 August thru 20 October, the entire construction concept relating to the Hue transmitter site was altered. In brief, OICC was relieved of all responsibility except that portion of the contract relating to acquisition and installation of the Continental electronic equipment at a cost of $478,000. On 12 August AMTRACO received a contract to furnish the prefabricated steel buildings to be erected at the site for about $96,000. A contract for the generators was let with AMTRACO on 27 September for $279,000. Another contract followed on 20 October for construction of the entire site by AMTRACO for $900,000. The total cost for the completed 200 KW transmitter site now stands at about $1,700,000.

l. In August, the SOG Budget Analyst visited the Comptroller, 5th Special Forces Group, Nha Trang, to compare FY 68 and 69 DANIEL BOONE budgets. Sizable differences were noted in the areas of personnel and construction.

m. During September, auditors from CAS performed an audit of SOG finance records with satisfactory results.

n. The FY 68 DANIEL BOONE budget was reviewed in November at 5th SFG with the result that a 2.7 million dollar budget was established as a funding target, including necessary construction. FY 68 DANIEL BOONE funds were held by 5th SFG, whereas FY 69 funds will be held by MACSOG.

o. The CINCPAC Budget Officer, LTC Passel, USA, and CNO Representative Capt. Bucklew, USN, visited the Logistics Section and Comptroller Branch during November. Previously submitted FY 69 money requirements, this time broken down by individual programs, were hand carried by LTC Passel to CINCPAC and on to Washington for DOD consideration. At the same time a second revision to the PRAIRIE FIRE FY 68 Annual Funding Plan was prepared, with LTC Passell's concurrence.

This revision indicated a reduced supplemental money requirement of 1.3 million dollars needed in addition to the approved budget for the remainder of FY 68. The original supplemental request submitted in July called for 2.9 million dollars. At years end the supplemental money request had not been acted upon by signing authority.

TAB A

FISCAL YEAR 68 BUDGET

	FOOTBOY	PRAIRIE FIRE	MUSCLE SHOALS	DANIEL BOONE
PERSONNEL	4,965,700	3,140,000	708,200	HELD
TRAVEL	29,800	69,000	2,000	
O & M	8,485,300	3,464,400	1,108,000	BY
CONTRACTURAL SVCS	916,200	480,400	- 0 -	
CONSTRUCTION	361,900	250,000	- 0 -	
RENTALS	89,400	34,000	18,000	5th SFG
TOTALS	$14,848,300	$7,437,800	$1,837,800	$2,771,000

APPENDIX VII

PLANS

1. MISSION. Advises the Commander, Studies and Observation Group, on all matters pertaining to SOG planning responsibilities to include COMUSSEASIA Unconventional Warfare Plans, COMUSMACV current and contingency operations plans, and other special planning requirements. Prepares plans, studies, reports, updates documents and executes other staff actions as directed. Provides direction and tasks other branches of the SOG staff, and when required, the UW Plans Branch, E & P Division, USMACTHAI, to insure that required plans are prepared in essential detail in a timely manner and are maintained current. Acts as SOG Historical Section.

2. 1967 ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. Published Plans.

(1) SOG OPLAN 37E-66, Operation FREEDOM SHIP (U) - Provides for the conduct of special maritime operations to encourage and assist NVN nationals to defect to South Vietnam. The principle objectives are to obtain new sources of intelligence and to exploit the psychological impact of possible large scale defections on NVN.

(2) FOOTBOY FY 1968 Program - Updates the FOOTBOY program and outlines objectives, plans, operational areas and the tempo/frequency of operations projected for the period FY 1968.

(3) General Plan for SOG Operations FY 1969 (U) - Assists the MACSOG staff and subordinate commanders in the formulation of detailed plans and programs for the continuation and expansion of MACSOG operations in FY 1969.

(4) JUWTF OPLAN (General War) 1-67 (U) - A unilateral capabilities plan providing for the conduct of Unconventional Warfare in Southeast Asia in a wide variety of situations ranging from limited war arising from the current conflict to one of unrestricted theater wide general war.

(5) SOG OPLAN 37G-67 (SHOTGUN) (U) -

(6) SOG OPLAN 37F-67 (NUT CRACKER) (U) - Provides for the conduct of exercises employing the Fulton Recovery System (SKYHOOK), designed to evaluate the coordination procedures and reaction time inherent in the activation of a Fulton Recovery mission.

(7) SOG OPLAN 37B-67 (Phase III PRAIRIE FIRE) (U) - Provides for a 3,000 man guerilla force, responsive to U.S. direction, to conduct operations against the NVA/VC/PL in Laos adjacent to the RVN border. Full implementation of this plan includes an appropriate expansion of the current PRAIRIE FIRE operational area.

(8) STD/SOG General Plan FY 68-70 (U) - Outlines the combined concept for intelligence collection and unconventional warfare operations during this period. Intended to assist and guide counterpart staff officers and subordinate commanders in the formulation of such detailed plans and programs as are required to insure achievement of the mutually agreed on objectives.

b. Other Projects Completed.

(1) JTD Revision on Air Operations Group - Provides the justification for additional positions for the Air Operations Group at Nha Trang.

(2) Revision of SOG Category "A" Briefing - An updating of the briefing given "need-to-know" parties detailing all aspects of specific SOG programs.

DATA

(4) Summary of COMUSMACV OPLAN 1-67 (General War) (U) - Summarized provisions for withdrawing U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Forces from South Vietnam within a six month period in accordance with the provisions of the Manila Conference Communique.

(5) Review of Annex N (UW) to COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 1-67 (General War) (U) - Provides for the conduct of Unconventional Warfare and associated operations in SEASIA by U.S./Allied Forces in situations of general war. Control and direction of these operations would be exercised through JUWTF, SEASIA.

TAB A

PLANS BRANCH ORGANIZATION



APPENDIX VIII
COMMUNICATIONS

1. OPERATIONS.

a. Communications activities experienced a significant expansion during 1967. This expansion was generated principally by the commencement of DANIEL BOONE operations and the requirements for MUSCLE SHOALS operations scheduled to commence in early 1968.

b. The communications in support of PRAIRIE FIRE operations continued essentially as before, except that a radio-teletypewriter net was established, linking C & C Detachment, Danang, with all of its FOBs and launch sites. Also, direct teletypewriter communications between SOG Headquarters and C & C Detachment were established.

c. Communications support for DANIEL BOONE operations is being set up in a pattern similar to that of PRAIRIE FIRE. Communications arrangements were not complete at the end of 1967 due to non-receipt of equipment.

d. A base station for supporting STRATA operations was established at NAD, Danang, providing communications with STRATA teams utilizing AN/PRC-74 SSB equipment in either the voice or CW mode.

e. The SOG SSB net was monitored in July by the 101st Radio Research Company, resulting in indications that transmission security was lax and that the net served as a lucrative source of information concerning SOG operations. Several actions were taken to improve security, including the rotation of call signs on a daily basis, implementing an authentication system, and stressing proper use of operational codes.

f. The restoration priority of circuit DMVAOP-26 (SOG HQ to Danang) was increased on 1 November from 2C to 1E. Since that time circuit reliability has increased from 86% to approximately 96%.

g. Action was initiated to acquire a HARK-I radio system which will permit rapid, semi-automatic reporting of information by teams in the field. It is planned to use this equipment in support of STRATA, DUMP TRUCK and possible Phase III PRAIRIE FIRE operations. The base station for this system will be located at Nakhon Phanom (NKP), Thailand.

2. FACILITIES AND CIRCUITRY.

a. Nakhon Phanom, Dalat training camp, STRATA FOB, and C-5 Detachment were added to the SOG SSB net and action was initiated to establish a separate SSB net between C-5 and its FOBs inasmuch as the SOG SSB net was overloaded. Implementation is scheduled for 1 February 1968.

b. A radio teletypewriter circuit was established between NAD, Danang and PARADISE Island in January, providing a relay to SOG Headquarters for perishable intelligence and psyops information.

c. On 22 October, a secure, dedicated TTY circuit was activated between the SOG Communications Center and the DUCK HOOK facility at NKP. The NKP terminal was relocated to a new NKP operations center in December.

d. In November, a secure, dedicated TTY circuit was activated between the SOG Communications Center and Ban Me Thout to handle DANIEL BOONE communications.

e. A request was validated by MACJ-6 for a circuit between SOG and Camp Long Thanh. Circuit start date is to be 1 March 1968.

f. Action was initiated to re-terminate the C & C Detachment terminal on circuit OP-26 from Camp Fay, Danang, to FOB-4 on 15 March 1968. Action was also initiated to add STRATA FOB as a third station on OP-26 when STRATA FOB moves into Camp Fay in March, 1968.

g. Action was initiated to procure radio teletypewriter equipment in order to establish a RATT backup of circuit OP-26. At the end of the year the equipment had been only partially received. The RATT circuit will be terminated at NAD, Danang.

h. The RATT net between C & C Detachment and its FOBs and launch sites was established in mid-year upon arrival of VSC-2 equipment in country. Equipment procurement and frequency clearance action was taken to extend this net to Nakhon Phanom to support MUSCLE SHOALS operations. At the end of 1967, frequency clearance had been obtained, but the equipment had not arrived.

i. At the years end, the RATT net between C-5 Detachment and its subordinates had not been completed due to lack of equipment.

(6) Appendix 3 to Annex T (Surveillance of NVN Withdrawal) to COMUSMACV OPLAN 67-68 (U) - Provides the command and control structure, establishes specific surveillance sites and stipulates MACSOG force requirements to monitor the withdrawal of NVN forces form SVN/Laos/Cambodia.

c. Projects in Progress.

(1) SOG OPLAN 37X-68 (Cease Fire Contingency Plan) (U) - Envisions SOG agency planning for changes to control procedures and operational techniques necessary to meet a cease fire or post hostilities situation.

(2) SOG OPLAN 37Y-68 (Assistance to Allied Prisoners of War) (U)- Envisions SOG forces deployed to PW camps in NVN/Laos/Cambodia/SVN to provide assistance and prevent atrocities/exploitation of US/GVN PWs.

(3) Annual CINCPAC Briefing on SOG Activities - Entails the collation of information from each SOG agency and the preparation of a summary of yearly activities complete with a pictorial review, and dissemination of proposed activities for the next year.

(4) SOG History, 1967 - The compilation and publication of each staff agency's activities for the past calender year for inclusion in the annual MACV Command History.

3. (U) <u>ORGANIZATION.</u> The Plans Branch Organization is shown at Tab A.

TAB A

PLANS BRANCH ORGANIZATION



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i. At the years end, the RATT net between C-5 Detachment and its subordinates had not been completed due to lack of equipment.

j. In December the point-to-point secure voice circuit between OP-80 and JSARC was deactivated at which time OP-80 was activated as an AUTOSEVOCOM subscriber.

k. Action was completed to validate 1st Flight Detachment and SOG Facility, Danang AB as AUTOSEVOCOM subscribers, but validation had not been received at the end of the year.

l. Action was completed to validate the SOG-STD co-located facility as an AUTOSEVOCOM subscriber.

m. Action was taken to install a KY-9 circuit between the NKP operations center and the STEEL TIGER task force at NKP. The KY-9's were delivered to NKP to be installed by the 483rd GEEIA Squadron in March, 1968.

n. Action was initiated to establish non-secure telephone "hotlines" between the SOG Coordination Center and NKP, 1st Flight Detachment, C & C Detachment, and MACV COC. These circuits were approved and are scheduled for activation upon relocation of SOG Headquarters to the MACV I compound.

o. Action was initiated to engineer and install the teletypewriter terminal at NKP in accordance with DCA "red-black" criteria. The 483rd GEEIA Squadron, Korat, Thailand, has been tasked with the installation scheduled to be accomplished in March, 1968.

p. Action was initiated to engineer and install the SOG Communications Center and SSO Communications Center at MACV I. PACFO-USASCC was tasked with this work, with a completion date of 15 January 1968.

3. EQUIPMENT.

a. Six VSC-2s, part of the new family of tactical SSB radios, were received in June and shipped to C & C Detachment, Danang, for use on the C & C RATT net. Considerable difficulty has been experienced in maintaining manuals, and proper test equipment.

b. Fifteen AN/PRC-74's were issued to field units. This set is an improved lightweight SSB radio which is to serve as an interim item between the AN/GRC-109 and the developmental AN/PRC-70. Presently, the sets are in use by STRATA teams and NAD, Danang.

c. One hundred and thirty-one of the new, minature FM squad radios, AN/PRT-4 and AN/PRR-9, were issued to C & C Detachment for use by PRAIRIE FIRE teams. These radios have been found suitable for air-ground as well as intra-team communications.

d. Several items of radio equipment were investigated or evaluated during the year for possible application to SOG operations. Among these are the RACAL TRA-906, the KELCOM FM Surveillance Kit, the RAS-10 receiving antenna, and the AN/PRC-70.

e. Several MS-1 wiretap devices were obtained from CAS, Saigon, for use by PRAIRIE FIRE teams.

f. Requirements for the secure voice device, KY-38, were submitted in number sufficient to cover every circuit or net which uses the AN/PRC-25.

g. Secure SSB voice equipment was also ordered to replace existing KWM-2A equipment.

4. SIGNAL PLANS.

a. During this period all teams in the field were queried as to whether they held the GADAZ signal plans at their locations. It was discovered that many of the teams had cached the plans in areas now considered unsecure, thus making activation of GADAZ an impossibility. From the standpoint of security, the GADAZ plan offered greater exposure of the team to the enemy. While it was considered a good method unless the capability of Project BUGS became over-extended, the continuous monitor method could have been an improvement. For the present number of teams in the field, the plans now being used are best.

b. The SAAT program was scrapped in favor of Short Time Reaction and Target Acquisition (STRATA). The radio judged most suitable for STRATA teams was the AN/PRC-74. SOG Communications developed a signal plan in support of the equipment and it is presently being used between the teams and the new base station established at Danang.

c. Normally used signal plans for agent teams in North Vietnam will continue to be used and improved upon when any deficiencies become apparent.

5. CRYPTO MATERIAL.

a. In December, 1966, a special code to be employed in cross-border operations was developed by the National Security Agency at SOG's request. This code, [illegible] appeared to be versatile and secure and went into effect in February, 1967. The biggest drawback to the system was that it was not categorized. Thus, it was extremely difficult to become familiar enough with for effective use. A revised version is categorized under subject headings and reports from the field indicate it has met with approval.

b. From the experience of developing locally produced codes and suggesting revisions to the NSA developed [illegible] new code was developed by SOG Communications to support STRATA. This code is simple to use; enables a Vietnamese to pass messages verbally to English speaking persons; offers a method of making messages brief; and gives a measure of security. This code has proven to be of great value in the field.

c. One time pads were furnished to the Vietnamese Liaison Bureau to cover traffic being passed on their exclusive CW circuits.

d. A new code, [illegible] was conceived by SOG Communications; presented to DIRNSA for approval; was so approved; and has been issued to the field for implementation on 1 February 1968. This code will be used for rotating, on a daily basis, the call signs and personnel identifiers used on the SOG SSB net.

6. LESSONS LEARNED.

a. There is no alternate traffic route between MACSOG Headquarters and 1st Flight Detachment or to activities at Ban Me Thout or Danang. Although equipment has been ordered for a RATT circuit to Danang, it is considered that when RATT is established between NKP and C & C Detachment, the route SOG-NKP-C&C could serve as an alternate route to NKP and the RATT equipment being procured could be used as the alternate route to Ban Me Thout.

b. There is an urgent need for secure voice radio equipment. Present codes are slow, cumbersome, and unless used strictly in accordance with instructions, are not very secure. As noted in paragraph 3f., above, this type of equipment is in the pipeline.

c. There is no suitable replacement, as yet, for the heavy, bulky AN/GRC-109 for TIMBERWORK teams. Also needed is a highly concealable portable, and effective radio for use by "Gray" agents operating in North Vietnam.

d. There is a requirement to realign the officer staff of the Communications Branch, SOG Headquarters. It is felt that Army Communications personnel who are better versed in unconventional warfare communications should dominate the Branch. A change to the JTD to this effect has been submitted.

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APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

COMMAND HISTORY 1968

ANNEX F

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

7 MAR 1969

MACSOG

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Annex F, 1968 Command History (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Inclosed is Annex F (Special Operations) to the 1968 Command History.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SIDNEY GRITZ
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

1 Incl
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MACV	
1 - J5	21
1 - SJS Hist Br	22
12- MACSOG	23-34

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TABLE OF CONTENTS--LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL i

TABLE OF CONTENTS--LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES. . . . . ii-iv

ANNEX F (SPECIAL OPERATIONS) to MACV 1968 COMMAND HISTORY . F-1 to F-7

TAB A-Organization through November 1968. . . . . F-A-1
TAB B-Organization of December 1968 . . . . . F-B-1

APPENDIX I-PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION . . . . . F-I-1 to F-I-2
TAB A-Personnel and Administration Div Organization . . . F-I-A-1
TAB B-Key Officers . . . . . F-I-B-1 to F-I-B-2

APPENDIX II-INTELLIGENCE. . . . . F-II-1 to F-II-15
TAB A-Intelligence Division Organization. F-II-A-1

APPENDIX III-OPERATIONS: FOOTBOY F-III-1

Section 1-Maritime Operations: PLOWMAN . . . . . F-III-1-1 to F-III-1-6
TAB A - Mission Summary . . . . . F-III-1-A-1 to F-III-1-A-7
TAB B - PLOWMAN Operating Areas F-III-1-B-1
TAB C - NVN Coastal Defense Fires F-III-1-C-1
TAB D - DONG TAM Operations Summary F-III-1-D-1
TAB E - BIFROST Operations Summary. F-III-1-E-1
TAB F - DEWEY RIFLE Operations Summary. F-III-1-F-1

Section 2-Air Operations: MIDRIFF F-III-2-1
TAB A - Chronology of MIDRIFF Missions. . . . . F-III-2-A-1 to F-III-2-A-3
TAB B - USAF/GRC UC-123 Missions. F-III-2-B-1
TAB C - USAF C-130E Missions. F-III-2-C-1
TAB D - USAF CH-3 Missions. F-III-2-D-1
TAB E - VNAF A-1G Missions. F-III-2-E-1
TAB F - USAF F-4 Missions F-III-2-F-1

Section 3-Psychological Operations: HUMIDOR . . . . F-III-3-1 to F-III-3-8
TAB A - Psychological Operations Group Organization. . . F-III-3-A-1
TAB B - PLOWMAN Detainees Comparison. F-III-3-B-1
TAB C - PLOWMAN Detainees by Province F-III-3-C-1

TAB D - Psyops Material Distribution. F-III-3-D-1
TAB E - HUMIDOR Leaflet Delivery. F-III-3-E-1
TAB F - Voice of Freedom Broadcast Hours. F-III-3-F-1
TAB G - Radio Broadcast Data. F-III-3-G-1
TAB H - R & A Studies and Reports . . . . . F-III-3-H-1 to F-III-3-H-2

Section 4-Airborne Operations: TIMBERWORK . . . . . F-III-4-1 to F-III-4-8
TAB A - TIMBERWORK Authorities. . . . . F-III-4-A-1 to F-III-4-A-2
TAB B - Agent Team Locations. F-III-4-B-1
TAB C - Team Background and Recap for 1968. . . . . F-III-4-C-1 to F-III-4-C-5
TAB D - STRATA Target Areas & Mission Locations F-III-4-D-1
TAB E - STRATA Mission Data . . . . . F-III-4-E-1 to F-III-4-E-2
TAB F - Project OODLES Map. F-III-4-F-1
TAB G - Project URGENCY Map F-III-4-G-1
TAB H - Project BORDEN Map. F-III-4-H-1
TAB I - Camp Long Thanh Monthly Student Strength. . . . F-III-4-I-1

APPENDIX IV-OPERATIONS: Cross-Border Ground Operations . . F-IV-1 to F-IV-9
TAB A - Summary of PF Operations. F-IV-A-1
TAB B - Summary of DB Operations. F-IV-B-1
TAB C - PF Operational Areas. F-IV-C-1
TAB D - DB Operational Areas. F-IV-D-1
TAB E - CCN Organization Chart. F-IV-E-1
TAB F - CCS Organization Chart. F-IV-F-1
TAB G - DB Operational Activities . . . . . F-IV-G-1 to F-IV-G-2
TAB H - DB Intelligence Production--CY 68 . . . . . F-IV-H-1

APPENDIX V-AIR OPERATIONS STUDIES . . . . . F-V-1 to F-V-5
TAB A - Air Operations Studies Group Organization . . . F-V-A-1
TAB B - C-123 and C-130 Logistic Sorties. F-V-B-1
TAB C - VNAF H-34 Missions. F-V-C-1
TAB D - VNAF U-17 Missions. F-V-D-1

APPENDIX VI-LIAISON F-VI-1

Section 1-Liaison Officer to STD. F-VI-1-1
Section 2-Liaison Officer to the Field Forces . . . . . F-VI-2-1 to F-VI-2-2

APPENDIX VII-LOGISTICS . . . . . F-VII-1 to F-VII-11

TAB A - Logistics Division Organization. F-VII-A-1

TAB B - Civilian Employee Manning Authorization. . . . F-VII-B-1

APPENDIX VIII-COMPTROLLER. . . . . F-VIII-1 to F-VIII-2

APPENDIX IX-PLANS. . . . . F-IX-1 to F-IX-4

APPENDIX X-COMMUNICATIONS. . . . . F-X-1 to F-X-4

ANNEX F (SPECIAL OPERATIONS) to MACV 1968 COMMAND HISTORY

1. GENERAL.

a. This annex gives detailed information on activities of the Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG) during calendar year 1968. The various programs and activities are covered at length in appendices to this annex.

b. Calendar year 1968 was marked by increased requirements, improved procedures, development of new concepts, tighter controls and added restrictions on some programs and lifted restrictions on other activities of MACSOG. Programs against North Vietnam (NVN), the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) elements in Laos and Cambodia and support of Field Forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) continued and increased within parameters issued by higher headquarters.

c. Internal reorganization, new installations and facilities, improved techniques, and new equipment have enhanced the functioning of the many facets of MACSOG and aided greatly in mission accomplishment.

2. MISSION.

The Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observations Group mission is stated as follows:

a. As directed by COMUSMACV and with concurrence of the US Embassy, MACSOG will advise, train and support counterpart forces in out-of-country unconventional and psychological warfare operations.

b. MACSOG will conduct unilateral planning for unconventional warfare activities under existing COMUSSEASIA plans, and will be prepared when directed to activate and command the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Southeast Asia.

This mission statement is taken from COMUSMACV Msg TSLD 37284/ 210229Z Oct 65 and approved by CINCPAC Msg 182128Z Nov 65.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Headquarters MACSOG began 1968 operating under a Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) dated 30 October 1967. Authorized strength of the organization was 155 officers, 251 enlisted men and 10 civilian personnel for a total of 416. On 15 August 1968, the 44 spaces of 1st Flight Detachment were transferred from the MACSOG JTD to 7th Air

Force jurisdiction, and the Detachment was placed under MACSOG operational control. On 3 October 1968 MACV directed a reduction of 11 other positions which placed the end of year strength at 361: 125 officers, 226 enlisted men and 10 civilians.

b. Chief, MACSOG directed a reorganization of the headquarters in September into a more clearly defined line and staff organization. The organization of MACSOG through November is shown at TAB A. The reorganization took effect on 7 December and is shown at TAB B.

4. (U) COMMAND.

Colonel John K. Singlaub, 037040, USA, commanded MACSOG from 14 May 1966 until 3 August 1968. Colonel Singlaub was succeeded on that date by Colonel Stephen E. Cavanaugh, Jr., 036485, USA.

5. (U) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION (APPENDIX I).

Primary effort during CY 68 was to establish an administrative program for the headquarters which encompassed all-inclusive instructions for the entire spectrum of administrative functional areas. The program minimized training time of newly assigned administrative personnel, increased efficiency of paperwork management, and improved the quality of documents generated by this headquarters.

6. INTELLIGENCE (APPENDIX II).

Throughout 1968 requirements for intelligence support of MACSOG operations and dissemination of intelligence derived therefrom increased and varied markedly from requirements of past years. This presented a challenge to the Intelligence Division to increase output while simultaneously maintaining and improving the quality of its product. Through initiation of new concepts, development of new techniques and employment of new programs, the Intelligence Division not only increased production of intelligence but improved timeliness, substantive content and tactical utility of the product. In addition, improved targeting and collection techniques employed by MACSOG operational elements has insured a well-rounded intelligence collection and dissemination effort.

7. OPERATIONS: FOOTBOY (APPENDIX III).

a. Maritime Operations--PLOWMAN (Sec 1, App III).

(1) One hundred forty (140) PLOWMAN missions were completed in 1968 targeted against NVN for the purposes of maritime interdiction, prisoner capture and general disruption of NVN coastal areas. MINT

TASKER NUMBER MACSOG TS 000024-69

DUE DATE 12-24-92 ANNEX F

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DOCUMENTS REMOVED/BEING REVIEWED:

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DOCUMENTS REMOVED

NOT DECLASSIFIED

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8. CROSS-BORDER GROUND OPERATIONS (APPENDIX IV).

a. PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) operations continued in Laos throughout 1968, although a large number of missions were conducted in SVN in support of the Field Forces. Total number of missions doubled over 1967, but cross-border missions increased by only 16%. The SLAM concept was continued in 1968, adding considerably to the overall results for the year. Search, Locate, Annihilate, Monitor (SLAM) is a concept where Recon Teams are employed to search for and locate the enemy. Platoons are then inserted for the annihilation. Finally, stay-behind teams monitor the area.

b. DANIEL BOONE (DB) operations continued throughout 1968. Some restrictions were lifted and assets increased which afforded a 100% increase in number of operations conducted. In response to tactical situations caused by the enemy's Tet Offensive, 57% of the DB effort was directed in SVN. In late September, DB forces reverted to their primary mission of cross-border operations with 95% of the overall program being directed into Cambodia. The DB effort revealed that the enemy has increased its presence in Cambodia sharply and is making increased use of Cambodian border area sanctuaries.

9. AIR OPERATIONS STUDIES (APPENDIX V).

a. The Air Operations Studies Branch (OP-32) coordinates responsive air support for MACSOG DATA combat operations in NVN, nicknamed MIDRIFF , and schedules airlift support for MACSOG activities within Southeast Asia. The branch also coordinates with 7AF on support for PRAIRIE FIRE/DANIEL BOONE operations.

b. MIDRIFF operations are covered in detail in Appendix III under FOOTBOY Operations.

c. PRAIRIE FIRE/DANIEL BOONE. Operations in Laos and Cambodia averaged over 49 missions per month in the combined areas of operation. This activity was supported by an average of 28 troopcarrier and 20 gunship helicopters per day throughout the year.

d. Airlift. During CY 68, OP-32 coordinated and scheduled the movement of 8,888,447 pounds of cargo, both classified and general, and 40,915 passengers. This was accomplished using 4,895 sorties and 6,384.5 flying hours from the four C-130 and four C-123 aircraft assigned to the Air Operations Group, Nha Trang AB, RVN, and the two aircraft contracted from China Air Lines.

10. LIAISON (APPENDIX VI).

Three Liaison Officer (LNO) assignments exist in MACSOG: one maintaining close and continuous contact between MACSOG and STD, and one each with I and II Field Forces, Vietnam. The two Field Force LNOs provide liaison between MACSOG, the Field Forces, Command and Control Centers, major tactical units in the Corps Tactical Zones, and between other elements of MACSOG. Responsiveness in the use of MACSOG assets and reaction to information gained by MACSOG assets has been greatly enhanced as a result of functions of the LNOs.

11. LOGISTICS.(APPENDIX VII).

Logistic activities during 1968 were centered on development of procedures and expansion of activities to provide more positive response in meeting the logistic requirements of a wide range of MACSOG operations. At year's end the Logistics Division had been reorganized along more functional lines to insure increased capability and greater efficiency in executing the expanding requirements of the many elements of MACSOG.

12. COMPTROLLER (APPENDIX VIII).

On 21 October 1968 Comptroller Branch was removed from Logistics Division and made a separate division. During the 2d quarter of FY 69, MACSOG unclassified annual funding plan of $525,000 was reduced by 25% to $394,000. Classified funds received through the first half of FY 69 were $14,777,000.

13. PLANS (APPENDIX IX).

The Plans Division continued throughout 1968 to provide current, long-range and contingency planning for MACSOG and JUWTF operations,

as well as providing input to the plans of higher headquarters. Post-Hostilities planning was the major effort in the last half of the year.

14. COMMUNICATIONS (APPENDIX X).

Communications activities expanded significantly during 1968 to support establishment of the STRATA FOB at Da Nang and NAD FOB at Phan Thiet. A program to educate personnel in use of MACSOG codes was implemented to improve transmission security.

15. JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER (APPENDIX XI).

a. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) (OP-80) mission is to provide a capability within USMACV for personnel recovery operations. In accomplishment of this mission JPRC was involved in 45 attempted recovery operations during 1968.

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b. In addition JPRC engaged in pertinent Evasion and Escape Program activities to include:

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[redacted] and periodic briefings for Army, Air Force and Navy aircrews on the mission and capabilities of JPRC.

c. MT

[redacted] and supported this program with Psychological Operations as appropriate.

APPENDIX I

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. (U) GENERAL.

The Personnel and Administration Division performs the functions of G-1 and Adjutant General staff organizations, therefore acts in the capacity of both a coordinating and special staff agency.

2. (U) MISSION.

The Personnel and Administration Division:

a. Advises and assists the MACSOG Commander on matters pertaining to personnel and administration.

b. Interprets personnel and administrative policies and directives from higher headquarters. Formulates, implements and disseminates MACSOG personnel and administrative policies, directives and procedures.

c. Exercises overall staff responsibility for, and coordinates the personnel and administrative functions within MACSOG. Directs and supervises all personnel matters and procedures including requisition and assignment of personnel.

d. Supervises and coordinates activities of subordinate branches of the Personnel and Administration Division, and exercises staff supervision of personnel and administrative activities of units or agencies subordinate to MACSOG.

e. Maintains liaison with other US military organizations or government agencies concerning all administrative matters.

3. (U) ORGANIZATION.

The Personnel and Administration Division is organized with two sub-elements: the Personnel Services Branch and the Administrative Services Branch (see TAB A). Assigned strength on 31 December 1968 was 4 officers and 15 enlisted men.

4. (U) ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. During CY 68 the Personnel and Administration Division established an administrative management program for the headquarters en-

compassing "how to do it" instructions for all personnel and administrative functional areas. The program was implemented by writing and publishing appropriate MACSOG Directives, which prior to this time were non-existent, and by holding a seminar for all administrative personnel assigned to the staff activities.

b. The major areas selected for improvement included how to staff papers through the command section, how to prepare correspondence, requisitioning publications and blank forms, in- and out-processing personnel, how to originate MACV and MACSOG dedicated circuit electrically transmitted messages, how to initiate a directive for publication, procedures to request Temporary Duty travel orders, Officer Efficiency/Effectiveness Report preparation and rating schemes, and strength accounting and reporting procedures. The program has minimized training time for newly assigned administrative personnel from the various component services.

c. In addition, the majority of other MACSOG Directives were reviewed, edited and updated to insure clarity and accuracy. A "Staff Digest" was introduced as a basis to impart information on a timely basis to the staff. A numbered series of MACSOG Policies with a distinctive letterhead also was introduced. The purpose of the series is to insure that announced policies of Chief, MACSOG are made a matter of record and are disseminated quickly to the headquarters staff and subordinate activities.

d. New office machines were requisitioned to replace obsolete typewriters and reproduction copiers. A Xerox 914 Office Copier was acquired which has substantially reduced the time necessary to duplicate documents and orders, and has made Personnel and Administration Division more responsive to needs of the other staff agencies.

5. (U) PERSONNEL.

A listing of officers assigned to key positions and their periods of tenure through 1968 is included at TAB B.

TAB A

ORGANIZATION CHART

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION DIVISION



TAB B

KEY OFFICERS, 1968

POSITION	DATES	INCUMBENT
1. Chief, SOG	1 Jan 68- 2 Aug 68	COL J.K. Singlaub
	3 Aug 68-31 Dec 68	COL S.E. Cavanaugh
a. Deputy	6 Mar 68-31 Dec 68	COL R.L. Gleason
b. Special Asst	1 Jan 68-31 Dec 68	NAME
2. Personnel and Administrative Officer	1 Jan 68- 5 May 68	CPT L.E. Young, Jr.
	5 May 68-31 Dec 68	MAJ G. Anthony
3. Chief, Intel Div	1 Jan 68-16 Dec 68	LTC P. Carretta, Jr.
	17 Dec 68-31 Dec 68	LTC R.D. Bradshaw
4. Chief, Ops Div	1 Jan 68-26 Jul 68	LTC J.D. Carney
	1 Aug 68- 4 Dec 68	COL M.J. Slominski
	5 Dec 68-31 Dec 68	COL J.G. Hayes
a. Chief, MAROP Sec	1 Jan 68-14 Mar 68	CDR J.P. Smith, Jr.
	15 Mar 68-31 Dec 68	CDR G.F. Rogers
b. C, Abn Ops (34)	1 Jan 68-31 Dec 68	LTC R.D. McKnight
c. C, Psyops Br (33)	1 Jan 68-14 Jul 68	MAJ J.H. Spear
	15 Jul 68-31 Dec 68	MAJ J.R. McGavin
d. C, Air Ops Br (32)	1 Jan 68-21 Oct 68	LTC H.C. Van Dyke
	22 Oct 68-31 Dec 68	LTC H.V. Hopkins, Jr.
5. Chief, Log	1 Jan 68-15 Dec 68	LTC C.W. Zuppann
	16 Dec 68-31 Dec 68	LTC D.F. Friend
Chief, Medical Sec	1 Jan 68-13 Aug 68	LT R.R. Remuzzi
	14 Aug 68-31 Dec 68	LT R.A. Gross
6. Chief, Commo	1 Jan 68- 2 Apr 68	CDR T.E. Vines
	3 Apr 68-31 Dec 68	CDR S.C. Montgomery
7. CO, MAROP Gp	1 Jan 68- 5 Jul 68	CDR N.H. Olson
	6 Jul 68-19 Dec 68	CDR A.G. Merget
	20 Dec 68-31 Dec 68	LCDR C.T. Edson
8. Chief, Psyops Gp	1 Jan 68-17 Apr 68	LTC T.W. Bowen
	18 Apr 68-28 Jun 68	Vacant
	29 Jun 68-16 Nov 68	LTC L.S. Bush
	17 Nov 68-31 Dec 68	Mr. H.F. Robbins

9. CO, 1st Flt Det	1 Jan 68- 6 May 68	LTC J. Deas
	7 May 68-31 Dec 68	LTC J.R. McCarthy
10. Chief, Plans Div	1 Jan 68-22 Apr 68	LTC C.S. Zoukis
	23 Apr 68-27 Jun 68	MAJ G.D. Tollerud
	28 Jun 68-31 Dec 68	LTC R.M. Johnson
11. Chief, Compt Br	1 Jan 68-21 Aug 68	LCDR T.B. Potter
	22 Aug 68-31 Dec 68	LCDR D.J. Brunner
12. Chief, JPRC	1 Jan 68-12 Mar 68	COL B.S. Keller
	13 Mar 68-29 Jun 68	LTC Reisner
	30 Jun 68-18 Aug 68	LTC F.K. Sloan
	19 Aug 68-30 Nov 68	CDR D. Prentiss
	1 Dec 68-31 Dec 68	LTC I.T. McDonald

TAB A

MACSOG ORGANIZATION THROUGH NOVEMBER 1968



APPENDIX II

INTELLIGENCE

1. GENERAL.

a. The goals set forth by MACSOG Intelligence Division for CY 68 were continued improvement in both quality and quantity of intelligence produced from MACSOG operations and continued improvement in timeliness, substantive content and tactical utility of operational intelligence support and guidance provided to MACSOG assets for accomplishment of their mission.

b. Through initiation of new concepts, refinement of existing techniques, and aggressive exploitation of all available intelligence resources, MACSOG Intelligence Division continued to improve it position with respect to the goals set forth above. Initiation and development of the Targeting Panel concept achieved a coordinated intelligence collection and dissemination program responsive to the needs of all command components concerned. Continued refinement in Photo Intelligence support and collection techniques has insured not only thorough mission planning support for the Recon Team but improved quality and content of mission results. The Intelligence Division has maintained its active use of data handling systems and continues to explore methods of adapting new technology to increase support of the intelligence mission. Throughout the year, the Intelligence Division has vigorously pursued the exploitation of all intelligence resources available to provide the most complete, up-to-date product possible to the man in the field.

2. MISSION.

The basic mission of the Intelligence Division is to collect, collate and disseminate intelligence information to MACSOG staff agencies in support of MACSOG operational elements and to receive, collate and disseminate the intelligence information derived from those operations to the intelligence community. This basic mission is broken out into six main functions, as follows:

a. Advise Chief, MACSOG concerning intelligence matters and develop intelligence estimates, summaries and studies.

b. Prepare documents pertaining to collection and use of intelligence by MACSOG, including dissemination to other staff agencies and personnel.

c. Advise Chief, MACSOG on matters of security and prepare necessary directives.

d. Exercise staff supervision of intelligence activities of units and agencies subordinate to MACSOG.

e. Maintain liaison with other military organizations and government agencies concerning intelligence matters.

f. Insure operational plans give full consideration to the potential of intelligence collection either in support of, or in conjunction with, other U.S. agencies whose mission involves the collection of intelligence.

3. ORGANIZATION.

At the close of 1968 the Intelligence Division was organized into four branches and had an authorized as well as actual strength of 35 personnel. (See TAB A) The four branches under the Intelligence Division are as follows:

a. Operations Branch: The Operations Branch is composed of five sections: Laos Study Section (handles all intelligence matters involving Prairie Fire operations), Cambodian Study Section (deals with all Daniel Boone intelligence matters), Vietnamese Study Section (divided into two subsections, one for all matters related to the MACSOG Agent program and the other for all maritime operations), the Air/Anti-Air Study Section (maintains all air intelligence information for NVN, Laos and Cambodia), and the Exploitation Section (responsible for exploitation of MACSOG prisoners/detainees obtained from MACSOG operations). There were 13 personnel assigned to the Operations Branch at the end of 1968 versus 15 authorized.

b. Photo Analysis Branch: The Photo Analysis Branch provides photo intelligence assistance to MACSOG staff agencies through the respective Operations Branch sections for support of MACSOG operational elements. It is composed of two sections: the Imagery Interpretation Section provides photo intelligence reports on all MACSOG targets as well as special studies while the Photo Lab Section provides film processing facilities in support of the MACSOG "hand-held Photograph program. At the end of 1968, Photo Analysis Branch had eleven assigned personnel against ten authorized, of which two were in the Photo Lab Section.

c. Security Branch: The Security Branch advises the Chief, Intelligence Division on all matters of security and prepares the necessary directives. The Branch had five personnel authorized and six assigned.

d. Administrative Branch: This branch provides administrative support to the Intelligence Division. Three personnel were authorized for the branch. [illegible]

4 INTELLIGENCE DIVISION IMPROVEMENTS.

The following improvements were made during 1968 to provide a more qualitative and timely intelligence product in support of the MACSOG mission and goals set forth by the Intelligence Division:

a. Reorganization of the Division: Significantly increased targeting operations and continuing expansion of operational activities throughout the year with commensurate increase in staff work, required a thorough review of the Intelligence Division organization to insure maximum utilization of personnel under existing manpower restrictions and changing requirements, a reorganization of staff functions was accomplished to support those areas of increased operations. This reorganization is depicted in TAB A. Among improvements was establishment of a Photo Lab Section within the Photo Analysis Branch to provide more timely support on high priority items formerly rendered by the 69th Signal Battalion.

b. Intelligence Reporting: The Intelligence Division made a concerted effort to improve quality, quantity and timeliness of intelligence reported to MACV J2 and the intelligence community. These efforts included the following:

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and MACV J2 to insure MACSOG's intelligence information consumers continue to receive quality products These evaluation reports are closely monitored and serve as basis for improvements in the reports.

(4) Personal Contacts The Division has encouraged all Desk Officers to make frequent visits with MACV J2 counterparts in the various divisions. Closer working relationships have developed as a result of these visits

(5) Briefings. Part of the reporting system used by the Intelligence Division is the weekly MACSOG COMUSMACV Wrap-up, attended by COMUSMACV and his senior staff Copies of the briefings, which contains significant intelligence information produced from the latest MACSOG operations, are provided MACV J2 representatives beforehand. MACV J2 representatives are invited to attend the pre-brief for Chief, MACSOG. Weekly briefings are provided MACV J2 on results of Target Panel meetings. These two briefings provide weekly updates to all MACV staff agencies on results of MACSOG operations, target scheduling and significant intelligence produced.

c. PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) Operations:

(1) The Target Panel concept was initiated in October. This new concept enabled the Intelligence Division for the first time to maintain continuing coordination and agreement among all concerned elements of MACSOG and COMUSMACV on identification, selection and assigned priority of intelligence targets for MACSOG missions. Designated representatives of pertinent components of MACV J2 and MACSOG meet weekly and conduct an all-source review and assessment of the status of pending requirements, target schedules and mission results. The Target Panels have proven highly effective in providing improved, focused intelligence support and guidance to achieve effective employment of MACSOG operational assets as well as providing timely dissemination of mission results.

(2) The cumulative, systematic input during CY 68, of information on the PF area, derived from a wide variety of sources, has resulted in the most comprehensive ADP data base of those areas available in the theater. It has proven to be an invaluable research tool for intelligence support and operational planning.

(3) The SLAM/Recon-in-Force concept continued to provide excellent results. Intelligence Division continued to exploit and develope the intelligence potential of this program.

(4) To assist in gaining more timely collection of intelligence from the Recon Team in addition to improving intelligence support, six TDY personnel were obtained from the 1st Special Forces Group to conduct on-the-spot debriefings of exfiltrated Recon Teams at the FOB.

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d. DANIEL BOONE (DB) Operations:

(1) The Target Panel concept was initiated for DB operations as well and has proven equally effective here as in PF.

(2) The Cambodian Study Group continued to exploit the potential of ADP with systematic inputs, providing for a solid data base [illegible] has been a valuable tool in mission planning and intelligence support.

(3) Three IDY personnel were [illegible] from 1st Special [illegible] to assist the C&C in collection of intelligence from Recon Teams and provide timely dissemination.

e. PLOWMAN Operations:

(1) During 1968 conversion of the PLOWMAN data base from an ADP filing system to an Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS), utilizing a magnetic tape file was completed. The new system permits a more flexible format for storage and retrieval of data in support of target planning and dissemination of Intelligence for PLOWMAN operations.

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f. Air Intelligence Operations:

(1) In order to display more accurately the increased enemy air defense capability in NVN, Laos and Cambodia and thus provide the complete and detailed intelligence to MACSOG operational units, graphic displays of all enemy aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, [illegible] and electronic order of battle were replotted on large scale maps. Additional graphic displays were added to include all available reports on ground fire received by friendly aircraft and reports of aircraft shot down. Missile order of battle information was [illegible] to include dates each missile site was last occupied. All displayed information is updated on a daily basis, providing one of the most [illegible] clusive and current displays on the air intelligence picture available.

(2) No effort was spared during the year to increase timeliness of air intelligence received by the operational units. Helicopter assets became increasingly vulnerable during the latter part of the year as the enemy shifted a large number of his air defense assets into the PF AO. A new system of support was initiated. Copies of the comprehensive graphic displays of air intelligence were made and distributed to the field. A new system of transmission was initiated to update the displays providing for immediate transmission of air intelligence reports as they are received by the Intelligence Division.

(3) In response to the increasingly heavy volume of fire received by MACSOG air assets, the Air Intelligence Section initiated a program of visits and briefings to operational units to present the enemy's air defense posture and insure all personnel are thoroughly familiar with information available to them.

g. Photo Analysis Operations:

(1) A significant improvement in intelligence support of MACSOG operational teams was achieved with introduction of a new, supplemental two-part Photo Intelligence Report package for team tactical field use. The new format consists of (1) a currently updated annotated photo map of the target area and (2) a narrative target area description and terrain analysis.

(2) As the high intelligence value of ground photography derived from Recon Team operations became increasingly apparent, a program was undertaken to expand MACSOG collection efforts and capabilities. New equipment was acquired and evaluated and training provided for all operational teams.

(3) To increase the timeliness of photo support to MACSOG operations and dissemination of the intelligence to all agencies involved, a two-step program was initiated. Facilities for MACSOG in-house photo processing and print-out were activated. By eliminating the need to send high priority items to the 69th Signal Battalion, a saving of 7-10 days was realized. The facility is still not complete and the number of photo lab personnel is insufficient to handle all high priority items; however, every effort is being made to alleviate the situation in 1969. The second step was initiation of a program to establish photo lab facilities at the C&C level. This will decrease some of the workload on the headquarters facility and increase timeliness of intelligence reporting from, in many cases, 3-4 weeks to 2-3 days. Action was initiated in late 1968 to begin the procurement of necessary equipment in CY 69.

(4) The Photo Analysis Branch became a participant in the RT Leaders' School at Camp Long Thanh. Instruction is being provided in ground photography, aerial reconnaissance programs over Laos and Cambodia, and in development of the Photo Analysis Branch product.

5. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

a. PRAIRIE FIRE (PF)

(1) Intelligence Information Report (IIR)

(a) During the period 1 January 1968 to 31 December 1968, 410 IIRs were submitted on enemy activity and terrain in the PF AO. A total of 277 were writen in 1967.

(b) Following the Tet Offensive of January 1968, PF assets were utilized extensively to support in-country missions, with a resultant decrease in operations in Laos until late September, when normal operations resumed. No IIRs were written on these in-country missions.

(2) Studies, Estimates, Annexes:

(a) An Intelligence Annex to OPLAN 37B-68 (Phase II PRAIRIE FIRE Intelligence Net) was prepared.

(b) A study was conducted for THUNDERCLOUD operations in the Tri-border Area.

(c) A study of enemy activity and plans along the Ho Chi Minh Trail (road and trail complex in eastern Laos used for infiltration of men and materiel from NVN to SVN) was accomplished and disseminated via IIR 6 799 0099 68. This report received an extremely laudatory evaluation by DIA as "one of the few" concise but complete studies of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

(d) A study of all LOCs in Laos was conducted to determine main VC/NVA logistic routes.

(e) A briefing on LOCs in Laos was prepared for the Graham Committee.

(f) An analysis of all ARC LIGHT Strikes in BA 613 was made.

(g) Photographic studies were made of routes 92, 922 and 548 in support of IGLOO WHITE activities.

(h) The PF section initiated a comprehensive study of the results of all ARC LIGHT strikes conducted in Laos An important input to this study were bomb damage assessment reports from MACSOG Recon Teams on ARC LIGHT strikes conducted as a result of MACSOG intelligence collection efforts. It is believed this is the first comprehensive study of its kind on out-of-country ARC LIGHT missions. The study has been disseminated to MACV.

(3) Target Selection and Development:

(a) During the year 600 targets were selected and developed with 235 of these on a recurring basis.

(b) Two new targets were developed and added to the PF target inventory.

(4) Wiretap Operation: MT

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(b) Six missions were conducted successfully, two in-country and four in the PF AO. The remaining eight missions were aborted due to enemy activity. Only one was exploitable.

(5) Significant Intelligence Produced During 1968:

(a) PF teams confirmed the existence of an enemy stronghold and cache site on CO ROC Mountain southwest of Khe Sanh. As a result, an ARC LIGHT strike was conducted, resulting in continous secondary explosions over a two-hour period.

(b) Intelligence gathered from BA 607 was instrumental in obtaining approval for an ARC LIGHT strike which produced a large number of secondary explosions, destroyed one PT-76 tank, and cut route 548 in several places.

(c) A number of personal letters from relatives and friends in NVN to NVA soldiers in the Tri-border Area were captured in an NVA Regimental Headquarters Area. They contained pertinent information on conditions in NVN and were disseminated to the intelligence community.

(d) Numerous infiltration activities, including old and new bivouac areas of Company/Regimental size, well used trails, and rest areas, truck parks and storage areas were located and many of them photographed.

(e) Numerous sightings of communications lines.

(f) Important information on VC/NVA vehicular movement, including trucks, tanks and APCs, was obtained on major motorable routes.

(g) The enemy's use of trucks to infiltrate troops through Laos was first confirmed by a PF team operating in the Tri-border Area on route 96/110 during February

(h) Intelligence information produced by PF teams in the Tri-border Area resulted in it being designated a SLAM Area (SLAM VII). In November, BA 613 was exploited as a revision of the SLAM VII concept, with teams locating targets to be exploited by larger forces and TAC Air. This operation resulted in the [illegible] of way stations, bivouac areas, truck parks, and storage areas. This information together with that of a knowledgeable POW captured during the operation, shed much light on the enemy's use of BA 613 and led to targeting of 9 successful ARC LIGHT missions in this Base Area.

(6) IGLOO WHITE (MUSCLE SHOALS) Intelligence Activities: The nickname MUSCLE SHOALS was changed to IGLOO WHITE during the year. The IGLOO WHITE desk continued to monitor project developments and to collect ground intelligence on the AO.

b. BANIEL BOONE.

(1) Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs):

(a) During the calendar year 418 IIRs were written on enemy activity and terrain in the DBAO, compared with 155 for the last six months of 1967.

(b) In a message dated 13 Feb 68, COMUSMACV made DB assets responsive to in-country requirements. As a result, the number of out-of-country missions peaked in February, suffered a slight drop in March and were drastically cut back from April through June, with a corresponding drop in intelligence production from the DB AO. The in-country program continued to the end of September, when normal operations were resumed. No IIRs were written for these in-country missions. Despite the cutback, intelligence produced in 1968 from the DB AO increased significantly.

(2) Studies, Estimates, Annexes:

(a) In January, a VESUVIUS committee was formed with MACV J2 to formulate targets of hard intelligence to be made into packets to demonstrate the VC/NVA use of Cambodia to Prince Sihanouk. Two targets were submitted for an initial package in February. Input was also provided for six other VESUVIUS packets. The amount of MACSOG input to the VESUVIUS program dropped significantly when DB assets were diverted to in-country use.

(b) A study of population distribution in Cambodia, with emphasis on the DB AO, was conducted.

(c) A study was completed on various indigenous organizations in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

(d) Lines of communication (LOCs) within Cambodia were studied to determine the major routes used in support of the VC/NVA logistic system. A briefing on these LOCs was prepared for presentation to the Graham Committee.

(e) The Intelligence Annex to the new DB OPLAN was written.

(f) An implementing directive in response to the BLACK BEARD Collection Program was prepared.

(3) Target Selection and Development:

(a) A total of 300 targets was selected and developed/updated during the year.

(b) A new operations order was received in December lifting certain restrictions and greatly increasing the scope of DB operations, with a concomitant increase in intelligence production. Plans are being developed to fully exploit this new order.

(4) Wiretap Operations: Four wiretap operations were conducted under the MT Program with two of these producing exploitable results.

(5) Significant Intelligence Produced during 1968:

(a) 807 targets were located.

(b) 272 active and inactive bivouac areas and way stations were discovered.

(c) 27 sightings of communications wire.

(d) 2 POWs of significant intelligence value were captured.

(e) 478 sightings of enemy troops were reported.

(f) Photographs were taken of roads, trails, bridges, storage and bivouac areas, enemy fortifications and terrain.

c. PLOWMAN

MT

(a) Effects of aerial mining of waterways.

(b) Effects of airstrikes.

(c) Reaction of the populace and NVN officials to bombing restrictions and peace negotiations.

(d) Economic conditions

(e) Order of battle.

(f) Status of LOCs.

(2) Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs): Based on the interrogation of detainees, 199 IIRs were written These reports covered subjects listed above plus the following:

(a) Effects of Naval Gunfire.

(b) Paramilitary Forces.

(3) Studies, Estimates, Annexes:

(a) Continuing studies and reports were published on the increasing volume and accuracy of hostile costal defense fire received by PLOWMAN missions.

(b) A study of capabilities, construction and tactics of armed junks was completed.

(c) The feasibility of waterway reconnaissance operations in Cambodia was examined and results published.

(4) Target Selection and Development: A total of 50 targets were selected of which 20 were developed in support of CADO missions. Five of these were in support of a new concept MT Seven of the 20 targets were approved and executed prior to the standdown on 1 November. Five missions developed under the new concept were never run due to the operational standdown.

(5) Problem Areas: A total of 352 IIRs and Spot Reports were disseminated during Calendar Year 1968. This represents a decline from 463 in 1967. The decline resulted from operational restrictions in effect for five months during the year. Only "at sea" interrogations were permitted from April through June and no operations were authorized subsequent to 1 November.

d. TIMBERWORK

(1) Spot Reports: Information received from the remaining MT in NVN was under continual evaluation for dissemination to the intelligence community. As a result of this

evaluation and studies produced DATA and MACV J2, there was little doubt that the teams had been compromised. Therefore, spot reporting was discontinued in July 1968 and the teams converted to diversionary assets.

(2) Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs). Information from STRATA team operations was received and evaluated for dissemination during the year. Eleven IIRs were produced between March (the initiation of STRATA operations) and the operational standdown on 1 Nov.

(3) Studies, Estimates, Annexes:

(a) Five area studies for Singleton Agent operations were conducted.

(b) A buildup of all available pertinent intelligence data on North Vietnam was undertaken as a standby data base to support any future operations.

(c) Support to the post-standdown movement of the Long-Term Black Agent Teams out of NVN by foot was provided.

(4) Target Selection and Development:

(a) During the year 100 targets of various types were selected and developed.

(b) Studies were conducted and data collected in support of target selection for STRATA team operations.

(c) Targets were developed and a data base established in support of the Singleton Agent Program.

(d) Participation in the development of the new Strategic Intelligence Team (SIT) concept and selection of suitable targets was provided. Due to the standdown no SIT teams were inserted.

(e) Intelligence support was also provided to the Notional Team concept in 18 notional areas of NVN.

(f) With cessation of operations against NVN, all assets were shifted for use in Laos and Cambodia, with intelligence support provided by respective intelligence sections in coordination with the TIMBERWORK Section.

e. Air Intelligence:

(1) The Air Intelligence Section maintained all aircraft, AAA, SAM, and electronic order of battle for Laos, NVN and Cambodia for use by MACSOG and its subordinate units.

(2) Spot Reports: Although reports were not normally required of the Air Intelligence Section, three Spot Reports were disseminated on ground fire received by aircraft supporting MACSOG missions

(3) Studies, Estimates, Annexes: Air order of battle studies were provided in support of PF, DB, PLOWMAN , and TIMBERWORK operations. In addition, studies and graphic displays were provided to OP-30 for mission planning

f. Photo Analysis Activities:

(1) Target Studies:

(a) During the year 1,050 target studies were accomplished in support of PF, DB, PLOWMAN , and TIMBERWORK operations; almost double the output of 1967.

(b) The format of target studies was changed from an annotated high altitude photograph to an annotated photo blowup of a 1:50,000 chart with an accompanying photo analysis of the target area keyed to the chart. High altitude photographs of some targets are still being provided. Further refinement of target studies is planned.

(2) Target Selection and Development: With the advent of the Targeting Panel concept, Photo Analysis Branch realized the opportunity to insure more effective utilization of aerial reconnaissance/photo analysis capabilities and resources in selection and development of targets. Undesirable targets have been eliminated, target coordinates changed to more suitable locations, and LZs and routes of advance selected. In future, manpower permitting, Photo Analysis Branch will become more involved in target development.

(3) Projects: To insure a more reliable and productive ground photography program, Photo Analysis Branch initiated a project to standardize and coordinate the entire program. Selection of equipment, instruction in its use, and photo processing guidance as well as interpretation of photography are included in the project. At present, the Pen EES-2 and the Ashai Pentax Spotmatic with 55mm and 200mm lenses have been selected along with a variety of suitable film Equipment and film will continue to be tested to insure the best equipment is available to the field.

(4) Library Services: The library currently contains approximately 286,000 feet of film and more than 30,000 feet are processed by the Photo Analysis Branch each week. This is a vastly significant increase over 1967 when only 100,000 feet was stored and 10,000 feet processed each week.

(5) Problem Areas: Under the JTD of 1967, ten military personnel and one DATA were authorized This number was found to be

inadequate to meet the requirements levied on the Branch. A request has been forwarded to change one authorized officer position to a Photo Lab Technician billet in order to man the new Photo Lab Facility. Additional Photo Imagery Interpreter and Photo Lab personnel will be requested.

g. Security Activities : The following is a listing of major activities accomplished by the Security Section during CY 68:

(1) The following directives were prepared:

(a) MACV SOG Dir 380-7 with change, subj: Military Security,Access to MACSOG Information (U).

(b) MACV Staff Memo 380-7, subj: Access to MACSOG Information(U).

(c) MACSOG Dir 380-5, subj: Security Directive (U).

(2) The relocation of MACSOG from MACV II Compound to MACV I Compound was planned and executed.

(3) Dossiers on Operational Personnel: Security Section continued the program of maintaining dossiers on operational personnel. As of 30 December 7,870 of these dossiers had been established.

(4) Biographic Files: Security continued control of all counterpart biographic files. During 1968 a requirement was established for all MACSOG Detachment Commanders to maintain a personnel file on all counterparts. Security maintains master files while the Detachment Commanders maintain duplicate dossiers.

(5) DATA

(6) MACSOG Conference Room: Security Section established security procedures for the MACSOG Top Secret Conference Room in Building #2 and technically sweeps the conference room before each conference.

(7) Indigenous Personnel Checks:

(a) The system for background investigations of indigenous personnel was completely revised. Information now received is more complete and turnover time has been reduced from 2-4 months to 3-4 weeks.

(b) Security checks are being accomplished on all indigenous personnel employed by MACSOG. Security presently has 2,800 completed dossiers filed.

(8) IBM Printout of MACSOG Access Roster: The IBM printout of the MACSOG Access Roster is now produced by IDHS, thus cutting the receipt time by 7-10 days.

(9) Polygraph/Technical Services: Security Section coordinated with MACV J2 and 525th MI Group for improved polygraph and technical services. Arrangements were made for MACSOG to receive these services on a priority basis and is now receiving vastly improved and essential services from these organizations.

(10) Liaison: Liaison visits to various intelligence agencies in the Saigon area were continued and contact with other agencies throughout RVN was established.

TAB A

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION MACV SOG



PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION

	Auth	Assg
Command Section	2	2
Admin Branch	3	3
Operations Branch	15	13
Photo Analysis Branch	10	11
Security Branch	5	6
Division TOTAL	35	35

APPENDIX III

FOOTBOY OPERATIONS

Appendix III contains the 1968 historical summaries of the operational aspects of the FOOTBOY program. Histories of the sub-programs are presented in sections as indicated below:

Section 1 - Maritime Operations

Section 2 - Air Operations

Section 3 - Psychological Operations

Section 4 - Airborne Operations

Section 1-MARITIME OPERATIONS

SECRET

1. GENERAL.

a.

MT

the year.

b. Due to these restrictions, steps were taken to plan and execute cross-beach training operations in South Vietnam. At the start of the Southeast monsoon season, in May 1968, BIFROST operations commenced in I Corps. BIFROST operations were designed to develop proficiency in cross-beach operations through the conduct of actual combat operations targeted primarily against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). BIFROST has continued throughout 1968.

c. At the onset of the 1968 Northeast monsoon season and resultant marginal surf conditions in I Corps, two action teams were deployed to Phan Thiet in II Corps beginning 1 November 1968 to conduct DEWEY RIFLE operations. The DEWEY RIFLE concept is identical to that of BIFROST, DEWEY RIFLE operations continued throughout the remainder of the year.

2. MISSION.

MT

3. ORGANIZATION.

Maritime operations were conducted in 1968 by the Maritime Operations Group (cover name: Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD) Da Nang) in conjunction with the Coastal Security Service (CSS) of the Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate. Staff cognizance of maritime operations was exercised through the Maritime Studies Branch, OP-31, Headquarters, Studies and Observations Group. There were no major organizational changes during the year.

a. Naval Advisory Detachment, Da Nang. The assigned strength of the Maritime Operations Group averaged 14 officer, 29 enlisted, and nine Filipinos throughout the year. No serious problems were encountered in filling assigned billets. A 65-man Mobile Support Team is attached on temporary duty to provide boat maintenance support. In September MACSOG was directed to eliminate those personnel who were considered excess-in-country, since they were not filling authorized JTD billets. The solution was to reduce the team by 26, reduce SEAL and Marine advisors by half and increase the CSS capability to provide maintenance support. This adjustment was still taking place at the end of 1968.

b. Maritime Studies Branch. The strength of the Maritime Studies Branch remained constant at four officers and two enlisted throughout the year.

4. PLOWMAN OPERATIONAL ASSETS.

a. Three Swift boats, for local logistic support, and seven Nasty Class PTFs were in the inventory at the beginning of 1968. In July this figure was increased to nine PTFs and further increased in September to eleven by addition of four new aluminum hulled boats. This level was maintained for the remainder of the year. Prior to July there were an average of six PTFs operational and one in Subic Bay Ship Repair Facility, Philippines, for overhaul. After arrival of the four new craft there were normally nine operational with two in Subic for overhaul.

b. Twelve PTF crews and three Swift crews were operational throughout the year. Action team strength at the beginning of the year was 69, organized into three teams. Recruiting efforts were initiated to attain a level of four twenty-man teams. Action team strength reached a high of 94 in August when it was determined that the quality of team personnel was in some cases unsatisfactory and that for the type missions envisioned twenty-man teams were too large. It was determined to reduce the size of teams to fifteen and maintain four teams. The reduction was to be made through attrition and the selecting out of unproductive personnel. This action continued for the remainder of the year.

c. A total of 157 PLOWMAN missions were launched in the first ten months of 1968. Of these, 140 were completed, 11 were aborted due to weather and six were aborted due to boat materiel problems. Six VN were killed in action and ten were wounded in action. No PTFs were [illegible] enemy KIA. 40 craft destroyed and 184 detainees taken and processed at "Paradise".

5. PLOWMAN SUMMARY.

a. Missions conducted. PLOWMAN operations were conducted as follows:

MT

(2) LOKI Missions. No fixed track reconnaissance-maritime interdiction missions were executed during 1968.

(3) CADO Missions. Two cross-beach landing team operations were conducted against Tiger Island during the year for the purpose of

MT

(4) Special Missions. Six missions were conducted which were included in the PLOWMAN concept but which did not specifically fall into one of the above mission categories.

MT

b. Detailed Mission Summary. See TAB A.

c. Operating Areas. (See TAB B) At the beginning of 1968 PLOWMAN MINT missions were authorized to operate as far north as 20° N and on a selected basis to conduct LOKI missions up to 20° 30' N. During the Tet standdown period all PLOWMAN operations were restricted to reconnaissance missions only. Following Tet, normal operations were resumed. On 10 April all PLOWMAN operations were restricted to coastal surveillance south of 19° N

MT

In 16 June this restriction was further modified to permit operations up to 20° N and on-board interrogations of NVN watercraft crewmen. Subsequently authorization was widened MT approval of cross-beach operations on a case-by-case basis. On 1 November all operations north of 17° N ceased.

d. Mission Analysis and Evaluation.

(1) Daily presence of SSPL craft in NVN coastal waters was a long-standing operational goal for MACSOG MAROPS and in August 1968 when

the weather was most favorable and with sufficient PTFs in the inventory, this goal was attained. Subsequent to that time the weather gradually deteriorated, reducing operations slightly, until the complete standdown was effected on 1 November. In 1967, 125 PLOWMAN operations were completed. The increased temp of 1968, however, permitted 140 completed missions in only the first ten months of the year with a proportionate increase in NVN watercraft contacts and intelligence reports. Restrictions on conduct of cross-beach operations above 17° N severely hampered employment of action teams and prevented their presenting a significant threat to the DRV itself. With eight exceptions (six Special missions and two cross-beach missions directed against Tiger Island) all operations north of 17° N were NOT

As in 1967, the WHITE AO (18° 40' N to 20° 00' N) remained the most lucrative for PLOWMAN operations DATA

It was in this area that most of the DATA

This area was also the most heavily defended. Although the effect of these operations on the DRV is not completely quantifiable, indications of their impact include the heavy buildup of coastal defense weapons along the coastline and resultant heavy fire received during conduct of missions in 1968. Approximately 40% of all PLOWMAN missions received coastal defense fire in 1968, suggesting some form of radar control (See TAB C). At the time of most concentrated effort, the NVN regime employed armed junks of a specially configured metal hull design that were obviously built to engage SSPL PTFs. Their construction and crew training indicated an extensive effort to thwart the effectiveness of the PLOWMAN program. DATA

Although interpreted as an isolated incident probably generated by fortuitous presence of NVN aircraft, the PLOWMAN mission of 6 October was attacked by a jet aircraft which made two unsuccessful firing runs. This was the only incident of air opposition in 1968. Of prime significance in program results, was the generation of 337 intelligence reports to higher authority, obtained during PLOWMAN operations.

(2) The high rate of activity and inability of the DRV to thwart operations is best illustrated by the complete freedom with which operations were conducted. The only significant limiting factor to maritime operations during the year were PTF availability and weather.

(3) The only two cross-beach operations conducted during the year were unprofitable and action teams contributed to the PLOWMAN program to only a limited degree.

6. ACTION TEAM OPERATIONS.

Inasmuch as operational restrictions imposed prevented action teams from conducting extensive operations against the DRV, alternate operations were established in South Vietnam as follows:

a. Delta Team Operations. At the beginning of 1968 one action team was being rotated each month to conduct riverine operation in support of the Mobile Riverine Force (TF 117). Patrols were conducted with assigned missions of reconnaissance, destruction, and capturing of selected prisoners. Overall, the delta operations were of considerable value to the teams and to TF 117. US advisors accompanied action teams on patrols. An opportunity to observe teams in action resulted in developing increased team proficiency as well as improving the capability of team leaders. Although the delta deployment was designed primarily as a training vehicle for action teams during the normally restrictive winter monsoon season, these operations resulted in obtaining valuable intelligence for the Mobile Riverine Force. These operations were terminated in March 1968 (See TAB D-Mission Summary).

b. BIFROST Operations. At the start of the Southeast Monsoon season, in May 1968, BIFROST operations commenced in I Corps. BIFROST operations were designed to develop proficiency in cross-beach operations through conduct of actual operations targeted primarily against VCI. BIFROST has continued throughout 1968. These operations were to be conducted under close supervision of US advisors while making an impact on the VCI through capture, harassment, destruction of supplies and generally creating a threat from the sea in VC-controlled areas. During the Southeast Monsoon season, May through Mid-October, BIFROST operations were successful in accomplishing these objectives. A review of operations conducted points out an increasing VC defense of beach areas and generation of intelligence for tactical use by friendly forces. Since the beginning of the monsoon transition, in October 1968, few BIFROST operations have been executed due to high surf and bad weather. The key to successful BIFROST operations, in addition to surf conditions, has been the gradual generation (through our own reconnaissance and prisoner interrogation) of accurate intelligence on location and movement of VCI in areas that are VC-controlled. (See TAB E-Mission Summary)

c. DEWEY RIFLE Operations. At the onset of the 1968 Northeast Monsoon season and the resultant marginal surf conditions in I Corps, two action teams were deployed to Phan Thiet in II Corps beginning 1 November to conduct DEWEY RIFLE operations. The DEWEY RIFLE concept is identical to that of BIFROST. In the case of DEWEY RIFLE, however, teams operate in direct support of the 3d Battalion, 506th Infantry (Abn) of 101st Airborne Division. In the short period of --- operations they have met with gratifying success in support of this element of Task Force South, I FFV. This success is due to their unique means of entry into the objective area and to the fact that

the coastline of Binh Thuan Province has heretofore been considered a relatively safe haven by the enemy. (See TAB F-Mission Summary)

7. TRAINING.

a. Maintenance Team Training. Formal training for the Vietnamese counterpart of the US Mobile Support Team commenced at Ships Repair Facility, Subic Bay 18 November with a six-week training course in engine maintenance, electronics, electricity and gunnery. This course will continue for three classes through March 1969 and will partially offset the loss of the US MST personnel reduction noted in paragraph 1a above.

b. On-the-job Training. Intensive on-the-job training is being conducted in supply, public works, and operations planning in order to facilitate the orderly turnover of responsibility and accountability for maritime operations to CSS.

TAB A

DETAILED MISSION SUMMARY

1 1968 MISSION SUMMARY

Missions launched	157
Missions aborted--weather	11
Missions aborted--materiel	6
Missions completed	140
MINT	132
LOKI	0
CADO	2
Special	6
Enemy craft destroyed	40
Enemy craft damaged	1
Enemy craft captured	1
Detainees captured	184
Detainees returned	210
Coastal defense fire received	58
Aircraft attacks received	1
Surface attacks received	6
Intelligence reports generated	337
Personnel KIA (VN)	6
WIA (VN)	10
MIA (VN)	0
Personnel KIA, WIA, MIA (US)	0
Enemy KIA (Est)	80

2. MONTHLY MISSION SUMMARY

a. January.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
05	MINT		5 detainees taken, 17 returned, 1 craft destroyed
11	MINT		None
12	MINT		None
13	MINT		None
14	MINT		None
21	MINT		10 detainees returned. PTF-6 encountered mine moderate damage.
22	Special		Released 3 defectors in junk.
29	Special		None
30	Special		9 detainees taken, 1 craft destroyed.

January Recap:

Missions	9
Detainees captured	14
Detainees returned	30
Craft destroyed	2

b. February.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
17	MINT		None
27	MINT		10 detainees taken, 2 craft destroyed.
29	MINT		2 detainees taken.

February Recap:

Missions	3
Detainees captured	12
Detainees returned	0
Craft destroyed	2

c. March.

03	MINT		14 detainees taken, 7 craft destroyed.
05	MINT		14 detainees taken, 6 craft destroyed.
07	MINT		9 detainees returned.
08	MINT		None.
10	MINT		None.
11	MINT		5 detainees taken.
13	MINT		5 detainees taken.
14	MINT		6 detainees taken.
15	MINT		None.
17	MINT		None.
18	MINT		None.
19	MINT		12 detainees taken.
21	MINT		None.
23	MINT		10 detainees taken.
27	MINT		None.
29	MINT		5 detainees taken.

March Recap:

Missions	16
Detainees captured	71
Detainees returned	9
Craft destroyed	13

d. April.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
01	MINT		4 detainees taken.
03	MINT		5 detainees taken.
04	MINT		2 detainees taken.
06	MINT		1 detainee taken.
08	MINT		2 detainees returned.
10	MINT		24 detainees returned.
15	MINT		None.
18	MINT		None.
22	MINT		None.
24	MINT		None.
29	MINT		18 detainees returned.
30	MINT		None.

April Recap:

Missions	12
Detainees captured	13
Detainees returned	44
Craft destroyed	0

e. May.

03	MINT		11 detainees returned.
06	MINT		11 detainees returned.
07	MINT		19 detainees returned.
08	MINT		None.
10	MINT		2 detainees returned: 1 craft captured.
12	MINT		3 detainees returned; 1 craft destroyed.
14	MINT		None.
16	MINT		None.
18	MINT		3 detainees returned.
21	MINT		None.
22	MINT		None.
27	MINT		None.
28	Special		3 defectors released.
30	MINT		None.

May Recap:

Missions	14
Detainees captured	0
Detainees returned	52
Craft destroyed/captured	2

f. June.

03	MINT		None.
05	MINT		None.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
06	MINT		None.
07	MINT		None.
09	MINT		None.
11	MINT		2 fishermen interrogated.
12	Special		1 defector released.
13	MINT		None.
15	MINT		4 fishermen interrogated.
18	MINT		5 fishermen interrogated.
21	MINT		11 fishermen interrogated.
22	MINT		None.
24	MINT		12 fishermen interrogated.
26	MINT		10 fishermen interrogated.
28	MINT		8 fishermen interrogated.

June Recap:

Missions	15
Detainees captured	0
Detainees returned	1
Craft destroyed	0
Fishermen interrogated	52

g. July.

01	MINT		8 fishermen interrogated.
03	MINT		None.
05	MINT		2 detainees taken, 15 fishermen interrogated.
07	MINT		4 detainees taken.
09	MINT		4 detainees taken, 5 fishermen interrogated.
10	MINT		15 fishermen interrogated.
12	MINT		4 detainees taken.
14	MINT		2 fishermen interrogated.
15	MINT		3 detainees taken.
17	MINT		11 fishermen interrogated.
18	CADO		None.
19	MINT		2 detainees taken, 2 returned.
21	MINT		4 detainees returned, 2 fishermen interrogated.
23	MINT		1 detainee taken, 4 returned.
27	MINT		6 detainees taken, 4 returned; 1 craft destroyed; 4 weapons captured. Enemy KIA 2, WIA 1; 26 fishermen interrogated.
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
30	CADO		None.
31	MINT		3 detainees taken.

July Recap:

Missions	18
Detainees captured	29
Detainees returned	17
Craft destroyed	[illegible]
Fishermen interrogated	84

h. August.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
02	MINT		2 detainees returned: 9 fishermen interrogated.
04	MINT		None.
06	MINT		4 detainees taken.
07	MINT		11 detainees taken, 7 returned; 5 craft destroyed. 2 VN KIA, 6 VN WIA, 26 Enemy KIA. 14 weapons captured.
09	MINT		None.
11	MINT		2 detainees taken.
12	MINT		None.
13	MINT		None.
15	MINT		2 detainees taken, 3 returned; 1 craft destroyed.
16	MINT		None.
17	MINT		4 metal hulled craft destroyed: 4 VN KIA, 3 VN WIA. Est 40 Enemy KIA. 4 weapons captured.
18	MINT		1 craft destroyed.
19	MINT		4 detainees returned.
20	MINT		None.
21	MINT		2 detainees taken, 2 craft destroyed.
22	CADO		None.
24	MINT		None.
25	MINT		2 detainees returned.
26	MINT		1 detainee taken, 2 craft destroyed.
27	MINT		2 detainees returned.
27	MINT		None.
28	MINT		None.
29	MINT		2 detainees taken, 1 craft destroyed.
30	MINT		6 detainees taken, 2 returned: 7 fishermen interrogated.
31	MINT		None.

August Recap:

Missions	25
Detainees captured	30
Detainees returned	22
Craft destroyed	17
Fishermen interrogated	16

i. September.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
01	MINT		None.
02	MINT		None.
03	MINT		2 detainees returned.
08	MINT		1 detainee taken; 2 craft destroyed.
09	MINT		1 detainee returned.
11	MINT		2 detainees returned.
12	MINT		None.
14	MINT		None.
15	MINT		4 detainees taken.
17	MINT		13 fishermen interrogated.
18	MINT		None.
19	MINT		6 detainees returned.
25	MINT		3 detainees taken, 10 returned; 1 craft destroyed.
26	MINT		1 detainee taken; 1 fisherman interrogated.

September Recap:

Missions	14
Detainees captured	9
Detainees returned	21
Craft destroyed	3
Fishermen interrogated	14

j. October.

02	MINT		None.
03	MINT		None.
04	MINT		4 detainees returned.
06	MINT		6 detainees taken; 1 craft damaged. Enemy air strike, no damage. 3 fishermen interrogated
07	MINT		1 craft destroyed.
08	MINT		None.
10	MINT		None.
21	MINT		9 detainees returned.
22	MINT		8 fishermen interrogated.
23	MINT		None.
24	MINT		None.
26	MINT		None.
27	MINT		3 fishermen interrogated.
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
29	MINT		16 fishermen interrogated.

October Recap:

Missions	15
Detainees captured	6
Detainees returned	13
Craft destroyed/damaged	2
Fishermen interrogated	43



TAB B

PLOWMAN

OPERATING AREAS

TAB C

NVN COASTAL DEFENSE FIRE
Accuracy Improvement



% of fire within 5 mils of mission craft

TAB D

DONG TAM DEPLOYMENT
MISSION SUMMARY 1968

Number of Successful Missions	Results
22	11 VC KIA/WIA
	17 VC prisoners captured
	5 firefights
	Numerous documents captured
	10 ambushes/area sweeps conducted, no enemy contact

TAB E

BIFROST MISSION
SUMMARY 1968

Number of Successful Missions	Results
25	6 VC KIA
	6 VC prisoners captured (WIA)
	2 firefights on landing
	Numerous documents captured
	11 ambushes/area sweeps conducted, no enemy contact

TAB F

DEWEY RIFLE MISSION
SUMMARY 1968

Number of Successful Missions	Results
22	8 VC KIA
	12 known VC Cadre captured
	13 persons with no ID captured
	Numerous documents captured
	700 lbs rice, 40 lbs fish, medical supplies captured
	10 ambushes/area sweeps conducted, no enemy contact

Section 2--AIR OPERATIONS

MIDRIFF

1. GENERAL.

MIDRIFF missions during 1968 were flown in support of the following FOOTBOY programs:

a. TIMBERWORK

MT

b. HUMIDOR

MT

c. PLOWMAN

MT

2. MISSION.

The Air Studies Section MIDRIFF mission is to support the other FOOTBOY programs by furnishing air delivery of personnel, supplies, equipment and leaflets to targets in NVN and certain areas of Laos and to provide an airborne platform for

3. ORGANIZATION.

Organization for support of MIDRIFF missions is as depicted for the Air Operations Studies Branch in TAB A, Appendix V to this Annex.

4. ACTIVITIES.

a. MIDRIFF missions required the use of many different type aircraft including the C-123, C-130, NC-121, A-1, F-4, CH-3, H-34, HH-53, O-1 and the O-2. These air assets were provided as required from 7th Air Force, Navy and VNAF units. A total of 706 MIDRIFF missions were scheduled during CY 68, with 427 completed.

b. The primary factor in mission completion, as in past years, was weather. During CY 68, 62% of all MIDRIFF cancellations were due to bad weather. When considering all MIDRIFF missions other than Project JENNY, 73% of the cancellations were due to bad weather.

c. There were no aircraft losses in conjunction with MIDRIFF operations during CY 68.

d. Specific MIDRIFF mission statistics are presented in TAB A through TAB F, broken down by aircraft mission, type and reason for cancellation.

TAB A

CHRONOLOGY OF MIDRIFF[illegible] MISSIONS

Date	Sponsor	Aircraft	Mission
5 Jan	VNAF	A-1G	
10 Jan	USAF	C-130	
15 Jan	USAF	C-130	
21 Jan	USAF	C-130	
24 Jan	USAF	C-130	
28 Jan	USAF	C-130	
10 Feb	USAF	C-130	
16 Feb	USAF	C-130	
6 Mar	VNAF	A-1G	
10 Mar	USAF	C-130	
16 Mar	USAF	C-130	
17 Mar	USAF	CH-3	
18 Mar	USAF	F-4D	
20 Mar	USAF	C-130	
23 Mar	USAF	CH-3	
24 Mar	USAF	F-4	
24 Mar	VNAF	A-1G	
28 Mar	USAF	C-130	
29 Mar	USAF	F-4D	
31 Mar	USAF	CH-3	
5 Apr	VNAF	A-1G	
6 Apr	VNAF	A-1G	
7 Apr	USAF	CH-3	
15 Apr	USAF	CH-3	
1 May	USAF	C-130	
5 May	VNAF	A-1G	
6 May	USAF	C-130	
7 May	GRC	C-123	
14 May	USAF	CH-3	
15 May	USAF	CH-3	
17 May	USAF	C-130	
19 May	USAF	C-130	
22 May	USAF	CH-3	
26 May	GRC	C-123	
29 May	USAF	CH-3	

Date	Sponsor	Aircraft	Mission
2 Jun	GRC	C-123	
6 Jun	USAF	CH-3	
7 Jun	VNAF	A-1G	
7 Jun	USAF	CH-3	
9 Jun	VNAF	A-1G	
10 Jun	USAF	C-130	
11 Jun	VNAF	A-1G	
13 Jun	VNAF	A-1G	
14 Jun	GRC	C-123	
15 Jun	USAF	C-130	
18 Jun	USAF	CH-3	
19 Jun	USAF	CH-3	
19 Jun	USAF	C-130	
20 Jun	USAF	CH-3	
22 Jun	GRC	C-123	
26 Jun	VNAF	A-1G	
27 Jun	USAF	CH-3	
29 Jun	USAF	CH-3	
30 Jun	USAF	CH-3	
2 Jul	USAF	C-130	
6 Jul	GRC	C-123	
6 Jul	USAF	CH-3	
7 Jul	USAF	CH-3	
9 Jul	USAF	C-130	
13 Jul	USAF	CH-3	
14 Jul	USAF	CH-3	
14 Jul	VNAF	A-1G	
15 Jul	USAF	CH-3	
21 Jul	USAF	CH-3	
23 Jul	USAF	CH-3	
28 Jul	USAF	CH-3	
29 Jul	USAF	CH-3	
29 Jul	VNAF	A-1G	
5 Aug	USAF	CH-3	
6 Aug	USAF	CH-3	
9 Aug	USAF	C-130	
10 Aug	USAF	CH-3	
10 Aug	GRC	C-123	
11 Aug	GRC	C-123	
14 Aug	USAF	CH-3	
16 Aug	USAF	CH-3	
16 Aug	USAF	C-130	
19 Aug	USAF	CH-3	
19 Aug	USAF	C-123	

Date	Sponsor	Aircraft	Mission
21 Aug	VNAF	A-1G	
21 Aug	USAF	CH-3	
24 Aug	GRC	C-123	
24 Aug	USAF	C-130	
27 Aug	USAF	C-130	
31 Aug	USAF	CH-3	
9 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
12 Sep	GRC	C-123	
14 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
15 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
22 Sep	USAF	C-130	
22 Sep	GRC	C-123	
23 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
24 Sep	GRC	C-123	
26 Sep	GRC	C-123	
26 Sep	USAF	C-130	
28 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
2 Oct	GRC	C-123	
2 Oct	USAF	C-130	
3 Oct	GRC	C-123	
4 Oct	USAF	CH-3	
5 Oct	GRC	C-123	
6 Oct	USAF	CH-3	
11 Oct	USAF	C-130	
15 Oct	GRC	C-123	
23 Oct	USAF	CH-3	
25 Oct	GRC	C-123	
28 Oct	USAF	CH-3	
26 Nov	USAF	C-123	

[illegible] B

[illegible] C-123

[illegible] Det, Nha Trang AB, RVN

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Canx Weather	Canx Maint	Neg TmCont	Other
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0	0	0	0
Feb	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0	0	0	0
Mar	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0	0	0	0
Apr	1	[illegible]	[illegible]	0	1	0	0	0
May	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Jun	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0
Jul	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Aug	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	0
Sep	4	1	5	3	3	0	0	2
Oct	4	3	8	3	4	1	0	1
Nov	1	1(FORAE)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dec	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTA[illegible]					8	1	0	3

TAB C

USAF C-130E

15th SOS, Nha Trang AB, RVN

Month	Resupply Sched	Resupply Comp	Psyops Sched	Psyops Comp	Canx Weather	Canx Maint	Neg TmCont	Other
Jan	8	1	6	4	5	3	1	0
Feb	4	0	3	2	4	0	0	1
Mar	3	1	5	3	4	0	0	0
Apr	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
May	0	0	6	5	1	0	0	0
Jun	1	1	4	2	2	0	0	0
Jul	0	0	3	2	1	0	0	0
Aug	1	1	3	3	0	0	0	0
Sep	0	0	7	2	5	0	0	0
Oct	2	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
(1 November bombing halt cancelled missions remainder of the year)								
TOTAL	21	5	38	24	23	4	2	1

TAB D

USAF CH-3

20th SOS, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand

Month	Infil/Exfil Scheduled	Infil/Exfil Completed	Canx Weather	Canx Maintenance	Other
Jan	0	0	0	0	0
Feb	0	0	0	0	0
Mar	5	3	2	0	0
Apr	10	3	5	2	0
May	27	5	17	0	5
Jun	17	9	3	0	5
Jul	13	9	2	1	1
Aug	24	12	7	0	5
Sep	11	5	5	0	1
Oct	24	5	19	0	0
(1 Nov Bombing Halt cancelled missions remainder of year)					
TOTAL	131	51	60	3	17

TAB E

VNAF A-1G

516th VNAF Sq, Da Nang AB, RVN

Month	Resupply Sched	Resupply Comp	Psyops Sched	Psyops Comp	VisRec Sched	VisRec Comp	Canx Weather	Canx Maint	Canx TmCont	Canx Other
Jan	12	0	0	0	2	1	6	1	4	2
Feb	4	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
Mar	3	1	4	1	1	1	4	1	0	0
Apr	6	0	4	2	0	0	5	0	3	0
May	3	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	1
Jun	3	1	7	4	2	1	1	2	2	1
Jul	0	0	3	0	2	2	2	1	0	0
Aug	1	0	2	0	1	1	2	0	0	1
(1 Nov Bombing Halt cancelled missions remainder of year)										
TOTAL	32	3	20	7	10	6	26	5	12	5

TAB F

USAF F-4

366th Tac Ftr Wg, Da Nang AB, RVN

Month	Resupply Sched	Resupply Comp	Psyops Sched	Psyops Comp	Canx Weather	Canx Maint	Neg Tm Cont	Other
Jan	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Feb	17	0	0	0	17	0	0	0
Mar	33	2	1	1	28	0	1	2
Apr	3	0	0	0	2	0	1	0
			(not used after April)					
TOTAL	56	2	1	1	47	0	5	2

TASKER NUMBER MACSOG TS000 1024-69

DUE DATE 12-24-92 Annex F. '68 CMD HISTORY

REDACT _____ DECLASSIFY ✓

DOCUMENTS REMOVED/BEING REVIEWED:

P.P. F-III-3-1 thru F-III-3-H-2

DOCUMENTS REMOVED

CIA

NOT DECLASSIFIED

Section 4--AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

TIMBERWORK

1. GENERAL.

The Airborne Operations Section, in conjunction with its Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) counterpart personnel, continued in 1968, to implement and expand the TIMBERWORK program. TIMBERWORK is the agent operations portion of the FOOTBOY program and has three distinct sub-programs: Agent Operations, Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition (STRATA) Operations, and Diversionary Operations (FORAE). Major significant changes in the TIMBERWORK program in 1968 were caused by the April restriction on air operations north of 20°N, by a security assessment in June which evaluated all the then in-place teams probably under NVN control, and by the 1 November halt of air activities north of 17°N.

2. MISSION.

MT

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. General. The Airborne Operations Section (OP-34) continued activities against NVN in 1968 organized into three basic branches. OP-34A continued to manage agent team operation, OP-34B continued to develop and MT (STRATA) concept, and OP-34C initiated and actively expanded diversionary operations. In November, operational control of STRATA assets was passed to OP-35 and, in December, OP-34 was redesignated as the Airborne Studies Group and continued agent team and diversionary operations under reduced TD authorization.

MT

c. STRATA Operations. In April 1967, JCS approved the infiltration of STRATA teams into selected areas of the panhandle of NVN with the mission of installation of seismis wiretap devices, roadwatch of critical LOCs, reconnaissance and pinpointing of selected enemy installations, and target acquisition for air strikes. Only two STRATA teams were infiltrated in 1967 and only one of these was recovered. The STRATA program was at a low ebb by the end of 1967 due to a number of factors; principally the weather in the operational area and lack of trained and motivated teams. In 1968, management of the STRATA program was the responsibility of OP-34B until the 1 November bombing halt suspended operations in NVN.

d. Diversionary Operations. Diversionary operations, designated by the CINCPAC code word FORAE, were conceived in late 1967, approved by Chief, MACSOG on 29 November 1967, and by COMUSMACV on 14 March 1968. The objectives are to divert main force NVN resources to defense and internal security, DATA

harass the enemy in his rear, and collect intelligence where possible. The last objective is accomplished by giving other agencies greater freedom of movement and, in a very limited degree, through the recovery of diversionary assets. FORAE is divided into three sub-programs; OODLES, URGENCY, and BORDEN. The development and conduct of diversionary operations in 1968 was the responsibility of OP-34C (redesignated in December as Special Section of the Airborne Studies Group).

e. Authorities: See TAB A.

4. AGENT TEAM OPERATIONS.

a. Agent Teams.

(1) In January 1968, there were eight in-place TIMBERWORK teams operational in NVN. Since that time two teams, DATA and DATA, have been surfaced by NVN and one team, DATA, stopped radio transmission and is now being carried as MIA.

(2) During March and April, 1968, US case officers assigned to agent teams were tasked with the writing of histories and preparing a security analysis of their respective teams. This resulted in one team, DATA being declared probably not under hostile control; five teams, DATA, DATA, DATA, DATA and DATA being declared under NVN control; and two teams, DATA and DATA, being declared as doubtful. As a result of the case officers' analysis controversy

problem, the decision was made by Chief, MACSOG to request a counter-intelligence survey team consisting of MACV J-2 and personnel.

The finding of this survey, completed in June, indicated that all teams were probably under NVN control, and subsequent operations with all teams were conducted accordingly.

(3) In November 1968, a decision was made to drop all in-place teams at the earliest feasible time. A study of past NVN case officer tactics revealed that once a team has been ordered to move for possible exfiltration, it is soon surfaced by NVN or ends radio contact, which terminates the operation after a period of 90 days. Current plans call for movement of all teams in order that they may be exfiltrated, or terminated by NVN.

(4) In January 1968, there were a total of 48 agents on the eight in-place teams. Since that time, 28 have been declared lost; 12 from team DATA, 2 from team DATA, 1 from team DATA, 7 from team DATA, 5 from team DATA, and 1 from team DATA.

(5) Seven aerial resupplies were made to in-place teams in 1968: 1 to team DATA, 1 to team DATA, 2 to team DATA, 1 to team ON, and 2 to team DATA. Bundles dropped to DATA in September and to 1 DATA in October were never recovered by the teams.

(6) Team Locations. See TAB B.

(7) Team Background and Recapitulation of 1968 Activities. See TAB C.

b. data COMUSMACV Msg 180520Z Aug 68 forwarded to CINCPAC MACSOG's concept of operations involving use of data agents in NVN to obtain information from population centers, where black team assets cannot operate. The agents selected under this concept would be documented as NVA soldiers to enable them to travel freely within the target area utilizing local transportation facilities. The initial operations were scheduled to be short-term with agents remaining on target from one to two weeks. Subsequent operations were to be lengthened as techniques and operational data were further developed. In 1968, two agents DATA and DATA were recruited from among leads spotted at the National Chieu Hoi Center at Gia Dinh. It was felt that those individuals who were former members of the NVA and who were captured or rallied recently offered the highest degree of survivability using bogus documentation in NVN. Selection criteria also included the degree of familiarity or area knowledge of leads as applied to possible target areas previously selected by MACSOG Intel Div. These target areas were in order of priority: VINH, THAI TRU, ANH SON, DONG HOI, THANH HOA, HA TINH and SAM SON. The two agents recruited were scheduled to be targeted against VINH and THANH HOA; however, due to the bombing halt of 1 November, permission for the launching of both agents was denied by JCS. The mission

and target area of agent DATA was therefore changed and on 1 December, the agent was launched into Cambodia (DB Target Area 350) in order to elicit specified EEI. This agent was declared MIA on 15 December. DATA is undergoing refresher intelligence training for a mission in either the DB or PF AO.

c. Recruiting.

(1) In-country recruiting during 1968 was limited to the two singleton agents and to recruitment of an eight-man strategic intelligence team (designated Team 915) originally recruited for a mission in the panhandle of NVN. Team 915 will complete training and begin operations in other authorized operational areas in January 1969.

___(2)

DATA

(3) By year's end, the Chieu Hoi Centers appeared to be the most likely source of potential agents, although counterpart spotting efforts continued throughout RVN.

5. STRATA OPERATIONS.

a. General. Due to a combination of variables such as NE Monsoon weather and fluctuating availability of personnel and aerial assets, no STRATA operation were conducted from the first of the year until mid-March. From 17 March until the bombing pause on 1 November, 24 STRATA teams were infiltrated into NVN. Twenty teams were successfully exfiltrated with all members, three teams exfiltrated minus missing members, and Team 120 has been missing in its entirety since 17 May. A total of 15 STRATA agents were declared missing in action during the year. There were twelve meeting engagements with enemy personnel (two in Target Area 7, four in Target Area 13, two in Target Area 11, and four in Target Area 2) resulting in an undetermined number of enemy casualties. Nine intelligence reports were forwarded to higher headquarters based upon information gathered by STRATA teams. In addition, survival data obtained on STRATA missions was included in appropriate after-action reports where it is available for use in Air Force evasion and escape planning.

b. STRATA Target Areas and Mission Locations. See TAB D.

c. STRATA Mission Data. See TAB E.

d. Recruiting. STRATA recruiting efforts in early and mid-1968 were sporadic and unrewarding, partially due to the Director of STD personally turning down the majority of the applicants as being too [illegible] predominantly deserters from CIDG forces. Toward the latter part of the year, a sustained effort was undertaken to recruit from the military. ARVN officers and NCOs began to enter training in larger numbers. STD remained responsible for spotting and recruiting throughout the year and quality of the STRATA recruit showed definite signs of improvement until the 1 November bombing halt. In addition to those agents recruited for STRATA training at Camp Long Thanh (CLT), a number of civilians with previous experience were enlisted and absorbed directly into operational teams at Da Nang.

6. DIVERSIONARY (FORAE OPERATIONS.

MT

MT

DATA

The PLOWMAN restrictions on capturing fishermen suspended all URGENCY operations in May, but the partial lifting of restrictions in July allowed a limited resumption until 1 November at which time restrictions imposed suspended the URGENCY(C) program. See map at TAB G.

c. Project BORDEN

MT

d. Recruiting.

(1) Project URGENCY

MT

(2) Project BORDEN

avoid compromise.

DATA

7. CAMP LONG THANH (CLT).

a. General. Through 1968, CLT continued to be the principal training site for basic STRATA, Airborne, and agent training. Detachment B-53, 5th Special Forces Group, augmented by MACSOG personnel, advised and assisted the STD cadre on all phases of training and camp management under staff supervision of Chief, OP-34. Upon reorganization of MACSOG in December, staff responsibility for training activities at CLT was transferred to the Operations and Training Directorate.

b. Monthly Student Status. See TAB I.

8. PROBLEM AREAS.

a.

DATA

b i.

DATA

c. Recruiting. As in previous years, the interrelated problems of recruiting and retention continued during 1968. Imposition of stricter selection criteria resulted in a considerable reduction of agents for operational use. It was not until the latter part of 1968

that STD recruiting efforts began to show improvement; and, at year's end, the outlook for 1969 was such that it appeared that foreseeable requirements would be satisfactorily fulfilled.

DATA

DATA

TAB A

TIMBERWORK AUTHORITIES, 1968

1. [illegible]

2. CINCPAC Msg 220438Z Jan 68: Reinforcement for RED DRAGON.

3. CINCPAC Msg 050244Z Mar 68: Team AXE.

4. CINCPAC Msg 132202Z Mar 68: TIMBERWORK missions between 17°N and 19°N.

5. CINCPAC Msg 041949Z Apr 68: FOOTBOY restrictions north of 20°N.

6. CINCPAC Msg 102038Z Apr 68: Restriction of Maritime Operations.

7. CINCPAC Msg 130210Z Apr 68: RED DRAGON and REMUS resupply.

8. CINCPAC Msg 160542Z Apr 68: Approval of STRATA Targets 10-12.

9. CINCPAC Msg 150210Z May 68: Cancellation of approved MIDRIFF missions for Team REMUS.

10. CINCPAC Msg 210120Z May 68: Review of In-place Teams.

11. CINCPAC Msg 220409Z May 68: Approval of STRATA Target 13.

12. CINCPAC Msg 222205Z May 68: Restrictions on Emergency Resupply.

13. CINCPAC Msg 030138Z Jul 68: Authority for Maritime Operations to 20°N.

14. CINCPAC Msg 232118Z Jul 68: Approval of STRATA Targets 14 and 15.

15. CINCPAC Msg 272207Z Jul 68: Suspension of emergency resupply approvals pending security analysis results.

16. CINCPAC Msg 180449Z Aug 68: Cancellation of CH-3 mission for HADLEY.

17. CINCPAC Msg 080032Z Sep 68: VINH Singleton Operations.

18. CINCPAC Msg 300535Z Sep 68: TOURBILLON resupply.

19. CINCPAC Msg 072356Z Oct 68: Suspension of Maritime Operations.

20. JCS Msg 0102192 Nov 68: Restrictions on FOOTBOYI Operations.

21. CINCPAC Msg 0222222 Nov 68: Gray Singleton Concept.


CHINA
CHINA
REMUS
EASY
TOURBILLON
EAGLE
ARES
HANOI
LAOS
HADLEY
ROMEO
VIENTIANE
THAILAND
LAOS
SOUTH
VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
GULF
OF
TONKIN
TAB B
LONG TERM AGENT TEAM
LOCATIONS
Teams Active in 1968
Teams Lost in 1968

TAB C

TEAM BACKGROUND AND RECAPITULATION OF ACTIVITIES

1. [redacted]

a. Background. A Vietnamese case officer encountered DATA DATA and assessed him as a capable man motivated by desire to revenge himself on the authorities of NVN. He was subsequently recruited as a singleton agent and infiltrated back into his home province to establish an intelligence collection net. His operational base is in the mountainous region directly north of Uong Bi, Quang Yen Province. To date, DATA has recruited 11 subsources and has provided information on NVN documentation, the Uong Bi power plant, highways, bridges, Haiphong Harbor and other miscellaneous items which he was able to observe or gain information on through debriefing of his subsources.

b. General. Continual analysis of DATA since 1966 indicates that he is under hostile control. Since last November, he has exhibited indications that the opposition is becoming impatient with the operation. DATA has hinted several times that he is having difficulty with radio communications and Central (MACSOG/STD control headquarters) was asked to find another means of communication. DATA was informed in Dec 67 that Central wanted to resupply him and he was instructed to find a suitable DZ. DATA, however, immediately began to expound on the difficulties of finding and using DZs in the area and again pleaded with Central to find a way to resupply him by other means. It would appear that DATA was attempting to get Central to expose additional assets. With this in mind, a diversionary operation was implemented in June 1968. The object of this operation, which is still in progress, will be to cause the security forces of Haiphong to expend their time and energies in useless pursuits and to implant the idea that Central has agents operating in the city of Haiphong. Upon conclusion of this deception plan, an exfiltration in international waters will be directed by Central.

2. DATA

a. Background. Team DATA was originally composed of six members, all natives of BAC GIANG Province, NVN. The team was infiltrated back into the province on 27 Jun 64, with the mission of conducting sabotage operations on NVN Route 1 and 4, MUC NAM QUAN rail line, and the MAI PHA air base. The team has recruited two subsources to date, who were the primary sources of information provided in 1968. The information received, however, has been of little or no value. In recent months, the team has been primarily tasked with roadwatch

assignments. DATA s mission in 1967 and 1968 was essentially changed to collection of intelligence information, although it was tasked with a sabotage mission in Mar 68. The mission was not completed. The team now consists of three members of the six originally infiltrated.

b. General. Continual analysis of DATA since 1967 indicates that the team is under hostile control. Therefore, in 1968, plans were developed to move the team south from its safe area for possible exfiltration. DATA was notified to move south, but was not informed of the reason for it. After a brief period of delaying, the team finally reported starting its movement in November. It is believed that the team will break radio contact, thereby terminating the operation, once the DATA NVN case officer becomes aware that an exfiltration is planned for the team.

3. DATA.

a. Background. Team DATA was the surviving 12 members of a total of 35 members infiltrated into SON LA Province, NVN, between 10 Aug 62 and 10 Oct 65. The team's original mission was to contact selected MEO and THAI settlements to establish safe areas for other teams operating in the area; determine resistance potential among the Montagnards; selectively arm tribesmen for harassing attacks on NVA, LOCs and road traffic; and recruitment of influential Montagnard leaders for exfiltration and training. By 1967-1968, the mission had been reduced to intelligence collection by observation and exploitation of a locally recruited net of subsources.

b. General. Analysis of Team DATA's files prior to Jun 68 indicated the team was probably not under hostile control. The team was reinforced four times with a total of 23 men. As of Jan 68 five of the original eight members and seven of the 23 reinforcement members survived. DATA came under suspicion in Mar 68, and in Jul 68 was determined by a DATA security review to be possibly under hostile control. After being alerted that one seriously ill member and three other members were to be exfiltrated the team went off the air and was last heard 26 Apr 68. Subsequently, on 7 Aug 68, a NVN newspaper reported that in late April (year not stated), a 12-man team of SVN rangers had been captured in SON LA Province and the team leader was identified as the DATA team leader.

4. DATA

a. Background. NVN Route 8 is an improved motorable road connecting Route 15 to Laos Routes 81, 12, and 121. These routes are considered major troop and supply infiltration routes to the South. In addition, the NGAN PHO River, running west to east in the same area

is a principal water supply route. A black team installed in this area could provide valuable information on flow of infiltration traffic. Team DATA 's mission was to conduct roadwatches, emplace a roadwatch device, identify potential airstike targets, and, on order, to conduct harassment and sabotage operations.

b. General. Te data was infiltrated on 25 Jan 67 by helicopter in Laos for overland movement into NVN. The team was placed on the wrong LZ due to pilot error and its initial radio contact, made on 17 Feb 67, reported that it had been compromised upon landing and was still trying to evade the enemy. It is believed that all communications equipment, DATA were destroyed or lost during this period. Communications with the team throughout 1968 were generally good, with almost immediate responses to messages. Originally an 11-man team, DATA is now composed of 7 members. Two members died in 1967 and another two in 1968. Current view on the security survey completed in Jun 67 concluded the team had been captured soon after infiltration. DATA was therefore used primarily in a diversionary capacity in 1968.

5. DATA.

a. Background. The RED RIVER Valley from the NVN/China border town of LAO KAY to Hanoi is a major line of communication with many rail, road, and water transshipment points from above 21°N. A black team located in LAO KAY and YEN BAI Provinces would be in an excellent position to conduct sabotage and intelligence missions. Planning for such an operation began in early 1966 and the concept was approved by CINCPAC in May 67.

b. General. Team

DATA

largely unproductive. Although it was conceded the team was not useful, nor could it be used in support of any diversionary operation, contact was maintained throughout 1968 because of the VN counterparts' belief the team was secure.

6. NAME

a. Background. Team NAME was a 6-man team infiltrated by parachute on 16 Apr 62 near DIEN BIEN PHU. Its mission upon infiltration and up to 1968 was to establish a base area from which intelligence collection activities could be launched; collect enemy military, political and economic information; locate resupply DZs and safe areas for possible infiltration of additional agents; collect available documents; and recruit subsources and support personnel.

b. General. Continued analysis of team NAME s files up to mid-1967 indicated the team was probably not under hostile control. NAME was reinforced 5 times since its infiltration in 1962. Beginning in Dec 67, message traffic from the team indicated it was beginning to encounter problems beyond its control, thereby revealing it was possibly under hostile control. This was confirmed by subsequent messages received and in Apr 68, when interrogation of a recently captured NVA prisoner of war revealed he had knowledge of capture of a SVN "ranger" team in the NAME area of operation in Jun 62. On 13 May 68, the NVN government confirmed this by announcing capture of a SVN "ranger" team in Apr (year not stated). All facts presented left no doubt this was team REMUS.

7. NAME.

a. Background. Team NAME, originally composed of 10 ethnic NVN was infiltrated back into an area immediately north of the DMZ in 1965. Its mission was to conduct area reconnaissance for collection of intelligence information; perform roadwatch mission; and conduct harassing and sabotage activities on order. Primary target in the team's area was NVN Route 103, which was believed to be a major route for infiltration of men and supplies to the south. In Oct 66, the ROMEO radio operator sent the words, NAME NT ,
. Since that time, mission accomplishment has been regarded as insignificant. The team had not furnished any reportable information during 1967 and 1968.

b. General. In 1968 the team's activity was generally limited to location of DZs and searching for survival food. NAME had been plagued with communications problems since its infiltration and the trouble persisted in 1968. NT

Contact with was

finally lost 5 Aug 68 while the team was reportedly on a reconnaissance mission. It is believed the decision to terminate the team was influenced by two events: a diversionary caching operation which was successfully completed [illegible] followed by a reconnaissance mission into a closely [illegible] no intelligence information could be gathered. Team NAME was composed of four remaining members when it was declared MIA on 4 Nov 68.

8. NAME

NT

r


TAB D
STRATA TARGET
AREAS and MISSIONS
7 Target Areas
12 Missions (numbers correspond to missions shown on TAB E)
NGHE AN
HON ME
XG
XF
MUI RON
Phu Dien Chau
Phuc Loi
Vu Lien
Ben Thuy
Loc Chau
Kim Cuong
Linh Cam
Ha Tinh
Huong Khe
Cam Xuyen
Keng Deng
Nam Theun
Ban Hin Khane
Pak Hin Boun
Nhommarath
Ban Phou Kheng
Khammouane
Thakhek
Mahaxay
Ban Sa Ang
Ban Kayak
Dai Hao
Ba Don
Quang Khe
Dong Hoi
Ban Wart
Sepone (Tchepone)
Ban Dong
Bo Ho Su
Gio Linh
Vinh Linh
KHAMMOUANE
PLATEAU BOLIKAMMON
CHAINE
QUANG BINH
QUANG TRI
VINH SPECIAL

TAB E

STRATA MISSION DATA

Seq No.	Team	Tgt Area	Dates	Mission	Remarks
1	111 (8 VN)	7	17-23 Mar	Roadwatch	Enemy contact 18 Mar
2	113 (8 VN)	7	31 Mar-7 Apr	Recon/Roadwatch	N/A
3	114 (8 VN)	7	7-15 Apr	Roadwatch	Enemy contact 9 Apr
4	120 (6 VN)	7	14-17 May	Riverwatch	Contact lost 17 May; Tm declared MIA.
5	111 (7 VN)	7	14-29 May	Roadwatch	N/A
6	122 (4 VN)	2	15-22 May	Roadwatch	N/A
7	113 (8 VN)	2	22 May-7 Jun	Roadwatch	N/A
8	114 (7 VN)	13	6-17 Jun	Roadwatch	3 MIA on 12 Jun
9	115 (7 Camb.)	11	20-29 Jun	Recon	Enemy contact 27 Jun
10	111 (7 VN)	13	20-30 Jun	Recon/Roadwatch	1 self-inflicted wound; extracted
11	117 (6 Camb.)	7	27 Jun-6 Jul	Roadwatch	N/A
12	118 (7 VN)	2	7-14 Jul	Roadwatch	Enemy contact 10 Jul
13	94 (8 VN)	13	13-28 Jul	Recon/Roadwatch	Enemy contact 17 & 21 Jul
14	93 (8 VN)	4	15-23 Jul	Roadwatch	N/A
15	115 (7 Camb.)	11	21 Jul-14 Aug	Recon	Enemy contact 7 Aug; 4 MIA
16	119 (6 VN)	13	29 Jul-14 Aug	Roadwatch	2 MIA
17	116 (7 Camb.)	13	5-16 Aug	PW	N/A
18	118 (6 Camb.)	2	6-21 Aug	Roadwatch	Enemy contact 16 & 18 Aug

Seq No	Team	Rgt Area	Dates	Mission	Remarks
19	94 (7 VN)	13	14-19 Aug	Reconnaissance	Enemy contact 14 Aug
20	93 (7 VN)	4	31 Aug-14 Sep	Reconnaissance	N/A
21	110 (8 Camb.)	13	9-23 Sep	[illegible]	N/A
22	92 (8 VN)	11	10-28 Sep	Reconnaissance	N/A
23	94 (6 VN)	2	4-23 Oct	Reconnaissance	Enemy contact 17 Oct
24	118 (7 Camb.)	7	5-23 Oct	Reconnaissance	N/A

TASKER NUMBER MAC SOG TS000 1024-69

DUE DATE 12-24-92 Annex F CMD History '68

REDACT _____ DECLASSIFY ✓

DOCUMENTS REMOVED/BEING REVIEWED:

pp. F III-4-F-1 thru F III-4-H-1

DOCUMENTS REMOVED

STATE

NOT DECLASSIFIED

TAB I

CAMP LONG THANH MONTHLY STUDENT STRENGTH

MONTH	STUDENT STRENGTH
JAN	72
FEB	91
MAR	116
APR	85
MAY	80
JUN	84
JUL	16
AUG	35
SEP	59
OCT	55
NOV	48
DEC	48

APPENDIX IV

CROSS-BORDER GROUND OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL.

a. Cross-border ground operations into Laos (PRAIRIE FIRE) and Cambodia (DANIEL BOONE) continued under the cognizance of the Commander, Ground Studies Group. 1968 was marked by expansion in scope and in tempo of operations, introduction of new concepts and elimination of some restrictions which had previously impeded a full utilization of assets.

b. Results of PRAIRIE FIRE and DANIEL BOONE operations increased in proportion to the expansion. A summary of operations for each program is set forth at TABs A and B.

2. MISSION.

a. General. The PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) and DANIEL BOONE (DB) programs have the general mission of conducting covert cross-border operations into VC/NVA-controlled areas of Laos and Cambodia. Political considerations have dictated that each program be conducted under separate operating rules. The specific concept, operating rules, and restrictions for each program are outline in subsequent paragraphs.

b. PRAIRIE FIRE. The PF program provides for cross-border reconnaissance operations into the panhandle of Laos using combined US/VN forces to locate, interdict and destroy enemy personnel and equipment on infiltration routes into RVN. PF Reconnaissance Teams (RT) are infiltrated by helicopter and reconnoiter to locate targets. Detected targets are exploited by ground forces, artillery, TAC Air and ARC LIGHT. PF forces are authorized to operate within areas depicted at TAB C and support NICKLE STEEL, IGLOO WHITE, and COMMANDO HUNT as well as the basic PF program.

c. DANIEL BOONE. The DB program provides for reconnaissance operations into Cambodia using combined US/VN forces to collect intelligence and to verify suspected enemy locations, infiltration routes and logistic bases. RTs are infiltrated by helicopter and by foot. DB forces are authorized to operate within the area depicted at TAB D.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. PRAIRIE FIRE.

(1) The basic RT consists of 12 personnel, three US and nine VN. Sixty-four (64) RTs are authorized in the PF program.

(2) PF Exploitation Forces consist of two battalions of four rifle companies each, and an additional four independent rifle companies. The basic exploitation element is the rifle platoon of the rifle company. Thirty-six (36) rifle platoons composed of four US and forty-one (41) VN, are presently authorized in the PF program.

(3) During CY 68, PF operations were conducted from Foward Operational Bases (FOB) located at Phu Bai (FOB-1), Kontum (FOB-2), Khe Sanh (FOB-3)*, Da Nang (FOB-4), and to a very limited degree from the MACSOG Support Facility (SUPPFAC) located in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. RT operations were also launched from various transient launch sites on an "as required" basis. Overall field operational control of PF operations was exercised through a Command and Control Detachment (CCN) located in Da Nang. CCN, FOB and launch site locations are shown at TAB C. PF organization and strength statistics are shown at TAB E.

b. DANIEL BOONE.

(1) The basic RT has the same organization as those used in the PF program. However, because of the pure reconnaissance nature of the DB mission, operations are frequently conducted using a split team composed of two US and four VN. Twenty-four (24) RTs are authorized in the DB program.

(2) Although not presently authorized to conduct exploitation operations in Cambodia, the DB program maintains four Reaction Companies, each having three Reaction Platoons. During CY 68, these forces were used to exploit in-country targets and to secure forward launch sites.

(3) During CY 68, DB operations were conducted from FOBs located at Ho Ngoc Tau (FOB-6) and Ban Me Thuot (FOB-5). As required. RT operations were launched from transient launch sites. Operations into the Cambodian portion of the tri-border area were also conducted from the PF FOB at Kontum. Field operational control of DB operations was exercised through Command and Control Detachment (CCS) located at Ban Me Thuot. CCS, FOB and launch site locations are shown at TAB D. DB organization and strength data are shown at TAB F.

c. Air Support:

(1) Cross-border operations require a high level of air support. The majority of operations, both RT and exploitation, are helicopter

* Evacuated 21 July 1968.

infiltrated and extracted. TAC air support is sceduled for all insertions and is the principal fire support weapon for exploitation of targets of opportunity. Light fixed wing aircraft are used to provide FAC, visual reconnaissance, and radio relay coverage for committed forces.

(2) A normal RT operation is supported by the following fragged air package:

(a) Three troopcarrier helicopters.

(b) Two or four helicopter gunships.

(c) Two A-1E close air support aircraft (PF only).

(d) One U-2 FAC aircraft.

(3) TAC air support in the PF AO, for exploitation of targets of opportunity is provided, as required, through standard FAC channels.

(4) MACSOG has no organic helicopter or TAC air assets; however, the following units are "dedicated" to support MACSOG cross-border efforts;

(a) VNAF 219th Helo Squadron.

1. Authorized: 25 CH-34s.

2. Average daily availability: 12.

(b) 20th Helo Squadron.

1. Authorized for MACSOG: 15 UH-1Fs.

2. Average daily availability for MACSOG: 8.

(5) Total average helicopter utilization for CY 68 was 47 per day, the majority of which were provided from Field Force assets. Of the daily average, 14 were used to support DB and 33 in support of PF operations.

(6) Overall average on-call TAC air utilization was .78 sorties per operation. PF operations used an average of 1.28 sorties per mission and DB an average of .41 sorties per mission.

4. CAPABILITIES.

a. RTs are capable of conducting the following type missions:

(1) Area and point reconnaissance.

(2) Road- and river- watch.

(3) Route mining and ambush.

(4) POW capture.

(5) Bomb damage assessment (BDA).

(6) Ground photography.

(7) Communications wiretap.

(8) Hand emplacement of electronic sensor devices.

(9) Direction of artillery, TAC air and gunship strikes on detected targets.

(10) Limited direct ground combat (normally employed only in self-defense).

b. Exploitation or reaction forces are capable of rapid engagement of RT-developed targets by direct ground combat. The exploitation force organization permits commitment of tailored elements ranging from platoon to company size to perform the following:

(1) Reconnaissance-in-force.

(2) Route interdiction.

(3) Ambush and raid.

(4) Establish and secure temporary patrol bases to support wide area RT operations.

(5) Short-term area denial.

(6) Cache destruction.

c. Programmed mission duration for RT operations is normally five days, but may be extended if the situation permits resupply of the team. The ideal level of operations is generally accepted to be 1.5 missions per team per month. Assuming all authorized RTs to be operational, the cross-border program should be capable of launching 132 RT missions per month (96 PF; 36 DB).

Section 1--LIAISON

Strategic Technical Directorate

1. (U) GENERAL.

The Studies and Observations Group Liaison Officer to the Strategic Technical Directorate maintains close and continuous liaison between the Chief, the staff of MACSOG and the Commanding Officer and staff of STD.

2. MISSION.

Part III, Statement of Functions, of the Joint Table of Distribution prescribes the duties of the Liaison Officer:

"6. Liaison Officer, STD.

"a. Acts as liaison between the Chief, MACSOG and Director, STD to provide overall coordination of the advisory, administrative and operational effort.

"b. Assists the Deputy in fulfilling his responsibilities."

3. (U) ORGANIZATION.

The JTD for MACSOG dated 30 October 1967 authorizes one (1) Liaison Officer in the Command Section.

4. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS.

a. The Liaison Officer attends the MACSOG Staff Meeting at 0800 hours each day to keep abreast of on-going activities. Staff sections having matters to be brought to the attention of Director, STD or his staff normally contact the liaison officer at the conclusion of the staff meeting. The liaison officer maintains an office at both MACSOG Headquarters and at STD Headquarters. Approximately half the liaison officer's time is spent with each organization.

b. Chief, MACSOG and his deputy are kept informed of STD activities through verbal briefings on routine matters and by memoranda to the Chief on all significant matters.

DATA

DMZ. As a result, these forces can provide vital intelligence of VC/NVA intentions; can harass and interdict the enemy on his LOCs, in his way stations, and in his base areas; can deny the enemy vital supplies and spoil his operational preparations; can force the diversion of large numbers of the enemy's forces from a primary offensive role to provide rear area security.

e. Limitations and Restrictions.

(1) Because of the inherent political sensitivity, JCS has imposed certain operational and procedural limitations upon conduct of cross-border operations. In this respect, operations into designated PF AO (TAB C) are relatively unrestricted.

DATA

. On the other hand, population density and political sensitivity dictate that DB operations into Cambodia be closely controlled. Stringent limitations were in effect for the DB program at the start of CY 68. However, as the year progressed it became clear that the enemy was making increasing use of Cambodian border area sanctuaries, staging areas and logistic bases to support operations into SVN. In response to this situation a number of operational restrictions were relaxed so as to permit an upgraded surveillance effort. Present DB operational authorities are outlined at TAB G.

(2) Geographic restrictions affect both the PF and DB programs. In the northern two-thirds of the PF Zone the spine of the Annamite Cordillera dominates the RVN/Lao border. During the northeast monsoon (Oct-Apr) precipitation, cloud build-up, and air turbulence above the eastern slopes of the Annamites severely restrict helicopter operations into the PF AO from RVN. In the southern portion of the DB AO large expanses of generally flat and relatively open terrain make it extremely difficult to operate undetected. These same areas become inundated during the southeast monsoon and are virtually impassable to foot troops operating off established trails and roads.

5. ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL RESULTS--1968.

a. PRAIRIE FIRE.

(1) Operational Summary. During CY 68, PF elements mounted 546 operations, of which 310 (57%) were cross-border missions and 236 (43%) were in-country missions, in support of the Field Forces. These operations resulted in 19 prisoners captured; 328 enemy KIA (body

count); an estimated 1591 enemy killed by air and artillery; 62 enemy vehicles destroyed or damaged; and 187 caches, structures and storage areas destroyed. In addition, PF teams contributed a major portion of the hard intelligence on VC/NVA use of Laos as an infiltration/staging area. During the first nine months of CY 68, the tactical situation imposed by the enemy's Winter-Spring Offensive influenced the scope and direction of PF operations. The seige and subsequent close-out of Khe Sanh Combat Base precluded operations into the northern fifth of the PF AO from January through mid-June and tied up approximately 600 personnel (US and VN) in a static defense role. During this same period, and on through September, a portion of the PF effort was diverted to in-country operations in support of the Field Forces. From February through September, approximately 59% of all operations were conducted in-country. In October, COMUSMACV directed MACSOG again emphasize cross-border operations and, during the last three months of the year, 77% of the PF efforts were directed out-of-country. Loss of the Kham Duc launch site on 12 May 1968 further degraded MACSOG's capability to provide coverage of the total PF AO. The Kham Duc site had provided coverage for the south central portion of the PF AO; an area encompassing approximately one-third of the total AO, containing vital target areas such as BA 614 and routes 966-165. Because of helicopter range limitations this area received only sporadic coverage throughout the remainder of CY 68. Overall cross-border operations during CY 68 were largely concentrated in the tri-border area (BA 609-613 and Routes 96-110B). Roughly 60% of PF cross-border operations were launched into this area. In comparison with 1967 operations, the overall effort doubled during CY 68 (546 operations in CY 68 versus 275 operations in CY 67). Total cross-border operations increased during CY 68 (310 for CY 68, 266 for CY 67). However, it should be noted that the degree of effort directed out-of-country shows a decrease when considered in terms of total operations and assets available. During CY 67 approximately 97% of the total effort was conducted out-of-country as contrasted to 57% for CY 68. During CY 68, operations were more costly in terms of US casualties, a rate of .44 per mission as opposed to .39 for CY 67. On the other hand, Vietnamese casualties ran at a lower rate during CY 68 (.69 per mission) than in CY 67 (1.04). Of the total 624 US/VN casualties taken during the year, 389 (62%) were attributable to cross-border operations. In all categories except "secondary explosions" and "structures destroyed/damaged", operational results rose over those for CY 67. With respect to the "secondary explosions" category, it should be noted that only one SLAM (reconnaissance-in-force) type operation was conducted during 1968 as opposed to six conducted in 1967. SLAM VII, targeted against BA 613, was initiated in November and continued on into early December. Thirteen RTs, four independent platoons, and four companies were concentrated against the target area, a suspected VC/NVA Base Area--Logistic Complex. There were 112 TAC air and 42 helicopter gunship strikes employed to exploit targets detected and fixed by ground elements.

This operation produced in excess of 370 secondary explosions and 64 sustained secondary fires. Thus, one sustained reconnaissance-in-force operation produced approximately one-half the CY 68 results in terms of combined ground team--air strike exploitation. In mid-December, a new concept was activated with operations being mounted into the northern quarter of the PF AO from a launch site located at . Four such operations were conducted during CY 68 and proved the feasibility of conducting long-range launches as a means to achieve added operational flexibility. During CY 68, the only major material losses attributable to cross-border operations consisted of helicopters downed and destroyed in Laos. Seventeen helicopters were lost while supporting out-of-country operations. Eight helicopters were lost in SVN.

(2) Operational Trends. Throughout the year there was a noticeable increase in enemy security elements protecting LOCs in the PF AO. PF teams encountered increasing resistance throughout the AO. Percentage of regular NVA elements encountered, as opposed to VC units has risen steadily. As the year progressed, antiaircraft weapons were sighted in increasing concentration and further south than previously. The bombing halt in NVN released large numbers of personnel to expand and secure LOC, base and staging areas in the PF AO. In response to this trend, PF operations shifted from a general technique of "scatter-gun" coverage of AO to systematic concentration of assets against selected target areas.

6. DANIEL BOONE.

a. Operational Summary. During CY 68, DB elements conducted 726 operations, of which 287 (39%) were cross-border missions and 439 (61%) were in-country missions in support of Field Forces. These operations resulted in nine prisoners captured; 586 enemy KIA (body count); an estimated 499 enemy killed by air and artillery; and produced the major hard intelligence on enemy use of Cambodia as an infiltration/staging area. As with PF, the enemy's Winter-Spring Offensive influenced scope and direction of DB efforts during the first nine months of CY 68. However, unlike PF, this period reflects an almost exclusive use of DB in an in-country role. From February through September 81% of the DB effort was directed to in-country reconnaissance, screening, and spoiling operations. Cross-border operations dropped to only five in May. DB returned to a primary cross-border role in October and 53 operations were conducted in Cambodia. During the last three months of the year, cross-border missions constituted 92% of the DB effort and averaged 46 operations per month. The majority of CY 68 cross-border operations were concentrated in DB Area 3 (TAB D). There were 134 missions (46% of the effort) into BA 702 and the southern portion of BA 609 was targeted with 88 missions (30%).

Area 2 received 18% of the effort with 53 missions conducted against BA 701-Route 19. Eleven missions were conducted in Area 4 and one in Area 5 (Parrot's Beak) to verify a suspected NVA build-up. Enemy activity during the Winter-Spring Offensive did not affect the DB program to the same degree as it did PF. Launch sites such as Duc Co, Duc Lap, and Dak To were occassionally rendered unsafe for helicopter operations, but this degradation was temporary and did not materially hamper overall operations. Because DB operations commenced in June of 1967, it is difficult to make meaningful comparisons on an annual basis. Total cross-border operations during CY 68 (287) ran two and one-half times higher than the previous year (110) and in-country operations were increased sixfold (439 CY 68 versus 71 CY 67). Cross-border operations during CY 68 (30%) dropped considerably in comparison with CY 67 (61%). Casualties rose during CY 68 for both US and VN personnel, principally due to in-country operations. During CY 68 the per-mission casualty rate for US personnel was .07% as contrasted to a rate of .04% for CY 67. The CY 68 VN rate was .39% versus a .03% CY 67 rate. Of 342 casualties incurred during the year, 281 were attributable to in-country operations. More casualties were taken by exploitation forces than by RTs. Major material losses from cross-border operations were two helicopters and one FAC aircraft. Four helicopters were downed in SVN while supporting in-country Field Force operations. The ability of DB RTs to penetrate Cambodia increased during CY 68. Successful penetrations were achieved by 80% of teams launched, as compared to 65% in CY 67. The majority of results stemming from combat actions are attributable to in-country actions, since offensive action is prohibited in Cambodia except for self-defense. Effectiveness of the cross-border effort can be measured in terms of intelligence produced. Intelligence provided by DB operations has verified VC/NVA use of Cambodian sanctuaries and contributed significantly to the development of "VESUVIUS" packages prepared for presentation to the Cambodian Government in CY 68. A summary of hard intelligence obtained during CY 68 is shown at TAB H.

b. Operational Trends. Enemy presence in Cambodia increased sharply during the year. Initial evidence of upgraded use of Cambodian sanctuaries was noted in the areas just south of the tri-border area. As the year progressed, significant sightings were made in areas further south. Increased activity was noted in the Nam Lyr Mountain, the "Fish Hook", and "Parrot's Beak" areas. Large enemy elements were observed with increasing frequency, as were well-constructed bivouac sites and logistic bases. It became increasingly clear that use of Cambodian bases was an indispensable element of the enemy's capability to sustain a viable level of operations in SVN. Preceding and following the bombing halt in NVN, major NVA units withdrew into Cambodia and were preparing bases from which they could react to future developments In response to this trend, a number of DB

operational restrictions were relaxed or eliminated to permit a more expansive monitoring of enemy activity in Cambodia. Authority was granted for use of helicopters for all authorized infiltrations and exfiltrations. Zone ALPHA was expanded to a depth of 30 KM and restrictions on the number of operations that could be conducted within the zone were lifted. A new area of operations, Zone CHARLIE, was opened to provide more effective coverage of the sensitive "Fish Hook" area, and certain critical targets in Zone BRAVO were pre-cleared by JCS to permit rapid reaction to enemy activity in the "Parrot's Beak".

TAB A

SUMMARY OF PF OPERATIONS--CY 68

MISSIONS	PF	IN-COUNTRY
Reconnaissance Team	271	203
Platoon	56	17
Company	0	16
TOTAL	327	236
Helicopter Gunship Sorties	287	138
Tac Air Sorties	635	68
Mines Emplaced	191	5
Enemy KIA (Body Count)	219	109 *
Enemy KIA (Estimated) **	1353	238
Secondary Explosions	676	29
Caches Destroyed	12	3
Structures Destroyed/Damaged	114	58
Enemy Weapons Captured	19	79
Enemy Vehicles Destroyed/Damaged	50	12
Enemy Prisoners Captured	1	18 *
Intelligence Reports	410	0
US: KIA	18	21 *
WIA	101	78
MIA	18	6
TOTAL	137	105
VN: KIA	40	21 *
WIA	173	98
MIA	39	11
TOTAL	252	130
TOTAL CASUALTIES	389	235
Helicopter Losses	12	5

* Includes 38 Enemy KIA, 9 Enemy POWs, 15 US KIA, and 16 VN KIA in the attack against CCN in August 1968.

** Includes killed by air and artillery

TAB B

SUMMARY OF DB OPERATIONS--CY 68

MISSIONS	DB	IN-COUNTRY
RT	287(232 penetrations)	278
Platoon	0	140
Company	0	21
TOTAL	287	439
Helicopter Gunship Sorties	354	376
Tac Air Sorties	48(40 in RVN enr to tgt)	253
Mines Emplaced	0	0
Enemy KIA (Body Count)	212	374
Enemy KIA (Estimated)*	328	171
Secondary Explosions	22	41
Caches Destroyed	1	8
Structures Destroyed/Damaged	0	0
Enemy Weapons Captured	UNK	UNK
Enemy Vehicles Destroyed/Damaged	3	7
Enemy Prisoners Captured	3	6
Intelligence Reports	373	0
US: KIA	3	14
WIA	11	24
MIA	2	1
TOTAL	16	39
VN: KIA	8	64
WIA	32	178
MIA	5	0
TOTAL	45	242
TOTAL CASUALTIES	61	281
Helicopter Losses	3	4

* Includes Killed by Air and Artillery


NORTH VIETNAM
MAI LOCLS
DEMARCATION LINE
FOB3
PF BOUNDRY
CCN & FOB4
THUAN THIEN
QUANG NAM
AN HOA LS
THAILAND
QUANG TIN
QUANG NGAI
FRS LS
DAK TO LS
KONTUM
FOB2
BINH DINH
PLEIKU
PHU BON
PHU YEN
CAMBODIA
DAK LAC
KHANH HOA
QUANG DUC
TUYEN DUC
NINH THUAN
LAM DONG
PHUOC LONG
TAY NINH
PHNOM PENH
BINH THUAN
BINH TUY
LONG KHANH
SAIGON
KIEN GIANG
AN XUYEN
TAB C
PRAIRIE FIRE
OPERATIONAL AREAS



TAB D

DANIEL BOONE

OPERATIONAL AREAS

TAB E

CCN ORGANIZATION



Authorized Force

Bn- 2

Co- 12

Plt-36

RT-64

Authorized Strength

	US	VN
Off	102	
EM	465	
Total:	567	3052

TAB F

CCS ORGANIZATION



AUTHORIZED FORCE	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	US	VN
Co—5			
Plt-20	Off	22	
RT-24	EM	136	
	Total	158	1070

TAB G

DANIEL BOONE OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. OPERATIONAL AREA and ZONES (TAB D).

The operational area includes the entire Cambodian border with RVN. This area is divided into three zones as follows:

a. Zone ALPHA extends from the Tri-border area south to Route 13 at a uniform depth of 30 KMs.

Data

but [illegible] h. Helicopters will not conduct infiltrations within 10 KMs of Mondul Kiri or 1 KM of Routes 13, 131 or 141 without approval from Washington.

DATA

b. Zone BRAVO extends from Logo (WT 9775) to the Gulf of Siam at a uniform depth of 20 KMs. Authority to conduct operations in Zone BRAVO will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

c. Zone CHARLIE extends from Route 13 to Logo at a uniform depth of 20 KMs, excepting those areas within 5 KMs of Snoul (XW 5434) and Mimot (XU 2907). Helicopter infiltrations/extractions are authorized

DATA

2. RESTRICTIONS.

On 17 December 1968 a portion of the DANIEL BOONE restrictions were lifted; however, the following restrictions remain in effect:

a. RTs will only initiate contact for the purpose of taking prisoners when isolated groups of two or three VC/NVA soldiers are encountered. Teams will otherwise engage in combat only for self-preservation or avoidance of capture.

b. RTs will take all possible precautions to avoid contact with Cambodian civilian and military personnel.

c. Tactical air strikes and exploitation forces are not authorized in Cambodia. Gunships will engage the enemy only when necessary for self-defense or that of the team.

d. RTs will not exceed 12 personnel, none of whom will be area-ethnic members. There is no restriction on number of US personnel who may accompany each RT.

e. Immediate reinsertion may be effected upon emergency extraction of the RT. This authority expires 48 hours after the final emergency extraction.

f. Recon overflights are limited to two per DB mission in Zones ALPHA and CHARLIE. Overflights of Zone BRAVO must be approved on a case-by-case basis by Washington.

TAB H

DANIEL BOONE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION--CY 68

1. During CY 68, DB cross-border reconnaissance operations produced the following hard intelligence on VC/NVA use of Cambodia:

a.	Trails and Roads reported:	807
b.	Bivouac Sites located:	272
c.	Communications wires located:	27 (11 tapped)
d.	Separate caches located:	8
e.	Prisoners captured:	3
f.	VC/NVA sightings:	478

2. REMARKS: Bivouacs located were in many instances occupied and enemy sightings included units of up to battalion size. In addition to intelligence on the VC/NVA, DB forces provided valuable collateral information on FARK activities in the border areas.

APPENDIX V

AIR OPERATIONS STUDIES

1. GENERAL.

During CY 68 air operations fell into three distinct areas:

a. MIDRIFF : Air operations in NVN in support of other MACSOG programs: TIMBERWORK , HUMIDOR , and PLOWMAN .

b. PRAIRIE FIRE/DANIEL BOONE operations in Laos and Cambodia supported by helicopter assets from areas in both RVN and Thailand.

c. Logistic Support: Both combat support airlift to teams and movement of support items such as food and building material for MACSOG activities within Southeast Asia.

2. MISSION.

The primary mission of the Air Operations Studies Branch (OP-32) is to coordinate responsive air support for Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG) combat operations in Southeast Asia. A secondary mission is to coordinate airlift for logistic support of MACSOG activities. Personnel assigned to OP-32 provide air expertise to aid other MACSOG Branches in planning operations using air assets.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. The Air Operations Studies Branch is headed by a USAF Lieutenant Colonel, responsible to the Director, Operations and Training Studies Directorate, and is divided into three sections.

(1) Airlift Section: The Airlift Section is headed by an Air Force Major and is responsible for the daily scheduling of logistic airlift, and the coordination for combat missions carried out by C-130 and C-123 aircraft of the Air Operations Group under the MIDRIFF concept of operations.

(2) Helicopter Section: The Helicopter Section is headed by an Air Force Major and is responsible for the daily coordination of helicopter and fixed wing assets used to support PF/DB operations, and works closely with other MACV staff agencies to establish requirements and priorities for future operations.

(3) High Performance Section: The High Performance Section is headed by an Air Force Major and is responsible for coordination and direction of USAF F-4 aircraft used for agent resupply in NVN and to support Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) delivery of Fulton Skyhook Recovery Kits and Evasion and Escape Kits. The section is also responsible for planning and control of VNAF A-1 missions used for agent team resupply and psyops leaflet drops in NVN.

b. Many varied types of aircraft were used to support MACSOG programs. Aircraft and air crews representing US Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and the RVN Air Force are used to support MACSOG operations. Air Operations Group, Nha Trang AB, RVN provided four specially equipped C-130E aircraft and four EC-123K/B aircraft, for combat operations and logistic support. Helicopter assets were provided daily from various Air Force, Army and Marine Corps units, as requested monthly from MACV J3. VNAF H-34s were provided by the 219th Sq, Da Nang AB, RVN. They are dedicated to special operations conducted by MACSOG and used to support PF. Project JENNY missions were flown from Da Nang AB, RVN by a Navy NC-121.

4. MIDRIFF

MIDRIFF missions during CY 68 were flown in support of the FOOTBOY programs. MIDRIFF operations are covered in detail in Section 2, Appendix III to this Annex.

5. PRAIRIE FIRE/DANIEL BOONE.

a. During the first six months of 1968 MACSOG averaged 24.7 missions per month in the PF AO. Operations decreased due to weather during the 3d quarter, but increased in the 4th quarter so that the average number of missions increased to 27.9 missions per month for the last six months. This accelerated tempo of operations in the PF AO resulted in a 12.9% increase for the last six months of CY 68 over the first half of the year.

b. MACSOG operations in the DB AO averaged 17.9 missions per month for the first six months of CY 68. The last six months revealed an increase in operations to an average of 29 missions per month, representing a 62% increase over the first six months of the year. Fluctuations in the PF/DB operations followed the trends of helicopter availability and favorable weather.

c. Helicopter support for PF/DB inserts was provided by 30 troop carrier helicopters and 20 gunship helicopters at the beginning of CY 68. The Tet offensive brought about a shift of emphasis to in-country [illegible] PF/DB operations in Laos and [illegible] summer progressed, emphasis was returned to Laos and

Cambodia and by the end of CY 68, PF/DB operations were supported by 27 troopcarrier and 20 gunship helicopters. Even though the number and size of insert operations had increased, the number of troopcarriers accomplishing the inserts had decreased due to improved techniques and better utilization of assets.

d. Support supplied by the 219th VNAF Squadron (H-34) is given in TAB C. Support supplied by the 110th VNAF Squadron (U-17) is given in TAB D.

6. LOGISTIC SUPPORT AIRLIFT.

a. Airlift is scheduled by OP-32, and provided by the Air Operations Group, Nha Trang AB, RVN in response to requests submitted by other MACSOG Branches. Both general and classified cargo is moved, along with MACSOG assigned and employed personnel. Airlift is usually scheduled daily for movement the following day. A capability is maintained, however, for emergency requirements; and airlift is available on one to two hours' notice, 24 hours a day.

b. During CY 68, C-123 and C-130 aircraft of the Air Operations Group airlifted 8,888,447 pounds of cargo and 34,915 passengers utilizing 2,205 C-123 and 2,690 C-130 sorties. The first six months were fairly uniform, with a high month for the C-130s in March, when 1,098,154 lbs. were moved. In July MACSOG-LOG began to move non-priority cargo through 7AF Aerial Port facilities, and the total cargo moved by MACSOG aircraft fell off to 307,049 lbs. in November. The passenger load remained relatively constant throughout the year, with a high of 3,624 in March. TAB B shows airlift support provided during the year.

DATA

7. SIGNIFICANT FACTS.

a. During CY 68, Forward Air Guide (FAG) training was conducted for Reconnaissance Team (RT) and STRATA trainees. The training has been successful for the US RT leaders, but due to the language problem, STRATA team members were not effective with US aircraft. They have, however, effectively directed VNAF air strikes.

b. STRATA insert procedures originally developed in mid-67, were refined, and by May 68, the Helo/FAC/A-1 package was functioning efficiently.

c. On 1 November 1968, a cessation of bombing of NVN was initiated. This included all MIDRIFF missions, except the Data Radio Broadcasts conducted by Project JENNY. Training missions were continued by C-130/C-123 aircrews in order to maintain a high state of aircrew/aircraft readiness.

d. Equipment development programs are carried on by the Air Operations Studies Branch. The following projects are typical:

DATA

e. On 16 June 1968, a new agreement was signed between AF Advisory Group and Headquarters, VNAF, defining the responsibilities of specified VNAF aviation units supporting MACSOG activities.

f. On 1 September 1968, an agreement between MACSOG and 7AF was signed outlining procedures whereby TAC Air would be on-call for use during insertion of PF Teams. This agreement added flexibility to the PF program by allowing last minute timing options and permitting alternate targets.

g. On 16 December 1968, PF Teams were launched from Data to test the feasibility of using Data launch sites while PCN sites are unusable during the Northeast Monsoon.

h. The 219th VNAF Squadron, hampered throughout the year by a lack of aircraft, was increased from 18 to 25 helicopters authorized in October, and by mid-December had 23 helicopters possessed, providing for more responsive support in the PF Area.

SEADP-156, Small Package Pick-up System, sub- [illegible] received in August. The two proposals required

development of ultra-sophisticated equipment and were considered unsatisfactory. The requirements originally levied were revised and the SEAOR was returned to CONUS for further study.

j. In line with the overall emphasis on force reduction, three officer JTD spaces were removed from OP-32. This reduction was accomplished by not replacing personnel as they rotated to CONUS.

TAB A

AIR OPERATIONS STUDIES BRANCH ORGANIZATION



KEY OFFICERS – 1968

Position	Dates	Incumbent
Chief	Jan – Oct	LTC H. VanDyke
	Nov – Dec	LTC H. V. Hopkins Jr.
Airlift Section	Jan – Sep	Maj A. Maggart Jr.
	Oct – Dec	Maj H. C. Gornto
Helicopter Section	Jan – Dec	Maj G. A. McCallson
High Performance Section	Jan – May	Maj J. P. Noonan
	Jun – Dec	Maj K. L. Hansen

TAB B

C-123 and C-130 Sorties (LOG)

Month	CARGO (Lbs.) C-123	CARGO (Lbs.) C-130	PASSENGERS C-123	PASSENGERS C-130	SORTIES C-123	SORTIES C-130	HOURS C-123	HOURS C-130
Jan	218,145	863,701	580	2,118	220	244	240.6	303.6
Feb	105,375	962,890	804	1,729	125	241	174.2	307.9
Mar	181,589	1,098,154	1,082	2,542	258	165	233.7	358.8
Apr	101,240	744,530	897	2,676	128	216	182.6	268.7
May	84,900	872,036	1,084	1,816	221	252	291.4	307.0
Jun	84,640	657,873	999	1,596	187	210	298.9	266.7
Jul	66,905	542,383	1,807	1,076	190	239	293.8	273.9
Aug	60,100	520,282	1,453	1,692	190	255	265.1	317.9
Sep	65,652	432,790	596	1,999	140	228	217.4	292.9
Oct	57,625	390,900	678	1,861	175	229	252.6	289.5
Nov	53,329	253,720	944	1,505	181	191	229.1	260.7
Dec	124,286	347,402	1,034	2,347	190	220	213.3	244.2
Tl:	1,203,786	7,684,661	11,958	22,957	2,205	2,690	2,892.7	3,491.8
Grand Tls:	8,888,447		34,915		4,895		6,384.5	

TAB C

VNAF H-34

219th Squadron, Da Nang AB, RVN

Month	Hours Flown	Sorties	Pax Carried	Cargo Carried	A/C Possessed	Avg Available
May	738.0	1,020	---	---	---	8.5
Jun	838.9	---	---	---	---	---
Jul	1,079.0	1,651	3,954	142,000	22	12.3
Aug	1,111.0	1,709	3,126	90,800	22	10.6
Sep	1,090.0	1,638	2,139	70,000	23	10.8
Oct	1,389.0	1,709	2,352	102,000	22	10.9
Nov	1,554.0	2,186	3,251	98,000	21	11.0
Dec	1,387.0	2,138	4,183	82,200	24	12.7

Note: Information not available for first four months of the year.

TOTAL:	9,186.9	12,051	19,005	585,000	22	10.9
						(7-month avg.)

TAB D

VNAF U-17

110th Squadron, Da Nang AB, RVN

Month	Hours Flown	Sorties	Pax Carried	Cargo Carried
Jul	57.3	47	94	0
Aug	---	--	--	---
Sep	95.0	78	74	2,200
Oct	139.0	126	138	5,250
Nov	165.0	165	183	6,600
Dec	93.3	40	160	1,250

Note: Information not available for months not shown.

TOTAL:	549.6	456	649	15,300

APPENDIX VI

LIAISON

1. GENERAL.

Liaison between elements of MACSOG and conventional forces was accomplished throughout RVN as operational requirements dictated. This coordination of activities was accomplished by officers designated by Chief, MACSOG.

2. MISSION.

To coordinate the activities and support functions of elements of MACSOG and conventional forces throughout RVN.

3. ORGANIZATION.

Though liaison was accomplished throughout RVN, only three positions have been identified for permanent duty liaison. Functions of the assigned Liaison Officers are presented in two sections as indicated below:

Section 1: Liaison to Strategic Technical Directorate.

Section 2: Liaison to I and II Field Forces, Vietnam.

4. OPERATIONS.

a. Operations supported by or in coordination with elements of III MAF, in the I CTZ, in regard to PF assets have been coordinated by the CO or Ops Officer of CCN on a "by operation" basis. HQ III MAF and CCN are both in the Da Nang area.

b. BIFROST Operations have been coordinated by designated representatives of MAD with HQ, I CTZ, III MAF, and 1st Coastal Security Group and their sub-elements.

c. DEWEY RIFLE Operations were coordinated with HQ II CTZ, Task Force South, CTF 115, and the Province concerned by representatives of MAD.

d. The Ops Officer, MAD, and a Plans Officer of OP-31 accomplished liaison with the 9th Division, Riverine Force and CTF-116 (GAME WARDEN) in preparation for the DONG TAM Operations.

e. In-country operations were coordinated with the Corps Tactical Zone Commanders and their sub-elements having prime interest.

Section 2--LIAISON

I and II Field Forces, Vietnam

1. GENERAL.

a. Liaison Officers (LNO) are attached to I and II Field Forces, Vietnam from MACSOG. The LNO for I Field Forces is stationed with that element in Nha Trang, RVN. The II Field Forces LNO is based at Long Binh, RVN.

b. LNOs were ordered attached to the Field Forces on 13 February 1968 by COMUSMACV. This action resulted from the Tet Offensive and the need for greatly increased in-country reconnaissance.

c. Liaison was continued, after MACSOG assets were returned to their primary missions, to provide better and more responsive co-ordination between the Field Forces and MACSOG.

2. MISSION.

The mission of MACSOG Liaison Officers to the Field Forces is to:

a. Advise the Field Forces' Commanding General(s) and staff on capabilities, limitations, employment, current strength, and future plans of MACSOG assets in the Field Forces' zones of interest.

b. Inform Chief, MACSOG of Field Forces' requests for desired reconnaissance priorities and EEI.

c. Arrange and coordinate requests for air and ground support of MACSOG assets.

3. ORGANIZATION.

One LNO each is attached to I and II Field Forces, Vietnam. They are assigned to Assistant Operations Officer positions on the approved JTD. LNO positions will appear on the JTD of Command & Control Center South when approved.

4. ACTIVITIES.

a. LNOs brief, debrief and maintain access rosters of personnel in the Field Forces with "need to know" information concerning PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) and DANIEL BOONE (DB) operations.

b. LNOs coordinate support provided by the Field Forces for PF and DB activities adjacent to II and III Corps Tactical Zones. They advise Field Force Commanders on requests for PF and DB missions.

c. The LNOs serve as a point of contact between Field Forces and JPRC and advise the Field Force Commanders, their staffs, and operational commanders on conduct of the BRIGHT LIGHT Program for personnel recovery operations.

APPENDIX VII

LOGISTICS

1. GENERAL.

a. Logistic efforts in CY 68 were centered on development of procedures and expansion of activities to provide more positive logistic response to the wide range of MACSOG operations.

b. The year 1968 saw completion of a considerable number of construction projects in support of MACSOG programs. Reorganization of logistic functions in latter CY 68 was effected to provide for better management and proper alignment. The Comptroller and HQ Commandant functions are now directly responsible to Chief, MACSOG. Air Resupply Branch was to be assigned under Director, Logistics at the close of CY 68.

2. MISSION.

Logistics Division provides general logistical support to all activities of MACSOG. This support encompasses forecasting, procurement, and issuance of all types of hardware and supplies; construction and maintenance of facilities; research and development of conventional and unconventional warfare materiel for field evaluation; and medical support as directed by Chief, MACSOG and as required to support headquarters and operational elements of MACSOG.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. In the first quarter of 1968, Logistics received additional personnel as a result of CY 67 change to the JTD. In March the Operations Support Branch was established with arrival of three officers. Additional US personnel enabled the Logistics Division to operate with over 90% manning throughout most of the year. The main shortage of US personnel was the manning of Army supply positions in the Supply Branch and shortage of a qualified R&D Coordinator. After reorganization of the Logistics Division there were 12 officers, 2 WOs and 35 enlisted personnel authorized. Logistics Division organization is shown at TAB A.

b. The number of contract employees with Paho remained relatively stable during the year. The manning was primarily in the maintenance fields; however, 4 personnel were working in supply specialty areas.

c. Vietnamese employee authorizations were increased again in 1968 from 109 authorized in January to 142 in December. Additional personnel positions were authorized to provide guards at House 50 (the new supply facility), MACV I (MACSOG Headquarters) and the Physical Examination Center which opened in August. There was an increase in drivers, supply personnel, and personnel to manage and maintain the transient hotel located in House 10. Because of the reorganization plan, civilian positions authorized to the maintenance activity and Headquarters Commandant functions were transferred at the end of CY 68. Manning authorizations are reflected in TAB B.

4. SUPPLY.

a. The MACSOG supply section received out-of-country support from Counterinsurgency Support Office (CISO), an agency of the 2d Logistical Command, for Class I, III and V supplies and common Class II and IV items. This support is handled through Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA). In addition, ISSAs have been negotiated with the Navy Support Activity in Da Nang and 7th AF at [illegible], [illegible] and. Materiel or equipment not normally available through supply channels is procured through local purchase.

b. The mission of MACSOG Supply Branch is to requisition, receipt, issue, and store all supplies and equipment required for MACSOG operations. Informal accountability is maintained in MACSOG supply until items are shipped to supported activities. Upon receipt, informal accountability is assumed by the using activity.

c. MACSOG Supply Branch currently supports 31 supply accounts. Current programs call for close-out of 3 accounts.

d. In early January 1968, initial planning was promulgated to move the supply facility (House 240) and storage locations to House 50.

e. During Tet, House 240 was directly involved in a part of the VC offensive. The VC were using a small graveyard, a rented villa and one or two small shacks directly behind the house as a firing position for mortars and rockets. Much of the VC supporting small arms fire was directed at Hourse 240 and house personnel returned fire. After about four hours the MPs arrived, used House 240 to fire from but were eventually withdrawn to another area. Several VC were killed or wounded by this return fire. No US personnel were wounded, one VN guard was seriously wounded. One RPG-2 Rocket round and 3 or 4 grenades hit the house and damaged it slightly.

f. The second quarter of 68 statistics of Supply Branch are typical of the volume of supplies and equipment handled by the activity

in support of MACSOG mission requirements. During the period 613,000 pounds of supplies and equipment were shipped by air to accounts in Da Nang and Nha Trang. An additional 164,000 pounds were shipped by sea. Accounts in the Saigon area were supported by truck movement. Supply processed over 6000 requisitions in this period.

g. In the second quarter of CY 68, a new system of stock control was implemented to accommodate increased workload with addition of three large accounts. Requisitions for stock increased and additional emphasis was placed on the newly initiated Prescribed Load List (PLL) Section.

h. The main supply point for support of MACSOG operations was moved from the inadequate facility at House 240 to House 50 located on Plantation Road near Tan Son Nhut Air Base (TSN) during the third quarter of CY 68. Several hundred tons of supplies and equipment were relocated from the Liaison Bureau and a warehouse at TSN which was on loan DATA . It was necessary to occupy the new area prior to completion of construction. By implementation of emergency lighting and working arrangements for House 50 personnel, the move was accomplished without any loss in continuity to supply operations. The new facility occupies one building which has an office area of 8,300 square feet and over 133,000 square feet of covered warehouse. Both office and one-third of the warehouse area have centralized air conditioning, thus adding a greatly improved facility for storage of medical, signal, weapons, clothing and expendable supplies and equipment required by MACSOG.

i. Upon the move to House 50, many improvements were initiated to enhance operations and included the following:

(1) Reorganized the Stock Control System to include a Repair Parts Section which, in a short period of time, has facilitated faster and smoother repair parts issue to users. The Repair Parts Section operates independently, utilizing their own Document Register, files, stock records, and Demand Data Cards.

(2) Introduced the Monthly "Supply Operations Guide" to each account. This guide contains supply changes and additions pertinent to operational supply personnel.

(3) Instituted a new system for breakdown of supplies and equipment to facilitate faster issue to users. A schedule of pickup and turn-in by accounts was established. This system allows the warehouse to set up advanced shipping manifests and permits the user to pick up and turn in supplies and equipment in minimum time.

(4) Completely set up a new warehouse complex for storage of medical, signal, expendables, arms and ammo, repair items and clothing. In addition, a standard procedure for stockage and locations was instituted.

5. CONSTRUCTION.

a. Work at Khe Sanh was stopped in January due to tactical conditions and problems of transportation. Khe Sanh was abandoned in late spring.

b. Construction of the Dao at Hue was delayed by the Tet Offensive and again by Tropical Storm Bess. Cost of the project will exceed 1.7 million dollars with completion anticipated in early 1969.

c. A project in progress was construction of a launch site at Mai Loc, started in August. Funds for the project were reallocated from the old FOB at Khe Sanh. Total construction cost was in excess of $150,000. Construction was accomplished by troop labor of the 45th Army Engineer Battalion. Major difficulties encountered were procurement of supplies and their subsequent movement to the job site. Vehicle convoys carried the majority of available materials. Construction was hampered when I CTZ placed a hold on all critical materials in order to support construction of troop housing for the 101st Air Cav. Some material was obtained from IV Corps and moved to the job site in order to maintain the construction effort. Other material was secured from NAD and from SeaBee units in Phu Bai and convoyed on MACSOG trucks to the job site. Shortly after completion in October, the site was turned over to the District Headquarters for their use.

d. Construction projects in Da Nang, for the most part, were accomplished by Sea Bees. Construction of the C&C Detachment site near Marble Mountain was completed by members of NMCB3 during June. Facilities included a 50-bed dispensary, 4000-sq. ft. warehouse, helo pad, billets for 107 persons and necessary latrines and showers, motor pool, admin space and TOC bunker. Cost $360,000. On 18 August many of these facilities were destroyed as a result of enemy attack. Reconstruction by SeaBees will cost $42,000. Reconstruction began in November 1968. Other major construction projects in the Da Nang area included construction and improvements to Monkey Mountain FOB and Black Rock. Construction totaling $240,000 started in September 1967 neared completion in August 1968. The work consisted of building access roads, security fencing, complete messing and berthing, and operational facilities for two separate camps, each independent of the other. The construction program at NAD provided fuel storage capacities, adequate electrical power and suitable pier facilities for supporting Mobile Support Team operations. Cost of these improvements

was $70,000. The improvements provide 63,000 gallons of fuel storage in support of watercraft and billet accommodations for personnel assigned to or using the facility. Improvements to personnel support facilities at Camp Fay totalling $144,000 are underway to provide better living conditions. Projects include improvements to plumbing and drainage system, air conditioning, partitioning of living spaces, and electrical power improvements. By subscribing to centrally generated power sources, operational costs have been reduced and more dependable service obtained.

e. Support of [redacted] Operations at Cu Lao Cham Island included construction of a VN Command Post, VN school building and approval for construction of a new warehouse and dispensary.

f. Construction on the Air Operations building in Nha Trang began 11 April. The $175,000 cost will provide a permanent operations facility for First Flight and is expected to be completed by 15 January 1969.

g. On 1 September the new warehouse at House 50 was occupied and the Supply Branch relocated (See para 4h). Cost of the new facility was $239,000. Other construction in the Saigon area included preparation of a Physical Examination Center, construction of barracks and latrines at the Liaison Bureau and improvements to the Joint Translation Center. Repair to water and sewage systems at House 10, roof repairs and painting at House 7 were also accomplished. All work was accomplished contractually.

h. Staff visits to all field activities by construction personnel afforded technical guidance. Recommendations on power generation and distribution brought improvements at CCN, CLT, Nha Trang, STD, BMT, and House 50. An indication of technical assistance rendered can be demonstrated in the case of BMT. On 1 July 1968 CCS came under support of MACSOG. A major construction effort was programed but, to support the basic mission, some immediate technical supervision was required on the electrical system. Thirty-KW generators were replaced with 100KW. A suitable control center and distribution system was installed to provide a capability to isolate certain areas of the camp when under attack. Another system was set up at Da Nang in order to provide more efficient operation. Improvements to water supply systems have also been directed and accomplished at 4 locations.

6. [redacted]) COMPTROLLER.

a. During January fund authorizations were received from CNO for third quarter FY 68. [redacted]
FOOTBOY([redacted]

b. In February, a message request was sent to CINCPAC for authority to transfer $900,000 from the personnel category of PF to O&M due to increased weapon and ammunition expenditure. The change in piastre rate from 80 to $1.00 to 118 to $1.00 in October 1967 was cited as the reason such a category shift of funds could be made. Approval authority was received from CINCPAC on 2 March 1968.

c. Fourth quarter FY 68 allocations from CINCPAC were received in April as follows: PF $1,977,000: MUSCLE SHOALS $233,000: FOOTBOY $2,000,000. Although the long overdue PF Phase II expansion supplemental of $1,285,000 was granted, MACSOG was requested to absorb a deficiency of $785,000 in FY 68 PF funds and FOOTBOY was requested to absorb a deficiency of $1,215,000.

d. In April CNO and CINCPAC gave approval for FY 69 program budgets of $8,117,000 for PF; $3,500,000 for DB; $1,288.000 for MUSCLE SHOALS/DUMP TRUCK and $13,707,000 for FOOTBOY . Total classified funds allocated for FY 69 are $26,612,000. A request for MACSOG's desired FY 69 quarterly appropriation to be forwarded by 30 April as well as preliminary budget estimates for FY 70 was received. Final FY 70 budget submission was made ready prior to 15 July.

e. In April, messages were sent to CINCPAC indicating the deficiencies in PF and FOOTBOY could be absorbed. PF was reduced to $6,653,000 and FOOTBOY reduced to $13,633,000 by CINCPAC on 27 Apr.

f. In May, a request was sent to CINCPAC for authority to transfer $348,000 from MUSCLE SHOALS/DUMP TRUCK program personnel category to O&M category due to piastre rate change. Authority was granted by CINCPAC on 14 May.

g. In June, authority was requested from CINCPAC and CNO to absorb IGLOO WHITE FY 69 fund allocation within PF to avoid separate accounting and reporting in view of expected future difficulties in differentiating between programs. CINCPAC recommended approval to CNO of MACSOG's request.

h. Due to lack of appropriations from Congress, the first quarter FY 69 funds were received in monthly increments. Although awkward to work with, this procedure had no detrimental effects on any MACSOG programs.

i. In September, action was taken to cost out all items issued to using activities. This is an effort to gather statistical data on which to base a more accurate division of costs among the various programs. This action provided comptroller with copies of all shipping manifests with unit prices listed.

j. Throughout the year Comptroller personnel made frequent staff visits to subordinate units, conducting cash counts, audits and indoctrinating Agent Officers. Several visits were made to CINCPAC for budget submission and comptroller monetary reviews of operating programs. On 21 October the Comptroller Branch was transferred from Logistics and elevated to Division status in order to provide more realistic control over expenditure of MACSOG funds. By making Comptroller Division directly responsive to Chief, MACSOG, rather than maintaining a subordinate role to the major user of MACSOG funds: a checks and balances system was established.

7. MEDICAL.

a. In January, a survey of the Medical Branch was completed by the MACSOG Surgeon. The study was compiled in three areas: organization and personnel, education, and coordination. The survey resulted in the following action:

(1) Eight MACSOG Medical Directives were promulgated and sent to the field to provide guidance for operations.

(2) A MACSOG Physical Examination Center (PEC) was approved to provide a complete medical screening program. The center was completed and equipped to provide X-ray and laboratory tests. Newly recruited personnel are processed through PEC prior to employment in the field.

(3) The Surgeon provided medical assistance in operational areas.

b. All medical supply and warehouse activities were centrally located in the Saigon area and control over medical supplies was transferred to the MACSOG Surgeon. This action has opened the way for greater efficiency and economy in supply of expendable and non-expendable medical items.

8. OPERATIONS SUPPORT BRANCH.

a. The Operations Support Branch of the Logistics Division was established in mid-March 1968. The branch consists of three officers. The primary mission of this branch has been to assist subordinate elements of MACSOG in obtaining necessary logistic support. This assistance has encompassed:

(1) Expediting long lead time items or finding an acceptable substitute.

(2) Surveillance of supply functions of subordinate activities of MACSOG, thereby increasing the overall efficiency of logistic support.

b. Field orientation trips were made during the year by the Operations Support Branch personnel to all operating locations to determine logistic areas requiring coordination and assistance. Informal reports were submitted to OICs in the field relating to logistic areas requiring attention and/or corrective action. Close liaison has been established with staff agencies and logistic activities of adjacent and higher headquarters. These include the MACV 'J' staff, USARV, 1st Logistical Command and CMEC, in addition to the operational divisions of MACSOG and their field elements.

c. Effective 1 July 1968, MACSOG Logistics assumed sole supply support for CCS, which was heretofore the responsibility of 5th SFG. S-4 personnel were oriented on supply procedures and requirements as outlined in MACSOG Directive 700-4. The accounts of all elements of CCS were consolidated in an effort to give the command some measure of control over supply activities.

d. CCN was attacked by an estimated force of 200 VC on 18 August 1968, resulting in destruction of the CCN warehouse and material loss estimated at $500,000. Among major items of equipment destroyed were 352 M-16s, 54 AN/PRC-25 radios and 49 light machine guns. Emergency shipment of equipment and rations was effected on 19 August 1968. CCN's stockage was brought to a 30-day level.

e. Compilation of a TDA for equipment was initiated and all operational elements have submitted recommendations for weapons and communications equipment. These have been consolidated on an initial draft. A TDA is to be established by Operations and Training Directorate for items of equipment to be authorized MACSOG elements.

f. Since inception of Operations Support Branch, logistic problems which previously caused unncessary delays have been decidedly reduced. The ability of this branch to determine and pursue appropriate action has reduced difficulties of MACSOG field elements.

9. (RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

a. During the first six months of 1968, Research and Development (R&D) was a responsibility shared by several officers in the Logistics Division as an additional duty. In July, an officer was assigned to function, full time, as MACSOG Coordinator for R&D. A re-evaluation of R&D programs and liaison with the R&D community was initiated. Coordination was made with the following agencies:

(1) MACSA--Overall coordination R&D matters in SEA.

(3) ARPA--DOD Advanced Research Projects.

(4) ACTIV--Field Testing of R&D Equipment in SEA.

(5) J342--ENSURE Requirements.

(6) LWL LNO--Limited War Laboratory R&D.

(7) 5th SFGA--Coordination.

Frequent liaison visits have been made to all MACSOG operational elements in the field to develop requirements and solutions to further support operational needs.

b. Numerous items of new equipment have been issued to the field for evaluation. They include: [redacted] DATA [redacted] DATA [redacted] DATA [redacted] Oxford il- [redacted] and evaluation.

c. Additional items have been requested for field evaluation. They include: [redacted] the [redacted] DATA [redacted]

d. The Clothing and Equipment Review Panel (CERP) meets quarterly in an effort to update MACSOG equipment. All MACSOG operational activities are represented. The prime purpose of these meetings is to discuss deletion of items and addition of new items of equipment and supply for use in MACSOG operations. Minutes of these meetings are published and distributed to all MACSOG agencies.

e. MACSOG requested a representative from the USAF Special Operations Center on TDY during September/October. He received a complete orientation of MACSOG facilities, operations and missions. A list of areas which the USAFSOC may be of assistance in was compiled. A letter was staffed specifying these areas and recommending direct coordination between MACSOG and USAFSOC.

10. TRANSPORTATION.

TASKER NUMBER MACSOG TS001024-69

DUE DATE 12-24-92 Annex F CMD History '68

REDACT_____ DECLASSIFY ✓

DOCUMENTS REMOVED/BEING REVIEWED:

P. F-VII-10

DOCUMENTS REMOVED

STATE

NOT DECLASSIFIED

g. The ramp pass system for TSN is being changed for CY 69. Sufficient number of floater passes have been requested for MACSOG vehicles.

11. MAINTENANCE SUPPORT BRANCH.

a. Maintenance in the Saigon area has operated most of the year with a shortage of skilled motor vehicle mechanics. Skilled mechanics are not willing to work at approved wage scales. This problem has been partially solved by hiring and teaching mechanic helpers until they obtain the skill level for promotion to mechanic.

b. During the year extensive modification was made in the Saigon maintenance facilities. The grease pit was repaired and waterproofed, the tool room was expanded, the carpenter shop was extended, and a parts room was established over the welding shop.

c. Facilities were renovated to provide more suitable living accommodations for transient personnel. Improvements made include the following:

(1) A new TV room completed. The ceiling was lowered, soundproofed, walls panelled and new lighting system installed.

(2) Sleeping quarters for permanent party personnel have been completed.

(3) One VIP room is completed.

(4) Quarters for transient personnel have been completed. Ceilings have been lowered and walls panelled. Vinyl asbestos tile flooring was installed throughout House 10.

(a) New showers and latrines were installed throughout House 10.

(b) A Snack Bar, to provide a limited mess facility for transient personnel, was completed and opened in December.

(5) A day-room for transient personnel has been completed. A pool table is on requisition.

d. Maintenance and utilities support was rendered to all sections within MACSOG. Power generator support and technical assistance has been provided to appropriate section in the Saigon area and other locations throughout Vietnam.

e. In late December, responsibility for the Saigon maintenance and transient compound (House 10) was transferred to the Headquarters Commandant.

TAB A

LOGISTICS DIVISION



RECAPITULATION

	Auth	Asgd
Off	13	12
WO	2	2
EM	35	32
Phil	4	4
Indig	86	72
TDY	2	2

TAB B

CIVILIAN EMPLOYEE MANNING AUTHORIZATION

1.	US Nationals	0
2.	DATA --Supply Branch	4
3.	Vietnamese Employees	
	a. Supply Branch (House 50)	56
	b. Physical Examination Branch	8
	c. Air Resupply Branch	22
4.	RECAPITULATION.	
	a.	4
	b. Vietnamese Employees	86
	c. TOTAL Civilian Employees Authorized	90

APPENDIX VIII

COMPTROLLER

1. (U) GENERAL.

Until 21 October 1968, Comptroller was a branch of the Logistics Division. The History Report of the Logistics Division (Appendix VII) covers comptroller activities through the first three quarters of calendar year 1968. This history encompasses only the last quarter of the year.

2. MISSION.

The Comptroller Division acts as principal economic and financial advisor to Chief, MACSOG. The division is directly responsible for financial management of MACSOG. In addition to the responsibilities for accounting, auditing, and disbursing, the division is also responsible for formulation of financial policies and regulations, and institution of internal controls.

3. ORGANIZATION.

The Comptroller Division consists of two sections, Fiscal and Finance, headed by the MACSOG Comptroller (04 Navy) with an administrative assistant. The Fiscal Section consists of one officer (Budget Analyst) and five enlisted men. The Finance Section consists of one officer (Finance Officer) and three enlisted men. A Yeoman 1st Class is assigned to this section to handle their administrative matters. The other enlisted men are Accounting Specialists and are involved in auditing of 15 Agent Accounts.

4. UNCLASSIFIED FUNDS.

a. During FY 68 and prior fiscal years, MACSOG unclassified funds were funded separately by CINCPAC. Requests for these funds were submitted as part of the MACSOG total budget requests to CNO via CINCPAC. Detailed justification was never required. This procedure was discontinued in FY 69 and MACSOG funds are now included as part of the total MACV budget. MACV now requires MACSOG to submit its budget more frequently and in greater detail.

b. During October 1968, CINCPAC reduced the MACV annual funding plan (AFP) by 25% and required MACV to accept such or furnish detailed justification for increase requests. Such requirements were subsequently imposed upon MACSOG by MACV. On 24 October MACSOG agreed to

accept the 25% ($131,000) reduction of its original AFP of $525,000. Revised AFP FY 69 is now $394,000. On 30 November MACSOG received the first half-year allocation of $197,000.

c. On 22 November 1968, the Comptroller Division performed the mid-year review of unclassified FY 69 budget estimates and submitted supporting detail to MACV for 3d and 4th quarter funds of $197,000.

5. CLASSIFIED FUNDS.

For the first half of FY 69 MACSOG received $14,777,000 in classified funds for all programs. Unobligated balance as of 31 December 1968 was $1,075,886.76. Balance by program is not considered significant since program totals will shortly be revised to reflect the actual amounts of O&M supplies used. These figures were previously unknown.

APPENDIX IX

PLANS

1. GENERAL.

a. During 1968 the Plans Division continued its efforts in long-range contingency planning and performed a variety of other tasks, such as preparation, presentation and publication of briefings, reports, fact books, and historical summaries. All MACSOG programs were touched upon by one or more of the various projects and required considerable coordination with other divisions and with higher authority.

b. The emphasis in planning during the year shifted from consideration of expanded efforts against the enemy to that which considered the approach of a cease-fire and reduction of US forces in RVN.

2. MISSION.

The Plans Division advises Chief, Studies and Observations Group on all matters pertaining to MACSOG planning responsibilities to include COMUSSEASIA unconventional warfare plans, COMUSMACV current and contingency operations plans, and other special planning requirements. Prepares plans, studies, reports, and briefs; updates documents and executes other staff actions as directed. Provides direction and tasks other branches of the MACSOG staff, and when required, the UW Plans Branch, E&P Division, [redacted], to insure that required plans are prepared in essential detail and are maintained current in a timely manner. Acts as MACSOG Historical Section.

3. (U) ORGANIZATION.

The Plans Division of MACSOG continued to perform its mission in 1968 with a JTD authorization of four officers and two enlisted men:

Director, Plans Division	05	USMC
Army Plans Officer	04	USA
Navy Plans Officer	04	USN
Air Force Plans Officer	04	USAF
Administrative Supervisor	E7	USA
Clerk Typist	E4	USA

4. ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. Plans and Annexes Prepared or Revised.

(1) OPlan 37A-68 (TOTEM POLE) (U). This plan, prepared at the direction of MACV, provided essential information for integration of wiretap procedures with current PRAIRIE FIRE (PF), DANIEL BOONE (DB), STRATA, and maritime action team operational missions. It provided guide-lines to all organizations of MACSOG for training, employment, installation, and logistic plans required to assure efficient introduction of certain DATA into areas of Laos, Cambodia or other selected areas as directed by Chief, MACSOG. Subsequent replacement of DATA equipment referred to in OPlan DATA by new, more sophisticated equipment, ended the usefulness of this plan. *

(2) OPlan 37C-68 (DANIEL BOONE)(U). This plan, an update of OPlan 37C-66, reflected current DB operations. It provided for cross-border reconnaissance into Cambodia by foot and air-infiltrated patrols to locate and identify VC/NVA units, equipment and installations. It directed preparation of plans for conduct of riverine reconnaissance and raid patrols, DATA, air and artillery strikes, and reaction force raids to destroy VC/NVA units, equipment and installations. Staffing of this plan was not completed. *

(3) OPlan 37D-68 Draft (Cambodian Maritime Operations) . This draft plan updated OPlan 37D-66. It provided for, in coordination with RVNAF, support and conduct of DATA intelligence, action team and maritime operations along the coast of Cambodia. The plan was designed to stop or restrict flow of personnel, material and supplies used to support VC/NVA insurgency against RVN. This plan was prepared as a result of direction received at COMUSMACV briefing on MACSOG General Plan, FY 69 (which did not allude to Cambodian maritime operations). Information pertinent to consideration of Cambodian maritime operations was presented to COMUSMACV in February 1968. As an outcome of this briefing the draft plan was shelved. The plan was not feasible for execution under the circumstances at that time.

(4) JUWTF OPlan 1-67 (GENERAL WAR)(U) A unilateral capabilities plan providing for conduct of unconventional warfare (UW) in Southeast Asia in a wide variety of situations These range from a limited war arising from the current conflict to one of unrestricted, theater-wide, general war. This plan, originally written in 1967, was revised to incorporate MACV comments.

(5) COMUSMACV OPlan 63-69 (Pre-Withdrawal)(U). Prepared Annex N to provide for conduct of UW and operation of a Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) during the period between a cease-fire in Vietnam

* CINCPAC Msg 102022Z Sep 68 and COMUSMACV Msg 240815Z Sep 68 cancelled all 37 Series OPlans.

and commencement of withdrawal of US forces. The annex also provided for preparation of plans for the period after the start of withdrawal of US forces. MACV J5 approved the annex for planning purposes and requested it be held by MACSOG pending J5 instructions to publish and issue it.

(6) COMUSMACV OPlan 69-69 (Withdrawal)(U). Prepared Annex N to provide for conduct of UW, operation of a JPRC, preparation for termination or transfer of specific operations to other US or GVN agencies, services or commands; and preparation for establishment of a staff organization within a Command/MAAGV to advise RVNAF on UW. MACV J5 approved the annex for planning purposes and requested it be held by MACSOG, reviewed, and if appropriate, revised upon receipt of CINCPAC OPlan 69-69.

b. Other Projects.

(1)

DATA

(2) SAUNA SCRUB (U). An input pertaining to DB operations was submitted to MACV J5 for use in SAUNA SCRUB, a staff study. The study examined current VC/NVA use of Cambodia.

(3) Review of MACSOG Programs. A report was submitted to Chief, MACSOG to present the status of MACSOG staff follow-up action on certain items from the JCS-CINCPAC Joint Survey Team Report (dtd 2 Jan 68). The items examined were those which required corrective or approving action by higher headquarters.

(4) Chief, MACSOG De-briefing. Prepared and staffed briefing which departing Chief, MACSOG gave to selected officers of CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and FMFPAC. In order to obtain the highest quality briefing slides, it was necessary to use the services of Pictorial Division, Operations, STRATCOM, in Okinawa.

(5) Paris Peace Talks. In June the Plans Division commenced periodic submissions of fact sheets on MACSOG programs to MACV J5. Information submitted was for support of the MACV Liaison Officer to the Senior Military Negotiator in Paris. Five updates of the original submission were forwarded.

(6) MACSOG Fact Book. Prepared a MACSOG Fact Book to be maintained in Chief, MACSOG's office for ready reference. Copies also forwarded to JCS (SACSA) and CINCPAC. This fact book is intended to provide current objectives, methods of operations, authorities and results of

all MACSOG programs. Periodic update to be conducted when directed by Chief, MACSOG.

(7) MACSOG Category "A" Briefing. Assumed responsibility for the preparation of Category "A" briefings. This briefing is designed to give parties with a "need to know" information on all MACSOG programs.

(8) Long-Range Planning Group Study. Compiled and coordinated MACSOG input to MACV J5, for use in the Long-Range Planning Group Study. This study group was charged with responsibility of carefully reviewing overall utilization of resources available for achievement of the MACV mission.

(9) 1967 MACSOG Historical Summary. Compiled, edited, staffed, and published the 1967 MACSOG Historical Summary. (Annex G to MACV 1967 Command History)

(10) Program for MACSOG Operations Fiscal Year 1969 (U). Compiled, edited and staffed the program for MACSOG Operations for FY 69.

(11) CINCPAC Intelligence Planning Visit. Coordinated CINCPAC Intelligence Planning Visit with MACSOG Intel, OP-30 and OP-35. Purpose was to develop parameters for CINCPAC planning for

DATA

(12) MACV I Compound Defense Plan. Wrote and staffed a defense plan for the MACV I Compound.

(13) Weekly Briefing. In December the Plans Division commenced briefing the MACV Special Plans Division (J54) on weekly developments of MACSOG programs.

APPENDIX X

COMMUNICATIONS

1. GENERAL.

During 1968, Communications activities continued to expand. There was an increase in both the number of teletype circuits and volume of traffic processed. A means of utilizing voice hotline circuits to pass teletype traffic, on a back-up basis, was incorporated. Equipment to give field units capability of secure voice communications was received and distributed.

2. MISSION.

To advise Chief, Studies and Observations Group on all matters pertaining to communications and electronics and to provide communications systems in support of Headquarters, Studies and Observations Group Activities.

3. ORGANIZATION.

During calendar year 1968, MACSOG Communications operated at an authorized strength of 3 officers and 29 enlisted men providing staff, communications center operations, teletype and radio maintenance manning.

4. OPERATIONS.

a. Communications activities have continued to expand during 1968. The primary factor behind this expansion was the establishment of STRATA FOBs at Da Nang and NAD FOB at Phan Thiet.

b. Communications support of PLOWMAN and PF continued with little change from 1967. The MACSOG Single Side Band (SSB) Net was divided with Net A dedicated to PF and Net B dedicated to DB operations.

c. The communications support for DB operations was organized in the same manner as the PF program. A radio-teletypewriter (RATT) net was established, linking CCS with FOB-6.

d. The STRATA Monkey Mountain Da Nang FOB Communications Center was established in July 1968, with the result being more timely reports from the STRATA program.

e. In November, with establishment of a base station at Phan Thiet for support of NAD teams, a direct teletypewriter (TTY) circuit was activated between MACSOG Headquarters and NAD FOB at Phan Thiet.

f. During May and June, MACSOG communications were monitored by the DATA Monitoring was conducted on insecure radio telephone, conventional telephone, and voice hotline systems of MACSOG. The results of this transmission security (TRANSEC) monitoring indicated a need for improvement. All MACSOG personnel, both at Headquarters and in the field. were briefed on the TRANSEC Report. Action was taken to educate all personnel on use of special MACSOG codes for use on any insecure circuit.

5. FACILITIES AND CIRCUITRY.

a. Non-secure voice hotlines were installed between MACSOG Headquarters and field units after relocation to MACV I Compound in January 1968.

b. In February a separate SSB net between CCS and MACSOG was established, thereby eliminating the overload problem on the CCN net.

c. In July, MMFOB in Da Nang was added to circuit DMVAOP-26 (MACSOG to Da Nang) as a multipoint extension. This circuit then tied MACSOG Headquarters with CCN, NAD and MMFOB Da Nang.

d. In September, a secure dedicated TTY circuit was activated between MACSOG Comm Center and CCN Da Nang. Activation of this circuit has provided an alternate traffic route for the Da Nang area.

e. In November, a secure dedicated TTY circuit was activated between MACSOG and Phan Thiet to handle NAD FOB DEWEY RIFLE Operations.

f. In December, the RATT circuit between NAD Da Nang and Cu Lao Cham Island was deactivated due to close-down of the Psyops effort at DODO.

g. Terminal Telegraph (TH-5) equipment was procured and installed at all MACSOG field units. This equipment makes it possible to use a voice hotline to pass teletype traffic and therefore serve as a backup circuit.

h. The CCN RATT net was extended to include Nakhon Phanom in December utilizing AN/GRC-26 equipment.

i. The RATT circuit between CCS and its FOB was established early in 1968. When CCS moved to BMT in July, voice hotlines were established with FOB-6 at Ho Ngoc Tau and MACSOG Headquarters.

j. A request was validated by MACV J6 for TTY and voice hotline circuits between MACSOG and CCC at Kontum. The circuit activation date is 15 January 1969.

k. AUTOSEVOCOM terminal for CCN Da Nang was validated. The KY-3 unit was shipped to Da Nang and should be in service early in 1969.

l. Action was initiated by MACV J6 to validate CCC, CCS, MAF MMFOB, Air Ops Group, and Joint Translation Center as AUTOSEVOCOM subscribers. It is expected that these stations will be validated but that service will not be realized until 1970.

6. EQUIPMENT.

a. DATA

This radio DATA The radios were received without crystals or battery power packs which are on order.

b. DATA 1. These units operate in conjunction DATA They were distributed to field units for operational use. They are presently being used between FOBs, launch sites and radio relay points. The FAC aircraft are being equipped MT MT

c. Many items of radio equipment were investigated or evaluated during the year for possible application to MACSOG operations. The DATA DATA

7. SIGNAL PLANS.

a. In October 1968, a DATA tactic was initiated where a DATA was supplied with all equipment DATA . This tactic was initiated DATA DATA

b. During a visit to Project DATA in December 1968, it was revealed that a new Signal Plan could be made for use in this DATA. DATA at a lesser cost and yet still meet our requirements, i.e., look the same as our present plans and be workable.

c. The expected in-country time of the new signal plans for DATA DATA is during February 1969.

8. CRYPTO MATERIAL.

a.

to the field for use on radio nets, voice hotlines and conventional telephones. DATA developed as a personnel code but has been expanded to include locations of MACSOG activities, MACSOG aircraft and routine reports.

b. In late November. DATA, developed by MACSOG COMM and Mr. Corcoran of DATA and produced by DATA, arrived in-country. MT MT It will replace the locally produced code that was used by STRATA teams.

c. In June 1968, a requirement was sent to DATA for a new Maritime Ops code. DATA has been produced and should arrive in-country in January 1969. It is similar to the STRATA code, MT MT

9. COMMUNICATIONS IMPROVEMENTS.

a. The new MACSOG Comm Center was designed for six (6) circuits with two (2) spare teletype positions. In the past year three additional TTY circuits were added. Additional DATA equipment was obtained to provide necessary backup. The required TTY equipment to provide for backup TTY positions was ordered. At year's end, this equipment had not yet arrived. When the equipment is received, the Comm Center will be modified to accommodate ten (10) circuits with three (3) spare TTY positions.

b. The only MACSOG units that have an alternate TTY traffic route are those in the Da Nang area. During the past year the CCN TTY circuit was established. This means that there are now two MACSOG circuits terminated in Da Nang. For other locations, installations have been made using TH-5s on voice hotlines for alternate traffic routes.

c. The requirement MT, should be DATA In 1969 this equipment will be used operationally by field units and aircraft assigned to MACSOG.

APPENDIX XI

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER

1. GENERAL.

MACSOG OP-80, activated in September 1966 under the cover designation of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), continued throughout 1968 to function as focal point for all information and activities related to missing and captured personnel in Southeast Asia

2. MISSION.

The JPRC acts as the staff cognizant agency and joint coordinating authority within MACV for post-search and rescue personnel recovery operations and as such develops requirements for collection of intelligence and other data necessary concerning detained and missing personnel; coordinates and maintains liaison with US and Allied entities to insure maximum utilization of available resources and to achieve minimum reaction time for launch of rescue/recovery operations; monitors and coordinates operations with participating agencies during planning and execution; assists in debriefing of recovered personnel; provides E & E briefing data to component commands and interested agencies.

DATA DATA

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. The current JTD of the JPRC is as follows:

TITLE	SERVICE	GRADE
Chief	AF	05
Ops/Plans Officer	AF	05
Intelligence Ops/Plans Officer	A	03
Intelligence Officer	N	04
Intelligence Officer	A	04
Operations Sergeant	A	E8
Intelligence Analyst	A	E7
Intelligence Analyst	A	E6

TITLE	SERVICE	GRADE
Stenographer	A	E5
Yeoman	N	E5

At the end of 1968 there were five officers and five enlisted men assigned, plus one officer on TDY from 5th Special Forces Group.

b. Based on experience gained in the past year, a slightly modified JTD has been submitted to CINCPAC. The proposed JPRC organization appears below:



c. There is no change in total personnel strength under the new organization. Under this concept, principal duties of the operations and plans officer will be coordination of prisoner recovery operations. As field representatives for the JPRC, they are required to interface with senior officers and commanders. In order that personnel have the requisite experience and knowledgeability, both Army and Navy positions have been upgraded to 05. One Army intelligence analyst was changed to Air Force Intelligence Operations Technician to perform branch functions relating to Air Force personnel and to assist in instructing Air Force personnel in E & E and post-SAR procedures.

4. PRISONER OF WAR RECOVERY OPERATIONS.

a. During 1968, JPRC conducted 32 PW recovery operations with eight successes freeing a total of 155 RVN military and political prisoners. Only one operation was cancelled, the prisoners were reportedly moved into Cambodia. This is in direct contast to 1967, when JPRC conducted only 16 PW recovery operations with one success, freeing 20 RVN prisoners. Thirteen operations were cancelled in 1967

because intelligence could not be sufficiently developed. The difference lies in the fact JPRC policy was redirected in the spring of 1969 toward faster inputs of intelligence and immediate local exploitation of information acquired.

b. An example of a successful PW recovery is Operation Cranberry Bog. At 271930H August 1968, two RVN PWs escaped from an enemy PW camp (vic WR 485681) in Chuong Thien Province, RVN and reported to a nearby ARVN outpost. The two were taken to the headquarters of the ARVN 21st Division on 28 August 1968. At this time information of their escape was forwarded through channels to JPRC. A JPRC representative was dispatched to IV Corps. The 21st Division did not appear to be interested as the target was across the Song Nuoc Trong River and in an enemy area. As a result of this lack of interest, the Province Revolutionary Development Cadre Officer acquired the two escapees for debriefing late in the afternoon of 28 August. Planning for a recovery operation was accomplished on 29 and 30 August.

MT

5. PW RECOVERY OPERATIONS--PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED.

a. Problems continued in several areas, including rapid receipt of intelligence information, rapid reaction to the information, and determination of validity of intelligence. MT

MT

b. In order to encourage rapid reaction to highly perishable intelligence, the requirement that all PW recovery operations be approved by JPRC was rescinded in April. This cleared the way for more immediate planning on the local level, and encouraged operations be

undertaken as quickly as possible. Commanders continue to be reluctant to undertake operations without first building a classical intelligence case, complete with confirmation and reconfirmation of data. These actions have resulted in compromise of intention of the operation, with subsequent transfer of prisoners to new camps. Determination of validity of information prior to final test of actually committing troops has been extremely difficult;

MT

6.

MT

7. RECOVERY OF BODIES OF DECEASED US PERSONNEL.

a. As a portion of the DATA established in 1967, it was decided DATA of remains of deceased US missing personnel as well as return for live missing personnel. During 1968, three US bodies were recovered as a result of agent operations.

b. In addition, seven bodies were recovered as a consequence of post-SAR recovery operations conducted by or for JPRC. This portion of DATA DATA of US personnel in enemy hands.

8. ATTEMPTED RECOVERIES OF DOWNED AIRCREWS AND EVADERS.

During 1968 there were only seven post-SAR alerts which reached the point of staging troops, and in only two cases were the DATA

DATA teams inserted. This is primarily the result of increased effectiveness and capabilities of SAR forces, such as in-flight refueling of helicopters, combined with decreasing air operations. Five bodies were recovered by DATA teams. Post-SAR opportunities are expected to remain low: however, JPRC will maintain an immediate reaction capability in this vital field.

9. DATA RETURN NEGOTIATIONS.

During 1968, JPRC was involved in ten negotiations which had the purpose of recovering US PWs DATA from the enemy. Most of the negotiations were handled by Special Agents of the 525th MI Group. These JPRC-initiated negotiations were closely monitored, DATA DATA DATA ... Invariably, negotiations broke down at the point where tangible proof was required. DATA DATA DATA They did not re-establish contact. JPRC will continue to give guidance and support to negotiations DATA DATA

10. EVASION AND ESCAPE PROGRAM.

a. DATA DATA DATA DATA

b. DATA

c. Aircrew Briefings. During 1968, JPRC representatives presented briefings on the JPRC mission, organization and personnel recovery capabilities to aircrews and DATA personnel of 7th Air Force, CTF 77 and Army aviation groups. DATA DATA

11. MT OPERATIONS.

a. DATA DATA any persons who helped US captured or missing personnel to return to

friendly control, provided information, returned equipment or other evidence which revealed their status or disposition, was continued. Efforts to implement the program were hindered by a lack of awareness

MT

DATA DATA

b. Special MT Programs. JPRC initiated several special-purpose MT programs.

DATA

12. JPRC INFORMATION BULLETINS.

In an effort to stimulate interest in and awareness of personnel recovery operations, DATA

DATA

DATA

TAB A

PW RECOVERY OPERATIONS/RAIDS--1968

OPERATIONS	DATES	FORCE & RESULTS	INTEL SOURCE
RIVER SPIKE	11-16 Feb	3 BL Teams & Bn backup. Nothing found.	Priest, cutout, VC interr. Looked good, but false info.
LINCOLN LIGHT	18-24 Feb	5 tms, 3 cos of 173d Abn. 1 ARVN NCO recovered.	Escapee source. Blood, Benge & Olsen. 2 US reported.
DUVAL SANDS	23 Feb-01 Mar	2 BL Teams to intercept Hue prisoners.	No go due to weather. 27 US PWs reported.
DI LINH	21-28 Mar	23d ARVN Ranger Bn, searched area, found nothing.	ARVN agent source. 2 US reported
DADE BEACH	30 Mar	BL Teams; found nothing	Source reported 4 US in camp.
PRU near BMT	07-09 Apr	37-man PRU force. Recent abandoned camp. Good intel, but date of info 05 Apr.	Montagnard escapee. PW moved after escape. Blood Benge & Olsen.
Near Tan An	05 Apr	3 cos, 9th Div. Found no evidence.	Multi sightings of US PW. 2 US rptd.
SA DEC	23 Apr	RF Team. 8 KIA, 3 captured. No US PW found.	Escaped ARVN PW. Heard US voices. Guards complained of having to feed US. 2 US rptd.
YD 995130	29 Apr	Co fm III MAF searched area, found nothing.	2 US PW sightings, working in rice field.
BR 858126	28 May	173d Abn Co gunships, National Police VR acft assault. No PW.	Rpt of 2 US PW taken N to An Do. 3 sep. agent rpts.

OPERATION	DATES	FORCE & RESULTS	INTEL SOURCE
RAYBURN CANE II	25-31 May	2 B50 tms inserted to recce area, exfiled & replaced by 2 HF	Intel same as Rayburn Cane I, + rpt of 3 other missionaries in same area.
BR 858202	30 May	2 173d Abn Co to recover PW at An Do. Neg results.	Rpt of 1 US PW taken to An Do. This is a 2d Op: See BR858126.
XS 088438	17 Jun	1 Troop, 1st Bn, 6th Air Cav, 1 Co, 1st Bn 12th Reg, 2 Plt, PF. No evidence of PW in area.	Source learned from a VC of 1 US alledgedly held at coords. Source willing to lead.
WS 778673	09 Jul	5th SF element camp there but abandoned.	Alleged escapee rptd camp. Cnfmd by USFAC.
XT 453373	09 Jul	4/23d, 25th Inf Div. PW camp never found.	Source alleged VC guard of camp holding 20-40 US/GVN PWs.
MILWAUKEE ROAD	23 Jul	Located what may have been camp. VC source wounded but continued Op for encounter. Bunkers destroyed. 1 plt B56, 1 plt PRU.	3 encounters w/3 VC. Camp deserted except for above.
CUSTER LANCE	27 Jul-30 Sep	173d Abn & 5 LRRP & 2 BL tms; located 1 abandoned camp. Neg results.	173d rptd many PW sightings near Bong Son. 2 Sandia dedives emplaced in abandoned camp.
CRANDBERRY BOG	28-31 Aug	9-man PRU tm & US SEAL & 2 sources: 60 PRU reaction force. Recovered 49 VN PW.	Escapee rptd 8 US PW. Camp located but US had been moved.
AZALEA CREEK	18-21 Sep	94-man RF/PF Co & US ldr & source. Op compromised. Gp of 25 VN PW found & recovered.	Escapee rptd 70 VN PW & possibly 2 US PW. Camp found abandoned.

OPERATION	DATES	FORCE & RESULTS	INTEL SOURCE
CAO LANH	27 Aug	Co D, 5th SFGA. 17 VN PW recovered.	Raid on Comm station. PW being moved in vic.
WS 800645	11 Sep	Delta Blackhawk, 1 ARVN plt. TACAir spt. 17 VN recovered.	Enemy base camp spotted from air.
SAGINAW LAKE	30 Sep	11th ACR, 1st Inf Div, 3 PRU tms, 1 LRRP Co. No PW sight & no enemy found in area.	2 PW camp sites in base area Delta. 9 US rptd.
SAGE BRUSH	15-18 Oct	1 Co, PRU, 1 trp Air Cav, 1 Co SF Mike Force. Nothing found. Position in error 1500 meters.	PW camp rptd. 4 US & 80 VN. Guard to defect & protect PW during raid.
XR 355638	05 Oct 68	Vinh Binh PRU unit. 27 VN recovered.	Camp rptd by woman whose husband was a PW in the camp.
JUNIPER BERRY	27-28 Oct	100 PRU. Neg results. Bunkers found, no PW. 2 VC captured. Source not avail to lead raid	Escapee fm camp on 24 Oct rptd 1 US, 56 ARVN + 18 others. 12 guards.
SAGE BRUSH II	08 Dec	1 BN M-Force, 1 Co PRU 37 helo CS used as block. Camp found abandoned. 2d camp found & 7 VN civilian recovered.	Escapee fm camp.

TAB B

PW RECOVERY OPERATIONS

DROPPED BECAUSE INTEL COULD NOT BE DEVELOPED

OPERATION	DATE	FORCE & RESULTS	INTEL
DOGWOOD KNOT	05-26 Sep	Agent of A-432 saw 2 US PW in RVN. Moved to Cambodia on 21 Sep. No ops permitted.	2 US PW. 2 Ops planned. Neither went due to weak intel and proximity Cambodian border

TAB C

PW RECOVERY OPERATIONS

GROUND RECCE CONDUCTED--NO CAMP LOCATED 1968

OPERATION	DATES	FORCE	RESULTS
IV CORPS	05-07 Feb	9th Inf LRRP	5 US PW sighted. Enemy contact but no PW found.
XS 344461	25 May	Recce tm, 1st Bde, 9th Inf. Searched 25km W of My Tho. Captured 1 VC. No PW.	PRU rptd PW vic XS 344461. Quick intel and reaction--PW not found.
PREBLE RIDGE	15 Jun	4 Spike tms recce in BS 3180, 3881, 4182 & 3878. Came under hy fire 16 Jun & exfilled. Friendly 4 WIA. 1 enemy KIA. No evidence of PW camps.	Multi PW sightings in 67 & 68. Sufficient evidence to launch recce tm. Too much. Americal Div will sweep area. Neg results.
RAYBURN CANE I	19-21 May	6-man PRU tm walk in 20 May. Exfil 21 May. Met VC Co.	2 escaped Montagnards saw Blood, Benge & Olsen. 60km SE BMT.
RAYBURN CANE III	17-21 Nov	15-man recce tm fm BMT. SF reaction Co.	Escapee fm camp vic BP4880. Tm compromised before camp located. (1 abandoned camp located).
NORFOLK TAR	12-30 Nov	15-man recon tm 1st Bn 1st Cav and 1 tp Air Cav reaction. Co A, SFG raiding.	Recon tm compromised & extracted. Area too hostile to continue.

TAB D

1968 POST-SAR OPERATIONS

OPERATION	DATE	FORCE	RESULTS
OLD CROW	14-22 Jan	2 BL tms into area. Environment too hostile to land	SAR rescued 3 of 7-man EB-66 crew and 5 helo crew members. 4 unrecovered.
TEXAS CREST	27-29 Feb	2 BL tms on ground. Second target	7 fm P2 picked up by SAR MT. Could not find 1 US PW.
ZU 2472	21 Oct	Bl tm alerted to recover 24 aboard C-47 crash near BMT. Tm not inserted.	Army medic inserted by helo, found all dead. Bodies recovered by 7AF.
M-60	27-29 Nov	BL tm inserted to search for survivors of UH-1 crash on DB mission	UH-1 (20th Helo) rescued 5 crew alive on 27 Nov. BL rescued remaining 5 bodies.
RF-4C "RIDGE"	12-17 Dec	BL tm prepositioned at DATA but DATA inserted 60 men ~~to search~~ for rear seat pilot	RF-4C downed. Front seat pilot recovered by SAR. DATA unable to locate rear seat pilot.
MILESTONE 407	19-21 Dec	DATA tm rqstd. 3 tms DATA at XD616021 Loudspeaker also used to try to locate pilot	1 man rescued, unable to locate pilot. SAR suspended 21 Dec.
PANDA 01	25-27 Dec	Rqstd DATA to assist in recovery of pilot in tree	Area too hot. BL tm alerted & staged at DATA. SAR indicated pilot & PJ possibly dead. Mission suspended.

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STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

COMMAND HISTORY 1969

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

MACSOG

6 April 1970

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Annex F, 1969 Command History (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Inclosed is Annex F (Special Operations) to the 1969 Command History.

2. (U) Because of the sensitive nature of the information contained in this Annex, its distribution has been limited to those agencies considered to have an essential need to know. It is requested that no further distribution be made without the express consent of this headquarters.

3. (U) Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosures.

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S. D. SERAFINI
CPT, USA
Asst AG

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TABLE OF CONTENTS - - LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

Letter of Transmittal..... i

Table of Contents - List of Effective Pages ..... ii to vi

Annex F (Special Operations) to MACV 1969 Command History.. F-1 to F-5

TAB A - Organization Through December 1969..... F-A-1

Appendix I - Personnel and Administration..... F-1-1 to F-1-2

TAB A - Personnel and Administration Div Organization.. F-1-A-1

TAB B - Key Officers..... F-1-B-1 to F-1-B-2

Appendix II - Intelligence..... F-II-1 to F-II-13

TAB A - Intelligence Div Organization..... F-II-A-1

Appendix III - Operations and Training..... F-III-1 to F-III-5

TAB A - Operations and Training Div Organization..... F-III-A-1

SECTION 1 - Maritime Studies Branch..... F-III-1-1 to F-III-1-4

TAB A - BIFROST/DODGE MARK Mission Summary..... F-III-1-A-1

TAB B - DEWEY RIFLE I and II Mission Summary..... F-III-1-B-1

TAB C - TRAN HUNG DAO Mission Summary..... F-III-1-C-1

TAB D - Maritime Operating Areas F-III-1-D-1

SECTION 2 - Air Studies Branch..... F-III-2-1 to F-III-2-7

TAB A - Air Studies Branch Organization..... F-III-2-A-1

TAB B - COMBAT SPEAR/HEAVY HOOK Summary..... F-III-2-B-1 to F-III-2-B-2

TAB C - 219th VNAF Squadron Summary..... F-III-2-C-1

TAB D - 110th VNAF Squadron Summary..... F-III-2-D-1

SECTION 3 - Psyops Studies Branch..... F-III-3-1 to F-III-3-4

TAB A - Psyops Studies Branch Organization..... F-III-3-A-1

TAB B - [redacted]..... F-III-3-B-1

SECTION 4 - Ground Studies Branch..... F-III-4-1 to F-III-4-12 (b)(1)

TAB A - Summary of PRAIRIE FIRE Operations..... F-III-4-A-1

TAB B - Summary of SALEM HOUSE Operations..... F-III-4-B-1

TAB C - PRAIRIE FIRE Organization..... F-III-4-C-1

TAB D - SALEM HOUSE Organization..... F-III-4-D-1

Appendix IV - Logistics Division..... F-IV-1 to F-IV-13

TAB A - Logistics Division Organization..... F-IV-A-1

Appendix V - Plans Division..... F-V-1 to F-V-5

Appendix VI - Communications Division..... F-VI-1 to F-VI-9

Appendix VII - Comptroller Division..... F-VII-1 to F-VII-2

Appendix VIII - Ground Studies Group..... F-VIII-1 to F-VIII-7

TAB A - PRAIRIE FIRE Areas of Operation..... F-VIII-A-1

TAB B - SALEM HOUSE Areas of Operation..... F-VIII-B-1

TAB C - Organization..... F-VIII-C-1

TAB D - CCN Organization..... F-VIII-D-1

TAB E - CCC Organization..... F-VIII-E-1

TAB F - CCS Organization..... F-VIII-F-1

Appendix IX - Airborne Studies Group..... F-IX-1 to F-IX-5

TAB A - Team Locations..... F-IX-A-1

TAB B - Team Backgrounds..... F-IX-B-1 to F-IX-B-4

TAB C - OODLES (~~C~~) Areas..... F-IX-C-1

TAB D - BORDEN (~~C~~) Areas..... F-IX-D-1

TAB E - EARTH ANGEL Teams..... F-IX-E-1

TAB F - Summary of STRATA Missions..... F-IX-F-1 to F-IX-F-7

TAB G - STRATA Missions..... F-IX-G-1

Appendix X - Strategic Technical Directorate..... F-X-1 to F-X-16

TAB A - Chronological Development..... F-X-A-1

TAB B - Strategic Exploitation Service..... F-X-B-1

TAB C - Strategic Technical Service..... F-X-C-1

TAB D - Strategic Technical Directorate..... F-X-D-1

TAB E - Counterpart Relationships..... F-X-E-1

Appendix XI - Psychological Studies Group..... F-XI-1 to F-XI-9

TAB A - Pschological Studies Group Organization..... F-XI-A-1

[redacted] (b)(1)

5

Appendix XII - Radio Studies Group.....F-XII-1 to F-XII-3

TAB A - Radio Studies Group Organization..... F-XII-A-1

TAB B - VOF Facilities..... F-XII-B-1

TAB C - VOF Coverages..... F-XII-C-1 to F-XII-C-4

TAB D - VOF Daily Broadcast Schedule..... F-XII-D-1

TAB E - VOF Daily Programing..... F-XII-E-1

TAB F - Growth of Production..... F-XII-F-1

TAB G - Broadcast Hours..... F-XII-G-1

Appendix XIII - Recovery Studies Division..... F-XIII-1 to F-XIII-6

TAB A - Recovery Studies Division Organization..... F-XIII-A-1

TAB B - JPRC Initiated Operations..... F-XIII-B-1

TAB C - US and ARVN Operations..... F-XIII-C-1

TAB D - E and E Kits Deployed..... F-XIII-D-1

Appendix XIV - Training Studies Group..... F-XIV-1 to F-XIV-3

TAB A - Training Studies Group Organization..... F-XIV-A-1

Appendix XV - Air Studies Group..... F-XV-1 to F-XV-2

TAB A - Air Studies Group Organization..... F-XV-A-1

Section 1 - First Flight Detachment..... F-XV-1-1 to F-XV-1-8

TAB A - First Flight Organization..... F-XV-1-A-1

TAB B - Combat Mission Summary..... F-XV-1-B-1

TAB C - Aircraft Maintenance Status..... F-XV-1-C-1

Section 2 - 15th Special Operations Squardon..... F-XV-2-1 to F-XV-2-5

TAB A - Abort, Norm & Nors Rate..... F-XV-2-A-1

TAB B - Combat Mission Summary..... F-XV-2-B-1 to F-XV-2-B-2

TAB C - Flying Time..... F-XV-2-C-1

TAB D - Combat Support Summary..... F-XV-2-D-1

TAB E - Mission Accomplishment..... F-XV-2-E-1

TAB F - Training..... F-XV-2-F-1

Section 3 - 20th Special Operations Squardon..... F-XV-3-1 to F-XV-3-4

TAB A - Operational Statistics..... F-XV-3-A-1

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ANNEX F (SPECIAL OPERATIONS) TO MACV 1969 COMMAND HISTORY

1. (~~TSLD~~) GENERAL.

a. This annex gives detailed information on activities of the Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG) during calendar year 1969. The various programs and activities are covered at length in appendices to this annex.

b. Calendar year 1969 was marked by increased requirements, improved procedures, development of new concepts, tighter controls and added restrictions on some programs and lifted restrictions on other activities of MACSOG. Programs against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) elements in Laos and Cambodia and support of Field Forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) continued and increased within parameters issued by higher headquarters.

c. Internal reorganization, new installations and facilities, improved techniques, and new equipment have enhanced the functioning of the many facets of MACSOG and aided greatly in mission accomplishment.

2. (~~TSLD~~) MISSION. The Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observations Group mission is stated as follows:

a. As directed by COMUSMACV and with concurrence of the US Embassy, MACSOG will advise, train and support counterpart forces in out-of-country unconventional and psychological warfare operations.

b. MACSOG will conduct unilateral planning for unconventional warfare activities under existing COMUSSEASIA plans, and will be prepared when directed to activate and command the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Southeast Asia. (This mission statement is taken from COMUSMACV Msg ~~TSLD~~ 37284/ 210229Z Oct 65 and approved by CINCPAC Msg 182128Z Nov 65.)

3. (U) ORGANIZATION.

a. Headquarters MACSOG began 1969 operations under a Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) dated 30 October 1967. Authorized strength of the organization was 125 officers, 226 enlisted men and 10 civilians for a total of 361. On 21 May 1969, a new, revised JTD was approved by the JCS. On 7 October 1969 an increase of 49 spaces was approved as a part of the FY 69 Force Structure request, bringing the authorized strength to 131 officers, 281 enlisted personnel and 1 civilian for a

8

[redacted]

total of 413 spaces. In addition, on 17 October 1969, a reduction of 19 spaces was approved by the JCS. The reduction was part of the troop reduction program. The authorized strength at the end of the year was 128 officers, 265 enlisted personnel and 1 civilian for a total of 394. This total figure does not include 9 civilian spaces which do not belong to the Department of Defense.

4. (~~SLD~~) COMMAND. Colonel Stephen E. Cavanaugh, Jr., 546249722, commanded MACSOG throughout calendar year 1969.

5. (U) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION (APPENDIX I). Primary effort during CY 69 was to establish an administrative program for the headquarters which encompassed all-inclusive instructions for the entire spectrum of administrative functional areas. The program minimized training time of newly assigned administrative personnel, increased efficiency of paperwork management, and improved the quality of documents generated by this headquarters.

6. (~~SLD~~) INTELLIGENCE (APPENDIX II). Throughout 1969 requirements for intelligence support of MACSOG operations and dissemination of intelligence derived therefrom increased and varied markedly from requirements of past years. This presented a challenge to the Intelligence Division to increase output while simultaneously maintaining and improving the quality of its product. Through initiation of new concepts, development of new techniques and employment of new programs, the Intelligence Division not only increased production of intelligence but improved timeliness, substantive content and tactical utility of the product. In addition, improved targeting and collection techniques employed by MACSOG operational elements have insured a well-rounded intelligence collection and dissemination effort.

7. (~~TSLD~~) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING. (Appendix III)

a. Maritime Studies Branch (Sec 1, App III). Maritime operations were conducted in 1969 by the Maritime Operations Group, while staff cognizance was exercised through the Maritime Studies Branch.

b. Air Studies Branch. (Sec 2, App III). Air operations were primarily in support of PRARIE FIRE, SALEM HOUSE and SHEDDER (~~[illegible]~~) operations.

c. Psychological Studies Branch. (Sec 4, App III). The MACSOG Psychological Warfare Program is directed against the enemy in both North and South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

d. Ground Studies Branch. (Sec 4, App III). The Ground Studies Branch continued in 1969 to exercise staff supervision of the activities of three subordinate commands: Airborne Studies Group; Ground Studies Group; and Training Studies Group.

8. (S) LOGISTICS. (Appendix IV) Logistic activities during 1969 were centered on development of procedures and expansion of activities to provide more positive response in meeting the logistic requirements of a wide range of MACSOG operations. At year's end the Logistics Division had been reorganized along more functional lines to insure increased capability and greater efficiency in executing the expanding requirements of the many elements of MACSOG.

9. (~~SLD~~) PLANS. (Appendix V) The Plans Division continued throughout 1969 to provide current, long-range and contigency planning for MACSOG and JUWTF operations, as well as providing input to the plans of higher headquarters. Post-Hostilities planning was the major effort in the last half of the year.

10. (~~SLD~~) COMMUNICATIONS. (Appendix VI) Communications activities expanded significantly during 1969. A program to educate personnel in the use of MACSOG codes was implemented to improve transmission security.

11. (~~TSLD~~) COMPTROLLER. (Appendix VII) Calendar year 1969 was the first full year of operation by the Comptroller's Division since it was separated from Logistics Division in October of 1968. Two downward revisions of the Annual Funding Plan for FY 69 were made in January and May 1969. Total obligations for FY 69 were made in January and May 1969. Total obligations for FY 69 as of 31 Dec 1969 were $19,321,400.00 as compared to the revised annual funding plan for FY 69 of $21,737,900.00. A final budget for FY 70 of $25,778,400.00 was submitted and approved. FY 70 obligations to 31 Dec 69 are $8,627,000.00.

12. (~~TSLD~~) GROUND STUDIES GROUP. (Appendix VIII) The Commander, Ground Studies Group directs cross border ground operations which fall in two programs, (PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE).

13. (~~TSLD~~) AIRBORNE STUDIES GROUP. (Appendix IX) The Airborne Studies Group continued to administer the TIMBERWORK (S) Agent Operations. TIMBERWORK (S) Operations in 1969 were conducted under three subordinate programs; Agent Operations, STRATA (Short Term Road watch and Target Acquisition), and Diversionary Operations. FOREA (S), the SINGLETON and EARTH ANGEL programs were started during January 1969.

14. (S) STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE (STD). (Appendix X) The Strategic Technical Directorate, (STD), Joint General Staff (JGS), Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) is the counterpart organization of MACSOG.

15. (TSLD) PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES GROUP. (Appendix XI) The mission of the MACSOG Psychological Studies Group is to conduct black psychological operations against North Vietnam (NVN). Black psychological operations directed against NVN are identified by the code word "HUMIDOR (Ø)". The primary target of HUMIDOR (Ø) operations is the civilian population of NVN. These operations are conducted to: establish attitudes with NVN contrary to present policies of the Lao Dong Party (LDP), create a feeling of distrust for the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), promote war-weariness and engender an attitude which indicates that continuation of the war is contrary to DRV national welfare.

16. (TSLD) RADIO STUDIES GROUP (Appendix XII)

a. Operates Voice of Freedom (VOF).

b. The Voice of Freedom (VOF) radio is a "gray" radio operation in the sense that the source of origin is not specifically identified. However, unwavering support for GVN/USG policies leaves little doubt in the minds of the audience that VOF is sponsored and supported by the RVN/US.

17. (TSLD) RECOVERY STUDIES GROUP (Appendix XIII)

a. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) mission is to provide a capability within USMACV for personnel recovery operations. In accomplishment of this mission JPRC was involved in 29 attempted recovery operations during 1969. These operations included conventional and unconventional warfare raids against Prisoner-of-War camps, as well as those operations mounted subsequent to termination of search and rescue (SAR) efforts.

b. In addition JPRC engaged in pertinent Evasion and Escape Program activities to include: testing, modifying and prepositioning of survival kits capable of being air-dropped; rating selected Areas for Evasion (SAFE Areas); and periodic briefings for Army, Air Force and Navy aircrews on the mission and capabilities of JPRC.

c. JPRC continued the reward program for return of missing/captured US personnel or information concerning them, and supported this program with Psychological Operations as appropriate.

18. (TSLD) TRAINING STUDIES GROUP (Appendix XIV) Throughout 1969 the Training Studies Group continued to administer MACSOG training programs to support TIMBERWORK (Ø), PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE requirements.

19. (TSLD) AIR STUDIES GROUP. (Appendix XV). On 28 October 1967, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by Chief, MACSOG, and the Chief of Staff, 7th Air Force which created the position of Deputy Commander for Special Air Operations (DSCO). Three Air Force special air operations

units (First Flight Detachment, 15th Special Operations Squadron, and 20th Special Operations Squadron) dedicated to supporting MACSOG were assigned under the new position. A detailed history of each unit is provided in the following sections:

Section 1 - First Flight Detachment

Section 2 - 15th Special Operations Squadron

Section 3 - 20th Special Operations Squadron

13

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TAB A

MACSOG ORGANIZATION THROUGH DECEMBER 1969



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APPENDIX I

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. (U) GENERAL. The Personnel and Administrative Division has increased in strength in proportion with the other elements of the Studies and Observations Group. In addition, as the overall strength of the Group increased, the necessity for providing administrative support and services increased substantially. Two additional positions were added to the Personnel and Administrative Division portion of the Joint Table of Distribution during this year. The Personnel and Administrative Division performs the functions of G-1 and Adjutant General Staff Organizations; therefore acts in the capacity of both a coordination and special staff agency.

2. (~~S~~) MISSION. The Personnel and Admisistrative Division:

a. Advises and assists the MACSOG Commander on matters pertaining to personnel and administration.

b. Interprets personnel and administrative policies and directives from higher headquarters. Formulates, implements and disseminates MACSOG personnel and administrative policies, directives and procedures.

c. Exercises overall staff responsibility for, and coordinates the personnel and administrative functions within MACSOG. Directs and supervises all personnel matters and procedures, including requisitions and assignment of personnel.

d. Supervises and coordinates activities of subordinate branchs of the Personnel and Administrative Division, and exercises staff supervision of personnel and administrative activities of units or agencies subordinate to MACSOG.

e. Maintains liaison with other US military organizations or government agencies concerning all types of administrative matters. These organizations include the 5th SFG, USARV Headquarters, MACV Staff Sections, Headquarters Seventh Air Force and COMANVFORV.

3. (U) ORGANIZATION. The Personnel and Administrative Division consists of two subordinate branches. (See TAB A). The Personnel Services Branch is responsible for all personnel actions both military and civilian, publication of orders, awards and decorations, and strength reporting. The Administrative Services Branch is responsible for publication of MACSOG directives and policies, processing of correspondence, classified documents control for the entire organization, providing guidance on filing procedures, a forms control program and requisitioning of publications and blank forms. Each subordinate branch is supervised by

an Adjutant General Corps officer. Authorized strength as of 31 December 1969 was four officers and twelve enlisted spaces. The assigned strength was three officers and twelve enlisted personnel.

4. (U) ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. During the year 1969, two draft reorganized Tables of Distribution depicting reorganization were prepared for submission to higher headquarters. The first was completed in October, but was not submitted due to a reduction of 19 spaces as a result of the September decrease in strength in Vietnam. In addition, 49 spaces were added to the Table of Distribution in October as the MACSOG part of the Force Structure for FY 1969. The Second Draft TD was prepared incorporating the above changes and desired internal reorganization and was submitted to Headquarters MACV on 24 December 1969.

b. Improvement was made in the Division by publishing a Standing Operating Procedure for each position. The one year tour made it imperative that procedures be simplified so that new personnel could assume their duties with a minimum of overlap.

c. In addition, a 77 page Studies and Observations Organization and Functions Manual and Staff Directory of the Group were published. The directory is published quarterly and contains all activities and names of Senior NCO's and Officers to include telephone numbers.

d. A new Civilian Personnel Manual was published which gave guidance to fifteen subordinate Civilian Personnel Officers. The manual was in consonance with the USARV and MACV Manual with modifications in several areas unique to the Group. In addition, a survey of all civilian positions was initiated during the year, which required the Civilian Personnel Officer to travel to the various locations in South Vietnam and make a detailed manpower survey. The survey resulted in a reduction of 56 authorized spaces. After completion of the survey, the Table of Distribution was appropriately modified, published and disseminated.

e. The office of the Personnel and Administrative Division was completely renovated. Paneling and accoustical tile were used to renovate two of the main working areas. The ceilings were lowered and new light fixtures installed.

5. (U) PERSONNEL. A listing of officers assigned to key positions during the year is included at TAB B.

TAB A

ORGANIZATION CHART
PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION DIVISION



16

TAB B

KEY OFFICERS, 1969

POSITION	DATES	INCUMBENT
1. Chief, SOG	1 Jan 69 - 31 Dec 69	COL S.E. Cavanaugh
a. Deputy	1 Jan 69 - 20 Feb 69	COL R.L. Gleason
	21 Feb 69 - 31 Dec 69	COL B.P. Gibson
b. Executive Officer	1 Jan 69 - 5 Mar 69	LTC I.C. Bland
	6 Mar 69 - 8 Sep 69	LTC R.W. Bomberger
	9 Sep 69 - 31 Dec 69	LTC F.G. Wilmot
c. Special Assistant	1 Jan 69 - 24 Jun 69	Mr. W.E. Donnett
	25 Jun 69 - 31 Dec 69	Mr. J.H. Malone
d. Acting Inspector General	28 Jun 69 - 31 Dec 69	LTC A.C. Monshower
2. Chief, Pers & Admin Div	1 Jan 69 - 4 May 69	MAJ G. Anthony
	5 May 69 - 31 Dec 69	MAJ E.D. Duran
3. Chief, Intel Div	1 Jan 69 - 24 Nov 69	COL I.T. McDonald
	25 Nov 69 - 31 Dec 69	COL J.F. Smith
4. Chief, O&T Div	1 Jan 69 - 27 Feb 69	COL J.G. Hayes
	*22 Mar 69 - 31 Dec 69	COL T.E. Marriott
a. Chief, Maritime Studies Branch	1 Jan 69 - 4 Feb 69	CDR G.F. Rogers
	5 Feb 69 - 31 Dec 69	CDR J.F. Baumgardner
b. Chief, Ground Studies Branch	1 Jan 69 - 10 Mar 69	LTC R.D. McKnight
	11 Mar 69 - 10 Jun 69	LTC C.S. Snowden
	11 Jun 69 - 31 Dec 69	LTC E.T. Hayes
c. Chief, Air Studies Branch	1 Jan 69 - 2 May 69	LTC H.V. Hopkins Jr.
	3 May 69 - 31 Dec 69	LTC K.E. Heller
d. Chief, Psyops Studies Branch	1 Jan 69 - 25 May 69	MAJ J.R. McGavin
	26 May 69 - 31 Dec 69	MAJ D.J. Thiessen

* During the period 27 February - 22 March 1969, LTC J.B. Toohey assumed the duties of Acting Chief, Operations and Training Division.

17

POSITION	DATES	INCUMBENT
5. Chief, Logistics	1 Jan 69 - 24 Nov 69	LTC D.F. Friend
	25 Nov 69 - 31 Dec 69	LTC T.C. Perkins
Chief, Medical Br	1 Jan 69 - 31 Dec 69	LT R.A. Gross
6. Chief, Plans Div	1 Jan 69 - 25 Jun 69	LTC R.M. Johnson
	26 Jun 69 - 31 Dec 69	LTC H.A. MacDonald
7. Chief, Commo Div	1 Jan 69 - 1 Mar 69	CDR S.C. Montgomery
	2 Mar 69 - 31 Dec 69	CDR W.T. Hollenbach
8. Chief, Compt Div	1 Jan 69 - 8 Jul 69	LCDR D.J. Brunner
	9 Jul 69 - 31 Dec 69	LCDR L.H. Klosky
9. Commander, Maritime Studies Group	1 Jan 69 - 30 Sep 69	LCDR C.T. Edson
	1 Oct 69 - 31 Dec 69	CDR H.W. Bergbauer
10. Chief, Psyops Gp	1 Jan 69 - 15 Jul 69	Mr. H.F. Robbins
	16 Jul 69 - 31 Dec 69	Mr. R. Draper
Ground Studies Gp	1 Jan 69 - 30 Jun 69	COL W.F. Johnson
	1 Jul 69 - 31 Dec 69	COL J.J. Isler
12. Airborne Studies Gp	1 Jan 69 - 6 Sep 69	LTC J.R. Jarvis
	7 Sep 69 - 31 Dec 69	LTC R.E. Scofield
13. Radio Studies Gp	1 Jan 69 - 14 Jun 69	Mr. M.D. Brown
	15 Jun 69 - 31 Dec 69	Mr. L.M. Steed
14. Chief, JPRC	1 Jan 69 - 28 Feb 69	LTC R. D. Bradshaw
	1 Mar 69 - 11 Jul 69	LTC J. G. Firth
	12 Jul 69 - Present	LTC G. R. Reinker

APPENDIX II

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. (~~TSLD~~) GENERAL.

a. The Intelligence Branch was formed in March 1964 and was composed of three sections: the Collections Section, the Targets Section, and the Productions and Estimates Section. The primary source of intelligence at this time was obtained by aerial photographic missions and maritime LOKI, and MINT missions.

b. The goals set forth by MACSOG Intelligence Division for CY 69 were continued improvement in both quality and quantity of intelligence produced from MACSOG operations in terms of timeliness, substantive content and tactical utility.

c. Through initiation of new concepts, refinement of existing techniques, and aggressive exploitation of all available intelligence resources, MACSOG Intelligence Division continued to improve its position with respect to goals set forth above. Further development of the Targeting Panel concept achieved a coordinated intelligence collection and dissemination program responsive to the needs of all command components concerned. Continued refinements in Photo Intelligence Support and collection techniques has insured more thorough mission planning support for field elements and has improved quality and content of mission results. The Intelligence Division has continued the use of data handling systems and explored methods of adapting new technology to increase support of the intelligence mission.

2. (~~TSLD~~) MISSION. The basic mission of the Intelligence Division is to collect, collate and disseminate intelligence information to MACSOG staff agencies in support of MACSOG operational elements and to receive, collate and disseminate intelligence information derived from those operations to the intelligence community. This basic mission is broken out into six main functions, as follows:

a. Development and dissemination of intelligence estimates, summaries and studies.

b. Chair targeting workshops.

c. Advise Chief, MACSOG on matters of security and prepare necessary directives.

d. Exercise staff supervision of intelligence activities of units and agencies subordinate to MACSOG.

e. Maintain liaison with other military organizations and government agencies concerning intelligence matters.

f. Insure operational plans give full consideration to the potential of the intelligence collection either in support of, or in conjunction with, other U.S. agencies whose mission involves the collection of intelligence.

3. (~~TSLD~~) ORGANIZATION. At the close of 1969 the Intelligence Division had been organized into four branches and had an authorized strength of 57 personnel under the JTD, approved in October 1969, and an actual strength of 50.

a. Operations Branch: The Operations Branch is composed of six sections; Laos Study Section (handles all intelligence matter involving PRAIRIE FIRE operations); Cambodian Study Section (deals with all SALEM HOUSE intelligence matters); Vietnamese Study Section (divided into two subsections, one for all matters related to the MACSOG Agent program and the other for all air intelligence information for NVN, Laos and Cambodia); Exploitation Section (responsible for the exploitation of MACSOG Prisoners and detainees obtained from MACSOG operations); and, the Debriefers of the RT's when they return from missions . There were 22 personnel assigned to the Operation Branch at the end of 1969 verus 25 authorized.

b. Photo Analysis Branch: The Photo Analysis Branch provides photo intelligence assistance to MACSOG staff agencies through the respective Operations Branch section for support of MACSOG operational elements. It is composed of two sections: The Imagery Interpretation Section provides photo intelligence reports on all MACSOG targets as well as special studies, while the Photo Lab Section provides film processing facilities in support of the MACSOG hand and aerial-hand held photography program. At the end of 1969, Photo Analysis Branch had 18 assigned personnel against 20 authorized, of which 4 are in the Photo Lab Section.

c. Security Branch: The Security Branch advises the Chief, Intelligence Division on all maters of security and prepares the necessary directives. The Branch has 5 personnel authorized and 4 assigned.

d. Administrative Branch: This branch provides administrative support to the Intelligence Division. Four personnel are authorized for the Branch, 4 assigned.

4. (~~TSLD~~) INTELLIGENCE DIVISION IMPROVEMENTS. The following improvements were made during 1969 to provide a more qualitative and timely intelligence product in support of the MACSOG mission and goals set forth by the Intelligence Division.

a. Reorganization of the Division: Significantly increased targeting operations and continuing expansion of operational activities throughout the year with commensurate increase in staff work required a thorough review of the Intelligence Division organization. This reorganization is depicted in TAB A. Among improvements was the establishment of field Photo Lab facilities at each C&C to provide more timely support on high priority intelligence items formerly rendered by the Photo Lab Section at this headquarters.

b. Intelligence Reporting: The Intelligence Division made a concerted effort to improve quality, quantity and timeliness of intelligence reported to MACV J2 and the intelligence community. These efforts included the following:

(1) Target Panels. Monthly target panel meetings between MACV J2 and MACSOG representatives have played an important part in dissemination of quality intelligence. They have served as a forum in which intelligence is disseminated by personal contact with the consumer, allowing him to see the raw intelligence information, discuss and analyze it with his MACSOG counterpart, and provide additional collection guidance or targeting requirements directly to the collector and operator.

(2) Spot Reports. Extensive use has been made of the KY-3 Secure Voice Telephone to "spot report" intelligence as it was received from MACSOG's operational units directly to the MACV J2 action officer. The use of this means of communication has been encouraged and developed during the year. It has resulted in real time intelligence reporting to MACV J2 and timely support from MACV J2 to the Intelligence Division of MACSOG.

(3) Intelligence Information Reports (IIR). Confidential IIR's were used to disseminate information throughout the intelligence community. All MACSOG intelligence reports have been published in this manner. Every effort has been made to improve timeliness of these reports. Evaluations of IIR's have been requested from both DIA and MACV J2 to insure MACSOG's intelligence information consumers continue to receive quality products. These evaluation reports are closely monitored and serve as basis for improvements in the reports.

(4) Personal Contacts. The Division has encouraged all desk officers to make frequent visits with MACV J2, the Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate and the Liaison Bureau. Closer working relationships have developed as a result of these visits.

(5) Briefings. Part of the reporting system used by the Intelligence Division is the weekly MACSOG COMUSMACV Wrap-up, attended by COMUSMACV and his senior staff. Monthly briefings are provided MACV J2 on results of Target Panel meetings. These two briefings provide current updates to all MACV staff agencies on results of MACSOG operations, target scheduling and significant intelligence produced.

5. (~~TSLD~~) OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

a. SALEM HOUSE (SH) Operations.

(1) The Cambodian Study Group, which meets once a month, with representatives from all the Military Intelligence Collection agencies in Vietnam, State and MACV J2 continues to meet and discuss the over-all Cambodian collection requirements. At the September meeting several members of the group voiced their opinion that since all sources (SOG and Special Intelligence) could not be discussed because of clearance, that the meetings were not accomplishing the objective. It was then decided a pilot group, consisting of [redacted] State, MACV J2 (CIIB), CIED & SRA and SOG, would meet prior to the regular monthly meetings to discuss all sources of intelligence on Cambodia and prepare the agenda for the regular meeting. Although this concept is still in its infant stages and too early to judge, it has been well received by all participants. (b)(1)

(2) Several significant events took place during the calendar year 1969 which resulted in the modification of the Salem House Area of Operations (SHAO) and restyling methods of operations.

(a) In March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cancelled several targets and placed a two week restriction on any operations south of BA 740, while the United States negotiated the release of three US POW's held by the Cambodians.

(b) Shortly after the release of the US POW's, Prince Sihanouk made an announcement that he was considering resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States. MACSOG reduced the depth of its cross border operations in an effort not to cause an international incident with the Cambodians. The number of helicopter inserts were also reduced and MACSOG went to more "walk-ins" from SF camps and a new concept of launching RT's from platoon bases located in South Vietnam.

22

(c) In late April and early May, Cambodian military forces began military operations against the rebels in Ratanakiri Province and were successful in reoccupying the villages of Pakap and Bokham on Tonle San River. MACSOG ceased all operations in this area until it was determined exactly where the Cambodian military was located. After a month it was determined the Cambodians were not capable of conducting operations north of the Tonle San River. MACSOG then resumed operations against the NVA north of the river.

(d) In late August and early September, III Corps seeded areas in South Vietnam to a depth of 4 kms extending from the east edge of BA 350 along the Cambodian border to the west edge of BA 352 (Fishhook). This seeding operation completely denied any MACSOG cross border operations in those areas for a period of 6 months.

b. SALEM HOUSE (SH) Intelligence Activities.

(1) Intelligence Reports rendered.

(a) MACSOG Intelligence Division provided MACV J2 (CIIB) 238 spot reports on enemy activity in the SALEM HOUSE Area of Operations during the year.

(b) During the calendar year 607 Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) were written on enemy activity in the SALEM HOUSE AO compared to 418 for CY 68.

(2) Studies, Evaluation & Special Reports.

(a) In March, the Intel Division prepared or provided the input to three studies and one evaluation.

1 A study on tracked vehicles over a year's time in the SHAO was prepared for MACV J2

2 A two month study (Feb & Mar), by Base Areas, of Enemy Activity and MACSOG activities (i.e. missions run, team sightings and casualties) in the SHAO was prepared for Chief, MACSOG for presentation to COMUS-MACV.

3 An evaluation of STRATA Team operations over a three month period, in the SHAO was prepared for the Commander of the Ground Studies Group.

4 A Cambodian Military Uniform Study was prepared for the use of Command and Control South for the purpose of briefing the team members.

(b) In April, one Special Report and one study were prepared.

1 A study of lucrative Prisoner of War target areas within the SHAO was prepared for the Director of Operations and Training.

2 The Intelligence Division provided the input for a Special Operation Report on significant SALEM HOUSE Activities in reponse to a Joint Chiefs of Staff request.

(c) In June, one special report and one study were prepared.

1 A Special Report and accompanying photographs concerning Cambodian attitude toward the VC/NVA was provided to Ambassador Bunker.

2 A study on the location of all Cambodian Military and National Police outposts, checkpoints and border crossing points within the SALEM HOUSE Area of Operations was prepared for use by CCS.

(d) In July, one study on Cambodian vehicles and license plates was prepared for assisting team members at CCS to better recognize Cambodian vehicles.

(3) Target Selection and Development.

(a) A total of 901 targets were selected and developed during the year, compared to 300 targets the year before. (443 missions were accomplished in CY 69)

(b) Four target areas, suspected of housing US POW's, were developed for JPRC

(4) Wiretap Operations: Three wiretap operations were attempted under the CIRCUS ACT program with negative results.

(5) Significant intelligence produced during 1969:

(a) 939 trails were located in the SALEM HOUSE Area of Operations, which were suspected of being infiltration routes.

(b) 187 active and inactive bivouac areas and way stations were discovered.

(c) 23 sightings of communications wire were reported.

(d) 4 POW's of low significant intelligence value were captured.

(e) 5,113 enemy were sighted during the year infiltrating through SALEM HOUSE AO.

(f) 481 vehicles and 40 cycles were observed in the VC/NVA held territory.

(g) 7 cache sites were located.

(h) 7 training areas were discovered.

(i) 4 truck parks were located.

(j) Aerial and ground photographs were taken of roads, trails, bridges, storage and bivouac areas, enemy fortifications and Cambodian terrain.

c. PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) Operations:

(1) The Data Processing System which had been used by the PRAIRIE FIRE desk was converted to Automatic Data Processing in September. This will hasten the retrieval of needed information and allow for varied formats upon request. Under the new system only MACSOG derived information is being utilized. This eliminates duplication of effort because both TASK FORCE ALPHA and 7th Air Force maintains an all source data base, and we receive their support.

(2) Task Force Alpha started producing, from their data base, a ten kilometer readout for all approved targets. The readouts contain all enemy activity reported in that area. They are then sent to the C&C concerned for use by the RT.

d. PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) Intelligence Activities:

(1) During the calendar year, 766 IIR's were produced on enemy activity and terrain in the PRAIRIE FIRE AO. This compares favorably with the 410 IIR's produced in 1968 and 277 in 1967.

(2) Analysis of the PRAIRIE FIRE AO was continuously in progress with the areas "West of the DMZ", BA 614 and West, BA 611 and BA 607 receiving the most emphasis. Other areas which received attention were:

(a) VC/NVA LOC's.

(b) POL Pipelines.

(c) Communication lines.

(d) Possible PW Camps.

(e) Base Camps, bivouac areas, bunker complexes.

(3) Wiretap Operations: 7 wiretap operations were attempted under the Circus Act Program with no information of intelligence value being obtained.

(4) Target Selection and Development:

(a) During the year 864 targets were selected and developed. The total missions run for the year were 458.

(5) Significant Intelligence Produced:

(a) A PF FAC rider was the first to observe the POL pipeline in the area west of the DMZ resulting in several ARC LIGHT strikes in September.

(b) A riverwatch team on the Xe Bang Hiang reported on the extensive usage of that LOC resulting in an ARC LIGHT strike in October.

(c) A platoon and an RT in BA 609 reported the construction of a new road and enemy strong points again resulting in ARC LIGHT strikes in September.

(d) An operation in BA 607 captured the first plotting board for a 122mm artillery piece in April.

(e) A series of operations in the area west of BA 614 and in the base area itself proved that the enemy is using the areas adjacent to the primary LOC's.

(f) In addition to the above, much information on LOC's, commo lines, vehicular movement, storage areas and camps/bivouac areas was produced and disseminated.

(g) 655 trails were located in the PRAIRIE FIRE AO which were suspected of being infiltration routes.

(h) 104 active and inactive bivouac areas were discovered.

(i) 61 sightings of communications wire were reported.

(j) 25 cache sites were found.

(k) 449 enemy were sighted during the year in the PRAIRIE FIRE AO.

(l) No prisoners of intelligence significance were captured in the PRAIRIE FIRE AO.

e. PLOWMAN (ℓ) Operations: As a result of the 1 November 1968 standdown on operations in North Vietnam, PLOWMAN (ℓ) operations have ceased. However, intelligence support as required is being provided to assets which are conducting operations in-country in an effort to maintain their readiness for reinitiation of operations in NVN, if so ordered.

f. TIMBERWORK (ℓ): With the cessation of operations against NVN, all assets were shifted for use in Laos and Cambodia, with intelligence support provided by respective intelligence sections in coordination with the TIMBERWORK (ℓ) section. Primary TIMBERWORK (ℓ) support provided by NVN desk personnel was the Singleton Agent Program and EARTH ANGEL programs under the auspices of Airborne Studies Group (MACSOG-36).

(1) Information received from Singleton Agents is under continuous review and evaluation. In addition to spot reports of significant information to MACV J2, all relevant data is reduced to an Intelligence Information Report (IIR) for widest dissemination within the intelligence community.

(2) Information derived from EARTH ANGEL operations is also processed as indicated in paragraph f. (1) above.

(3) During the reporting period, the NVN section has prepared nine (9) IIRs, based on information derived from Singleton Agent Operations. The NVN section has prepared eleven (11) IIRs relative to EARTH ANGEL derived information.

g. A compilation of all available pertinent intelligence data on NVN was undertaken as a standby data base to support any future operations in NVN in event current restrictions are lifted.

h. Air Intelligence Operations:

(1) The Air Intelligence Section maintained Order of Battle on aircraft and airfields (AOB), Anti-Aircraft Artillery and Automatic Weapons (AAAOB) and Electronic Systems (EOB) of North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; as well as Surface to Air Missile Order of Battle (SAMOB) of North Vietnam and enemy AAA threat information in South Vietnam for use by MACSOG and its subordinate units.

(2) Air Intelligence Activities:

(a) All applicable information on enemy aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, radar and SAM was forwarded to MACSOG operational units as it became available.

(b) The anti-aircraft threat in Laos increased over six hundred percent reaching a peak in mid-June. With the onset of the monsoon rains the enemy began moving weapons into depot maintenance. The increased enemy reaction ratio, noted by late October, indicated that redeployment of these weapons was progressing at a very rapid rate. Large caliber (100mm/85mm) AA weapons have been deployed in the vicinity of Ban Karai Pass, just North of the PRAIRIE FIRE AO.

(c) The anti-aircraft threat in the SALEM HOUSE AO increased, primarily as a result of the enemy's ability to rapidly deploy his weapons.

(d) No fire control radar is known to have been located in either the PRAIRIE FIRE AO nor the SALEM HOUSE AO.

(3) The production of a comprehensive listing of all available information on AW/AAA sites within the PRAIRIE FIRE AO and SALEM HOUSE AO was begun on a monthly basis. Dissemination was made to headquarters elements and to all MACSOG operational units.

6. (~~TSLD~~) PHOTO ANALYSIS OPERATIONS.

a. During 1969, significant changes were made in intelligence support for MACSOG operational teams. Emphasis centered on producing target materials covering an area from a 5 kilometer radius around the center of target to an area 10 x 20 kilometers, depending upon the mission involved. The narrative support for the photo map became a comprehensive, categorized summary of intelligence within the target areas. The following items were included: Terrain and vegetation, rivers and streams, roads and trails, military activity/defenses, village/civilian activity, agricultural activity, landing/drop zones, avenues of movement and miscellaneous. A 1:50,000 map was annotated depicting the items written in the narrative. The map was then enlarged to a scale of 1:25,000 and printed on waterproof paper. This item is designed for the team leader to take on missions.

b. Improvements in filing and retreival of photo reports at Headquarters and the C&C's were implemented. Plot books were compiled, using a 1:100,000 map as a base, with an overlay indicating areas covered by a photo analysis report. These books now present a visual reference of all photo maps produced.

c. Instruction in ground hand-held photography was expanded to include the operation of the Asahi Pentax Spotmatic, PENN EE and Nikon II cameras. Further emphasis was placed upon taking photography of intelligence value by the construction of briefing aids and the publication of an instruction booklet.

d. Photo labs were established and are now operational at the C&C's and NKP to process team photography. An enlarging and limited color capability is available. This facility allows for more meaningful and timely intelligence to be reported at the C&C level. The labs are manned by volunteers from the staff and are trained at the Headquarters lab. Periodic visits by headquarters technicians are made to insure that the labs are producing the highest quality product consistent with available equipment.

e. A training film was produced to show the techniques employed during the insertion and extraction of an operational team. The film was made by photo analysis personnel operating with RT's in the Camp Long Than AO. It will be used as a training film for new personnel at the C&C's.

f. The Photo Analysis Branch library contains approximately 300,000 feet of film representing coverage of MACSOG's AO. Approximately 5,000 feet are processed through the library each week. An estimated 5,000 maps and charts are on hand to supply sections within MACSOG Headquarters and the VN Liaison Branch.

g. Replacement of trained, qualified personnel continued to be a problem. Augmentation on a 6-month TDY basis was provided by the First Special Forces Group in Okinawa.

7. (~~S~~) SECURITY BRANCH. The following are the major activities accomplished by the Security Branch during the period 1 January - 31 December 1969.

a. Wrote the following directives:

(1) MACSOG Dir 360-1 (~~S~~), Policies and Procedures (U).

(2) MACSOG Dir 380-10, Destruction of Classified Material.

(3) MACSOG Dir 380-11 (~~S~~), Cover Stories (~~S~~)

(4) MACSOG Dir 380-12 (TS), Classification Guide (U).

(5) MACSOG Dir 380-13, Conditions of Entry for MACV-1.

b. Re-wrote the following directives:

(1) MACV Dir 380-29 (S), Access to Studies and Observations Group (SOG) Information (U).

(2) MACSOG Dir 380-7, Access to Studies and Observations Group (SOG) Information.

(3) MACSOG Dir 381-1 (S), Reporting Biographic Data (U).

(4) MACSOG Dir 604-1 (S), Agent Dossiers and Security Checks (S).

(5) MACSOG Dir 604-2 (S), Recruitment Records and Security Checks (S).

(6) MACSOG Dir 606-1, SOG Headquarters Pass System.

c. Conducted 21 CI Technical (DASE) Inspections.

d, Conducted 34 CI Inspections.

e. Processed 249 security checks on indigenous operational personnel.

f. Processed 131 requests for security clearances for indigenous personnel.

g. Supervised the conduct of an Operational Security (OPSEC) Survey. The OPSEC team was composed of representatives from Operations and Training Division, Communications Division, 101st Radio Research Company, and Security Branch.

h. Conducted 21 limited investigations involving MACSOG personnel and/or information.

i. Supervised the conduct of 11 formal investigations conducted in accordance with AR 15-6, AR 380-5, and MACV Directive 380-5.

j. Revised the Permanent Access Roster for most major activities which request MACSOG briefings.

k. Requested and monitored the conduct of a Physical Security Survey of MACV-1 Compound. (Conducted by HAC PMO).

l. Requested and monitored the conduct of a Counterintelligence Survey of MACSOG Headquarters. (Conducted by 5th Bn, 525 MI Group.)

m. Requisitioned and received new photographic and laminating equipment to be used in preparing passes for MACV-1 Compound and for MACSOG Headquarters.

n. Coordinated and processed paperwork for polygraph examinations of key indigenous personnel at all MACSOG locations.

o, Continued to maintain liaison with various intelligence and investigative agencies in the Saigon area. Liaison has been strengthened by attending the regularly scheduled meeting of the Intelligence Investigative Agencies in the Saigon area.

p. Submitted change to JTD, deleting the USMC, E6, MOS 0211, and one Army E6, MOS 97B and adding an Army WO, MOS 971A and an Army E5, MOS 97D.

q. Processed approximately 809 requests for MACSOG briefings, maintained supporting files and coordinated publication of printout of those briefed with IDHS.

r. Prepared continuity file for Security Branch with supporting SOP's.

s. Continued to give security briefings to all incoming personnel and to debrief departing personnel. Established schedule for daily briefings and debriefings.

t. Assumed responsibility for operation and maintenance of shredder on MACV-1 Compound used for destruction of classified material.

8. (~~TSLD~~) INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS (SAMPLES).

a. A MACSOG team operating in Base Area 613 in February 1969 captured two Soviet aiming circles, one complete plotting board, two Soviet R-108-D field radios, a Soviet binocular periscope and numerous papers and technical documents pertaining to the Soviet 122mm artillery piece.

b. A MACSOG RT operating in Base Area 607 in July 1969 captured three 37mm AAA guns and a quantity of 37mm ammunition.

c. West of Base Area 609 in September 1969, a MACSOG RT encountered an enemy force being led and controlled by 4 Chinese advisors.

d. A MACSOG Trailwatch team in BA 702 observed and reported 175 enemy moving east, armed with AK-47's and carrying full rucksacks. Two enemy were pulling a machine gun mounted on wheels.

e. A MACSOG team operating south of Base Area 702 discovered a ferry and dock complex on the Tonle San River.

TAB A

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION MACV SOG



PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION

	AUTH	ASG
COMMAND SECTION	3	2
ADMIN BRANCH	4	4
OPERATIONS BRANCH	25	22
PHOTO ANALYSIS BRANCH	20	18
SECURITY BRANCH	5	4
DIVISION TOTAL	57	50

APPENDIX III

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING DIVISION

1. (~~S~~) GENERAL. Appendix III contains the 1969 historical summaries of the Operations and Training Division. History of the sub-branches are presented in sections as indicated below:

a. Section 1 - Maritime Studies Branch.

b. Section 2 - Air Studies Branch.

c. Section 3 - Psyops Studies Branch

d. Section 4 - Ground Studies Branch.

2. (~~S~~) MISSION. To assist Chief, MACSOG in combined matters pertaining to operations, organization and training. Inherent to this are the following tasks:

a. Provides staff support for all air, ground, maritime and psychological operations.

b. Makes recommendations, during planning and operations, concerning Task Organization and priorities for use of resources including personnel, supplies and equipment.

c. Supervises preparation of operations plans and orders.

d. Integrates support from all services, US agencies and counterpart organizations with MACSOG operations.

e. Designates general locations for fixed installations.

f. Develops and maintains the troop bases to insure assignment of the service components needed to support and accomplish the mission.

g. Organizes and equips units of all service components.

h. Assists counterpart headquarters in the organization of unconventional warfare units.

i. Plans and conducts training inspections.

j. Assists counterpart headquarters in training matters.

3. (U) ORGANIZATION. See TAB A.

4. (~~TSLD~~) MARITIME STUDIES BRANCH (MACSOG-31).

a. Advises the Director, O&T on matters concerning maritime and cross-beach operations.

b. Advises the Director, O&T, of the status of plans and operations and of the results of completed operations.

c. Provides staff supervision of the activities of the Maritime Operations Group at DaNang, RVN, and other forward operating bases.

d. Provides advisory support and assistance to counterpart personnel engaged in planning and execution of maritime operations.

e. Coordinates and provides assistance to counterpart personnel in recruiting, organizing, training, planning and staging of operational forces engaged in maritime operations.

f. Coordinates all planned maritime operations with other friendly forces to prevent mutual interference of forces.

g. Prepares and submits to higher authority for approval, plans for all planned activities and concepts of the Maritime Operations Group.

h. Provides liaison with the military establishment for the development and procurement of new equipment for employment in maritime operations.

5. (~~TSLD~~) AIR STUDIES BRANCH (MACSOG-32).

a. Prepares and maintains plans for the employment of air assets in support of unconventional warfare as directed by COMUSMACV or JCS and for the direction, coordination and monitoring of missions in support of unconventional warfare.

b. Prepares detailed plans for the conduct of air operations in support of UW activities, to include aerial delivery, close air support and air reconnaissance missions.

c. Coordinates and controls the employment of VNAF aircraft and crews in support of MACSOG.

d. Determines number and type of aircraft required to provide effective and economical air support for MACSOG operations.

e. Requests and coordinates air support from 7th AF, 7/13AF, III MAF and VNAF sources.

f. Provides staff officers for temporary assignment at forward operating bases to supervise the execution of Special Air Warfare Missions.

g. Exercises control over launch, movement and recovery of aircraft operation in support of MACSOG.

h. Performs post combat mission analysis to identify factors which affect successful execution of assigned missions, and take necessary corrective action as required.

i. Prepares and maintains current file of detailed target folders with suitable mission profiles for all assigned or supporting aircraft.

j. Evaluates all available information on research and development of Special Air Warfare material and recommends procurement of needed items of equipment.

k. Supervises and coordinates operational testing to improve the tactics and techniques employed by air units operating in support of MACSOG. Assists in developing new concepts, tactics and techniques for the employment of air assets in support of UW.

6. ~~(TSLD)~~ PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES BRANCH (MACSOG-33).

a. Advises and assists the Director, O&T on all matters pertaining to covert psychological operations.

b. Advises Director, O&T on unilateral combined and joint operational activities, and the control, analysis and recording of data pertaining to the HUMIDOR (~~C~~) program.

c. Provides staff supervision of the Psychological Operations Group.

d. Maintains operational control of sensitive unilateral efforts in addition to those combined and joint efforts designated by Director, O&T.

e. Maintains operational control of Air operations within HUMIDOR (~~C~~) to include Project JENNY.

f. Provides conceptual guidance of the HUMIDOR (~~C~~) program.

g. Develops, coordinates and recommends operational concepts, studies, plans and position papers in response to Director, O&T requirements.

h. Coordinates and provides liaison with the US Embassy and the Hq MACV on all matters pertaining to covert psychological operations.

i. Provides staff supervision of the Radio Studies Group.

7. (~~TSLD~~) GROUND OPERATIONS BRANCH (MACSOG-34).

a. Advises and assists the Director, O&T in the conduct of covert and clandestine ground operations, training and special projects.

b. Develops, coordinates and recommends concepts and techniques for the conduct of airborne and airmobile operations, ground operations and diversionary operations, to include associated specified psychological operations within the assigned areas of responsibility.

c. Evaluates plans and operations prepared by the ground commands.

d. Provides staff supervision for the conduct and management of special training required for mission accomplishment.

e. Evaluates operational techniques and results in order to improve training and operational readiness.

f. Provides staff supervision of the Ground Operations Group, Airborne Operations Group and Training Group.

g. Supervises, coordinates and controls the activities of the Laos, Cambodia, Agent, Training and Special Projects studies sections.

8. (~~S~~) STATISTICS AND ANALYSES SECTION.

a. Operates an information center for the purpose of informing the Director, O&T, and Chief, MACSOG of the status of current operations, combat units and major items of operational equipment.

b. Maintains current operations maps and information relative to ongoing operations and operations scheduled for the immediate future.

c. Maintains information concerning current status of operational units (recon teams, agent teams, reaction forces, aircraft crews, boat crews, etc.) and major items of operation equipment (aircraft, vessels, etc).

d. Maintains information concerning current and projected training programs.

e. Coordinates operational briefings for the Director, O&T, Chief,

MACSOG, and visitors to the MACSOG Headquarters.

f. Operates a VIP briefing facility.

g. Prepares and presents VIP briefings to include the weekly COMUS-MACV wrap-up briefing.

h. Maintains a library of standardized briefing aids.

i. In conjunction with the operations branches, performs operational analysis as directed by the Director, O&T.

j. Coordinates the use of MACV automatic data processing systems by the operations branches and functions as a repository for the storage of the operational information data bank in ADP form.

TAB A

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING DIVISION ORGANIZATION



RECAPITULATION

	AUTH	ASG
OFF	30	26
EM	26	23

Section 1 - Maritime Studies Branch

1. ~~(TSLD)~~ General.

a. The year 1969 was marked by a distinct change in the type and tempo of operations that were conducted by the Maritime Studies Group. The November 1968 stand down precluded further PARBOIL (Ø) missions north of 17-00N and thus ended the active participation of the maritime operations portion of the FOOTBOY (Ø) program. Due to a requirement by higher authority to be able to resume PARBOIL (Ø) operations, the PTFs and cross-beach action teams were maintained in a high state of readiness by conducting in-country operations.

b. In-country operations were conducted utilizing the PTF/cross-beach team concept. These operations were initially called BIFROST missions and in June, at the request of CINCPAC, renamed DODGE MARK missions. These missions were conducted from the Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD), Da Nang in I and II Corps at the request of the field force commanders. The missions were targeted primarily against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) located within 5000 meters of the coast. These missions were conducted throughout 1969.

c. During the latter portion of the 1968 Northeast Monsoon season and resultant marginal surf conditions in I Corps, two action teams were deployed to a forward operating base (FOB) at Phan Thiet in II Corps to conduct DEWEY RIFLE operations. These operations were identical to that of DODGE MARK and were conducted in January and February. In mid-October, at the onset of the 1969 Northeast Monsoon season, two action teams, two PTFs and one PCF were deployed to a FOB at Cam Ranh Bay, CTF 115 headquarters base, to conduct DEWEY RIFLE II missions in II Corps. The FOB was closed on 31 December and the action teams and PCFs moved to the Market Time base at Qui Nhon to continue DEWEY RIFLE II operations in that area.

d. In February and April, two cross-beach action teams were provided to COMNAVFORV and participated in TRAN HUNG DAO operations along the SVN and Cambodian border north of Ha Tien in IV Corps. A total of 55 missions were conducted and the action teams returned to NAD DA Nang when the weather and surf conditions permitted the conduct of DODGE MARK missions in I Corps.

2. (~~TSLD~~) MISSION.

a. The current mission of the Maritime Studies Group is to conduct covert maritime interdiction, intelligence collection, psychological warfare, cross-beach operations including ambush/capture missions and the general harassment of VC/VCI/NVA in the coastal areas of South Vietnam.

b. The PARBOIL (~~[illegible]~~) mission is to conduct covert maritime interdiction, intelligence collection, psychological warfare, cross-beach operations and general harassment in the coastal ~~areas~~ of North Vietnam.

3. (~~TSLD~~) ORGANIZATION: Maritime operations were conducted in 1969 by Maritime Operations Group (cover name: Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD), Da Nang) in conjunction with the Coastal Security Service (CSS) of the Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate. Staff Cognizance was exercised through the Maritime Studies Branch, MACSOG-31, Headquarters, Studies and Observations Group. There were no major organizational changes during the year.

a. Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD), Da Nang, (MACSOG-37). The assigned strength of the Maritime Studies Group averaged 15 officers, 55 enlisted and 6 Filipinos throughout the year. In October, as part of the overall SVN force reductions, NAD was reduced by eleven billets to its current level of 13 officers and 49 enlisted personnel. A further reduction in the Mobile Support Team is expected now that the PTF reduction to four boats has been approved.

b. Maritime Studies Branch. The strength of the Maritime Studies Branch remained constant at four officers and two enlisted throughout the year.

4. (~~TSLD~~) OPERATIONAL ASSETS:

a. Eleven PTFs and three Swift boats (PCF) for logistic support comprised the main waterborne assets at the beginning of 1969. The PTFs included seven Nasty class and four aluminum hulled Osprey class boats. In addition, four Trumpy class PTFs were held in ready reserve at SRF Subic Bay, P.I. The number of PTFs changed during the year due to structural problems in the Osprey class, receiving two additional Trumpy class PTFs and reduction in operational requirements. In March the four Osprey class PTFs were discovered to have suffered structural deficiencies due to improper welding and fitting of the intersecting joint between the keel vertical plate and cap plate. These four PTFs were returned to CINCPACFLT control and shipped

to SRF Subic Bay for repair. In July MACSOG was authorized to reduce to seven operational PTFs at NAD Da Nang and the six Trumpy PTFs in reserve SRF Subic Bay were returned to CINCPACFLT control. In December, authority was requested and granted to reduce to four operational PTFs at NAD Da Nang with three PTFs held in reserve at SRF Subic Bay. This action had not been completed by the end of the year.

b. The PTF crews were reduced from twelve to seven in July due to the reduction in PTFs. Three PCF crews were maintained throughout the year.

5. ~~(TSLD)~~ BIFROST/DODGE MARK: Operating under the original name of BIFROST, these missions were well established by the first of the year, having been continued throughout 1968 as a means of developing proficiency in the cross-beach operations. These operations continued until the first week of June when, at the request of CINCPAC, the mission code name was changed to DODGE MARK. Conducted under combat conditions from NAD Da Nang BIFROST/DODGE MARK missions were centered around Barrier Island and I and II Corps Tactical Zones in support of I and II Field Force Commanders. While their objective was the capture and harassment of VC/VCI/NVA and the destruction of their supplies, the value of the teams as intelligence gathering agents became increasingly important. Numerous prisoners and documents captured during these operations were to prove exceedingly valuable in aiding other allied units. Intelligence gained from captured prisoners on Barrier Island resulted in the combined US Army/USMC/ARVN operation DARING REBEL/VU MINH 03 in which 400 enemy were killed and 200 captured in May 1969. High surf conditions continued to hamper operations during the Northeast Monsoon season, and teams were deployed to forward operating bases in III Corps during these times. Insertion of the teams was by PTF/PCF to within 5,000 yards of the beach and by RB-12 to just outside the surf line where the teams would swim the remaining distance. Detailed results of these missions can be found in TAB A.

6. ~~(TSLD)~~ DEWEY RIFLE I and II: DEWEY RIFLE missions were conducted during two separate periods in 1969. Their overall objective and method of operation was similar to both DODGE MARK/BIFROST, i.e. the ambush/capture of VC/VCI/NVA through the use of cross-beach action teams inserted by PCFs or PTFs. DEWEY RIFLE I, carried over from 1968, was conducted from the forward operating base (FOB) at Phan Thiet until 27 February. During this period a total of 26 missions were conducted. At the beginning of the Northeast Monsoon season in October, FOBs were set up at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay for the start of DEWEY RIFLE II missions. By the end of December, a total of 34 missions were conducted from these two FOBs. Coordination with the Naval Support Facility at Cam Ranh Bay was excellent and every consideration was provided those stationed at the FOB. Pier facilities for the boats

and messing and living facilities for the men were both excellent. CTF 115 (Market Time) helped to provide intelligence information and extended the use of their facilities for use as an operations office. The biggest and by far the most significant problem encountered at Cam Ranh Bay was the weather. Continuous high surf conditions caused the cancellation of all but two operations. The FOB was closed on 31 December and the action team moved to Qui Nhon. Intelligence on enemy activity in the Cam Ranh Bay area was obtained from the NILOs in Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Phan Rang. Visual reconnaissance of the area was available by Army helicopter from the Phan Rang airbase. Clearance for these operations had to be obtained from the senior advisor in Phan Rang 72 hours in advance. The FOB at Qui Nhon was established at Market Time headquarters and was permitted generous use of Market Time facilities, including PCFs, skimmers and pier and berthing facilities. Targeting for operations in the Qui Nhon area was done by commanders in the II Corps Tactical Zone. The overall results of DEWEY RIFLE I and II can be found in TAB B.

7. ~~(TSLD)~~ TRAN HUNG DAO: In February, at the request of COMNAVFORV, two cross-beach teams with two US advisors were deployed to the southern Cambodia/Vietnam border. The TRAN HUNG DAO missions were generally successful; however, the action teams were not utilizing their abilities or training. It was believed that these ground operations, using infantry tactics, reduced the proficiency of the teams to conduct their primary mission. The action teams were returned to MACSOG operational control and commenced operations in I Corps operating out of NAD. Detailed results of operation TRAN HUNG DAO may be found in TAB C.

TAB A

BIFROST/DODGE MARK

MISSION SUMMARY 1969:

Number of Successful Missions	Results
62	108 VC/NVA KIA
	2 VC WIA
	28 VC POW
	13 Sampans Destroyed
	17 Weapons Captured
	71 Bunkers Destroyed
	129 Suspects Detained
	38 Kilos of Documents Captured
	4000 Pounds of Rice Captured
	1000 Rounds of Ammunition Captured
	320 Pounds of Salt Captured
	6 Hooches Destroyed

TAB B

DEWEY RIFLE I AND II

MISSION SUMMARY 1969:

Number of Successful Missions	Results
38	5 VC/NVA KIA
	4 VC WIA
	6 VC/NVA POW
	18 VC Suspects Detained
	6 Sampans Destroyed
	17 Weapons Captured
	29 Grenades Captured
	3000 Pounds of Rice Captured
	100 Pounds of Medical Supplies Captured

TAB C

TRAN HUNG DAO

MISSION SUMMARY 1969:

Number of Successful Missions	Results
55	3 VC KIA
	1 Sampan Destroyed
	3 Weapons Captured
	1500 Pounds of Rice Captured
	18 VC Suspects Detained
	13 Curfew Violators Detained
	Numerous Documents Captured



TAB D

MARITIME OPERATING AREAS

Base 54740 9-66

Section 2 - Air Studies Branch

1. ~~(TSLD)~~ GENERAL.

a. During CY 69, Air Operations were primarily in support of PRAIRIE FIRE, SALEM HOUSE and maintaining the capability to initiate SHEDDER (Ø) operations if required. (Codeword SHEDDER (Ø) replaced MIDRIFF (Ø) which was compromised in December 1969, JCS msg 231529Z Dec 69).

b. Many varied types of aircraft were used to support MACSOG programs. Air Studies Group, Nha Trang AB, RVN provided four specially equipped C-130E aircraft (COMBAT SPEAR) and four EC-123K aircraft (HEAVY HOOK), for combat operations and logistic support. In August 1969 one C-130E began modification in the CONUS and a C-7 was obtained from MACV to supplement airlift requirements. Helicopter and light fixed wing FAC/Liaison assets were provided daily from various USAF, USA, USMC and VNAF units as requested monthly from MACV J3, VNAF and 7th Air Force. VXN-8 Det WESPAC, Da Nang AB, RVN provides one (1) NC-121 in support of Project JENNY.

2. ~~(TSLD)~~ MISSION. The primary mission of the Air Studies Branch, MACSOG 32, is to coordinate responsive air support for Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG) clandestine and covert combat operations in Southeast Asia. A secondary mission is to coordinate airlift for logisitic support of MACSOG activities. Personnel assigned to MACSOG 32 provide air expertise to aid other MACSOG branches in planning operations using air assets.

3. ~~(TSLD)~~ ORGANIZATION. The Air Studies Branch is managed by a USAF Lieutenant Colonel, responsible to the Director, Operations and Training Division, and is divided into two sections. (See Tab A)

a. Airlift Section. The airlift section is supervised by an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel and is responsible for the daily scheduling of combat logistic airlift, and the coordination for combat missions carried out by C-130 and C-123 aircraft of the Air Studies Group under the SHEDDER (Ø) concept of operations.

b. Helicopter Section. The helicopter section is supervised by an Air Force Major and is responsible for:

(1) The daily coordination of helicopter, FAC Liaison, and TAC AIR support of MACSOG ground reconnaissance operations.

(2) Maintaining close coordination with other MACV staff agencies,

7th Air Force and VNAF to establish requirements and priorities for future air support operations.

(3) Monitoring, coordinating and providing direction to insure USAF F-4 and VNAF A-1 units maintain the capability to perform agent resupply, delivery of Fulton Skyhook Recovery kits, Escape and Evasion kits, and PSYOPS Leaflet drops.

4. (~~TSLD~~) AIRLIFT COMBAT MISSIONS.

a. On 30 July 1969, CINCPAC authorized COMBAT SPEAR/HEAVY HOOK infiltrations into the PRAIRIE FIRE area of operations. Tacit authority existed earlier in CY 69; however, appropriate mission numbers were not assigned until receipt of CINCPAC message date-time-group 300450Z Jul 69. This message set aside several mission numbers for personnel infiltrations and resupply missions across the Laotian Border. During CY 69, ten (10) missions were flown by HEAVY HOOK and twelve (12) missions were flown by COMBAT SPEAR.

b. Project JENNY aircraft operations continued throughout CY 69, performing Black Radio broadcasts on a nightly schedule. 233 missions were flown by an NC-121 aircraft, call sign BLUE EAGLE ONE, over the Gulf of Tonkin. Prior to 13 Oct 1969, these missions were contained within the boundaries on and north of the 19th parallel as defined by: 1850N 10700E to 1930N 10740E. All missions since that date have been moved south below the 19th parallel to reduce overall support requirements for the security of the aircraft. The new coordinates containing the mission orbit are: 1840N 10700E to 1900N to 10740E. The aircraft will continue to orbit within these new coordinates until such time a classified American source indicates the mission goals are not being accomplished.

5. (~~TSLD~~) COMBAT SUPPORT AIRLIFT.

a. Combat support airlift is scheduled by MACSOG 32 in response to requests submitted from other MACSOG agencies. The airlift is provided by the Air Studies Group, Nha Trang AB, RVN utilizing COMBAT SPEAR and HEAVY HOOK aircraft. Classified cargo and personnel are moved, as required, for mission accomplishment.

b. During CY 69, COMBAT SPEAR and HEAVY HOOK aircraft airlifted 7,681,460 pounds of cargo and 42,590 passengers. COMBAT SPEAR aircraft flew 3,517 sorties utilizing 3,642.0 flying hours and HEAVY HOOK aircraft flew 2,546 sorties utilizing 3,064 flying hours. TAB B

c. MACSOG Directive, Air Transportation-Airlift Support Procedures was updated 13 Oct 1969. The directive clarifies manifesting procedures and provides positive authority for enforcement. Lead time for requesting combat airlift support was reduced. Emergency

airlift remains available with a minimum of two (2) hours notice.

d. China Air Lines (CAL) continued to provide a Tradewind (modified C-45) aircraft for use by Chief, SOG and other VIP travel. A C-47 is provided for general passenger use. These two contract aircraft move approximately 450 to 500 passengers per month, for a total of about 5,500 for the year. CY 69 expenditures for CAL EM-2 and EM-3 were $244,115.33.

6. (~~SLD~~) AIRLIFT TRAINING.

a. BLACK BARON training exercises were established in CY 69. BLACK BARON training consists of employing electronic countermeasures equipment in air defense against F-102 fighter aircraft since the F-102 equipment is much like the MIG-17 and MIG-21 equipment. This training has been accomplished for HEAVY HOOK aircraft at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand and for COMBAT SPEAR aircraft at Clark AB, Republic of the Philippines. Since the bombing halt in November 1968, the current training requirements have been reduced to maintaining familiarity with the equipment.

(1) HEAVY HOOK aircraft flew twenty (20) ECM training missions since the beginning of the training program on 31 May 1969.

(2) COMBAT SPEAR aircraft flew eighteen (18) ECM training missions since 24 Jan 1969, when the program began.

b. RED BARON training facilities were establighed at HSIN CHU Air Field, Taiwan during CY 69. RED BARON training consists of employing airborne electronic countermeasures tactics against ground tracking radar facilities. This training was made available for HEAVY HOOK aircraft only. Seven (7) missions were flown since 5 Nov 1969.

c. Low level training was approved for both HEAVY HOOK and COMBAT SPEAR organizations during CY 69. This type training is accomplished during the period set aside for BLACK BARON training. Typically, the BLACK BARON ECM training lasts approximately 1 1/2 - 2 hours. The remaining 2 - 2 1/2 hours in each four (4) hour flying period are used for low level training.

d. The Fulton Recovery System was demonstrated by COMBAT SPEAR aircraft six (6) times during CY 69. Prior to each demonstration, one training exercise was accomplished and provided minimum aircrew proficiency on the system.

7. (~~SLD~~) AIRLIFT SIGNIFICANT FACTS.

a. A review of the Cover Stories provided the COMBAT SPEAR and HEAVY HOOK operations was conducted during CY 69. It was determined

that serious shortcomings existed, particularly in the HEAVY HOOK operation. Consequently, MACSOG 32 provided an in-depth Staff Study of the existing cover stories. Salient points recommended for change were: Indicate that HEAVY HOOK aircraft are based at Nha Trang, RVN rather than Tan Son Nhut, RVN; provide a cover story for the presence of mixed Chinese Air Force (CAF) - USAF aircrews in USAF marked aircraft; that rotary wing aircraft in support of MACSOG operations exhibit olive drab paint, the last three of four digits of their serial number, and subdued markings/insigina, as applicable; COMBAT SPEAR and HEAVY HOOK aircraft be camouflaged with standard color scheme non-luminous paint. These recommendations for change were forwarded to CINCPAC in August 1969. CINCPAC reviewed the proposals and agreed with all the major changes except the proposal to camouflage COMBAT SPEAR and HEAVY HOOK aircraft with a standard color scheme. They added some minor changes and forwarded their proposals to MACSOG in December 1969. Essentially, MACSOG agreed with CINCPAC in these proposals and returned the package, through COMUSMACV channels, to CINCPAC.

b. A combat airlift mission planning conference was conducted at MACSOG in October 1969. The conference was attended by MACSOG mission planners and units that support MACSOG. The conference developed more workable operating procedures for coordinating air drop operations in a combat situation. A proposed plan was agreed on and implemented. The procedures are contained in MACSOG Directive 57-2.

c. The four (4) COMBAT SPEAR C-130E aircraft assigned to the Air Studies Group at Nha Trang are programmed for modification in the CONUS. The first aircraft began modification on 10 Aug 1969. Modification of all four (4) C-130s is to be completed by Mar 1971. To supplement the loss of C-130 flying time during the modification program, one hundred eighty (180) hours of C-7 flying time per month was obtained in Aug 1969 from MACV.

8. ~~(TSLD)~~ HELICOPTER OPERATION. The helicopter section provided aircraft support for PRAIRIE FIRE, SALEM HOUSE operations and reconnaissance team (RT) training.

a. PRAIRIE FIRE. During CY 69, PRAIRIE FIRE operations were supported daily with the following fragged air assets which operated from two (2) mobile launch sites in Thailand and four (4) mobile launch sites in South Vietnam. The number of aircraft reflect the daily average fragged to support the mission.

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT	TYPE AIRCRAFT	ORGANIZATION TASKED
11	CH-34	VNAF

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT	TYPE AIRCRAFT	ORGANIZATION TASKED
3	CH-3	7AF
8*	A-1E	7AF
3	UH-1 Slicks	111 MAF
6	UH-1 Guns	111 MAF
4	UH-1 Slicks	IFFV
4	UH-1 Guns	IFFV
2	U-17	VNAF
2	O-1	IFFV
8	O-2/OV-10	7AF

* Additional TACAIR requirements were provided by diverting airborne sorties.

b. SALEM HOUSE. During CY 69, SALEM HOUSE operations were supported daily with the following fragged air assets which operated from five (5) mobile launch sites in South Vietnam. The number of aircraft reflect the daily average fragged to support the mission.

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT	TYPE AIRCRAFT	ORGANIZATION TASKED
4	UH-1 Slicks	IFFV
4	UH-1 Guns	7AF
5	UH-1 Slicks	IIFFV
4	UH-1 Guns	IIFFV
4	O-2/O-1 FAC	7AF
2	O-1 Observation	IFFV
2	O-1 Observation	IIFFV

c. During the last quarter of CY 69, reconnaissance team (RT) training was conducted at the Camp Long Thanh training facility. A field training exercise was included in the program and was supported by the following air assets for a four (4) day period each month.

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT	TYPE AIRCRAFT	ORGANIZATION TASKED
3	UH-1 Slicks	IIFFV
2	UH-1 Guns	IIFFV
1	O-2 FAC	7AF

d. VNAF helicopter operations support provided by the 219th VNAF Squadron (CH-34) is contained in TAB C. Support provided by the 110th VNAF Squadron (U-17) is contained in TAB D.

9. (~~TSLD~~) HELICOPTER SIGNIFICANT FACTS.

a. During CY 69, Forward Air Guide (FAG) training continued for Reconnaissance Team (RT) and STRATA Teams. The training consists of ground instruction and an airborne demonstration on how to direct an air strike from the ground. It has been successful in that both US and ARVN lead teams have effectively directed US air strikes.

b. The STRATA insert procedures originally developed in mid-1967, were expanded in Feb 1969 to include support for the PRAIRIE FIRE AO. STRATA teams were launched from Nakhon Phanom AB, Thailand. The Ubon launches are staged through PS-2 (a launch site in Thailand) and provided PRAIRIE FIRE area coverage not within range of in-country helicopter assets. The Helo/FAC/A-1 package supports US/ARVN lead RTs and STRATA teams.

c. The VNAF 219th helicopter squadron was increased from 18 to 25 UE strength and 12 depot storage aircraft were held in reserve to offset combat losses. Additional CH-34s in US storage facilities will be made available as required to insure that the UE strength is maintained. It was agreed that the flying hour allocation would be distributed with 85% in support of the MACSOG mission and 15% to meet unit training, functional test flights and unit administrative requirements. The flying hour allocation distribution was essential to insure quality maintenance and adequate crew training. Programming action has been initiated to convert the 219th to UH-1s during 2nd quarter FY72.

d. The 20th SOS was severely hampered by engine problems and a shortage of UH-1P airframes. The unit was removed from the MACSOG mission from 19 Jul 1969 to 1 Dec 1969. Since 1 Dec 1969, the 20th SOS has been capable of providing only four (4) gunships and has insufficient slick aircraft assigned to assume the helicopter trooplift mission role. The CH-3s previously assigned to the 20th SOS in Thailand were reassigned to the 21st SOS under the single manager/operator concept.

e. As part of the Vietnamization program to provide training facilities for the VNAF, the 20th SOS (UH-1P) moved from Nha Trang to Tuy Hoa 5 Sep 1969 and the 6th SOS (A-1E) moved from Pleiku to DaNang 15 Dec 1969.

f. A Helicopter Section Seminar was conducted in January 1969. The seminar was attended by all aviation units which support the MACSOG mission. A detailed report was prepared which included targeting, standard operating procedures, tactics and techniques used to support infiltration/exfiltration of MACSOG reconnaissance elements. The seminar report was published and distribution was completed 1 May 1969. This is the first known operational documentation of helicopter/FAC/TACAIR usage in support of UW.

g. To further the diversion of tactics for infiltration of reconnaissance teams (RT), limited night helicopter paradrop training was conducted 16, 17 and 18 Dec 1969. A four (4) man RT was helicopter paradropped on a combat mission into Cambodia at 0400H 23 Dec 1969. Infiltration was undetected and the team was extracted 1200H 24 Dec 1969. An evaluation of the night helicopter paradrop techniques will be completed early in January 1970, to determine future use of the tactic.

h. Four (4) Escape and Evasion kits, CTU-1/A containers were dropped in support of downed aircrew members from F-4 aircraft during 1969.

i. Two (2) LAU-59 resupply containers were dropped from O-2 FAC aircraft in support of SALEM HOUSE operations during 1969.

j. For emergency recovery and after coordination with 7AF and the American Embassy Laos, CBU-19 (CS gas) was air delivered on two (2) occasions, 26 Oct 69 and 4 Dec 69, in support of PRAIRIE FIRE teams. They were pinned down by enemy fire and inevitably would have been overrun had the agent not been employed. Eight (8) A-1E sorties were employed on both occassions and in each instance, ten (10) minutes after delivery, the enemy fire was silenced and the teams were able to move to extraction landing zones. Extraction in both instances was uneventful. Attempted extractions prior to the agent use were aborted due to heavy ground fire being directed against the helicopters.

TAB A

AIR STUDIES BRANCH ORGANIZATION



PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATION TITLE	AFSC	RANK	BRANCH
CHIEF	E0036	05	AF
ADMINISTRATION	70270	E6	AF
	70250	E5	AF
	70250	E4	AF
	01435	04	AF
	01435	04	AF
	02518	03	AR
	27170	E7	AF
	27170	E7	AF
	27170	E7	AF
AIRLIFT SECTION	E1416	04	AF
	E1416	04	AF
	E1516	04	AF
	27170	E7	AF
HELICOPTER SECTION	E1416	04	AF
	07561	04	MC
	07563	04	MC
	01435	03	AF
	27170	E6	AF

TAB B

MONTH	CARGO (lbs) C-123	CARGO (lbs) C-130	PASSENGERS C-123	PASSENGERS C-130
JAN	88427	645967	1338	2526
FEB	145595	579589	755	2543
MAR	131975	576035	1130	2393
APR	74700	469930	688	2718
MAY	65300	318386	572	2477
JUN	68195	440308	980	2596
JUL	122306	514647	1096	2878
AUG	176455	395800	1809	2044
SEP	184660	434764	1686	2160
OCT	303035	568798	1585	2477
NOV	213062	478319	1806	1264
DEC	237852	447355	1631	1438
TOTAL	1,811,562	5,869,898	15076	27,514
	7,681,460		42,590	

TAB B

MONTH	SORTIES C-123	SORTIES C-130	HOURS C-123	HOURS C-130
JAN	192	315	240	342
FEB	165	364	194	439
MAR	154	307	167	320
APR	127	299	167	320
MAY	149	325	209	342
JUN	174	327	211	322
JUL	227	364	289.6	359.4
AUG	289	246	350.4	267.4
SEP	242	246	289.2	245.0
OCT	275	284	327.0	255.5
NOV	290	216	323.5	218.3
DEC	262	224	296.3	211.4
TOTAL	2,546	3,517	3,064.0	3,642.0
	6,063		6,706.0	

TAB C

VNAF CH-34

219th Squadron

MONTH	HOURS FLOWN	SORTIES	PAX CARRIED	CARGO CARRIED
Jan 1969	1378	2138	4183	82,200
Feb 1969	1231.6	1520	2361	89,600
Mar 1969	1257.9	1754	3139	148,800
Apr 1969	1240.5	1985	3180	128,000
May 1969	1361	2167	3364	69,420
Jun 1969	1497.3	3110	3145	57,800
Jul 1969	1416	2515	3211	62,880
Aug 1969	1643	2034	2826	617,100
Sep 1969	1542	2320	3343	61,200
Oct 1969	785	807	1452	9,860
Nov 1969	1263	1625	2660	42,850
Dec 1969	930	1442	2162	121,250
TOTAL	15,545.3	23,417	35,026	1,490,960

TAB D

VNAF U-17

110th Squadron

MONTH	HOURS FLOWN	SORTIES	PAX CARRIED	CARGO CARRIED
Jan 1969	199.9	145	145	4100
Feb 1969	128.3	94	93	4400
Mar 1969	124.5	95	101	2000
Apr 1969	120.3	82	137	650
May 1969	135.6	101	108	1140
Jun 1969	173.05	114	164	800
Jul 1969	163.45	92	142	2300
Aug 1969	186.15	116	160	400
Sep 1969	173.35	97	136	240
Oct 1969	168.5	86	141	None
Nov 1969	143	76	125	None
Dec 1969	130	89	226	None
TOTAL	1,846.10	1,267	1,678	15,930

(1) The development of an aircraft launched balloon system for leaflet delivery to North Vietnam. This system was processed through early stages of development, but was cancelled prior to the expected test in South Vietnam because of prohibitions against delivery of leaflets into North Vietnam.

(2) A covert psyops program designed to exacerbate relations between the VC/NVA and the cambodian Government, using both printed material and radio operations was studied, but dropped because of the normalizing of relations between the US Government and Cambodian Government.

SECTION 3

PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES BRANCH

1. (~~S~~) GENERAL. The Psychological Studies Branch (MACSOG-33) was organized in the fall of 1968, as a staff section under the Director of Operations and Training. MACSOG-33 at the time of the reorganization relinquished responsibilities for the conduct of covert operations and became a staff element responsible for advising the MACSOG staff on the employment of covert psychological operations. When the reorganization took place the Radio Studies Group (MACSOG-70) and the Psychological Studies Group (MACSOG-39) were formed as operational commands. MACSOG-33 provides staff supervision for MACSOG-39 and 70.

2. (~~TSLD~~) [redacted]

(b)(1)

3. (U) ORGANIZATION. See TAB A.

4. (~~TSLD~~) [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)

[redacted]

(b)(1)

TAB A

PSYOPS STUDIES BRANCH ORGANIZATION



[redacted]

(b)(1)

TAB B

SECTION 4

GROUND STUDIES BRANCH

1. (~~TSLD~~) GENERAL. The Ground Studies Branch continued in 1969 to exercise staff supervision of the activities of three subordinate commands: Airborne Studies Group (Timberwork) (Ø); Ground Studies Group (PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE); and Training Studies Group. Detailed accounts of these activities are contained in appendices IX, VIII, and XIV, respectively.

2. (~~TSLD~~) MISSION: The Ground Studies Branch (MACSOG-34) advises and assists the Director of Operations and Training in the conduct of covert and clandestine ground operations; agent operations; training; and special projects.

3. (Ø) ORGANIZATION:

a. The Ground Studies Branch consists of the Office of the Chief and three organic sections: Special Studies, Field Studies and Training Studies.

b. The Office of the Chief administers the operations of the branch. It contains a total of 6 personnel.

c. The Special Studies Section administers the TIMBERWORK (Ø) and POLE BEAN programs and contains 3 personnel.

d. The Field Studies Section administers the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE programs with a total of 6 personnel.

e. The Training Studies Section administers the training program to support TIMBERWORK (Ø), PRAIRIE FIRE, and SALEM HOUSE programs. There are a total of 3 personnel in the section.

4. (~~TSLD~~) SPECIAL STUDIES SECTION.

a. TIMBERWORK (Ø), the agent operations portion of the FOOTBOY (Ø) program, continued to be administered by Airborne Studies Group in conjunction with its Strategic Technical Directorate counterpart personnel during calendar year 1969. The Special Studies Section maintained staff responsibility for administering the TIMBERWORK (Ø) program. The restrictions on air operations north of 20° N latitude and the 1 November 1968 halt of air operations north of 17° N latitude remained in effect. All in-place teams were still considered as under the control of NVN intelligence. TIMBERWORK (Ø) operations in 1969 were conducted under four

subordinate programs: Agent Operations; STRATA (Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition); Diversionary Operations (FORAE (Ø)); and EARTH ANGEL (U). Special Studies also exercised Staff supervision of the POLE BEAN (U) program.

b. Agent operations opened in 1969 with five in-place teams operational in NVN: ARES; EAGLE; TOURBILLION; HADLEY; and RED DRAGON. During February ARES requested information on the position of the US and RVN governments in the Paris Peace talks, responses to the questions raised were coordinated with the US Embassy, Saigon prior to transmittal. No significant information was provided by the remaining teams. Three teams (TOURBILLON, HADLEY and RED DRAGON) were declared KIA during the year. The remaining two teams continued to be utilized in a diversionary capacity pending planned termination at years end. The singleton agent program was brought under the RODCA (U) reporting system in accordance with existing security directives and therefore discussion of these activities is prohibited in this history.

c. STRATA operations in 1969 were conducted exclusively in the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE areas of operation. From 1 January to 31 December 1969, forty-two STRATA teams were inserted in the PRAIRIE FIRE area of Laos and twenty-one STRATA teams were inserted in the SALEM HOUSE area of Cambodia for a total of sixty-three missions. During the year one team was lost in its entirety and portions of eight others were declared MIA for a total of thirty personnel lost. The STRATA FOB and operational assets were transferred to the operational control of Airborne Studies Group in July 1969. The major problem experienced in the program was maintaining a sufficient pool of trained personnel to replace those lost on missions. An intensified recruitment and training program was initiated to alleviate this problem. Emphasis during the year was placed on extending STRATA stay time to periods of fifteen to thirty days per mission and providing STRATA teams with a parachute insertion capability.

d. Diversionary (FORAE (Ø)) operations were conducted under two subordinate programs: OODLES (Ø) and BORDEN (Ø). Project OODLES (Ø) was conceived to portray an apparently extensive and successful clandestine agent network in NVN. Fourteen notional teams were maintained in an active status in 1969. Message traffic with these teams was restricted to family morale messages sent by HUMIDOR (Ø) SSPL one-way voice broadcast in the OODLES (Ø) project. Project BORDEN (Ø) continued to [redacted] (b)(1)

Documents captured during the year by US and Allied forces verified the success of the [redacted] effort. The program which has in great part achieved the desired objectives was reduced to a maximum of three [redacted] per month as of July as part of a planned scale down of the project while maintaining the proficiency of the mechanism. Throughout the entire year, the project remained oriented toward the [redacted] and resources to counter a [redacted] of NVA organizations and units in NVA/VC controlled areas of Laos, Cambodia and RVN. (b)(1)

e. The EARTH ANGEL (U) program came into being in February 1969 with the approval of the concept by CINCPAC. This program employs former NVA personnel recruited from the Chieu Hoi Centers and trained as 3 to 4 man roadwatch and reconnaissance teams. Initially the program consisted of three teams but was expanded to five teams in September 1969 based on the ability demonstrated by the teams to perform the type missions for which the program was established. From 8 April to 31 December 1969, five EARTH ANGEL teams were inserted in the PRAIRIE FIRE area of Laos and fifteen EARTH ANGEL teams were inserted in the SALEM HOUSE area of Cambodia. Portions of two teams were declared MIA totaling three personnel lost from the program during the period of operation.

f. POLE BEAN (U) See appendix XI, Psychological Studies Group history for a detailed account of developments and activities in the program.

5. (~~TSLD~~) FIELD STUDIES SECTION.

a. MACSOG cross-border operations began in September 1965 under the code name SHINING BRASS. Evaluation of the program continued with various changes in operational areas and rules of engagement until at the present time MACSOG cross-border ground operations fall under two separate programs; PRAIRIE FIRE operations into Laos and SALEM HOUSE operations into Cambodia. Both programs are under the direction of Chief, Ground Studies Group, MACSOG and are administered by the Field Studies Section.

b. During 1969, cross-border ground operations into Laos (PRAIRIE FIRE) and Cambodia (SALEM HOUSE) continued to be conducted by the Ground Studies Group (see Appendix VIII) and Airborne Studies Group (see Appendix IX). The year 1969 was marked by a continual increase in the tempo of operations, introduction of new concepts and refinement of previous operational techniques. Results of PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE operations continued to provide valuable information observed and reported

from the enemy sanctuaries. A statistical summary of operations for each program is set forth at TABS A and B.

c. The PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) and SALEM HOUSE (SH) programs have the general mission of conducting covert cross-border operations into VC/NVA - controlled areas of Laos and Cambodia. Political considerations have dictated that each program be conducted under separate rules of engagement (ROE). The specific concept, operating rules and restrictions for each program are outlined in subsequent paragraphs.

d. The PF program provides for cross-border reconnaissance and exploitation operations into the panhandle of Laos using combined US/VN forces to locate, interdict and destroy enemy personnel and equipment on infiltration routes and LOC's leading into RVN. PF Reconnaissance Teams (RT) and Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition (STRATA) teams are infiltrated by helicopter, overland and by parachute into the AO to reconnoiter assigned targets and exploit targets of opportunity. Detected targets are exploited by ground forces (up to three platoons), artillery, TAC Air and, when justified, ARCLIGHT strikes. PF forces are authorized to operate within the area depicted at TAB A, Appendix VIII and support Nickel Steel, IGLOO WHITE and COMMANDO HUNT as well as the basic PF program. Under specific case-by-case approval PF assets are available for SAR missions, outside of the normal PFAO boundary.

e. The SH program provides for reconnaissance operations into Cambodia using combined US/VN forces to collect intelligence and to verify suspected enemy locations, infiltration routes and logistical complexes. RT's are infiltrated by helicopter, by parachute, and overland. SH forces are authorized to operate within the area depicted at TAB B, Appendix VIII.

f. During CY 1969, a general reorganization of the Ground Studies Group operational elements was accomplished. Three separate Command and Control Detachments, with paralleled structures, were established to provide more effective and responsive control of cross-border operations. (See TAB C) The organizational aspects of the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE programs and their supporting commands and activities are discussed at TABS C and D respectively.

6. (~~TSLD~~) AIR SUPPORT.

a. Cross-border operations particularly in the PFAO, require a high level of air support and coordination. The majority of operations, both reconnaissance and exploitation, are helicopter infiltrated and extracted. TAC Air support is scheduled

for all PF insertion and is the principal fire support weapon for exploitation of PF targets of opportunity. SALEM HOUSE rules of engagement (ROE) prohibit the utilization of TAC Air in the SHAO. Light fixed wing aircraft are used to provide FAC, visual reconnaissance, and radio relay coverage for committed forces. Both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters are used for resupply of operational elements.

b. A normal RT operation in the PFAO is supported by the following air package:

(a) Four troopcarrying helicopters.

(b) Four helicopter gunships.

(c) Two A-1E close air support aircraft.

(d) One O-2 FAC aircraft.

(e) One O-1/U-17 reconnaissance aircraft.

c. TAC Air support in the PFAO, for exploitation of targets of opportunity is provided, as required, through normal FAC channels.

d. MACSOG has no organic helicopter or TAC Air assets; however, the following units are "dedicated" to support MACSOG cross-border efforts; further, local arrangements with adjacent and higher, local headquarters provide limited additional air support:

(a) VNAF 219th Helo Squadron

(1) Authorized: 25 CH-34's

(2) Average daily availability: 11

(b) 20th Helo Squadron

(1) Authorized for MACSOG: 14 UH-1FS

(2) Average daily availability for MACSOG: 6

e. Total average helicopter utilization for CY 69 was 48 per day, the majority of which were provided from Field Force assets. Of the daily average, 31 were used to support PRAIRIE FIRE and 17 were used in support of SALEM HOUSE operations.

f. Overall average of on call TAC Air available was 3.5 sorties per day in PF.

7. (~~TSLD~~) CAPABILITIES:

a. RT's are capable of conducting the following type missions:

(1) area, point and route reconnaissance.

(2) Road, trail and river - watch.

(3) Route mining and ambush.

(4) PW capture.

(5) Bomb damage assessment (BDA) (PF only).

(6) Ground photography.

(7) Communications wiretap.

(8) Hand Emplacement of electronic sensor devices.

(9) Direction of artillery, TAC Air and gunship strikes on detected targets. (PF only)

(10) Limited direct ground combat (normally employed only in self-defense).

b. Exploitation or reaction forces (PF only) are capable of rapid engagement of RT-developed targets by direct ground combat. The exploitation force organization permits commitment of tailored elements ranging from one platoon to three platoon size to perform the following:

(1) Reconnaissance-in-force. (area, point, route)

(2) Route interdiction.

(3) Ambush and raid.

(4) Establish and secure temporary patrol bases to support wide area RT operations.

(5) Short-term area denial. (when resupplied)

(6) Cache destruction.

c. Programmed mission duration for all RT operations is normally ten days, but may be extended if the situation permits resupply of the team. The ideal level of operations is generally accepted to be 1.5 missions per team per month. Assuming all authorized RT's to be operational, the corss-border

program should be capable of launching 135 RT missions per month (90 PF, 45 SH).

d. Finally, the most unique capability of PF/SH forces stems from MACSOG's singular mandate for unconventional operations. PF/SH elements are the only UW ground forces authorized to carry the war to the VC/NVA within their "safe haven" areas of Laos, Cambodia and the DMZ. As a result, these forces can provide vital intelligence of VC/NVA intentions; can harass and interdict the enemy on his LOCs, in his way stations, and in his base area; can deny the enemy vital supplies and spoil his operational preparations and can force the diversion of large numbers of the enemy's forces from a primarily offensive role to provide rear area security.

e. Limitations and Restrictions.

(1) Because of the inherent political sensitivity, JCS has imposed certain operational procedural limitations upon conduct of cross-border operations. In this respect, operations into the designated PF AO (TAB C) are relatively unrestricted, with exception that not more than three exploitation platoons may be on any given target at the same time and all operations must be coordinated with CINCPAC 24 hours in advance. On the other hand, population density and political sensitivity dictate that SH operations into Cambodia be closely controlled.

(2) Geographic restrictions affect both the PF and SH programs. In the northern two-thirds of the PF Zone the spine of the Annamite Cordillera dominates the RVN/Lao border. During the northeast monsoon (Oct-Apr) precipitation, cloud build-up, and air turbulence above the eastern slopes of the Annamites severely restrict helicopter operations into the PF AO from RVN. In the southern portion of the SH AO large expanses of generally flat and relatively open terrain make it extremely difficult to operate undetected. These same areas become inundated during the southeast monsoon and are virtually impassable to foot troops operating off established trails and roads.

8. (~~TSLD~~) ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL RESULTS - 1969

a. PRAIRIE FIRE.

(1) Operational Summary. During CY 69, PF elements mounted 458 operations, of which 452 (99%) were cross-border missions and 6 (1%) were in-country missions. Of this total, 408 were RT size and 50 were platoon or larger size reconnaissance

in force missions. The average monthly total conducted was 38. These operations resulted in 454 enemy KIA (body count) and another 718 estimated KIA by PF forces and supporting airstrikes and artillery; 20 enemy vehicles were destroyed or damaged; and 197 caches, structures and/or storage areas were destroyed. PF teams contributed a major portion of hard intelligence on VC/NVA use of Laos as an infiltration/staging area. In direct contrast to CY 68, PF assets were able to concentrate almost exclusively on cross-border operations resulting in 40% increase in cross-border missions over CY 68. The loss of Khe Sanh and Kham Duc as launch sites in CY 68 was partly overcome by increased use of Nakhon Phanom, RTAFB, Thailand and Dak Pek Special Forces Camp as launch sites. Use of Dak Pek, significantly increased MACSOG ability to launch into the area encompassing the route 165/966 Complex and BA 614. Overall cross-border operations during CY 69 reflected a focus of effort into the Tri-border area (BA 609-613) along Routes 96 and 110. There were 171 missions, or roughly 38% of the entire cross-border effort expended, into this area. A considerable quantity of valuable hard intelligence was collected from this area. Further north, in the BA 614/Rte 165/966 complex, 43 missions were conducted, approximately 9% of the collection effort. Adverse weather conditions and high altitudes added to the extremely hostile environment in this area. In and around BA 607, 57 missions or 13% of the total operations were conducted. Many of the operations into this general area were in conjunction with allied forces operating near the border. Further north in the vicinity of BA611 and to the north to include the laotian Salient, 119 missions were conducted, 26% of the total effort during CY 69. The number actually operating within Base Area 611 itself was small due to the extreme density of enemy logistical activities and troops in that area. The remaining 62 missions or 13% were conducted in the northernmost area of the PFAO and into the Nickel Steel area of the DMZ. Eight missions were actually conducted in the DMZ during CY 69. In comparison with CY 68 operations, which were heavily committed to in-country operations in support of the Field Forces during the enemy's Winter-Spring Offensive, approximately 99% of the total MACSOG effort was conducted out-of-country in contrast to 57% for CY 68. During CY 69, US casualty figures were .50% per mission as compared to .44% in CY 68 and .39% in CY 67. Vietnamese casualty figures were .78% per mission in CY 69 as compared to .69% in cy 68 and 1.04% in CY 67. Of the total 586 US/VN casualties incurred during the entire year, 584 or over 99% were solely attributable to cross-border operations. More casualties per mission were taken by reconnaissance in force (RIF) missions. In all statistical categories, except estimated enemy KIA, secondary explosions, vehicles destroyed,

and prisoners captured, operational results rose over those for CY 68 (TAB A). Significantly, enemy KIA (body count) more than doubled over the previous year and enemy weapons captured nearly tripled. Some of the more successful operations were roadblock/interdiction missions in the tri-border area against Route 96/110. On one operation, six enemy vehicles were destroyed. Operations west of the DMZ gained added importance when information of significant intelligence value was collected on an enemy POL pipeline and suspected multichannel communications circuit in the area. Increased enemy activity, coupled with adverse weather conditions, prevented full exploitation of the information gathered; however, several ARCLIGHT strikes were conducted in the area resulting in numerous secondary explosions. During CY 69, 47 operations were conducted from Thailand. These operations were launched from both Nakhon Phanom and Ubon, RFAF Bases and proved the feasibility of long-range insertions from the West during periods of adverse weather in RVN. During CY 69, the only major material losses attributable to PRAIRIE FIRE operations consisted of helicopters downed and destroyed. 31 helicopters were lost during CY 69 while supporting out-of-country PRAIRIE FIRE operations.

(2) OPERATIONAL TRENDS. Throughout CY 69, the enemy's increased ability to react swiftly to heliborne operations posed a significant threat to cross-border operations. His chain of observation posts, interconnected and linked with communication circuits, enabled him to respond rapidly to helicopter insertions. As in CY 68, the bombing halt in NVN enabled the enemy to increase his infiltration activities, and up-grade the posture of his security forces and AAA positions throughout the PFAO. The use of multiple RT's and platoon size elements to provide greater "staying power" was necessary in some areas. The tri-border area continued to be a prime infiltration route for the enemy's movement of troops and equipment into RVN and as a staging area for operations against the bordering SF camps at Ben Het and Dak Pek. Truck traffic within this area during the dry season was exceptionally heavy. Consequently, MACSOG efforts focused on monitoring this traffic in certain portions of BA 609 and provided the only hard intelligence concerning his logistical build-up in late CY 69. Numerous roadwatch missions were established along main arteries of communication to monitor enemy movement and to employ TAC Air against targets of opportunity. During the last half of the year a concerted NVA effort to expand POL logistical supply operations West of the DMZ was noted. Specific MACSOG targeting against this area, to further develop intelligence on this effort, was emphasized and resulted in establishing a definite trace of POL

pipelines and use of the Xe Bang Hiang River as a logistical artery. PF elements continued to encounter strong enemy resistance throughout the PFAO, and particularly in and around his main logistical complexes. It was noted that rear service troops appeared to be well-trained in security tactics, although not as combat effective and well disciplined as regular NVA forces. The presence of heavy concentrations of AAA weapons along the major LOC's was more evident during the dry season. Indications are that the enemy caches a significant percentage of his AAA weapons during the monsoon season only to reestablish them again as the improved weather gives rise to an increase threat to his LOC's. A systematic targeting process continues to further develop patterns ~~of enemy~~ infiltration and logistical movement and locations of enemy base camps, truck parks, and storage sites.

b. SALEM HOUSE

(1) Operational Summary. During CY 69, SH elements conducted 470 operations, of which 454 (97%) were cross-border missions and 16 (3%) were in-country missions in support of Field Forces. These operations resulted in four prisoners captured, 613 enemy KIA (body count) and an estimated 554 enemy killed by the RT's and supporting helicopter gunships. Unlike the previous year, CY 69 reflects an almost exclusive use of SH assets in cross-border missions. SH operations averaged 39 per month and were concentrated primarily throughout Zone Alpha (TAB D). There were 59 missions (12%) launched into BA 702, the SH portion of the Tri-border area surrounding BA 609 was targetted with 43 missions (9%). Base area 701 was the target of 58 missions (12%); and BA 740 was the site of 90 missions (20%). Enemy activity intensified during the later half of CY 69 in the southern portion of Zone Alpha as the enemy fortified his positions in BA 350 and 351, and prepared his seiges of the Bu Prang and Duc Lap Special Forces Camps; however, 125 missions (26%) were conducted against targets in this area. The remaining 79 cross-border missions (18%) were targeted in and around these base areas against main enemy LOC's and suspected storage areas. Total Cross-border operations during CY 69 (454) ran 58 percent higher than the previous year while incountry operations decreased to 4 percent of the CY 68 efforts (439 CY 68 verus 16 CY 69). Casualties rose during CY 69 for US personnel principally because of the enemy's increased counter-reconnaissance efforts throughout the SH operations area. VN casualties, on the other hand, decreased reflecting the shift of emphasis from large unit exploitation operations within SVN to reconnaissance missions in Cambodia. During CY 69 the per mission casualty rate for US personnel was .13% contrasted to a rate of .07% for CY 68 and .04% for CY 67. The CY 69 VN casualty rate was .13% versus a .39% CY 68 rate and a .03% CY 67 rate. Of 119 total US/VN casualties incurred during

the year all but three were attributable to out of country operations. Major material losses from cross-border operations were fourteen (14) helicopters downed by hostile fire. Successful penetrations were achieved by 85% of the teams launched, as compared to 80% in CY 68. As offensive action is prohibited in Cambodia except for self-defense, it is noteworthy that the majority of results stemming from combat actions are attributable to compromised teams during cross-border operations. Throughout CY 69, intelligence provided by SALEM HOUSE reconnaissance efforts verified major enemy movements and defined logistical complexes and base areas in his Cambodian sanctuary.

(2) Operational Trends. An analysis of CY 69 intelligence efforts in the SHAO indicated that enemy presence was maintained at a high level throughout the year as the VC/NVA forces continued to use Cambocia as a sanctuary and staging area for operations against RVN. Major NVA elements which initially operated in the tri-border area during the first half of the year made a significant move south in July and August and established their operational areas in the vicinities of BA 350 and 351. Prior to this move, MACSOG operational elements had detected significant logistical and activity buildups in the BA 350/351 areas providing early warning of the move. These same units displaced northward again during the month of December 69, and MACSOG efforts were focused on monitoring this movement and defining his base areas. New techniques to increase mission stay time included emphasis on patrol bases in RVN to launch RT's into Cambodia. As in CY 68, the enemy continued to capitalize upon his impunity to counteraction, perpetuated by the restrictions and limitations imposed upon MACSOG forces by the rules of engagement (ROE) in Cambodia. Use of artillery, TAC Air and exploitation by platoon or multiplatoon elements would significantly hinder his unimpeded use of the VC/NVA Cambodian sanctuary. MACSOG continued its efforts to obtain approval for limited exploitation operations in area exclusively or predominately occupied by VC/NVA forces.

9. (~~TSLD~~) TRAINING STUDIES SECTION

Throughout 1969 the Training Studies Section continued to administer SOG training programs to support TIMBERWORK (~~C~~), PRAIRIE FIRE, and SALEM HOUSE requirements. The Training Studies Group (See Appendix XIV) conducts training at Camp Long Thanh (YS 1968) in coordination with the counterpart Airborne Training Center of the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD). The Training Studies Section works in conjunction with the Training Officer on the STD staff to coordinate training requirements levied on the Camp Long Thanh training center.

Summary of Prairie Fire Operations CY69

MISSIONS	PFAO	IN - COUNTRY
Reconnaissance Team	404	4
Platoon (or larger)	48	2
Company	0	0
Battalion	0	0
Total	452	6
Bridges Destroyed	2	0
Helicopter Gunship Sorties	689	14
Tac Air Sorties	1,016	8
Anti-personnel Mines Emplaced	272	2
Vehicle Mines Emplaced	20	0
Enemy KIA (Body Count)	454	0
Enemy KIA (Estimated)	718	0
Secondary Explosions	253	23
Caches Destroyed	25	0
Structures Destroyed/Damaged	161/21	0/0
Enemy Weapons Captured	55	0
Enemy Vehicles Destroyed/Damaged	18/2	0/0
Enemy Prisoners Captured	0	0
Intelligence Reports	748	18
Helicopter Losses	28	3
Friendly Casualties:		
US: KIA	19	1
WIA	199	0
MIA	9	0
TOTAL	227	1
VN: KIA	56	1
WIA	270	0
MIA	31	0
TOTAL	357	1
US/VN Total Casualties	584	2

TAB B

Summary of Salem House Operations . . . . . CY 69

MISSIONS	SHAO	IN-COUNTRY
Reconnaissance Team	454	8
Platoon	0	8
Company	0	0
Battalion	0	0
Total	454	16
Helicopter Gunship Sorties	398	0
TAC Air Sorties	8	0
Anti-personnel Mines emplaced	4	0
Enemy KIA (Body Count)	613	0
Enemy KIA (Estimated)	554	0
Secondary Explosions	7	0
Caches Destroyed	2	0
Structures Destroyed/Damaged	2	0
Enemy Weapons Captured	12	0
Enemy Prisoners Captured	4	0
Intelligence Reports	607	0
Helicopter losses	14	0
Friendly Casualities		
US: KIA	10	0
WIA	47	0
MIA	3	0
TOTAL:	60	0
VN: KIA	11	1
WIA	44	2
MIA	1	0
TOTAL:	56	3
US/VN Total Casualties	116	3

TAB C

PRAIRIE FIRE ORGANIZATION

1. (~~SLD~~) The basic tool of the PF program is the Reconnaissance Team (RT). This team consists of twelve personnel, generally composed of three US and nine indigenous personnel (Special Commando Unit-SCU). During CY 69, a concerted effort was made to train and develop RT's of complete Vietnamese composition. These teams are usually composed of two Vietnamese soldiers (ARVN) as leaders and six SCU. A total of sixty RT's, both US and/or ARVN-led are currently authorized in the PF program.

2. (~~SLD~~) PF assets available for an exploitation role consist of four exploitation companies of three platoons each. The basic exploitation element is the rifle platoon led by a US officer. Each platoon is composed of six US and forty-two SCU. In addition, there are two security companies with four platoons each. These units provide security at the Command and Control Detachment headquarters and at operational launch sites.

3. (~~TSLD~~) During CY 69, PF operations were conducted using a mobile launch site (MLS) concept. Two Command and Control Detachments, one at Da Nang (CCN) and one at Kontum (CCC) exercised field operation of the PFAO, under Command and Control North (CCN) control, RT's and exploitation forces were launched from Phu Bai (MLS-1), Quang Tri (MLS-2), and Nakhon Phanom, Thailand (MLS-3). In the southern PFAO, under Command and Control Central (CCC) control, operations were launched from Dak To and Dak Pek. In addition, Ubon RTAF, Thailand, [redacted] afforded an added capability to reach high priority areas of intelligence interest in the southern portion of the PFAO. When adverse weather conditions and other operational priorities prohibited or hindered helicopter insertions, additional emphasis was placed on overland infiltrations from friendly forward units and Special Forces camps strategically located along the RVN/Laos border. Launch sites and the boundaries of the PFAO are shown at TAB A, Appendix VIII. (b)(1)

TAB D

SALEM HOUSE ORGANIZATION

1. (~~S/LD~~) The basic RT consists of twelve personnel, three US and nine VN; however, because of the purely reconnaissance nature of the SH mission, enemy contacts are avoided and operations are generally conducted using a split team composed of two US and four VN. Thirty (30) RT's are authorized in the SH program.

2. (~~TS/LD~~) Although exploitation operations are not presently authorized in Cambodia, the SH program maintains two Exploitation Companies, with three Exploitation Platoons each. During CY 69, these forces were used to establish patrol bases for launching RT's; to exploit in-country targets; and to secure forward launch sites.

3. (~~TS/LD~~) During CY 69, SH operations were conducted from launch sites located at Ban Loi, Duc Lap, Ban Me Thout and Duc Co. As required, RT operations were mounted from temporary launch and support sites along the RVN/Cambodia border. Operations into the Cambodian portion of the tri-border area were also conducted from the PF launch site at Dak To. Field operational control of SH operations was exercised through Command and Control Detachment South (CCS) located at Ban Me Thout. Launch sites and zones of operations are shown at TAB B, Appendix VIII.

APPENDIX IV

LOGISTICS DIVISION

1. ~~(SLD)~~ GENERAL.

a. The MACSOG Logistics Division is organized to provide logistical support to all elements of MACSOG. The organizational structure allows the Logistics Division to cover the wide spectrum of specialized logistical support peculiar to MACSOG's mission requirements.

b. The primary supply facility for MACSOG is House-50, a supply warehouse and storage area, located in Saigon. House-50 requisitions required items of supply from both in-country and out-of-country sources. Items available in-country are obtained from the 1st Logistical Command, USARV; Naval Support Activities, Da Nang and Saigon; and 7th Air Force through the use of Interservice Support Agreements (ISSA). Requisitions for items not readily available from in-country sources are processed through the Counterinsurgency Support Officer (CISO), 2nd Logistical Command, Okinawa. To insure expeditious handling and minimum delay of urgently required items, CISO processes MACSOG's requisitions through the Quick Reaction Procurement System (QRP). Specialized equipment not available through normal supply channels, to include offshore procurement, is also ordered through CISO.

c. Logistical support within MACSOG has expanded to meet changing mission requirements and provide responsive support to all MACSOG Activities. During CY 69 emphasis was focused on improved management practices and adherence to established supply procedures. To insure economy of operation and a continuing program of supply effectiveness, complete inventories were taken of equipment at House-50 and all subordinate accounts. The completed inventories provided a basis for determining the capability of the Logistic Division to fill requisitions from subordinate elements of MACSOG in a timely manner. As a result of this inventory it was further determined that a sizeable portion of certain on-hand stocks could be turned-in for monetary credit because of reduced or deleted mission requirements.

d. Realignment of internal procedures initiated within the Logistics Division allowed for improved planning and programmed stockage of supplies and equipment to meet known mission requirements. This was a significant factor in the reduction of MACSOG's O & M budget during CY 69.

2. ~~(SLD)~~ MISSION. The Logistics Division provides general logistical

support to all activities of MACSOG. This support encompasses forecasting, procurement, storage, issue, and delivery of all types of hardware and supplies; construction and maintenance of facilities; air delivery of supplies and equipment; research and procurement of conventional and unconventional warfare material for field evaluation; and medical support as directed by Chief, MACSOG to support Headquarters and operational elements of MACSOG.

3. ~~(SLD)~~ ORGANIZATION. As a result of a MACSOG JTD change approved by CINCPAC in March 1969, the Logistics Division was divided into six branches: Administration, Operations Support, Supply, Construction, Medical, and Air Delivery. The reorganization provided the Director, Logistics a vehicle for furnishing specialized support to MACSOG activities in all areas pertaining to logistics support. Logistics Division organization is shown at TAB A.

a. Administration. The Administration Branch, consisting of two enlisted personnel, a Navy Yeoman and an Air Force NCO, provided administrative support for all branches within the Logistics Division. This branch processed the large volume of paperwork that was a necessary and attendant part of the frequent correspondence between the Logistics Division, MACSOG subordinate activities, and various supporting supply agencies. The Branch was required to operate with only one Air Force NCO during the period 12 September 1969 to 28 November 1969 as a result of a delay in receiving an input for the Navy Yeoman's position.

b. Operations Support.

(1) During the First Quarter of CY 69, as a part of the reorganization within the Logistics Division, the number of officers assigned to the Operations Support Branch increased from 3 to 4. The Research and Development Officer was transferred from the office of the Director, Logistics and assumed duties as the Chief, Operations Support Branch (R&D). Fully manned in accordance with the MACSOG JTD, the branch consists of 2 Army supply officers, 1 Army R&D officer, and 1 Air Force Transportation Officer.

(2) Research and development investigations of significance were conducted in the areas of clandestine night helicopter landing, personnel incapacitation, clandestine air dropable beacons, and lightweight secure voice transmission. Resolution of these problems is beyond the scope of in-country resources and each one will require a significant CONUS research and development effort. Evaluations on silenced weapons for MACSOG use have been conducted. The 9mm Hush Puppy, the Limited Warfare Laboratories tunnel weapon, the 32 caliber Berretta with silencer, and the 9mm British Wellrod Device

were evaluated. At the close of the year evaluations were continuing, and no decision for purchase had been made.

(3) Operations support personnel made frequent liaison visits to MACSOG field activities for the purpose of assisting staff officers in resolving potential and actual problem areas relating to logistical matters. Assistance was also provided in the area of R&D, resulting in the introduction, testing, and volume requisitioning of items of equipment peculiar to MACSOG's mission requirements. Among some of these items were:

(a) STABO Rigs. A device worn by reconnaissance team personnel as an item of web gear which serves the purpose of enabling personnel to be extracted by helicopter from hostile or unsuitable landing areas. This device is a considerable improvement over extraction devices previously used for this purpose as it it virtually impossible for a wounded or incapacitated man to fall out of the STABO Rig. It was determined that the most economical method of manufacture would be to have the rigs fabricated in Okinawa by the 2nd Logistical Command. An order was placed with CISO on 1 July for 2,650 STABO Rigs, however; CISO experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining a sufficient quantity of "V" rings to enable the 2nd Logistical Command to fill the requirement. As a result, delivery of the full quantity ordered was not received until 24 December 1969.

(b) Mini-Grenade. A small, lightweight grenade approximately two thirds as powerful as the M-26 grenade. One of the key advantages of the Mini-Grenade, which makes it especially adaptable to MACSOG's use, is its relative light weight. Reconnaissance team members are able to carry a greater number of Mini-Grenades than the M-16 with no appreciable increase in weight and are able to throw them further with a greater degree of accuracy. MACSOG placed an order through CISO for 50,000 at a cost of $140,000.

(c) PRC-90 Radios. In an effort to standardize the type of survival radios used by MACSOG personnel, the Logistics Division in conjunction with the Communications Division, conducted a study to determine the type radio best suited for MACSOG's requirements. The PRC-90 survival radio, recently adopted by the U.S. Navy, provided the best combination of features desired for MACSOG operations. Based on the results of the study a decision was made to purchase 150 PRC-90 radios to replace,

on an attritional basis, the wide variety of survival radios in the MACSOG inventory.

(d) XM177E2 Rifles. Arrangements were made to purchase 1,200 of these weapons for use by reconnaissance personnel. The weapons arrived in October 1969 and are in use.

(e) 30 Round M-16 Magazines. Pre-production models were obtained in small quantities to evaluate for MACSOG use. As a result of the response from the field 5,000 were ordered. These should arrive during the Second Quarter CY 70.

(f) [redacted] (b)(1)

(4) Improved U.S. military equipment purchased by MACSOG during the year included the lightweight Riot Control Agent Protective Mask, and an array of lightweight individual equipment; including lightweight rucksacks, web gear, ammunition pouches, and canteens.

(5) The entire year was characterized by steadily increasing logistical activity in MACSOG. One highlight was a logistics meeting conducted in early April at which goals and methods of achieving these goals were outlined to all logistics and supply personnel. The remainder of the year saw work toward achieving these goals. Consistent procedures, supply accountability, and the configuration of the MACSOG supply system to align with and mesh with the conventional supply system in-country were initiated and to a large extent achieved during the year.

(6) In an effort to improve the supply system and stabilize certain aspects of logistics planning, a table of authorization (TA) for all C&C detachments was developed in conjunction with the Operations and Training Division and Ground Studies Group providing a list of authorized equipment and the quantity to be issued. In addition, existing MACSOG logistics directives were revised to incorporate procedures designed to improve and standardize the quality of support provided to all elements of MACSOG. Among the revised directives were 700-7, which established procedures for obtaining new or unusual items of clothing and equipment, and the Logistics Supply Directive 700-4, which established general supply pro-

cedures for all accounts. A Logistic Guide, non-directive in nature, was published during the month of December. The purpose of this guide is to provide Supply Officers and NCO's an informal guide to assist them in the accomplishment of their duties.

(7) Action was taken toward a departure from the sterile equipment policy of the past. With the exception of the items mentioned below, it is felt that sterilization of equipment carried into either the PF or SHAO is not necessary and in fact weakens the cover story. Sterilized equipment, foreign weapons, etc., are not carried by CIDG patrols. If an RT is to purport to be a lost CIDG patrol then its members should do as much as possible to look like such. Equipment which is intentionally left behind, such as mines and wire tap devices, should be sterilized in accordance with presently applicable policy in SHAO.

(8) No major problems were encountered in the Class I area with the exception of an over-stockage of PIR rations at DaNang early in the year resulting from delivery by ship at that location from the supplier. This was resolved by redistribution of assets. Requirements were reevaluated in September and a reduced contract for future requirements was requested through CISO. Units draw MCI and LRP rations from local supply sources on ISSA agreements. PIR rations are issued solely from House-50. Garrison rations are obtained through non-appropriated fund mess procedures.

(9) Ground petroleum products are procured from local supply sources, both military and commercial, through ISSA agreements. As a rule bulk products are delivered and package products are picked up by the requestors.

(10) Use of aircraft fuel represented one of the more acute problem areas during 1969. Use of Mobile Launch Sites in relatively remote areas, especially in II Corps, necessitated that POL product and dispensing facilities be moved into these sites. Initially, because of the time frame and the operational requirement, MAC SOG provided necessary support to include fuel delivery coordination, assisting with ground handling, and dispensing equipment. This action set a precedent from which it was very difficult to depart, but as of the close of the Calendar Year the following procedure was in effect: U.S. Army aviation units provide for their own fuel delivery, ground handling, and dispensing equipment whenever this is necessary. VNAF H-34 helicopter fuel requirements are provided by U.S. Army aviation units working at the same MLS. USAF (20th SOS) has obtained fuel dispensing equipment through MACSOG and provides this service for itself. The organization does not have the capability of supporting

itself at remote launch sites, so the C&C detachment coordinates fuel delivery and provides physical ground handling assistance.

(11) Ammunition.

(a) Refinements were made in the reporting by units of ammunition drawn at ASP's. Some problems arose in March and April resulting from shortages in allocated aircraft ammunition. In several instances, because of the operational requirements, MACSOG provided ammunition supply at MLS for gunships. The support question was resolved in May. Supporting aviation units provide their own ammunition in all cases. If a shortage exists because of allocated munitions, it is the responsibility of the aviation unit to resolve the problem.

(b) Captured ammunition and associated items such as magazines, links, etc., became a problem area. As combat activity by U.S. units decreased there was a corresponding decrease in captured assets. Sources explored were CMEC, MACJ-4, ARVN assets, 1st Logistical Command, and DA, who provided a European source. As a final in-country effort before purchase, liaison teams were sent to U.S. combat divisions, the J-4 source was re-explored, and a request was sent to STD for required items. As of year's end, no source had proved effective.

c. Supply Branch.

(1) The MACSOG Supply Branch requisitions, receives, stores and issues all classes of supply and equipment required to support MACSOG operations. This is accomplished through use of Interservice Support Agreements with the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force in-country, and the Counterinsurgency Support Office, an agency of the 2d Logistical Command, for out-of-country support. Materials and equipment are also obtained from the PX system, local purchases, and RMK.

(2) The Supply Branch currently supports 17 accounts throughout South Vietnam.

(3) During the First Quarter of CY 69, continuing emphasis was placed on stock locations and warehousing procedures, caused by the move to the new location in late 1968. During the month of March 1969, all storage sections of House-50 were reinventoried for the first time since the move. Although quantitive counts were taken, the primary purpose of the

the inventory and extensive re-warehousing was to store like items of supply in the proper sections of the warehouse, thus eliminating double storage and handling.

(4) In the Second Quarter of CY 69, an initial screening of the stock accounting records was conducted to determine success. As a result of this screening and increased emphasis being placed on the supported accounts turning in their known excesses, over $200,000.00 worth of service-able items were also turned in to classification points and Property Disposal Officers.

(5) A new and complete stock record system was established during the 2nd quarter following the basic procedures outlined in U.S. Army regulations. An accelerated training program was also developed to teach the local nationals the proper procedures to follow in maintaining these records. Personnel changes were made and many positions were redesignated to fit the new stock record section.

(6) During the month of June 1969, new location surveys were made and procedures were established for the conduct of a 100% inventory. On 15 June 1969, House-50 "closed its gates" and conducted a 100% inventory. As a result of this inventory, it was known for the first time exactly what was on hand.

(7) Numerous procedural and organizational changes were made during the first two months of the Third Quarter CY 69. The most significant of these was the implementation of procedures to maintain running totals of obligations and dues-ins for FY 70 funds and maintaining the dollar value of inventory. This necessitated establishing a new and extensive receiving section, documentation processing, and supply handling system.

(8) Continued screening and increased emphasis placed on the turn-in of excess by supported accounts resulted in the disposal of an additional $228,800.00 serviceable and $139,500.00 unserviceable equipment to supply commands.

(9) During the latter part of the Second Quarter and the begining of the Third Quarter, the rainy season created two major problems for the Supply Branch. Because of existing poor drainage one third of the open storage area was underwater during this period. To eliminate this problem, a pumping station was constructed and a drainage system was installed to remove the water from the area. The damp weather also posed a problem in the storage of PIR rations. An open shed was constructed and used exclusively for ration

storage.

(10) During the months of August and September 1969, the perimeter defense of House 50 was improved with the rebuilding of all bunkers and the installation of an emergency lighting set around the perimeter.

(11) The Fourth Quarter CY 69 was marked by an increase in the quantity of supplies received and processed over the previous three quarters. An extensive study was conducted on the signal equipment on hand and as a result, an additional $400,000.00 serviceable excess was identified and disposed of to appropriate supply agencies.

(12) During CY 69, House-50 processed 18,700 requests from the supported accounts, 13,600 receipts were processed; 2.5 million pounds of supplies were received; and 3.4 million pounds were shipped during CY 69.

(13) There was no significant enemy activity during 1969 which affected the operation of the supply facility.

d. Construction.

(1) One billet within the Construction Section was deleted from the TD. This position was dropped midway in the year without detrimental effect. Current workload and manning level were compatible.

(2) In the Headquarters Commandant Compound in Saigon (House-10) a new generator maintenance building, supply warehouse, guard barracks with latrine, and a vehicle wash rack were completed in February.

(3) Two minor projects were completed in the Second Quarter of CY 69 at House-50 to correct deficiencies in storage yard drainage. These projects were accomplished by construction contracts.

(4) Major modifications were made to a facility called Foxtrot 5 for the relocation of Airborne Studies Group. This construction work was completed in October 1969 by House-10 personnel at a material cost of $3,600.00. Shortly after completion of this project, Airborne Studies Group was relocated to a building within the Liaison Bureau Compound.

(5) No construction other than minor maintenance work was accomplished at Nha Trang.

(6) At the Naval Advisory Detachment in DaNang the early part of the year saw the completion of the Swift and Nasty Boat Pier and the renovation of the BEQ at Camp Fay. Several minor construction projects were completed during the Third and Fourth Quarters of CY 69; i.e., replaced lighting in the Nung Camp, replaced switchboard at Camp Fay, constructed three new defensive bunkers and repaired existing bunkers at Camp Fay, improved site drainage system at Camp Fay, and converted a portion of the supply warehouse to administrative space.

(7) The physical plant at the VOF Transmitter Site at Con Te Island was completed under contract early in the year. Subsequently, claims resulting from enemy action during the 1968 Tet offensive were processed and agreement for final settlement was made with the contractor. Three antennas were erected, the POL storage tank fabricated, and miscellaneous small work completed during the First Quarter of the CY; after which, work began on the installation of radio gear, the tuning of the transmitter and antenna system, and final preparations for broadcasting were made. Several technical problems were encountered. The diesel generating system was installed, inspected, and tested. After acceptance, several major components failed and no spare parts were on hand to effect repairs. The transmitters were finally placed in operation on a dummy load and final tuning and broadcast operations are scheduled to commence in early CY 70.

(8) At the VOF transmitter site at Thanh Lam, a new water well was drilled to a depth of 40 meters, insuring that facility's water supply. This work was accomplished by contract during the month of August 1969. Also under contract, a project was completed in October for the renovation of the latrine and shower at VOF Thanh Lam.

(9) In the First Quarter CY 69, renovation of the electrical system at Camp Long Thanh was accomplished. The camp is now capable of receiving 135 KVA on 13.8 transmission lines from Camp Bear Cat. The requirement for generators at the activity level is virtually eliminated. Other work, accomplished under contract at CLT, included the renovation of six barracks and three shop buildings. This included replacing thatched bamboo and leaking roofs with permanent masonry construction. A self-help project is underway at CLT to provide additional facilities in the isolation area. This work is scheduled for completion in January 1970.

(10) Reconstruction of battle damage sustained during the August

1968 attack at CCN was completed in February 1969. This work was done by MCB 12. The project was expanded to provide facilities at CCN to accomodate increased troop population resulting from the closing of facilities at Mai Loc and Phu Bai. This work included 4,600 square feet of billets, 900 additional square feet of medical treatment facilities, a 600 square foot pilot's day room, and a 60 foot high rappelling tower. A current self-help project to provide an intricate camp drainage system is underway, scheduled for completion in January 1970.

(11) Work at CCC consisted primarily of self-help projects. A new 4,000 square foot classroom/school/SCU theater was completed in November 1969. Two additional self-help projects which are currently underway and scheduled for completion in early January 1970 are additions to the indigenous mess hall and construction of a new motor pool, including grease pit, tire and battery shop, and engine repair facility. In April thru June the staff of this Construction Section aided with the installation of an adequate electrical distribution system, new camp wiring and relocation of the generator plant. On the 15th of December, the Fifth Special Forces Group began work on drilling a new water well.

(12) At CCS, work during the First Quarter of CY 69 included the construction of five barracks (5,000 sq. ft.) for members of Recon Teams, and ten barracks (16,000 sq. ft.) for indigenous personnel. Sanitary facilities for all new living spaces were provided, including a water-borne sewage system which virtually eliminated septic tank maintenance problems. The system included laying underground sewer pipe, constructing lift stations, and constructing an effluent lagoon. A new deep water well provides sufficient water for the system as well as supplying other U.S. units in the Ban Me Thuot (East Field) area. This work was accomplished by contractor forces. Personnel support facilities were improved during this period to include the renovation of the camp mess hall. These additional facilities more than adequately support the personnel from Camp Ho Ngoc Tau which was closed on 15 January 1969. During the First Quarter of this year, troop support from the 70th Engineers was employed to apply peneprime on helicopter pads and roadways as a measure to control duty. A substantial network of sidewalks was installed by camp forces. In July, a generator bunker was constructed by personnel of the Construction Section to replace the earlier generator shed which was destroyed by mortar fire. August saw the completion of a new 4,000 square foot warehouse, built under contract. Continuing under construction is a 40 ft. X 120 ft. Butler building being erected by con-

tractor forces to serve the dual purpose of providing space for helicopter maintenance for the 20th SOS and additional warehouse space for CCS, is scheduled for completion in mid-January 1970. This same contractor is providing two 18 ft. by 72 ft. floor slabs for additional U.S. billets which are to be completed by station forces. On the 22nd of December, Army Engineer Forces for the 18th Engineer Brigade began work on a project to install 15,000 square yards of AM-2 aluminum matting in the area of the helicopter landing field to eliminate dust. This project, estimated to cost $350,000.00 is being funded by the U.S. Air Force. The installation will take an estimated thirty days to complete.

(13) The policy of the Logistics Division as related to construction activity is one of maintenance emphasis on the MACSOG facilities' physical plants. Major construction projects will be kept to an absolute minimum commensurate with the needs of the overall MACSOG mission. The annual budget for construction is most austere in keeping with this philosophy.

e. Medical.

(1) The Physical Examination Center was closed during the month of March as the result of a study directed by Chief, MACSOG which determined that the cost of operation was increasing in conjunction with decreasing utilization of the facilities. The requirement for physical examinations continues and the mission of the PEC is now being carried out by the field dispensaries and the liaison service with significant monetary savings.

(2) The requirement for the MACSOG Morbidity Report, initiated during the latter part of 1968, and continued through 1969, provided Chief, MACSOG with pertinent statistical data on the health of the organization. During 1969 approximately 3,500 inpatients and 84,000 outpatients were treated by the dispensaries within the organization.

(3) The X-Ray and laboratory equipment, formerly utilized at the PEC, was transferred to the Medical Section of the Liaison Service, providing them the capability for better diagnosis and treatment.

(4) Liaison visits to the medical facilities by the Surgeon and his staff afforded professional and administrative guidance to the field units. In conjunction, periodic inspections were conducted by the Surgeon in the area of preventive medicine to insure that the high standards were maintained.

(5) The SCU Medical Course currently offered at CLT is being revised to provide a more realistic approach to training personnel in the following areas: life saving steps, personal hygiene, field sanitation, and prevention of common diseases. The goal being that these individuals trained will disseminate their acquired knowledge, especially in the area of sanitation and hygiene, to their fellow soldiers and families. A dental course is in the planning stage for both American and indigenous personnel.

(6) The Liaison Service Surgeon assigned qualified military medical personnel to the C&C's to provide greater flexibility in available medical support, to include training of indigenous auxiliary medical personnel and conducting local MEDCAPS. In conjunction with the above, the medical supply system of the Liaison Service was reorganized with guidance from the MACSOG Surgeon to provide adequate and efficient support to the units solely under STD control.

(7) The indigenous immunization program, provided for by MACSOG Directive, was successfully implemented, and during the year 18,000 inoculations were given. Appropriate records are being maintained to insure the continued success of the program.

f. Air Delivery Branch.

(1) The Air Delivery Branch reverted from operational control of the Air Operations Group to the operation control of the Director of Logistics in early 1969. The physical location remained unchanged.

(2) Activities during the First Quarter of 1969 were primarily training, maintenance of equipment, and some testing of mission-specific air delivery modes. Particularly, methods for small team unobtrusive drops of food, ammunition, and water were explored. The LAU-59 rocket pod modified for air delivery was refined and a range of water delivery modes was developed with and demonstrated to the C&C Detachments.

(3) Prior to April 1969, each C&C Detachment maintained a number of personnel parachutes on-hand for training and operations. In April they were withdrawn from the C&C's because proper storage and supervision was not available at these locations. Air Delivery Branch assumed the responsibility to provide personnel parachutes for all activities except Saigon and Camp Long Thanh in May 1969.

(4) Air Delivery supported on call and emergency resupply of platoon operations and STRATA teams throughout the year. They also supported training/proficiency jumps and parachute insertions of STRATA and reconnaissance personnel. In November 1969, responsibility for personnel parachute support to all MACSOG U.S. personnel was assumed by Air Delivery. The personnel parachute packing detachment at Camp Long Thanh continued to support the Vietnamese training mission with personnel parachutes. This division of responsibility was effected because no U.S. qualified parachute rigger was assigned by 5th SFG to Camp Long Thanh; therefore, the responsibility for maintenance of U.S. parachutes could not be fixed at that location.

(5) Through the last quarter of CY 69, Chief, Air Delivery Branch participated in several major planning sessions toward the publication of a MACSOG Airborne SOP which was pending approval for publication at the close of the year.

(6) Air Delivery remained responsible during 1969 for the packing and maintenance of USAF Escape and Evasion Kits, and for maintaining Fulton pick-up kits in a ready for drop configuration.

TAB A

ORGANIZATION CHART
LOGISTICS DIVISION



RECAPITULATION

	AUTH
OFF	12
WO	2
EM	31
PHIL	4
INDIG	79
ARVN	3

APPENDIX V

PLANS DIVISION

1. (~~TSLD~~) GENERAL.

a. The plans section was authorized in 1965 to provide current, long-range and contigency planning for MACSOG and JUWTF operations, as well as providing input to the plans of higher headquarters.

b. During 1969 the Plans Division continued its effort in long-range contingency planning and performed a variety of other tasks, such as preparation, presentation and publication of briefings, fact books and historical summaries. All MACSOG programs were touched upon by one or more of the various projects and required considerable coordination with other MACSOG divisions and with higher authority.

c. The emphasis in planning during the year was directed toward the possibility of a cease fire, a reduction of US Forces in RVN and post hostilities T-day planning.

2. (~~S~~) MISSION. The Plans Division advised Chief, Studies and Observations Group on all matters pertaining to MACSOG planning responsibilities to include COMUSSEASIA unconventional warfare plans, COMUSMACV current and contingency operations plans, and other special planning requirements. Prepares plans, studies, reports and briefs; updates documents and executes other staff actions, as directed. Provides direction and tasks other branches of the MACSOG staff, and when required, the UW Plans Branch, E & P Division, USMACTHAI, to insure that required plans are prepared in essential detail and are maintained current in a timely manner. Acts as MACSOG Historical and Documentation Section.

3. (U) ORGANIZATION.

a. The Plans Division of MACSOG continued to perform its mission in 1969 with a JTD authorization of four officers and two enlisted men:

Director, Plans Division	05	USMC
Army Plans Officer	04	USA
Navy Plans Officer	04	USN
Air Force Plans Officer	04	USAF

Administrative Supervisor	E7	USA
Clerk Typist	E4	USA

b. At the initiative of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) at JCS, a team has been formed at the Pentagon to document the organization and activities of MACSOG. The team has conducted research in Washington, Hawaii and Saigon to build a comprehensive data base for future analysis. A major, USA, was assigned as the MACSOG Documentation Team Member. Although he was carried on the MACSOG roster and charged against the MACSOG personnel allowance, he received much of his guidance for the performance of his duties from the JCS Documentation Team. Working in MACSOG Plans where much of the historical data is retained, the Documentation Team Member had free access to all MACSOG offices and bases.

4. ~~(TSLD)~~ ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. MACSOG OPLAN 69-69 (Redeployment(U)). This plan was prepared to provide for the redeployment phase of Post-Hostilities in Vietnam. It is a contingency plan for the phase down and termination or transfer of MACSOG activities during the Redeployment phase of Post-Hostilities. This plan supports COMUSMACV OPLAN 5J69 and annex N (UW) to COMUSMACV OPLAN 5J69.

b. 1968 MACSOG Historical Summary. Completed, edited, staffed and published the 1968 MACSOG Historical Summary (Annex F to MACV 1968 Command History)

c. MACSOG FACT BOOK. Up-dated MACSOG Fact Book with copy to be maintained in Chief, MACSOG's office for ready reference. An updated Fact Book was presented to Major General Freund, JCS (SACSA) and a copy forwarded to CINCPAC. This Fact Book is intended to provide current objectives, methods of operations, authorities and results of all MACSOG programs.

d. MACSOG Category 00 and 01 Briefings. These briefings superseded former categories "A", "B", "C" and "D". Statistics and Analysis Section was assigned the responsibility for the presentation of category 00 briefings which is the complete information on all aspects of MACSOG. This category is seldom required and will be approved on a case by case basis by Chief, MACSOG. Category 01 briefings with six supplements was assigned to Plans Division. The basic category 01 briefing deals only

with the security and organization of the Studies and Observations Group. These briefings are designed to provide selected individuals information on the particular MACSOG program(s) for which they have a demonstrated need. The supplements are as follows:

(1) 01A. General information on MACSOG's mission and organization to include PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE.

(2) 01B Special Projects.

(3) 01C Maritime Studies.

(4) 01D Psychological Studies.

(5) 01E Logistical Studies

(6) 01F Recovery Studies.

e. Paris Peace Talks. The Plans Division continued periodic submissions of fact sheets on MACSOG programs to MACV J5. Information submitted was for support of the MACV Liaison Officer to the Senior Military Negotiator in Paris. During 1969 five updates were submitted, the last being dated 14 June 1969. MACV determined that the need no longer existed for any input, with the exception of that from Joint Personnel Recovery Center. Direct coordination and liaison was established between the responsible J5 officer and MACSOG Recovery Studies Branch.

f. RVNAF Post Hostilities Unconventional Warfare Force. JCS message 021826Z Jan 69 states in part, "Efforts should be directed toward the developemnt and improvement of a special operations (UW) capability within each component of the RVNAF". To that end MACSOG has been coordinating with the US component services in SVN, with the objective of developing the most suitable UW force for each Vietnamese component service for the post-hostilities period. The MACSOG Army Plans Officer and the 5th SFGA Plans Officer conducted a study to determine a suitable ARVN UW organization for Post-Hostilities. Then, on 3 July 1969, Chief, MACSOG, and the CO of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) signed a memorandum for record outlining areas of agreement for future planning of the ARVN UW force.

g. Vietnamese Naval (VNN) Unconventional Warfare Mission and Organization. Compiled, edited and staffed a proposal for VNN Unconventional Warfare Mission and Organization during the Post Withdrawal Phase of Post-Hostilities.

h. Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) Unconventional Warfare Mission and Organization. Compiled, edited and staffed a proposal for VNAF Unconventional Warfare Mission and Organization during the Post Withdrawal Phase of Post-Hostilities.

i. SOG/STD Intelligence Collection Capabilities. Compiled, coordinated and staffed MACSOG input to J2 on MACSOG/STD intelligence collection (detection) capabilities during the post-hostilities period.

j. Program for MACSOG Operations Fiscal Year 1970(U). Compiled, edited and staffed the program for MACSOG Operations for FY 1970.

k. Visit of Major General Freund, JCS (SACSA). The Army Plans officer was assigned the duty as project officer for the visit of MG Freund, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, OJCS. The three day visit included trips to the following commands: III MAF, I Corps, XXIV Corps, 101st Abn Div, I Field Force Vietnam, 5th SFGA, II Field Force Vietnam, and IV CTZ.

l. Helicopter Tactics and Techniques for use with Reconnaissance Teams. This manual was prepared utilizing available information from all the helicopter units in SEA supporting MACSOG. This document was the first of its kind and will be disseminated to units in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force after final staffing and editing.

m. Studies and Observations Group Year-End Review of Vietnam, 1968. This Year-End Review of Vietnam 1968 has been prepared in response to a CINCPAC requirement dated 3 November 1968. It is a narrative summary of MACSOG operations for Calendar year 1968 and consists of a brief historical perspective, a discussion of status and progress of major continuing programs, MACSOG participation in T-Day Planning for SEA and objectives and outlook for Calendar Year 1969.

n. Visit of MACSOG Documentation Team. The MACSOG Documentation Team from the Office of JCS (SACSA) visited MACSOG during the period 16-27 July. The major task arising from this visit was the reproduction of hundreds of documents within authority of security regulations for transfer to JCS (SACSA). This documentation was used for compilation and support of the JCS/MACSOG Documentation Project.

o. Prepared detailed reply to CINCPAC, MSG 150145Z Oct 1969. This message requested comments on unconventional warfare planning considerations and a review of current plans to include the following:

(1) Advantages and disadvantages for theater level control of UW operations.

(2) Rationale for selection of UWOA's.

(3) Desired functions and capabilities of assets.

(4) Discussion of gaps in intelligence required for detailed planning in certain areas.

p. Special Operations/Unconventional Warfare. Prepared, staffed, and edited Annex L to COMUSMACV Operation Plan; a Vietnamization-RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (Phase III) and related U.S. planning.

q. Prepared, staffed, edited, and presented to COMUSMACV a briefing on the future of STD, VNSF, 5th SFG and 5th SFG support of MACSOG.

5. (~~TS~~) MACSOG DOCUMENTATION PROJECT.

a. In October 1968, Major General W. E. Depuy, OJCS, SACSA recommended to the Chairman, JCS, that a project be initiated to prepare a detailed documentation of the history of MACSOG for use in planning at the Unified/Specified Command, Military Department and JCS Staff level for similar activities in future wars. This documentation effort has been prepared in sufficient depth to permit formal analysis of all MACSOG programs and to determine the value of each.

b. One officer was assigned to MACSOG Plans Division in excess of JTD authorization to fulfill documentation requirements. The remainder of the Documentation Project Team was formed from members of Special Studies Group, OJCS, in Washington.

c. Present planning estimates place completion of the intial draft of the MACSOG Documentation at about 1 January 1970. After some review and editing COMUSMACV (including MACSOG), CINCPAC [redacted] will be afforded an opportunity to comment on the completed data base prior to review by JCS. (b)(1)

APPENDIX VI

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

1. (~~TS~~) GENERAL. During 1969, communications activities continued to expand. Message volume increased by 10%, and communications responsibilities were broadened with the assumption of responsibility for providing technical guidance on wiretaps.

2. (~~S~~) MISSION. To advise Chief, Studies and Observations Group on all matters pertaining to communications and electronics, and to provide communications systems support to Headquarters, Studies and Observations Group Activities, and subordinate commands. Inherent to this are the following tasks:

a. Advise MACSOG-40 on types and quantities of communications/electronics equipment to meet MACSOG's specific requirements.

b. Monitor communications/electronics training and provide guidance in communications/electronics training to the Training Studies Group at Camp Long Thanh and other MACSOG subordinates.

c. Provide guidance and assistance to the Strategic Technical Directorate on communications/electronics matters, insuring that STD has viable communications prior to withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Vietnam.

d. Provide guidance and assistance to C&C commanders and OIC NAD on all phases of communications/electronics, with particular emphasis on tactical communications doctrine.

e. Monitor SOI's and communications planning of subordinate units.

f. Maintain close liaison with DODSPECREP, MACV Science Advisor, and other representatives in the R&D field in order to remain cognizant of the state of the art in communications/electronics.

g. Ascertain communications requirements of Headquarters MACSOG and subordinate units. Coordinate long lines requirements with MACV J6, DCA, SAM, and other agencies, as applicable.

h. Maintain close coordination with other MACSOG staff sections to insure their communications needs are met in the best possible manner.

i. Maintain liaison with USARV, NAVFORV, 7TH AF, III MAF Field Forces and Corps headquarters, and subordinate communications/electronics engineering and maintenance agencies to insure MACSOG requirements are met expeditiously and efficiently.

j. Provide guidance to all MACSOG units on communications security and periodically monitor MACSOG communications to insure communications security practices are being complied with.

k. Maintain coordination with Chief BUGS and Project BUGS and provide guidance to MACSOG units on communications from agents, STRATA teams, STD trainees, to Project BUGS.

l. Maintain a crypto account and control distribution of special MACSOG codes to subordinates.

m. Provide crypto security assistance to subordinates.

3. (S) ORGANIZATION. During calendar year 1969, MACSOG communications operated at an authorized strength of 3 officers and 29 enlisted men. These personnel provided staff support to Chief, MACSOG. Additionally, they provided communications operations and maintenance support through the operation of a communications center and a single-side band radio station. The Director of Communications/Electronics, a Commander U.S. Navy directs all MACSOG-60 activities and serves as the primary advisor to Chief, MACSOG for communications/electronics. The other two officers are the communications/electronics material officers, Major U.S. Air Force and the communications operations and plans officer, Captain U.S. Army. A Chief Master Sergeant U.S. Air Force is the senior enlisted member of MACSOG-60. He serves as NCOIC of the Communications Division and also performs duties as senior Air Force enlisted representative in MACSOG Headquarters. Other enlisted personnel are primarily concerned with maintenance and operation of the MACSOG Headquarters Communications Facilities.

4. (S) OPERATIONS.

a. Communications support of PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) and SALEM HOUSE (SH) continued. The MACSOG single side band net for both PF net (A) and SH net (B) were combined into one net. The C&C subordinate MLS units were removed from this net and placed under direct control of their respective headquarters.

b. There has been little change in the type of communications support given to the PF and SH areas. Two teletype nets (TTY) were established. One links CCN with the MLS at Quang TRI and Camp Eagle. The other links CCS with Quan Loc. The advent of these two nets were 100% improvement over the radio-teletype circuitry (RATT), from a operational and security viewpoint.

c. The order for the procurement of the URC-64 in favor of the PRC-90 was rescinded. Sufficient data on the PRC-90 was not available at the time the URC-64 was requisitioned. When additional information on the PRC-90 became available, a reexamination was made,

and it was discovered that the PRC-90 had the following points in its favor:

(1) Two voice channels in two frequency ranges.

(2) Both voice channels have separate transmitter and receiver circuits, providing a measure of redundancy.

(3) Provisions for noiseless earphone reception and an audible beacon monitor to confirm beacon or mcm transmission.

(4) Flexible antennae which is less prone to damage during operation in dense underbrush.

(5) Higher power output on beacon operation, consequently greater operating distance expected.

(6) Lead time for procurement is nine months less than that of the URC-64, and acquisition costs approximately $300.00 less.

d. A transmission security analysis was made by the 101st Radio Bn of MACSOG COMMUNICATIONS. It was directed against three locales, Saigon, Nha Trang and Da Nang. Friendly monitor resources were targeted against telephonic and radio communications. Period of exploitation was 2 through 28 February 1969. The results of this analysis indicate very pressing requirements for secure voice communications in all MACSOG systems.

e. A study of communications requirements for Command and Control detachments was conducted by MACSOG Comm Div during the period 31 March - 17 May 1969. This study revealed the following areas of concern.

(1) The comm/electronics inventory contains a complex mix of equipment which is difficult to support with spare parts and requires maintenance men with uncommonly varied training and experience.

(2) Much of the teletype equipment is worn and obsolescent and requires an inordinate amount of maintenance.

(3) A majority of the HF radio equipment is obsolescent and unstable. It will not support a secure radio teletype signal from the C&C to the launch site. The Commander is therefore denied expeditious receipt of vital tactical information.

(4) Due to lack of positive management control procedures, some returning teams have been transferring tactical radio equipment directly to outgoing teams, thereby precluding preventive

maintenance procedures which would insure radios are operating at optimum efficiency when deployed.

(5) Although sufficient maintenance support agreements are in effect with adjacent radio and teletype repair units, these units frequently do not have sufficient spare parts or technical knowledge to effect repairs due to obsolescence of C&C equipment.

(6) Test equipment on hand was inadequate to meet maintenance requirements.

f. Management of Tactical RADIO Resources: Recent history indicates poor management of tactical radio resources by the C&C's. In order to insure that recon teams and exploitation forces deploy with tactical radio equipment operating at optimum efficiency, C&C Commanders were enjoined to initiate positive management control over tactical radio assets, and insure the initiation of a viable preventive maintenance program (PM). As a minimum, the PM program should accomplish the following:

(1) Peaking of radios.

(2) Cleaning of antennae joints and fittings.

(3) Cleaning of audio contacts on radio and handset.

(4) Taking meter readings on batteries prior to issuing.

(5) Make a transmit and receive function performance check of radio set prior to issue.

g. Instructions were promulgated for implementing communications security requirements in FAC and weather reporting communications. The CINCPAC OPSEC team identified the area of FAC reporting via non-secure communications means as a major weakness in MACSOG security. Action was initiated to insure that all FAC aircraft and launch sites are equipped with secure FM systems.

h. The Director, STD Communications and the MACSOG Communications Material Officer, visited all C&C's and their subordinate Mobile Launch Sites. The purpose of their visit was to study communication methods employed by the Liaison Service and make recommendations for improvements.

i. The Comm Division noted during December that teams with operable radios were unable to contact ground radio relay sites. A hasty profile prepared by this division in one of these cases clearly showed that the team in question was in radio defilade with respect to the radio relay site and should not have expected

positive FM communications. A message to all C&C's was orginated informing them that a team should be aware of this before insertion. Excessive radio transmissions in a vain attempt to contact the radio relay site might seriously compromise a team. It was recommended that a profile defilade map be made for each active radio relay site. This would provide a quick check to determine what target areas should not expect communications with the ground radio relay sites. Technical assistance and instructions on preparing profile defilade maps were placed at the field commanders disposal.

k. Building Three, MACV-1 Compound was rewired for telephone service. This action was necessary due to the numerous telephone problems caused by rain or damp weather, which seriously impaired the accomplishment of the MACSOG mission.

5. (S) FACILITIES AND CIRCUITRY.

a. AUTOSEVOCOM service was requested for CCC, CCS, and AOG, to enhance the MACSOG capability to arrange for, and coordinate the efficient use of PF and SH teams and assets.

b. Requested the deactivation of curcuit JMP-8, as NAB FOB at Phan Thiet was being closed.

c. A secure dedicated TTY circuit was activated between MACSOG and Camp Long Thanh. Activation of this circuit increased the message speed of service between the two locations.

d. Secure telephone voice circuit (KY-3) between CCN, Da Nang and MACSOG was activated. This circuit will support high priority requirements needing immediate action.

e. Requested installation of TTY circuit between CCN, MLT-1 and MLT-2. This request was validated by MACV J-6 and assigned validation number 0205. DCA SAM completed circuit planning and engineering and issued CEO S93266 to DCA SAM Rep Da Nang. Circuit designator assigned was XLF-1.

f. Surveyed all MACSOG communications assets and reviewed circuit uses and assigned circuit restoration priorities. Reported to MACV-J6 that priorities assigned to MACSOG secure teletype circuits are valid and should not be reduced.

g. Circuit XLF-1, a secure multi-point half duplex circuit connecting C&C North with its subordinate mobile launch teams which reduces the radio transmissions between the units and enhances communications security was activated in July.

h. Requested MACV J-6 upgrade the restoration priority of circuits XC-08 and XLF-1.

i. A circuit request to MACV J-6 for a receive only facsimile circuit for CCN was submitted. This circuit is required to provide current weather data in support of operations.

j. A 60 WPM half-duplex circuit between MACV-1 Compound comm center Hung Vuong (ARVN Compound) Comm Center, Nguyen Chn Thoai Street was requested in November. Purpose of this circuit is to provide our STD counterparts with a alternate route to the C&C's.

6. (S) EQUIPMENT.

a. COMM Division recommended the incorporation of the KY-38/PRC-77 into the FAC aircraft intercom system. The secure requirements of aircraft communications could be feasibly satisfied without modifying aircraft equipment, by use of an interconnecting cable with a two way switch to be inserted between helmet comm cable and radio systems.

b. Recommended that the proposed T.A. developed for the C&Cs by SOG be adopted with the following exceptions:

(1) PRC-77/KY-38 be substituted for the PRC-25 where ever appearing. Reason: production of PRC-25 with slight modifications that permit mating with KY-38 for covered voice.

(2) Spare parts authorized for the RT-10, PRC-77/KY-38, PRC-64, PRT-4/PRR-9 or HT-1 should be revised upward by 20% to allow for maintenance and combat losses.

c. Received recommendation from OJCS/SACSA to field test the FM-5 radio set developed by USAID.

d. Made a preliminary report on the adaptability of the FM-5 to MACSOG operations. It appears favorable but is limited in that it is uncovered voice, and is restricted to two frequencies.

e. A satisfactory test of Tape Reocrder, Toshiba, Model GT-701V was conducted. The purpose of this test was to determine suitability of tape recorders for recording and playback of high speed (CW) transmissions. Tests consisted of a 300 WPM burst transmission, recording a playback at approximately 18 WPM.

f. A pressing requirement surfaced for electro-mechanical and electronic test equipment at the C&C's. In order to avoid duplication of items, an inventory of assets from the C&C's was requested.

g. The Director of MACSOG Commo visited Ubon and conducted liaison with the CO of the 15th SOS concerning the RT use of the Miniponder in conjunction with four AC-130 aircraft. The 16th SOS CO and staff were very enthusiastic about this proposal and indicated an avid desire to work with the RTs. The miniponder is a micro-miniaturized transponder which, when triggered by an active x-band radar set will cause a coded presentation to appear on the screen of the x-band radar set. Due to power limitations, the effective range of the miniponder is five miles. AC-130 aircraft would support the teams with night suppression fire, or fire at targets of opportunity using the miniponder offset method.

h. Received 15 FM-5 radios for testing and evaluating as possible replacement/substitute for the AN/PRC-25 radio. The radios were subsequently distributed to C&C's for field testing. Initial estimates of the radio appears unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

(1) The transmit indicator light was too bright.

(2) Rec volume could not be turned low enough.

(3) Microphone was not water proof.

(4) The radio had to be operated clear of trees and from an area fairly high in order to make contact.

i. Received requests from Field Commanders for UHF radio equipment. After evaluating their requirements, the following determinations were made:

(1) A tunable multi-channel UHF radio would be a valuable asset for ground to air coordination in PRAIRIE FIRE operations.

(2) Radios should be located at C&C's and Launch Site.

k. Provided all MACSOG subordinate units with guidance for antennae installations. Problems encountered in contacting MACSOG units on SSB indicates at least part of the problem is antennae installation. Recommended use of the half wave length dipole antenna elevated one half wave length or one quarter wave length above effective ground level. Pointed out to associated units that the elevation of antennaes above the ground is a critical factor. Incorrect or arbitrary selection yields unpredictable radiation patterns and less than optimum communications. The locations of antennaes over building or other obstructions is to be avoided because it produces unpredictable radiation patterns. However, if locations for antennaes are severly limited, various configurations must be tried, and the best selected. It was indicated

that there are other types of properly engineered, horizontally polarized antennaes that may be used effectively besides the half-wave dipole, such as folded dipoles V antennae, and various arrays of long wire.

l. A half-duplex TTY circuit between CCS and Quan Loi was activated in September. This curcuit will enhance communications security and improve reliability of communications between the two locations. A final unsatisfactory report was submitted on the FM radio to Major General Freund, OJCS SACSA, Wash, D.C. Despite the lighter weight of the FM-5, inadequate range and undependable communications in dense foilage areas were the primary reasons for the unsatisfactory findings. Additionally the FM-5 proved to be not nearly as rugged as current tactical FM sets. All FM-5 radios held by MACSOG are being returned to USAID.

m. Requested MACV-J6 assistance in obtaining services of a team for the purpose of rearranging antenna elements of a 66 foot rotable log periodic antenna, type LPH-9 at the Thu Duc transmitter site. Scope of work includes lowering antennas, rearranging antenna elements and re-erection of antenna.

n. Recommended to the Director O&T that a course of instruction be developed for the care and operational use of the PRC-64. This course to be taught to all STRATA and U.S. personnel attending the communications course at Camp Long Thanh. The PRC-64 will be used by RT's in lieu of the PRC-74. The PRC-64 has a weight of 1/4th and acquisition cost of 1/6th that of the PRC-74.

o. The communications operations officer escorted an NSA wiretap design engineer from Wash, D.C., and a DODSPECREP to three C&C's, to discuss wiretap equipment and techniques with personnel who make use of the equipment. Several goals were accomplished by these visits; the design engineer acquired first-hand opinions from the users on what improvements could be made in current equipment and what features should be designed into new equipment; testing and demonstration of developmental equipment was accomplished.

7. (~~S~~) CRYPTO MATERIAL.

a. MACSOG received three editions of Nestor Key Lists for KY-38's. Only one edition with a copy count of fifty is required.

b. Requested MACV-J6 program MACSOG for issue of the KY-38 "Mini Gun", Nestor keying device at the earliest date. It was pointed out that the reduction in weight and bulk of material would materially aid the accomplishment of the MACSOG mission.

8. (~~S~~) FACILITIES. The MACSOG Communications System. MACSOG maintains a multi-purpose means communications system linking subordinates with MACSOG Headquarters. Secure teletype to major subordinates is the primary means of passing MACSOG classified communications. The MACSOG Comm Center maintains point-to-point Orestes covered teletype circuits to CCN, CCC, CCS, AOG, NAD/MMFOB, PROJECT BUGS, Cam Long Thanh, SUPPFAC NPN, and Headquarters MACV.

9. (~~S~~) TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS. MACSOG-60 closely monitors tactical communications of MACSOG subordinates with an eye to improvement. Expanded use of the Nestor tactical sevure voice system and procurement of new light weight radio equipment (AN/PRC-90) are examples of MACSOG-60's involvement in tactical communications.

APPENDIX VII

COMPTROLLER DIVISION

1. (U) General. Calendar year 1969 was the first full year of operation by the Comptroller's Division since it was separated from Logistics Division in October 1968. The year was characterized as one of consolidation, strengthening and of expanding existing accounting procedures.

2. (U) Mission. The Comptroller Division acts as principal economic and financial advisor to Chief, MACSOG. The Division is directly responsible for financial management of MACSOG. In addition to the responsibilities for accounting, auditing, and disbursing, the Division is also responsible for formulation of financial policies and regulations, and institution of internal controls.

3. (U) Organization. The Comptroller Division consists of two sections, Fiscal and Finance, headed by the MACSOG Comptroller (04 Navy) with an administrative assistant. The Fiscal section consists of one officer (Budget Analyst) and three enlisted men. The Finance section consists of one officer (Finance Officer) and two enlisted men.

4. (~~TSLD~~) Unclassified funds. SOG continued to receive its unclassified funds from CINCPAC through MACV. These funds are used to support the cover story that MACSOG is a staff element of MACV. The original AFP FY 70 was $400,000.00. A mid year review of unclassified funds was conducted in December 1969, and if approved, will result in savings of $158,500.00. Unclassified fund obligations as of 31 December 1969 were $93,084.19.

5. (~~TSLD~~) Classified funds. The Annual Funding Plan (AFP) for classified funds experienced two further revisions in January and May of 1969. The net result of these revisions was a savings of $3,874,100.00. The adjusted Annual Funding Plan for Fiscal Year 1969 was $21,737,900.00; total obligations against this AFP as of 31 December 1969 were $19,321,400.00. In May of 1969, Comptroller submitted a final budget for FY 70 and a proposed budget for FY 71. The final FY 70 budget was approved and is currently the SOG authorized funding plan for FY 70 and is broken down as follows:

FOOTBOY (U)	$9,478,700.00
SALEM HOUSE	5,520,300.00
PRAIRIE FIRE	9,874,200.00
IGLOO WHITE	905,200.00
TOTAL	$25,778,400.00

The preliminary Fiscal Year 71 Budget is broken down as follows:

FOOTBOY (✓)	$9,367,400.00
SALEM HOUSE	5,255,500.00
PRAIRIE FIRE	9,409,300.00
IGLOO WHITE	869,000.00
TOTAL	24,901,200.00

Total obligations against AFP FY 70 as of 31 December 1969 were $8,627,100.00

6. (✓) Operations.

a. During calendar year 1969 several new changes were implemented by the Comptroller. Perhaps, most important was the introduction of the Activity Expenditure Report in September. This report shows expenditures by activity, thus, enabling activity and headquarters commanders to see how much the activities costs to run. The Comptroller Division also tightened control of activity expenditures through the implementation of an expenditure authorization system.

b. Two civilian pay raises were granted following the lead of the U.S. Embassy except that civilians at Radio Studies Group, Liaison Bureau, STD and CSS received only one pay raise. Pay of operational personnel was not raised.

APPENDIX VIII

GROUND STUDIES GROUP

1. (~~TSLD~~) GENERAL.

a. The Commander, Ground Studies Group directs cross-border ground operations which fall in two programs. PRAIRIE FIRE is the nickname given to ground reconnaissance and exploitation forces operating in the panhandle of Laos. SALEM HOUSE is the nickname given to ground reconnaissance elements operating in Cambodia.

b. During the year 1969, the enemy has shown an increased potential for detering the clandestine insertion of teams in both the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE areas of operation. During the calendar year he has demonstrated his increased capability to monitor radio nets and locate teams by means of Radio Direction Finding equipment. There is evidence that he has diverted substantial forces for the purpose of LZ watching and tracking team members. He has also, on several occassions, employed the use of tracking dogs to locate team positions.

c. The increased effort to prevent MACSOG elements from operating in the enemy's safe-havens and rear area has resulted in efforts by MACSOG subordinate elements to increase the assurance of clandestime insertions and continued security. Secure voice radio transmissions have been used where practical. Smaller teams and variations of insert techniques have been employed, resulting in mission effectiveness despite increased efforts on the part of the enemy to prevent team penetrations. MACSOG elements continue to locate and verify valuable intelligence information from the cross-border sanctuaries of the enemy.

2. (~~TSLD~~) MISSIONS.

a. General: US and RVN forces will conduct covert cross-border operations into VC/NVA controlled areas of Laos and Cambodia.

b. The mission of the PRAIRIE FIRE program provides for cross-border reconnaissance operations into the panhandle of Laos using combined US/VN forces to locate, interdict and destroy enemy personnel and equipment on infiltration routes into RVN. PF Reconnaissance Teams (RT) are infiltrated to reconnoiter and locate targets. Detected targets are exploited by ground forces, artillery, TAC AIR, and ARC LIGHT if warranted. The authorized area of operations is depicted at TAB A.

c. The mission of the SALEM HOUSE program provides for cross-border reconnaissance operations into Cambodia using combined US/VN forces

to collect intelligence and to verify suspected enemy locations, infiltration routes, and logistics bases. SALEM HOUSE Reconnaissance teams (RT) are infiltrated by helicopter, parachute, or by foot and are authorized to operate in the SH area of operations as depicted at TAB B.

d. Political considerations have dictated that each program be conducted under separate operating rules. The specific concept, operating rules, and restrictions for each program are outlined in subsequent paragraphs.

3. ~~(TSLD)~~ ORGANIZATION.

a. MACSOG-35 is organized as a control headquarters for the three Command and Control Detachments. It also has operational control of a separate launch facility, SUPPFAC located at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. In addition it has operational control of the Liaison Bureau which functions as a liaison to the Liaison Service, Strategic Technical Directorate. (TAB C)

b. The PRAIRIE FIRE area of operations is controlled by two Command and Control Detachments, C&C Detachment North (CCN) located at DaNang and C&C Detachment Central (CCC) located at Kontum. (TAB D and TAB E). Each C&C is organized with a headquarters, two Mobile Launch Sites, two Exploitation Companies of three platoons each, a security company, and one Reconnaissance company consisting of 30 Reconnaissance teams each. The RT is the basic unit of the reconnaissance effort and is authorized 3 US and 9 indigenous personnel (Special Commando Unit). During CY 69 operations were launched from Dak Pek, Dat To and Uborn, Thailand under the control of CCC. Teams were launched from Phu Bai, Mai Loc, Quang Tri, and Nakhon Phanom, Thailand under the control of CCN. The Thailand launch facilities enable a team to insert from the west into Laos when the weather is unworkable on the eastern edge of the operational area.

c. The SALEM HOUSE area of operations is controlled by Command and Control Detachment South (CCS) located at Ban Me Thout. (TAB F). A small portion of the SALEM HOUSE area located in the Tri-Border area of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is operated in by both CCC and CCS. CCS is organized similar to CCN and CCC with a headquarters, two Mobile Launch Sites, two Exploitation companies of three platoons each, a security company, and one Reconnaissance Company consisting of 30 Recommaissance Teams. Each Reconnaissance team has an authorized strength of 3 US and 9 SCU. Due to operational restrictions, exploitation in Cambodia is not authorized; however, the Exploitation companies are tasked to establish patrol bases, and to exploit in-country targets. During the CY 69

operations were launched from Quan Loi, Ban Don, Duc Lap, Gia Nghia, Ban Me Thout, Tay Ninh, Duc Co, Song Be, Bu Lop, Bu Prang, and Loc Ninh.

4. (~~TSLD~~) NON ORGANIC ASSETS:

a. MACSOG has no organic air assets; however several units are dedicated to support MACSOG cross border ground operations. Air assets are found in Section 2, of Appendix III.

b. The majority of helicopter assets are provided by the Field Forces.

c. Tactical Air Support is provided for the PRAIRIE FIRE AO thru standard FAC channels.

d. Cross-border operations require a great amount of air support. The majority of infiltrations and extractions are accomplished by helicopter. In the PRAIRIE FIRE area, TAC air is scheduled for all insertions as the principle fire support weapon. It is also used for the exploitation of targets of opportunity. In both the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE areas, light fixed wing aircraft serve the function of command and control FAC, visual reconnaissance, and radio relay. Fixed wing and rotary wing assets are used for aerial resupply of commited forces.

5. (~~TSLD~~) OPERATIONAL AREAS:

a. The PRAIRIE FIRE area of operations includes the Laotian border at a depth of approximately 20 kilometers and runs from the tri-border of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam north to the vicinity of the DMZ at approximately XD 4398. (TAB A).

b. The SALEM HOUSE operational area includes the entire Cambodian border with RVN. This area is divided into three zones as follows: (TAB B)

(1) Zone ALPHA extends from the Tri-border area south to Route 13 at a uniform depth of 30 kms. There are no numerical limitations on Zone ALPHA missions or number of helicopter infiltrations/extractions, but helicopters must not exceed the 30km depth. Helicopters will not conduct infiltrations within 10 KMs of Mondul Kiri (YU 3879) or 1 KM of Routes 13, 131, or 141 without approval from Washington. Sanitized M14 mines with self-destruction attachments are authorized in Zone ALPHA north of Srepok River. Dates and locations of mine emplacements will be recorded, and records maintained by CCS.

(2) Zone BRAVO extends from Logo (WT 0775) to the Gulf of Siam at a uniform depth of 20 kms. Authority to conduct operations in Zone BRAVO will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(3) Zone CHARLIE extends from Route 13 to Logo at a uniform depth of 20 kms, excepting those areas within 5 kms of Snoul (XV 5434) and Memut (XU 2807). Helicopter infiltrations/extractions are authorized but no more than 10 operations will be conducted in any 30-day period.

6. (~~TSLD~~) OPERATING RESTRICTIONS:

a. PRAIRIE FIRE operating restrictions in effect as of 31 Dec 1969 are as follows:

(1) Team size is considered to be that of a squad sized element. Nothing in writing specifies the exact size or the number of US personnel on each team. Normal configuration is usually 3 US and 9 indigenous personnel. Reinforcement and/or Exploitation forces are limited to three platoons. Company and Battalion sized forces are not authorized in the PFAO.

(2) Authorized fire support in the PFAO is limited to artillery, TAC air, helicopter gunships, and platoon TO&E crew served weapons. Anti-personnel mines (M-14) may be emplaced around static positions but must be removed when the unit moves. M-14 mines may be left in place; however they are limited to two placed together with no two groups being closer than fifty meters from each other. Anti-vehicular mines may be placed on roads no closer than five hundred meters from each other. All mines left in place will be recorded with exact locations showing eight digit coordinates. These records are maintained by the C&C Detachments.

(3) Offensive action may be conducted utilizing helicopter insertion techniques to the full depth of the PFAO. There are no restrictions on aircraft overflights and no limitations on the number of RT missions that can be run in the PRAIRIE FIRE area of operations. Offensive actions are authorized for the purpose of destroying enemy caches, equipment, troops, and interdicting LOC's. VC/NVA prisoners remain a continuing priority mission.

b. SALEM HOUSE restrictions are periodically changed; however, the following restrictions remain in effect:

(1) RTs will only initiate contact for the purpose of taking prisoners when isolated groups of two or three VC/NVA soldiers are encountered. Teams will otherwise engage in combat only for self-preservation or avoidance of capture. Teams are authorized to destroy significant enemy caches found during reconnaissance operations.

(2) RTs will take all possible precautions to avoid contact with Cambodian civilian and military personnel.

(3) Tactical air strikes and exploitation forces are not authorized in Cambodia. Gunships will engage the enemy only when necessary for self-defense or defense of the team.

(4) RTs will not exceed 12 personnel, none of whom will be area ethnic members. There is no restriction on the number of US personnel who may accompany each RT.

(5) Immediate reinsertion may be effected upon emergency extraction of the RT. This authority expires 48 hours after the final emergency extraction.

(6) Recon overflights are limited to two per mission in Zones ALPHA and CHARLIE. Over-flights of Zone BRAVO must be approved on a case-by-case basis by Washington.

7. (~~TSLD~~) OPERATIONAL TRENDS.

a. Throughout CY 1969 there have been significant developments in equipment, tactics, and personnel in both the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE areas of operation. These changes have been a direct result of the enemy's increased effort to thwart MACSOG ground elements, his build-up of forces and the increase in his effectiveness. To this end we have improved our operational techniques and increased our efforts to extract vital intelligence from his rear areas.

b. Since the 1968 bombing halt the enemy has effectively improved his lines of communication. Our teams have noted fewer and fewer black pajamas and mixed uniforms. Enemy units have been better dressed, better armed and better trained. An increase in the percentage of automatic weapons has been noted. Fewer captured weapons belong to the older family of semi-automatic weapons such as the ChiCom carbine type 53 and the SKS. He has materially improved his anti-aircraft artillery capability and has demonstrated increased small arms effectiveness in the anti-aircraft role.

In both Laos and Cambodia an increased capability and effort is being made to open new roads and trails. MACSOG elements have reported new efforts in road maintenance. Communications equipment has improved. Reconnaissance teams have noted an increase in suspected Radio Direction Finding (RDF) capability. Jamming of FM radio nets has increased, and it is suspected that he possesses a greater capability to monitor and translate our radio traffic. During the calendar year several new tactics and techniques have been noted. RT's have noticed changes in the techniques of tracking the team. Interpreters with the teams have reported that enemy leaders have given instructions not to shoot but to try and capture the Americans. There are several instances of trackers following the team for long periods of time without firing a shot. Dogs have long been suspected as being trained as a part of a hunter-killer team. Many teams have reported having been chased by dogs. In November a team in the SALEM HOUSE area killed a tracker and his dog. The dog was still on a leash. Civilians in the areas of operation continue to be a problem. However, in Cambodia where the problem is greater, we have noted that the civilians have seemingly moved away from the border areas. They have apparently grouped around hamlets and villages and no longer live as dispersed along the border. This is especially true in the tri-border area north of the Tonle San River in Ratanakiri Province of Cambodia.

c. In coping with the changes and improvements in the enemy's position in Laos and Cambodia, MACSOG elements have made several operational changes. New and better equipment is being requested, tested and used. A new lightweight riot mask is being carried in lieu of the older protective mask. Light weight mini grenades and mini smoke is reducing the field load of the team member. The STABO rig is now standard emergency extraction equipment for all teams and replaces the less effective McGuire rig. AN/PRC 90 radios have been issued in limited quantities which reduce the weight of communications equipment and will augment the operational FM radios. The higher frequency of the PRC 90 will be more difficult for the enemy to monitor. Problem areas in equipment exist in the helicopter assets. The aircraft are older and require more maintenance. This is particularly evident in the VNAF CH-34 helicopters. Personnel turbulence has caused a limited degree of problems in the RT's. Our team leaders are generally younger and less experienced. This problem has, to some degree, been offset with an emphasis on training. All RT members are now required to attend the RT leaders course at Camp Long Thanh. Improved techniques and tactics of RT operations are constantly being studied and field tested. The primary method of insert and extraction remains the helicopter assault. However, methods of employing helicopter assets are continually changed. A recent successful insert by parachute was accomplished and has proved to

be a most effective and clandestine method of infiltration if conducted properly. Another operational change in the past year has been to employ Reconnaissance teams in one particular area, systematically work that area, and then move in total to another area. This procedure has replaced a "scatter gun" approach to targets in the SALEM HOUSE and PRAIRIE FIRE areas. With the integration of the EARTH ANGEL teams into this system we can methodically work alternate areas simultaneously with the added safety factor of separating these two programs. In addition, RT's can respond to request for perishable intelligence of troop movements and indications with a much greater flexibility.



TAB A

PRAIRIE FIRE AREA

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
TOP SECRET LIMDIS
NORTH VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
Dong Hoi
Dong Ha
Quang Tri
Hue
Nakhon Phanom
Khammouane (Thakhek)
Sakon Nakhon
Seno
Savannakhet
Muong Phin
Muong Nong
Saravane
THAILAND
Ubon Ratchathani
Warin Chamrap
Sisaket
Surin
Pakse
Attopeu
Da Nang
Hoi An
I CORPS
Tam Ky
Quang Ngai
Mo Duc
Kontum
Hoai Nhon
Pleiku
An Tuc
Qui Nhon
Song Cau
Hau Bon
Tuy Hoa
II CORPS
DUC CO
ALPHA
Stung Trang
Khong
Siem Reap
CAMBODIA
BAN DON
CCS
DUC LAP
Nha Trang
Kompong Thom
Pursat
Kratie
CHARLIE
Kompong Cham
Gia Nghia
GIA NGHIA
Bo Duc
SONG BE
Loc Ninh
QUAN LOI
Bao Loc
Phan Rang
Dang Kong
BRAVO
PHNOM PENH
TAY NINH
Thuoc Vinh
Takeo
Svay Rieng
Khiem Cuong
Phu Cuong
Xuan Loc
Phan Thiet
Sihanoukville
Kampot
Chau Phu
Moc Hoa
Cho Lon
SAIGON
Phuoc Le
Ham Tan
III CORPS
Cao Lanh
My Tho
Go Cong
Vung Tau
Ream
Ha Tien
Long Xuyen
Sa Dec
Vinh Long
Truc Giang
Duong Dong
DAO PHU QUOC
Rach Gia
Can Tho
Phu Vinh
Vi Thanh
Khanh Hung
Bac Lieu
Quan Long
IV CORPS
Con Son
F-VIII-B-1
TOP SECRET LIMDIS
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
TAB B
SALEM HOUSE AREA

56873 9-67

TAB C

GROUND STUDIES GROUP ORGANIZATION



TAB D

CCN ORGANIZATION



TAB E

CCC ORGANIZATION



TAB F

CCS ORGANIZATION



APPENDIX IX

AIRBORNE STUDIES GROUP

1. ~~(TSLD)~~ GENERAL. The Airborne Studies Group, which had formerly been known as OP-34, was designated with its present title on 8 December 1968. As a part of its new designation it was relocated, given the cover of the Joint Translation Center and separated from MACSOG Headquarters. The organization continued to conduct agent and diversionary operations during 1969 and increased its capabilities by implementing two new programs (SINGLETON AND EARTH ANGEL). The Airborne Studies Group, in conjunction with its Vietnamese counterpart personnel from the Special Task Force of the Strategic Technical Directorate, continued to implement the TIMBERWORK (~~[illegible]~~) program. TIMBERWORK (~~[illegible]~~) has been continued as the agent operation portion of the FOOTBOY (~~[illegible]~~) program and has three distinct sub-programs: Agent operations, Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition (STRATA) operations, and diversionary operations (FORAE)(~~[illegible]~~). Major significant changes in the TIMBERWORK (~~[illegible]~~) program occurred not in concept but rather in the means of execution. The emphasis of the program although shifted from North Vietnam proper to the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE areas of operation maintains the capability of conducting operations in North Vietnam on order.

2. ~~(TSLD)~~ MISSION. The TIMBERWORK (~~[illegible]~~) program has the mission of collecting military intelligence through cross-border agent operations and conducting diversionary agent operations designed to deceive enemy security forces and dissipate their resources.

3. ~~(TSLD)~~ ORGANIZATION.

a. General. The Airborne Studies Group (MACSOG-36) continued cross-border activities into Laos and Cambodia during 1969. It is organized into a headquarters and two subordinate branches -- MACSOG-36A and MACSOG-36B. MACSOG-36A continued to manage agent and agent team operations and also directed diversionary operations. MACSOG-36B continued to develop and to implement the Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition (STRATA) concept.

b. Agent Team Operations. Prior to 1969, long-term agent teams were infiltrated into North Vietnam to conduct intelligence collection, target acquisition, development and support of civilian intelligence and escape and evasion nets, early warning, selective harassment, psychological operations and assistance to downed air crews.

c. Diversionary Operations. Diversionary operations, designated by the CINCPAC code word FORAE (~~[illegible]~~) were conceived in late 1967, approved by Chief, MACSOG on 29 November 1967 and by COMUSMACV on 14 March 1968. The objectives are to divert main force NVN resources to defense and internal security, divert them away from

actual clandestine operations, increase strain on control of the populace, create opportunities for friendly psychological operations, exploit and harass the enemy in his rear, and collect intelligence where possible. Originally FORAE (Ø) was divided into three sub-programs; OODLES (Ø), URGENCY (Ø) and BORDEN (Ø). With the cessation of the bombing north of the DMZ in November 1968 and restrictions on operations north of 20°N, project URGENCY (Ø) was terminated.

d. STRATA Operations. In April 1967, JCS approved the infiltration of STRATA teams into selected areas of the panhandle of North Vietnam with the mission of installation of seismic wiretap devices, road-watch of critical LOCs, reconnaissance and pinpointing of selected enemy installations, and target acquisition for air strikes. Effective November 1968 with the bombing halt in North Vietnam the area of operation for the STRATA organization was changed from NVN to Laos and Cambodia. Prior to November 1969 agent teams consisted of both civilian and ARVN personnel; since that date all agent teams are composed of ARVN personnel only.

4. ~~(TSLD)~~ AGENT TEAM OPERATIONS.

a. In January 1969, there were five in-place TIMBERWORK (Ø) teams operational in NVN. Though all teams were suspected as being compromised, message play was maintained to be used as a diversionary operation. These 5 operational teams which consisted of 20 agents were given varying tasks designed to implement the diversionary aspect during early January. Team EAGLE, HADLEY and RED DRAGON were ordered to move for exfiltration and ARES was ordered to prepare sites for caches to be brought in by another agent. TOURBILLON had not sent any messages since 27 December 1968 and was eventually terminated as KIA on 24 June 1969. Team HADLEY reported its move toward exfiltration until 21 February 1969 and then suddenly went off the air and was subsequently declared KIA on 19 August 1969. Team RED DRAGON followed the same general pattern as the above mentioned teams and went off the air on 6 June 1969 and was declared KIA on 6 December 1969. RED DRAGON was surfaced by the NVA on 6 December 1969. ARES and EAGLE continued message play throughout the entire year. ARES began to ask political questions in early February concerning the USA and RVN governments' position at the Paris Peace Talks. In June, both of the remaining teams, ARES and EAGLE, were given specific instructions to prepare their own exfiltration plans and report their instructions by message. ARES submitted a plan that inferred that they really intended to exfiltrate, while EAGLE continued to stall and made no effort to hide their intention of not exfiltrating. Finally, it became obvious that neither team was really going to exfiltrate and radio contact was discontinued at the end of November 1969.

b. Team locations (see TAB A).

c. Team background (see TAB B).

5. (~~TSLD~~) SINGLETON OPERATIONS. The Singleton agent program was brought under the RODCA (U) reporting system in accordance with existing security directives and therefore discussion of this activity is prohibited in this history.

6. (~~TSLD~~) DIVERSIONARY OPERATIONS (FORAE (~~C~~)).

a. Project OODLES (~~C~~). This project is designed to portray an apparently extensive and successful agent network in selected areas of NVN. Fourteen notional teams have been activated by message traffic and reinforced by bundle and resupply drops during 1968 to physically locate eight of the teams. In 1969 this message play continued with a total of 60 family morale messages being sent to the notional teams. Conduct of this project parallels conduct of the in-place long-term agent operations and becomes more credible by NVN knowledge of captured actual teams. Family messages are sent via HUMIDOR (~~C~~) SSPL one-way voice link and the notional teams are resupplied in the same manner as actual teams. To add creditility, personnel presence is implied by the paradropping of an ice block-weighted personnel parachute to be found, after the ice melts, hanging in trees. Another method is actual infiltration of a pseudo-agent who is led to believe he was separated both from team members who were to have received him on the drop zone and from other team reinforcements seen in the aircraft. The reinforcements seen by the pseudo-agents are actually RVNAF cadre and do not exit the aircraft as the agent is led to believe. (see TAB C)

b. Project BORDEN (~~C~~). This project employs NVA ralliers and prisoners of war to convince NVN that a successful penetration of NVA is being conducted with the mission of inducing defection and collecting intelligence. The project, is designed to divert military resources to counter this penetration, harass and alienate NVA troops from their leaders,strain NVN ideological control, induce defection and collect intelligence. NVA soldiers are collected from division-level detention facilities as soon after capture as possible, oriented for two weeks on the freedom and prosperity of RVN at a certralized security facility, and in other ways convinced to support RVN. They are trained one week as agents and infiltrated into NVA controlled territory of RVN, Laos, Cambodia and NVN. The agent's mission is to return to the NVA as an escapee or under appropriate cover, collect intelligence, recruit dissatisfied soldiers through the use of a secret "FIR BRANCH" pass or an ultraviolet mark on the prospective rallier and exfiltrate through defection. It is fully expected and intended that many of the recruited agents will reveal their assigned mission to the NVA

of their own volition or under interrogation. Those NVA soldiers not recruited as agents during the orientation period are returned to normal detention facilities to spread specific project information to other detainees for eventual transmission to NVA intelligence analysts. During 1969, 58 detainees were returned to detention facilities, 43 were inserted as agents into NVA controlled territories of RVN, Laos and Cambodia. These retained agents were assigned a total of 31 missions, sometimes utilizing two or three agents on one mission. The success of this program was supported by two captured enemy documents dated 8 January 1969 and 18 May 1969 in I CTZ. These documents directed that subordinate units "take precautionary measures against enemy programs" which, from the description, fit the BORDEN project. [redacted] (b)(1) A significant event occurring in July concerning the BORDEN project was that the number of agents utilized was reduced to three per cycle and recruiting was turned over to the Vietnamese. (See TAB D)

7. (~~TSLD~~) EARTH ANGEL PROGRAM.

a. EARTH ANGEL. This program began as a direct result of the curtailment of any new operations in North Vietnam after 1 November 1968. In early January a query was received from the SACSA concerning what assets would be available if operations were resumed in NVN. This led to a study which resulted in a proposal of 2 or 3 man teams of Hoi Chanh for reconnaissance operations in the PRAIRIE FIRE-SALEM HOUSE areas. These teams were to wear NVA uniforms in an effort to avoid detection by the enemy. This proposal was approved by CINCPAC in March 1969. Implementation began immediately and three pilot teams were recruited and trained. The first team was infiltrated into SALEM HOUSE area of operation on 8 April 1969 to observe a ferry and dock system in the vicinity of YA-649251. The mission was considered successful though two members of the team were lost. Two more teams were inserted during the month of May against targets in the PRAIRIE FIRE area; however, both teams were terminated for fabrication of information. In June another team was inserted into the PRAIRIE FIRE area, but once again the team did not reach the target and deception was noted on the post mission polygraph examinations. These three unsuccessful missions prompted a study to determine the weak areas in the program and also in the recruitment of new teams. The study was completed in July and training began for three new teams. As a result of the study new training methods were employed and psychological motivation emphasized.

b. In August a team was inserted into the PRAIRIE FIRE area to conduct an area reconnaissance in the vicinity of YE 7443. This

mission was a success and began an upward trend in the credibility of the EARTH ANGEL program. Two more missions were conducted in September in the SALEM HOUSE area and both were successful though one team member was lost. These successes resulted in an expansion of the program and resulted in five missions being conducted during October, four or which were successful. The most important information was the discovery of an NVA battalion size unit in the PRAIRIE FIRE area vicinity of YU 6668. Two missions were run into areas of known heavy enemy activity during the month of November. Both missions were designed to detect artillery that was used by the NVA within Cambodia to shell Bu Prang and Duc Lap Special Forces camps. One team was captured and held for one month at which time they successfully escaped. The second team returned with negative results. During the month of December, a total of five teams were inserted in the SALEM HOUSE area of operation. Four missions were completed during December with the 5th mission carrying over into 1970. The MACSOG missions were for point reconnaissance, and all reported no significant enemy activity.

8. ~~(TSLD)~~ STRATA OPERATIONS.

a. STRATA is an acronym for Short Time Road Watch and Target Acquisition. The STRATA program is responsible for inserting Vietnamese agent teams into Laos and Cambodia in order to gather area intelligence information, locate and observe infiltration routes into South Vietnam, direct airstrikes on enemy military traffic, and conduct action missions as directed by Chief, MACSOG. The teams were trained by American and VN personnel.

b. To preclude the teams knowing more than absolutely necessary about STRATA operations, instructors usually wore civilian clothing, but when in uniform never displayed insignia or rank. When team members were launched on a mission, they were given the cover story of having been trained to search for and to assist pilots shot down over Laos or Cambodia. Their reasons for accepting the mission were deferment from serving in the Army of SVN and high pay. If a team made contact with civilians or Cambodian/Laotian patrols they were instructed to state that they were a recon patrol.

c. Sixty-three missions were conducted during the period 5 Jan 69 to 26 Nov 69. A brief summary of each mission is contained in TAB F.

d. STRATA Target Areas and Missions. (See TAB G)



TAB A

LONG TERM AGENT TEAM LOCATIONS

▲ TEAMS LOST IN 1969
● TEAMS LOST IN 1968

TAB B

TEAM BACKGROUNDS

1. ~~(TSLD)~~ ARES.

a. Background. A Vietnamese case officer encountered ARES at the Refugee Debriefing Center, Saigon, on 29 Aug 60 and assessed him as a capable man motivated by desire to revenge himself on the authorities of NVN. He was subsequently recruited as a singleton agent and infiltrated back into his home province to establish an intelligence collection net. His operational base is in the mountainous region directly north of Uong Bi, Quang Yen Province. ARES recruited 11 subsources and provided information on NVN documentation, the Uong Bi Power Plant, highways, bridges, Haiphong Harbor and other miscellaneous items which he was able to observe or gain information on through debriefing of his subsources before terminating radio contact in December 1969.

b. General. Analysis of ARES in 1966 indicated that he was under hostile control. In November 1968, he exhibited indications that the opposition was becoming impatient with the operation. ARES hinted several times that he was having difficulty with radio communications and Central (MACSOG/STD control headquarters) was asked to find another means of communication. ARES was informed in Dec 67 that Central wanted to resupply him and he was instructed to find a suitable DZ. ARES, however, immediately began to expound on the difficulties of finding and using DZs in the area and again pleaded with Central to find a way to resupply him by other means. It appeared that ARES was attempting to get Central to expose additional assets. With this in mind, a diversionary operation was implemented in June 1968. The object of this operation, was to cause the security forces of Haiphong to expend their time and energies in useless pursuits and to implant the idea that Central had agents operating in the city of Haiphong. Upon conclusion of this deception plan, an exfiltration in international waters was directed by Central in June 1969, with which ARES failed to comply.

2. ~~(TSLD)~~ EAGLE.

a. Background. Team EAGLE was originally composed of six members, all natives of BAC GIANG Province, NVN. The team was infiltrated back into the province on 27 Jun 64, with the mission of conducting sabotage operations on NVN Routes 1 and 4. MUC NAM QUAN railline, and the MAI PHA air base. The team recruited two subsources who were the primary sources of information provided in 1968. The information received, however, was of little or

no value. The team was primarily tasked with roadwatch assignments. EAGLE's mission in 1967 and 1968 was essentially changed to collection of intelligence information, although it was tasked with a sabotage mission in Mar 68. The mission was not completed. The team now consists of three members of the six originally infiltrated.

b. General. Continual analysis of EAGLE since 1967 indicated that the team was under hostile control. Therefore, in 1968, plans were developed to move the team south from its safe area for possible exfiltration. EAGLE was notified to move south, but was not informed of the reason for it. After a brief period of delaying, the team finally reported starting its movement in November. It was believed that the team would break radio contact, thereby terminating the operation, once the EAGLE NVN case officer became aware that an exfiltration was planned for the team. Radio contact was terminated in December 1969.

3. ~~(TSLD)~~ HADLEY.

a. Background. NVN Route 8 is an improved motorable road connecting Route 15 to Laos Routes 81, 12, and 121. These routes are considered major troop and supply infiltration routes to the South. In addition, the NGAN PHO River, running west to east in the same area is a principal water supply route. A black team installed in this area could provide valuable information on flow of infiltration traffic. Team HADLEY's mission was to conduct roadwatches, emplace a roadwatch device, identify potential airstrike targets, and, on order, to conduct harassment and sabotage operations.

b. General. Team HADLEY was infiltrated on 25 Jan 67 by helicopter in Laos for overland movement into NVN. The team was placed on the wrong LZ due to pilot error and its initial radio contact, made on 17 Feb 67, reported that it had been compromised upon landing and was still trying to evade the enemy. It is believed that all communication equipment, except for one RS-1 radio and some Panasonic radios, were destroyed or lost during this period. Communications with the team throughout 1968 were generally good, with almost immediate responses to messages. Originally an 11 man team, HADLEY lost four members. Two members died in 1967 and another two in 1968. Current view on the security survey completed in Jun 67 concluded the team had been captured soon after infiltration. HADLEY was therefore used primarily in a diversionary capacity in 1968. The team was officially declared KIA in August 1969.

4. (~~TSLD~~) RED DRAGON.

a. Background. The RED RIVER Valley from the NVN/China border town of LAO KAY to Hanoi is a major line of communication with many rail, road, and water transshipment points from above 21°N. A black team located in LAO KAY and YEN BAI Provinces would be in an excellent position to conduct sabotage and intelligence missions. Planning for such an operation began in early 1966 and the concept was approved by CINCPAC in May 67.

b. General. Team RED DRAGON was widely dispersed on its infiltration drop on 21 Sep 67. Difficulty in assembling and the loss of one radio caused a 32-day delay in the team establishing its first radio contact. Radio communications with the team in 1968, as in 1967, were generally poor due to atmospheric conditions and frequent retransmissions were necessary. RED DRAGON's security status was a matter of question since its initial radio contact, and the question continued to plague both US and VN case officers throughout the year. While US personnel were convinced the team was under NVN control, the VN counterpart case officer felt otherwise. This difference in opinion had a marked effect on handling of the team until June, when a MACV J2[redacted] security review indicated the team was under hostile control. Maintenance of RED DRAGON was further complicated by difficulties in resupply. The team was resupplied first on 18 Mar 68 by FAC aircraft, but the limited bombing halt declared on 1 Apr 68, prevented any further resupply of the team. RED DRAGON, therefore, spent much of its time in 1968 searching for survival food and was largely unproductive. Although it was conceded the team was not useful, nor could it be used in support of any diversionary operation, contact was maintained throughout 1968 because of the VN counterparts' belief the team was secure. The team went off the air in June 1969 and was declared KIA on 3 December 1969.

(b)(1)

5. (~~TSLD~~) TOURBILLION.

a. Background. Team TOURBILLON, during 1968, was composed of three surviving members of 27 agents infiltrated between 16 May 62 and 24 Dec 66. The original team, composed of 7 members, was infiltrated by parachute on 16 May 62 with team CASTOR serving as its reception party. The original mission of the team was one of sabotage and harassment. By 1967 and 1968, the mission was changed to intelligence collection by observation.

b. General. TOURBILLON first came under suspicion of being under hostile control in Jan 67 when a reinforcement radio operator, infiltrated on 24 Dec 66, transmitted messages containing duress signals. After further case officer analysis and [redacted]

analysis of all in-place TIMBERWORK (/) teams, it was concluded the team came under hostile control prior to Dec 66, possibly as far back as 1962. The team's activities in 1968 confirmed its controlled status. No significant intelligence was reported and the team moved continually in an attempt to evade the enemy. Contact was maintained throughout the year in order to utilize the team in a diversionary effort. TOURBILLON was last heard in December 1968 and was terminated in June 1969.


CHINA
CHINA
Dong Van
Ching-hsi
Bao Lac
Ha Giang
Lao Cai
Cao Bang
Bac Can
Ning-ming
Lang Son
Tuyen Quang
Yen Bai
Thai Nguyen
Mong Cai
Phong Saly
Lai Chau
Dien Bien Phu
Son La
Phu Tho
Phuc Yen
Bac Giang
Bac Ninh
HANOI
Soi Tay
Hoa Binh
Ha Dong
Hai Duong
Quang Yen
Hon Gai
Haiphong
Kien An
Hung Yen
Phu Ly
Thai Binh
Nam Dinh
Ninh Binh
Thanh Hoa
Luang Prabang
LAOS
Xieng Khouang
Vang Vieng
Ban Chieng
Cua Bao
Phu Qui
Linh Cam
VIENTIANE
Nong Khai
THAILAND
Udon Thani
Nakhon Phanom
Khammouane
Sakon Nakhon
Savannakhet
Dong Hoi
Vinh Linh
DEMARCATION LINE
Dong Ha
Quang Tri
Bo Ho Su
Tchepone
SOUTH VIETNAM
Hue
Muong Nong
LAOS
PINE
MIKADO
HAIL
COBRA
RAM
HOMER
FLASH
HELMET
BARON
RIO
ELECTRA
PLUTO
LISBON
ROCKET
DUKE
SPEAR
ROCKET
PANTHER
NORTH VIETNAM
TAB C
PROJECT OODLES (Ø)
TEAMS ACTIVE
TEAMS NOT ACTIVE
F-IX-C-1
NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

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

TAB D

BORDEN OPERATIONS 1969

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

TAB E

EARTH ANGEL MISSIONS

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TAB F

STRATA MISSION DATA

1. Mission: Roadwatch RD 92, location: Laos, Duration: 5-11 Jan 69.
   Remarks: Heavily used trails were observed. Contact was made with enemy and airstrike conducted by F-4C aircraft. Team received emergency extraction.

2. Mission: Roadwatch RD 141, Location: Laos, Duration: 7-9 Jan 69
   Remarks: Road was observed with enemy truck traffic moving troops. Many well used trails located. Enemy battalion base camps was observed. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

3. Mission: Riverwatch XE PON River, Location: Laos, Duration 12-15 Jan 69.
   Remarks: First American led team. Contact with enemy on two occasions resulted in seven enemy KIA. Team received emergency extraction during which one gunship crashed but its crew was saved.

4. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 7, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 3-22 Jan 69.
   Remarks: Road was observed with heavy civilian truck traffic. Five well used trails were observed. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

5. Mission: Roadwatch on Rd Between Rd 14 and Rd 141, location: Cambodia, Duration: 17-20 Jan 69.
   Remarks: Contact was made with estimated enemy platoon resulting in one agent WIA. Team received emergency extraction.

6. Mission: Riverwatch XE BAN GIANG River, Location: Laos, Duration: 23-28 Jan 69.
   Remarks: Second American Led Team. River was observed and found not navigable at that time. Numerous well used trails were observed. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

7. Mission: Trailwatch YU 652597, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 30 Jan 3 Feb 69.
   Remarks: Trail was observed but without traffic. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

8. Mission: Roadwatch RD 141, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 30 Jan - 3 Feb 69.
   Remarks: Road was observed with limited traffic. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

9. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 1944, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 31 Jan - 9 Feb 69.
   Remarks: Road was observed and had not been used for three to six months. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

10. Mission: Roadwatch Hwy 14, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 5-14 Feb 69.
    Remarks: Highway was observed with light civilian traffic. Numerous trails were observed. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

11. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 9, Location: Laos, Duration: 6-14 Feb 69.
    Remarks: By-pass of Rd 9 was observed. Contact was made with NVA troops which resulted in team becoming split in two groups. Extraction was made from two different locations.

12. Mission: Area recon Vic YU 725955, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 18-24 Feb 69.
    Remarks: Three well used trails were observed. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

13. Mission: Roadwatch YU 530837, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 18-24 Feb 69.
    Remarks: Old unused trails were observed. Negative Enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

14. Mission: Roadwatch RD 92, Location: Laos, Duration: 19-21 Feb 69.
    Remarks: Third American led team. Contact was made with estimated enemy company. Airstrike was conducted with two A-1E aircraft. Enemy way station was observed. Team received emergency extraction.

15. Mission: Area recon vic XD 619604, Location: Laos, Duration: 23 Feb-5 Mar 69.
    Remarks: Team made contact with enemy of unknown size which resulted in five agents MIA. One agent successfully escaped and evaded to South Vietnam and returned on 5 Mar 69. Initial emergency extraction was refused by Air Force Commander due to extraction of an American led RT in the near vicinity at the same time STRATA team was to be extracted.

16. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 925, Location: Laos, Duration: 3-11 Mar 69
    Remarks: Road was observed with negative traffic. A destroyed enemy Bn Base camp was observed. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

17. Mission: Bright Light to search for team members MIA of (15), Location: Laos, Duration: 6-9 Mar 69.
Remarks: Team made enemy contact resulting in three MIA, two WIA. Team received emergency extraction. One FAC rider was shot down and killed. Missing team members of (15) were not located.

18. Mission: Area recon BA 610, Location: Laos, Duration: 7-15 Mar 69.
Remarks: Combined operation with RT from CCN. Contact was made with enemy resulting in two enemy KIA and one enemy CIA. Airstrikes were conducted on enemy positions. Normal end of mission extraction.

19. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 19, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 17-21 Mar 69.
Remarks: Well used trails found for bicycle and foot traffic. Contact was made with enemy force of unknown size with negative results. Team received emergency extraction.

20. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 14, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 21-30 Mar 69.
Remarks: Large 2.5 meter wide trail observed with heavy civilian foot and truck traffic. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

21. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 131, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 21-30 Mar 69.
Remarks: Road was observed to be four meters wide with hard surface and heavy civilian traffic. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

22. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 926, Location: Laos, Duration: 25-27 Mar 69.
Remarks: Road was observed with heavy truck traffic at night. Two AA weapons were observed. Enemy track vehicle was heard in the area. Contact was made with enemy of unknown size with negative results. Team received emergency extraction.

23. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 9, Location: Laos, Duration: 27-28 Mar 69.
Remarks: Team inserted on two consecutive days and made contact with enemy at both insert points. Team received emergency extraction on both inserts.

24. Mission: Area recon vic YU 5078, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 31 Mar-8 Apr 69.
Remarks: Team observed a five meter wide road with intensive civilian truck traffic and numerous well used trails. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

25. Mission: Area recon BA 610, Location: Laos, Duration: 7-8 Apr 69.
Remarks: Contact was made with enemy of unknown size and airstrike was conducted. Contact resulted in one agent MIA. Team received emergency extraction.

26. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 926, Location: Laos, Duration: 7-9 Apr 69.
Remarks: Road was observed with heavy enemy traffic and appeared to be the main supply route into SVN. Contact was made with an estimated enemy company and an airstrike was conducted. Team received emergency extraction.

27. Mission: Road/Riverwatch TONLE SAN River, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 7-16 Apr 69.
Remarks: Road was observed to be five meters wide with hard packed surface and traffic marks about one month old. River 200 meters wide and navigable but no traffic observed. Complex of 600 L-shape bunkers observed. Negative enemy contact. Normal end of mission extraction.

28. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 92, Location: Laos, Duration: 19-20 Apr 69.
Remarks: Road was observed and appeared well traveled but no traffic was observed. Contact was made with enemy of unknown size with negative results. Team received emergency extraction.

29. Mission: Riverwatch STOENG TA POK River, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 16-24 Apr 69.
Remarks: River observed with intensive boat traffic. Contact was made with estimated company size unit with negative results. Team received emergency extraction.

30. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 925, Location: Laos, Duration: 24-29 Apr 69.
Remarks: Road observed and appeared not to have been used for an extended time period. Contact was made with enemy and airstrike conducted with unknown results. Team received emergency extraction.

31. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 926, Location: Laos, Duration: 30 Apr 69.
Remarks: Contact was made with enemy on insert point resulting in one enemy KIA. Team received emergency extraction.

32. Mission: Area recon BA 604, Location: Laos, Duration: 1-3 May 69.
Remarks: Contact was made with enemy unit of unknown size with negative results. Team received emergency extraction.

33. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 926, Location: Laos, Duration: 4-5 May 69.
Remarks: Contact was made with company size unit. Airstrike was conducted resulting in one enemy KIA. One Anti-Aircraft weapon was located. Team received emergency extraction.

34. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 925, Location: Laos, Duration: 5-8 May 69.
Remarks: One non used trail observed. Contact was made with enemy unit of unknown size resulting in two enemy KIA. Team received emergency extraction.

35. Mission: Riverwatch XE BANG GIANG River, Location: Laos, Duration: 10-11 May 69.
Remarks: Contact was made with estimated platoon size enemy unit with negative results. Team received emergency extraction.

36. Mission: Area recon BA 604, Location: Laos, Duration; 16 May 69.
Remarks: Contact was made near insert point with estimated platoon size enemy unit resulting in one enemy KIA and one enemy WIA. One agent MIA and one agent WIA. Team received emergency extraction.

37. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 92 by-pass, Location: Laos, Duration: 21 May 69.
Remarks: One trail observed appeared to be in use. Contact was made near insert point with unknown size enemy unit resulting in two agents WIA. Team received emergency extraction.

38. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 1036, Location: Laos, Duration: 30 May 69.
Remarks: Contact was made near insert point with unknown size enemy unit with negative results. Team received emergency extraction.

39. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 1039, Location: Laos, Duration: 3 Jun 69
Remarks: Contact was made near insert point with enemy unit of unknown size resulting in two enemy KIA. Suspected enemy helicopter resupply LZ was observed. Team received emergency extraction.

40. Mission: Area recon BA 604, Location: Laos, Duration: 23 Jun 69.
Remarks: Contact was made near insert point with enemy unit of unknown Size resulting in one enemy KIA. Team received emergency extraction.

41. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 1039, Location: Laos, Duration: 24-27 Jun 69
Remarks: Well used NE/SW oriented trail was observed which was not indicated on current map. Contact was made with estimated squad size enemy unit with negative results. Enemy communications lines were observed. Team received emergency extraction.

42. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 1039, Location: Laos, Duration: 21-22 Jul 69.
Remarks: Contact was made on insert point with enemy unit of unknown size. Airstrike was conducted with unknown results. Team received emergency extraction. One agent injured during extraction.

43. Mission: Trailwatch YB 4705, Location: Laos, Duration: 12-20 Aug 69.
Remarks: Well used NE/SW oriented trail was observed which was not indicated on current map. Contact was made with estimated platoon size enemy unit resulting in one enemy KIA. Team received emergency extraction.

44. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 1039, Location: Laos, Duration: 20-23 Aug 69.
Remarks: Power lines were observed along trail attached to trees with insulators. Contact was made with estimated platoon size enemy unit resulting in two enemy KIA. Team received emergency extraction.

45. Mission: Establish OP on Hill 419, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 20-23 Aug 69.
Remarks: Team observed one NVA company armed with AK-47 rifles, Russian MG's and eight B-40 rocket launchers moving on well used trail direction South. Contact was made with enemy unit of unknown size with negative results. Team received emergency extraction.

46. Mission: Trailwatch YC 5065, Location: Laos, Duration: 24-27 Aug 69.
Remarks: Contact was made with estimated enemy platoon with negative results. Team received emergency extraction.

47. Mission: Roadwatch RD 1039, Location: Laos, Duration: 11-20 Sep 69
Remarks: Three trails with signs of recent use were observed which were not indicated on current map. Power lines were observed running along trail attached to trees with insulators. Contact was made with enemy unit of unknown size with negative results. Team received emergency extraction.

48. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 926, Location: Laos, Duration: 16-22 Sep 69.
Remarks: Team observed trail about five months old and located an enemy ammo cache. Contact was made with enemy unit of unknown size and airstrikes were conducted resulting in secondary explosions. Team received emergency extraction.

49. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 969, Location: Laos, Duration: 21-28 Sep 69.
Remarks: Contact was made with enemy unit of unknown size with negative results. Team received emergency extraction.

50. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 969, Location: Laos, Duration: 1-12 Oct 69.
Remarks: Team was inserted by night parachute drop. One agent MIA on insertion. Contact with enemy unit of unknown size caused emergency extraction.

51. Mission: Trail/Riverwatch, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 9-15 Oct 69.
Remarks: Team became split as a result of contact with enemy of unknown size resulting in one agent MIA. Same agent successfully E&E back to South Vietnam and returned on 29 Oct 69. Team received emergency extraction.

52. Mission: Trail/Riverwatch, Location: Laos, Duration: 12-16 Oct 69.
Remarks: Contact was made with enemy unit of unknown size with negative results. Team received emergency extraction.

53. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 1039, Location: Laos, Duration: 22-25 Oct 69.
Remarks: One trail was observed with signs of recent use. Contact was made with enemy unit of unknown size resulting in one agent WIA. Team received emergency extraction.

54. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 165, Location: Laos, Duration: 22-26 Oct 69.
Remarks: Contact was made with enemy unit of unknown size resulting in three agents KIA, one agent WIA and one agent MIA. Remainder of team received emergency extraction.

55. Mission: Roadwatch Rd 966, Location: Laos, Duration: 20 Nov 69.
Remarks: Radio contact with team was lost from the moment of insert and team was presumed to be KIA or CIA.

56. Mission: Roadwatch Rds 165 and 968, Location: Laos, Duration: 20 Nov - 12 Dec 69.
Remarks: Contact was made on three occasions with enemy unit of unknown size resulting in six agents MIA. Team could not be extracted as a result of bad weather. Two agents successfully E&E back to South Vietnam and returned on 12 Dec 69.

57. Mission: Linear recon to Dollar Lake, Location: Laos, Duration: 25 - 26 Nov 69.
Remarks: Team was inserted by night parachute drop and one agent was injured by a tree landing. Negative enemy contact. Team received emergency extraction for injured agent.

*58. Mission: Area assessment YA461125, Location: Cambodia, duration: 15 - 26 Mar 69.

*59. Mission: Roadwatch YU 343626, Location: Cambodia, Duration: 15 - 26 Mar 69.

*60. Mission: Area Assessment YC 381283, Location: Laos, Duration: 9 - 19 Jun 69.
Remarks: One agent KIA, two agents MIA.

*61. Mission: Area Assessed YC 381283, Location: Laos, Duration: 26 Mar 69.
Remarks: One agent KIA, two agents MIA, one agent WIA.

*62. Mission: Roadwatch, Rd 9, Location: Laos, Duration: 28 Mar 69.
Remarks: Team made enemy contact on insert and received emergency extraction.

*63. Mission: Roadwatch XD530792, Location: Laos, Duration: 16 May 69.
Remarks: Contact was made with enemy on insert point and received emergency extraction.

*Small STRATA Teams.



TAB G

STRATA MISSIONS

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APPENDIX X

STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE (STD)

1. (~~TS~~) GENERAL.

a. Development.

(1) The Liaison Service of the President of Vietnam was a military organization which had the mission of collecting strategic intelligence throughout South Vietnam. This organization was under direct control of President Diem. It was not the same organization as the present day Liaison Service. In mid-1958, the Director of the Liaison Service submitted a project for the establishment of an agency to collect strategic intelligence in North Vietnam. The President approved the organization and 12 officers were sent to the United States to attend a two month Special Intelligence Training Course. (TAB A depicts chronologic developement of STD.)

(2) In November 1958, Bureau E to the Liaison Service was formed. The Director of the Liaison Service established the organization and designated its members. [redacted] (b)(1) Training was begun in 1958 and operations in 1959.

(3) In January 1962, the Special Topographic Exploitation Service was formed with the Special Branch for Clandestine Operations as a subordinate element. The Special Topographic Exploitation Service was directly responsible to the President of South Vietnam and its mission concerned both internal security and special operations outside the Republic of Vietnam. The Special Branch for Clandestine Operations was responsible for conducting intelligence operations against North Vietnam using military and civilian personnel.

(a) Maritime operations were conducted using the PCF Swift Boats and Yabuta Class Junks. The Junks were built by fishermen and other seafarers who had come south avoiding the communist take-over of the northern part of Vietnam. They built these craft along the lines of those constructed in the vicinity of Vinh and the northeastern coastal area of North Vietnam. Construction sites were at Da Nang and Cap St. Jacques (Vung Tau) where these northern people had settled.

(b) Air operations for delivery of agent teams and resupply employed VNAF modified C-47 aircraft. The modification consisted of additional fuel tanks to allow them to fly over much greater distances. The aircraft flew from Saigon (Tan Son Nhut Air Base) to Da Nang, topped off with fuel, then flew over the Gulf of Tonkin, across the NVN coastline and on to their target. These aircraft operated all the way to the vicinity of the NVN/Chinese border. General Ky, now Vice President of RVN, was one of the pilots who flew these missions.

(4) Several out-of-country sub-branches were established for clandestine activities. Missions for these sub-branches included collecting information on communist activities in North Vietnam and recruiting, training and infiltrating agents into North Vietnam. Special Branch was in the process of establishing sub-branches in Tokyo and Hong Kong in late 1963 when the program was dropped.

(a) COMET-located in Vientiane, Laos.

(b) HERCULE-located in Savannakhet, Laos.

(c) ALTO-located in Bangkok, Thailand.

(d) [redacted] (b)(1)

(5) On 1 April 1963, the Special Topographic Exploitation Service was redesignated the Special Forces (SF) Command. The Special Branch for Clandestine Operations retained its designation and was attached to the SF Command for administration. Operational control of the Special Branch reverted to the Chief of Staff (CofS), Joint General Staff (JGS).

(6) The mission of the SF Command in 1963 was much the same as it is now; to train, arm and support the people of the hamlets to protect themselves and defend their villages from the Viet Cong and also to infiltrate SF personnel into the VC secret zones in-country for intelligence purposes.

(7) On 1 April 1964, the Special Branch was split; one portion becoming the Strategic Exploitation Service and the other a separate entity, the Liaison Service.

(a) The Strategic Exploitation Service (SES) (See TAB B) remained under administrative control of the SF Command and operational control of the CofS, JGS. The mission of the SES was to conduct intelligence gathering operations in NVN. Col Tran Van HO assumed command of SES in April 1964.

(b) The Liaison Service also remained under administrative and operational control of CofS, JGS the same as SES. Their mission was to conduct intelligence gathering operations in Laos.

(c) The Coastal Security Service (CSS) is the cover name for the Vietnamese Maritime Operations Force. It was formed as a part of SES as of 1 April 1964 at Da Nang. CSS was successor to PACIFIC sub-branch which was charged with the mission of infiltrating and exfiltrating agents and equipment into and out of NVN by sea.

(8) Also, on 1 April 1964, that element that had been the Special Topographic Exploitation Service (then a part of the SF Command) was reconstituted as the 77th Special Forces Group. The SF Group was formed in the present day STD Compound. At the same time, the new 31st Special Forces Camp was formed in the compound now occupied by the present Liaison Service. Missions of both groups remained the same as for the SF Command. The SF Command plus the two groups moved to Nha Trang later in 1964.

(9) SES was renamed Strategic Technical Service (STS) (See TAB C) on January 1965 and the Liaison Service was made an integral part of STS at that time. Administrative, operational control and missions remained the same for both elements.

(10) STS was renamed Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) (See TAB D) on 1 November 1967 with administrative and operational control remaining the same as before. The missions also remained the same.

(11) STD and its sub-element, the Liaison Service, became an assigned, subordinate activity of JGS and no longer was associated with SF Command as of 1 February 1968. STD assumed its own administrative and personnel support. As an independent directorate of JGS, STD is supported by Headquarters, Vietnam High Command. As an organic activity of STD, the Liaison Service remains under direct operational control of the CofS, JGS.

b. STD Mission and Capabilities.

(1) Mission. To exercise operational command over forces and personnel assigned or attached to execute special operations or conduct unconventional warfare as directed by the Joint General Staff/RVNAF or competent authority.

(2) Capabilities.

(a) Providing command and control of forces performing special operations or unconventional warfare missions.

(b) Planning, coordinating and implementing those special operations or unconventional warfare missions authorized by the High Command, RVNAF.

(c) Preparing coordinated US/VN plans for special contingency or special emergency operations as directed by the High Command, RVNAF; developing capabilities to provide support for the accomplishment of such special contingency or emergency plans.

(d) Training those forces assigned for special operations or unconventional warfare.

c. Organization.

(1) Although activated in 1964, there was no approved Table of Organization and Equipment for STD until Jan 67 when ARVN TOE 40-201A was published. The "A" Series TOE authorized a total strength of 123 officers and 359 other ranks from ARVN. Concurrently, the CSS, attached from the Vietnamese Navy for operational control, was authorized 55 officers and 37 other ranks under TOE 3-759.

(2) Under the "B" Series TOE, approved 29 Apr 68, STD was authorized 185 officers and 297 other ranks from ARVN. The proposed authorized strength of CSS in 1968 went to 49 officers and 363 other ranks.

(3) Since 1964 the STD organization has been supplemented by increasing numbers of mercenaries. In 1964 there were some 470. This number increased to 1675 when SHINING BRASS Operations were initiated in Oct 65. By the end of 1968 the number of mercenaries under STD control had reached 2,353. Administrative local civilian employees numbered 1,918 at the end of 68.

(4) The "C" Series TOE was approved in Jun 69 and authorized 307 officers and 610 other ranks.

2. (TS) COUNTERPART RELATIONSHIPS.

a. General. Direct counterpart relations exist in several specific areas. These relations are shown by the Chart at TAB E, and are discussed below.

b. Director, STD.

(1) Direct counterpart relationships exist between the Director, STD and Chief, MACSOG.

(2) Coordination and liaison is conducted on all the many functions, missions and operations for which STD is responsible and MACSOG maintains interest. Establishment of policies, program objectives and support, coordination on STD TO&E structure and manning, establishment of civilian TD ceilings within staff and operating elements and delineation of amount and type of logistic and financial support are among the more important matters of coordination.

c. Deputy Director, STD.

(1) The Deputy Director deals with his parallel, Deputy Chief, MACSOG on all matters concerning the overall organization, function and operation of STD. He must be prepared to assume directorship of the organization and therefore must remain abreast of all STD activities and the assistance, advice, and guidance offered and the restraints imposed by MACSOG.

(2) Because of his responsibility to maintain this knowledge, he has an additional counterpart in the person of MACSOG Director, Operations and Training (MACSOG-30). The current organization of STD distributes and intermingles functions normal to MACSOG-30 among several STD staffs and sub-commands. Director, MACSOG-30 maintains liaison with the Deputy Director, STD, in matters involving policy advice relative to current and future reconnaissance, maritime, air, psychological warfare, and training operations and force levels.

d. Personnel Branch, Admin and Log Service.

(1) Counterpart to the Personnel Branch is the MACSOG Civilian Personnel Office (CPO). CPO maintains the Civilian Table of Distribution as well as the STD Personnel Branch.

(2) CPO and STD Pers Branch coordinate in hiring and termination of local national civilians for STD and the Joint Translation Center.

(3) MACSOG CPO: in conjunction with MACSOG Security, STD Security, and the VN Military Security Service, process all final security checks of Vietnamese civilian personnel being hired on a temporary or permanent basis for MACSOG, STD, or any of the sub-elements.

e. STD/MACSOG Logistics Relationships.

(1) Logistics in RVNAF are handled somewhat different than that of the US. RVNAF has five Area Logistic Commands (ALC's) covering Vietnam. The ALC's furnish common item support to all services in their area of responsibility. The ALC's are operated by ARVN. VNN and VNAF provide only service peculiar items to their forces.

(2) STD Logistics Branch acts as a Log Staff Agency for the STD subordinate elements. STD Headquarters issues logistic guidance to the sub-elements. STD Headquarters constitutes a separate customer for one of the ALC's.

(3) The subordinate commands of STD deal directly with the ALC's as separate accounts.

(4) From its inception, MACSOG provided the majority of logistic support for STD and its elements. CSS was recently required to rely on the RVNAF Log System. At present the Command and Control Detachments and the Airborne Training Center at Camp Long Thanh are supported entirely through US Log channels. Plans are being prepared for these elements to adopt the RVNAF system also.

(5) Considering the information shown above, it becomes apparent that little advice from MACSOG logistic personnel is appropriate.

f. Finance Branch, Admin and Log Svc. MACSOG finances certain of STD's administrative costs and supplies for operation of programs run by Special Task Force/MACSOG-36. These funds are issued to the STD Finance Officer by MACSOG Comptroller. They are expended by STD within the authorizations set forth in MACSOG Directives (primarily salaries and MACSOG Directive 37-2). Monthly, the STD Finance Officer submits an accounting for funds expended and on hand to the MACSOG Comptroller. These accounts are audited by the Comptroller personnel and results are reported to the STD Finance Officer.

[redacted]

(b)(4)

(a) [redacted]

(b) [redacted]

(b)(1)

h. Intelligence Branch, Intel and Ops Service.

(1) MACSOG Intelligence Division gives STD Intelligence Branch guidance on staff organization and manning; operation and management of various programs; and collecting, processing, collating, and disseminating intelligence information.

(2) STD S-2 is presently reorganizing his office and staff to assimilate the MACSOG targeting procedures. He attends the monthly target panel meetings to become familiar with procedures and methods used. Similar techniques will be initiated in STD Intel Branch.

(3) All information concerning MACSOG Intelligence Division operation is available for review by selected members of STD with exception of that material carrying the "No Foreign" restriction.

i. Operations Branch, Intelligence & Operations Service.

(1) The Chief, Ground Studies Branch (MACSOG-34) maintains close and direct counterpart relations with Chief, Operations Branch.

(2) These elements theoretically have prime staff responsibility for the cross-border mission and the operational elements which conduct those missions; however, in practice the Ops Br is not actively involved in the cross-border programs. They coordinate on manning and TO&E structure for the operational elements.

(3) Both the Ops Branch and MACSOG-34 maintain staff cognizance of training conducted for personnel slated for programs in their sphere of interest.

(4) The staff elements exchange information on targeting to be used in the monthly Targeting Panel meetings. This combined effort is designed to stimulate interest and participation in mission planning.

j. STD Communications Branch.

(1) Director, MACSOG Communications provides the STD Signal Officer with guidance in the formulation of signal plans for STRATA and ARVN cross-border teams, communications, security, and capabilities and limitations of equipment.

(2) STD Signal Officer and Director, MACSOG Comm, together, conduct liaison with JGS J-6 and ARVN Signal Corps elements and their advisors for procurement of communications assets.

(3) MACSOG Comm provides STD with technical guidance and assistance in effecting repair to communications equipment which is beyond STD capabilities.

k. Naval Liaison Branch.

(1) Naval Liaison Branch of STD is the staff element maintaining cognizance of the maritime operations of the Coastal Security Service. The Branch is charged with generally the same functions as their MACSOG counterpart, Maritime Studies Branch (MACSOG-31).

(2) Coordination between these two staff agencies is close. Policy matters are discussed back and forth and traffic flow to and from the operational elements at Da Nang follows both US and VN channels.

(3) Major areas of coordination are:

(a) Mission planning, coordination and approval.

(b) Determining force levels.

(c) In-country operating areas.

(d) Intelligence gathering networks.

(e) Logistic support including transportation requirements.

l. Liaison Service.

(1) Liaison Service is a subordinate command of STD. Their primary area of interest is in the ground cross-border operations. Counterpart to this element is the Ground Studies Group (MACSOG-35).

(2) Subordinate to the Liaison Service are the ARVN elements at the Command and Control Detachemnts (C&C Dets). Operational command of all elements, US, ARVN, and SCU, is exercised by Commander, MACSOG-35. The commanders of the Liaison Service and MACSOG-35 coordinate on all missions, functions, and problem areas of the C&C Dets.

(3) The C&C Dets are US commanded and operated. ARVN counterpart staffs have functioned in recruiting SCU personnel, providing security checks on their personnel and keeping the US C&C Det Commander informed of information and directives passed to them by the Liaison Service in Saigon. ARVN C&C Det staffs are being encouraged to take a more active part in administrative, operations, and support planning and mission coordination.

(4) Presently, there are two basic type Reconnaissance Teams (RT), US led and ARVN led. ARVN personnel often serve on US led RT's. US personnel are not placed subordinate to ARVN personnel. After a period of training and evaluation by US Commanders and RT leaders, ARVN RT leaders are selected and their teams formed. They receive additional training to mold them as a team before they are sent on a mission.

(5) There are no ARVN commanded Exploitation Forces at this time.

(6) ARVN C&C Det Staff personnel administer most disciplinary action to ARVN and SCU personnel. They prepare and issue identification papers and maintain background security check cards on all SCU personnel. The ARVN staff handles only ARVN base pay responsibilities. SCU base pay and ARVN and SCU per diem and special pay is provided and administered by US personnel.

m. Coastal Security Service.

(1) Coastal Security Service (CSS) is an element of STD supported by both the VN Navy and ARVN. They are responsible for conducting special maritime operations, including cross-beach operations, as directed by STD. Operating in an integrated liaison/advisory capacity is their counterpart, the Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD).

(2) CSS operators use PCF Swift and PTF Nasty Class boats on loan from the US Navy.

(3) NAD assists and advises CSS in Staff and planning procedures, training, tactics (both maritime and cross-beach), reconnaissance and security, fire support, and boat maintenance support.

(4) CSS personnel accomplish much of the maintenance on the assigned boats with supervision and assistance from NAD personnel. A floating dry dock has been provided to enhance maintenance and maintenance training of CSS personnel. Major boat maintenance is accomplished at the Boat Repair Facility, Subic Bay, Philippines. Selected CSS personnel have attended maintenance training at Subic.

(5) NAD operational personnel accompany and participate in certain in-country cross-beach operations against known VC/VCI/NVA base areas. This provides direct observation of cross-beach teams by US personnel and future training is adjusted to improve observed shortcomings. In-country cross-beach missions are based on intelligence gathered from many sources, are often requested by various US and VN conventional ground force headquarters, and have proven highly successful.

(6) In the proposed Post Hostilities configuration, CSS will have all Navy personnel and will be the VN Navy UW organization. They will receive advisory support from the US Naval Advisory Group.

n. Airborne Training Center.

(1) The Airborne Training Center is an ARVN military facility located at Camp Long Thanh (CLT). The center is an element of STD and all ARVN personnel assigned to the Training Center are members of STD.

(2) Counterpart to the Airborne Training Center is Training Studies Group (MACSOG-38). In addition to conducting all training for US personnel, MACSOG-38 assists in preparation and implementation of training programs. Members of MACSOG-38 are selected very carefully for their knowledge, experience and ability to supervise and instruct. These personnel attend the major portion of instruction given by ARVN personnel and make corrections and suggestions when the period of instruction is completed.

(3) Administration and logistic requirements for support of training, camp operation and facility improvement are points of continuous coordination. Logistic and financial requirements are closely scrutinized and complete justification is required prior to approval.

(4) US personnel advise on and coordinate combat training operations conducted as field training out of CLT. Requests for

transportation beyond the capability of CLT is coordinated through MACSOG-38.

(5) Control of the training facility is in the hands of the Commander, Airborne Training Center. This control is influenced by Commander, Training Studies Group, through US monetary and logistic support and denial of advice or assistance to programs and projects not approved by Chief, MACSOG.

o. Coordination and Liaison Detachment. Coordination and Liaison Detachment is counterparted by MACSOG Air Studies Branch (MACSOG-32). The functions set down for these two elements are very similar. MACSOG-32 advises and assists in training counterpart personnel in planning conduct of air operations in support of UW activities, including aerial delivery, close air support, aerial reconnaissance, logistic air support scheduling, and coordination for use of assets from supporting air elements. Major efforts are being put forth in plans and programs to enhance the capabilities of the Coordination & Liaison Det in this field. The JTD calls for 14 personnel in the Det plus ten VNAF personnel on indefinite TAD; two of the TAD officers are presently working in the Detachment.

p. Special Task Force.

(1) The Airborne Studies Group (MACSOG-36) is counterpart to Special Task Force (STF). STF is responsible to STD for planning and conduct of covert and clandestine ground operations.

(2) MACSOG-36 advises and assists STF in the following areas:

(a) Recommendations on selection, training and supervision of agent personnel.

(b) Guidance on financial matters and major expenditures.

(c) Establishment of training plans and programs, support and supervision of training, and assistance with training aids.

(d) Preparation of long range operational planning; organizing and directing operations; provides aerial photography, documentation and other intelligence material, and transportation in support of agent team operations.

(3) Targets for agent and STRATA teams are currently being selected by US manned Targeting Panels. Members of these Panels are representatives of MACSOG Intelligence Division, Operations and Training Division, and Airborne Studies Group and MACV J-2.

(4) STF presently consists of a group of well trained and experienced VN personnel capable of assuming responsibility for covert and clandestine operations except in the areas of finance and logistics.

3. (TS) RECRUITMENT.

a. Agent Personnel.

(1) Requirements for agent teams and the rules and procedures established for recruiting clandestine agents are based on intelligence indicators and requirements developed in the operation plan. Development of the plan, the geographic area agents would be operating in and the ethnic origin of the inhabitants dictated what type individual and how many personnel would be required. Only after the information above had been obtained was any recruiting attempted.

(2) The designated Case Officer and/or spotters would then proceed to in-country locations, including military organizations likely to produce qualified candidates for the agent mission planned. Interviews were conducted with prospective agent personnel and certain information forms were completed. Emphasis was placed on motivating the prospect to volunteer for a highly important assignment in support of his country.

(3) The information forms (similar to US DD Form 398, Personal History Statement) were then reviewed by the VN National Police and CAS and a background security investigation was conducted. If the individual met all requirements, the Case Officer went out to perform the actual recruitment.

(4) Agent trainees were brought to Saigon to one of several safe houses. Later in the program all agent personnel were placed in isolation training facilities at Camp Long Thanh. Complete administrative and security processing, including a polygraph test, constituted the first activity in the isolation area.

b. Special Commando Unit (SCU) Personnel.

(1) The Liaison Bureau is MACSOG (MACSOG-35) liaison to the Liaison Service of STD. The element consists of one officer (O-3) and three NCO's.

(2) Recruitment of SCU personnel to fill the various elements of the C&C Dets and Monkey Mountain Forward Operating Base (MMFOB) is accomplished through the combined efforts of the Liaison Bureau and the Liaison Service.

(3) Requisitions for additional personnel are submitted by the C&C Dets and MMFOB, through both ARVN and US channels, stating any desired characteristics (such as ethnic origin) of the new recruits.

(4) The combined recruiting team proceeds to the province capable of providing the desired personnel. An interview is held with the Province Chief and Province advisor to determine any restrictions which may have been imposed on recruiting in that area.

(5) A publicity campaign is initiated. Announcements are made over the local radio station and visits to villages to speak to prospective recruits are made.

(6) Certain restrictions have been placed on recruitment of selected ethnic personnel:

(a) Vietnamese and Chinese personnel are not eligible for recruitment into MACSOG Programs until after they are at least 24 years of age. Basis for this restriction is so as not to interfere with regular VN Military recruitment.

(b) Montagnard and Nung personnel can be recruited after they have reached their 18th birthday. These ethnic people are not subject to draft by VN Military Forces.

(7) Comparison of approximate ethnic strengths at the C&C Dets is as follows:

	VN/Chinese	Montagnard	Total
C & C South	300	500	800
C & C Central	100	600	700
C & C North	500	300	800

(8) No difficulty has been experienced using this method of recruitment. Retention of personnel has been a problem. All personnel are recruited for an indefinite period. They can quit or be terminated at any time. A monetary bonus is awarded for extended service.

(9) The C&C Dets do not do any recruiting on their own. They can assist in the recruiting effort to improve the quality of the recruits received.

(10) Recruiting has been authorized at encampments of VN Airborne and Ranger units.

4. (~~TS~~) TRAINING.

a. Agent Training.

(1) Agent training normally lasts 10 to 12 weeks. In the past this training time was often extended for various reasons, delay in getting the required number of qualified agent trainees, weather delays, etc. Radio operator trainees usually required as much as 20 weeks training to become proficient.

(2) Agent Training Subjects.

(a) Observation and reporting.

(b) Use of non-technical communications: cut-outs, dead drops, witting live drops, unwitting live drops, personal meetings, use of accomodation address, and secret writing.

(c) Surveillance techniques, counter surveillance.

(d) Personnel security.

(e) Use of bona-fides (clandestine agent recognition systems).

(f) Map reading.

(g) Spotting and recruiting of sub-sources.

(h) Technical communications -- radio, one-time pads.

(i) Scouting and patrolling and related military subjects.

(j) Parachute training.

b. SCU Training.

(1) Basic Training. The majority of basic training for new recruits is conducted at Camp Long Thanh. Five weeks of intensive training is conducted to make basic soldiers of the new recruits. A limited amount of basic training is conducted by the C&C Dets.

(2) Further Training.

(a) Upon completion of basic training the recruits are sent to the C&C Dets (or MMFOB) to which they are assigned and are integrated into RTs or exploitation companies. They begin training to become part of that team. This training can be likened to advanced basic training and basic unit training.

(b) As time permits, additional training is given to further enhance operational capabilities. This includes retraining at individual skills as well as unit and exploitation training.

(c) Specialist training such as the basic airborne course, radio operation, medical training and the RT Leaders Course is used to qualify selected individuals for Further utilization.

TAB A

Chronologic Development of STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE



TAB B

STRATEGIC EXPLOITATION SERVICE (SES)



TAB E

SOG / STD RELATIONSHIP



TAB C

STRATEGIC TECHNICAL SERVICE



TAB D

STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE (STD)



APPENDIX XI

PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES GROUP

1. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

3. ~~(SLD)~~ ORGANIZATION. Presently MACSOG-39 is organized along functional lines as shown in TAB A. A request for realignment of the JTD was submitted in October 1969 to conform to this organization. (b)(1)

4. [redacted]

5. [redacted]

(b)(1)

[redacted]

(b)(1)

6. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)

7. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)

[redacted]

(b)(1)

[redacted]

(b)(1)

8. [redacted]

9. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)

10.

[redacted]

11. [redacted]

(b)(1)

12. [redacted]

13. [redacted]

TAB A

PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES GROUP
MACSOG-39



TOP SECRET LIMDIS

TAB B

[redacted]

(b)(1)

TOP SECRET LIMDIS

TAB C

(b)(1)

TAB D

[redacted]

(b)(1)

TAB D

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

TAB D

TAB E

[redacted]

(b)(1)

TAB F

[redacted]

(b)(1)

[redacted]

(b)(1)

APPENDIX XII

RADIO STUDIES GROUP

1. (~~TSLD~~) GENERAL. Radio Studies Group is the MACSOG element responsible for coordinating the fiscal, logistical and administrative activities of the U.S. financed, Vietnamese operated Voice of Freedom (VOF) radio station and for ensuring that the program content is in accordance with United States policy.

2. (~~TSLD~~) MISSION. The overall mission of VOF is to conduct anti-communist psychological operations in North Vietnam, with the current primary objective of bringing the war to a successful conclusion. While all programming is produced to further this objective, two considerations are borne constantly in mind: the stations credibility and its image. It is axiomatic that if the station's credibility is damaged, its effectiveness will be proportionately lessened. Particular care is therefore taken in the production of information programs. While VOF news is necessarily slanted, the degree is confined to initial selection of items. While the official broadcasting outlets in North Vietnam reduce all news to strident propaganda, VOF news is delivered without embellishment or editorialization. Since its beginning in 1964, VOF has striven to build and maintain the image as the voice of the people of the South, extending friendship and compassion to the people of the North.

3. (~~TSLD~~) ORGANIZATION.

a. Operationally VOF is the responsibility of MACSOG, while United States policy guidance is the responsibility of JUSPAO. The Director of the Radio Studies Group, the senior American Officer of the station, is a civilian (a USIA Officer, carrying a Foreign Service rank), but operationally is assigned to Chief, MACSOG. He assumes the dual function of VOF manager under MACSOG and policy coordinator with his Vietnamese Counterpart, under the chief of the North Vietnam Affairs Division of JUSPAO. Serving under the Director is a staff of seven military and one civilian. (See TAB A)

b. There are about twenty-five Vietnamese military and about two hundred and fifty Vietnamese civilian personnel regularly engaged in VOF activities. A large percentage of these are former North Vietnamese who migrated to South Vietnam in 1954.

c. Administrative Advisory Section:

(1) Advises the Chief on all aspects of radio station, personnel, fiscal, and logistical administration.

(2) Supervises Civilian Personnel administration for the Voice of Freedom radio station.

(3) Provides administrative support to military advisory personnel assigned to the Voice of Freedom.

d. Programming Advisory Section: Advises the Chief on all aspects of radio programming.

(1) Provides advisory assistance to Vietnamese personnel of the Voice of Freedom programming department.

(2) Monitors Voice of Freedom program material to insure it does not violate JUSPAO policy guidance.

e. Technical and Engineering Advisory Section: Advises the Chief on technical and engineering aspects of radio station operations.

(1) Provides advisory assistance to Vietnamese personnel of the Voice of Freedom engineering department in all technical fields, including equipment operation and maintenance, studio operations, and the operation and maintenance of short and medium wave transmitters.

(2) Provides advisory and technical assistance to the Vietnamese personnel of the Voice of Freedom in the training of technical personnel.

(3) Coordinates with the Administrative Advisory Section for logistical-technical support.

4. (~~S~~) OBJECTIVES.

a. Countering the propanganda of Radio Hanoi.

b. Informing North Vietnamese listeners about life in the Free World and, in particular, about life in free South Vietnam.

c. Presenting accurate, timely, and factual information about the Vietnam conflict and other events of national or international importance.

d. Providing the people of North Vietnam with a basis for comparing life in North Vietnam with life in Free South Vietnam.

e. Improving relations between the peoples of North and South Vietnam.

5. (~~SLD~~) FACILITIES. VOF production facilities are located at #7 Hong Thap Tu street in Saigon. Programs are taped and newscasts are aired live from a complex of five studios. Program support facilities include one of the largest music libraries in Southeast Asia and an extensive political research library. Latest news releases from five news services are available from the station's teletype section and additional reference materials are recorded by the monitor section from Radio Hanoi and Radio Liberation and the Vietnamese Services of Radio Moscow and Radio Peking. In order to increase signal strength in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, a 200KW medium wave transmitter is being constructed in the Hue area. The complex, now nearing completion, is located on Con Te Island in the Tany My Lagoon. This transmitter will provide a significant increase in day time coverage for the target area; operated at half-power it will provide excellent coverage at night. See TAB C for present and proposed coverage areas. The island complex is substantially self-substaning, with its own quarters, water supply and power plant. Power is provided by four 500KW generators which are capable of independent or synchronous operation, in manual or automatic modes. Security for this complex is provided by a guard force, perimeter chain link fence, guard towers and perimeter lights. When operational, the 200KW will supplant only the 20KW medium wave transmitter at Thanh Lam. Programming will continue to be aired over the 20KW short wave transmitter. Refer to TAB E for breakout of VOF facilities by locations.

TAB A

RADIO STUDIES GROUP ORGANIZATION



TAB B

CURRENT VOF FACILITIES

SAIGON

PRODUCTION FACILITIES

THAN LAM

20 KW SHORTWAVE TRANSMITTER
20 KW MEDIUMWAVE TRANSMITTER

CON TE

200 KW MEDIUMWAVE TRANSMITTER

TAB C


VOICE OF FREEDOM
MEDIUM WAVE DAY COVERAGE
HALF MILLIVOLT PER METER CONTOUR
FREQUENCY OF TRANSMITTER:
655 KILOHERTZ
SOLID LINE = PRESENT COVERAGE
(20 KW)
BROKEN LINE = PROJECTED COVERAGE
(200 KW)
PEKING
SEOUL
NAN CHING
HAN KOU
CHUNG CHING
TAI PEI
KUNMING
LIU CHOU
HONG KONG
HANOI
VIENTIANE
HUE
RANGOON
BANGKOK
NOT TO SCALE
PNOM PENH
SAIGON

TAB C


VOICE OF FREEDOM
MEDIUM WAVE NIGHT COVERAGE
(50% OF TIME)
HALF MILLIVOLT PER METER CONTOUR
FREQUENCY OF TRANSMITTER:
655 KILOHERTZ
SOLID LINE = PRESENT COVERAGE
(20 KW)
BROKEN LINE = PROJECTED COVERAGE
(200 KW)
PEKING
SEOUL
NAN CHING
HAN KOU
CHUNG CHING
TAI PEI
KUNMING
LIU CHOU
HONG KONG
HANOI
VIENTIANE
HUE
RANGOON
BANGKOK
NOT TO SCALE
PNOM PENH
SAIGON

TAB C


VOICE OF FREEDOM
ESTIMATED SHORT WAVE COVERAGE
FROM SAIGON
ONE MILLIVOLT PER METER CONTOUR
POWER OUTPUT : 20 KILOWATTS
ANTENNA GAIN : 11 DECIBELS
SOLID LINE : 7235 KILOHERTZ
BROKEN LINE : 9580 KILOHERTZ
PEKING
SEOUL
NAN CHING
HAN KOU
CHUNG CHING
TAI PEI
KUNMING
LIU CHOU
HONG KONG
HANOI
VIENTIANE
HUE
RANGOON
BANGKOK
NOT TO SCALE
PNOM PENH
SAIGON

TAB C


VOICE OF FREEDOM
ESTIMATED SHORT WAVE COVERAGE FROM HUE
ONE MILLIVOLT PER METER CONTOUR
TRANSMIT FREQUENCY : 9670 KILOHERTZ
POWER OUTPUT : 20 KILOWATTS
ANTENNA GAIN : 11 DECIBELS
PEKING
SEOUL
NAN CHING
HAN KOU
CHUNG CHING
TAI PEI
KUNMING
LIU CHOU
HONG KONG
HANOI
VIENTIANE
HUE
RANGOON
BANGKOK
NOT TO SCALE
PNOM PENH
SAIGON

TAB D

VOICE OF FREEDOM 21 HOUR PER DAY BROADCAST SCHEDULE



PERSUASION
- COMMENTARIES
- NEWS ANALYSIS
- DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS
- EVALUATIONS
- PROGRESS REPORTS

ENTERTAINMENT
- MUSIC
- DRAMA
- THEATER
- SERIAL
- LITERATURE
- ART

INFORMATION
- NEWS
- SPECIAL EVENTS
- ALMANAC
- PANEL DISCUSSION
- PROFILE

TAB E

VOF's 29 HOURS OF PROGRAMING DAILY

VIETNAMESE	20 HRS	MEDIUM WAVE
ENGLISH	.5 HR	MEDIUM WAVE
FRENCH	.5 HR	MEDIUM WAVE
CANTONESE	6 HRS	SHORT WAVE
MANDARIN	2 HRS	SHORT WAVE
TOTAL	29 HRS	

TAB F

GROWTH OF PRODUCTION



* DROP OF 6 HOURS IS DUE TO 1968 BEING A LEAP YEAR.

TAB G

BROADCAST HOURS

Thanh-Lam

Short Wave	(9670KHz)	16 hours/day
* Medium Wave	(655KHz)	21 hours/day

Thu-Duc

Short Wave	(9580KHz)	6 hours/day
Short Wave	(7235KHz)	2 hours/day
Total broadcast time		45 hours/day

* The medium wave programming is being transferred to the 200KW transmitter site at Con-Te as it becomes operational.

APPENDIX XIII

RECOVERY STUDIES DIVISION

1. [redacted]

(b)(1)

2. [redacted]

3.

4.

5.

(b)(1)

6.

[redacted]

(b)(1)

7. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)

8. [redacted]

9.

10.

(b)(1)

11.

12.

[redacted]

(b)(1)

TAB A

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER, ORGANIZATION



TAB D

EVASION AND ESCAPE/SURVIVAL KITS DEPLOYED IN 1969

DATE	CIRCUMSTANCES AND RESULTS
20 Mar 69	Two CTU-1/A survival kits dropped into Laos where a code letter "N" was constructed. The kits remained unopened until 8 Apr 69, at which time they were destroyed by napalm to prevent enemy use.
9 Apr 69	One E&E kit with survival radio was dropped into NVN above the DMZ for use by possible friendly evader. Results proved negative.
13 Nov 69	Two E&E kits dropped into Laos in vicinity of [redacted] constructed in a creek bed. Photo coverage of area revealed that the kits disappeared. Negative results from possible evaders in the area. Suspect enemy recovered and removed kits. (b)(1)
15 Nov 69	One E&E kit dropped in vicinity of Misty 31 crash site and possible code letter in Laos. One week later the kit disappeared. Negative results from possible evader. Suspect enemy recovered and removed kit.

APPENDIX XIV

TRAINING STUDIES GROUP

1. (~~TSLD~~) GENERAL.

a. Throughout 1969, the Training Studies Group continued to administer MACSOG training programs to support TIMBERWORK (~~S~~), PRAIRIE FIRE, and SALEM HOUSE requirements.

b. Each training course contained in the MACSOG training program is formally approved as a program of instruction prior to its conduct at Camp Long Thanh. The 15 courses currently approved are:

(1) Short Term Road Watch and Target Aquisition (STRATA) Non-Commissioned Officers course: conducted to provide fillers for the MACSOG-36 operated STRATA program.

(2) STRATA Officers Course: Conducted to provide STRATA team leaders for the MACSOG-36 operated STRATA program.

(3) Vietnamese Basic Airborne Course (VNBAC): Conducted to train VN personnel in basic airborne techniques required to make air infiltrations.

(4) U.S. led Reconnaissance Team Training (US RT): Conducted to train US RT leaders in Long Range Patrol Techniques and Procedures used for the collection of intelligence in support of MACSOG-35 activities.

(5) Vietnamese Reconnaissance Team Training: Conducted to train (VNRT) leaders in Long Range Patrol Techniques and Procedures used for the collection of intelligence in support of MACSOG-35 activities.

(6) US Demolitions (US Demo): Conducted to train personnel assigned to operational elements demolition techniques.

(7) Vietnamese Demolitions (VN Demo): Conducted to train personnel assigned to operational elements demolitions techniques.

(8) Vietnamese Communications Course (VN Comm): Conducted to give the VN comm personnel a CW operating capability.

(9) Civilian Irregular Defense Group BCT Courses (CIDG BCT): Conducted to provide personnel to provide security for MACSOG operational bases.

(10) Special Commando Unit Basic Combat Training (SCU BCT): Conducted to train personnel as fillers for MACSOG operational elements.

(11) Vietnamese Medical Course (VN Medic): Conducted to provide medics for VN controlled, operational units and camp medics.

(12) U.S. Exploitation Force Leader Course (US EF): Conducted to train US personnel to be exploitation force leaders.

(13) U.S. Covey: Conducted to train US personnel to be FAC/Covey in support of intelligence collection efforts.

(14) VN Covey: Conducted to train VN personnel to be FAC/Covey in support of intelligence collection efforts.

(15) BORDEN (C): Conducted to train personnel in basic intelligence collection.

2. (~~TSLD~~) MISSION. The Training Studies Group administers all aspects of the MACSOG training program in support of TIMBERWORK (C), PRAIRIE FIRE, and SALEM HOUSE programs to include training estimates, programs, supervision, and evaluation.

3. (~~TSLD~~) ORGANIZATION. MACSOG-38 is organized as Det B-53, 5th SFGA, 1st SF (See TAB A) consisting of 7 officers and 24 enlisted men. Additionally, a communications augmentation is authorized consisting of 4 enlisted men.

a. Camp Long Thanh student output for calendar year 1969 was 1,832 graduated students as shown below by quarter and course:

COURSE	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Total
STRATA NCO	10	12	0	22	45
STRATA OFF	0	0	0	10	10
VN BAC	35	29	0	22	86
US RT	59	59*	68*	50	236
VN RT	36	51	56	61	204
US Demo	4	0	0	0	4
VN Demo	17	0	0	0	17
VN Comm	0	12	0	7	19
CIDG BCT	39	24	0	0	63
SCU BCT	60	220	325	215	819
VN Medic	0	117	9	0	126
US EF	0	17	12	0	29
US Covey	0	0	13	8	21
VN Covey	0	0	6	11	17
US/VN POW	0	0	0	72	72
BORDEN (C)	22	26	11	6	65
TOTAL(QTR)	282	567	500	483	1,832

* 30 Students were personnel from the 1st Special Forces Group, Airborne serving on temporary duty as MACSOG Reconnaissance Team members.

b. During calendar year 1969, 19 MACSOG personnel attended and successfully completed sniper training at a Sniper School initially conducted by the 9th Inf Division and later by the 25th Inf Division.

c. During 1969 the position of Commander, Training Studies Group has been filled by the following:

Major M. Ponzillo Jr	1 January 1969 - 8 October 1969
LtCol E. McGowan	9 October 1969 - 31 December 1969

TAB A

TRAINING STUDIES GROUP ORGANIZATION



APPENDIX XV

AIR STUDIES GROUP

1. (TS) GENERAL.

a. Prior to 1968, Air Force resources supporting the unconventional warfare activities of MACSOG were, of necessity, requested by MACSOG through 7th Air Force channels. The extreme sensitivity of MACSOG's activities, coupled with the high security classification of their operation, created several problems in dealing with the large number of people in Headquarters, 7th Air Force, through which requests for air support had to be coordinated. On the other hand, Headquarters, 7th Air Force was concerned about the proper utilization of Air Force assets supporting MACSOG. Of particular concern was the requirement for Air Force supervision in such matters as tactics, flying safety and crew protection. The divergence of primary responsibilities of each agency resulted in a totally unsatisfactory working relationship. Efforts to resolve the difficulties were initiated through a series of inter-agency staff meetings in the fall of 1967. On 28 October 1967, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by Chief, MACSOG, and the Chief of Staff, 7th Air Force which created the position of Deputy Commander for Special Air Operations (DCSO) under the Commander 14th Special Operations Wing. In MACSOG terminology the position is know as the Commander, Air Studies Group (ASG). Three Air Force special air operations units (First Flight Detachment, 15th Special Operations Squadron, and 20th Special Operations Squadron) dedicated to supporting MACSOG were assigned under the new position. The first Commander, Air Studies Group, Colonel David C. Collins, USAF, was in place at Nha Trang, Vietnam, on 2 March 1968. Specific operational details were spelled out in a subsequent memorandum of agreement, dated 1 September 1968. Under this Joint Service Agreement, Air Studies Group is required to provide direct supervision and operational control of assigned Air Force assets supporting MACSOG operations. The agreement also provides for tasking by MACSOG of the 15th Special Operations Squadron and the First Flight Detachment.

b. The Commander, Air Studies Group supervises the operations of the First Flight Detachment, the 15th Special Operations Squadron and the 20th Special Operations Squadron. A detailed history of each of these units is provided in the following sections:

Section 1 - First Flight Detachment
Section 2 - 15th Special Operations Squadron
Section 3 - 20th Special Operations Squadron

TAB C

SUBORDINATE US AND ARVN PW RECOVERY OPERATIONS

DATE	UNIT	RESULTS
2 Mar 69	5th SFGA, PRU	13 VC, KIA, 3 VC captured.
6-8 Mar 69	1st Inf Div	Operation run with negative results.
19 Mar 69	IV Corps, PBR's, LCVP's, PRU	Camp located but abandoned.
23 Mar 69	A/3/60th 9th Inf Div	Camp located; 10 ARVN freed.
3 Apr 69	21st ARVN Div	33 VN civilians and 2 ARVN recovered.
9 Apr 69	9th Inf Div	Operation run with negative results.
8 Apr 69	41st ARVN Ranger Bn.	15 VN PWs recovered.
26 Apr 69	PRU	Operation run; camp found abandoned with cook fires still warm.
5-8 May 69	US Navy, MSF	Operation run with negative results.
23 May 69	III Corps MSF	Operation run with negative results.
27 May 69	IV Corps Elements	Operation run with negative results.
2 Jun 69	PRU	Operation run with negative results
5 Jul 69	ARVN	9 ARVN, 27 civilians recovered.
10 Jul 69	RF, PRU, Recon Co 5th ARVN Regt.	Operation run resulting in one US PW being recovered. The PW later died as a result of injuries inflicted by the Viet Cong.
8-9 Aug 69	199th LIB	Operation run with negative results.
7 Sep 69	US Navy with GVN	16 PWs (ARVN) recovered.
27 Sep 69	5th RAR, 1st ATF	Operation run with negative results.

TAB B

JPRC INITIATED PW RECOVERY OPERATIONS 1969

OPERATION	DATE	RESULTS
ELM STREET	4 Jan 69	Operation cancelled due to lack of detailed intelligence.
NUI BA DEN	8 Feb 69	Operation cancelled due to lack of detailed intelligence.
MONROE BAY	17 Apr 69	Operation run with negative results.
TROJAN	13 May 69	Operation run with negative results. Van Putten escaped during period of operation.
SEAWAVE	4 Jul 69	Camp raided; documents captured; negative PWs recovered.
MAGNOLIA CHAIR	10-13 Jul 69	5 ARVN freed, 17 VC captured, 5 VC KIA, 23 VC KBA, 102 sampans destroyed, 39 bunkers destroyed, 4 kilos of documents captured, 1000 grenades and an ammunition factory destroyed, 18 weapons captured, two 82mm mortar rounds destroyed.
IV CORPS	10 Sep 69	Operation run; no camp found.
CHERRY BARK	13 Oct 69	Operation cancelled due to lack of detailed intelligence; MACSOG Exploitation Company had been deployed to IV CTZ FOB.
U-MINH	29 Oct 69	Operation cancelled due to lack of detailed intelligence.
WALNUT HARP	9 Dec 69	Operation cancelled due to lack of detailed intelligence.
SANTA CLAUS	9-11 Dec 69	Operation run by MACSOG RT with negative results. During the operation, SGT Shepard and WO Peterson were released by the VC.

2. (~~TS~~) MISSION.

The mission of the Commander, Air Studies Group, is to conduct unconventional air operations in support of MACSOG and other agencies as directed. These operations include:

a. Helicopter and fixed wing airlift, and helicopter gunship support for infiltration and exfiltration of unconventional warfare personnel.

b. Resupply of in-place unconventional warfare teams.

c. Dissemination of psychological warfare materials.

d. Exfiltration of evadees or escapees.

e. Training and exercising special forces in procedures and advanced techniques of employment.

f. Movement of unconventional warfare teams and supplies from main operating bases to forward operating locations.

3. (~~TS~~) ORGANIZATION.

An organizational chart showing the Air Studies Group together with higher and subordinate elements is shown on TAB A. The detailed organizational structures of subordinate units are provided in Sections 1, 2 and 3 of this Appendix. The office of the Commander, Air Studies Group consists of the commander, two staff officers and an administrative supervisor. During 1969, the position of Commander, Air Studies Group has been filled by the following:

Colonel David C. Collins	1 Jan to 1 Mar
*Colonel Donald G. Lepard	1 Mar to 26 Mar
Lt Colonel Russell A. Bunn	27 Mar to 14 Apr
Colonel Ernest E. Bradley	14 Apr to 19 Oct
Colonel Milton Fuerst	19 Oct to 31 Dec

* Colonel Donald G. Lepard was killed on 26 March when the UH-1P helicopter he was aboard was lost due to enemy action. Lt Colonel Russell A. Bunn, Commander, 15th Special Operations Squadron, assumed the duties of Commander, Air Studies Group until the arrival of Colonel Ernest E. Bradley who was assigned on a temporary duty basis from the 463d Tactical Airlift Wing, Clark Air Base, Philippine Islands.

SECTION 1

FIRST FLIGHT DETACHMENT

1. (~~TS~~) GENERAL. First Flight was organized to provide C-123 aerial support for unconventional warfare activities conducted by the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG). Six modified C-123's, seven Chinese Air Force (CAF) crews, three Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) crews and United States Military aircrew instructors were originally assigned to First Flight. Four of the original modified aircraft were lost and two were replaced from [redacted] resources. Subsequently, the CAF aircrew commitment was reduced to six and the VNAF aircrews were dropped from First Flight. This unit was initially located at Nha Trang Air Base, RVN and has remained at this location. (b)(1)

2. (~~TS~~) MISSION. The primary mission of the First Flight Detachment is to provide the necessary air assets required by MACSOG to carry out clandestine air operations in Southeast Asia. A secondary mission is to furnish adequate logistic airlift for all MACSOG activities. This aerial support includes the aerial positioning of covert agent teams in Laos and their resupply. First Flight is also responsible for the training required to maintain CAF crew members in a combat ready status.

3. (~~TS~~) ORGANIZATION.

a. The Commander, First Flight Detachment is directly responsible to the Commander, Air Studies Group. (See TAB A) All operational missions flown by First Flight are originated and directed by the Air Studies Branch (MACSOG-32) which is under the Operations and Training Division (MACSOG-30). Administrative support was provided by the 14th Special Operations Wing at Nha Trang AB, RVN until 15 Oct 69. As of that date, the 14th SOW relinquished USAF control of Nha Trang AB to the VNAF and moved to Phan Rang AB, RVN. First Flight remained under the 14th SOW; however, administrative support is now provided by the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing at Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN. Logistical support was provided by the Logistics Division (MACSOG-40), and the 14th SOW until 15 Oct 69. As of that date, the responsibility for the logistics support formerly provided by the 14th SOW was transferred to 12th TFW at Cam Ranh Bay AF, RVN.

b. First Flight Manning as of 31 Dec 69:

	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
US Officers	17	19
US Enlisted Men	44	42
Non-US Civilians	91	85

Chinese Air Force Aircrew Members and Staff	60	60
TOTAL	212	206

c. Most U.S. personnel are instructor qualified aircrew members. The non-U.S. employees include 13 China Air Lines (CAL) employees and Vietnamese nationals employed as guards, administrative and logistics specialists, etc. Twenty-two of these personnel are assigned to the Resupply Branch, Logistics Division (MACSOG-40). The Chinese Air Force (CAF) has 6 crews (9 members each) assigned to First Flight. Three of these crews are on-station at Nha Trang AB, RVN and three are at Hsin-Chu A/D, Taiwan. One CAF crew is rotated every 15 days.

d. In February 1969, the JCS approved a plan to transfer the 14th Special Operations Wing and most of its supporting functions to other bases, and to turn over most of the base facilities to the VNAF. First Flight remained at Nha Trang, thus requiring extensive planning and negotiations to insure continued logistical and maintenance support for unit aircraft. Operation of the aircraft maintenance speciality shops was assigned to the 15th Special Operations Squadron, a MACSOG flying organization also assigned to Nha Trang AB. Four additional aircraft maintenance specialists were assigned to First Flight as a result of the loss of certain base specialist support. Various additional maintenance facilities were transferred to First Flight as a result of the USAF phase-out.

e. The civilian personnel force was reduced in August from 111 to 95 employees. An additional 10 personnel were reduced prior to the end of 1969.

f. As a result of the withdrawal of USAF support functions from Nha Trang AB in October all personnel, finance and individual supply records were transferred to the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing at Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN.

g. In April 1969, approval was received to send four new CAF pilots to the CONUS for C-123 co-pilot checkout. After these four pilots completed training, CAF upgraded four of the present co-pilots to Aircraft Commanders (AC) and released four of the present AC's from the project. There continues to be six CAF crews trained and ready.

4. (~~TS~~) COVER.

Cover stories required for First Flight Air Operations within Southeast Asia must consider the use of USAF Crews, GRC (Government of the Republic of China) crews and mixed crews (USAF and GRC). It is not expected that these stories will permanently deceive the opposition, but they may discourage them from bringing public charges

concerning the operations. Friendly areas are defined as South Vietnam, Laos (under RLG control) and Thailand. Hostile areas are defined as North Vietnam and Laos (under PL control).

a. U.S. crews downed over friendly territory will: If on [redacted] the crew will state they were on a routine fact sheet mission; if on a mission of transporting agent teams and/or cargo between SVN and Thailand, the crew will state they were on a routine flight in SVN [redacted] Agent team members, if aboard, will report the same. A U.S. Crew over hostile territory will: If on a [redacted] If able to [redacted] jettison the [redacted] the crew will state that they were on a routine fact sheet mission. If on a mission of transporting agent teams and/or agent carge between SVN and Thailand, the crew will state they were on an authroized U.S. Search and Rescue mission for U.S. aircrews believed downed in NVN. Team members, if aboard, will state that they comprise the search team and were chosen because of their linguistic qualifications. (b)(1)

b. GRC crews, while engaged in a combat mission without an American crewmember on board, and downed in either friendly or hostile territory will report that they were engaged in ferrying the aircraft from Vietnam to Taiwan for major maintenance and wandered off course due to complete navigational equipment failure. [redacted] if time permits. Team members, if on board, will state that they are being transported to Taiwan for training purposes under a reciprocal agreement between their country and the GRC. They are carrying their own equipment since they do not know what facilities exist at the training base.

c. Since the cover story of U.S. crew specifically states that the aircraft will be U.S. manned and operated it was necessary to provide a link as to why the GRC is operating these aircraft with mixed crew members (USAF) and (GRC). When First Flight Detachement aircraft are flown with mixed crews (USAF and GRC) over friendly territory the appropriate cover story in paragraph 4a will be used in conjunction with the statement that the GRC crew was undergoing a check ride in accordance with

the Bogus Contract requirement. A U.S. Instructor Pilot will always be a crew member except for combat missions.

5. (~~S~~) PERSONNEL PROBLEMS.

a. First Flight continued to receive personnel without the Mandatory TOP SECRET clearance, and without the minimum experience level to perform the mission of this unit. In our efforts to obtain suitable replacements, we consistently outlined our minimum requirements in messages to 7AF and PACAF; however, we were still plagued with replacements without the needed experience. Had we rejected these individuals because of lack of TS clearance or failure to meet minimum experience standards, we would have lost our combat capability. Additional flying time in-country was necessary to upgrade these individuals with commensurate loss of manhours. This has also had a decided effect upon the training of our counterpart crews, which is an essential part of our mission. A letter dated 10 Oct 69 was sent to 7th AF DPO and DPA reiterating our minimum requirements.

b. Significant delays were encountered in obtaining authorized Communication Specialist, Operations Specialists, Loadmasters and a Logistics Officer during the year. The Liaison Maintenance Officer position at Taipei was inadvertently dropped from the First Flight manning document in August 1969. After a great deal of correspondence and coordination this position was restored to First Flight in November 1969.

6. (~~S~~) AIRCRAFT.

a. Two aircraft underwent K-Mod (Jet Modification) in the CONUS during 1969. Aircraft WC departed Nha Trang on 17 Jan 69 and returned in May 1969. Aircraft WE departed Nha Trang on 11 Mar 69 and returned on 3 Jul 69. This completed K-Mod of all unit aircraft. Loss of these aircraft to the modification program reduced the aircraft possessed status significantly during the first half of 1969. Programmed flying time and mission commitments were appropriately reduced during this period.

b. Unavailable jet engine parts, particularly throttle actuators, created the majority of the maintenance/supply problems relating to unit aircraft. Cannibalization of these parts between aircraft was often required to meet mission commitments. After extensive negotiations, a spare R-2800 reciprocating engine and a J-85 jet engine were obtained and in place in July 1969. This reduced the engine change time and permitted additional sources for unavailable parts. Loss of seven of the unit's most experienced maintenance technicians during the first half of 1969, as

well as their replacement by low skill level specialist, affected the quality of maintenance during this period.

c. Inspection of aircraft Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) wave guides revealed extensive corrosion which was affecting system operation. The AFLC Liaison Office at Ontario, California procurred and shipped new wave guides. Two aircraft have had new wave guides installed at Taipei and the wave guides for the other two aircraft are on hand awaiting installation.

d. New TOC 123-589 FM Radios were installed in unit aircraft by China Air Lines in Taipei. This modification increased the effective FM range; however, multiple malfunctions in the UHF and VHF radios were subsequently traced to this modification.

e. Unit C-123's underwent Periodic Aircraft Maintenance Inspection until April 1969 at which time First Flight converted to a modified Phase Inspection System. Light phase inspections (Phases 1, 3 & 5) were conducted at Nha Trang by First Flight maintenance personnel and heavy phase inspections (Phases 1, 3 & 5) were conducted at Taipei by China Air Lines. This resulted in a significant savings to the government and aligned First Flight with the standard USAF phase concept. Aircraft continued to be returned to Taipei every 200 flying hours for phase/IRAN. One aircraft was usually in Taipei undergoing maintenance at all times.

7. ~~(TSLD)~~ OPERATIONS.

a. All combat missions over North Vietnam were suspended during 1969 as a result of the bombing halt initiated by President Johnson in November 1968. Combat operations were limited to the aerial delivery of agent teams in Laos or within South Vietnam along the Cambodian border; resupply of these teams in both countries; and rehearsal drop missions within South Vietnam for teams which were scheduled for insertion. This rehearsal concept was developed by MACSOG in October 1969 in order to better prepare the team members as well as develop their confidence in the area of air operations. Proper drop zone (DZ) lighting was a matter of concern for resupply missions and was stressed during the rehearsal missions. A test program was initiated in November 1969 to improve the techniques of lighting drop zones. This program was prompted by difficulties encountered by the C-130 (Combat Spear) and C-123 (Heavy Hook) aircrews in properly identifying poorly marked drop zones. This program was still undergoing testing at the end of 1969 and no firm results had been arrived at as of that time.

A summary of combat operations for 1969 is shown at TAB B. Twenty-eight combat missions were scheduled by MACSOG and twenty-seven were completed successfully. The unsuccessful mission was an agent drop which had to be aborted within 30 seconds of the drop zone due to a complete undercast of clouds. All drop missions in Laos were flown by American crews due to the fact that Chinese crews were not permitted to fly tactical missions in Laos because of diplomatic agreements between the Governments of Laos and the Republic of China.

The amount of cargo, number of passengers, number of sorties and flying hours flown during 1969 increased significantly in comparison to 1968. This was partially explainable by the increase in the number of possessed aircraft during the last half of 1969. All four aircraft had completed K-MOD in the CONUS by July 1969 and were returned to PACAF. One aircraft is usually in phase maintenance inspection at Taipei at all times; however the availability of at least three aircraft in Vietnam greatly increased the operational capability of First Flight. During 1969 the unit flew more sorties and transported more passengers than in any previous year.

The Flying Safety program was formalized for the first time due to the efforts of a fully-trained Flying Safety Officer. No aircraft accidents or incidents were experienced by First Flight during 1969. This fine record is more meaningful in light of the fact that the flying weather during 1969 was unusually poor as compared to annual averages. The introduction of four new Chinese pilots with the accompaning loss of more experience CAF pilots adds emphasis to this record. There was also an increase in aircraft in-flight emergencies and three aircraft were hit by enemy ground fire; however, the professional skill of the unit's Instructor Pilots consistently resulted in the safe recovery of the aircraft. The extensive flying experience of First Flight aircrew instructors was a major contributing factor to the professional accomplishment of the unit's combat flying mission. This flying experience is depicted in the following table.

	Nr Asgnd	Avg Flying Time (Hrs)	Avg C-123 Time (Hrs)
Instructor Pilots	8	5115	1937
Navigators	4	3100	-
Flight Engineers	3	5100	-

Radio Operators	4	5130	-
Loadmasters	5	3350	-

e. It is also noteworthy that the Chinese aircrew members are among the most highly qualfied in the Chinese Air Force. They also are very experienced in the type of flying conducted by this unit. The Chinese crew member's biggest problem continued to be difficulty with the English language. For this reason, English classes for these crew members were conducted by First Flight personnel. Basic English and aviation terminology were emphasized in these classes.

f. Due to the limited number of combat missions and training missions which could be flown by Chinese crews in Vietnam, provisions were made to conduct flight training sessions at Hsin-Chu A/D, Taiwan. This training was devoted to maintaining the CAF crews' tactical proficiency and was scheduled in conjunction with aircraft imputs to China Air Lines for phase maintenance. Day and night training missions included pilot transition, low level navigation, air drop training and ECM training. This training was successful in maintaining the tactical proficiency as well as overall flight proficiency for the crews at Hsin-Chu who were previously not flying for 50-60 periods.

g. Additional emphasis was placed upon Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) proficiency against airborne interceptor and ground radar threats to the aircraft.

h. On 28 Jan 69, First Flight flew an airborne test of locally modified ECM equipment against F-102's of the 405th Tactical Fighter Wing at Clark Air Base, P.I. Twenty-nine intercepts were run at low altitude and high altitude (20,000 feet) and proved that the modified equipment will "break lock" up to an altitude of 20,000 feet.

i. Airborne interceptor/ECM training was conducted against F-102's, detached from the 405th TFW, at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand. Four missions were flown against the F-102's and up to 75 separate intercepts were accomplished on each trip. Low level navigation training was also conducted during these trips. A maximum amount of valuable training was completed in a compressed time frame. Unfortunately, the F-102's were reassigned to Clark AFB, P.I., in October 1969 and this training program was discontinued.

j. Two ECM training missions were conducted against F-4's from the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing. The availability of F-4's for this training created a number or coordination problems. The interceptor proficiency of the F-4 pilots was significantly less than that of the F-102 pilots. The number of intercepts which could be completed in a normal training period with the F-4's was also less than with the F-102's.

k. On 10 Mar 69, Loadmaster training was initiated for six Vietnamese Parachute Delivery Operators (PDO's) from the Air Delivery Branch.

8. (~~S~~) COMMANDERS. During 1969 the position of Commander, First Flight Detachment has been filled by the following:

1 Jan 69 to 4 May 69	LtCol J. R. McCarty
5 May 69 to 31 Aug 69	Major R. M. Gibson
1 Sep 69 to 31 Dec 69	LtCol W. R. Waugh

TAB A

FIRST FLIGHT ORGANIZATION CHART



~~SECRET~~

TAB B

1969 COMBAT MISSION SUMMARY

MONTH	AGENT DROPS		PSYOPS		RESUPPLY/TEAM DROP TNG		CANX/ABORT		
	SCHED	COMP	SCHED	COMP	SCHED	COMP	WX	MX	OT
JAN	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0
FEB	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MAR	1	1	0	0	5	5	0	0	0
APR	1	1	0	0	3	3	0	0	0
MAY	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JUN	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0
JUL	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AUG	2	1	0	0	1	1	*1	0	0
SEP	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
OCT	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
NOV	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
DEC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS	11	10	0	0	17	17	*1	0	0

* Air Abort, DZ Undercast

TAB C

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

MONTH	AIRCRAFT POSSESSED	PERCENT OPERATIONALLY READY	PERCENT NORM	PERCENT NORSG
JAN	2.00	77.70%	17.60%	4.70%
FEB	2.39	65.40%	14.26%	20.25%
MAR	1.55	70.70%	17.30%	12.00%
APR	1.57	81.80%	13.90%	4.30%
MAY	2.30	85.90%	12.95%	1.15%
JUN	2.00	80.16%	17.91%	1.93%
JUL	2.97	77.01%	6.86%	16.13%
AUG	3.12	66.70%	22.64%	10.66%
SEP	3.07	88.40%	6.40%	5.20%
OCT	3.13	97.51%	2.49%	0.00%
NOV	3.53	90.05%	7.73%	2.22%
DEC	3.25	80.07%	6.10%	13.83%
ANNUAL AVERAGE	2.57	80.12%	12.18%	7.68%

NOTE:

POSSESSED - Aircraft On-Station at Nha Trang, RVN

NORM - Not Operationally Ready Maintenance

NORS - Not Operationally Ready Supply Grounded

SECTION 2

15th SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON

1. (~~TSLD~~) GENERAL.

a. The 15th Special Operations Squadron is stationed at Nha Trang AB, RVN and is assigned to the 14th Special Operations Wing, Phan Rang AB, RVN. The 15th SOS is under the operational control of the Commander, 7AF, administered through the Deputy Commander for Special Air Operations, 14th SOW. Mission capabilities are allocated in support of MACV (MACSOG) operations. Prior to December of 1966 the unit operated out of Ching Chuan Kang AB, Taiwan, on a TDY basis.

b. During 1969, the 15th SOS continued its mission to support unconventional warfare in Southeast Asia. In addition to out-of-country combat missions, logistic support was provided for the many in-country activities of MACSOG. Since the halt of all air activities over North Vietnam the combat missions have all been flown over Laos, with some in-country re-supply missions. The movement of the 14th SOW from Nha Trang AB to Phan Rang AB in October of 1969 necessitated some changes in the squadron organization, notably in maintenance and supply. Maintenance suppport is now provided by specialist assigned to the squadron. Phase inspections and heavy maintenance continue to be performed at Ching Chuan Kang AB, Taiwan, by the 314th FMS. Support is provided by a Forward Supply Point operated by the 12th Supply Squadron at Cam Ranh Bay. Though this period of transition was not without its problems, mission accomplishment was not effected and by the year end most of the more serious problems had been resolved or reduced to an acceptable level.

2. (~~TSLD~~) MISSION.

The mission of the 15th SOS is to conduct tactical airlift operations in support of selected United States and Republic of Vietnam Counterinsurgency forces in Southeast Asia; to conduct rescue and recovery operations as directed by the Joint Personnel Recovery Center, using the Fulton Recovery System; and to carry out a program of unconventional warfare operations assigned under 7AF Operations Order 460-70, Combat Spear, classified Top Secret.

3. (~~S~~) ORGANIZATION.

a. For the first three quarters of 1969, manning in the 15th SOS was stable, with 39 officers and 54 enlisted men authorized. Assigned strength during this period was also stable,

with some minor deviations from time to time due to rotation of personnel. But while assigned strength was stable, the required grades and skill levels were not, particularly in the Maintenance field.

b. As of 1 October 1969, 15th SOS manning has been governed by 7th AF Strawman PAD 69-101. This document authorized 39 officers and 99 enlisted men. This increase in enlisted men allowed for the maintenance men transferred from the 14th FMS. During the last quarter, assigned strength was 39 officers and 114 enlisted men. The excess in enlisted strength was due to the fact that 15 enlisted personnel belonging to 1st Flight Detachment were assigned to the 15th SOS for administrative purposes.

c. A constant manning problem occured in maintenance as there is no authorized input of personnel to replace those rotating back to CONUS, as there is with aircrew members. This has left maintenance short of needed personnel. In the last quarter Avionics and Flight line maintenance required TDY personnel to be brought in to maintain the unit's mission capability.

d. During 1969 the position of Squadron Commander has been filled by the following:

LtCol Russell A. Bunn	1 January 1969 - 27 March 1969
LtCol John R. Kummer	28 March 1969 - 5 August 1969
LtCol John F. Newell Jr.	6 August 1969 - 31 December 1969

e. During the first three quarters of the year no significant changes occurred in the squadron organization; however, with the implementation of the Nha Trang Proposal in the last quarter of 1969, certain significant changes took place. As a result of the proposal, the 14th SOW moved to Phan Rang AB, taking with it the support functions it formerly provided to the unit. The areas most effected by this move were Maintenance, Supply, and Personnel and Finance.

f. In order for the squadron maintenance section to provide proper support for the aircraft at Nha Trang, 63 maintenance specialists were transferred from the 14th Field Maintenance Squadron to the 15th SOS. In addition, a quality control section was established in the organization. A summary of abort rates, NORM rates, and NORS rates are given in TAB A.

g. The supply support function was taken over by the 12th Supply Squadron, Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN. Here a major problem developed in that the Nha Trang Proposal was not specific enough in detailing the extent of support the 12th Supply Squadron was to provide, nor how this support was to be accomplished. This resulted

in overlong delays in getting vital aircraft parts, and frequent breakdowns in communication often led to the wrong parts being sent. In addition, with the supply point being 15 miles from Nha Trang, transportation of parts was also a real problem. During the month of October in-country airlift was the primary method of getting supply items to Nha Trang. Vital aircraft parts were occasionally picked up by squadron aircraft specially sent to Cam Ranh or rerouted through there on return from other missions. Several meetings were held during October and November and as a result the supply problem has been almost completely solved. This was done by establishing a Forward Supply Point (FSP) at Nha Trang operated by the 12th Supply Squadron. At year end all items required by the FSP were not in stock, but efforts are continuing to bring stock levels up to that required as soon as possible.

h. All personnel and finance actions were taken over by the 12th Tactical Fighter Wing CBPO at Cam Ranh Bay AB. The only problems encountered in this area were due to the time and distance between Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay. This has been partially solved by scheduling squadron aircraft through Cam Ranh Bay twice a week to provide transportation for those who have business with the 12th TFW, CBPO or Finance Office.

i. The 327th Combat Support Squadron has been established at Nha Trang to provide the necessary housekeeping functions, and provides no direct support to the unit's administrative or operational needs.

4. ~~(TSLD)~~ OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

a. 15th SOS operations during 1969 continued to support the combat and logistic requirements of MACV (MACSOG). A significant change in combat operations over the year before was occasioned by the halt of all combat operations over North Vietnam. All combat missions were flown over Laos except for three re-supply missions flown in-country. A total of forty-one combat missions were flown, of which thirty-four were completed. Of the seven incompleted, four were due to inability to identify the DZ at last light, and the last due to no lighting being observed on the DZ. All except one, a re-supply mission, were reflown and carried as complete. Battle damage occured on only one mission, a daylight resupply flown on 10 March 1969. Small arms fire struck the aircraft causing minor damage.

b. During February the unit flew nine flare missions over Laos. These missions were laid on by 7th AF. It was soon realized that the aircraft were not suited for the mission and no more

were laid on. A Complete summary of combat missions flown during 1969 is given in TAB B.

c. There were 599 in-country log missions, with a total of 3625.4 hours, flown in support of MACSOG activities.

d. During August one airplane was returned to CONUS for IRAN. The IRAN program will apply to all squadron aircraft and is expected to run through 1970. TAB C gives a breakdown of logistic support flown in 1969.

e. All training in the use of the aircraft specialist equipment and low level radar was performed at Clark AB, R.P.I. A constant problem has been the lack of time, dictated by mission requirements, to satisfy all training requirements. This problem has been partially solved during the last quarter of the year by sending two crews at a time and remaining at Clark for four days. A significant increase in training time has been gained over the old system of sending one crew for three days.

f. Training in the use of the Fulton Recovery System was performed at Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN. Excellent cooperation was received throughout the year from Base Operations and from U. S. Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay. In addition, there were six live pick-up demonstrations during the year. The demonstration on 8 September at Koke Kathiem AB, Thailand was performed before the King of Thailand. The volunteer for the 21 July demonstration at Nha Trang was Lt Col John R. Kummer, at that time the squadron commander of the 15th SOS.

5. (U) SAFETY. The 15th SOS had a perfect Flying and Ground safety record during 1969. There was one reportable vehicle accident in June with no injuries and minor damage. All safety procedures and SOI's have been reviewed and updated. A monthly ground safety inspection is made and documented. In October the unit passed a safety inspection given by 7th AF without a single discrepancy.

6. (U) SPECIAL PROJECTS. Members of the 15th SOS have been exceptionally active in civic action projects. There are two permanent projects. One is a project to modernize and improve living conditions in the BINH CANG Convent, 3 kilometers northwest of Nha Trang. During the year wells were cleaned and a water system installed. Pumps and tanks for this project came from base resources. Also all kitchen tables have been covered with aluminum. Books and school supplies have been donated. The second project is the construction of a ferro-cement fishing boat for use by the local Vietnamese. It has several advantages over the wooden boats now being used. It is lighter, cheaper, and easier to build, and will last indefinitely. The squadron is supplying technical

Assistance and supervision. The Vietnamese are providing the labor. Continuing throughout the year were donations to many orphanages and refugee camps of food and clothing. School supplies were also donated by the families and friends of members of the 15th SOS.

TAB A

(~~S~~) Abort, NORM & NORS Rate

	TYPE ABORT Air/Gnd	ABORT RATE %	NORM RATE %	NORS RATE %
Jan	3 / 1	1.3	18.8	6.9
Feb	2 / 3	1.4	18.6	5.1
Mar	2 / 0	0.7	36.7	17.1
Apr	0 / 1	0.3	29.5	8.5
May	0 / 1	0.3	9.4	5.5
Jun	0 / 0	0.0	17.6	2.0
Jul	0 / 0	0.0	9.3	6.3
Aug	0 / 0	0.0	16.4	6.3
Sep	0 / 0	0.0	4.2	5.5
Oct	0 / 0	0.0	5.6	1.7
Nov	0 / 0	0.0	14.5	0.0
Dec	2 / 0	0.3	7.3	5.8

TAB B

(TS) COMBAT MISSION SUMMARY

1969	Scheduled	Flown	Complete	Incomplete	Remarks
Jan					
Infiltration	0	0	0	0	
Resupply	0	0	0	0	
Orbit	4	4	4	0	
Feb					
Infiltration	5	3	3	0	2 Weather Delays
Resupply	0	0	N/A	N/A	
Flare	18	9	9	0	
Orbit	5	5	5	0	
Mar					
Infiltration	0	0	N/A	N/A	
Resupply	2	1	1	0	1 Weather Delay
Orbit	1	1	1	0	
Apr					
Infiltration	2	2	2	0	
Resupply	0	0	N/A	N/A	
May					
Infiltration	1	1	1	0	
Resupply	0	0	N/A	N/A	
June					
Infiltration	8	5	1	4	1 Acft Abort 3 DZ obscured by WX
Resupply	0	0	N/A	N/A	

TAB B

July	Scheduled	Flown	Completed	Incomplete	Remarks
Infiltration	3	1	0	1	2 Weather Delays 1 DZ obscured by WX
Resupply	0	0	N/A	N/A	
August					
Infiltration	2	2	1	1	Unable to see DZ at end of last light period
Resupply	0	0	N/A	N/A	
September					
Infiltration	2	1	1	0	73½ hr delay by OP-3
Resupply	1	1	1	0	
Oct					
Infiltration	1	1	1	0	
Resupply	1	1	0	1	No lights seen on DZ
Nov					
Infiltration	1	1	1	0	
Resupply	1	1	1	0	
Dec					
Infiltration	1	1	1	0	
Resupply	0	0	N/A	N/A	
Annual Totals					
Infiltration	26	18	12	6	
Resupply	5	4	3	1	
Flare	18	9	9	0	
Orbit	10	10	10	0	

TAB C

(~~S~~) HOURS ALLOCATED & FLOWN, OPERATIONAL READY STATE

	Aircraft Possessed	Hours Allocated	Hours Flown	% Hours Flown	Ops Ready Rate %
Jan	3.5	300	342.0	114	74.4
Feb	4.0	300	439.0	146	76.3
Mar	4.0	300	320.0	107	46.1
Apr	4.0	300	320.0	101	62.0
May	4.0	310	342.0	110	85.1
Jun	4.0	300	322.0	107	80.4
Jul	4.0	300	359.4	119	84.4
Aug	3.4	250	267.4	107	77.3
Sep	3.0	225	245.0	109	90.3
Oct	3.0	225	255.5	113	80.5
Nov	3.0	225	218.3	97	83.2
Dec	3.0	225	211.4	94	79.0

TAB D

(S) COMBAT SUPPORT SUMMARY

	Cargo Airlifted Tons	Personnel
Jan	322.7	2526
Feb	289.8	2543
Mar	288.0	2393
Apr	234.4	2710
May	159.1	2437
Jun	220.1	2596
Jul	257.3	2873
Aug	197.9	2034
Sep	217.9	2110
Oct	284.4	2342
Nov	236.7	1221
Dec	223.4	1414

TAB E

(~~S~~) MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

	Fragged	Flown	%
Jan	51	47	92.1
Feb	74	66	89.2
Mar	56	51	91.0
Apr	57	49	85.9
May	60	55	91.6
Jun	59	58	98.3
Jul	62	61	98.3
Aug	51	46	90.1
Sep	42	38	90.4
Oct	46	43	93.4
Nov	44	41	93.0
Dec	38	34	89.5

CHART IV

	(U) TRAINING TIME		(U) FULTON SYSTEM
Jan	0.0	1st Quarter	10.6 hrs
Feb	5.5	2d Quarter	4.2 hrs
Mar	4.5	3d Quarter	6.2 hrs
Apr	0.0	4th Quarter	4.8 hrs
May	16.1		
Jun	0.0		
Jul	18.4		
Aug	11.3		
Sep	11.6		
Oct	10.0		
Nov	16.7		
Dec	16.6		

SECTION 3

20TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON

1. (~~TS~~) GENERAL.

a. The 20th SOS was organized to provide a dedicated Air Force helicopter squadron in support of MACSOG activities throughout Southeast Asia. The Air Force UH-1F helicopters were modified to include the required communications equipment and weapons systems to support long range reconnaissance teams. Upon modification, the UH-1F's were redesignated UH-1P's. The squadron was originally equipped with twenty-six helicopters. Twenty-two were stationed at Nha Trang and supported MACSOG activities at Ban Me Thuot, Duc Co, Ban Don and Duc Lap. The remaining MACSOG four helicopters were a detachment of the 20th SOS at Udorn, Thailand and supported activities in Laos.

b. 1969 has been an extremely variable year for the 20th SOS. The early months of 1969 proved to be one of the highest levels of mission support. Combat and operational losses of aircraft caused a serious degradation of mission capability as replacement aircraft were not available. As a result, the 20th SOS detachments at Udorn and Tan Son Nhut were forced to cease operations in order to provide aircraft in support of the mission at Ban Me Thuot. Even with the consolidation of assets, the squadron possessed aircraft dwindled to the present number of twelve. Due to losses, the squadron was forced to give up part of the mission in support of MACSOG activities. The present support is four gunships. Slick helicopter support is provided by various Army units depending on operating location.

2. (~~TS~~) MISSION.

The primary mission of the 20th SOS is the support of MACSOG activities. This includes helicopter support of counterinsurgency, reconnaissance, base defense, psychological warfare, and logistical support of USAF units and U.S. sponsored activities. A secondary mission which was flown out of Tan Son Nhut by the 20th SOS Det 1, was that of transporting intelligence film and VIP's for the 7th Air Force Headquarters. Significant accomplishments of the 20th SOS are shown in TAB A.

3. (~~S~~) ORGANIZATION/TRAINING.

a. During 1969 the position of Squadron Commander has been filled by the following:

*Lt Col Frank A. Di Figlia 1 January 1969 - 26 March 1969

Lt Col David K. Sparks 26 March 1969 - 18 November 1969

Lt Col Stephen Von Phul 18 November 1969 - 31 December 1969

*On March 26 1969, Lt Col F. A. Di Figlia was killed in a helicopter crash.

b. At the end of 1969, the 20th SOS had five Flight Examiners, five Instructor Pilots, five Aircraft Commanders, 30 1st pilots for a total of 45 assigned with 44 authorized. Adequate replacements have been arriving to cover combat losses and rotations among the pilots.

c. On 1 December 1969, there were only nine pilots in the squadron who were completely qualified for the 20th SOS mission. Pilots arriving on station directly from Sheppard AFB appear to be adequately trained in the operation of the helicopter. The training at Hurlburt AFB, Florida is supposed to be combat crew training, but generally is just a course of familiarization with the equipment and some further instruction in flying.

d. Formal training for pilots is conducted on a regular basis and consists of initial briefings and 1st pilot check rides for incoming personnel. In order to upgrade to aircraft commander (combat capable), a pilot must have two weeks of flying on the mission as a copilot. He must also have completed six gun training rides in which he demonstrated proficiency in gun tactics. Then he flys for a week on the mission under the supervision of a Flight Examiner. If he satisfactorily completes this week, he is upgraded as a combat qualified aircraft commander. A plan has been formulated by the squadron commander, whereby two aircraft, in addition to those on the mission, will be sent to Ban Me Thuot for the purpose of training pilots and gunners. These aircraft would be available to the mission as backup aircraft.

4. (S) PROBLEMS.

After the 20th SOS lost three aircraft to major accidents and experienced four aircraft incidents involving engine malfunctions, it became apparent that there was a definite downward trend in the reliability of the T-58-3 engine. From the latter part of July, the squadron found itself unable, periodically, to perform the mission due to these engine failures. The normal mission at Ban Me Thuot East, RVN requires 600 hours of flying time per month. The entire 20th SOS fleet was suspended from flying after 31 August 1969. At this time the Army took over our share of supporting the long range reconnaissance teams in that they flew

both the slick and gun portion of the mission. A major change in the mission of the 20th SOS occurred at the end of September in that the 20th SOS was to only provide the gun birds for the mission, and the Army was to supply the slicks. Due to numerous stand-downs, assorted maintenance problems and a great deal of bad weather, it was 1 December 1969 before the 20th SOS again assumed responsibility for the gun bird portion of the mission. It has been determined that to maintain four gunships on the mission at all times, the squadron must possess at least 12 aircraft. In order to support a slick and gun operation, 18 aircraft would be required. At the end of 1969, the 20th SOS had 12 aircraft in its possession.

5. (S) MAINTENANCE.

a. On 5 Spetember, the 20th SOS moved from Nha Trang AB, RVN to Tuy Hoa AB, RVN. In many ways this move further weakened our maintenance capability. During the move the NORS-G rate increased considerably due to the necessity of waiting for parts to arrive from Nha Trang.

b. After the three operational losses in July and August, a G. E. COSMAT team and representatives of OCAMA and WRAMA assembled at Tuy Hoa AB on 9 September to begin working on the problem of engine malfunctions. The team accomplished an airframe/engine inspection and a review of engine records. This activity led to a program of improved maintenance procedures and practices.

c. Foreign Object Damage (FOD) has been one of the main maintenance problems. The T-58 engine is very susceptable to FOD. During the past six months, the squadron had been losing engines at the rate of 1.3 per month. A FOD Prevention Program was initiated, and as of 31 December, the 20th SOS had experienced 25 FOD free days.

d. An extensive unit level inspection and repair program has been instituted. At the end of December six aircraft have been processed. Upon completion of this program the operational ready rate should improve and provide a more reliable aircraft for mission support.

6. (U) CIVIC ACTIONS.

a. Emphasis in civic action work shifted with the move from the Nha Trang area to the central highlands and into the small villages. Here the 20th SOS supplied essential medical and education supplies to these isolated Vietnamese and Montagnard villages. With the help of the Army Special Forces, a MEDCAP

operation was conducted. A medical technician, and a dental technician treated approximately 200 people in the Happy Valley refugee area, which is located south of Ban Me Thuot. Also, at Buon Y Jong, a village in the same area, blankets, clothes, hygiene kits and toys were distributed.

b. The biggest single civic action work was performed by the 20th SOS at Udorn RTAFB. From 10 January 1969 to 15 January 1969, the 20th SOS provided primary airlift support for the emergency evacuation of tribesmen in Northern Laos. The emergency evacuation was ordered because high officials were concerned with imminent danger of the area being overrun by hostile enemy forces. The evacuation was carried out deep in an area that was surrounded by hostile enemy actions. The unarmed and unescorted CH-3 and UH-1 helicopters were subjected to possible ground fire throughout the entire evacuation route. In this operation, 230.9 flying hours were logged, completing 539 sorties, transporting 115.1 tons of cargo and baggage, and moved 5,107 passengers to an area 14 miles away to escape enemy atrocities.

c. The 20th SOS at Udorn accepted the Udorn community orphanage as a squadron civic action project. The support of the orphanage consisted of daily visits by squadron members during which they painted the interior and exterior of several buildings, exercised and entertained the children and donated large quantities of vitamins, diapers, sheets, mattress covers and other sundry items.

TAB A

OPERATIONAL STATISTICS

	HOURS FLOWN	MISSIONS FRAGGED	MISSIONS FLOWN	SORTIES	PAX	CARGO TONS	ROCKETS EXPENDED	7.62 AMMO EXPENDED
FIRST QUARTER	3860.8	1292	1255	7526	7514	162.9	1791	886,140
SECOND QUARTER	4028.1	1167	1162	7463	6501	144.9	1939	1,033,455
THIRD QUARTER	1562.2	581	602	3014	2224	44.0	964	495,050
FOURTH QUARTER	1041.3	325	305	1590	349	11.0	1054	571,400
TOTALS	10,492.4	3365	3324	19,593	16,588	362.8	5748	2,986,045