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PONAST II

VOLUME II  
PREATTACK MEASURES

54

23 May 1973

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(U) Although this JCS study involved the participation of OSD, OEP, CIA, DCPA, DIA, DCA, and State Department with contributions from 24 other departments and agencies, it does not necessarily represent the views of the Secretary of Defense or the heads of the other participating or contributing departments and agencies.

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The purpose of this volume is to set the stage for the ensuing analysis of the simulated strategic nuclear exchange.	<u>5</u>
It insures that the preattack measures of the United States and the Soviet Union show a logical sequence of actions and indicate postures, both military and civilian, that both sides could have attained prior to the nuclear attack. Agencies represented in the Post-Nuclear Attack Study (PONAST) considered it vital to the success of the study that the preattack preparations were identified to as great an extent as possible. The various defense conditions and readiness conditions were examined in light of the imposed deterioration of world events.	<u>6</u>
B. <u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>17</u>
1. <u>(S) Alternative Nuclear Exchange Scenarios (FIGURE I-1).</u>	<u>18</u>



C

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2. (U) <u>Structure.</u> The descriptions of the preattack events	<u>1</u>
and measures for Scenario A are presented in the next four parts	<u>2</u>
of this volume. Part II summarizes the events which provide or	<u>3</u>
reflect the increasing tension of the preattack period. Part	<u>4</u>
III summarizes the preattack control and readiness measures	<u>5</u>
taken by the respective national governments. Part IV describes	<u>6</u>
the military preattack measures implemented by both sides. Part	<u>7</u>
V deals with the preattack measures on behalf of, and responses	<u>8</u>
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	22
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(U) Lines of succession were up-to-date, but agencies were re- quested by OEP as of _____ to reexamine pertinent orders and assure that all parties would be fully informed of developments.	27 28 29
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(U) At _____ agencies were requested by OEP to review their plans to assure that all necessary documents and other preparations were as complete as possible.	31 32 33



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1  
2

A. UNITED STATES

2. (U) Civil Defense Training. State and local governments, 20  
with the assistance of the universities in the Civil Defense 21  
University Extension Program, began intensified training of 22  
employees and volunteers in civil defense emergency operations 23  
skills on 27 December 1970. Figure V-1 sets forth the personnel 24  
requirements established by the State and local governments,\*\* 25  
together with the number of trained personnel available as of 26  
27 December 1970 and as of 5 January 1971. 27

\*\*As stated in Civil Defense Annual Program papers submitted to OCD Regional Offices. Data as of 1 July 1970.

6. (U) Shelter Utilization Planning. Near the end of December 1970, State and local officials responsible for existing community shelter utilization accelerated work on their planning projects, while those who had completed their shelter allocation plans reviewed them. As plans were completed or updated, many communities released the results to the public, generally through publication in area newspapers. With the declaration of \_\_\_\_\_, the OCD urged all local governments to publish in their local newspapers their local shelter utilization plans. Where such plans were not available, local governments were urged to publish lists of the public shelters available together with such gross allocation as could be accomplished in 24 hours. By 4 January 1971, the public throughout the country had been advised of the shelters available to them. In a number of rural counties people were told that very little public shelter was available. In some of the larger cities refined shelter allocation plans were not available, so information to the residents of these metropolitan areas was primarily through publication of the lists of public shelters.

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7. ~~(C)~~ Activation of State and Local Continuity Plans...

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PONAST II  
VOLUME III  
NATIONAL SURVIVAL

APPENDIX D  
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

23 May 1973

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APPENDIX D TO VOLUME III  
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (C<sup>3</sup>)

PART I--UNITED STATES MILITARY

A. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1. (U) Introduction. (It was considered desirable to report the results of the attack on C<sup>3</sup> in one section of the study report. Although some mention, for clarity, has been put in the basic Volume III, this Appendix with its Annexes gives full coverage to the subject, and may, for completeness, repeat some of the information contained in the basic Volume.)

2. (U) Organization. In the material which follows, Defense Communication Agency (DCA) summaries of the results of the attacks give an appreciation for communication losses suffered by the US. This is followed by the attack results as they affected the National Command Authorities (NCA),\* the Services, and the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands (CINCs). Figures are provided to give the survival status of officials (Figure I-1), headquarters (Figure I-2), C<sup>3</sup> worldwide (Figure I-3), and selected US facilities (Figure I-4). Individual Service summaries comprise the next part of this Appendix, followed by military intelligence support capability summaries. Next, C<sup>3</sup> as it applies to the civil leadership is presented. Finally, the USSR Command and Control is addressed. The Annexes present more specific and detailed information.

3. ~~(TS)~~ Summary of Results

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B. DCA SUMMARY--SCENARIO A

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1. (U) Purpose: To provide an overall summary of DCS communications at the end of the Scenario A attack.

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
31





2. (U) Scope: Overall status of the residual DCS communications<sup>1</sup>  
is summarized for the following:

- |                                |          |
|--------------------------------|----------|
| a. US/Canada to European area. | <u>2</u> |
| b. Intra-Europe                | <u>3</u> |
| c. US/Canada to Pacific area.  | <u>4</u> |
| d. Intra N. America.           | <u>5</u> |
|                                | <u>6</u> |



ANALYSIS OF DCS COMMUNICATIONS  
POST NUCLEAR ATTACK STUDY  
(PONAST II)

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the detailed data from which these summaries were prepared. —

2. (U) Scope 15

This study included an analysis of the worldwide DCS. 16  
Commercial facilities such as commercial satellites, submarine 17  
cables, and the US and foreign commercial landline networks 18  
are included, in addition to the military cable, microwave, 19  
tropospheric scatter, HF radio, and military satellite links. 20

3. (S) Methodology 21

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PONAST II

VOLUME III  
NATIONAL SURVIVAL

23 May 1973

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VOLUME III  
NATIONAL SURVIVAL

PART I

INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION

1. (U) Purpose. The purposes of this volume are: (a) to assess the capability of the US and the USSR to survive and continue the conflict; (b) to provide a basis for determining what actions could be taken to enhance survivability, reconstitution, and rehabilitation of the US; and (c) to continue the development of the analytical procedures for post-nuclear attack study (Volume V). (The capability to recover for both nations is assessed in Volume IV.)

2. (U) Organization. The INTRODUCTION section provides a summary of the attack\* used in the study. Part II consists of the Scenario A analyses of the national survival of the US and the USSR. Part III contains the observations for this volume (based on all three scenarios) and, in particular, contributes to the first and second aspects of the purpose as stated above.

B. ATTACK SUMMARY--SCENARIO A

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PONAST II

VOLUME IV  
NATIONAL RECOVERY

23 May 1973



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(U) Although this JCS study involved the participation of OSD, OEP, CIA, DCPA, DIA, DCA, and State Department, with contributions from 24 other departments and agencies, it does not necessarily represent the views of the Secretary of Defense or the heads of the other participating or contributing departments and agencies.

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
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PART I. INTRODUCTION

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B. (U) PURPOSE

The analysis of the recovery period has the dual purposes of ascertaining both for the US and for the USSR: (1) whether the surviving national economy retained sufficient power to recover from the attack, and if so, (2) how soon the recovery could be achieved. To create a basis for making such findings for each adversary, the recovery period analysis develops for each a series of annual production programs, beginning with that for Year One which runs from the seventh month through the eighteenth month after the attack--Year Two, nineteenth through the thirtieth month, etc. The resulting series of production year simulations depicts a recovery production plan designed both to meet the recovery objective and to show the number of years required.

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C. (U) ORGANIZATION

It is first required that the national economic goals, objectives, and guideposts be selected and defined in terms sufficiently explicit to provide a measure of recovery attainment. It is then necessary to establish the capacity limitations and other constraints on output. The next step is the specific quantification of those final demands which must be satisfied in order to fulfill the goals and objectives. Finally, a set of annual final demand statements must be devised which will satisfy the goal-filling demand statements as quickly as possible while not exceeding the production capacities available in each year. The resulting set of feasible annual production schedules will constitute the plan for recovery with which to fulfill the stated purposes of the recovery analysis. The interrelationships of the various elements of the national economic goals, objectives, and guidelines used in the recovery analysis of the United States are illustrated in Figure IV-1. The goals and objectives for the USSR are shown in Figure IV-2.


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FIGURE IV-1  
STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND GUIDEPOSTS  
( For the Analysis of the U. S. )



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FIGURE IV 1

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### STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS FOR THE USSR RECOVERY




FIGURE IV-2

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PART II

UNITED STATES

A. NATIONAL ECONOMIC GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND GUIDEPOSTS

1. (U) Goals. Two recognizably different goals guide the effort in the recovery period.

a. Survival Support. The first priority goal is to sustain the sufficiency of the economy for the maintenance of national survival. As part of this, the first priority survival support goal for the economy in the recovery period is to maintain an adequate operating capacity and managerial control of production and distribution activities. These must be maintained at a level sufficient to sustain national survival primarily out of current production. The intent here is to insure that this support can be continued indefinitely.

b. Recovery. Once survival support is assured, the effort of the economy would be directed to the attainment of recovery. Thus, the recovery goal for the economy would be to increase the operating capacity and managerial control of its production and distribution activities to the extent required to support all major national expenditure categories at per capita levels comparable to those in the preattack national posture.

2. (U) Objectives. In order to sustain the goal of national survival support and to achieve the national recovery goal, certain related direct and derived economic objectives must be attained in priority order. (The direct objectives call for activities resulting, themselves, in some desired state of affairs--hence, direct. The derived objectives call for activities which result in an improved capability to support the pursuit of one or another of the direct objectives.

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1. (U) <u>Interindustry Model of the Economic Structure</u>	<u>12</u>
a. <u>Basic Input-Output (I-O) Table</u> . The principal	<u>13</u>
characterization of the operating economy in the recovery	<u>14</u>
period is in terms of the interindustry relationships among	<u>15</u>
the sectors into which the economy is divided. The 86 sector	<u>16</u>
input-output tables of the 1958 US economy,* with modification,	<u>17</u>
are used. Dollar amounts in the analysis of the US recovery	<u>18</u>
are in all cases 1958 constant dollars, unless specifically	<u>19</u>
noted otherwise. This applicability of I-O analyses for the	<u>20</u>
postulated economy is discussed on page 75 of this volume.	<u>21</u>
The selection of this OBE table, and the stability of input-	<u>22</u>
output relationships are discussed in Volume V.	<u>23</u>
b. <u>I-O Table Modifications</u> . Fundamental changes in the	<u>24</u>
handling of imports and of Research and Development are	<u>25</u>
made. Also two aggregations, affecting five of the 86	<u>26</u>
sectors in the basic table, are adopted to avoid artificial	<u>27</u>

\*Office of Business Economics (OBE), Department of Commerce in  
the September 1963 issue of the Survey of Current Business.

Thus, the immediate derived objective is to relate to some  
ultimate direct objective.) Just as the two national economic  
goals operate in priority sequence, so the national economic  
objectives associated with them must be attained in the  
following priority.

a. Civil Survival Support. This direct objective is to  
maintain a standard of living sufficient to preserve the  
health of the population and the vigor of those who produce.

b. Military Survival Support. This direct objective  
is to maintain and support the military forces at least at  
the level required to preserve the national independence and  
territorial integrity of the United States.

c. Capability to Support Survival and Recovery. This  
derived objective comes in two parts.

(1) Survival Support Capability. Maintain and, as  
necessary, augment the capacity of the US economy to  
insure the continued capability to achieve the foregoing  
survival support objectives.

(2) Recovery Support Capability. Maintain and, as  
necessary, augment the capacity of the US economy to  
support attainment of the following military and civil  
recovery objectives.

d. Military Recovery. This direct objective is to restore  
the military strength of the United States.

e. Civil Recovery. This direct objective is to restore  
the capacity for providing the preattack standard of living  
in the United States.






bottleneck indications. Their adoption results in the  
reduction of the sector total from 86 to 83. The details  
of these changes and aggregations are found in Volume V.

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2. ~~(S)~~ Sector Capacity

a. Concept of Capacity





PART III

1

USSR

2

A. ~~(S)~~ NATIONAL ECONOMIC GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

3

To provide guideposts for determining the recovery of the Soviet economy after the Scenario A nuclear exchange, the following goals and objectives are established:

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1. (U) Reconstitute a viable economy and make particular allowances for those activities which facilitate stabilization.

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2. (U) Provide an adequate, although austere, standard of living and, where essential requirements do not conflict, increase the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) on a per capita basis to the preattack levels.

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3. (U) Reestablish to preattack levels all public consumption expenditures, including essential national, republic, regional, and local government services.

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4. (U) Support the surviving military forces.

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5. (U) Rebuild military forces and combat stocks to preattack levels.

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6. (U) Expand industrial capacity to meet the demands implied by the goals listed above.

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B. ~~(S)~~ FORMULATION OF DEMANDS FOR FINAL PRODUCTS

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PART I. INTRODUCTION	<u>4</u>
(U) As in Volume III, the purpose of an Appendix on Scenario B	<u>5</u>
is to compare the impact of the Scenario B-attack with that	<u>6</u>
of the Scenario A. Also as in Volume III the comparison is	<u>7</u>
made only where the results materially differ. For both	<u>8</u>
countries, Appendix B of Volume III showed major differences	<u>9</u>
in the population and certain key manufacturing sectors.	<u>10</u>
These differences have a bearing on the possible rate of	<u>11</u>
recovery. Therefore it becomes the purpose of this Appendix	<u>12</u>
to compare the prognosis of recovery under Scenario B with	<u>13</u>
that found plausible for Scenario A. An explicit comparison	<u>14</u>
would require the construction of a fully tested Scenario B	<u>15</u>
recovery production plan. However, an adequate approximation	<u>16</u>
of the comparison is obtained from the results of substituting	<u>17</u>
Scenario B attack residuals for those of Scenario A in the	<u>18</u>
execution of the first two years of the final Scenario A plan.	<u>19</u>
This procedure shows the deficits which would have to be	<u>20</u>
overcome or accommodated in the formulation of a satisfactory	<u>21</u>
Scenario B plan. Estimates are made from these deficiencies	<u>22</u>
of the added time that would be required for such plans.	<u>23</u>

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