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NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT

911/357 (4 MAY 1975)

4-19 MAY 1975

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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#62



MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: NEMVAC Survey Report (U)

(U) The attached NEMVAC Survey Report is submitted as directed in your memorandum, CM-378-75, 2 May 1975, subject as above.

(Original Signed)
JOHN R. D. CLELAND, JR.
Major General, USA
Vice Director
Operations Directorate, J-3

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GLOSSARY

Abbreviations which are used throughout this report are listed and explained below.

<u>ABBREVIATION</u>	<u>LONG TITLE</u>	
ABCCC	Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center	
ABF	Attack(s) by Fire	
ACFT	Aircraft	
AM	Amplitude Modulation	
AMEMB	American Embassy	
AMC	Airborne Mission Command (in ABCCC)	1
ARCT	Air Refueling Control Time	1
ARF	Amphibious Ready Group	1
ARR	Airborne Radio Relay	1
ARRG	Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group	1
ARRS	Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron	1
ARRW	Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing	1
ATC	Air Traffic Control	1
AVCAL	Aviation Consolidated Allowance List	1
CAS	Close Air Support	1
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit	2
CDMRVN	Chief, Diplomatic Mission, Republic of Vietnam	2
CHFLTCOORDGP	Chief, Fleet Coordination Group at NKP	2
COMDR	Commander	2
CP	Command Post	2
CTF	Commander, Task Force	2
CTG	Commander, Task Group	2
DAO	Defense Attache Office	2
DATT	Defense Attache	2
DIRLAUTH	Direct Liaison Authorized	2
DRSTO	Defense Resources Support and Termination	3
E&E	Emergency and Evacuation (Plan)	3
ECM	Electronic Counter Measure	3
FAC	Forward Air Controller	3
FM	Frequency Modulation	3

ABBREVIATION

LONG TITLE

FOL	Forward operating Location
FLT	Fleet
FPJMT	Four Power Joint Military Team
GSF	Ground Security Force
GSFC	Ground Security Force Commander
Helo	Helicopter
HF	High Frequency
H-Hour	Time the order of execution is given
L-Hour	Time the first flight of evacuation aircraft arrive at the LZ's. (Option IV)
LPH	Amphibious Assault Ship (Landing Platform, Helicopter)
LZ	Landing Zone (evacuation site)
MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAU	Marine Amphibious Unit
MODLOC	Modification of Location
MSC	Military Sealift Command
NAVAIR	Naval Air
NEMVAC	Non-combatant Emergency and Evacuation
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operational Plan in complete format
POC	Point of Contact
PRF	Pulse Repetition Frequency
RCA	Riot Control Agent
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RRA	Radio Relay Aircraft
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SAR	Search and Rescue

ABBREVIATIONLONG TITLE

SARC	Search and Rescue Coordinator
SARCO	Search and Rescue Control Officer
SEA	Southeast Asia
SITREP	Situation Report
SOW	Special Operations Wing
SUPIRS	Supplemental Photo Interpretation Reports
SVN	South Vietnam
TACAIR	Tactical Air Forces
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TSN	Tan Son Nhut Airport
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
USACSG	US Army Command Support Group (Hawaii)
USARPAC	US Army Forces, Pacific
USSAG	United States Support Activities Group
VHF	Very High Frequency

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Survey. The NEMVAC Lessons Learned Survey was directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the task of validating important lessons learned from the recent emergency evacuation of South Vietnam. The specific purpose of the evaluation was to insure the best possible readiness of US Forces to conduct NEMVAC operations under all conditions worldwide, should circumstances again require such operations. The survey was conducted 4-19 May 1975, with visits to the headquarters and agencies of CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CG FMFPAC, COMSEVENTHFLT, 13AF, COMUSSAG/7AF, CTF 76 and CTG 79.1, and included interviews with the former DATT Saigon, and CTF 77. In addition to the collection of record data and the reconstruction of the operation with various staff principals, candid and detailed discussions with the force commanders themselves provided a comprehensive review and assessment of the evacuation operation.

2. The Special Nature of NEMVAC Operations.

a. NEMVAC operations differ from normal military operations in several critical respects. The very essence of NEMVAC operations is acknowledgement that internal security and/or USG political relations with a particular country have deteriorated to the point where an emergency evacuation is required. All other means will have been exhausted before such an acknowledgement is made, and the decision to order NEMVAC might be delayed until the last possible moment. Command and control at the evacuation site will be difficult, since direction may not pass from the Ambassador/Chief of Mission to the Military Commander at the time of execution. Prior coordination and site survey will probably have been restricted, because in-country presence of military personnel

[REDACTED]

prior to the evacuation would be seen as tacit admission of
probable policy failure. The NEMVAC Commander must be pre-
pared to deal with the situation as it actually exists at
the time evacuation is ordered. The evacuation sites and
the timing of the operation will be determined, not so much
by the plan, but by the existing local situation. The NEMVAC
Commander's ability to influence the local situation will be
minimal. The rules of engagement will probably be such that
the NEMVAC Commander must be prepared to defend the evacua-
tion from hostile forces--perhaps including previously
"friendly" forces who have turned hostile once evacuation
commences--without having the authority to preempt hostile
actions by preventive military measures. Overlaying all of
this is the fact that NEMVAC operations are politically
sensitive and thus will almost certainly be monitored--
and perhaps controlled--from the highest levels.

b. The evacuation of the RVN on 29-30 April 1975 highlighted
many of these critical areas. The decision to order the
evacuation--a decision that seemed obvious when considering
only the deteriorating military situation--was delayed until
the last possible moment so that all political initiatives
could be attempted. The initial decision had been made to
evacuate the DAO by fixed-wing aircraft. This fixed-wing
evacuation was determined to be impossible when hostile
artillery and rocket fire closed the air base at Tan Son Nhut.
The decision to evacuate the entire US presence by helicopter
under Option IV, Operation FREQUENT WIND, was not made until
late morning, 290251Z April 1975 (1051 Saigon time). At that
time, the Embassy was operating in a condition White (normal
day-to-day) alert posture. In view of the fact that the
timing of the order to execute NEMVAC was delayed, the capa-
bility for rapid response to such an order was imperative.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NEMVAC forces had been prepositioned for some time in anticipation of this order. However, an initial delay in helicopter movement was occasioned by the rapid shift from Option II (fixed-wing) to Option IV (helicopter). Once the evacuation began, it became necessary to modify the plan. Whereas the plan called for the DAO to be the primary evacuation site, the deteriorating local situation required that the Embassy also become a major site. The evacuation of the DAO proceeded smoothly under the NEMVAC Commander. The unplanned and unexpected situation at the Embassy, however, caused some confusion, and command was never clearly passed from the Embassy staff to the NEMVAC Commander. This resulted in differing reports on numbers of evacuees, a general misunderstanding of the actual situation at the Embassy, and it complicated helicopter control.

3. [REDACTED] Operational Summary.

a. Mission Accomplishment. The military forces assigned to conduct the FREQUENT WIND Option IV NEMVAC operation successfully accomplished the mission of evacuating US citizens and designated aliens from the Saigon area on 29-30 April 1975. This was achieved through the execution of a well conceived plan under rapidly changing circumstances and a hostile environment. A significant aspect of FREQUENT WIND was the extensive night helicopter operations conducted. Total casualties were relatively light: 2 USMC Embassy Security Guards killed in an attack by fire prior to execution, and 2 USMC CH-46 SAR helo aircrew presumed dead following a crash at sea. Equipment losses consisted of one USN A-7 aircraft, one USMC CH-46 and one USMC AH-1J, all lost at sea.

b. Summary of Operations. During the early morning hours of 29 April 1975, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attacks-by-fire on the Tan Son Nhut airport, Saigon, and the USDAO compound, adjacent thereto, ultimately contributed to the cessation of fixed-wing aircraft NEMVAC operations from the Saigon area. As a consequence, at 290250Z April 1975, JCS directed the execution of FREQUENT WIND Option IV, helicopter evacuation of US personnel and designated aliens in the Saigon area.

(1) Formal execution of FREQUENT WIND Option IV, helicopter and air support operations, began at 290251Z and extended through completion at 300054Z April 1975. The Saigon evacuation began with the helicopter insertion at the USDAO compound of 880 Task Group 79.1 (USMC) Ground Security Forces (GSF) from Task Force 76 ships, commencing at 290706Z April 1975. At 290712Z, the lift of evacuees began using the same helos employed for GSF insertion. During the remainder of the operational period evacuees were helicopter lifted from the USDAO compound and the US Embassy Saigon to Task Force 76 ships located in holding areas approximately 17 nautical miles south of Vung Tau, Vietnam. The following is a resume of specific evacuation operations conducted:

(a) Total evacuation helicopter sorties

1. From USDAO compound	122
2. From US Embassy Saigon	72

(b) Total passengers lifted	8,795	1
<u>1.</u> From USDAO compound	6,416	2
<u>a.</u> US citizens	395	3
<u>b.</u> Foreign nationals	5,205	4
<u>c.</u> GSF (incl 66 in-place at execute)	816	5
<u>2.</u> From US Embassy Saigon	2,379	6
<u>a.</u> US citizens	978	7
<u>b.</u> Foreign nationals	1,228	8
<u>c.</u> GSF (incl 43 in-place at execute)	173	9
(2) The evacuation of 7,806 US citizens and foreign		10
nationals from the USDAO compound and US Embassy Saigon		11
by USMC/USAF helicopters was supported by a major air		12
effort by the USAF/USN forces involved. This effort		13
consisted of the following sorties: 444 USMC/USAF heli-		14
copter support; 204 TACAIR support; 24 AH-1J (COBRA)		15
combat escort; 8 AC-130 SPECTRE gunship; 5 EC-130 (ABCCC);		16
44 KC-135 tanker; and 2 HC-130 (KING) SAR support.		17
4. <u>FREQUENT WIND Planning.</u> Military planning for the evac-		18
uation of the Republic of Vietnam commenced approximately		19
1 year prior to actual FREQUENT WIND operations. Final,		20
detailed planning was conducted during the period 7-20 April		21
1975. This compression during the final planning period was		22
caused by the rapid deterioration of the military situation		23
and planning was complicated by the uncertainty concerning		24
the exact parameters of the projected evacuation. COMUSSAG/		25
7AF, COMSEVENTHFLT and subordinate commanders developed or		26
revised plans as necessary to support the evacuation of		27
1,500, 3,000, 6,000, and 200,000. These plans addressed vari-		28
ous options for evacuation by fixed-wing aircraft, sealift,		29
helicopter or combinations thereof. Basic military plans devel-		30
oped earlier under the series for Vietnam, plus the		31
extensive coordination between USDAO Saigon, COMUSSAG/7AF,		32

[REDACTED]

COMSEVENTHFLT, and subordinate commanders facilitated the rapid planning effort required during the final days before the execution of FREQUENT WIND, Option IV. Despite changing last minute requirements and a lack of information concerning finite numbers of evacuees, the military planning effort for the evacuation of Saigon, including the coordination attendant thereto, was professional and complete.

5. [REDACTED] Command and Control and Communications.

a. JCS charged CINCPAC with assisting the Department of State in the protection and evacuation of US noncombatants and designated aliens located within the PACOM area. CINCPAC, in turn, designated COMUSSAG/7AF as the subordinate command and coordinating authority responsible for military NEMVAC activities and the conduct of those operations in RVN. CINCPACAF forces committed to FREQUENT WIND were placed OPCON to COMUSSAG/7AF, other commands were placed in a supporting role (e.g., CINCPACFLT and CINCSAC). In accordance with established procedures supporting forces remained under CINCPACFLT and CINCSAC operational control during the operation with the exception of the TG 79.1 Ground Security Force which was under the operational control of COMUSSAG/7AF while over or on Vietnamese territory ("feet dry"). The supported commander, COMUSSAG/7AF, was charged with assisting the Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, RVN (CDMRVN). However, CDMRVN's control authority did not extend to military forces supporting or conducting evacuation operations under Option IV. COMUSSAG/7AF acted in coordination with and under the policies established by CDMRVN, when time and communications permitted as required by COMUSSAG/7AF OPLAN

[REDACTED]

(1) The command relationships outlined were adequate to the task at hand and permitted the operation to be brought to a successful conclusion.

(2) The major on-scene tactical commanders (COMUSSAG/7AF, COMSEVENTHFLT, CTF 76, CTG 79.1) each stated a preference to the survey for assigning operational control of all participating forces to a single commander.

(3) The establishment of a secure voice conference net with NMCC, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COMUSSAG/7AF and USDAO Saigon as subscribers facilitated the direct, real time communications between the senior commands.

This net became a command and control and reporting net prior to the execution of FREQUENT WIND, Option IV. The manner in which this net was employed required that all subscribers be prepared to discuss detailed features of the plan.

b. Communications. Communications plans were executed as written. Although some net outages occurred, such problems did not significantly affect the operation because of the multiple communications means planned and provided. Tactical commanders' evaluations were that in general communications did not hamper tactical command and control or execution.

6. Force Composition, Readiness and Timing. The forces committed to FREQUENT WIND included the bulk of the US SEVENTH FLEET and 7AF, with substantial support from 13AF, the Strategic Air Command, Military Airlift Command and Military Sealift Command. All support roles were fulfilled throughout the evacuation operations. Continuous TACAIR coverage was provided, alternating 2-hour blocks on station between assets from two USAF Tactical Fighter Wings in Thailand and two CVAs on station off the coast of South Vietnam. The availability of the

carrier ENTERPRISE as the second CVA configured for TACAIR was the result of her having been delayed from a scheduled outchop from WESTPAC in anticipation of the evacuation of Vietnam. The GSF afloat consisted of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) with a Regimental Landing Team (RLT) consisting of three Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) one of which was helo assault-landed for the evacuation option selected. The inventory of evacuation vehicles was adequate, including large capacity MSC ships used to transport evacuees to intermediate processing sites. There were two unique aspects to the composition of the FREQUENT WIND task force. The first of these was the availability of additional amphibious shipping in WESTPAC with which to form a third Amphibious Ready Group (ARG CHARLIE). These units were new arrivals from CONUS as scheduled relief ships for elements of ARGs ALFA and BRAVO with a programmed overlap to permit participation of a large scale amphibious force in a combined exercise in the Philippines. The fact that these additional ships did not include a major helicopter platform led to the second unusual aspect of the force. Drawing from the experience gained in EAGLE PULL wherein the attack carrier HANCOCK was reconfigured as a helicopter carrier for USMC helos (and retained for FREQUENT WIND), USS MIDWAY (CVA-41) was reconfigured to accommodate ten USAF CH/HH-53s.

a. Readiness. Forces were initially placed on a 24-hour alert response status on 18 April 1975 and gradually brought to a 1-hour alert by first light 28 April. In reporting attainment of the 1-hour alert posture, CTF 76 included the caveat that redistribution of the GSF (by cross-decking helicopters) required a 2-hour notification prior to L-hour, as described in his supporting plan. In response to the CTF 76 message, COMUSSAG/7AF clarified the issue by stating that the 1-hour alert did not constitute L minus 1 hour, but was keyed to the launch of the first support aircraft. Since

[REDACTED]

this occurred at L minus 3 hours, COMUSSAG/7AF defined the 1-hour alert status as L minus 4 hours and holding, and advised that the posturing of personnel and equipment should be adjusted accordingly. This clarification was not provided to Washington agencies. USSAG subsequently queried the CINCPAC staff verbally as to the status of cross-decking of CTF 76 helicopters for Option IV and was advised that it was believed that this had already been done.

b. (S) Timing. As the situation around Saigon became critical on 28 April, the decision was made to attempt a maximum effort C-130 evacuation lift beginning as soon as possible upon receipt of the CINCPAC execute order. USSAG/7AF provided a reference time of 282215Z on which to base launch requirements, CINCPAC gave the C-130 execute order at 281809Z and USSAG/7AF followed this with an order to launch all USAF support aircraft, less TACAIR, for an L-hour of 290300Z. About the time ABCCC arrived on station, Tan Son Nhut was declared unsafe for fixed-wing operations and the decision was made at 290250Z to switch to Option IV. Upon receipt of the Option IV execute order over the secure voice net, COMUSSAG/7AF dispatched an execute message to all concerned which established L-hour as 290300Z for TACAIR reference timing purposes and stated that USSAG/7AF would direct insertion time for GSF to coincide with TACAIR. In addition, COMUSSAG began trying to determine the earliest L-hour that the fleet could make, in view of the fact that the support aircraft less TACAIR, were already on station, and his concern over the progress of the fleet cross-decking operation. CHFLTCOORDGRP NKP, responding to COMUSSAG's request to determine if the fleet could meet a 0430Z L-hour called CINCPACFLT on a secure voice telephone, the results of which

[REDACTED]

were interpreted by CINCPACFLT to be that an L-hour of 1
290430Z was desired by COMUSSAG/7AF. While COMUSSAG/7AF 2
awaited what he believed to be the CINCPACFLT negotiation 3
of an L-hour, CINCPAC directed, in a series of conversations 4
on the secure voice net between 0318Z and 0328Z, that the 5
helicopters get started into Saigon. COMUSSAG/7AF, therefore, 6
issued a directive to launch Navy TACAIR ASAP with a helo 7
LZ time to be set 15 minutes after the TACAIR arrival on 8
station. COMUSSAG believed that this in effect set the LZ 9
arrival time and fulfilled USSAG's responsibilities for 10
establishing L-hour. CINCPACFLT, in the meantime, dispatched 11
a message in response to CHFLTCOORDGRP's telephone call 12
establishing 290430Z as L-hour for GSF insertion. CTF 76, 13
while not privy to all of the secure voice communications, 14
had received the various iterations of L-hour, none of which 15
were interpreted to require GSF redistribution since they did 16
not establish an L-hour, per se, for helicopter operations. 17
Having clearly established L-hour as the time of arrival at the 18
helicopter LZs in the plan and in pre-execute dialogue between 19
the fleet and USSAG/7AF, both CTF 76 and CTG 79.1 considered the 20
subordination of the helicopter L-hour to that for TACAIR to be, 21
in effect, a redefinition of the term. CTF 76 had, however, upon 22

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receipt of the Option IV execute order, begun preparatory
actions short of helicopter transfers. At 0350Z when
CTF 76 received the CINCPACFLT 0430Z L-hour message, he
directed immediate initiation of GSF redistribution, but
recognized that 0430Z at the LZs could not be met. Accord-
ingly, he advised COMUSSAG/7AF by message that 0600Z was
the earliest LZ time possible and that, unless directed other-
wise, he would so execute. CTF 76 subsequently determined he
could not meet 0600Z and changed L-hour to 0700Z, with the first
GSF being inserted at 0706Z.

c. [REDACTED] Summary. Uncertainty over the GSF helicopter cross-
decking status on the part of COMUSSAG/7AF and the use of
L-hour references for activity other than GSF arrival
time at the LZs resulted in delays and confusion in the
establishment of L-hour for helicopter operations. In
addition to these difficulties, lack of knowledge of the
cross-decking requirement at the higher levels, and the
lack of current status information in the Hawaii command
centers, precipitated a series of questions over the command
conference net concerning the whereabouts of the helicopters
before their departure for the LZs was possible. Since JCS
and other headquarters were not addressees on the messages
and/or plans defining the 1-hour alert and explaining the
GSF cross-decking requirement, it was expected that heli-
copters would arrive at the LZs within one and one-half
hours after the execute order. An explanation of the
built-in delays was not provided by any agency on the
secure conference net.

7. Military/Embassy Relationships.

a. Prior to Execution of NEMVAC Operations. Prior to execution of NEMVAC operations there were only two military units in RVN. The principal unit was the Defense Attache Office (DAO) commanded by the Defense Attache (DATT), MG Homer Smith. The DATT, as a member of the US Mission to RVN, was under the direction of the US Ambassador. Through military channels he reported to COMUSSAG, thence to CINCPAC and JCS. The other military unit was the US Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team (USDEL FPJMT) commanded by Colonel John H. Madison, Jr., which was under the operational control of the Political/Military Unit, AMEMB, but attached to DAO for support. Some time prior to the execution of Option IV, Operation FREQUENT WIND, the DATT had been appointed as the US Mission Coordinator for Emergency Evacuation, and had organized an Emergency Evacuation Center (EEC) in the DAO compound drawing on the resources of both the DAO and the USDEL FPJMT. The EEC was the focal point for evacuation for the entire US Mission and processed thousands of personnel for evacuation by fixed-wing aircraft. The EEC was augmented by air movement specialists and representatives from the USMC GSF. Immediately prior to the execution of NEMVAC operations, the USDEL FPJMT had been detached from the DAO and ordered to report to the Political/Military Unit at the AMEMB compound.

b. Execution of NEMVAC Operations.

(1) DAO Compound. The transition from fixed-wing evacuation to helicopter evacuation was accomplished with minimum adjustment. The existing EEC and the airlift processing centers assisted in organizing and marshaling the evacuees under the command of the GSF Commander,

CTG 79.1. The transfer of command and responsibility from the DATT to CTG 79.1 was in accordance with the plan. Prior reconnaissance and liaison by members of CTG 79.1 facilitated this transfer of responsibility and resulted in an efficient operation.

(2) Embassy Compound. It was envisioned that the Ambassador and his staff would be evacuated through the DAO Evacuation Site, therefore no plans were made by the GSF to take charge of the Embassy evacuation. The initial evacuation of the Embassy (primarily Embassy staff members) was by Air America helicopters to the DAO Evacuation Site. When it was ascertained that the over 2,000 people crowded into the Embassy compound could not be moved to the DAO Evacuation Site as planned, alternative arrangements were made. Major Kean, USMC Embassy Security Guard began to organize an LZ in the Embassy Parking Lot. Colonel Madison volunteered the services of the USDEL FPJMT (3 officers, 3 NCOs) to assist in marshaling evacuees. Both Colonel Madison and Major Kean were still part of the AMEMB staff and the Embassy evacuation remained under the control of the Embassy (primarily the Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Wolfgang Lehman), and was not passed to CTG 79.1. No senior member of the GSF was sent to assume control of the Embassy for CTG 79.1. Command and control and communications remained ambiguous. Reporting on the situation at the Embassy to the EEC at the DAO was made by various individuals within the Embassy. This lack of clear-cut command and control arrangements caused misunderstandings and confusion regarding the evacuation of the Embassy.

8.  Tactical Control and Monitoring. As has been discussed in preceding paragraphs, there were no significant problems encountered in the preparation and marshaling of forces in the operating area and the control and monitoring procedures attendant to these early phases are subsumed in that assessment. Similarly, all air support, including TACAIR, was flown generally as planned, requiring no procedural deviations in control or monitoring concepts prescribed in the plan. Once the L-hour issue for GSF insertion was resolved, control of the initial helicopter operations (specifically, the first three waves) functioned as planned accomplishing the extraction of 5,567 persons from the DAO compound with 96 helo sorties flown in 5 hours and 41 minutes. It was in the unplanned expanded operation out of the Embassy compound that a control problem developed. While preparations at the Embassy included modification of the parking lot to permit H-53 operations, the plan called for the evacuation of less than 100 people from the Embassy roof with Air America helos, or with CH-46s as a last resort. The ad hoc nature of this phase, combined with the lack of firm numbers of evacuees to be extracted from the Embassy, resulted in some H-53 helicopters being held on deck or in an airborne holding pattern at their parent ships when they could have been integrated into the daisy-chain pattern to the Embassy. This temporary breakdown in control was not only a function of faulty or uncertain evacuee information and unanticipated Embassy evacuation operations, but it was also influenced by concern for aircraft maintenance, crew rest (one pilot spent 22-1/2 hours at the controls), night and weather complications and the hostile environment. It is considered that these factors in aggregate distracted key individuals from the pressing requirement to immediately

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adjust helicopter control procedures so as to maximize the lift effort at the Embassy. This was critical since the helicopter forces were nearly three times greater than a force normally controlled by a single Helicopter Direction Center (HDC).

9. Reporting Procedures. The various FREQUENT WIND Option IV plans of COMUSSAG/7AF and supporting commanders contained provisions for detailed reporting to higher authority. These provisions included ample guidance on frequency and type of SITREPs, OPREPs, and the collection of reports from all involved units. Voice reports on the number of evacuees in each lifting helicopter were specifically required, as were spot reports identifying numbers and categories of evacuated personnel. Once execution was directed, the secure voice conference net tended to supplant the message reports specified. Consequently, several commands ceased transmission of such reports, although key SPOTREPs/SITREPs were retransmitted by subordinate commands to higher authority. CINCPAC filed a series of situation reports to the JCS which contained operational/evacuee information gleaned from all sources of information available.

10. Rules of Engagement and Operating Authorities. The ROE and operating authorities provided by higher headquarters and the USSAG/7AF OPLAN were considered by all participating units and organizations as adequate and thorough, and no significant problem areas or issues developed during the evacuation operation. Prior to execution, however, several issues were surfaced which required resolution. The issues concerned the use of Riot Control Agents (RCA),

and authorities against KOMAR vessels.

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Each of these issues was resolved satisfactorily prior to execution, either by the granting of additional authorities not previously granted, by the issuance of additional guidance, or by interpretation or amplification of existing ROE or authorities.

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ANNEX A TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS (U)

- REFERENCES:
- a. Compendium of FREQUENT WIND message traffic
 - b. USSAG/7AF 181230Z Apr 75, subject: USSAG/7AF OPLAN (U); Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation (NEMVAC) Plan for RVN (OPTION IV)
 - c. COMSEVENTHFLT 130456Z Apr 75, subject: OPLAN FREQUENT WIND (C)
 - d. CTF 76 100516Z Apr 75, subject: CTF 76 OPLAN)(FREQUENT WIND)
 - e. CTF 79 181500Z Apr 75, subject: LOI for Operation FREQUENT WIND (C)
 - f. CTG 79.1 191541Z Apr 75, subject: CTG 79.1 OPLAN 2-75 FREQUENT WIND (C)
 - g. CTF 77 181826Z Apr 75, subject: CTF 77 OPLAN (FREQUENT WIND) (C)
 - h. CTF 72 220637Z Apr 75, subject: CTF 72 OPLAN)(FREQUENT WIND) (C)

1. General Concept of NEMVAC Operations. The general plan for Vietnam NEMVAC operations envisioned an evacuation by commercial means (air, sea) when considered warranted by the Ambassador with possible augmented support by military lift. Then at such time as the situation precluded the use of commercial means of evacuation the Ambassador would request military evacuation. Military evacuation considered all means of lift; fixed wing aircraft, sea, and helicopter, with the use of military forces as required to protect, defend, and support the evacuees as well as evacuation forces. Normal progression expected would be from commercial to military fixed wing and

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sealift and finally helo lift, with use and introduction of ground security forces dependent on the political and/or tactical military situation.

d. Option IV. As requested by the Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, RVN, and directed by CINCPAC, COMUSSAG/7AF conducts helicopter airlift operations to evacuate US noncombatants and designated aliens from Saigon and vicinity under military direction.

2. [REDACTED] General. The overall responsibility for the protection and evacuation of US citizens and designated aliens located in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), including noncombatants sponsored by the Department of Defense, rested with the Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, RVN (CDMRVN). JCS directed CINCPAC to exercise

operational command over all military forces conducting evacuation operations in Vietnam (FREQUENT WIND). COMUSSAG/7AF was charged with assisting the CDMRVN in the fulfillment of evacuation responsibilities. The control authority of the CDMRVN did not extend to military forces supporting or conducting evacuation operations. COMUSSAG/7AF was designated by CINCPAC as the subordinate command and coordinating authority for CINCPAC responsible for military NEMVAC activities in RVN and for the conduct of military NEMVAC operations in RVN. FREQUENT WIND Option IV operations were planned for, and the operation conducted during the period 29-30 April 1975 under these command arrangements. PACAF forces committed to FREQUENT WIND were placed OPCON to COMUSSAG/7AF. Other Pacific Command forces as well as Strategic Air Command, Military Airlift Command and Military Sealift Command forces operated in support of COMUSSAG/7AF for the conduct of FREQUENT WIND Option IV operations (Ref b).

a. Basic Concept of Operations. For Option IV the basic concept of operations was set forth in reference b and supporting documents (references c through h). The threat of hostile actions or the cancellation of fixed wing aircraft operations at Tan Son Nhut airport would require a helicopter evacuation. Evacuation would be by helicopter airlift from LZ's in the vicinity of Saigon. Aircraft would be launched as required to evacuate all eligible personnel, recycling evacuation aircraft as necessary...Evacuees would be transported from the LZ's in the vicinity of Saigon to a staging area or direct to vessels at sea. Vung Tau, if secured, could be used as a staging area to aggregate evacuees in a safer, more secure environment prior to further movement to MSC shipping....Tasked Air Forces would conduct air defense and air cover operations over the objective area and the

ingress/egress routes as necessary to protect military aircraft participating in evacuation operations. Ground support force introduced into the LZ's under this plan would arrive with the first evacuation aircraft, secure the evacuation sites, and protect the lives of US noncombatants and designated aliens....NEMVAC operations would be conducted with helicopter assets launched from US Navy vessels off the coast of RVN.

b. During the early morning hours of 29 April 1975, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attacks-by-fire on the Tan Son Nhut airport, Saigon, and the USDAO compound, adjacent thereto, ultimately contributed to the cessation of fixed wing aircraft NEMVAC operations from the Saigon area. As a consequence, at 290250Z April 1975, JCS directed the execution of FREQUENT WIND Option IV, helicopter evacuation of US personnel and designated aliens in the Saigon area.

c. FREQUENT WIND helicopter and air support operations extended throughout the period 290251Z - 300054Z April 1975. The Saigon evacuation began with the helicopter insertion at the USDAO compound of 880 USMC personnel from TG 79.1, as a Ground Security Force (GSF) from Task Force 76 ships, commencing at 290706Z April 1975. The immediate extraction of evacuees was initiated at 290712Z April 1975, using the same helos employed to insert the GSF. During the remainder of the operational period evacuees were helicopter lifted from the USDAO compound and the US Embassy Saigon to Task Force 76 ships located in holding areas approximately 17 nautical miles south of Vung Tau, Vietnam. The following is a resume of specific evacuation operations conducted:

(1) Total evacuation helicopter sorties		<u>1</u>
(a) from USDAO compound	122	<u>2</u>
(b) from US Embassy Saigon	72	<u>3</u>
(2) Total passengers lifted	8795	<u>4</u>
(a) from USDAO compound	6416	<u>5</u>
<u>1</u> . US citizens	395	<u>6</u>
<u>2</u> . Foreign nationals	5205	<u>7</u>
<u>3</u> . GSF (incl 66 in-place at execute)	816	<u>8</u>
(b) from US Embassy Saigon	2379	<u>9</u>
<u>1</u> . US citizens	978	<u>10</u>
<u>2</u> . Foreign nationals	1228	<u>11</u>
<u>3</u> . GSF (incl 43 in-place at execute)	173	<u>12</u>
3. <u>Summary of the Operational Environment.</u> The execution		<u>13</u>
of Operation FREQUENT WIND began in the face of hostile enemy		<u>14</u>
action. Intelligence reports had indicated that NVA forces had		<u>15</u>
closed in on Tan Son Nhut Air Base and that the NVA had com-		<u>16</u>
menced their final operation to seize and secure the city of		<u>17</u>
Saigon. The NVA had attacked downtown Saigon with 122mm rockets		<u>18</u>
on 27 April, had bombed Tan Son Nhut Air Base with six captured		<u>19</u>
A-37 aircraft on 28 April, and had begun an artillery and		<u>20</u>
rocket attack on the air base and the DAO compound early on the		<u>21</u>
morning of 29 April. RVNAF aircraft had been shot down in the		<u>22</u>
vicinity of Tan Son Nhut with SA-7 missiles, and it was believed		<u>23</u>
that SAM-2 missiles could be in range. Two US Marines had been		<u>24</u>
killed by the rocket and artillery attack on the DAO compound		<u>25</u>
and one USAF C-130 aircraft had been destroyed. Added to these		<u>26</u>
real dangers were anticipated threats that had to be provided		<u>27</u>
for--the possibility of armed RVNAF opposition to US evacuation,		<u>28</u>
and the possibility of panic-stricken mobs preventing the landing		<u>29</u>
of helicopters. While these anticipated threats did not		<u>30</u>
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materialize to any significant degree, they could not be disregarded until the entire lift was safely completed. Although there were some 33 reported incidents against the aircraft involved in the evacuation (see Tab D to Appendix 3 to Annex D), it is significant to note that except for the C-130 destroyed before the evacuation began, no aircraft were lost to hostile fire. Except for the 2 US Marines who were killed in the initial rocket salvo at the DAO compound on the morning of 29 April, there were no casualties caused by enemy action. There were numerous reports of hostile small arms fire, but it must be considered more as harassing fire rather than deliberate attempts to halt evacuation.

4. Summary of the Pre H-Hour Operations and Actions.

Following completion of EAGLE PULL operations and the Seventh Fleet assistance in Vietnamese evacuation of civilians and military personnel from the coastal areas of military regions I and II, JCS authorized a 72 hour response posture to the Vung Tau area for Pacific Fleet units on 12 April 1975. The ground situation in the Republic of Vietnam soon dictated an improved FREQUENT WIND readiness posture, however, and therefore at 172323Z April 75, JCS directed the reconfiguration of one CVA with USAF H-53 helicopters and as soon as possible the bringing of amphibious ready groups with appropriate escorts to a 24 hour response position off Vung Tau. On 18 April (182145Z), CINCPAC directed all shore based FREQUENT WIND forces to assume a 6 hour alert status as soon as possible. Simultaneously, CINCPACFLT was directed to place all FREQUENT WIND forces on a 6 hour alert posture upon arrival in the vicinity of Vung Tau. On 200355Z April 75 six USAF CH-53 and four HH-53 helicopters recovered onboard USS MIDWAY, effecting the JCS directed reconfiguration of one additional CVA. Subsequently, the USS MIDWAY

[REDACTED]

USAF helo composition was changed to eight CH-53s and two HH-53s. 1
On 21 April 75, JCS directed the deployment of a Hawaii based 2
USMC BLT to Okinawa, Japan, by airlift. By 24 April, TF 76 3
amphibious forces, two supporting TF 77 attack carrier 4
striking groups and TF 73 service force ships and eight 5
USNS/MSC charter ships had joined the shore-based FREQUENT WIND 6
forces on 6 hour alert posture. (See Annex D, Appendix 2 for 7
Seventh Fleet/MSC Force disposition.) FREQUENT WIND forces 8
maintained this posture until first light 28 April when, in 9
accordance with CINCPAC direction, a one hour alert posture 10
was attained. CTF 76 reported attainment at 272130Z Apr 75 11
for TF 76 units and at 272030Z Apr 75 for TG 79.1. In this 12
message (CTF 76 272152Z Apr 75 - reference a) CTF 76 noted 13
that, "...GSF requires two hours notification prior to L-hour 14
to effect intership transfers by helo." COMUSSAG/7AF 15
280255Z Apr 75, in reporting attainment, defined the one hour 16
alert posture as follows, "1. (S) ...FYI this is not, repeat not, 17
L minus one hour. L-hour has not been set and no execute order 18
has been issued as of this time. 2. (S) One hour response time 19
is keyed to the first fragged aircraft takeoff time. This 20
occurs at L minus three hours. Affected forces, consider 21
present alert status as L minus four hours and holding. 22
Posturing of personnel and equipment should be adjusted 23
accordingly, as appropriate." CINCPAC (280310Z 24
Apr 75) later relaxed the one hour alert posture to 6 hours. 25
Then, as a result of the worsening situation in military region 26
III, CINCPAC (281412Z Apr 75) redirected attainment of a one 27
hour alert posture for all FREQUENT WIND forces (less the 28
Okinawa-based GSF) at first light 29 April. Simultaneously, 29
CINCPAC directed planning to execute maximum practicable C-130 30
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[REDACTED]

evacuation lift commencing as soon as feasible, using all available assets as required. Execution was to be on CINCPAC order. In response, COMUSSAG/7AF (281745Z Apr 75) directed all forces to assume one hour alert posture, and the posturing of forces to permit launch (if directed) within one hour of 282215Z Apr 75. At 281809Z Apr 75 CINCPAC executed the C-130 evacuation lift, planning an extraction rate of approximately 9,000 per day. Then, at 282116Z Apr 75 CINCPAC directed placement of all FREQUENT WIND forces on a one hour alert posture immediately. In response, COMUSSAG/7AF (282325Z Apr 75) directed the launch of all USAF support aircraft for an L-hour at 290300Z Apr 75. This message specifically directed the launch of KC-135 tankers, radio-relay aircraft, airborne rescue and the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (EC-130), but withheld the launch of USAF TACAIR. These support aircraft were on station about 290115Z Apr, in position to support C-130 evacuation operations from Tan Son Nhut airport. At 290210Z Apr 75, USSAG queried CINCPAC as to the status of helo cross-decking, recommending that if a helo option is being considered, such reconfiguring be accomplished. The CINCPAC response indicated that it was believed that they have that now. Subsequently, CINCPAC and CJCS in coordination with USDAO Saigon and the Ambassador, Saigon made the determination that Tan Son Nhut airport was unsuitable for fixed wing aircraft operations and authority was obtained to execute FREQUENT WIND Option IV. CJCS directed execution of Option IV, the helicopter evacuation of US citizens and designated aliens from the Saigon area, at 290250Z Apr 75 via the secure voice conference net.

5. [REDACTED] Pre L-Hour Helo Insertion Operations and Actions. Operations in preparation for helicopter insertion of the GSF into the established USDAO compound LZ were initiated by CINCPAC,

[REDACTED]

CINCPACFLT and COMUSSAG follow-on directives to the JCS execute order (see Appendix 1). The designation of L-Hour (defined as the landing of the first helicopters in the LZ's) is a matter of record contained in Appendix 4, Annex D. During the NEMVAC survey, COMUSSAG stated that he desired to determine whether CINCPACFLT could make an 0430Z L-Hour. Because of a temporary outage on the FFN (WEST) the fast, most direct TTY communications net between COMUSSAG/7AF and COMSEVENTHFLT/CTF 76, CHFLTCOORDGRP, at about 290315Z Apr 75 contacted CINCPACFLT via secure telephone stating that USSAG/7AF desired, if possible, to shoot for an 0430Z helicopter arrival time in the LZ's. CINCPACFLT interpreted this to mean USSAG/7AF wanted to set this time as L-Hour, and dispatched a message (290340Z Apr 75) designating L-Hour as 290430Z. CTF 76 subsequently revised L-Hour to 290600Z and finally to 290700Z in order to complete the USMC helicopter cross decking operations within TF 76 prior to departure for GSF insertions. In response to CINCPACFLT and USSAG directives, TF 77 combat and combat support aircraft launched at 290415Z for TACAIR support operations. TF 77 TACAIR reported on station at 290445Z. The first TG 79.1 (USMC) helicopters launched for cross decking operations at 290430Z. These operations required pre-planned intership sorties by the 24 TG 79.1 (USMC) CH-53 helicopters for GSF troop pickup, refueling and prepositioning for final departure from the TF 76 holding area to the USDAO compound. These operations allowed for the deployment of the GSF configured for maximum tactical advantage in a hostile environment in a minimum time. (See Annex D, Appendix 3, Tab G for the details of pre L-Hour cross decking operations.) At 290520Z the GSF Commander was "feet dry" in a UH-1E helo enroute to the USDAO compound. He arrived at the LZ at 290608Z, under

[REDACTED]

the impression that the L-Hour of 290600Z remained effective. During this inbound transit, however, CTF 76 had determined that the 290600Z L-Hour was unattainable because of continuing helo cross decking operations, and had delayed that L-Hour to 290700Z. The GSF Commander reported ground fire in the area of the USDAO compound at 290630Z as the first two flights (6 USMC helos) departed the TF 76 holding area enroute the Saigon area. At 290645Z USAF TACAIR arrived on station relieving TF 77 aircraft as planned. By 290657Z the entire first wave of 36 USMC/USAF helos was enroute to the USDAO compound for GSF insertion and evacuation lift. Concurrently, at about 290640Z the first report of the Can Tho evacuation by LCM-8 down the Bassac River was reported to CINCPAC. COMSEVENTHFLT subsequently dispatched USS BARBOUR COUNTY and SS PIONEER CONTENDER to the area to pick up the evacuees, including 22 Americans and the US Consul General, Can Tho, upon arrival in the open sea. At 290706Z the first flight of USMC CH-53 helos arrived at the USDAO compound, inserting the initial GSF troops.

6. [REDACTED] Post L-Hour Operations at USDAO Compound. The first three CH-53 helicopters which landed at USDAO compound at 290706Z and inserted 105 GSF troops departed the LZ at 290712Z with 149 evacuees. The decision to use the GSF insertion helos for immediate evacuation lift was made by the GSF Commander after his evaluation of the situation. Thus the helicopter evacuation of the Saigon area began. At about 290721Z the magnitude of the evacuation problem was first indicated when the USDAO Saigon reported via conference net about 2,000 US citizens and Vietnamese at the US Embassy for evacuation. This number was never planned for; therefore, the scope of the operation was expanded to begin simultaneously employing CH-46 helos for Embassy evacuation. Meanwhile the USDAO compound evacuation by helicopters continued. USAF TACAIR was on station, the area weather was

[REDACTED]

described as good and the first wave helicopter flow was well
established. The GSF Commander activated four landing areas
within the USDAO compound for GSF insertion and evacuee lift.
Although random fire was reported at the USDAO compound, the
smooth flow of evacuation continued from that area and by about
290825Z the last H-53 evacuation helo of the first wave had
departed the compound area. The first wave of 36 H-53
helicopters had inserted 880 GSF troops and had extracted 1,970
evacuees in about 90 minutes. Simultaneously (at 290825Z) the
second wave of 34 H-53 helicopters began cycling to the USDAO
compound to continue the evacuation lift. At about 290826Z
the first and only TACAIR ordnance expenditure occurred when
USAF aircraft defensively responded to enemy fire, successfully
attacking an AAA site approximately 10 miles northeast of
Saigon. At 290845Z TF 77 TACAIR relieved USAF aircraft on
station, continuing the air support as planned. The weather
overland began to deteriorate about this time, with a low cloud
deck reported moving up river to Nha Be. Scattered rainshowers
began moving to the center of Saigon. By 290930Z rainshowers
extended from Nha Be to Saigon, cloud coverage was from 6/8 to
7/8, and by 291030Z 5000' overcast conditions prevailed at Tan
Son Nhut, with a low thin deck beneath. Thus deteriorating
weather began to affect the operations before sunset (291106Z)
and continued to be poor for some time after darkness.
(7ACCS FREQUENT WIND Report.) At 290850Z the GSF Commander
reported 1,500 evacuees at both the USDAO compound and the US
Embassy--a total of 3,000 plus GSF remaining to be evacuated,
thus confirming the magnitude of the Embassy evacuation. The
GSF Commander also decided against the insertion of an addi-
tional two USMC companies of GSF at the Air America compound

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but subsequently deployed 130 GSF troops from the USDAO com-
pound to the US Embassy for added security. By 290900Z the
planned transfer of evacuees from USN to MSC shipping in the
holding area at sea commenced and was proceeding smoothly. At
290935Z the evacuation of the US Embassy was initiated with the
launch of four USMC CH-46 helos. The first helo in the flow
now programmed for the Embassy landed at 291000Z, commencing
that portion of the Saigon area evacuation. At 291000Z the
third wave of H-53 evacuation helos began cyclic operations
to the USDAO compound. At 291030Z the final lift off of the
second wave helos occurred. The second wave of 34 H-53 helos
extracted 2,057 evacuees in about 105 minutes. Meanwhile, the
uncertainty regarding the total number of evacuees remaining
at US Embassy continued. An Embassy official, in an inter-
view aboard USS BLUE RIDGE, indicated 100 US citizens and an
unspecified number of Vietnamese remained. At about the
same time (291050Z) USDATT Saigon reported on the secure
conference net that the Ambassador stated that 2,500
evacuees remained. At sunset (291106Z) the evacuation of both
the USDAO compound and the US Embassy continued, although
slowed somewhat by ensuing darkness and deteriorating weather.
USAF TACAIR departed, to be replaced by USAF AC-130 SPECTRE
gunships, F-4 WILD WEASEL support and from TF-77 EA-6A/B EW support
two A-7 TACAIR support and KA-6B tanker aircraft for the
remainder of the night. The first of three aircraft losses
occurred at 291109Z when the pilot of a TF 77 A-7E ejected 18
nautical miles from USS ENTERPRISE. An SH-3 SAR helo rescued
the pilot and returned him to ENTERPRISE at 291236Z. At 291236Z
the last H-53 helos lifted from the USDAO compound, completing
the evacuation of civilian personnel. In 31 sorties, the third

[REDACTED]

wave had lifted 1,540 passengers in 146 minutes. The CH-46
evacuation helo flow to and from the US Embassy continued.
2,000 people were reported remaining to be evacuated. At
291325Z a CH-46 SAR helo crashed proximate to the USS
HANCOCK. Two aircrew were recovered, but two others were
missing and ensuing SAR operations failed to recover them.
At 291336Z the H-53 lift of GSF at the USDAO compound began,
completing at 291612Z. This final evolution involved the
extraction of 816 GSF troops. The evacuation operation from
the USDAO compound consisted of 122 helicopter sorties, lift-
ing 6416 passengers consisting of 395 US citizens, 5205 foreign
nationals and 816 GSF. Concurrently, at the time of completion
of this lift operation, the last of three aircraft losses
occurred when an AH-1J COBRA helo ditched alongside the USS
KIRK. The two aircrew were recovered in good condition.

7. [REDACTED] Post L-Hour Operation, Final Embassy Evacuation. At
291635Z CTF 76 reported that 150 GSF, the Ambassador and 500
Vietnamese nationals remained at the US Embassy. At this time,
the DATT Saigon and the GSF Commander arrived aboard USS BLUE
RIDGE. To complete an ancillary operation to the main Saigon
area helicopter evacuation, the US Consul General, Can Tho,
and 22 US citizens in two LCM-8's arrived at the SS
PIONEER CONTENDER standing off the mouth of the Bassac River
about 291700Z. All personnel in the party were reported safely
evacuated. Following an interruption of helicopter evacuation
operations at the US Embassy, a flow pattern of one CH-46 and
one CH-53 was initiated about 291815Z. The first evacuees of
this period of evacuation operation were lifted from the Embassy
LZ's at 291854Z. At 291855Z, ABCCC relayed the following
message to the Ambassador: ". . . On the basis of the reported
total of 726 evacuees remaining . . . the President has authorized

[REDACTED]

19 helos and no more; last lift no later than 300345Z. You will
depart on last lift." The helicopter flow to the Embassy con-
tinued until 292058Z when the Ambassador was lifted from the
Embassy roof top on the 19th planned helo (761 personnel were
evacuated on the nineteen helos). There remained a reported 200
US personnel, including 170 GSF, to be evacuated. Ten additional
CH-46 helos continued evacuation from the Embassy from 292100Z
until 292346Z when the last GSF lifted off the roof top. During
this period, CTF 77 initiated, at about 292200Z, a surge in TACAIR
support over the night time sorties by launching 8 A-7 (CAS),
2 F-14 (MIGCAP) and supporting aircraft for daylight operations.
TF 77 provided this general support level until termination of
operations. The entire Embassy evacuation operation which com-
menced at 291000Z, consisted of 72 sorties, lifting a total of
2379 passengers, including 978 US citizens, 1228 foreign
nationals and 173 USMC personnel. The last element of the GSF
landed aboard TF 76 ships at 300025Z. JCS terminated all
FREQUENT WIND operations at 300054Z April 1975.

8. Mission Accomplishment. The military forces assigned to
conduct the FREQUENT WIND Option IV NEMVAC operations success-
fully accomplished the mission of evacuating US citizens and
designated aliens from the Saigon area on 29-30 April 1975.
This success was based on detailed planning and responsive
execution in reaction to changing circumstances and in a hostile
environment. Casualties were relatively few: 2 USMC Embassy
Security Guards killed by ABF prior to execution, and 2 USMC
CH-46 SAR helo aircrew presumed dead following a crash at sea.
Equipment losses consisted of one USN A-7 aircraft, one USMC
CH-46 and one USMC AH-1J, all lost at sea.

Appendices

- 1 - Chronology of Events
- 2 - Force Composition

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS (U)

1. Key events leading to FREQUENT WIND Option IV execution.

TIME	EVENT	
172323Z Apr 75	JCS directed reconfiguration of one CVA with USAF H-53 helicopters and as soon as possible bring ARGs with appropriate escorts to 24-hour response in position off Vung Tau.	1
180409Z Apr 75	CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF to take JCS 172323Z for action. For CINCPACFLT: Assume 24-hour response to Vung Tau ASAP for FREQUENT WIND forces (CINCPAC 180409Z Apr 75, REF A).	2
182145Z Apr 75	CINCPAC directed all shore based FREQUENT WIND forces to assume 6-hour alert status ASAP. For CINCPACFLT: All FREQUENT WIND forces assume 6-hour alert status upon arrival vicinity of Vung Tau. (CINCPAC 182145Z Apr 75, REF A)	3
200355Z Apr 75	6 USAF CH-53's and 4 HH-53 arrived aboard USS MIDWAY as directed by JCS, completing the helo reconfiguration of one additional CVA.	4
210118Z Apr 75	JCS directed deployment of Hawaii-based BLT to Okinawa by airlift (JCS 210118Z Apr 75, REF A).	5
210256Z Apr 75	CINCPAC executed JCS 210118Z Apr - movement of Hawaii-based USMC BLT to Okinawa. (CINCPAC 210256Z Apr 75, REF A).	6
24 Apr 75	TF 76/TG 79.1/TF 77 forces in place off Vung Tau in 6-hour alert posture.	7

240745Z Apr 75 COMUSSAG/7AF to COMSEVENTHFLT: Clarified L-Hour as arrival time of first helo's at the LZ. 1
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241804Z Apr 75 JCS authorized CINCPAC to execute FREQUENT WIND, when requested by US Ambassador, Saigon. (JCS 241804Z Apr 75, REF A). 4
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271455Z Apr 75 CINCPAC directed commands to bring all FREQUENT WIND forces (less Okinawa-based GSF) to one-hour alert posture first light 28 April 75. (CINCPAC 271455Z Apr 75, REF A). 8
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271650Z Apr 75 USSAG/7AF directed generation of forces to achieve an assumed L-Hour at 272230Z or as soon thereafter as possible. (USSAG/7AF 271650Z Apr 75, REF A). 12
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272152Z Apr 75 CTF 76 reported attainment of one hour alert posture for TF 76 units at 272130Z and for TG 79.1 (GSF) at 272030Z, noting that the GSF requires two hours notification prior to L-Hour to effect intership helo transfers. 16
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280255Z Apr 75 USSAG/7AF to AIG 8715: As of first light 28 April all FREQUENT WIND forces were placed on one-hour alert posture. FYI, this is not repeat not, L minus one hour. L-Hour has not been set and no execute order has been issued as of this time. One hour response requirement is keyed to the first fragged aircraft takeoff time. Affected forces, consider present alert status as L minus four and holding. Posturing of personnel and equipment should be adjusted accordingly, as appropriate. (USSAG/7AF 280255Z Apr 75, REF A). 21
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280310Z Apr 75	CINCPAC directed resumption of six-hour alert posture. (CINCPAC 280310Z Apr 75, REF A).	<u>1</u>
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281412Z Apr 75	CINCPAC redirected a one-hour alert posture for FREQUENT WIND forces (less Okinawa-based GSF) for first light 29 April 1975. Also directed was planning to execute maximum practicable C-130 evacuation lift commencing as soon as feasible using all available assets as required. Execution to be on CINCPAC order. (CINCPAC 281412Z Apr 75, REF A).	<u>3</u>
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281430Z Apr 75	USSAG directed all forces to assume one-hour alert posture. Posture forces to permit launch (if directed) within 1 hour of 282215Z Apr 75. Maintain one-hour to launch posture until relieved. (USSAG/7AF 281430Z Apr 75 corrected by USSAG/7AF 281745Z Apr 75, REF A).	<u>10</u>
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281809Z Apr 75	CINCPAC executed maximum practicable C-130 evacuation lift. Plan extracting approximately 9000 per day. (CINCPAC 281809Z Apr 75, REF A).	<u>17</u>
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282116Z Apr 75	CINCPAC directed placement of all FREQUENT WIND forces on one-hour alert posture immediately. (CINCPAC 282140Z Apr 75, REF A).	<u>20</u>
		<u>21</u>
		<u>22</u>
282140Z Apr 75	USSAG reported tasked forces attained one-hour alert posture. (USSAG/7AF 282140Z Apr 75, REF A).	<u>23</u>
		<u>24</u>
		<u>25</u>
		<u>26</u>
282325Z Apr 75	USSAG directed launch of all USAF support aircraft for an L-Hour at 290300Z Apr 75. Tankers/RRR/AR/ABCCC. Withhold TACAIR. (USSAG/7AF 282325Z Apr 75, REF A).	<u>27</u>
		<u>28</u>
		<u>29</u>
		<u>30</u>
		<u>31</u>

[REDACTED]

About 290115Z ABCCC and all support aircraft on station. 1

Thereafter, USAF support aircraft maintained 2

continuous on station posture. (Annex D, 3

Appendix 1). 4

290145Z Apr 75 CHFLTCOORDGRP NKP notified CTF 77.0 that C-130 5

airlift would commence again at 290220Z, and 6

that L-Hour of 290300Z was established to 7

position support aircraft and did not commit 8

TACAIR or helos. The message also indicated 9

that if helo evacuation (Option IV) was ordered, 10

Navy TACAIR might get the first two hours. 11

290204Z Apr 75 CJCS advised CINCPAC that if Tan Son Nhut is 12

unusable for fixed wing as a result of enemy fire 13

or becomes so during the day, you are to revert 14

immediately to helicopter evacuation of all repeat 15

all US citizens from both Embassy and DAO 16

Decision to go to helicopter lift rests with 17

Ambassador Martin. (CJCS 290204Z Apr 75, REF A). 18

290210Z Apr 75 J-3 USSAG on secure voice conference net to 19

J-3 CINCPAC recommended fleet redistribute 20

GSF if helo lift is planned. 21

290216Z Apr 75 CTF 77 reported that USS GRIDLEY (PIRAZ) reports 22

multiple C-130 aircraft orbiting "FEET WET" off 23

Vung Tau. Aircraft proceeding one at a time into 24

and out of Tan Son Nhut. (CTF 77 290216Z Apr 75, 25

REF A). 26

About 290220Z Tan Son Nhut airport is declared unsatisfactory 27

for fixed wing aircraft operations by General 28

Smith, USDAO Saigon. General Smith concurred 29

with CINCPAC recommendation to start Option IV 30

(conference net). 31

290250Z Apr 75 JCS directed execution of FREQUENT WIND
Option IV (secure voice conference net and
JCS 290336Z Apr 75, REF A).

290251Z Apr 75 CINCPAC directed execution of FREQUENT WIND
Option IV on conference net.

290252Z Apr 75 CINCPAC directed execution of FREQUENT WIND
Option IV. (CINCPAC 290252Z Apr 75, REF A).

290251Z Apr 75 USSAG/7AF executed FREQUENT WIND (Option IV).
L-Hour is 290300Z Apr 75 for TACAIR reference
purposes. USSAG/7AF will direct insertion time
for GSF to coincide with TACAIR. (USSAG/7AF
290251Z Apr 75, REF A).

290317Z Apr 75 USSAG executed FREQUENT WIND Option IV in
fragmentary order format. (USSAG/7AF 290317Z
Apr 75, REF A).

290318Z Apr 75 CINCPAC to CPF: Launch the helos now.
(Conference net).

290333Z Apr 75 CINCPACFLT executed FREQUENT WIND Option IV.
L-Hour will be designated by COMUSSAG/7AF.
(CINCPACFLT 290333Z Apr 75, REF A).

290336Z Apr 75 CJCS confirmed telecon of 290250Z executing
FREQUENT WIND Option IV. (JCS 290336Z Apr 75,
REF A).

2. Key Events After Execution.

290340Z Apr 75 CINCPACFLT message: L-Hour is set as 290430Z.
COMSEVENTHFLT take first two periods of TACAIR
support. (CINCPACFLT 290340Z Apr 75, REF A).

290350Z Apr 75 USSAG directed launch of Navy TACAIR for second
two-hour block as soon as possible. Also
directed launch of helicopters to arrive LZ
15 minutes after Navy TACAIR on station at Hope
(check point). (USSAG 290350Z Apr 75, REF A).

290400Z Apr 75 CTF 77 reported launching of USS CORAL SEA TACAIR. Actual launch time 290415Z ETA on station at 0445Z. Also reported using L-Hour of 290300Z for TACAIR timing purposes as directed by USSAG/7AF message 290251Z Apr 75. (CTF 77 290400Z Apr 75 and CTF 77 131250Z May 75, REF A).

290403Z Apr 75 US nationals at Can Tho evacuating by boat down Bassac River (conference net).

290408Z Apr 75 COMSEVENTHFLT executed FREQUENT WIND Option IV and reiterated CINCPACFLT's message setting L-Hour at 290430Z. (COMSEVENTHFLT 290408Z Apr 75, REF A).

290430Z Apr 75 First TF 79.1 helicopters airborne from USS HANCOCK for pre L-Hour troop pickup/cross decking within TF 76. (See Annex D, Appendix 3, for details of required two (2) hour pre L-Hour helicopter cross decking operations).

290432Z Apr 75 USSAG/7AF reported that initial penetration of Vietnam airspace by armed FREQUENT WIND forces occurred at 290432Z at position 10-24N/106-58E. (USSAG/7AF 290440Z Apr 75, REF A).

290436Z Apr 75 COMSEVENTHFLT authorized CTF 76 to adjust the CINCPACFLT announced L-Hour at 290430Z as necessary in view of 30 minute notice to position helicopters in the LZ's. (COMSEVENTHFLT 290436Z Apr 75, REF A).

290442Z Apr 75 CTF 76 reset L-Hour as 290600Z UNODIR USSAG/7AF. (CTF 76 290442Z Apr 75, REF A).

290444Z Apr 75 CTF 76 executed L-Hour of 290600Z. (CTF 76 290444Z Apr 75, REF A).

290445Z Apr 75 Navy TACAIR/MIG CAP/FORCE CAP/ AEW/EW Support aircraft on station. (See Annex D, Appendix 1. Also CTF 77 131250Z May 75, REF A).

290515Z Apr 75 USS ENTERPRISE launched TACAIR/MIG CAP/AEW/EW/ Tanker support aircraft for on station relief. (CTF 77 290550Z Apr 75, REF A).

290520Z Apr 75 GSF commander departed Task Force 76 area "FEET DRY" enroute DAO compound, Saigon. (See Annex D, Appendix 3).

290532Z Apr 75 CTF 76 changed L-Hour for helos on the ground, Saigon to 290700Z Apr 75. (CTF 76 290532Z Apr 75, REF A).

290541Z Apr 75 CINCPACFLT reported USS CORAL SEA TACAIR on station at 290445Z and first helo launch at 290445Z Apr 75. (CINCPACFLT 290541Z Apr 75, REF A).

290546Z Apr 75 CTF 76 special situation report changed L-Hour to 290700Z and reported GSF commander "FEET DRY" at 290520Z. (CTF 76 290546Z Apr 75, REF A).

290600Z Apr 75 GSF commander in air over Saigon LZ. (CTF 76 290622Z Apr 75, REF A).

290608Z Apr 75 GSF commander arrived DAO compound, Saigon. (See Annex D, Appendix 3).

290630Z Apr 75 First two flights of six USMC H-53 helos from USS OKINAWA with 210 GSF embarked departed TF 76 launch area enroute DAO compound LZ. ETA 290700Z. (CTF 76 290636Z Apr 75, REF A)

GSF commander reported ground fire in the area of the DAO compound. Also GSF commander estimated 2300 evacuees in area, including 300 Americans. (CTF 76 290630Z Apr 75, REF A).

290640Z Apr 75 Two LCMs with US evacuees from Can Tho 1
 290642Z Apr 75 Third flight of two USMC H-53 helos from 4
 USS OKINAWA with a total of 70 GSF embarked 5
 departed TF 76 launch area enroute Saigon. 6
 ETA DAO compound 290712Z. (CTF 76 290652Z 7
 Apr 75, REF A). 8
 About 290645Z USAF TACAIR on station and relieving TF 77 9
 TACAIR. (Annex D, Appendix 1). 10
 290657Z Apr 75 Entire first wave of 36 USMC/USAF H-53 helos 11
 had departed TF 76 launch area enroute Saigon. 12
 Helos report AAA fire over Saigon and Newport. 13
 (CTF 76 290728Z Apr 75, REF A). 14
 290700Z Apr 75 GSF commander reported small arms and AAA 15
 fire throughout Saigon. Weather in area good. 16
 (CTF 76 290700Z Apr 75, REF A). 17
 About 290700Z Four F-4 aircraft arrived on scene to provide 18
 support for the two LCMs on the Bassac River, 19
 previously reported under attack by VNAF heli- 20
 copters. No apparent problems. (USS BARBOUR 21
 COUNTY 290815Z Apr 75, REF A). 22
 290706Z Apr 75 First flight of USMC helos on deck at DAO 23
 compound LZs. (CTF 76 290722Z Apr 75, REF A). 24
 290712Z Apr 75 First flight of USMC helos departed DAO com- 25
 pound LZ with 149 evacuees. (CTF 76 290722Z 26
 Apr 75, REF A). 27
 290728Z Apr 75 First two flights (6 helos) outbound with 28
 total of 194 evacuees. GSF commander reported 29
 maximum passenger load on each helo is 65 with 30
 no baggage. (CTF 76 290742Z Apr 75, REF A 31
 and Annex D, Appendix 3). 32

290730Z Apr 75	Third flight (3 helos) departed USDAO LZ	<u>1</u>
	with about 148 evacuees. Random fire	<u>2</u>
	reported on LZ. Four landing areas (numbers	<u>3</u>
	36, 37, 38, 40) being used at USDAO compound	<u>4</u>
	LZ. (CTF 76 290746Z Apr 75 - REF A)	<u>5</u>
290805Z Apr 75	Approximately 1451 evacuees reported enroute	<u>6</u>
	or on board TF 76 shipping. VNAF helos	<u>7</u>
	continued to land aboard TF 76 ships.	<u>8</u>
	(CTF 76 290812Z Apr 75 - REF A)	<u>9</u>
290815Z Apr 75	USS CORAL SEA and USS ENTERPRISE launched TF 77	<u>10</u>
	TACAIR/MIG CAP and AEW/EW/Tanker support air-	<u>11</u>
	craft to relieve USAF TACAIR/MIG CAP on station	<u>12</u>
	at 290845Z. (Annex D, Appendix 1)	<u>13</u>
About		<u>14</u>
290825Z Apr 75	First wave of 36 helicopters completed	<u>15</u>
	evacuation sortie, extracting 1970 evacuees	<u>16</u>
	in about 90 minutes from the DAO compound	<u>17</u>
About		<u>18</u>
290825Z Apr 75	Second wave of 34 helicopters cycled to DAO	<u>19</u>
to	compound and returned to TF 76 ships extracting	<u>20</u>
291030Z Apr 75	2,057 evacuees in a period of 105 minutes.	<u>21</u>
290826Z Apr 75	Report of USAF F-4 WILD WEASEL expenditure	<u>22</u>
	against AAA site 10 miles northeast of Saigon	<u>23</u>
	on secure voice conference net.	<u>24</u>
290845Z Apr 75	TF 77 TACAIR relieved USAF TACAIR on station.	<u>25</u>
	(Annex D, Appendix 1)	<u>26</u>
		<u>27</u>
		<u>28</u>
		<u>29</u>
		<u>30</u>
		<u>31</u>

290850Z Apr 75 GSF commander reported 1500 evacuees at both 1
 USDAO and US Embassy. Total remaining to be 2
 evacuated 3000 plus GSF. Additional GSF 3
 insertion to USDAO compound was withheld at 4
 the request of the commander. (CTF 76 290859Z 5
 Apr 75, REF A). 6
 About 290855Z The first of three GSF platoons arrived at 7
 the Embassy from the USDAO compound to provide 8
 additional security. Subsequently, two platoons 9
 arrived at 291100Z and 291300Z for a total of 10
 130 personnel. (See Annex D, Appendix 3.) 11
 290900Z Apr 75 Transfer of evacuees from USN to MSC shipping 12
 commenced and proceeding smoothly. (CTF 76 13
 290912Z Apr 75, REF A). 14
 290920Z Apr 75 GSF commander reported light ground fire at 15
 DAO compound as second wave of helos continued 16
 extractions of evacuees. (CTF 76 290926Z 17
 Apr 75, REF A). 18
 290935Z Apr 75 Four CH-46 helos launched from USS HANCOCK to 19
 take evacuees from rooftop of Embassy Saigon. 20
 ETA Embassy 291010Z. Unconfirmed report indi- 21
 cated 2000 persons remain to be evacuated. 22
 (Annex D, Appendix 3 and CTF 76 291000Z Apr 75, 23
 REF A). 24
 290943Z Apr 75 Twenty-three Americans reported on boat coming 25
 down the Bassac River from Can Tho. (C7F 26
 290943Z Apr 75, REF A). 27
 290945Z Apr 75 TF 77 TACAIR/MIGCAP relieved on station. 28
 (Annex D, Appendix 1). 29
 291000Z Apr 75 Third wave of 31 H-53 helos conducted evac- 30
 uation sorties, extracting 1540 evacuees from 31
 the DAO compound in a period of 146 minutes. 32
 (Annex D, Appendix 3). 33



291000Z Apr 75	CH-46 helicopter evacuation from the US Embassy Saigon commenced. (Annex D, Appendix 3)	<u>1</u>
291050Z Apr 75	Debrief of US Embassy official on board BLUE RIDGE indicated 100 US and unspecified numbers of Vietnamese remain to be removed from Embassy. (CTF 76 291100Z Apr 75, REF A).	<u>2</u> <u>3</u> <u>4</u> <u>5</u> <u>6</u> <u>7</u> <u>8</u> <u>9</u>
291109Z Apr 75	Pilot of A-7E from VA 27, USS ENTERPRISE, ejected 18nm from the carrier. SAR helo has pilot in sight. (USS ENTERPRISE 291126Z Apr 75, REF A)	<u>10</u> <u>11</u> <u>12</u> <u>13</u>
291113Z Apr 75	Information received that 3 tugs with barges underway from Newport with 6000 evacuees aboard, including some Americans. (CPF 291113Z Apr 75, REF A)	<u>14</u> <u>15</u> <u>16</u> <u>17</u>
291126Z Apr 75	Pilot of A-7E picked up by SH-3 SAR helo and returned to USS ENTERPRISE. (USS ENTERPRISE 291222Z Apr 75, REF A)	<u>18</u> <u>19</u> <u>20</u> <u>21</u> <u>22</u> <u>23</u> <u>24</u> <u>25</u> <u>26</u> <u>27</u>
291236Z Apr 75	Last CH-53 lift of evacuees from USDAO Compound departed. (Annex D, Appendix 3)	<u>28</u> <u>29</u> <u>30</u> <u>31</u>



291315Z Apr 75 CTF 76 reported helicopters flowing smoothly 1
 in and out of Embassy, Saigon. 2000 remain to 2
 be evacuated. One CH-53 hit by AAA fire with 3
 minimum damage. Proceeding under own power. 4
 Also reported were multiple ABFs on TSN Airport. 5
 (CTF 76 291320Z Apr 75, REF A) 6
 291325Z Apr 75 CH-46 crashed at sea vicinity of USS HANCOCK 7
 while on plane guard tasking. Two aircrew 8
 were rescued by USS HANCOCK. Two aircrew missing. 9
 SAR continued. Two aircrew never recovered and 10
 are presumed dead. (CTU 77.0.0 291442Z Apr 75, 11
 REF A) 12
 291336Z Apr 75 First H-53 lift of GSF from USDAO compound 13
 departed. (Annex D, Appendix 3) 14
 291341Z Apr 75 C7F message 291341Z Apr 75 indicated the follow- 15
 ing message was received by the US Ambassador, 16
 Saigon: "Can only continue evacuation from 17
 Embassy through 2300 local tonight. Unless 18
 you and other US citizens come out before then, 19
 we will have to restart operations tomorrow 20
 with all the grave risk to my personnel and to 21
 yours that that entails. Urgently recommend 22
 you allow us to lift you and US citizens out 23
 now. Known threat exists to your area for 24
 tomorrow." (C7F 291201Z Apr 75, Ref A. For 25
 Ambassador, Saigon response see C7F 291341Z 26
 Apr 75, Ref A.) 27
 291610Z Apr 75 One AH-1J (COBRA) helo ditched in water in the 28
 vicinity of USS KIRK. Both pilots were re- 29
 covered in good condition. (USS OKINAWA 30
 291732Z Apr 75, Ref A) 31

291612Z Apr 75 Last H-53 helo lift of GSF including Col Gray, 1
 CO RLT-4, from USDAO compound was executed. 2
 This completed the evacuation of the compound. 3
 The operations consisted of 122 helicopter 4
 sorties, lifting 6416 passengers (395 US, 5205 5
 others, and 816 GSF). (Annex D, Appendix 3) 6
 291635Z Apr 75 CTF 76 reported that 150 GSF, Ambassador and 7
 500 VN nationals remained at US Embassy. All 8
 lifts from the Embassy reported being made by 9
 CH-46 helicopter. BGen Carey, GSF Commander, 10
 and MGen Smith, DATT Saigon, arrived aboard 11
 USS BLUE RIDGE. (CTF 76 291649Z Apr 75, Ref A) 12
 291700Z Apr 75 US Consul General Can Tho arrived SS PIONEER 13
 Contender in LCM-8. All in party reported 14
 safe (23 AM CITS). (CTF 76 291659Z Apr 75, 15
 REF A) 16
 291739Z Apr 75 CTF 76 reported the planned flow pattern for 17
 Embassy evacuation would consist of one CH-46 18
 and one H-53 in flights at ten minute intervals. 19
 (CTF 76 291739Z Apr 75, REF A) 20
 291815Z Apr 75 CTF 76 reported that planned helo flow of one 21
 CH-46/one H-53 for Embassy evacuation commenced 22
 at 291815Z. (CTF 76 291825Z Apr 75, REF A). 23
 291854Z Apr 75 One CH-46 and one H-53 reported lift off from 24
 Embassy with 75 evacuees embarked. (CTF 76 25
 291857Z Apr 75, REF A) 26
 291855Z Apr 75 ABCCC transmitted following message to Amba- 27
 sador Martin: ". . .Based on the reported total 28
 of 726 evacuees . . . President has authorized 29
 19 helos and no more; last lift no later than 30
 0345H. You will depart on last lift." (CTF 31
 76 291937Z Apr 75, REF A and 7ACCS FREQUENT 32
 WIND report). 33

291945Z Apr 75 Helo flow to Embassy continues, movement going well. (CTF 76 291953Z Apr 75, Ref A) 1
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292020Z Apr 75 CTF 76 reported 737 passengers out of Embassy LZ on 18 loads, Ambassador still remains at Embassy. Message reported 500 more VN persons had arrived at Embassy for evacuation. (CTF 76 292023Z Apr 75, Ref A) 3
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292035Z Apr 75 Ambassador informed 20 helo flow exceeded. Requested only US citizens and GSF be taken out from this point. (CTF 76 292107Z Apr 75, Ref A) 8
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292058Z Apr 75 US Ambassador Saigon airborne from Embassy roof LZ. Enroute USS BLUE RIDGE. (CTF 76 292107Z Apr 75, Ref A) 12
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292110Z Apr 75 200 US of which 170 are GSF reported at Embassy. (CTF 76 292115Z Apr 75, Ref A) 15
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292157Z Apr 75 COMSEVENTHFLT reported seven CH-46s enroute Embassy, that GSF had retired from the parking lot, and that roof must now be used for evacuation. (CTF 76 292157Z Apr 75, Ref A). 17
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292200Z Apr 75 CH-46 landed at LZ 292220Z, advises 80 to 90 Americans in Embassy. Lifted off with 20 GSF. Reported Vietnamese in lower building. Seven CH-46 helos running shuttle from shipping to Embassy. Three USAF H-53 helos have been ordered to support Embassy roof top extraction (CTF 76, 292231Z Apr 75). 21
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292200Z Apr 75 TF 77 (USS ENTERPRISE) launched to provide increased TACAIR support for daylight evacuation operations. (CTF 77, 131250Z May 75, Ref A) 28
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292330Z Apr 75 TF (USS CORAL SEA) launched to relieve
 TACAIR on station at 292345Z Apr 75. (CTF 77
 131250Z May 75, Ref A)
 292335Z Apr 75 At 292325Z only 30 to 35 GSF remain at Embassy.
 USAF helos not airborne. Two more CH-46's
 enroute and will clear final GSF from Embassy
 roof. (CTF 76 292335Z Apr 75)
 292346Z Apr 75 Last members of GSF lifted off Embassy roof
 outbound to TF 76 ships. Last American re-
 ported out of Saigon and all GSF accounted
 for. During the Option IV operations, 72
 sorties lifted a total of 2379 passengers (978
 American citizens, 1228 others, 173 GSF)
 from Embassy. (CTF 76 292355Z Apr 75, Ref A
 and Annex D, Appendix 3).
 300006Z Apr 75 Last GSF element reported "FEET WET."
 (CTF 76 300016Z Apr 75, Ref A)
 300025Z Apr 75 Last element of GSF reported aboard TF 76
 ships. (CTF 76 300016Z Apr 75, Ref A)
 300054Z Apr 75 JCS terminated all FREQUENT WIND operations,
 effective immediately. (JCS 300054Z Apr 75,
 Ref A)

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APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

FORCE COMPOSITION (U)

1. [REDACTED] COMUSSAG/7AF supported forces and USN/USAF supporting forces conducting the operations were drawn from the following operational commands:

a. CINCPACAF

(1) Seventh Air Force

- (a) 56th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron
- (b) 56th Special Operations Wing
- (c) 388th Tactical Fighter Wing
- (d) 432nd Tactical Fighter Wing

(2) Thirteenth Air Force

- (a) 7th Airborne Command and Control Squadron

b. CINCSAC

- (1) 3707th Strategic Wing

c. COMAC

- (1) 40th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron

d. COMSC

- (1) Commander MSC Far East (USNS/MSC Charter Shipping)

e. CINCPACFLT

(1) Seventh Fleet

- (a) Amphibious Force (TF 76)
- (b) Marine Amphibious Force (TF 79)
- (c) Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (TF 72)
- (d) Service Force (TF 73)
- (e) Cruiser Destroyer Force (TF 75)
- (f) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 77)

2. [REDACTED] The evacuation of 7806 US citizens and foreign nationals from the USDAO compound and US Embassy Saigon by USMC/USAF helicopter sorties required continuous support operations by forces

of the above major commands. The following is a resume of the total operational effort. Of the total 638 helo sorties shown below, 194 helicopter sorties were directly involved in civilian evacuation and GSF insertion and withdrawal.

a. Air Operations Sorties

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USN/USMC</u>	<u>NOTES</u>
CH-46	NA	266	1
CH-53	68	290	1
HH-53	14	NA	
TACAIR	115 (F-4)	177	2
	12 (A-7)		
AH-1J	NA	24	1
AC-130 (SPECTRE)	8	NA	
EC-130 (ABCCC)	5	NA	
KC-135 (TANKER)	44	NA	
HC-130 (KING)	2	NA	
C-130	12	NA	3
C-141	2	NA	3
P-3	NA	6	

Notes: #1 Sorties include GSF insertion/withdrawal, SAR, evacuation, Sparrow Hawk, pre L-hour cross deck, intra-force (TF 76) evacuee lift, combat support/escort.

#2 TACAIR support sorties include MIGCAP (F-4/F-14), Electronic Warfare (EA-6A/B), Airborne Early Warning (E-1/E-2), Airborne Tanker (KA-6), Close Air Support (A-7, A-6, F-4), WILD WEASEL (F-4).

#3 While not directly involved in OPTION IV, the C-141 sorties were utilized for backhaul from Thailand to the Philippines, and the C-130s were to be utilized for OPTION II.

b. Ships/USMC Forces

(1) Amphibious Ships	15
(2) 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade	
(3) Cruiser/Destroyers	17
(4) Service Force Ships	9
(5) Attack Carriers (CVA)	2
(6) Attack Carriers (CVA) temporarily configured for helicopter support	2
(7) USNS/MSC Charter Ships	8

c. Seventh Fleet Fixed Wing/Helicopter Aircraft

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ANNEX B

ANNEX B TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

PLANNING (U)

1. General. Although planning for the evacuation of the Republic of Vietnam was initiated approximately one year prior to execution, the final detailed phase of planning was severely compressed due to the rapid deterioration of the military situation coupled with uncertainty concerning the numbers and types of people to be evacuated. Initial planning was oriented primarily to the evacuation of American citizens and the last minute addition of great numbers of Vietnamese, unspecified in precise quantity, introduced a quantity variant into planning that greatly complicated the process. In addition, the principal staffs concerned with evacuation planning were concurrently involved in other operations, most notably the evacuation of Phnom Penh. As the final planning evolved, a series of options were developed which addressed evacuation by fixed wing aircraft, sealift, helicopter or combinations with forces identified, including the capability to conduct operations under conditions wherein hostile action against evacuation forces and/or evacuees was contemplated. Though repeated efforts were made to size the problem, specific numbers of evacuees could not be determined, and on 7 April, JCS requested CINCPAC develop a concept plan for evacuation of 100,000. Subsequently, on 13 April, JCS provided guidance for CINCPAC to develop detailed plans for evacuation of 1,500, 3,000, 6,000, and 200,000. Planning called for four options of varying capability and capacity. It was recognized early in the planning process that the helicopter option should not be considered as a preferred mode

[REDACTED]

for evacuation of large numbers of people, but rather should
be reserved for the last minute evacuation of minimal numbers
of essential personnel. This required an early high level
decision to evacuate by other means while such evacuation was
feasible. A further complication of the planning process was
the lack of designated temporary safehavens. It was assumed
throughout most of the planning that safehavens in Thailand
and the Philippines could be used and certain decisions were
made based on these assumptions. In view of the fact that only
Option IV, the helicopter evacuation, was executed the chronology
of planning is more specifically addressed to that portion
pertaining to Option IV. In general, even though compacted
by time with many and varied capacity plans required due to
evacuee number uncertainty, the planning was professional,
complete, and provided for flexibility in execution as
attested to the success of the operation.

2. [REDACTED] Planning Directives.

a. General.

[REDACTED]

The American Embassy, Saigon on 3 April 1975
published the Emergency and Evacuation; Air and Sea
Evacuation Plan, Vietnam.

b. Background. With the rapid deterioration of the military situation in the northern military regions of South Vietnam, JCS designated CINCPAC the Department of Defense Vietnamese refugee evacuation coordinator and provided authority for commercial air and sealift of refugees from Danang (later extended to other locations designated by Chief, US Diplomatic Mission such as Qui Nhon and Nha Trang). CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT to designate an on-scene commander to coordinate and control embarkation at ports and places selected in conjunction with American Embassy, Saigon. JCS further restricted any US military personnel, craft, or shipboard equipment from being placed ashore and specifically prohibited US military forces from involvement in combat activities in support of refugee evacuation. In early April, CINCPAC undertook contingency planning for emergency evacuation of Saigon, recommending immediate evacuation and thinning out of Americans, deployment of additional assets

especially helos and carrier decks, and requested action to identify numbers and types of evacuees for which US had responsibility. CINCPAC additionally tasked COMUSSAG to develop an additional option for helicopter lift of US/ designated aliens from Saigon area including appropriate ground security forces, similar to the evacuation of Cambodia, EAGLE PULL. The Department of State was requested to identify the size of the evacuation as well as determine temporary safehavens and final destinations of refugee evacuees. Recommendations were also made to initiate full-scale evacuation by air and sea while conditions were still favorable.

c. Directives from JCS. On 7 April 1975, OJCS verbally tasked CINCPAC to provide a concept plan for use of military forces to evacuate 100,000 US, South Vietnamese, and Third Country Nationals from the Saigon area including; concept of operations, required forces with location and time to be in place, and command and control. This initial requirement was to be completed by 9 Apr 75. After concurring with CINCPAC initial planning, JCS subsequently on 13 Apr 75 provided planning guidance to CINCPAC for development of detailed plans with appropriate options for removal of 1,500, 3,000, 6,000 evacuees from Vietnam using US combat forces as necessary, and for removal of 200,000 evacuees assuming administrative lift in a permissive environment with GVN providing ground control and security, with US combat forces used only to protect air and/or sealift assets and associated personnel. This planning was to be completed by 19 April with priority given to US citizens. See Appendix 1 to Annex B, Chronology of Planning.

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d. Directives from CINCPAC. Upon receipt of JCS tasking for concept plans for evacuation of 100,000, CINCPAC convened a special planning group comprised of representatives from CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, USACSG, and FMFPAC which produced on 9 April CINCPAC's Concept Plan, TAXI TIME. With guidance contained in JCS 13 April message, CINCPAC reconvened the special planning group and produced concept plans for evacuation of 1,500, 3,000, 6,000 and 200,000 persons. Of interest on 15 April, due to possible press compromise, the name TALON VISE was changed to FREQUENT WIND for all SVN evacuation plans. CINCPAC additionally tasked COMUSSAG, with assistance to be provided from CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and USDAO Saigon, to provide detailed plans in consonance with CINCPAC concept planning and to ensure that Embassy E&E plans were compatible. On 18 April 1975, naval forces were directed to assemble off Vung Tau, South Vietnam in preparation for evacuation. See Appendix 1 to Annex B, Chronology of Planning.

e. Directives from CINCPACFLT. On 2 April 1975, CINCPACFLT directed COMSEVENTHFLT develop plans with COMUSSAG for helicopter evacuation of SVN. On 3 April 1975, CINCPACFLT directed COMSEVENTHFLT to load MIDWAY (CVA 41) with all available USMC helicopters from Okinawa in anticipation of proposed SVN evacuation and requested comments on utilization of an additional CVA in support of helicopter operations. COMSEVENTHFLT staff planners were directed by CINCPACFLT to report to COMUSSAG to assist in detailed planning.

f. COMSEVENTHFLT Directives and Initiatives. In late July 1974, COMSEVENTHFLT made the decision to initiate detailed planning for RVN noncombatant evacuation of Military Region I. In January 1975, the COMSEVENTHFLT Plan, FORTRESS JOURNEY, was published. As the situation deteriorated in MR I, COMSEVENTHFLT promulgated a Letter of Instruction (LOI), 25 March 1975, in support of TALON VISE for evacuation from Danang using SEVENTHFLT assets not involved in EAGLE PULL. Additionally, on 3 April 1975, an OPLAN for the evacuation of Saigon and Can Tho was promulgated independently, without directive from higher authority. This later plan with slight modification was republished as the effective COMSEVENTHFLT Plan for FREQUENT WIND. It is significant to note that the early planning initiated by COMSEVENTHFLT facilitated the final, compacted, detailed planning.

g. COMUSSAG Directives and Initiatives.

deadlines. See Appendix 2, Annex B, Coordination Conferences. On 18 April, Option IV, Helicopter Evacuation of SVN, FREQUENT WIND, was published. Five minor changes were transmitted from 18-28 April and execution was directed on 29 April 1975. The early submission of the USSAG CONPLAN provided a viable framework for follow-on planning.

2. Coordination Conferences. Due to the complexities, shortened planning time, and the numerous commands involved in NEMVAC planning many coordination conferences/meetings were held at various commands, most notably COMUSSAG who was charged with responsibility for RVN NEMVAC planning and execution. On 26-27 June 1974, key personnel from American Embassy, Saigon visited USSAG to coordinate the Embassy E&E Plan. From 1-3 July 1974, USSAG chaired a planning conference in Saigon, hosted by USDAO Saigon, which included representatives from AMEMB/DAO, USACSG, PACFLT, FLTCOORDGRP, MAC, and MSC. Plan concepts and all major issues were agreed upon, except command relationships between some major participants which were resolved later by CINCPAC. Additional meetings between LTGen Burns, COMUSSAG, and VADM Steele, COMSEVENTHFLT, were held at NKP, Thailand. On 6-9 April 1975, a working/planning conference was convened at USSAG with attendees representing COMSEVENTHFLT, III Marine Amphibious Force, and Fleet Coordinating Group. The conference was held to develop Option IV (Helo); however, because rough draft plans for both Option II (Fixed Wing) and Option IV were available, the representatives reviewed in detail, corrected, and approved both options. Occurring simultaneously on 8-9 April 1975 at CINCPAC, with representatives from the component commands; PACFLT, PACAF, USACSG, and FMFPAC concept planning for JCS requirements of 100,000 evacuees was developed. Again on 10 April, a meeting was held in Saigon in response to

[REDACTED]

requirements for review of Option IV with USSAG, AMEMB/DAO and Ground Security Force representatives. The CINCPAC components and FMFPAC reconvened on 14-15 April to develop concept plans from JCS guidance on evacuation of 1500, 3000, 6000 and 200,000 evacuees. A final conference was held at USSAG on 15 April with LtGen Burns (COMUSSAG), RADM Oberg (CINCPACFLT Rep Saigon), RADM Benton (CINCPAC Rep Saigon), and Col McCurdy (USDAO Saigon). See Appendix 2, Annex B, Chronology of Coordination.

3. [REDACTED] Conclusions and Comments. In general the planning evolution was complicated by two major factors; the inability to determine the exact numbers and types of people to be evacuated from South Vietnam; and the unexpected, rapid collapse of the northern military regions. The number of evacuees, based on gross estimates from 1500 to 200,000, and the uncertainty of their locations required preparation of a number of plans in a highly compressed time frame. Early in the detailed planning, Saigon was recognized as the primary evacuation area; but, even with that assumption, the permutations and combinations of plans based on number of evacuees, modes of transportation, time available for evacuation, forces available, and specific evacuation sites greatly compounded the detailed planning task. These two major factors were somewhat offset by the early planning initiated by COMSEVENTHFLT and ongoing detailed planning of COMUSSAG in support of FREQUENT WIND formerly TALON VISE. In addition, early coordination between USSAG, AMEMB/DAO and major supporting commands further eased the impact of the compressed planning requirements. The nonavailability of updated, current Embassy E&E plans, specifically with regard to designated numbers and types of evacuees as well as specific location and pick-up points, critically affected planning. This

 coupled with rapid changes in the political/military situation complicated final planning. CINCPAC's requirement for "worst case" planning, based on the uncertainty of GVN and RVNAF reactions during the evacuation, assured that less demanding situations were covered and contributed to the success of the operation. In conclusion, though plagued by short fuze requirements with lack of definitive direction in terms of number of evacuees, the planning effort and coordination with resultant Oplans was professional and complete at all command levels.

APPENDICES

- 1 - Chronology of Planning
- 2 - Chronology of Coordination
- 3 - Chronology of Planning Directives

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

1. Chronology of Planning

- 10 Apr 74 - CINCPAC directed USSAG to develop supporting plan for evacuation U.S. personnel from RVN in accordance with CINCPAC OPLAN (CINCPAC 101904Z Apr 74)
- 30 Jul 74 - USSAG CONPLAN submitted.
- Aug 74 - COMSEVENTHFLT initiated detailed planning for RVN NEMVAC starting with MR I.
- 16 Dec 74 - CINCPAC approved USSAG CONPLAN supporting plan for evacuation RVN.
- 28 Feb 75 - USSAG published CONPLAN RVN evacuation.
- 29 Mar 75 - JCS designates CINCPAC DOD coordinator Vietnam refugee evacuation and prohibits use of U.S. Military Forces and assets in Vietnam. (JCS 290010Z Mar 75, JCS 300310Z Mar 75).
- 31 Mar 75 - CINCPAC designates CINCPACFLT on-scene commander for refugee evacuation RVN. Request permission to enter RVN waters. (CINCPAC 310815Z Mar 75).
- 2 Apr 75 - CINCPAC initiates contingency planning; recommends deployment additional helos and carrier decks, massive thin out Americans, Need to "size" problem. Delineates forces available for helo lift, recommends recon-figure additional CVA to helo platform. Direct USSAG develop additional helo option

for RVN evacuation. (CINCPAC 020207Z Apr 75, 020441Z Apr 75, 020657Z Apr 75) CINCPACFLT tasked COMSEVENTHFLT for assisting USSAG developing helo lift plan. (CINCPACFLT 021357Z Apr 75)

3 Apr 75 - CINCPACFLT directs COMSEVENTHFLT to load CVA 41 (MIDWAY) with all available USMC helos at Okinawa. (CINCPACFLT 030031Z Apr 75) JCS concurs with CINCPAC plan for helo option and formation of forces. (JCS 032320Z Apr 75)

4 Apr 75 - CINCPAC recommends use of MSC shipping and aircraft to backhaul evacuees from Saigon. Need early decision on safehaven. Specifies need for Ground Security Forces (GSF), need to define lift size and early determination of ROE for GSF, air support. (CINCPAC 040320Z Apr 75, 040846Z Apr 75, 041115Z Apr 75).

5 Apr 75 - CINCPAC directs USSAG develop oplan IAW CINCPAC 041115Z Apr 75. Consider Vung Tau as possible evacuation location. Requests determination temporary safehavens and final destination refugees, method identification and documentation Vietnamese for evacuation. (CINCPAC 050030Z Apr 75, 050249Z Apr 75).

7 Apr 75 - CINCPAC approves USSAG Concept Plan for Helo Option (Option IV) Evacuation RVN. Request detailed plan ASAP. (CINCPAC 072325Z Apr 75). OJCS verbally requests evacuation contingency from CINCPAC for evacuation of 100,000 people.

9 Apr 75 - CINCPAC provides concept plan with forces required for evacuation of 100,000 (CINCPAC 090550Z Apr 75). Embassy Saigon reports on evacuation planning and estimates evacuees (AMEMB Saigon 090045Z Apr 75).
 10 Apr 75 - CINCPAC requests USSAG determine Embassy Saigon plan compatibility with evacuation in assembly and movement to landing zones. (CINCPAC 100629Z Apr 75).
 13 Apr 75 - JCS provides guidance for development of detailed plans for evacuation of 1500, 3000, 6000 and 200,000 evacuees. (JCS 131654Z Apr 75).
 14 Apr 75 - CINCPAC requests USSAG provide detailed plans IAW JCS 131654Z Apr 75. (CINCPAC 140320Z Apr 75).
 15 Apr 75 - CINCPAC changes CONPLAN TALON VISE to FREQUENT WIND due to possible press compromise. (CINCPAC 150430Z Apr 75).
 17 Apr 75 - CINCPAC provides concept plan for evacuation of 1500, 3000, 6000 and 200,000 evacuees from RVN. (CINCPAC 170501Z Apr 75). JCS directed reconfiguration of CVA with Thailand based USAF helos and forces be brought to 24 hour response posture off Vung Tau. (JCS 172323Z Apr 75)
 18 Apr 75 - JCS requests expansion of detail of Option IV (USSAG 090435Z Apr 75) to approximately same level of detail as EAGLE PULL (JCS 180005Z Apr 75), CINCPAC passed to USSAG for action (CINCPAC 180300Z Apr 75) USSAG

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publishes Option IV FREQUENT WIND (Helo 1
Lift) (USSAG 181230Z Apr 75). 2
CINCPAC directed PACFLT to reconfigure CVA 3
and forces assume 24 hour response off Vung 4
Tau (CINCPAC 180409Z Apr 75). CINCPAC pro- 5
posed deployment of one USMC Okinawa based 6
battalion to DAO Saigon (CINCPAC 180134Z Apr 7
75). Requested authority to use security and 8
support forces to secure LZs, embarkation 9
points, and Saigon-Vung Tau waterway (CINCPAC 10
182235Z Apr 75). 11
19 Apr 75 - CINCPAC requests authority to move Hawaii based 12
Battalion to Okinawa (CINCPAC 190029Z Apr 75). 13
20 Apr 75 - JCS provided interim reply on request for bat- 14
talion to DAO Saigon and from Hawaii to Okinawa. 15
(JCS 192300Z Apr 75). CINCPAC concurred with 16
additional detail on helo operations provided 17
by USSAG (USSAG/7AF 191045Z Apr 75) in response 18
to 18 April JCS request. (CINCPAC 200230Z 19
Apr 75). CINCPAC provided situation report 20
concerning his visit to Saigon (CINCPAC 21
200629Z Apr 75). USSAG published Change 1 to 22
Option IV (Helo Lift) FREQUENT WIND, ROE 23
changes (USSAG 211205Z Apr 75). 24
21 Apr 75 - CINCPAC requested MAC be tasked to provide 25
airlift to meet 6 hour response. (CINCPAC 26
212353Z Apr 75). USSAG publishes Change #2 27
to OPTION IV, FREQUENT WIND, ROE changes 28
(USSAG 211205Z Apr 75). 29
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23 APR 75 - USSAG publishes Change 3 to Option IV (Helo Lift) FREQUENT WIND, changes WILD WEASEL ROE (USSAG 231115Z Apr 75). JCS provided guidance to peak C-130 flights to evacuate remainder DAO personnel when Tan Son Nhut comes under attack (JCS 230004Z Apr 75) JCS disapproved request to move USMC platoon from GSF to DAO compound. (JCS 232329Z Apr 75).

24 Apr 75 - CINCPAC provided capabilities estimate concerning Saigon situation. (CINCPAC 241645Z Apr 75). JCS authorized augmentation of USMC security guard at DAO compound (JCS 241626Z Apr 75). JCS authorized CINCPAC to execute Options II, III and/or IV of FREQUENT WIND Operation Plan. (JCS 241804Z Apr 75).

25 Apr 75 - USSAG publishes Change 4 to Option IV (Helo Lift) FREQUENT WIND, defines "L" Hour. (USSAG 250645Z Apr 75).

26 Apr 75 - USSAG publishes Change 5 to Option IV (Helo Lift) FREQUENT WIND, changes launch times, helo flow, TACAIR and communication. (USSAG 261250Z Apr 75).

27 Apr 75 - USSAG publishes Fragmentary Order for Option IV FREQUENT WIND (USSAG 270633Z Apr 75) and supercedes this Fragmentary Order with USSAG 272023Z Apr 75. Fragmentary Order.

29 Apr 75 - CINCPAC executes Option IV FREQUENT WIND (Helo Lift) (CINCPAC 290252Z Apr 75).

APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

1. Chronology of Coordination

- 26-27 Jun 74 - Key personnel from American Embassy visit
USSAG to coordinate Draft of USSAG Con-
tingency Plan for Evacuation of Republic
of Vietnam.
- 1-3 Jul 74 - Coordination Conference held at Saigon with
representatives from Embassy, US DAO,
USACSG, PACFLT, FLT COORDGP, MAC, MSC and
USSAG to resolve Evacuation Plan of Vietnam.
- 28-31 Aug 74 - COMSEVENTHFLT arranged liaison visit to
Saigon and Danang to discuss evacuation
planning for Military Region I.
- 6-9 Apr 75 - Planning Conference held at USSAG, NKP,
Thailand with representatives from COM-
SEVENTHFLT, III MAF, and FLT COORDGP.
- 8-9 Apr 75 - CINCPAC hosted working concept planning
conference composed of PACFLT, PACAF,
USACSG and FMFPAC to develop concept plans
for evacuation of 100,000 evacuees.
- 10 Apr 75 - Meeting held at Saigon in response to USDAO
Saigon with USSAG, USMC Ground Security
Force Planners and DAO/Embassy personnel to
discuss evacuation planning of Vietnam.
- 14-15 Apr 75 - CINCPAC hosted second working concept
planning conference composed of component

representatives and FMFPAC to develop
concept plans for 1500, 3000, 6000 and
200,000 evacuees.

15 Apr 75 - Conference held at USSAG, NKP, Thailand
between CINCPAC Rep Saigon (RADM Benton),
CINCPACFLT Rep Saigon (RADM Oberg), USDAO
Rep Saigon (Col McCurdy), and COMUSSAG
(LTGen Burns).

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APPENDIX 3

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

CHRONOLOGY OF PLANNING DIRECTIVES (U)

Chronological listing of significant publications and message traffic related to Republic of Vietnam evacuation.

- a. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) FY 1975 - Evacuation planning tasking for unified commands.
- b. CINCPAC CONPLAN
- c. CINCPAC msg 101904Z Apr 74 - Directed USSAG develop RVN evacuation plan.
- d. USSAG CONPLAN 30 July 1974.
- e. CINCPAC ltr ser S873, 16 Dec 74 - Approved USSAG RVN evacuation plan.
- f. USSAG/7AF CONPLAN - RVN evacuation plan.
- g. JCS msg 290010Z Mar 75 - Designated CINCPAC DOD Coordinator RVN evacuation.
- h. JCS msg 291917Z Mar 75 - Extended evacuation authority to other areas than Danang.
- i. JCS msg 300310Z Mar 75 - Limits use of military assets and forces in RVN.
- j. CINCPAC msg 310751Z Mar 75 - Specifies requirements for RVN evacuation control.
- k. CINCPAC msg 310815Z Mar 75 - Tasks CINCPACFLT as on-scene commander RVN evacuation.
- l. JCS msg 012224Z Apr 75 - Concurs with CINCPAC 310751Z Mar 75.
- m. CINCPAC msg 020207Z Apr 75 - Initiating planning, size problem, urge evacuation.
- n. CINCPAC msg 020441Z Apr 75 - Identifies forces required for helo evacuation RVN.
- o. CINCPAC msg 020657Z Apr 75 - Directs USSAG develop helo option.

p. CINCPACFLT msg 021354Z Apr 75 - Directs COMSEVENTHFLT coordi-
 nate helo planning option. 1
 q. CINCPACFLT msg 030031Z Apr 75 - Directs COMSEVENTHFLT to 2
 load USMC Okinawa based helos on Midway. 3
 r. JCS msg 032320Z Apr 75 - Concurs with CINCPAC 020441Z Apr 75 4
 s. CINCPAC msg 040320Z Apr 75 - Recommend evacuation RVN on 5
 backhaul MSC and air. 6
 t. CINCPAC msg 041115Z Apr 75 - Need to size problem; ROE, for 7
 GSF and air support. 8
 u. CINCPAC msg 042351Z Apr 75 - Request safe havens and final 9
 destination for refugees. 10
 v. CINCPAC msg 050030Z Apr 75 - Directs USSAG to develop helo 11
 option IAW 041115Z Apr 75. 12
 w. CINCPAC msg 050249Z Apr 75 - Recommend start evacuation of 13
 non-essentials now. 14
 x. COMUSSAG msg 050510Z Apr 75 - Proposed plan for helo evacu- 15
 ation of RVN. 16
 y. CINCPACFLT 051045Z Apr 75 - Tasks 7th FLT to provide planners 17
 to USSAG. 18
 z. JCS Telecopier 051920Z Apr 75 - Request time and composition 19
 of forces in place for RVN evacuation. 20
 aa. JCS Verbal Tasking, 7 Apr - Request CINCPAC develop concept 21
 for RVN evacuation of 100,000. 22
 bb. CINCPAC msg 072325Z Apr 75 - Approves proposed USSAG Option 23
 IV (helo). 24
 cc. CINCPAC msg 081202Z Apr 75 - Request USSAG OPLAN Option IV 25
 by 090200Z Apr 75. 26
 dd. AMEMB Saigon msg 090045Z Apr 75 - Mission view and evacua- 27
 tion data with numbers of people. 28
 ee. CINCPAC msg 090550Z Apr 75 - Concept plan for evacuation 29
 100,000. 30
31

ff. CINCPAC msg 091943Z Apr 75 - Summary planning for 5-10,000
evacuees by sea and air. 1
2
gg. CINCPAC msg 100629Z Apr 75 - Directs USSAG to ensure AMEMB 3
E&E plans compatible. 4
hh. JCS msg 131654Z Apr 75 - Provides guidance and requests plan 5
for 1500, 3000, 6000, and 200,000. 6
ii. CINCPAC msg 140320Z Apr 75 - Request USSAG consider guidance 7
JCS 131654Z. 8
jj. CINCPAC msg 150430Z Apr 75 - Change TALON VISE to FREQUENT 9
WIND. 10
kk. CINCPAC msg 170501Z Apr 75 - Provides concept plans for 1500, 11
3000, 6000, and 200,000. 12
ll. JCS msg 180005Z Apr 75 - Requests details of helo flow 13
Option IV. 14
mm. CINCPAC msg 180300Z Apr 75 - Directs USSAG include CINCPAC 15
concept 170501Z in planning. 16
nn. USSAG/7AF msg 181230Z Apr 75 - OPLAN FREQUENT WIND 17
Option IV helo. 18
oo. CINCPAC msg 182235Z Apr 75 - Forces assembling off Vung Tau, 19
need ROE for GSF. 20
pp. CINCPAC msg 190029Z Apr 75 - Request move Hawaii USMC 21
BLT to Okinawa. 22
qq. JCS msg 192300Z Apr 75 - Interim reply on Hawaii BLT. 23
rr. CINCPAC msg 200629Z Apr 75 - Update on SVN from CINCPAC 24
trip. 25
ss. USSAG/7AF msg 201745Z Apr 75 - Change #1 to Option IV 26
FREQUENT WIND. 27
tt. USSAG/7AF msg 211205Z Apr 75 - Change #2 to Option IV 28
FREQUENT WIND. 29

uu. USSAG/7AF msg 231115Z Apr 75 - Change #3 to Option IV 1
FREQUENT WIND. 2
vv. CINCPAC msg 241645Z Apr 75 - Urged evacuation. 3
ww. USSAG/7AF msg 250645Z Apr 75 - Change #4 to Option IV 4
FREQUENT WIND. 5
xx. USSAG/7AF msg 261250Z Apr 75 - Change #5 to Option IV 6
FREQUENT WIND. 7
yy. USSAG/7AF msg 270633Z Apr 75 - Frag order for Option IV 8
FREQUENT WIND. 9
zz. USSAG/7AF msg 27023Z Apr 75 - Supersedes 270633Z Frag order. 10
aaa. CINCPAC msg 290252Z Apr 75 - Execute Option IV FREQUENT 11
WIND. 12
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ANNEX C

ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (U)

- References:
- a. JCS Pub 2
 - b. DOD Directive 5100.30, dated 2 December 1971, Subj: Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).
 - c. DOD Directive S5100.44, dated 9 June 1964, Subj: Master Plan for the National Military Command System.
 - d. Letter, dated 13 May 1975, 7ACCS/DO, Subj: FREQUENT WIND Report.
 - e. PACAF Transcript of Secure Voice Conference
 - f. USAF T.O. 1C-130E(LL)-101, General Description of ABCCC/USC-15.
 - g. USSAG/7AF OPLAN: FREQUENT WIND Option IV.
 - h. CINCPAC (S) 200300Z Apr 75, Subj: USAF Operations aboard USS MIDWAY (S).

1. Command and Control


a. (S) General. This Annex addresses the command and control relationships developed for and used in FREQUENT WIND Option IV, and the supporting communications procedures and nets which were planned for and employed in the operations. COMUSSAG/7AF was assigned responsibility for the development of a coordinated CONPLAN for the evacuation of the Republic of South Vietnam based on CINCPAC CONPLAN

(1) Plan Summary, Command Relationships:

(a) When directed by CINCPAC, COMUSSAG/7AF will initiate, conduct and control NEMVAC operations IAW this plan.

- (b) CINCPAC will exercise operational control over all CINCPAC designated military forces assigned to USSAG/7AF for the support of FREQUENT WIND operations through COMUSSAG/7AF.
- (2) Basic Plan, Coordinating Instructions:
- (a) COMUSSAG/7AF is the central coordinating agent for all plan/activities in connection with FREQUENT WIND operations.
- (b) Task/support organizations will develop appropriate supporting and implementing plans and will coordinate all plans/changes through COMUSSAG/7AF.
- (3) Annex J, Command Relationships:
- (a) In addition to rendering NEMVAC assistance to Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, RVN, COMUSSAG/7AF will exercise control over evacuation operations as directed by CINCPAC.
- (b) CINCPAC will exercise operational control (OPCON) over all military forces assigned to the support of NEMVAC operations.
- (c) COMUSSAG/7AF will exercise operational control over all US military forces assigned to USSAG/7AF, and over such forces as may be directed by CINCPAC.
- (d) Other PACOM forces supporting this plan will remain under operational control of their respective Service components.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AT EXECUTION



X OPGON TO COMUSSAG FEET DRY
OPCON TO CTF76 FEET WET
XX DIRECT LIAISON/COORD WITH USSAG AUTH

Figure 1
C-3

(e) Marine elements employed in GSF operations will come under OPCON COMUSSAG/7AF upon "feet dry" and will return to OPCON CINCPACFLT upon "feet wet."

(f) In the event an AOA is established by CINCPAC, all forces within the designated AOA will come under the operational control of the ATF Commander.

(g) COMUSSAG will exercise OPCON over all 13AF assets upon implementation of this plan.

(h) USAF helicopters aboard USS MIDWAY (CVA 41) were retained under the operational control of USSAF/7AF, with Tactical Control authority delegated to CTF 76. Tactical Control was "defined as detailed and local direction and control to accomplish mission tasks assigned." (ref h).

b. Summary of Operations.

(1) (C) Upon execution, the command and control relationships outlined above were adequate, and permitted the operations to be brought to a successful conclusion. A key issue, however, is the time at which the control of the evacuation passes from the Ambassador to the Military Commander. This break must be clean, decisive, and acknowledged to allow the responsible Military Commander control and authority over the evacuation.

(2) (C) As stated previously, the command relationships were in accordance with published directives and were adequate for this operation. However, all commanders concerned (COMUSSAG, COMSEVENTHFLT, CTF 76, and CTG 79.1) stated they would have preferred to see OPCON of all forces given to a single commander for Option IV. COMUSSAG specifically desired that OPCON of supporting forces be passed to him at first alert.

[REDACTED]

The other commanders stated that OPCON should 1
have been vested in COMSEVENFLT or CTF 76. (It is 2
noted that the decision to retain in COMUSSAG/7AF 3
the responsibility for conduct and control of NEMVAC 4
operations for FREQUENT WIND Option IV was made in 5
order to preclude differing command relationships 6
for the several FREQUENT WIND Options which might 7
selectively or simultaneously have been executed for 8
the evacuation operation in RVN). 9

(3) Another aspect to the command and control relationships 10
was the move of COMSEVENTHFLT from his flagship to the 11
amphibious control ship, BLUE RIDGE, after execution in 12
order to observe the operation first-hand. From this 13
vantage point, when it became apparent that the helo 14
requirements from the Embassy were indefinite and due 15
to his overall operational responsibility for the helo 16
forces, he felt compelled to go directly to the Am- 17
bassador in an attempt to determine finite require- 18
ments. This was due to the already extended time period 19
of operations with the attendant risks to operational 20
safety from fatigue of pilots, deck crews, and support 21
personnel. 22

2. Communications 23

a. (U) General 24

(1) For communications purposes, the NEMVAC operations 25
can be divided into two phases: 26

(a) Phase one consists of actions by the U.S. Embassy 27
and by individuals to reduce the numbers of U.S. 28

citizens in a country because of a growing threat
to their safety.

(b) Phase Two is the actual NEMVAC operation involving
the operational use of US Armed Forces.

(2) In phase one, communications are required between the
US Embassy and Washington for rapid assessment of the
situation and to a designated military organization so
that NEMVAC plans can be made, reviewed, rehearsed, and
military forces alerted.

(3) In phase two, communications are required between
US Embassy and the military force executing the NEMVAC
plan, within the military force to control the operation,
and between the military commander on the scene and the
higher headquarters so that a diplomatically and politi-
cally sensitive operation can be controlled properly.

b. Planning

(1) South Vietnam had an extensive network of military
long haul communications for US use shown in Appendix 1,
but very little commercial communications out of country.
As the South Vietnamese withdrew from the highlands and
MR-I, US ability to communicate with Saigon, the site of
potential NEMVAC operations, became doubtful. Therefore,
on 2 April 1975, a satellite terminal was installed in
DAO compound (see Appendix 2 for chronology of actions
regarding this action). This added a direct way to commu-
nicate from Saigon without having to depend on a single,
vulnerable submarine cable entry point at Vung Tau. When

the submarine cable was lost at 290314Z Apr 75, the
satellite terminal continued to provide contact until
291109Z Apr 75.

(2) A number of actions were taken to establish additional
communications capabilities to insure that information for
command and control was available in a timely way to
locations remote from the evacuation area. Some of the
most significant ones are listed here, with Appendix 3 and
its Tabs containing the chronology and diagrams as
appropriate.

(a) A secure voice conference circuit was established
between the NMCC, CINCPAC Command Center, CINCPACAF
Command Center, CINCPACFLT Dep Opns/Plans Office,
DAO Saigon ECC, and USSAG Command Center. This
circuit operated throughout the entire execution of
Option IV, starting at 282325Z Apr 75 except contact
with the DAO was lost at 291109Z Apr 75 due to loss
of the DAO satellite terminal because of a power
fluctuation. This circuit provided the most rapid and
primary flow of information to NMCC and CINCPAC.

(b) CINCPACFLT established procedures to monitor and
use fleet flash nets West and North, allowing rapid
TTY flow of information and direction between key
Navy elements involved in the operation.

(c) CINCPAC arranged a capability to monitor the USSAG
HF Command and Control Net through the use of COMMANDO
ESCORT facilities in the Philippines. This allowed
monitoring of real time reporting between USSAG, ABCCC,
CTF 76, and others on this net.

[REDACTED]

(3) Furthermore, because of the continuous nature of evacuation operations starting in March, a variety of tactical communications nets had been established, exercised, and used by Naval and Air Forces as well as the DAO and AMEMB. A majority of the participants had a chance to meet, discuss, and plan communications before they had to use them. These circumstances served to create a favorable climate during the execution phase.

(4) By 18 April 1975, the basic plan for tactical communications had been established. As shown in Appendix 4, the major participants in the operation (USSAG, ABCCC, CTF 76, and CTF 79.1) then developed their own detailed supporting plans. These plans were compatible. On 22 and 23 April 1975, communications rehearsals were made including ABCCC, but results were not completely satisfactory (see Appendix 4). All forces made individual equipment checks; no further overall exercise was held for OPSEC reasons and no overall dry run was conducted. Communications for the press were not part of any plan initially. Changes to plans were not available to JCS since the AIG used to distribute changes did not include JCS.

c. Operations


(1) The chronology of significant communications events is in Appendix 5. In general, communications plans were executed as written. The outages and changes are noted, but mechanical problems of that nature did not hamper the operation, because of multiple means planned and provided. On-the-scene commanders' evaluations were that in general

communications never hampered tactical command and control and execution. However, the availability of selected additional circuits (e.g., secure voice nets between USSAG and COMSEVENFLT and/or CTF-76) could have improved the flow of information. CTG 79.1 noted that he experienced difficulty with direct communications via HF to his rear echelon and CTF-76. The direct secure voice conference was a cause of concern to several commanders subordinate to CINCPAC in that they felt it contributed to confusion and interfered with proper command and control.

Appendices

- 1 - Wideband Communications Systems in RVN
- 2 - Measures Taken to Improve Long-Haul Communications With Saigon
- 3 - Communications Capabilities Established for Command, Control and Information at Remote Locations
- 4 - Communications Plans
- 5 - Chronology of Significant Communications Events

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)
WIDEBAND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IN RVN (U)



APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

MEASURES TAKEN TO IMPROVE LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS WITH SAIGON (U)

TSC-54

		<u>1</u>
		<u>2</u>
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		<u>4</u>
160610Z Mar 75	Warin-Pleiku TROPO in HAZCON. Suspected personnel evacuation.	<u>5</u> <u>6</u>
180230Z Mar 75	Pleiku communications out.	<u>7</u>
202330Z Mar 75	CINCPAC J6 meeting on Vietnam communication requirements. Actions based on intelligence estimates of 7-10 days for DANANG and 2-3 weeks for Nha Trang.	<u>8</u> <u>9</u> <u>10</u> <u>11</u>
21-24 Mar 75	Telcon coordination/action with JCS, DCA-PAC, PACAF, CDRUSACSG, 6TH SIG COMD.	<u>12</u> <u>13</u>
250007Z Mar 75	CINCPAC msg to JCS. Request for TSC-54 deployment NLT 28 Mar 75 and move Narrow Beam antenna.	<u>14</u> <u>15</u> <u>16</u>
251923Z Mar 75	DA msg to CDRUSACC. DA supports move and will fund. Get ready.	<u>17</u> <u>18</u>
252342Z Mar 75	CDRUSACC to 6th SIG Comd. Take action.	<u>19</u>
25 Mar 75	6TH SIG COMD letter to CDRUSACSG. Request for highway transport to Hickam AFB.	<u>20</u> <u>21</u>
260004Z Mar 75	JCS msg to CINCPAC, CSA, CSAF, and DCA. Deployment approved.	<u>22</u> <u>23</u>
260235Z Mar 75	6TH SIG COMD msg to PACAF. Request for special airlift.	<u>24</u> <u>25</u>
262350Z Mar 75	PACAF msg to MAC. Request for special airlift.	<u>26</u>
270336Z Mar 75	6TH SIG COMD msg to DAO. Deployment alert.	<u>27</u>
271903Z Mar 75	DA msg to MAC. Fund citation.	<u>28</u>
272210Z Mar 75	DSCS II WESTPAC satellite Narrow Beam coverage moved to S.E.A.	<u>29</u> <u>30</u>

281810Z Mar 75 Warin-Monkey Mtn TROPO in HAZCON. 1
281853Z Mar 75 TSC-54 departs Hickam AFB on C5 SSAM mission 2
3607. 3
291254Z Mar 75 Monkey Mtn communications out. 4
300145Z Mar 75 TSC-54 arrives Saigon. 5
010630Z Apr 75 Nha Trang cablehead in HAZCON. 6
020512Z Apr 75 TSC-54 orderwire established. Circuit 7
activation begun. 8
020845Z Apr 75 Nha Trang cablehead failed. Wetwash Alpha out. 9
021245Z Apr 75 TSC-54 link to Hawaii activated. 10
291109Z Apr 75 TSC-54 communications lost. 11
(Approx) 12
291600Z Apr 75 TSC-54 destroyed. 13

APPENDIX 3

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES ESTABLISHED FOR COMMAND, CONTROL AND
INFORMATION AT REMOTE LOCATIONS (U)

CHRONOLOGY

182003Z Apr 75 Director, Joint Staff requests CINCPAC to
 establish a secure voice conference.

190707Z Apr 75 CINCPAC directs establishment of the secure
 voice conference. Diagram is shown at TAB A.
 During the survey, the feasibility of having
 COMSEVENTHFLT in the conference was explored.
 USS OKLAHOMA CITY could have established a
 narrow band (Steam Valve) secure voice cir-
 cuit via satellite. The circuit would have
 to be added to the conference at Hawaii or
 at the NMCC. Hawaii SECORD has capability
 for only one narrow band circuit per con-
 ference; therefore either DAO or COMSEVENTHFLT
 circuit would have had to be extended to
 the NMCC for addition to the conference.
 While this is technically feasible, pre-
 vious tests conducted by the NMCC have re-
 vealed that conferencing of two or more
 narrow band secure voice circuits yields a
 marginal quality conference.

190405Z Apr 75 CTF 76 requests establishment of special
 interest communications circuit.

21 Apr 75 COMSEVENTHFLT in OKLAHOMA CITY moves to
 vicinity of Vung Tau.

21 Apr 75 OKLAHOMA CITY establishes satellite cir-
 cuits with NCS Guam. Relieves backlog at

SECRET

Guam. Diagram is shown in TAB E.

240656Z Apr 75 COMSEVENTHFLT defines Fleet Flash Net North and states the rules for use of Fleet Flash Nets North and West. Diagram is shown in TAB B.


26 Apr 75 Diplomatic circuit establishment between BLUE RIDGE and AMEMB Saigon. Diagram is shown in TAB D.

29 Apr 75 CINCPAC Command Center starts monitoring USSAG/7AF HG Command Net. Diagram is shown in TAB C.

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
TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)
SECURE VOICE CONFERENCE (U)

C-3-A-1



—— WIDE BAND (MUSCLE TRUNK) SECURE VOICE
- - - - NARROW BAND SECURE VOICE

FLEET FLASH NETS WEST AND NORTH (U)




PAR B TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVIVABLE SUPPORT
FLEET FLASH N. S. WEST AND NORTH (U)

TAB C TO APPENDIX 3 TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

MONITORING OF USSAG HF COMMAND AND CONTROL NET BY CINCPAC (U)


COMMAND AND CONTROL NET (HF)

C-3-C-1



DIPLOMATIC CIRCUIT (U)

C-3-D-1




CLASS D TO APPE DIA 3 TO AMEMB C TO NERVAO DOWEL AND ON 107
DIPLOMATIC C. DIT (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

TAB E TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)
USE OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS TO ASSIST MESSAGE DISTRIBUTION (U)

C-3-E-1



APPENDIX 4

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

COMMUNICATIONS PLANS (U)

1. (C) Annex K to USSAG/7AF OPLAN promulgated by
USSAG/7AF message 181230Z Apr 75, formed the basis for
communications plans of units tasked to participate in the
evacuation of US noncombatants and certain designated aliens
from Saigon. The salient features of the plan were:
 - a. All US forces will use organic C-E equipment to support
their respective needs.
 - b. All ground communications airlifted into the objective
area will be man portable.
 - c. HF will be the primary command and control communications
from the objective area to the support areas.
 - d. FM will be the primary ground communications in the
objective area.
 - e. The 7th AF TACC/ABCCC communications package will be
the primary system.
 - f. COMSEC devices (secure voice) will not be used by ground
forces employed in this operation.
2. (U) Given above guidance and taking into account service
doctrine, participating forces established communications as
illustrated in the Tabs to this Appendix.
3. (C) The ABCCC conducted communications tests involving BLUE
CHIP, two radio relay aircraft (RRA), and Navy units twice:
0300Z-0800Z 22 Apr 75 and 0800Z-23 Apr 75 for two to three hours.

a. On 22 Apr 75, the RRA were approximately 325 miles apart and UHF secure voice could not be established between CRICKET and BLUE CHIP. On the 23rd, the RRA were closer together, but the distance between RRA #2 and CRICKET appeared to be too great to allow UHF secure voice to function. UHF secure voice and UHF voice relay between CRICKET and BLUE CHIP were not satisfactory during the actual operation.

b. During both tests, CRICKET worked with Navy elements and the exercises were useful in that:

(1) Good frequencies were identified and orbit areas and antenna selection were evaluated.

(2) Frequency users were confirmed and identified.

(3) AF and Navy operators had a chance to practice procedures.

c. A third test was requested by the Navy but USSAG felt that for OPSEC reasons and to reduce the chance of the enemy identifying the various orbits it should not be conducted.

Tabs

A - Command Control Communications

B - General Communications Diagram

C - GSF Communications

D - ABCCC Call Sign and Frequency Lists


E - ABCCC Communications Capabilities

TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS

C2 COMMUNICATIONS

LEGEND:

TACAIR RRA (KC-135) 
 ABCCC (EC-130) 
 SLOWMOVERS (AC-130)  SAR (HC-130) 
 USN COMD ELEMENTS 
 HF DATA LINK 
 HF RELAY ROUTE 
 AF COMD NET (HF) 
 SAR NET (HF) 
 AF COMD NET ALT (UHF) 
 AF SECVOX (UHF) 
 SAR ALT (UHF) MIGCAP & MIGCAP ALT (UHF) 

SLOW MOVERS (AC-130) (TARGET VALID) 

FAST MOVERS (F-4) 

UDORN HF SSB STATION
COMUSSAG/7AF
NAKHON PHANOM

THAILAND

LAOS

SVN

CAMBODIA

RRA 1

SARCO

RRA 2

SARGON
EVAC
COORD

CENTER

AMC/ABCCC

CTF 77 COMCARGRU 5
USS CORAL SEA

COM 7TH FLT (OKLAHOMA CITY)


PIRAZ-USS GRIDLEY (RED CROWN)

CTF 76 CTG 79.1 - CG 9TH MAB
TACC (USS BLUE RIDGE)


IRONHAND/WILD WEASEL (F-4C)

GENERAL COMMUNICATIONS DIAGRAM (U)

TAB B TO APT. JLN 4 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAL SURVEY REPORT (U)
GENERAL COMMUNICATIONS DIAGRAM (U)



GSF COMMUNICATIONS (U)



C-4-C-1



TAB D

1

TAB D TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

2

ABCCC CALL SIGN AND FREQUENCY LISTS (U)

3

ABCCC CALL SIGN LIST

4

<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>
BARITONE	Ground Security Force Detachment
BLUE CHIP	7AF TACC Nakhon Phanom Thailand
BLUE MAX	Navy Request for MIGCAP/FORCAP
BLACK EAGLE	E-2 Aircraft (ENTERPRISE)
CLIMAX	USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN 65)
CRICKET	ABCCC
CYCLONE	E-1 Aircraft (CORAL SEA)
EMBASSY	US Embassy (Saigon)
FANCY DAN	Ground Security Force Detachment
FLAGSTONE	Navy TACC (BLUERIDGE) (RESCAP/SURCAP)
GOLDCHIP	Fleet Coordination Group at NKP
GRAND CENTRAL	Saigon Evac Coord Center AMEMB
GUNNER	Ground Security Force Commander
HARBORMASTER	Navy SAR Coordinator (works for JEHOVAH)
HORNBLOWER	Small Escort Ship
ICEPACK	Navy TACC (BLUERIDGE)
ILLUSION	Command Control Center (CTF 76)
JACKSONVILLE BRAVO	Saigon Defense Attache (in field)
JEHOVAH	Task Force Commander (co-located with Perfume)
JOKER	Joint Rescue Coordination Center
JOLLY GREEN	USAF HH-53 (MIDWAY)
KING 2 1/22	HC-130 SAR Commander
KNIFE	USAF CH-53 (MIDWAY)
KNIFE BOY	Ground Security Force Detachment

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<u>CALL SIGN</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>1</u>
MUSTANG	USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43)	<u>2</u>
NESTOR KEYLIST	KY-28 Secure Voice Keylist	<u>3</u>
OSWALD	Navy SAR South (CTU 77.01 ship	<u>4</u>
	USS WORDEN) (CH 52)	<u>5</u>
PERFUME	Commander (TG 77.0)	<u>6</u>
LIBERTY BELL	E 1/2 Aircraft	<u>7</u>
MEMOIR	Thai ALCC	<u>8</u>
RAMPAGE	USS HANCOCK (CVA-19)	<u>9</u>
RED CROWN	PIREZ Control (CTU 77.0.2)	<u>10</u>
RIVER RAT	Navy request for escort/fire	<u>11</u>
	suppression	<u>12</u>
SCHOOLBOY	USS MIDWAY (CVA 41)	<u>13</u>
SPARROWHAWK PACKAGE	2/CH-46 with 15 Marines/AC	<u>14</u>
SAG	Evacuation Force Director (NKP)	<u>15</u>
STEAMVALVE	CVA's guard net designator used	<u>16</u>
	for carrier coordination	<u>17</u>
TAILPIPE	Combat Control Team	<u>18</u>
TEABALL	Former name for WCC, now uses	<u>19</u>
	changing call sign	<u>20</u>
TEMPLE	Command Control Center (CTF 79)	<u>21</u>
TIGER OPS	ALCC Saigon	<u>22</u>
ULCER	Command Control Center (CTF 71)	<u>23</u>
ALAMO	LZ Control Team for LZ# 36, 37, 38,,	<u>24</u>
	39	<u>25</u>
ANNEX	LZ Control Team for LZ# 35	<u>26</u>
AIR AMERICA	LZ Control Team for LZ# 40	<u>27</u>
LZ # 35	DAO Base Exchange Parking Lot	<u>28</u>
LZ #36	DAO Softball Field	<u>29</u>
LZ # 37	DAO Tennis Court	<u>30</u>
LZ # 38	DAO Parking Lot South Perimeter	<u>31</u>

CALL SIGNDESIGNATION

LZ # 39

DAO Parking Lot North Perimeter

LZ # 40

Air America Ramp

GREEN BANDIT

F-5 Threat

YELLOW BANDIT

A-37 Threat

PINK BANDIT

A-1 Threat

CADILLAC

Code word for SAM launch

PAPPA BEAR 06

Ground Control Team

CUNNINGHAM

CTG 79.1 Rear Echelon*

FAIRMONT

Helicopter Direction Center*

ABCCC MASTER FREQUENCY WORKSHEET

<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>PRIMARY</u>	<u>SECONDARY</u>	<u>ALTERNATE</u>
Air Force Command Net	HF	6686	8010	3530
Air Force Command Net	UHF	266.6 (Clear voice radio relay)		
(Alternate)				
Air Force Command Net	UHF	247.1 (Secure voice radio relay)		
(Alternate)				
Saigon Embassy Net	UHF	360.5		
	FM	36.25	38.40	
GSF Command Net	FM	35.00	59.65	67.15
GSF Tactical Net	FM	39.75	62.40	58.10
GSF Internal Net	FM	64.25	35.95	40.15
		59.40	65.80	36.40
GSF Helo Control	FM	67.55	UHF 350.5	
Target Validation	UHF	242.4	253.5	
RESCORT/TACAIR	UHF	289.2	228.7	225.2
WILD WEASEL/IRONHAND	UHF	240.2	248.1	
SPEC	UHF	123.1	127.7	
Aircraft Control	UHF	263.2	230.4	
(Option II)				
C-130/C-141	VHF	119.1	126.0	

*NOTE: Designators not recorded by ABCCC.

<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>PRIMARY</u>	<u>SECONDARY</u>	<u>ALTERNATE</u>	<u>1</u>
Helo Control (Option IV)	FM	36.95	55.85		<u>2</u>
	UHF	238.2	247.7		<u>3</u>
Tan Son Nhut Tower	UHF	236.6			<u>4</u>
	VHF	118.7			<u>5</u>
Saigon ALCC	VHF	129.6			<u>6</u>
Tan Son Nhut	UHF	360.5			<u>7</u>
Defense Attache	VHF	134.65			<u>8</u>
	HF	11176 (USB)			<u>9</u>
MIGCAP (USAF)	UHF	319.8 (Primary Radio Relay)			<u>10</u>
MIGCAP (Navy)	UHF	243.0 (Alternate Radio Relay)			<u>11</u>
	UHF	386.6	271.4	282.8	<u>12</u>
Tan Son Nhut	UHF	235.8	274.1		<u>13</u>
Landing Zone Control	FM	44.10	35.70		<u>14</u>
SEARCH AND RESCUE NETS:					<u>15</u>
USAF SAR Net	HF	7945	4475	13227	<u>16</u>
	UHF	235.0 (Clear voice radio			<u>17</u>
		relay KING to JOKER)			<u>18</u>
	VHF	123.1	127.7		<u>19</u>
	FM	40.75	47.70	37.70	<u>20</u>
Navy SAR Net (Primary	UHF	364.2			<u>21</u>
Coord)					<u>22</u>
(Scene of action)	UHF	282.8 (SAR DELTA)			<u>23</u>
	UHF	247.3 (SAR BRAVO)			<u>24</u>
Navy/ABCCC Secure	UHF	382.1 (SECURE)			<u>25</u>
Coordination					<u>26</u>
Navy PIREZ Control	UHF	386.6	337.8		<u>27</u>
(RED CROWN)					<u>28</u>
Navy TACC	UHF	260.1			<u>29</u>
Navy SECURE Common	UHF	250.2			<u>30</u>
(Button "9")					<u>31</u>

<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>PRIMARY</u>	<u>SECONDARY</u>	<u>ALTERNATE</u>	<u>1</u>
NOTE: Navy Alphabetical					<u>2</u>
designators for USAF freqs:					<u>3</u>
ALPHA		8010 KHZ	USB		<u>4</u>
BRAVO		6686 KHZ	USB		<u>5</u>
CHARLIE		3050 KHZ	USB		<u>6</u>
DELTA		289.2	MHZ		<u>7</u>
ECHO		228.7	MHZ		<u>8</u>
FOXTROT		225.2	MHZ		<u>9</u>
GOLF		319.8			<u>10</u>
LANDING ZONE CONTROL					<u>11</u>
FREQUENCIES OPTION IV:					<u>12</u>
DAO Softball Field	FM				<u>13</u>
Newport	FM	65.65			<u>14</u>
	UHF	378.2			<u>15</u>
Soccer Field	FM	62.00			<u>16</u>
Commissary Parking Lot	FM	35.50			<u>17</u>
Embassy LZ	FM	61.65			<u>18</u>
	UHF	386.7			<u>19</u>
Quan Doi Soccer Field	FM	35.30			<u>20</u>
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TAB E

TAB E TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

ABCCC COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES (U)

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APPENDIX 5

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATIONS EVENTS (U)

<u>April</u> <u>DTG</u>	<u>Remarks</u>	
181230Z	USSAG/7AF OPLAN to all but JCS. See TAB A for comments regarding transmission of plans.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
20 Apr 75	GSF Advance Party arrives in Saigon.	9
202154Z	CINCPAC msg transmitting USSAG/7AF OPLAN (FREQUENT WIND Option IV) to JCS. Received 202249Z Apr 75.	10 11 12 13
210500Z approx	USS OKLAHOMA CITY arrives vic Vung Tau. Assists in management of message backlogs. See TAB B for discussion of message flow.	14 15 16 17
220300Z	ABCCC comm practice with fleet units.	18
230800Z	Second ABCCC comm practice.	19
241035Z	COMUSSAG/7AF updates AIG 8715 which will be used in addressing messages in conjunction with OPLAN 5060V. JCS not in AIG 8715.	20 21 22 23
272023Z	USSAG/7AF FRAG. Not received by JCS.	24
282134Z	CINCPAC - NMCC secure voice conference established.	25 26
282217Z	DAO Saigon added to secure voice conference. See TAB C for performance.	27 28 29

<u>April</u>	<u>Remarks</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>DTG</u>		<u>2</u>
282232Z	USSAG BLUE CHIP added to secure voice conference.	<u>3</u> <u>4</u>
282237Z	CINCPACFLT added to secure voice conference.	<u>5</u> <u>6</u>
282238Z	CINCPACAF added to secure voice conference.	<u>7</u> <u>8</u>
282300Z	CHFLTCOORDGRP at NKP denied use of Fleet Flash Net (W) until 290110Z. Reason unknown.	<u>9</u> <u>10</u> <u>11</u>
282317Z	CRICKET 01 launched.	<u>12</u>
290100Z	CRICKET 02 launched.	<u>13</u>
290115Z	CRICKET 01/02 in orbit area.*	<u>14</u>
	CRICKET 01 primary.	<u>15</u>
290230Z	Beginning of interference on radio nets. See TAB D for complete listing.	<u>16</u> <u>17</u> <u>18</u>
290314Z	439L undersea cable, Vung Tau RVN-Thailand out due to enemy action or abandonment of facilities at Vung Tau.	<u>19</u> <u>20</u> <u>21</u> <u>22</u>
290314Z	CHFLTCOORDGRP at NKP denied use of Fleet Flash Net (W) until 290433Z. This was due to the fact that RADM Benton wanted access to FFN(W) while at the ECC DAO Saigon and the keying line was routed via 439L.	<u>23</u> <u>24</u> <u>25</u> <u>26</u> <u>27</u> <u>28</u>
290358Z	CRICKET 01 has pressurization difficulties and CRICKET 02 assumes orbit.	<u>29</u> <u>30</u> <u>31</u>

*Direct quote from CRICKET log; however, probably means 02 enroute.

April
DTG

Remarks

290459Z

Conversation between PERFUME,
CRICKET, and BLUE CHIP. "CRICKET,
BLUE CHIP. Inquire where the helos
are please."
"PERFUME, CRICKET. Over."
"CRICKET, PERFUME. Over."
"This is BLUE CHIP, CRICKET. Go
ahead."
"This is PERFUME. Interrogative do
you have helos airborne. Over."
BLUE CHIP. "Helos are airborne. Is
that affirmative."
"This is PERFUME. Affirmative.
Over."
BLUE CHIP. "Roger."
BLUE CHIP. "What time off CRICKET."
NOTE: Total misunderstanding by
all concerned of what each station
transmitted.

290500Z

MIST 43 checks in with CRICKET and
departs 26.5 VFR. NOTE: Example
of unnecessary clutter on the HF
command net.

290505Z

ADM Gayler to MGEN Archer. "We've
got to do something about the comm
between CRICKET and the choppers.
If that aircraft can't contact them,
I think you should check out your
other one and take whatever action

April
DTG

	<u>Remarks</u>	<u>1</u>
	you must because we can't live	<u>2</u>
	with this situation of being unable	<u>3</u>
	to talk to them." NOTE: First	<u>4</u>
	helo, carrying BGEN Carey went	<u>5</u>
	"feet dry" at 290520Z. There were	<u>6</u>
	no choppers "feet dry" at 0505Z.	<u>7</u>
290510Z	CRICKET 02 HF radio fades. CRICKET	<u>8</u>
	01 begins to relay and continues	<u>9</u>
	until 290954Z.	<u>10</u>
290531Z	CRICKET's first contact with	<u>11</u>
	ILLUSION (CTF 76) on UHF (helo	<u>12</u>
	control frequency).	<u>13</u>
290545Z	CRICKET's first contact with ICE	<u>14</u>
	PAC (TACC on BLUE RIDGE) on UHF	<u>15</u>
	(helo control frequency).	<u>16</u>
290610Z	CRICKET's first contact with ICE	<u>17</u>
	PACK on HF.	<u>18</u>
290633Z	CRICKET's first contact with	<u>19</u>
	ILLUSION on HF.	<u>20</u>
290954Z	CRICKET 03 on station in area.	<u>21</u>
291020Z approx	Secure voice between AMEMB and	<u>22</u>
	SECORD out.	<u>23</u>
291048Z	Embassy confirms VHF, HF, and	<u>24</u>
	FM contact with CRICKET.	<u>25</u>
291100Z approx	At sunset, CGSF encounters problems	<u>26</u>
	communicating via HF from DAO com-	<u>27</u>
	pound to ILLUSION (TACC aboard USS	<u>28</u>
	BLUE RIDGE). Problem appears to be	<u>29</u>
	poor antenna assignment on BLUE	<u>30</u>
	RIDGE and poor coordination of	<u>31</u>
	frequency changes.	<u>32</u>

[REDACTED]

<u>April</u> <u>DTG</u>	<u>Remarks</u>	
291109Z	Satellite terminal TSC-54 in DAO compound fails due to power fluctuation.	<u>1</u> <u>2</u> <u>3</u> <u>4</u>
291140Z approx	BLUE CHIP: "... we got so many people chattering on the channel, Cunningham and people like that, that we can't get through..."	<u>5</u> <u>6</u> <u>7</u> <u>8</u> <u>9</u>
291230Z approx	BLUE CHIP: "PAC, we have a frequency congestion, with one of the terminals...we have been able to determine...apparently is from Hawaii, a terminal call sign Cunningham. We've asked him to stay off the air but he is still cluttering it up. Our informal or unofficial word it is FMFPAC..." NOTE: Cunningham was BGEN Carey's rear echelon onboard ship.	<u>10</u> <u>11</u> <u>12</u> <u>13</u> <u>14</u> <u>15</u> <u>16</u> <u>17</u> <u>18</u> <u>19</u> <u>20</u>
291300Z approx	NMCC places commercial call to Saigon. Saigon commercial operator states she hasn't had contact with any American installation for 3 or 4 days. On 16 May 75, MGEN Smith and COL E. H. Graham stated that commercial telephones continued to function until at least 291400Z.	<u>21</u> <u>22</u> <u>23</u> <u>24</u> <u>25</u> <u>26</u> <u>27</u> <u>28</u>
291600Z approx	Satellite terminal TSC-54 at DAO destroyed.	<u>29</u> <u>30</u>
291754Z	CRICKET 04 on station in area.	<u>31</u>

[REDACTED]



<u>April</u> <u>DTG</u>	<u>Remarks</u>	<u>1</u>
291855Z	PACOM sends Presidential message to	<u>2</u>
	AMB Martin via BLUE CHIP and CRICKET.	<u>3</u>
	See TAB E about diplomatic post secure	<u>4</u>
	teletype useage.	<u>5</u>
291937Z	Embassy Saigon destroying comm gear.	<u>6</u>
	Transmits last message.	<u>7</u>
292010Z	CRICKET 01 (second sortie) on station	<u>8</u>
	in area until 300007Z.	<u>9</u>
300034Z	Secure voice conference concluded.	<u>10</u>
		<u>11</u>
		<u>12</u>
		<u>13</u>
		<u>14</u>
		<u>15</u>
		<u>16</u>
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		<u>29</u>
		<u>30</u>
		<u>31</u>

TAB A

TAB A TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)
TRANSMISSION OF PLANS (U)

1. The following messages dealing with plans were received by COMSEVENTHFLT from USSAG/7AF:

<u>DTG</u>	<u>No. of Sections</u>	<u>PREC</u>
a. 090435Z Apr 75	22	0
b. 171130Z Apr 75	22	0
c. 180905Z Apr 75	20	0
d. 181230Z Apr 75	27	0
e. 220930Z Apr 75	23	0
f. 230441Z Apr 75	11	0
g. 241145Z Apr 75	17	0
h. 270635Z Apr 75	08	0
i. 171130Z Apr 75	22	0
j. 220930Z Apr 75	23	0

TOTAL 195 Sections

2. Under ideal conditions it takes approximately 15 minutes to transmit/receive one (1) section of a message with a 100 words/minute teletype equipment. Using the data above it would take 48.75 hours (2 days) of circuit time to transmit/receive the above messages under optimum HF conditions. Because of poor HF conditions many sections required retransmission as many as 3 times. It required Guam almost 3 days to transmit a 27 section message before all afloat addressees received for all sections. In order to save circuit time the following methods were used to readdress any lengthy message to afloat units by COMSEVENTHFLT:

a. CAMS Guam was directed by message to readdress messages to afloat units from COMSEVENTHFLT directly from NAVCOMPARS

[REDACTED]

precluding the need for COMSEVENTHFLT to process the tape necessary to transmit these messages via COMPARS for further routing to afloat units.

b. Due to the command ship's satellite communications facility not being affected by poor HF propagation conditions, messages addressed to ships in close proximity to the command ship were processed there for distribution and delivered via helo.

3. [REDACTED] Several problems were encountered concerning transmission of changes to plans, each one using excessive circuit time.

a. One case concerns correcting the DTG of two sections of a multi section message. Instead of just correcting the DTG the entire section was transmitted as a corrected copy. This required addressees to notice not only the change in DTG, but caused a need to read the entire message to check for further corrections in the text.

b. The second case involves the transmission of an entire msg USSAG 220930Z (22 sections) which contained several changes. The changes could have been sent as a separate message having not more than 3 sections. This would save addressees the time required to read all 22 sections in order to locate the changes involved.

c. A tremendous amount of circuit time would have been saved in the case of messages requiring readdressal if the originators of these messages had addressed all required addressees on the first transmission. The failure to do this required several long sections to be retransmitted for action to proper addressees.

TAB B

TAB B TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)
MESSAGE FLOW (U)

1. [REDACTED] During the execution of "FREQUENT WIND" Option IV, there were significant increases in the number of messages handled by Seventh Fleet ships, accompanied by an escalation in the precedence of these messages.

a. Seventh Fleet command ship had an increase of 40% over normal message volume.

(1) The number of messages handled is shown in Enclosure 1. Of significance is the increase in FLASH messages on 29 April 1975.

(2) The handling times for outgoing messages are shown in Enclosure 2. The chart also shows the percentage of messages in each precedence category.

(3) The average incoming message handling times are shown for FREQUENT WIND and compared to exercises in Enclosure 3.

b. CTF 76 reported that the Task Force flagship's normal volume of traffic is less than 500 messages send and receive per day with 80 percent of these ROUTINE or PRIORITY precedence. For eight days prior to FREQUENT WIND execution, the volume increased to over 1500 messages per day with over 45 percent of these FLASH or IMMEDIATE precedence and approximately 20 percent multi page operation orders, plans, or intelligence reports. On execution day, the volume was over 2,200 messages with about 70 percent FLASH or IMMEDIATE precedence.



[REDACTED]

2. (U) Enclosure 4 is a chart showing the backlogs that existed at Naval Communications Stations Guam and Honolulu prior to the operation.

3. (U) Enclosures 5 and 6 show the total amount of messages processed by LDMX to CINCPAC and the average handling times for incoming messages respectively.

1
2
3
4
5
6


MESSAGES HANDLED BY USS OKLAHOMA CITY



C-5-B-1-1

AVERAGE MESSAGE IN-HOUSE TIME

COMSEVENTHFLT/OKLAHOMA CITY OUTGOING TRAFFIC



C-5-B-2-1


AVERAGE INCOMING MESSAGE HANDLING TIMES COMSEVENTHFLT/OKLAHOMA CITY

	HANDLING TIMES			
	<u>FLASH</u>	<u>IMMEDIATE</u>	<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>ROUTINE</u>
OCT 72	00:50	3:15	6:00	11:40
JOLLY ROGER	00:55	3:21	6:10	12:20
*NICKEL PLATE	01:49	2:56	6:46	8:02
**READEX	00:54	2:28	4:10	15:10
**FREQUENT WIND	01:58	03:54	07:54	15:56

*10% RANDOM SAMPLE

**20% RANDOM SAMPLE

NCS GUAM & HONOLULU BACKLOG



TAB E

TAB E TO APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX C TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)
DIPLOMATIC POST SECURE TTY (U)

The diplomatic communications circuit usage was very light. 15 messages in 24 hours were sent during the evacuation of Saigon (same comment applies to evacuation of Phnom Penh), even though it did provide a real time path between the Embassy and the Task Force Commander. It had been expected that this circuit would provide a secure means for direct liaison between the on-scene evacuation commander and the embassy being evacuated. In both of these cases however, most of the information about the conditions at the Diplomatic Post were received via higher military authority or via non-secure voice radio circuits (either direct or relayed). It should be considered that traffic loading on this circuit is a function of command relationships.

ANNEX D

ANNEX D TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

FORCE COMPOSITION/DISPOSITION (U)

REFERENCES: a. USSAG CONPLAN 5060V.

b. COMUSSAG/7AF 181230Z Apr 75, Subj: OPLAN

(OPTION IV) - FREQUENT WIND (C).

c. CTG 79.1 191541Z Apr 75, Subj:

CTG 79.1 OPLAN 2-75 (FREQUENT WIND) (C)

d. 9th MAB Serial 02A11075, 20 Apr 75, Subj:

Helicopter Intelligence Study and Selected
Photography

e. COMUSSAG/7AF 272023Z Apr 75, Subj:

FREQUENT WIND Alert Fragmentary Order (C)

f. CTG 76.4 280055 Apr 75, Subj: FREQUENT WIND

Helicopter Ship to Shore Plans (C)

g. CTU 79.1.2 281754 Apr 75, Subj: CTU 79.1.2

OPLAN 1-75 Frag Order 01-75-FREQUENT WIND (C)

h. CTG 79.1 290446 Apr 75, Subj: FREQUENT WIND

Execute Order (S)

i. CTU 79.1.2 290452Z, Subj: CTU 79.1.2 OPLAN

1-75 Frag Order 2-75-FREQUENT WIND (C)

(C) The attached appendices provide a detailed recap of FREQUENT WIND force composition, disposition, and readiness. Included are appendices on TACAIR/Support aircraft (USAF and USN), 7th Fleet ships, the Ground Security Force (GSF) operations (including helicopter operations), and a discussion of force alert readiness and L-hour.

APPENDICES

1 - TACAIR/Support Aircraft

2 - Seventh Fleet Ships

3 - Ground Security Force Operations

4 - Force Readiness

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

1. [REDACTED] The overall employment of tactical fighter/attack aircraft was specified by USSAG CONPLAN
2. [REDACTED] Tactical direction of all USAF/USN tactical aircraft was exercised by USSAG when "Feet Dry." OPCON of Navy TACAIR was exercised by 7th Fleet. The Airborne Mission Commander (AMC) onboard the ABCCC aircraft (CRICKET) operated as an extension of USSAG with specific authorities delegated by COMUSSAG.
3. (S) The duration of the expected evacuation was estimated in the OPLAN to be 12-14 hours with TACAIR required on station at L-Hour and provided continuously throughout the evacuation period. The basic plan directed TACAIR to be provided in two-hour blocks starting with USAF aircraft followed by USN forces and alternating thereafter. During the actual execution, this sequence was reversed such that USN TACAIR provided the first two-hour block. Maximum anticipated utilization specified in the plan required launch of 10 aircraft as 1 hour plus 45 minute intervals during daylight hours.
4. [REDACTED] TACAIR forces included units from two USAF tactical fighter wings based in Thailand and two CVAs assigned to CTF 77 located approximately 30 miles southeast of Vung Tau, RVN. Specific A-7 forces listed in the basic plan consisted of 16 USAF A-7s, including 4 A-7s for SAR operation. A maximum of 30 USN A-7 aircraft were tasked. F-4 forces included 40 USAF F-4s. These force levels were subsequently altered in the changes to the basic plan. Some of these changes

occurred relatively late in the planning cycle as a result of JCS/CINCPAC direction that the number of TACAIR sorties should be approximately doubled in response to the threat. The actual Frag Order directed sorties as follows:

<u>USAF</u>	<u>USN</u>
94 F-4	16 F-4
20 A-7	68 A-7
	16 A-6
	16 F-14

Change 5 to the Frag Order modified some event times and aircraft recovery destinations.

5. (S) The mission/function of TACAIR was to provide suppression of hostile fire directed against US Forces engaged in the evacuation operations. Helicopter escort was also required. Strike, MIGCAP, and WILD WEASEL capabilities were also to be provided.

6. Operating procedures and restrictions were as specified in the Rules of Engagement. (See Annex F)

7. Munitions for USAF TACAIR were as specified

and included principally CBU, unguided GP bombs, 20mm (HEI) ammo, AIM-7/9 air-to-air missiles and guided bombs.

8. Execution of the FREQUENT WIND TACAIR operations was essentially as planned, except as noted below. There were no gaps in TACAIR coverage. USAF and USN flew 127 and 177 sorties respectively. No USN ordnance was expended. The only USAF ordnance expended (1 AGM-45, 2 CBU-58 and 2 CBU-71) by TACAIR forces was at about 290826Z by an F-4 WILD WEASEL flight against a 57mm AAA site approximately 10 miles northeast of Saigon. Chronology of key TACAIR events began at 281745Z when USSAG directed FREQUENT WIND forces to assume a 1-hour alert

[REDACTED]

posture. USSAG's message 282325Z directed launch of all
USAF support aircraft for L-Hour of 290300Z and further
directed a withhold of all TACAIR. At 290251Z USSAG passed
CINCPAC's order to execute Option IV and establish L-Hour
as 290300Z for TACAIR timing references. CINCPAC verbally
directed launch of helicopters at about 290328Z. Accordingly,
at 290350Z USSAG subsequently directed the launch of Navy
TACAIR with helicopters scheduled to arrive 15 minutes after
TACAIR was on station. In view of the fact that the first
2-hour block of TACAIR had largely expired when the launch was
executed, USSAG directed that the first TACAIR be provided by
fleet resources. Accordingly CTF 77 reported launching of the
first fleet sorties (EW, MIGCAP, TANKER) at 290400Z. The first
USN TACAIR (A-7s) were launched at 0415Z. The employment of
TACAIR starting with fleet resources first was the only signi-
ficant departure from the basic plan which had scheduled the
first block of TACAIR sortie to be provided from USAF bases
in Thailand. In view of the large number of evacuees and the
protracted number of TACAIR protective sorties needed, both
USSAG/7AF and CTF 77 generated considerably more sorties than had
been planned in the Frag Order. USAF TACAIR was aerial refueled,
by KC-135. KA-6 tankers were available for USN TACAIR refueling
as required. Following the last evacuation helicopter arriving
"Feet Wet" at 300011Z, the last Navy TACAIR recovered at TF 77 at
300115Z. In summary, there were no significant problems
associated with TACAIR operations in support of FREQUENT WIND.

APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

SEVENTH FLEET SHIPS: COMPOSITION, DISPOSITION, ACTIONS (U)

1. General. On 18 April 1975 virtually all of the Seventh Fleet ships which ultimately comprised the armada off Vung Tau were in various ports throughout WESTPAC (see Tab A). Many of these vessels had entered port within the previous 24 hours, having been at sea for 3-4 weeks, awaiting and finally executing the EAGLE PULL evacuation of Phnom Penh. Upon receipt of the alerting orders to assume a 24-hour response time, the units comprising ARG Alfa and ARG Bravo got underway the evening of 18 April and proceeded toward Vung Tau (see Tab B for force composition). ARG Charlie was not yet constituted, but amphibious ships which had just arrived from CONUS as the scheduled relief units for most of Alfa and Bravo were in port in Okinawa or Japan. Elements of the USMC 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines which had remained in Okinawa, embarked in USS Denver and USS Duluth and they set sail to rendezvous with other ARG Charlie vessels in the vicinity of Vung Tau. Since there was no LPH or other major helicopter platform among these newly arrived amphibious units, on 17 April JCS had directed reconfiguration of the attack carrier Midway for helicopter operations, as had been done with the CVA Hancock for ARG Bravo. The unique facet of the Midway operation was the embarkation of 10 USAF heavy lift helicopters from Thailand, thereby employing the majority of the Pacific Command's heavy lift assets in the FREQUENT WIND task force. By 24 April the three ARG's were in position off Vung Tau, less two trailing ships of ARG Charlie, and they were joined by two attack carrier strike groups (Coral Sea and Enterprise) and the Seventh Fleet flagship, USS Oklahoma City. Additionally, the flagship of the amphibious commander (CTF 76),

[REDACTED]

USS Blue Ridge, and ships of the Seventh Fleet Mobile Logistics Support Force (MLSF) joined the Vung Tau armada, along with MSC vessels which were already in Saigon or offshore in the vicinity of Vung Tau. It is significant to note that the fourth attack carrier, Enterprise, was available as a result of having been delayed from her scheduled outchop from WESTPAC in anticipation of the evacuation of Vietnam.

a. [REDACTED] At 2145Z on 18 April, CINCPAC directed all forces to assume a 6-hour alert posture upon arrival off Vung Tau. The task force commander reported attainment of the 6-hour alert on 24 April. At 1455Z on 27 April CINCPAC directed all forces to advance the readiness posture to a 1-hour response, which was subsequently relaxed again to 6 hours at 0310Z on 28 April. The task force moved out from the coastline at night during the relaxed periods and back in to the optimum launch point just outside RVN territorial waters (3NM) by first light the next day. By the time CINCPAC issued the 1-hour alert for first light on 29 April, the situation had deteriorated ashore to the point where NVA/VC long-range artillery from the Vung Tau peninsula had to be considered. As a result, inward movement of the task force was adjusted to place the forward-most elements of the formation at least 17 NM offshore. This precaution complemented actions taken earlier by CTF 76 on 21 April which included relocation of the destroyer protective force to the north to counter a growing NVA KOMAR threat.

b. (S) Although the 1-hour response requirement established for first light on the 29th was geared toward a maximum C-130 fixed wing operation, the disposition of the task force remained oriented for executing Option IV, the all-helicopter evacuation. This had no detrimental effect on

TACAIR response capability from the carriers since they were positioned beyond the amphibious forces for all options and the additional distance for jet aircraft was negligible. In this disposition the three amphibious ready groups, principally the major helicopter decks, were assigned individual 12NM by 30NM rectangular operating areas, oriented perpendicular to the coastline and parallel to each other (see Tab C). Contiguous to the land end of these helicopter carrier operating areas were six smaller areas assigned to the amphibious ships with helo platforms and wet wells for landing craft. The MSC ships were stationed in a holding area to the southeast of the amphibious shipping with instructions for four of the ships to relocate to recovery anchorages as close to the wet-well ships as practicable on execution of Option IV, and for the remaining MSC ships to move to a waiting area immediately southeast of the wet-well ships. This latter adjustment would provide for the most expeditious movement of evacuees from the helicopter-capable ships to the MSC ships using the small landing craft in shuttle fashion. The MSC vessels were the primary vehicles for transporting the evacuees to designated safe havens. In addition to the MLSF ships holding to seaward of the carriers, USS Peoria (LST-1183) was positioned about half way between the helicopter platforms and the mouth of the Saigon River to act as a Search and Rescue unit for the evacuation helicopters.

2. Execution. The composition and disposition of the Naval force did not vary substantially from the pre-execution situation described above. In spite of the larger than planned numbers of evacuees brought out by the USMC and USAF helicopters, the composition of the task force proved to be adequate

SECRET

and the disposition of the ships provided the flexibility and capability to accomplish the task successfully. While the functioning of the various elements went according to plan throughout the 24-hour evacuation operation, there were two events or factors worth highlighting. One of these was devised by the fleet planners of the operation and enhanced the control and smoothness of evacuee flow. The other, while considered in the planning phase, could not be planned for in detail and was counterproductive to control.

a. [REDACTED] In the first instance, it was determined early in the preparatory stages that the amphibious landing craft, the "Mike" boats, were much too big and too heavy to be used alongside the MSC ships' fragile accommodation ladders. Since the plan called for use of the Mike boats to transfer evacuees from the wet wells of the helo platforms to the large capacity MSC vessels, a means to get the evacuees off the Mike boats and onto the MSC ships safely was essential. The solution was the employment of the large, flat causeways used to bridge the final yards between the ramp of a beached LST (Landing Ship Tank) and the shore. The LST's splashed their causeways near the MSC ships, maneuvered them alongside and secured them to the deep-draft vessels, creating an intermediate floating "pier" on which the accommodation ladder could rest solidly and alongside which the Mike boats could tie up and easily discharge evacuees. A bonus feature of the causeway concept was that it provided an excellent opportunity for USMC security elements to sanitize the evacuees of weapons and other contraband.

b. [REDACTED] The second unusual factor in the operation was the undisciplined arrival of 65,000 fleeing Vietnamese in RVNAF helicopters, light fixed wing aircraft and boats. The large

[REDACTED]

numbers in general and the determination of RVNAF pilots in particular constituted a hindrance to the planned flow of US helicopters and FREQUENT WIND evacuees. The Vietnamese helicopters defied control and safety by "cutting out" US helicopters on final approach. Many ditched alongside US Navy ships, one crashed into the side of USS Blue Ridge and others were jettisoned over the side of Navy ships after discharging refugees. One Vietnamese pilot voluntarily flew abandoned RVNAF helicopters from vitally needed deck spots and ditched them alongside in the water. He and other refugees were rescued from the sea by organic small boats normally used to carry US seamen from anchorages to shore. While skill and desperation were evident in nearly equal measure in the RVNAF pilots, the timing and magnitude of their exodus were the crucial factors impacting on FREQUENT WIND operations. The airmanship of the American air crews and the efforts of flight deck personnel preserved success in the face of this interference.

c. [REDACTED] While the disposition of the ships, the use of the causeways and the proximity to the coastline were well-thought-out elements of the plan, it became obvious that the convenience and simplicity of the causeways were attracting an unmanageable number of impromptu refugees. A carefully balanced consideration of route distances for US helicopters and shore separation to avoid over-saturation of refugee handling capability was required. In the FREQUENT WIND case, the priority to favor minimum evacuation distances prevailed and the task force did not begin withdrawing to a distance out of practical reach of small craft until the planned operation was complete. The costs for this proximity to the LZ's were borne without unacceptable

[REDACTED]


interference to the evacuee flow, but the delays incurred doubtlessly prolonged the overall operation and in one related case resulted in the loss of a US helicopter due to fuel starvation.

Tabs

- A - Location of All Seventh Fleet Ships on 18 April 1975
- B - FREQUENT WIND Force Composition
- C - Force Disposition Off Vung Tau

**18 APRIL 1975
LOCATION OF PRINCIPAL
SEVENTH FLEET SHIPS
SUBSEQUENTLY PARTICIPATING
IN FREQUENT WIND**

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA



LOCATION CODE

1 SUBIC BAY

USS MIDWAY (CVA-41)
USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)
USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2)
USS THOMASTON (LSD-28)
USS PEORIA (LST-1183)
USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC-19)
USS DUBUQUE (LPD-8) - ARG BRAVO
USS STODDERT (DDG-22)
USS KNOX (DE-1052)
USS COCHRANE (DDG-21)
USS H.P. WILSON (DDG-7)
USS WORDEN (DLG-18)
USS ROWAN (DD-782)
USS R.B. ANDERSON (DD-786)
USS GURKE (DD-783)
USS J.P. JONES (DDG-32)

ARG ALFA

2 MANILA

USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65)
USS REASONER (DE-1063)

3 SINGAPORE

USS HANCOCK (CVA-19) - ARG BRAVO
USS KIRK (DE-1083)
USS COOK (DE-1087)

4 HONG KONG

USS DURHAM (LKA-114)
USS FREDERICK (LST-1184)

ARG BRAVO

5 OKINAWA

USS DENVER (LPD-9)
USS DULUTH (LPD-6)
USS MOBILE (LKA-113)
USS MT VERNON (LSD-39)
USS TUSCALOOSA (LST-1187)
USS BARBOUR COUNTY (LST-1195)

ARG CHARLIE

6 IWAKUNI (NUMAZU)

USS ANCHORAGE (LSD-36)

7 AT SEA

USS OKLAHOMA CITY (CLG-5) - ENR SUBIC
USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43)
USS GRIDLEY (DLG-21)
USS MEYERKORD (DE-1058)
USS BAUSELL (DD-845)

TAB A TO AP, PART 2 TO ANNEX D TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)
18 APRIL 1975 LOCATION OF PRINCIPAL SEVENTH FLEET SHIPS (U)

TAB A

D-2-A-1

TAB B

TAB B TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

FREQUENT WIND FORCES: TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION OF SEVENTH FLEET
SHIPS (U)

1. CTF 76. Commander Amphibious/Special Task Force, Seventh
Fleet: RADM D. B. Whitmire.


<u>Task Org</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
TG 76.0	USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19)	CTF 76 EMB; SPECOPS and Command Grp
TU 76.0.3	USS Barbour Country (LST-1195)	Special Forces
	USS Tuscaloosa (LST-1187)	
	USS Ramsey (DEG-2)	
TU 76.0.9	USS Midway (CVA-41)	USAF Helo's EMB
	USS Rowan (DD-782)	
	USS R.B. Anderson (DD-786)	
TG 76.3	USS Cochrane (DDG-21)	Area Defense Group
	USS Stoddert (DDG-22)	
	USS J. P. Jones (DDG-32)	
	USS H. B. Wilson (DDG-7)	
	USS Cook (DE-1083)	
	USS Kirk (DE-1087)	
TG 76.4	USS Okinawa (LPH-3)	ARG ALFA
	USS Vancouver (LPD-2)	
	USS Thomaston (LSD-28)	
	USS Peoria (LST-1183)	
TG 76.5	USS Hancock (CVA-19)	ARG BRAVO
	USS Dubuque (LPD-8)	
	USS Durham (LKA-114)	
	USS Frederick (LST-1184)	

<u>Task Org</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Remarks</u>	<u>1</u>
TG 76.9	USS Duluth (LPD-6)	ARG CHARLIE	<u>2</u>
	USS Denver (LPD-9)		<u>3</u>
	USS MT Vernon (LSD-39)		<u>4</u>
	USS Mobile (LKA-113)		<u>5</u>
	USS Anchorage (LSD-36)	Did not Arr on Sta	<u>6</u>
2. <u>CTF 77.</u>	Commander Attack Carrier Striking Force, Seventh Fleet: RADM R. P. Coogan.		<u>7</u>
			<u>8</u>
<u>Task Org</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Remarks</u>	<u>9</u>
TU 77.0.1	USS Worden (DLG-18)	AAW Picket	<u>10</u>
	USS Gurke (DD-783)		<u>11</u>
TU 77.0.2	USS Gridley (DLG-21)	PIRAZ	<u>12</u>
	USS Bausell (DD-845)		<u>13</u>
TG 77.5	USS Coral Sea (CVA-43)	CTF 77 EMB	<u>14</u>
	USS Myerkord (DE-1058)		<u>15</u>
TG 77.7	USS Enterprise (CVAN-65)		<u>16</u>
	USS Knox (DE-1052)		<u>17</u>
	USS Reasoner (DE-1063)		<u>18</u>

NOTES:

1. While not a part of FREQUENT WIND forces, USS Oklahoma City (CLG-5), Commander Seventh Fleet, embarked, was in the immediate vicinity of TF 76 and her firepower was made available to CTF 76, if desired.
2. There were nine TF 73 MLSF ships in the vicinity of Vung Tau providing support, as required.
3. There were eight MSC ships participating in the evacuation, but not under the OPCON of COMSEVENTHFLT.

SEVENTH FLEET OPERATING/HOLDING AREAS FOR FREQUENT WIND



D-2-C-1

TAB C TO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D
SEVENTH FLEET OPERATING/HOLDING AREAS (U)

TAB C

APPENDIX 3

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U).

GROUND SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS (U)

1. General. On 26 March 1975, the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General R. E. Carey, was activated for planning contingency operations, as directed. Initially, the 9th MAB consisted of the 33d and 35th Marine Amphibious Units (MAU). On 11 April 1975, the MAB reported to CTF 76 for planning operation TALON VISE (subsequently renamed Operation FREQUENT WIND). On 13 April 1975, the 31st MAU was placed under OPCON of the Brigade. On 18 April 1975, the 9th MAB was reorganized into a doctrinally structured Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) consisting of a Headquarters, Regimental Landing Team (RLT-4), Provisional Marine Air Group (PROVMAG-39) and a Brigade Logistic Support Group (BLSG), with an additional unit functioning as a security force for MSC shipboard security. On 20 April 1975, the 9th MAB reported to CTF-76 for operations in support of the COMUSSAG/7AF. TAB A graphically portrays the 9th MAB organization.

2. Ground Security Force Planning.

a. In viewing the overall Vietnam evacuation zone, 9th MAB naturally focused their planning primarily on Saigon. Under study were the DAO compound, Tan Son Nhut area, Newport Docks, and about twelve or thirteen roof tops throughout Saigon which required small security teams. These were planned for evacuation by Air America helicopters to other military evacuation processing centers. To indicate the unpredictable situation, at first the plan called for less than 100 people to be evacuated from the Embassy. Can Tho also became a requirement and was planned for accordingly. Further, Vung Tau remained an area of possible employment throughout 9th MAB planning.

b. In general, setting the stage for the size of force which was finally employed, the following assessment was made. It was planned to employ up to two battalions in the DAO/Air America complex; in reality, two separate complexes but treated as a single complex. The Newport Docks area required a battalion, the roof tops called for approximately five-man teams on each of the twelve or thirteen roof tops and no ground security force was planned for the U.S. Embassy because they had a Marine security guard detachment there. At Can Tho, it was planned for one or two companies, depending upon the threat, and for Vung Tau, from one battalion to a brigade was planned. The planning considerations for the application of force for each of these areas and options depended upon the estimated hostile threat. The prime consideration in MAB planning was the protection of U.S. citizens requiring evacuation, with crowd control and other security considerations secondary.

c. As planning progressed, there developed a keying on the DAO/Air America complex. Newport was of lesser potential by comparison; it was planned for, but the concentration was on the DAO/Air America complex. Four basic options for the DAO/Air American complex were planned as follows:

(1) Employ one battalion in the DAO complex, to include the annex, with five landing sites and the capability of landing 12 helicopters simultaneously.

(2) Option one plus the employment of a battalion command element and a rifle company, with the option of building up to a full battalion if necessary, into the Air America compound. The additional force was primarily for security purposes to cover the evacuation of the DAO compound.

[REDACTED]

(3) Employ only two companies of ground security force within the DAO compound. This was a minimal application of force to meet a situation of negligible threat or with only a small number of evacuees.

(4) Employ no ground security force at all.

d. Ultimately, following a radio conversation between the Commanding General, 9th MAB, and Col TAYLOR, his deputy commander on the scene at the compound the morning of 29 April, it was decided to employ one battalion in the DAO complex and to be prepared to deploy the additional force for the Air America compound. This proved to be an adequate application of force, and 9th MAB did not have to put the additional company and battalion command element in the Air America compound. A key point in 9th MAB planning was flexibility with the plan structured for a "worst case" situation.

e. Command Relationships.

(1) The Command Relationships generally adhered to established lines for the GSF.

(2) During planning.

(a) American Embassy/DAO Saigon determined the basic NEMVAC requirements for RVN and identified them to COMUSSAG/7AF.

(b) COMUSSAG/7AF designated by CINCPAC as coordinating authority for NEMVAC operations in RVN and coordinated planning with Naval Forces through CINCPACFLT.

(c) CTF-76 designated On-Scene Commander.

(d) CTF-79 (III MAF) activated CTG 79.1 for planning.

(e) CTG 79.1 (9th MAB) reported to CTF 76 for planning, as directed.

(f) RLT-4 (CTU 79.1.2) BLSG (CTU 79.1.3) PROVMAg 39 (CTU 79.1.4) and Amphibious Security Forces (CTU 79.1.7) reported OPCON to 9th MAB (CTG 79.1).

(3) During Operations.

(a) American Embassy/DAO advised COMUSSAG/7AF of need to conduct evacuation operations and number of evacuees, method of evacuation, loading points, and requirements for a Ground Security Force.

(b) CINCPAC assigned Naval Forces through CINCPACFLT to support USSAG/7AF in the conduct of NEMVAC operations in RVN.

(c) USSAG/7AF, based on request from AMEMB/DAO Saigon, requested from CINCPAC the forces considered necessary to conduct the evacuation and assumed operational control of the Ground Security Force (GSF) assigned to RVN NEMVAC operations by CINCPACFLT when physically located ashore.

(d) CTG 79.1 reported OPCON to CTF-76 when directed by CTF-79.

(e) CTG 79.1, as designated Ground Security Force Commander (GSFC), was responsible for all operations ashore and the security of all designated personnel and evacuation installations located within the area of operations ashore.

(4) The established command relations for operation FREQUENT WIND essentially provided the GSF commander the lines of command and control necessary to properly accomplish his missions. The one major exception to this arrangement was the failure of CTF-76 to authorize

DIRLAUTH by CTG 79.1 with COMUSSAG/7AF. Such liaison would have facilitated GSF planning.

3. Advance Liaison and Reconnaissance (U).

a. Advance Command Element.

(1) On 19 April 1975, a Ground Security Force (GSF) Advance Command Element, consisting of the Deputy GSF Commander, Colonel Taylor; GSF Communications Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Verdun; GSF Air Officer, Major Cox; and two Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) men, proceeded to Saigon to initiate liaison with the American Embassy and the Defense Attache Office (DAO) and to conduct detailed reconnaissance of the proposed helicopter landing zones (HLZ) and fixed wing evacuation loading sites. This Advance Command Element subsequently was expanded by the addition of HLZ control teams and communicators.

(2) At the embassy, liaison was conducted with Mr. Jacobsen, Special Assistant (Field Operations), Mr. Garrett, Chief, Office of Security, and Major Kean, USMC, Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps Security Guard Company, Hong Kong, which is the parent administrative unit of the Saigon Embassy security guards. The primary purpose of liaison with the embassy was to: determine the number of Americans to be evacuated, ensure effective communication links between the embassy and DAO compound, inspect proposed HLZs on the roof and in the courtyard, and to provide a continuing GSF presence for planning purposes.

[REDACTED]

(3) The number of Americans to be evacuated was never precise inasmuch as no effective means existed to identify all American citizens in-country. Depending upon the person queried by Colonel Taylor, the number reportedly varied from 1,500 to 5,000 on any given day. Notwithstanding the problem of determining how many were to be evacuated, it was made clear to Colonel Taylor that the embassy plans called for the assembly of all Americans at the DAO compound for evacuation, that Air America helicopters would pick up the Ambassador from the roof top, and that one CH-53 helicopter would pick up the Marine Security Guard from the Embassy compound. Accordingly, no specific plans were developed for military helicopter evacuation at the Embassy.

(4) At the Defense Attache Office (DAO), the Advance Command Element worked with Major General Smith and his small evacuation planning staff, principally Colonel McCurdy, USAF, Air Attache; Captain Carmody, USN, Naval Attache; Lieutenant Colonel Tobin, USAF Plans Officer; and Major Sabater, on loan to DAO from the U.S. Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team (US Del, FPJMT). In general, Colonel Taylor had the impression that, while a unique organization in size and scope of operations and prepared to assume a vast number of responsibilities in South Vietnam, the DAO was not organized or prepared for the conduct of NEMVAC operations. Nevertheless, they were so tasked by the embassy. The DAO was already fully occupied with its efforts to provide

[REDACTED]

materiel support for RVNAF, concentration on the fixed wing evacuation operations tasked by the Ambassador, and performance of other essential tasks.

(5) The GSF Advance Command Echelon prepared defensive plans for the twelve helicopter landing sites in the compound and the DAO Dodge City annex behind the compound, and planned for the destruction of the DAO compound upon final evacuation.

(6) During the period of time from 19 to 28 April 1975, DAO concentrated on the fixed wing evacuation

Because the DAO did not have sufficient professionally qualified people, it was augmented by a Marine Security platoon and flight line personnel, which materially assisted in this phase of the operation.

b. Landing Zone Preparations.

(1) LZ selection and preparation was assigned as the immediate task for the Advance Command Element. The selection of sites was limited by the existing perimeter of the DAO complex and by the availability of open spaces that would be capable of handling CH-53 helicopters. The principal desires in site selection were defensibility of the site by the GSF and concealment of preparatory activities from the Vietnamese outside the compound.

[REDACTED]

(2) Site improvement consisted of removing obstacles to aerial flight such as lightpoles, flagpoles, wires, and other obvious obstacles that would impede aerial approach to the LZ. In addition, numerous obstacles on or around the sites had to be removed such as fences, sheds, complete buildings, power lines and many trees. Some of the sites were paved and did not require any surface preparation, but others consisting of compacted earth required preparation with soil coagulants to make them durable for use over an extended period of time.

(3) Some difficulty was perceived in obtaining necessary permission or approval for site preparation activities, assumed to be because of the hesitancy to disclose preparations prematurely to the Vietnamese. In addition, some of the skilled equipment operators were evacuated by fixed wing aircraft during this period which diminished essential operator capability and talent and resulted in obstacle clearance occurring up to within several hours of the commencement of helicopter operations.

(4) As the LZ were nearing completion, photographs were taken from the approach angle to be utilized by incoming aircraft and of the ingress and egress routes to be flown to and from the city. This photography included all known check points and obstacles to flight and was accomplished at the proper flight altitudes. These photographs were used to brief the Commanding General, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (9th MAB), his staff, and the helicopter squadron commanders so they would be familiar with the area prior to execution of Option IV.

[REDACTED]

(5) Plans were made in coordination with the DAO staff for internal LZ operations to include the handling of people to be accumulated in each zone regardless of whether they arrived by bus, on foot, or by Air America helicopter. Each LZ with the exception of LZ #39 (see TAB B) had a fully briefed and trained marshaling team present to organize people into groups of approximately fifty, manifest them, and, as necessary, search and control baggage. Marshals were in communication with Landing Zone Control Teams (LZCT) on the roof at DAO compound or in the Annex who directed helicopters into the LZ as required. Evacuees were guided to the helicopters by well marked individuals wearing high visibility colors and carrying ping pong paddles painted different colors to overcome the noise problems caused by the aircraft. As a result of this technique, GSF personnel experienced no difficulties in loading.

(6) Preplanned procedures for helicopter control called for CRICKET to hand off incoming helicopters to the LZCT when they crossed the initial point (IP) designated Key-hole (see TAB C). The LZCT would direct the helicopters into appropriate sites and provide information on the local enemy situation, weather, and obstacles. It was further planned to consolidate to LZ #37 as the number of evacuees diminished and as darkness approached to simplify security requirements and to facilitate lift out of the pre-serialized GSF at the termination of operations.

4. [REDACTED] Intelligence Considerations.

a. Summary of Threat-Planning Phase. During the 9th MAB planning phase, NVA forces were continuously pressing

towards the MR III/Saigon enclave, providing a sense of
urgency in the GSF planning. As plans were being finalized
towards the end of April, NVA forces continued to drive
toward the Bien Hoa/Long Binh complex. During the night of
27-28 April, an estimated 500-1,000 rounds of artillery
fire impacted on the Bien Hoa Air Base. Indications were
that elements of the 7th NVA Division were attacking the
rear of the 18th ARVN Division east of Bien Hoa, and elements
of the 341st NVA Division were attacking from the east with
tanks and air defense weapons. Shelling of Long Lac (11
miles east of Bien Hoa) by 122mm field artillery began on the
29th. Reports indicated that NVA forces had attacked along the
Korean Highway between Bien Hoa and Saigon. NVA forces
continued to move north along QL-15 towards Long Binh to
outflank the two Marine brigades. The Bien Hoa/Long Binh
complex was expected to fall into NVA/VC hands sometime the
29th. During the night of 27-28 April, enemy forces also
overran the town of Tan Uyen located northwest of Bien Hoa.
In the area between Saigon and Bien Hoa, fighting rapidly
intensified. On the morning of 28 April, sappers entered
the Newport compound and burned two warehouses and later
fired B-40 rockets into the USAID warehouse near QL-1.
VC troops were reportedly stopping travelers along QL-1
and intending to cut power lines to Saigon and move AAA
into the area. A large flow of refugees was reported
coming from Bien Hoa, but ARVN road blocks near Bien Hoa
and also at Newport bridge hindered the movement. An
unidentified enemy unit was moving west along LTL-25
toward Nhon Trach Town and encountering stiff ARVN
resistance. It appeared that the NVA were driving west-
ward in order to shell Saigon with the 20,800 meter range
122mm guns. In southern Phuoc Tuy, NVA forces positioned
artillery to support attacks on Vung Tau and reportedly

[REDACTED]

captured 20 tanks from ARVN airborne and Marine units
which they were anticipated to use in attacks. Attacks
by fire against Vung Tau were expected and unidentified
elements of the 3d NVA Division were driving southwest
toward Vung Tau. The threat to Tan Son Nhut had increased
dramatically not only from NVA ground units but also from
the air. On the 28th, six A-37s attacked and bombed Tan
Son Nhut. Other A-37s were prevented from conducting bomb
runs by friendly AA fire. Eleven aircraft were destroyed
on the ground. C-130s departing Tan Son Nhut reported
receiving ground fire from runway 25. A 57mm AA zone was
established just north of the base and a 23mm area just
west of the base. Reports continued to be received which
indicated that the NVA was moving ammunition rapidly into
the area just outside of Tan Son Nhut in order to shell the
air base. The Joint General Staff estimated that attacks
by fire against Tan Son Nhut would probably occur the night
of 28 April. In Saigon, the palace was reportedly strafed
at the same time that the air attack took place against Tan
Son Nhut. An NVA force of up to four regiments attacked
Tay Ninh and the ARVN were reported withdrawing along QL-22.
West and southwest of Saigon, fighting continued with QL-4
interdicted in Long An and Dinh Thuong Provinces. In other
developments: The NVA brought FAN SONG radars into
the area northeast of Bien Hoa. The FAN SONG, normally
associated with the SA-2 surface-to-air missile system,
would extend the SAM envelope just northwest of Bien Hoa.
A debrief of a VNAF helicopter pilot who landed on the USS
BLUE RIDGE on the night of 27 April revealed that ARVN would
probably fire on any aircraft departing Tan Son Nhut.

b. Summary of Enemy Activity - Execution Phase. Early on
the morning of 29 April, Tan Son Nhut and the DAO com-
pound took incoming, both 122mm rockets and artillery.

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Two Marines at the DAO were killed and one USAF C-130 was reported hit and destroyed. Other aircraft were subjected to hostile fire during the evacuation. A listing of reported incidents, other than small arms/automatic weapons fire is attached at Tab D.

5. Ground Operations

a. General Plan

(1) The plan envisioned for the DAO Compound and implemented called for a battalion command group and a minimum of four companies occupying assigned defensive positions along the perimeter. (See TAB E) Each company was provided sufficient area to achieve desirable tactical dispersion; however, each company area was small enough in tactical responsibility so a multiple security force could be quickly concentrated at any point in the compound on very short notice. The battalion was further required to have its Bravo command group control the DAO Annex area and throughout the DAO complex assist in crowd control, marshaling, and other tasks incident to getting the job done.

(2) The plan was sufficiently flexible so that additional forces could be introduced to meet any contingency. An example of this flexibility was when the American Embassy requested a platoon to assist in crowd control, marshaling, and movement of evacuees. This platoon was introduced at 0900Z. Subsequently, the Embassy required further augmentation and an additional two platoons were introduced at 1100Z and at 1300Z, respectively.

b. Events That Led to Decision to Employ One Battalion Landing Team

(1) On 29 April at 0415Z, the initial recommendation from the Deputy Ground Security Force Commander in the DAO compound was to employ one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) in the DAO complex and a minimum of one rifle company from a second BLT in the Air America Compound. Forces were alerted and appropriate fragmentary orders were issued. This initial recommendation was based on the fast moving enemy threat approaching the DAO/Air America area.

Additionally, the desire to achieve a fast build-up was also influenced by the observed AAA activity around Tan Son Nhut. Members of the DAO and the GSF had observed a number of VNAF aircraft destroyed in flight on the 28th and 29th of April.

(2) The tactical plan required an exact helicopter flow and any deviation from the planned flow could place the GSF elements in an undesirable tactical situation to cope with the many unknowns that existed. One unknown specifically was the reaction of local Vietnamese Nationals around the compound when increased GSF activity was observed.

(3) The Ground Security Force Commander, after consulting with the Commanding Officer, RLT-4, modified the plan to introduce only one Battalion Landing Team in the DAO Compound. After assessing the full situation, his rationale was that:

(a) Crowd control operations were going smoothly.

(b) GVN/ARVN security for the most part was effective.

(c) The enemy threat to the compound at this time was not imminent because ARVN forces were actively fighting the NVA/VC at Tan Son Nhut.

(d) Every additional Marine that was introduced had to be withdrawn, thus prolonging the evacuation period.

(e) The evacuation was proceeding on schedule and no problems were anticipated with the continuing flow of evacuees from the compound.

c. Operational Summary

(1) At 290415Z April 1975, the GSF received the order to execute Operation FREQUENT WIND. The GSF initial elements commenced their tactical alignment aboard the various amphibious ships at 290430Z (see TAB E) with the first elements arriving in the DAO landing zones at 290706Z.

(2) The plan called for the tactical build-up at the DAO prior to commencing evacuation; however, the GSF commander's assessment of the situation allowed immediate implementation of the evacuation.

(3) Forces of BLT 2/4 deployed to their assigned security areas without incident. (See TAB F) BLT 2/4 was augmented by the 3d Platoon, Company C, BLT 1/9 which had been at the DAO Compound since 260300Z. The total 9th MAB GSF ashore numbered 946.

(4) A ready reaction force, called a SPARROW HAWK, consisting of a platoon from Company A, BLT 1/9 was airborne aboard two CH-46 aircraft. Additionally, a command group and two companies of BLT 1/9 were alerted and prepared to launch if required.

[REDACTED]

(5) As the evacuation at the DAO progressed, it became apparent that the numbers of evacuees at the American Embassy far exceeded the planning figure. The security provided there by the 43 Marines of the Embassy Security Guard Detachment proved to be insufficient and additional forces were required. Between the hours of 290900Z and 291300Z, three platoons (130 Marines) from BLT 2/4 were lifted by three CH-53 helicopters from the DAO compound to augment the Embassy.

(6) The GSF began to withdraw from the DAO at 291336Z with the last elements departing at 291612Z without incident. The DAO compound was destroyed by demolitions and thermite grenades by the departing GSF. (See TAB G)

(7) The evacuation at the US Embassy was not a coordinated action. This resulted from the confusion as to the total number of evacuees to be transported which was never made clear, and the lack of the necessary command and control to properly accomplish evacuation requirements. The GSF had only scheduled a single helicopter lift from the Embassy, hence no plan existed for the large volume of evacuees assembled there.

Inasmuch as the Embassy plan was for minimum evacuation from that location, the execution of the unplanned lift became essentially a "seat of the pants" operation. The Embassy staff, without full knowledge of the situation, became involved in reporting numbers of evacuees and made other recommendations affecting the operation (e.g., indicating the number of helicopters required to complete the Embassy evacuation) in most instances without consultation with the military members present. The primary military coordinator at the Embassy was Major J. H. Kean, USMC, a commander

[REDACTED]

in the Marine Security Guard system with permanent duty assignment in Hong Kong. Functioning under and reporting to the Embassy staff, he commenced evacuation preparations such as felling trees for LZ clearance, removing vehicles and reviewing security requirements. It became clear early in the evacuation that additional security was required to augment the 43 Marines of the Embassy guard. In addition to the three SPARROW HAWK teams provided, limited augmentation was provided by the arrival of the six member US Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) headed by US Army Colonel Madison at the Embassy at noon on 29 April. These members provided valuable assistance throughout the evacuation. Their primary function was to marshal and control evacuees and they remained on the scene until approximately 292130Z reporting evacuee totals to the Embassy Staff. Neither Major Kean nor Colonel Madison were kept current with the overall situation. Further, their functioning as the LZ coordinator and evacuee marshal for the CH-53 flights from the parking lot LZ restricted their availability to monitor the total evacuation picture. The fact is that no one agency/person was in overall charge of Embassy evacuation. This caused erroneous reports to be provided to the GSF commander and led to other senior headquarters being provided inaccurate information. This factor impacted on the helicopter flow and probably resulted in the failure to evacuate 420 foreign nationals who were processed and scheduled for lift throughout the

latter stage of the operation. Tab H portrays the situation at the Embassy during the evacuation.

(8) The evacuation at the Embassy continued throughout the early morning hours. The GSF began its extraction at 292000Z and continued until the last element departed at 292346Z from the Embassy roof top.

d. TAB F portrays the tactical emplacement of RLT-4 forces in the DAO complex.

6. Helicopter Operations

a. Planning Phase

(1) The 9th MAB, under CTF 76, was tasked to develop and submit a plan outlining specific helicopter operations including routes, altitudes, numbers and type, lift capacity per cycle (GSF and evacuees), and general procedures.

(2) The commander's guidance to his planners was as follows:

(a) Provide to CTF 76 a Helicopter Flow Schedule that will support GSF scheme of maneuver ashore for insertion of GSF, evacuation operations, and extraction of GSF.

(b) Include in Helicopter Flow Schedule flexibility to allow insertion, evacuation, and extraction to/from multiple sites in Saigon (e.g., DAO, Tan Son Nhut, and Newport), Vung Tau or Can Tho areas, and plan for multi-deck operations on launch/recovery decks at sea.

(c) Be prepared to conduct night and IFR operations in a "daisy chain" operation from multiple sites as required. Flow to be controlled by Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC).

(d) Provide armed helicopter escort (Cobra),	<u>1</u>
Sparrow Hawk (platoon embarked in 2 CH-46), SAR,	<u>2</u>
and airborne ambassador recovery capability.	<u>3</u>
(3) Some of the planning considerations in develop-	<u>4</u>
ing the plan were:	<u>5</u>
(a) Aircraft availability	<u>6</u>
<u>1.</u> 90% 1st lift	<u>7</u>
<u>2.</u> 85% 2d lift	<u>8</u>
<u>3.</u> 75% sustained	<u>9</u>
(b) Aircraft inventory	<u>10</u>
<u>1.</u> 44 H-53 (including 10 USAF helos on USS	<u>11</u>
MIDWAY)	<u>12</u>
<u>2.</u> 27 CH-46 (3 subsequently became unavailable	<u>13</u>
with departure of USS DUBUQUE)	<u>14</u>
<u>3.</u> 6 UH-1E	<u>15</u>
<u>4.</u> 8 AH-1J	<u>16</u>
(c) Cycle rate	<u>17</u>
<u>1.</u> 90 minutes based on 70 mile round trip	<u>18</u>
to most distant site (DAO/Air America) from an	<u>19</u>
average MODLOC.	<u>20</u>
(d) GSF Insertion/Extraction	<u>21</u>
<u>1.</u> Helicopter flow developed to accommodate	<u>22</u>
insertion/extraction of two battalions (1680	<u>23</u>
personnel).	<u>24</u>
<u>2.</u> Helicopter Employment Landing Assault	<u>25</u>
Tables (HEALT) were developed accordingly.	<u>26</u>
(e) Deck Availability	<u>27</u>
<u>1.</u> USS MIDWAY - 10 spots (initially USAF heli-	<u>28</u>
copters were planned to operate only from CVA,	<u>29</u>
but during execution they did operate from	<u>30</u>
amphibious shipping.	<u>31</u>

2. USS HANCOCK - 7 spots

3. USS OKINAWA - 5 spots

4. Other amphibious shipping - 8 spots

b. Operational Summary

(1) Multi-deck operations during the period preceding L-Hour were required to facilitate an immediate build-up of forces ashore to achieve the desired readiness posture for insertion of forces in the Evacuation Objective Area (EOA). It was planned to introduce a large number of personnel into the EOA as fast as possible. Multi-deck operations permitted accomplishment of this objective. The troops to be used for the Ground Security Force were embarked in the helicopters from six ships. There were 880 troops to be initially landed in the landing zones. This landing of GSF personnel was accomplished by two flights of twelve aircraft each. Each flight was designed to land twelve aircraft simultaneously in the DAO compound. The second of the two flights followed very close behind the first so as to provide immediate introduction of the prescribed combat power. To accomplish the task described above, a pre-L-Hour helicopter transfer plan was required. This plan was designed to distribute the proper personnel to appropriate helicopter platform spots for a subsequent simultaneous departure to the EOA. The plan, enclosed at Tab E depicts helicopter lifts required to accomplish specific pre-L-Hour transfer evolutions.

(2) After receipt of the execution order for Option IV at 290415Z the first helicopters launched at 290430Z to accomplish the required cross decking. The first helicopters of the first wave touched down in the DAO compound at 290706Z.

[REDACTED]

(3) A GSF of 880 personnel was introduced during the first wave which consisted of 36 H-53 aircraft, 1970 evacuees were removed from the DAO and the elapsed time for the first wave was 90 minutes. The average load for each aircraft was 55 passengers.

(4) The second wave accomplished the lift of 2057 evacuees through 33 sorties which were accomplished over a 105 minute time span. The average load for each aircraft was 62 passengers.

(5) The third wave was accomplished in a 146 minute evolution with 29 sorties lifting 1540 evacuees from the DAO. This essentially cleared the DAO of all evacuees less the GSF.

(6) A total of 122 sorties were flown during the evacuation of the DAO with 6416 passengers lifted from that location. This total includes 395 US citizens, 5205 foreign nationals, and 816 GSF personnel, The last GSF departed the DAO compound at 291612Z.

(7) At approximately 291000Z the evacuation of the US Embassy began. This movement was not completed until 292346Z. During the period 18 H-53 and 54 CH-46 sorties evacuated 2379 passengers of which 978 were US citizens, 1228 were foreign nationals and 173 USMC personnel.

(8) One of the significant operational aspects of FREQUENT WIND was the extensive helicopter flight operations which were conducted at night. Of the total sorties flown by the helicopter force, approximately half were flown during hours of darkness. Further, the majority of these sorties were flown into the embassy, an area of operations

unfamiliar to the pilots. Related to these night helicopter operations was the effective use of the AH-1J helicopter in guiding evacuation helicopters to the landing sites.

(9) Tab C displays the helicopter approach and retirement routes. These routes were periodically modified in actual flight by the pilots when required because of poor weather and hostile enemy fire.

(10) At approximately 291300Z a CH-53 received minor damage when hit by AAA fire, the helicopter was able to continue its mission. Aircrew losses sustained were two CH-46 pilots who were lost at sea while on a SAR mission. In addition to the CH-46 aircraft lost on the SAR mission, an AH-1J was lost at sea when it ditched due to fuel exhaustion. This was caused by the available landing decks being blocked by Air America aircraft. Both AH-1J pilots were recovered with no injuries.

(11) Helicopter Command and Control.

(a) The approved plan called for helicopter assets being controlled by the PROVMAG commanding officer located in the command ship USS BLUE RIDGE utilizing TACC afloat capabilities. The Helicopter Direction Center (HDC), located on the USS OKINAWA, gave radar coverage to each flight to their "Feet Dry" entry points and turned them over to the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) in an EC-130. Flights and waves of aircraft were to be programmed in an orderly flow based on GSF commander's desires.

(b) Tab I is the Helicopter Flow Chart for the overall evacuation.

(c) The chart indicates that the planned helicopter schedule for evacuation from the DAO was essentially adhered to and was accomplished expeditiously. The

[REDACTED]

gap which exists in the DAO lift from the time of the last evacuees' extraction to the commencement of movement of the GSF is explained by the desire to concentrate on the Embassy during that period. At 1035Z, the GSF commander had requested his PROVMAAG commander to "... direct all aircraft from the DAO to Embassy, one arriving every 25 minutes. I want to saturate the Embassy."

(d) The flow chart indicates what appears to be a 2 hour gap in operations from about 1700Z to 1900Z. This period does not represent total non-flying time inasmuch as the one way trip from ship to shore was taking approximately 45 minutes because of hostile ground fire and adverse weather conditions. Following the extraction of the GSF from the DAO compound at 1612Z all H-53 helicopters were directed by CTF 76 to return to base for aircraft servicing and crew rest. Although instructions were given to continue evacuation of the embassy with CH-46s, CTF 76 decided it was necessary to shut them down for required maintenance checks which took the better part of an hour to accomplish.

(e) These instructions to shut down the helicopters were not communicated to COMUSSAG. In point of fact, COMUSSAG was operating on information from CTF-76 that eight helicopters were inbound starting at 291647Z.

(f) Discussion with key personnel involved in the helicopter flow and review of message traffic indicates the control of helicopters by the TACC/HDC was not consistently accomplished according to the above plan. A contributing factor to this may have been the heavy


unplanned lift requirement at the embassy. Despite this unplanned lift and in view of the large number of helicopter assets available, it would appear that better management of the flow by the TACC/HDC would have resulted in helicopters being available on a continuous basis at the evacuation sites.

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
TABS

- A - 9th MAB ORGANIZATION
- B - 9TH MAP LANDING ZONES
- C - HELICOPTER APPROACH AND RETIREMENT ROUTES
- D - INTELLIGENCE SITUATION
- E - HELICOPTER CROSS-DECKING
- F - 9TH MAB DEFENSIVE PLAN
- G - DAO COMPOUND DESTRUCTION
- H - EMBASSY EVACUATION SITUATION
- I - HELICOPTER FLOW CHART


9TH MAB LANDING ZONES



LEGEND



TAB D TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)
 INTELLIGENCE SITUATION (U)



TAB E

TAB E TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

FORCE COMPOSITION/DISPOSITION

Helicopter Cross Decking. The following list is a time sequence of the pre-L-hour launching and loading of the first 24 aircraft, which are the aircraft that carried the Ground Security Force to their designated landing zone. Additionally, during the launch and loading of the 24 troop carriers, eight CH-46 aircraft were launched, as well as four AHLJ's (Cobra gunships), all of which had to be fitted into the empty deck space. Further, there were a limited number of launch spots available on the primary launch ships. There were five available on the LPH-3 (Okinawa) and seven available on the CVA-19 (Hancock). This evolution was also complicated by the fact that the 24 troop/evacuee helos had to be refueled before launching on their trips to the designated landing zones. The schedule follows:

<u>TIME</u>	<u>SHIP</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
L-2:00	Hancock (CVA-19)	Launch 6 CH-53 for troop pick-up (3 to Vancouver (LPD-2), 3 to Peoria (LST-1183))
L-1:50	Vancouver (LPD-2)	Land 2 CH-53 from Hancock for troop pick-up
L-1:45	Vancouver (LPD-2)	Launch 2 CH-53 w/troops to Hancock for refuel
L-1:45	Vancouver (LPD-2)	Land 1 CH-53 from Hancock for troop pick-up
L-1:40	Vancouver (LPD-2)	Launch 1 CH-53 w/troops to Hancock for refuel
L-1:40	Hancock (CVA-19)	Launch 3 CH-53 to Vancouver for troop pick-up


<u>TIME</u>	<u>SHIP</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u></u>
			<u>1</u>
L-1:40	Peoria (LST-1183)	Land 1 CH-53 for troop pick-up	<u>2</u>
L-1:35	Peoria (LST-1183)	Launch 1 CH-53 w/troops to	<u>3</u>
		Hancock for refuel	<u>4</u>
L-1:35	Peoria (LST-1183)	Land 1 CH-53 for troop pick-up	<u>5</u>
L-1:30	Peoria (LST-1183)	Launch 1 CH-53 w/troops to	<u>6</u>
		Hancock for refuel	<u>7</u>
L-1:30	Okinawa (LPH-3)	Load 2 CH-53 w/troops	<u>8</u>
L-1:30	Vancouver (LPD-2)	Land 1 CH-53 for troop pick-up	<u>9</u>
L-1:30	Peoria (LST-1183)	Land 1 CH-53 for troop pick-up	<u>10</u>
L-1:25	Vancouver (LPD-2)	Launch 1 CH-53 w/troops to	<u>11</u>
		Mt Vernon for refuel	<u>12</u>
L-1:25	Peoria (LST-1183)	Launch 1 CH-53 w/troops to	<u>13</u>
		Hancock for refuel	<u>14</u>
L-1:25	Vancouver (LPD-2)	Land 2 CH-53 for troop pick-up	<u>15</u>
		and refuel	<u>16</u>
L-1:20	Okinawa (LPH-3)	Launch 4 CH-53 (2 w/troops to	<u>17</u>
		Dubuque for refuel, 2 to Peoria	<u>18</u>
		for troop pick-up)	<u>19</u>
L-1:15	Hancock (CVA-19)	Land 3 CH-53 w/troops from	<u>20</u>
		Peoria for refuel	<u>21</u>
L-1:15	Mt Vernon (LSD-39)	Land 1 CH-53 w/troops from	<u>22</u>
		Vancouver for refuel	<u>23</u>
L-1:10	Okinawa (LPH-3)	Load 4 CH-53 w/troops	<u>24</u>
L-1:00	Okinawa (LPH-3)	Launch 4 CH-53 w/troops (2 to	<u>25</u>
		Denver for refuel, 2 to Duluth	<u>26</u>
		for refuel)	<u>27</u>
L-1:00	Hancock (CVA-19)	Launch 3 CH-53 to Okinawa for	<u>28</u>
		troop pick-up and refuel	<u>29</u>
L-1:00	Dubuque (LPD-8)	Land 2 CH-53 w/troops from	<u>30</u>
		Okinawa for refuel	<u>31</u>




<u>TIME</u>	<u>SHIP</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>1</u>
L-1:00	Peoria (LST-1183)	Land 1 CH-53 for troop pick-up	<u>2</u>
L-0:50	Denver (LPD-9)	Land 1 CH-53 w/troops from	<u>3</u>
		Okinawa for refuel	<u>4</u>
L-0:50	Duluth (LPD-6)	Land 1 CH-53 w/troops from	<u>5</u>
		Okinawa for refuel	<u>6</u>
L-0:50	Hancock (CVA-19)	Land 3 CH-53 w/troops from	<u>7</u>
		Vancouver for refuel	<u>8</u>
L-0:50	Peoria (LST-1183)	Launch 1 CH-53 w/troops to	<u>9</u>
		Mobile for refuel	<u>10</u>
L-0:50	Peoria (LST-1183)	Land 1 CH-53 for troop pick-up	<u>11</u>
		and refuel	<u>12</u>
L-0:45	Denver (LPD-9)	Land 1 CH-53 w/troops from	<u>13</u>
		Okinawa for refuel	<u>14</u>
L-0:45	Duluth (LPD-6)	Land 1 CH-53 w/troops from	<u>15</u>
		Okinawa for refuel	<u>16</u>
L-0:40	Mobile (LKA-115)	Land 1 CH-53 w/troops from	<u>17</u>
		Peoria for refuel	<u>18</u>
L-0:40	Okinawa (LPH-3)	Load 4 CH-53 w/troops	<u>19</u>
L-0:30		Launch 1st wave of 12 CH-53	<u>20</u>
		(4 from Okinawa, 2 each from	<u>21</u>
		Dubuque, Denver, and Duluth,	<u>22</u>
		and 1 each from Mobile and	<u>23</u>
		Peoria)	<u>24</u>
L-0:30	Okinawa (LPH-3)	Land 3 CH-53 for troop pick-up	<u>25</u>
		and refuel	<u>26</u>
L-0:15		Launch 2d wave of 12 CH-53	<u>27</u>
		(6 from Hancock, 3 from	<u>28</u>
		Okinawa, 2 from Vancouver and	<u>29</u>
		1 from Mt Vernon)	<u>30</u>
			<u>31</u>




9TH MAB DEFENSIVE PLAN





TAB G TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)
DAO COMPOUND DESTRUCTION (U)






TAB I TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)
HELICOPTER FLOW CHART (U)







APPENDIX 4

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX D TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

FORCE READINESS (U)

1. General. Following the EAGLE PULL evacuation of Cambodia, Seventh Air Force and Seventh Fleet forces resumed a normal WESTPAC readiness posture (ARGs ALFA and BRAVO were placed on 72-hour alert) which, for Seventh Fleet ships, permitted port visits throughout the area from Singapore to Japan. By 18 April 1975, many units had been in port less than 24 hours when CINCPAC, responding to JCS direction, ordered all FREQUENT WIND forces to assume a 24-hour response to Vung Tau as soon as possible. In conjunction with the increased readiness posture, CINCPAC reconfigured a second CVA, USS MIDWAY, for helicopter operations; embarked USAF CH/HH-53 helicopters from Thailand; and constituted the third Amphibious Ready Group, ARG CHARLIE, comprised of relief ships reporting in from CONUS and elements of the USMC 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines on Okinawa. Later on 18 April, CINCPAC further increased the readiness posture to a 6-hour alert status, to be attained on arrival off Vung Tau for Seventh Fleet units. The alert status was subsequently advanced to 1 hour as of first light 28 April and alternately changed between 1 and 6 hours to correspond with daylight and darkness, respectively, until execution was directed on 29 April. The first L-hour announcement came as an alerting order for 282230Z in anticipation of a maximum C-130 evacuation lift. This assumed L-hour was superseded by COMUSSAG/7AF 282325Z Apr 75 (see Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex A for this and all subsequent messages referenced in this appendix) which directed the launch of all USAF support aircraft, less TACAIR, for an L-hour of 290300Z. Several iterations of L-hour ensued, with 290700Z finally set and executed for Option IV. Routine WESTPAC

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readiness postures were resumed following the JCS 300054Z
Apr 75 termination of FREQUENT WIND operations.

2. Alert Posture. In the initial planning phases for the
helicopter evacuation of Vietnam, it was determined that the
critical event with respect to a timing reference point was
the actual arrival at the Landing Zones (LZs) of the first
helicopters. This set FREQUENT WIND Option IV apart from the
EAGLE PULL operation as well as other options in the Vietnam
evacuation plan, since L-hour had been defined previously as the
launch hour for the type aircraft planned to be employed. While
some minor confusion existed initially over this distinction,
including conflicting applications in the Option IV plan promul-
gated by USSAG/7AF, this ambiguity was cleared up well in advance
of the execution phase and caused no problems (see COMSEVENTHFLT
240258Z Apr 75 and USSAG/7AF 240745Z Apr 75). Nevertheless, as
events led to advancing the readiness posture to a 1-hour alert
status, additional clarification became necessary in applying
a 1-hour response to the L-hour flow requirements in the OPLAN.
In reporting attainment of the 1-hour alert posture at 272030Z,
CTF 76 included the caveat that redistribution of the GSF
required a 2-hour notification prior to L-hour (see Appendix 3
to Annex D for a detailed discussion of intrafleet transfer
requirements). The redistribution requirement had been ad-
dressed in joint planning sessions and was included in
supporting plans which were known to the operating commands
involved in the evacuation, but which were not forwarded to
CINCPAC and JCS. In response to the CTG 76 message, COMUSSAG/
7AF clarified the issue by stating that the 1-hour alert did
not constitute L minus 1 hour, but was keyed to the launch of
the first support aircraft. Since this occurred at L minus
3 hours, COMUSSAG/7AF defined the 1-hour alert status as
L minus 4 hours and holding, and advised that the posturing

[REDACTED]

of personnel and equipment should be adjusted accordingly (see COMUSSAG/7AF 280255Z Apr 75). This clarification was not provided to Washington agencies.

3. L-Hour Chronicle. As the situation around Saigon became critical on 28 April, the decision was made to attempt a maximum effort C-130 evacuation lift beginning as soon as possible upon receipt of the CINCPAC execute order (see CINCPAC 281412Z Apr 75; also see Tab A for a compendium of all significant L-hour-related traffic). USSAG/7AF 281745Z April 75 directed that FREQUENT WIND Forces assume a 1-hour alert posture and provided a reference time of 282215Z on which to base launch requirements. The message also stated that forces would not be launched without an execute message. The C-130 execute order was dispatched at 281809Z followed by COMUSSAG/7AF 282325Z which directed the launch of all USAF support aircraft, less TACAIR, for an L-hour of 290300Z. By 290220Z, with ABCCC and other non-TACAIR support aircraft on station and with C-130's holding feet wet off Vung Tau, Tan Son Nhut airport was declared unsafe for fixed wing operations. At 290251Z CINCPAC ordered execution of Option IV over the secure voice conference net (see Appendix 3 to Annex C) and followed this with a message execute order, CINCPAC 290252Z Apr 75. Although there were many headquarters and commands involved in FREQUENT WIND, the principal ones for purposes of L-hour auditing are COMUSSAG/7AF, CINCPACFLT and CTF 76. Since prior to insertion of the GSF ashore CTG 79.1 was collocated with and subordinate to CTF 76, only CTF 76 will be addressed in this context.

a. COMUSSAG/7AF. Upon receipt of the Option IV execute order over the secure voice net, COMUSSAG/7AF dispatched an execute message (290251Z Apr 75) to all concerned which established L-hour as 290300Z for TACAIR reference timing

purposes and stated that USSAG/7AF would direct insertion
time for GSF to coincide with TACAIR. This message was
retransmitted by USSAG/7AF under DTG 290317Z Apr 75 (with
additional addressees) and was received by CTF 76 at 290328Z,
47 minutes earlier than the original message. Immediately
following receipt of the execute for Option IV, COMUSSAG/7AF
began trying to determine the earliest L-hour that the fleet
could make, in view of the fact that the support aircraft,
less TACAIR, were already on station, but with the knowledge
that the 2-hour cross-decking requirement existed. COMUSSAG/
7AF requested that CHFLTCOORDGRP collocated in the same
building communicate with the fleet to establish L-hour. The
Fleet Flash Net, CHFLTCOORDGRP's fastest means of record
communications with CINCPACFLT and CTF 76, was temporarily
out of service at this time. He therefore called CINCPACFLT
on a secure voice telephone, the results of which were an
understanding by CINCPACFLT that an L-hour of 290430Z was
desired by COMUSSAG/7AF. While COMUSSAG/7AF awaited what
he believed to be the CINCPACFLT negotiation of an L-hour,
CINCPAC directed, in a series of conversations on the
secure voice net between 0318Z and 0328Z, that the heli-
copters get started into Saigon. Although USSAG/7AF had
raised the GSF cross-decking requirement with PACOM 2 hours
earlier (290115Z and 290210Z), COMUSSAG/7AF was uncertain
as to the status of the GSF redistribution process. Accord-
ingly, COMUSSAG/7AF directed (290350Z Apr 75) the launch of
Navy TACAIR ASAP with a helicopter LZ time to be set 15
minutes after the TACAIR arrival on station. At 290416Z
COMUSSAG/7AF received CINCPACFLT 290340Z Apr 75 which set
L-hour as 290430Z. In view of the CINCPAC secure voice
net order and the two messages referred to above, COMUSSAG/7AF

considered his obligation to establish a GSF insertion time fulfilled and issued no further directives regarding L-hour. When he later received CTF 76 messages stating that the earliest GSF time at the LZ would be 290600Z, subsequently modified to 290700Z, COMUSSAG/7AF accepted these revised L-hours as exigencies of the situation. Direct contact with CTF 76 was not attempted.

b. CINCPACFLT. Following the telephone conversation with the CHFLTCOORDGRP concerning the negotiation of L-hour, and believing that COMUSSAG/7AF desired 290430Z, CINCPACFLT established (290340Z Apr 75) the L-hour as 290430Z.

c. CTF 76. Since the CTF 76 ships were not on the secure voice conference net over which the decision to execute Option IV was passed, the receipt of CINCPAC 290252Z Apr 75 at 290308Z was the first Option IV execute order received by CTF 76. This was followed by COMUSSAG/7AF 290317Z Apr 75, received at 290328Z, which repeated the execute, established 290300Z as L-hour for TACAIR timing purposes and advised that GSF insertion time would be forthcoming. Neither of these messages was interpreted to require initiation of GSF cross-decking, however, since they did not establish an L-hour, per se, for helicopter operations. They did serve to alert the GSF and the helicopter personnel and initial preparatory actions short of helicopter movement were taken. Direct contact with USSAG/7AF was not attempted. Upon receipt at 0350Z of the CINCPACFLT message directing an 0430Z L-hour, initiation of the GSF cross-decking was directed, but it was apparent to CTF 76 that 0430Z at the LZ's could not be met. Following consultation with the GSF Commander and receipt of authority from COMSEVENTHFLT to

adjust timing as necessary, CTF 76 dispatched (290442Z Apr 75) a message to COMUSSAG/7AF giving 290600Z as the earliest GSF insertion time and stating that CTF 76 would so execute unless directed otherwise. CTF 76 followed this with a message (290444Z Apr 75) to all fleet units establishing L-hour as 290600Z. In monitoring the progress of the interships transfers and helicopter refueling, the HDC determined that the 0600Z L-hour could not be met. CTF 76 290532Z Apr 75 changed the L-hour to 290700Z. Subsequently, the first GSF landed at 0706Z and the first wave of evacuees was lifted out at 0712Z.

4. Summary. Attainment of the initial 24-hour readiness posture, including the formation of a third ARG and the integration of USAF helicopters and a second attack carrier into the evacuation forces, posed no insurmountable problems. The 6-hour and 1-hour alert status adjustments were achieved as directed, requiring only the clarification of the application of the 1-hour alert to the L-hour schedule of events. There was, however, confusion in the fleet amphibious forces over the various iterations of L-hour. Having clearly established L-hour as the time of arrival in the helicopter LZ's in the plan and in pre-execute dialogue between the fleet and USSAG/7AF, CTF 76 and CTG 79.1 considered the subordination of the helicopter L-hour to that for TACAIR to be, in effect, a redefinition of the term which exacerbated the problems encountered in determining execution timing for the intership transfers of the GSF. Specifically, the establishment of an L-hour for the launch of support aircraft and for TACAIR timing purposes, followed by a different L-hour from an unexpected source and one that could not possibly be met, required the Amphibious Task Force Commander and the Ground Security Force Commander to take actions not anticipated in the plan in order to maintain control of the

[REDACTED]

situation at the tactical level. Inhibitions of principal commanders, e.g., CTF-76 and COMUSSAG/7AF, to communicate laterally through direct, real-time means obviated quick solutions to problems incurred in setting an optimum L-hour for Option IV. In addition to these difficulties, lack of specific details of the cross-decking requirement at the higher levels, and the lack of current status information in the Hawaii command centers, precipitated a series of questions over the command conference net concerning the whereabouts of the helicopters long before their departure for the LZs was possible. Since JCS and other headquarters were not addressees on the message and/or plans defining the one-hour alert and explaining the GSF intership transfer requirement, it was expected that helicopters would arrive at the LZs within one and one-half hours after the execute order. An explanation of the built-in delays was not provided by any agency on the secure conference net.

TAB

A - L-Hour Chronicle

TAB A

TAB A TO APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX D TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

L-HOUR CHRONICLE (U)

<u>DTG (Apr 75)</u>	<u>ORIG</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	
180409Z	CINCPAC	EXECUTE... Assume 24 hour response to VUNG TAU ASAP.	1 2 3 4 5 6
182145Z	CINCPAC	EXECUTE... Bring all shore based FREQUENT WIND Forces, all options, to 6 hour alert... ASAP (CINCPACAF). All FREQUENT WIND Forces assume 6 hour alert... upon arrival VUNG TAU.	7 8 9 10 11 12 13
192013Z	CINCPACFLT TO: CINCPAC	PROVIDED EST of 6 Hour alert status... Earliest 191700 to 261100Z Anchorage (latest).	14 15 16
241736Z	JCS	CONPLAN FREQUENT WIND execution - Authorized (CINCPAC) to execute Options II, III and/or IV USSAG/ 7AF CONPLAN 5060V - FREQUENT WIND when requested by US Ambassador, Saigon.	17 18 19 20 21 22
271455Z	CINCPAC	Bring all FREQUENT WIND Forces (less Okinawa based GSF) to one hour alert posture first light 28 April 1975.	23 24 25 26
271650Z	COMUSSAG/7AF	GEN Forces to achieve assumed L-hour at 272230Z Apr 75 or as soon thereafter as possible. (0630G) No launch without execute message.	27 28 29 30 31

<u>DTG (Apr 75)</u>	<u>ORIG</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>1</u>
272210Z	CTF SEVEN SIX	One-hour alert attained, how-	<u>2</u>
		ever, require two-hour notifi-	<u>3</u>
		cation prior to L-hour to	<u>4</u>
		effect intership transfers of	<u>5</u>
		GSF by helo.	<u>6</u>
280255Z	USSAG/7AF	Frequent Alert Posture para 2 -	<u>7</u>
		"One hour response requirement	<u>8</u>
		is keyed to the first fragged	<u>9</u>
		A/C takeoff time. This occurs	<u>10</u>
		at L minus three hours. Af-	<u>11</u>
		fectd forces, consider present	<u>12</u>
		alert status as L minus four	<u>13</u>
		hours and holding."	<u>14</u>
280310Z	CINCPAC	All FREQUENT WIND Forces di-	<u>15</u>
		rected resumption of six hour	<u>16</u>
		alert posture.	<u>17</u>
281412Z	CINCPAC	Bring all FREQUENT WIND Forces	<u>18</u>
		to one-hour alert posture first	<u>19</u>
		light 29 April. (2) Plan to	<u>20</u>
		execute MAX practicable C-130	<u>21</u>
		EVAC lift... ASAP. Execute on	<u>22</u>
		my order.	<u>23</u>
281430Z	USSAG/7AF	FREQUENT WIND (less Oki-based	<u>24</u>
		GSF) assume one-hour alert pos-	<u>25</u>
		ture. Posture forces to permit	<u>26</u>
		launch (if directed) to meet an	<u>27</u>
		assumed L hour of 282230Z -	<u>28</u>
		maintain one-hour to launch pos-	<u>29</u>
		ture from assumed launch time	<u>30</u>
		until relieved. (Corrected	<u>31</u>
		version DTG 281745Z changes	<u>32</u>
		assumed L-Hour to 282215Z).	<u>33</u>

<u>DTG (Apr 75)</u>	<u>ORIG</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>1</u>
281809Z	CINCPAC	Execute para 2 - reference (a)	<u>2</u>
		(CINCPAC 281427Z) Max feasible	<u>3</u>
		C-130 evac.	<u>4</u>
282116Z	CINCPAC	Bring all FREQUENT WIND Forces	<u>5</u>
		to one hour alert posture imme-	<u>6</u>
		diately. (CINCPAC 281412Z said	<u>7</u>
		first light 29 April).	<u>8</u>
282130Z	USSAG/7AF	Reports 130 hit TAN SON NHUT at	<u>9</u>
		282001Z.	<u>10</u>
282325Z	USSAG/7AF	FREQUENT WIND launch all USAF	<u>11</u>
		support A/C for L hour of	<u>12</u>
		290300Z - Tankers/RRA/AR/ABCCC	<u>13</u>
		<u>without all TACAIR.</u>	<u>14</u>
290115Z	USSAG/7AF	To CINCPAC on secure voice:	<u>15</u>
		pointed out need for GSF re-	<u>16</u>
		distribution for helo option,	<u>17</u>
		if contemplated.	<u>18</u>
290145Z	CHFLTCOORDGP NKP	Para (2) L-hour of 290300Z was	<u>19</u>
		est. to position support A/C	<u>20</u>
		and does not commit TACAIR or	<u>21</u>
		Helos (3) indications are if	<u>22</u>
		Helo Evac goes Navy TACAIR may	<u>23</u>
		get first 2 hours. Will advise.	<u>24</u>
290210Z	USSAG/7AF	To CINCPAC on secure voice:	<u>25</u>
		reminder of GSF redistri-	<u>26</u>
		bution requirement and recommen-	<u>27</u>
		dation to accomplish this ready	<u>28</u>
		posture, if not already done.	<u>29</u>

<u>DTG (Apr 75)</u>	<u>ORIG</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>1</u>
290251Z	COMUSSAG/7AF	Execute FREQUENT WIND Option IV.	<u>2</u>
		2) L hour is 290300Z Apr for	<u>3</u>
		TACAIR for reference timing	<u>4</u>
		USSAG/7AF OPLAN is implemented.	<u>5</u>
		4) USSAG/7AF will direct inser-	<u>6</u>
		tion time for GSF to coincide	<u>7</u>
		with TACAIR.	<u>8</u>
290252Z	CINCPAC	1. This is an Execute message.	<u>9</u>
		2. Execute FREQUENT WIND	<u>10</u>
		OPTION IV.	<u>11</u>
		3. Restrictions reference (a)	<u>12</u>
		apply.	<u>13</u>
290317Z	USSAG/7AF	FREQUENT WIND FRAG-FREQUENT	<u>14</u>
		WIND Execute OPTION IV MSG.	<u>15</u>
		2. L hour is 290300Z TACAIR	<u>16</u>
		ref timing. USSAG will direct	<u>17</u>
		insertion time for GSF to	<u>18</u>
		coincide with TACAIR.	<u>19</u>
290333Z	CINCPACFLT	This is execute MSG etc L hour	<u>20</u>
		will be desig. by COMUSSAG/7AF.	<u>21</u>
290340Z	CINCPACFLT	1. L hour set as 290430Z.	<u>22</u>
		2. COM7F take first 2 periods	<u>23</u>
		TACAIR support. Report flash	<u>24</u>
		first TACAIR - Helo launch time.	<u>25</u>
290350Z	USSAG/7AF	Launch NAVAIR second 2 hour	<u>26</u>
		block ASAP. Launch helo to	<u>27</u>
		arrive LZ 15 min after NAVAIR	<u>28</u>
		on station at Hope.	<u>29</u>

<u>DTG (Apr 75)</u>	<u>ORIG</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
290356Z	C7F	C7F passes L Hour from CINC-PACFLT Msg 290340Z L-hour 290430Z etc.
290408Z	C7F	L-Hour 29-430Z as per CINC-PACFLT 290340Z.
290436Z	C7F	References L-Hour. Set 290430Z and authorized CTF 76 to adjust as necessary - in view of 30 minute notice to position helos in LZ etc.
290442Z	CTF SEVEN SIX	To USSAG 1. Interrogative L-Hour for GSF earliest time in LZ for GSF is 290600Z UNODIR we will execute with L-Hour of 290600Z.
290444Z	CTF SEVEN SIX	Executes L-Hour of 290600Z.
290446Z	CTG SEVEN NINE PT ONE	Executes L-Hour of 290600Z.
290532Z	CTF SEVEN SIX	L-Hour for helos on ground Saigon is changed to 290700Z (to CHFLTCOORDGP NKP - C7F CINCPAC - CTF 77).
290541Z	CINCPACFLT	TACAIR on station.
290545Z	CTF SEVEN SIX	SITREP - L-Hour changes 290700Z vice 290600Z Commander GSF "Feet Dry" 290620Z.
290636Z	CTF SEVEN SIX	First two flights of helos from Okinawa with 210 GSF embarked departed launch area - 290630Z.

<u>DTG (Apr 75)</u>	<u>ORIG</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u></u>
290722Z	CTF SEVEN SIX	First FLT departed USDAO LZ	<u>1</u>
		290712Z - on deck 290706Z 149	<u>2</u>
		EVACs, etc.	<u>3</u>
			<u>4</u>
292355Z	CTF SEVEN SIX	Last US out of Saigon all GSF	<u>5</u>
		accounted for. No losses.	<u>6</u>
300011Z	C7F	Last Helo "Feet Wet."	<u>7</u>
300054Z	JCS	Terminates all FREQUENT WIND	<u>8</u>
		operations. Withdraw all US	<u>9</u>
		Forces from territorial air-	<u>10</u>
		space and waters of RVN.	<u>11</u>

ANNEX E TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

REPORTING PROCEDURES (U)

- REFERENCES:
- a. CINCPAC CONPLAN 5060V
 - b. COMUSSAG FREQUENT WIND OPLAN OPTION IV (C)
 - c. CTF 76 OPLAN 5060V-1-75 (FREQUENT WIND) (C)
 - d. JCS PUB 6
 - e. Compendium of CTF 76 Operational Report Requirements

1. General. For this operation, situation reports (SITREPS) were required prior to execution of FREQUENT WIND by all participating organizations concerning numbers and types of evacuees and disposition of sealift and airlift assets. Upon execution situation reports were required daily and spot reports were required at significant events (ref b).

a. CINCPAC was required to report on a daily basis the numbers of evacuees by various categories (Appendix 1) to include US citizens, third country nationals, local nationals employed by US Government and US private companies. Also required were identification of Vietnamese relatives of US citizens. Changes in alert posture were also to be reported as they were achieved.

(1) (U) As a part of the twice daily SITREP submitted by CINCPAC the number of AMCITS evacuated that day and the number remaining were reported. The source for this information prior to execution of FREQUENT WIND was the daily AMEMB status report. After execution the data was to be gathered from the various organizations in support of the evacuation operations.

(2) (U) The problem in accuracy resulted from the US citizens which were not under the direct control of DOD or State Department. These people could neither be forced

[REDACTED]

to report in or be forced to evacuate. As a result, as each day leading to plan execution passed, AMCIT figures changed. The result was that at execution no firm figures were available to use as a basis for planning.

b. [REDACTED] Upon execution the situation reports were to focus on key events throughout the evacuation. A situation report was required every 24 hours as of 1600Z so as to arrive NLT 2000Z, this was later modified to every 12 hours. Spot reports were required for the following event:

- (1) GSF arrival at LZs.
- (2) Extraction of GSF.
- (3) Injury to GSF or evacuees.
- (4) Hostile action or threat of hostile action.
- (5) Event leading to higher force requirements.
- (6) Number and status of evacuees as helo leaves LZ

c. [REDACTED] After evacuation was completed the following spot reports were to be submitted:

- (1) Number of DOD mil/civ evacuees.
- (2) Name/rank/initial evacuation site.
- (3) GSF/evacuee casualties.
- (4) Data on casualties.

d. [REDACTED] Upon completion of the operation, all participating units were to provide COMUSSAG/7AF with an after-action report with summary and recommendations for improvement, if appropriate. COMUSSAG/7AF was to consolidate and forward to CINCPAC.

e. [REDACTED] In addition to the formalized hard copy reporting system described previously, the decision was made to implement a secure conference net similar to that used in EAGLE PULL. This net would provide real time information to key officials in the Washington area.

2. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

a. Once the operation was executed a conference net for real time information flow was established with the NMCC which included CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COMUSSAG/7AF and DAO Saigon. As a result, both CINCPACFLT and COMUSSAG minimized formal reporting during the operation since it was felt that the information provided on the conference net fulfilled that requirement. CINCPACFLT did, however, re-address a number of pertinent CTF-76 and CTF-77 SITREPs and spot reports to CINCPAC. The potential problem with this is that not all principals such as CTF 76 and COMSEVENTHFLT were on the net and were therefore not receiving the voice transmitted data.

b. CTF 76 developed a comprehensive plan for reporting and levied specific requirements on all subordinate agencies to report significant data. In addition, performatted messages were available to assist in expediting release. The formats and information required are in ref e. CTF 76 transmitted a total of 72 special SITREPs to C7F and COMUSSAG/7AF. As previously indicated, some of these were, in turn, retransmitted to higher echelons.

ANNEX F

ANNEX F TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/OPERATING AUTHORITIES (U)

- References:
- a. CINCPACINST 03710.5, dated 24 August 1970,
Peacetime ROE for Seaborne Forces (U).
 - b. CINCPAC 040355Z May 73, Subj: Proposed
Rules of Engagement for Ground Forces (U).
 - c. CINCPAC 300300Z May 73, Subj: Proposed
Rules of Engagement for Ground Forces (U).
 - d. CINCPAC 310220Z Jul 73, Subj: COMUSSAG/7AF
CONPLAN -EAGLE PULL (U).
 - e. JCS 2474/142336Z Aug 73, Subj: SEAsia
Revised Operating Authorities (U) (Subse-
quently cancelled by JCS 7232/092230Z May 75,
but which were in effect during FREQUENT WIND
operations).
 - f. JCS 2475/142338Z Aug 73, Subj: SEAsia Basic
Rules of Engagement (ROE) - Ceasefire in NVN,
RVN, DMZ, and Laos and Cessation of Combat
Activities by US Forces in the GKR (U).
 - g. COMUSSAG/7AF 270536Z Mar 75, Subj: USSAG/
7AF OPLAN (EAGLE PULL) (U).
 - h. CINCPAC 031736Z Apr 75, Subj: ROE -
Evacuation Vietnam/Cambodia (C).
 - i. JCS 1221/050001Z Apr 75, Subj: ROE -
Evacuation Vietnam (C).
 - j. CINCPAC 092240Z Apr 75, Subj: ROE -
Evacuation Vietnam (C).
 - k. COMUSSAG/7AF 181230Z Apr 75, Subj: OPLAN
(Option IV) - FREQUENT WIND (C).

1. JCS 6315/191336Z Apr 75, Subj: ROE -	<u>1</u>
Evacuation Vietnam (C).	<u>2</u>
m. CINCPAC 191525Z Apr 75, Subj: ROE -	<u>3</u>
Evacuation Vietnam (C).	<u>4</u>
n. JCS 6449/191936Z Apr 75, Subj: FREQUENT	<u>5</u>
WIND WILD WEASEL Deployment (C).	<u>6</u>
o. CINCPAC 200301Z Apr 75, Subj: FREQUENT	<u>7</u>
WIND WILD WEASEL Operations (C).	<u>8</u>
p. CINCPACFLT 200815Z Apr 75, Subj:	<u>9</u>
FREQUENT WIND WILD WEASEL/IRON HAND/	<u>10</u>
Electronic Warfare (EW) Support (C).	<u>11</u>
q. COMUSSAG/7AF 211205Z Apr 75, Subj: Change	<u>12</u>
to USSAG/7AF OPLAN (U)	<u>13</u>
(Change #2).	<u>14</u>
r. COMUSSAG/7AF 220150Z Apr 75, Subj: WILD	<u>15</u>
WEASEL Support for FREQUENT WIND (C).	<u>16</u>
s. CINCPACAF 220430Z Apr 75, Subj: FREQUENT	<u>17</u>
WIND WILD WEASEL Operations (C).	<u>18</u>
t. CINCPACFLT 220535Z Apr 75, Subj: FREQUENT	<u>19</u>
WIND ROE (C).	<u>20</u>
u. CINCPAC 230329Z Apr 75, Subj: WILD WEASEL	<u>21</u>
Support for FREQUENT WIND (C).	<u>22</u>
v. CINCPAC 230334Z Apr 75, Subj: FREQUENT	<u>23</u>
WIND ROE (C).	<u>24</u>
w. COMSEVENTHFLT 230836Z Apr 75, Subj:	<u>25</u>
FREQUENT WIND ROE (C).	<u>26</u>
x. CINCPACFLT 231015Z Apr 75, Subj: WILD	<u>27</u>
WEASEL Support for FREQUENT WIND (C).	<u>28</u>
y. COMUSSAG/7AF 231115Z Apr 75, Subj:	<u>29</u>
Change to USSAG/7AF OPLAN (U)	<u>30</u>
(Change #3).	<u>31</u>

[REDACTED]

z. COMSEVENTHFLT 231542Z Apr 75, Subj:
FREQUENT WIND ROE (C).

aa. JCS 2000/241804Z Apr 75, Subj: Exe-
cution CONPLAN FREQUENT WIND (C).

1. General. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Operating Authorities developed for FREQUENT WIND operations were, from the outset, designed to insure survivability of committed air and ground forces, while at the same time observing provisions of congressional legislation and directives of other higher authorities, and recognizing the sensitive political situation existent at the time. Specifically, US Forces were to employ only the minimum force necessary for successful evacuation of designated noncombatants and to insure their safety and the safety of participating forces. Legislative prohibitions against aggressive, offensive operations necessarily required explicit restraints on the expenditure of ordnance for any purpose other than direct defense of an element of the evacuation force or concentrations of designated evacuees actually under attack by a hostile force. The minimum application of force under defensive response conditions only was clearly reflected in the ROE and Operating Authorities for FREQUENT WIND, and was consistently applied throughout the execution phase of the operations.

2. Provisions. In addition to existing JCS Rules of Engagement (ROE) (ref f) and SEAsia Operating Authorities (ref e), specific ROE for the Ground Security Force (GSF) and supporting air cover were incorporated into the FREQUENT WIND OPLAN (ref k). The ROE covered all GSF, TACAIR, support air and other ordnance delivery operations conducted in support of a general evacuation of noncombatants from the Republic of Vietnam. Further, the ROE applied to all units and organizations of all Service components tasked to support COMUSSAG/7AF

[REDACTED]

in the execution of the evacuation operation. Appendix 15
to ANNEX C of COMUSSAG/7AF OPLAN Noncombatant
Emergency and Evacuation (NEMVAC) Plan for RVN (Option IV),
as amended by Change Two (ref q) and Change Three (ref y),
constituted the entire ROE and Operating Authorities pro-
visions for the FREQUENT WIND operation conducted on 29-30
May 1975.

3. [REDACTED] ROE/Operating Authorities Development. The ROE and
Operating Authorities developed for FREQUENT WIND were pat-
terned closely after those developed for EAGLE PULL (non-
combatant evacuation from Phnom Penh), and in fact were
almost identical to those developed for the Cambodian oper-
ation. In addition, the ROE and Operating Authorities promul-
gated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 August 1973, governing
the operations of U.S. Forces following cessation of combat
operations by U.S. Forces effective 15 August 1973, provided
the basis for the ROE and authorities for air and surface
operations in support of the GSF and the evacuation operation.

4. [REDACTED] Adequacy. The ROE and authorities guidance and details
provided by the USSAG/7AF OPLAN were considered by all par-
ticipating units and organizations as adequate and thorough,
and no significant problem areas or issues developed during
the evacuation operation. Prior to execution, however,
several issues were surfaced which required resolution. The
issues concerned (a) the use of Riot Control Agents (RCA),
(b)
and (c) authorities against KOMAR vessels. Each of these issues
were satisfactorily resolved prior to execution, either by the
granting of additional authorities not previously granted, by
the issuance of additional guidance, or by interpretation or
amplification of existing ROE or authorities.

[REDACTED]

a. Use of RCA. During the development of the EAGLE PULL plan, the authority for the use of RCA was requested and received from National Command Authority in advance of plan finalization and mission execution. In the case of FREQUENT WIND, however, authority for the use of RCA was not received by the time of the initial published version of the plan. In the initial FREQUENT WIND plan, therefore, the use of RCA was indicated as not yet approved.

(1) On 3 April 1975 (ref h), CINCPAC requested JCS concurrence to use ROE from the EAGLE PULL plan for the employment of GSF in South Vietnam evacuations. On 5 April 1975 (ref i), JCS advised that the ROE previously approved for EAGLE PULL were approved for use in TALON VISE except that the use of RCA was not authorized in South Vietnam. CINCPAC requested reconsideration of the use of RCA in South Vietnam. On 19 April 1975, (ref l), JCS forwarded approval for the use of RCA (CS and CN) by US Forces in South Vietnam in situation requiring crowd dispersal during emergency evacuation operations. The JCS had requested this authority on the basis of CINCPAC's 3 April 1975 request, but the approval was not forwarded to JCS until 18 April 1975.

(2) Upon receipt of the JCS approval, CINCPAC forwarded the authority to the field, and on 21 April 1975 COMUSSAG/7AF promulgated Change #2 to the FREQUENT WIND OPLAN (ref q) incorporating the change in ROE to permit the use of RCA in FREQUENT WIND operations.

[REDACTED]

b. WILD WEASEL Operations. On 18 April 1975, in response to a request from USSAG/7AF, CINCPAC tasked PACAF to deploy WILD WEASEL assets from Okinawa, Japan to Thailand, to support pending evacuation operations in South Vietnam. USSAG/7AF had based their request on reports of probable North Vietnamese SA-2 deployments in South Vietnam which could threaten US Forces conducting evacuation operations. Upon deployment of the WILD WEASEL detachment, JCS (ref n) instructed CINCPAC to insure that deploying WILD WEASEL crews were thoroughly briefed on ROE and Operating Authorities.

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[REDACTED]

(2) Following telephone conversations between CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which CINCPAC was advised that the Joint Chiefs in session informally agreed with the COMUSSAG/7AF request, CINCPAC advised the field (ref u) that interpretation of existing ROE authorized attack of SA-2 sites under the guidelines proposed by COMUSSAG/7AF. The ROE for FREQUENT WIND were subsequently changed (ref y) to reflect the new guidelines.

5. Execution Phase. No difficulties or problems concerning ROE or Operating Authorities were reported during the execution phase of FREQUENT WIND or identified during this survey.

ANNEX G

ANNEX G TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

ADMINISTRATIVE (U)

- (U) REFERENCES: a. CM-378-75, Subject: Noncombatant Emergency and Evacuation (NEMVAC Lessons Learned) dated 2 May 1975 (FOUO)
- b. JCS 1731/031344Z May 75, subject: NEMVAC Lessons Learned (U)

1. The NEMVAC Survey was conducted during the period 4-19 May 1975 in order to validate important LESSONS LEARNED in the FREQUENT WIND evacuation operations in South Vietnam so that operations of a similar nature in the future could benefit from the experiences gained in the effort.

2. (U) Attached are appendices listing the survey members, and the itinerary of the group.

Appendices

- 1 - Survey Members
- 2 - NEMVAC Survey Itinerary

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

SURVEY MEMBERSHIP (U)

NAME/RANK	ORGANIZATION
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MGEN JOHN R.D. CLELAND, JR., USA	OJCS
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CAPT EDWARD S. BRIGGS, USN	CINCPACFLT
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COL ROBERT E. HAEBEL, USMC	FMFPAC
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CAPT JOHN H. HARNS, USN	CINCPAC
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COL PAUL A. SEYMOUR, USAF	OJCS
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CAPT TED C. STEELE, USN	OJCS
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COL DARYLE E. TRIPP, USAF	HQ USAF
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LTC VINCENT DAMBRAUSKAS, USA	OJCS
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LTC THOMAS T. GLIDDEN, USMC	OJCS
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LTC OWEN L. GREENBLATT, USAF	OJCS
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NOTE: Additional assistance was provided on the Survey by the following former members of the Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT):

LTC HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., USA	FPJMT
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CAPT STUART A. HERRINGTON, USA	FPJMT
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APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX G TO NEMVAC SURVEY REPORT (U)

NEMVAC SURVEY ITINERARY (U)

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>PRINCIPALS VISITED</u>
HQ CINCPAC	4-5 MAY 75	ADM GAYLER
		MGEN LANG
HQ CINCPACAF	5 MAY 75	GEN WILSON
		LGEN MARSHALL
HQ CINCPACFLT	5 MAY 75	ADM WEISNER
		VADM ST. GEORGE
		RADM HARRIS
		RADM OBERG
HQ FMFPAC	6 MAY 75	MGEN MILLER
CTF 76	8 MAY 75	RADM WHITMIRE
CTG 79.1	9 MAY 75	BGEN CAREY
HQ 13AF	10 MAY 75	MGEN MANOR
7 ACCS (ABCCC)	11 MAY 75	COL J. ROOSMA
COMUSSAG/7AF	12 MAY 75	LGEN BURNS
		MGEN HUNT
		MGEN ARCHER
COMSEVENTHFLT	15 MAY 75	VADM STEELE
DAO SAIGON	16 MAY 75	MGEN H. SMITH