

THIS FILE IS MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE DECLASSIFICATION EFFORTS AND RESEARCH OF:

THE BLACK VAULT

THE BLACK VAULT IS THE LARGEST ONLINE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT / GOVERNMENT RECORD CLEARING HOUSE IN THE WORLD. THE RESEARCH EFFORTS HERE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS THROUGHOUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND ALL CAN BE DOWNLOADED BY VISITING:

[HTTP://WWW.BLACKVAULT.COM](http://www.blackvault.com)

YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO YOUR FRIENDS, BUT PLEASE KEEP THIS IDENTIFYING IMAGE AT THE TOP OF THE .PDF SO OTHERS CAN DOWNLOAD MORE!

Downgraded to

~~SECRET~~

26

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

OFFICE

COPY NO.

~~1. MACSOG DOCUMENTATION SECRET~~
~~ATTACHED~~

SECURITY, COVER AND DECEPTION	1
PART I - BACKGROUND	2
A. GENERAL	3
B. DEFINITION OF TERMS	4
PART II - SECURITY	5
A. DIRECTIVES	6
B. RESPONSIBILITY	7
C. CLEARANCES	8
D. ACCESS	9
E. BRIEFINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS	10
F. OPERATIONAL SECURITY SURVEYS	11
G. PHYSICAL SECURITY	12
PART III - DECEPTION (COVER) STORIES AND DOCUMENTATION	13
A. SEE DEFINITION OF TERMS	14
B. MACSOG DIRECTIVE 380-11	15
C. COVER STORIES	16
PART IV - EQUIPMENT	17
A. NON-ATTRIBUTABILITY	18
B. COMMUNICATIONS	19
C. AIRCRAFT MOUNTED ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURE (ECM) EQUIPMENT	20
D. THE NIGHTINGALE DEVICE	21
PART V - CODES AND CODE WORDS	22
A. CODING SYSTEMS	23
B. CODE WORDS, NICKNAMES, AND SOG WORDS	24
PART VI - TECHNIQUES	25
A. TECHNIQUES	26
B. GROUND ELEMENTS	27
C. HELICOPTER INSERTION/ EXTRACTION TECHNIQUES	28
TAB 1 - SPECIAL REPORT OF A SENSITIVE OPSEC EXAMINATION	29
TAB 2 - REVIEW OF OPSEC EXAMINATION FINDINGS	30
TAB 3 - OPSEC SURVEY	31
TAB 4 - CODEWORDS, NICKNAMES, SOG WORDS, AND CALL SIGNS	32

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

GROUP 1
 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
 DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

H-1

~~SECRET~~

DOC 23

55-813 (73-286)

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX H
SECURITY, COVER AND DECEPTION

PART I. BACKGROUND (U)

A. (S) GENERAL

This appendix will cover the security aspects, passive and active, and cover and deception techniques employed by and in support of the various elements, activities and operations of MACV Studies and Observations Group. The sensitive nature of activities and operations conducted by SOG require stringent security procedures and policies for control and safe guarding classified information.

B. () DEFINITION OF TERMS

1. (U) Security

- a. Measures taken by a command to protect itself from espionage, observation, sabotage, annoyance, or surprise.
- b. A condition which results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures which insure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.
- c. With respect to classified matter, it is the condition which prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information which is safeguarded in the interests of national defense.

d. Protection of supplies or supply establishments against enemy attacks, fire, theft, and sabotage.

e. A condition which results from the establishment of measures which protect designated information, systems, components, and equipment against hostile persons, acts or influences.*

2. (S) Cover

- a. Protective guise used by a person, organization or

* (U) Publication, JCS, "JCS Pub I" , Aug 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

installation to prevent identification with clandestine activities - 1
2

b. The assumed identity and/or purpose through which an undercover agent disguised his true identity and/or mission.** 3
4

c. Measures designed to provide security to plan, operation or activity. Cover includes special measures taken to shield the real plan, operation or activity as well as to intensify normal security and passive defense measures.*** 5
6
7
8
9

3. (C) Deception. Activity designed to mislead an enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.* 10
11
12

4. (C) Military Cover and Deception. The art of causing an enemy or a potential enemy to derive and accept a particular predetermined appreciation of friendly military dispositions, capabilities and intentions so that the enemy or potential enemy will react in a specific, preselected manner disadvantageous to himself and advantageous to friendly forces. Military cover and deception is patterned to reach and affect directly the enemy decision process at command level. The terms "cover" and "deception" are customarily used together. Cover and deception includes strategic and tactical cover and deception. The principle differences between these types lie in the scope and importance of the operation plan they are supporting.* 13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

5. (C) Strategic Military Cover and Deception. That form of cover and deception which is planned and undertaken to support strategic military plans and policies or to support national policies. It embraces cover and deception that is normally sustained over a relatively long period of time. It may be exploited on a worldwide basis, in collaboration 26
27
28
29
30
31

* (U) Publication, JCS. "JCS Pub I" 1 Aug 1968

** (U) Publication, US Army, "Dictionary of US Army terms" AMS, O-23, Mar 69

*** (C) Publication, US Army, "Tactical Cover & Deception(C)" FM 31-40, Sep 67.

**** (C) Ibid

* (U) Publication, JCS. "JCS Pub I" 1 Aug 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

with other Governmental departments or agencies, by the Department of Defense, the Military Services, or the commanders of unified and specified commands, jointly or individually.*

6. (C) Deception Plan. The plan that specifies the manner in which the deception story will be presented to the enemy or potential enemy.*

7. (C) Deception (Cover) Story. The intelligence estimate that the friendly force desires the enemy or the potential enemy to formulate as a result of friendly deception activities.*

8. (C) Cover and Deception Means. Those methods or techniques used for channeling controlled information in support of the deception story into the enemy intelligence system. To be effective, these means must be of special interest to and under the surveillance of the enemy.*

9. (C) Counterintelligence. That aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations or material against sabotage.*

10. (U) Counterespionage. A category of counterintelligence, the objective of which is the detection and neutralization of foreign espionage.*

* (U) Publication, JCS, "JCS Pub I" 1 Aug 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-3

Appendix A

~~TOP SECRET~~

PART II. SECURITY (U)

A. (U) DIRECTIVES

SOG security activities are governed by Army, MACV and SOG Regulations and Directives in the 380-Series and other pertinent guidance.

B. (U) RESPONSIBILITY

Safeguarding SOG classified information is the responsibility of designated officers and NCOs in each branch or agency and each individual who has possession of the information or material. All personnel assigned to SOG are responsible for the safeguarding of classified information which comes under their care.

C. (C) CLEARANCES

1. (C) U S Personnel. All US personnel assigned to SOG or to one of the operational control or direct support elements must possess a security clearance for access to information through TOP SECRET. Personnel who do not have the required degree of security clearance are not made privy to SOG activities or information. Requests for security clearance verification or background investigation for TOP SECRET are processed through normal channels for all personnel assigned to SOG.

2. (TS) Vietnamese (VN) Personnel. Vietnamese personnel recruited to work or perform operational missions at one of the SOG activities must also be cleared for exposure to classified information.

a. Vietnamese military personnel are checked by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) security organizations. Confirmation that these personnel are cleared is

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-4

Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

gained through the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) 1
Security Section. 2

b. Recruitment of indigenous personnel for operational 3
requirements pertaining to SOG-35 (cross-border ground 4
operations) is the responsibility of the Liaison Bureau 5
At time of recruitment, Liaison Bureau recruiters conduct 6
a limited name check with any reputable source available, 7
local police, District Chief and/or any American intelli- 8
gence units in the area. 9

c. STD is responsible for recruitment of indigenous 10
agent personnel for operational requirements pertaining to 11
SOG-36. 12

d. Several forms are used, for the various categories of 13
personnel, to initiate Local Agency Checks and establish 14
dossiers on each individual employed by SOG. 15

(1) MACSOG Form 690-1: Civilian Employ Personnel 16
Action (On file) 17

(2) MACSOG Form 690-3. SCHRECK (On file) 18

(3) MACSOG Form 690-4 Personnel Record Questionnaire 19
(On file) 20


(4) MACSOG Form 690-6: Request for Security Check 21
(On file) 22

(5) MACSOG Form 690-9: Personnel Status Record (On file) 23

(6) Vietnamese National Police Form TCSOG/477: Finger 24
Print Card (On file) 25

e Civilian hire personnel, administrative, labor, cooks 26
etc; are cleared by SOG Security Branch through the VN 27
National Police and the American Embassy. Guidance on 28
recruiting, hiring, investigating, and clearing indigenous 29
personnel is to be found in SOG Directives 604-1, 604-2 and 30
690-2. 31

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~3. (S) TRIPD COUNTRY PERSONNEL(b)(1)
(b)(3)b. Philippine Nationals

(1) All Filipino personnel are hired indirectly through Contract Number 5-70 with the Eastern Construction Company dated 1 July 1969. As of 20 August 1969, a total of 46 Filipinos are employed by SOG. Extracts from the Contract appear below:

"Article V - SPECIAL PROVISIONS:

"b... The Contractor (Eastern Construction Company) will be responsible to obtain and furnish necessary security clearances, personnel passes...

"c. The Contractor shall furnish in writing to the Contracting Officer the name, security clearance, and any other pertinent information if requested by the Contracting Officer..."

(2) A prerequisite for Philippine Nationals to be employed overseas is a Passport. Prior to issuance of a passport, a check is conducted by the Philippine National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to determine if the individual has a criminal record or any association or dealings with communists. No further criteria for security check or acceptance can be identified at this time.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~~~D. (S) ACCESS~~

1. (S) Compartmentalization is maintained within SOG to limit access to those personnel who have a definite need to know.* Cross-border elements are maintained separate from other, unrelated activities and vice-versa. Personnel involved in Maritime Operations have no need to know of the cross-border effort and are therefore not informed of the operation.

2. (S) Specific, selected job assignments within higher, adjacent and parallel organizations require access to SOG activities on a need to know basis. These job titles and the name of the incumbent is kept on the SOG Access Roster which is maintained current by the Security Branch. Positions appearing on the roster have been approved by Chief, SOG. Detailed guidance is provided in MACV Directive 380-29, dated 30 August 1969. (On file)

~~E. (U) BRIEFINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS~~

1. (U) SOG Members. Personnel newly assigned to SOG are initially given a general security briefing. Subsequent to confirmation of possession of a Top Secret security clearance, the individual is briefed on the particular facet of SOG activities with which he will be dealing during his tour. Upon completion of these briefings, the individual completes the front side of MACSOG Form 6 (Tab H) and signs the briefing certificate on the reverse side. This document is then countersigned by the briefer.

2. (U) Non-SOG Members. Non-members, MACV Staff, flight crews, VIP visitors receive a combination briefing/debriefing. If the individual receives the briefing at SOG headquarters, he completes MACSOG Form 7 (On file) and it is countersigned by the briefer. If the individual is briefed by one of the

* (S) NOTE: Para II D 1 discusses compartmentalization. This was the case through the tenure of Col Singlaub (3 Aug 68). Col Cavanaugh felt this was too restrictive though good security procedure. Information on the majority of programs now receive wider but still very limited distribution within SOG headquarters. Some programs still kept very close.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

detachments, he completes MACSOG Form 7 also. A separate briefing certificate is provided for personnel who have no reason to know that the activity they are being briefed on is a part of, or has anything to do with, SOG.

3. (U) Personnel Departing SOG. Personnel who out-process through SOG headquarters receive an oral debriefing by Security Branch. The debriefing certificate on the reverse side of MACSOG Form 6 is executed. Two copies of MACV Form 144-R (On file) are also prepared, one for retention in the Security Branch, one copy to become part of the individual's personnel records. Similar procedures are followed for debriefing personnel departing from other than this headquarters.

F. (U) OPERATIONAL SECURITY (OPSEC) SURVEYS

1. (U) CINCPAC representatives conducted an operational security survey of SOG during October and November 1968 and submitted their report "Examination of Military Assistance Command Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG) Operations (U)," dated 1 December 1968. The survey covered many facets and was considered of benefit to SOG. (TAB 1)

2. (U) An initial detailed review was conducted in December and January and a report of actions taken and/or recommended, regarding the CINCPAC survey, was prepared 3 February 1969 by SOG. (TAB 2)

3. (U) Chief, SOG directed an Operations Security (OPSEC) survey which was conducted during the period 11 May through 26 June 1969. Purpose of the survey was two-fold:

a. To follow-up the CINCPAC OPSEC Survey of October-November 1968.

b. To identify sources of enemy prior knowledge not previously identified by CINCPAC. This survey covered all the activities and installations of SOG and includes not

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

only those facets looked into by CI/CFAC but also points
 observed by the survey team and comments made by key personnel
 of the surveyed activities. (TAB 3)

G. (TS) ~~PHYSICAL SECURITY~~

1. (TS) Standing Operating Procedures (SOP), drawn up by
 each element within or supporting SOG, contain an installation
 defense plan. These plans show such things as defensive wire,
 minefields, booby-trap and illumination trip devices, fields
 of fire and final protective fire lanes, weapons bunkers and
 individual firing positions, alternate and supplemental
 positions, mortar positions, bunkers within the compound, and
 emergency communication nets. These plans also specify how
 assistance such as artillery, air or additional troop support
 is to be requested, as well as reports and points of coordination
 required

2. (S) Included in these SOPs are instructions on how
 classified material is to be destroyed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PART III

DECEPTION (COVER) STORIES AND DOCUMENTATION (C)

A. (U) SEE DEFINITION OF TERMS

B. (TS) MACSOG Directive 380-11, Subj: Military Security, Cover Stories (C), dated 17 August 1969, sets forth cover stories for SOG and its subordinate operational elements. The directive is classified Secret.

C. (TS) COVER STORIES.

Cover stories are used by SOG members in their contacts with personnel outside the organization. Unclassified cover stories are shown in quotation marks.

1. (U) Studies and Observations Group (SOG): "Studies and Observations Group is a special staff section of Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV) under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, USMACV. It is responsible for the study and observation of joint or combined counterinsurgency operations of a comprehensive nature. The studies and observations include intelligence and psychological activities as well as combat actions that may involve any forces and resources of any service of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and USMACV. SOG is not an implementing agency, the operations it studies and observes are conducted by the RVNAF commands which have responsibility for the areas of operations."

2. (C) Training Studies Group, Camp Long Thanh (MACSOG-38) "Camp Quyet Thang is an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Training Center operated by the Joint General Staff to train selected military and para-military units and/or individuals in counterinsurgency operations to include parachute and helicopter infiltration into remote unprepared areas, demolitions, booby-trap and ambush techniques, survival, and psychological operations against Viet Cong base areas and lines of communication within their areas of responsibility. Camp Quyet Thang also conducts research tests and development activities in support of its special operational training."

3. (TS) Maritime Studies Group (MACSOG-37): This activity uses the cover designation "US Naval Advisory Detachment (USNAD)," an advisory element to the Coastal Security Service (CSS).

a. "CSS The Headquarters of CSS is located in Saigon and is integral part of the naval forces of the Republic of Vietnam. The northern district headquarters and its operation forces are located at the Navy Base. The basic

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-10

Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

mission of the CSS is to provide security for territorial waters and coastal areas of South Vietnam against penetration and infiltration from the sea by Viet Cong or North Vietnam (NVN) craft or personnel, and of protecting national fishing craft in these areas. CSS operations complement those of the Vietnamese Naval Junk Force which cannot provide the large areas of coverage or reaction speed that is provided by the variety of motor patrol craft operated by CSS. CSS also has established training facilities to train boat crews, support personnel, and attached Vietnamese Marine and "Biet Hai" personnel in special amphibious, security, and ground reconnaissance operations in conjunction with CSS patrols."

b. In event a Maritime Operations (MAROPS) craft is captured by DRV Security Forces "The craft was a motor patrol craft of the PT or Swift Class, attached to the Coastal Security Service of the RVN Navy. The craft was proceeding to a search and rescue station in international waters off the coast of North Vietnam when it was attacked. The practice of stationing a search and rescue patrol craft in international waters off the coast of North Vietnam has been a normal precaution since the advent of RVNAF air operations against North Vietnam. At last contact, the craft reported that it was under attack at a position which would have placed it in international waters."

c. "USNAD. The U.S. Naval Advisory Detachment's role is to advise and assist our Vietnamese counterparts in the following operations:

"(1) Training of small craft crews.

"(2) Training of boat maintenance and support personnel.

"(3) Training of anti-infiltration units to patrol coastal and delta areas of South Vietnam.

"(4) USNAD personnel additionally performs their own personnel, administrative, logistical and other house-keeping functions."

4. (TS) Air Studies Group (MACSOG-75): Air Studies Group and its subordinate elements have no cover story provided per se for local area contacts. Personnel are instructed to say nothing when queried other than they have a special mission and are not authorized to discuss it.

a. JCS approved cover stories for Air Studies Group missions were forwarded by CINCPAC in February 1967.*

* (S) Ltr, CINCPAC, "Cover Support - U.S. Aircraft Employment in FOOTBOY(C)(S)," 25 Feb 1967.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-11

Appendix H

* (S) Ltr, CINCPAC, "Cover Support - U.S. Aircraft Employment in FOOTBOY(C)(S)," 25 Feb 1967.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

"INTERDEPARTMENTAL COVER SUPPORT OF JOINT-
VICT AIR OPERATIONS, USAF C-123 AIRCRAFT

"I. INTRODUCTION. In order to provide guidance for US personnel engaged in covert operations against North Vietnam (NV), the following cover story has been devised. It is not expected that this story will permanently deceive the opposition, but it may discourage them from bringing public charges concerning the operations.

"IV. PERTINENT COVER STORY(S) TO BE DISSEMINATED BY RESPONSIBLE OFFICES ARE INDICATED BELOW:

"A. General Press and Publication Inquiries. The US Government will have no comment in connection with the flights. The Government of South Vietnam will ignore any protest emanating from communist sources.

"B. Inquiries Concerning Aircraft Presence in South Vietnam or Thailand.

"1. MACV. The aircraft are for use in support of US, ARVN and PWMA forces engaged against the Viet Cong. They are specifically configured for extremely accurate navigation and their mission is no different from that of other airlift forces.

"2. MACTHAI. The aircraft are in support of US forces in SEA. They are specifically configured for extremely accurate navigation and their mission is no different from that of other airlift forces.

"C. Incident Over Friendly Territory.

"1. Cover Story.

Cover for USAF C-123 Aircraft and Crew

"a. The aircraft will carry US Air Force markings.
The crew will be US Air Force in flight uniforms.

"b. If on a PSYOPS mission the crew will state they were on a routine FACT SHEET mission.

"c. If on a mission of transporting agent teams and/or agent cargo between SVN and Thailand, the crew will state they were on a routine airlift flight in SVN when they were directed to participate in a search mission in response to receipt by US control agencies of an international distress call from an unidentified aircraft.

"d. Team members, if aboard, will report c. above.

"D. Incident Over Hostile Territory.

"1. Cover Story.

Cover for USAF C-123 Aircraft and Crew.

"a. Same as C.1.a. above.

"b. If on a PSYOPS mission the crew will attempt

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-12


Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

to jettison PSYOPS material. If able to jettison PSYOPS material, the crew will state they were on routine airlift flight when they were diverted to participate in a search mission in response to receipt by United States Control Agencies of an international distress call from an unidentified aircraft. If unable to jettison PSYOPS material, the crew will state that they were on a routine FACT SHEET mission.

- "c. If on a mission of transporting agent teams and/or agent cargo between SVN and Thailand, the crew will state they were on an authorized search and rescue mission for US aircrews believed downed in North Vietnam.
- "d. Team members, if aboard, will state that they comprise the search and rescue force and were chosen because of their linguistic qualification."*

NOTE: The following is a recommended addition:*



"INTERDEPARTMENTAL COVER SUPPORT TO NORTH VIETNAM OPERATIONS, US HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT:

"IV. PERTINENT COVER STORY(S) TO BE DISSEMINATED BY RESPONSIBLE OFFICES ARE INDICATED BELOW:

"A. General Press and Publication Inquiries. The US Government will have no comment in connection with the flights. The Government of South Vietnam will ignore any protest emanating from communist sources.

"1. Responsible Action Office(s). No comment by all departments of the U.S. Government concerning operational missions.

"2. Coordinating Offices(s). Not applicable - no requirement for U.S. Government press release.

* () IDIU, LDCI (1)

** () Ltr COMUSMACV, "Covert Protection for Aircrews and Air Assets (S), 31 August 1969.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-13

Appendix H

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~"B. Inquiries Concerning Aircraft Presence in South Vietnam or Thailand"

"1. MACV. The aircraft are for use in support of US, ARVN, FVMA forces engaged against the Viet Cong. They are also employed as strike aircraft against military targets in NVN

"2. MACTHAI. The aircraft are utilized in support of US military operations in Vietnam

"D. Incident Over Hostile Territory.""1. Cover Story"Cover for US High Performance Aircraft and Crews

a. The high performance aircraft will carry US Air Force Markings and camouflage paint. Crew will be US Air Force in flight uniform.

b. Aircrews will attempt to jettison resupply containers. If able to jettison containers the aircrews will state they were on a strike mission into NVN. If aircrews are unable to jettison resupply containers, they will state that they were on an emergency reconnaissance mission to locate downed US aircrews and deliver medical supplies and survival equipment and that they did not know the specific contents in the containers."*

"INTERDEPARTMENTAL COVER SUPPORT TO NORTH VIETNAM OPERATIONS, CH-3 HELICOPTERS""IV. PERTINENT COVER STORY(S) TO BE DISSEMINATED BY RESPONSIBLE ACTION OFFICES ARE INDICATED BELOW:"

"A. General Press and Publication Inquiries. The US Government will have no comment in connection with the flights. The Government of South Vietnam will ignore any protest emanating from communist sources.

"1. Responsible Action Office(s). No comment by all departments of the U.S. Government concerning operational missions.

"2. Coordinating Office(s). Not applicable - no requirement for U.S. Government press release.

"B. Inquiries Concerning Aircraft Presence in South Vietnam or Thailand."

"1. MACV. The helicopters are for use in support of US, ARVN, FVMA forces engaged against the Viet Cong. They are also employed for use in Search and Rescue (SAR) operations for downed US and VNAF pilots in NVN.

"2. MACTHAI. The helicopters are utilized in support of air operations in NVN as search and rescue (SAR) aircraft for downed US and VNAF pilots.

* (S) Ltr, CINCPAC, "Cover Support - US Aircraft Employment in FOOTBOY(C)" 25 Feb 1967, Incl (2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-14

Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~"C. Incident Over Friendly Territory.""1. Cover Story"CH-3 Cover for Aircraft and Crews

"a. The CH-3s will carry US Air Force markings and camouflage paint. Crew will be US Air Force in flight uniform.

"b. If queried, crews will state they were on a routine airlift flight when they were directed to participate in a search mission initiated in response to receipt by United States control agencies of an international distress call from an unidentified aircraft.

"c. Team members will report b. above.

"D. Incident Over Hostile Territory.""1. Cover Story"CH-3 Cover for Aircraft and Crews

"a. Same as C.1.a. above.

"b. If queried, crews will state they were on an authorized US search and rescue mission for downed US aircrews.

"c. Team members, if aboard, will state they comprise the search and rescue force and were chosen because of their linguistic qualification."

b. Extracts of pertinent portions of these documents are disseminated to subordinate operational units which possess or operate MACSOG support aircraft.

c. It is difficult for the US Government to plausibly deny involvement in any air operation unless aircrews and air assets are thoroughly sterilized with respect to identity, origin and sponsorship. Accordingly, cover stories must be designed to reinforce the deniability position rather than to explain the presence of an aircraft and/or crew in a given geographical location.

d. A letter was recently dispatched to CINCPAC, discussing cover documentation and physical sterility for air crews and military air assets supporting MACSOG, to clarify

and update cover stories and sterility guidance.**This document shows current procedures and contradictions, reaches conclusions and makes recommendations to correct deficiencies noted.

* (S) Ibid. Encl (3).

** Ltr, COMUSMACV, "Cover Protection for Aircrews and Air Assets(S) 31 August 1969 (Tab ___ to Annex C to Appendix C)

shows current procedures and contradictions, reaches conclusions

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. (TS) Command and Control Detachment The Command and Control Detachments (CCN, CCC, CCS) are actually part of the Special Operations Augmentation, 5th Special Forces Group, and are identified as such. Their mission is to advise and patrol with the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) on "in-country" missions along the Laotian and Cambodian borders.

a. Should a team or any of its members be captured in Laos, one of two cover stories is used depending upon the depth of penetration. The cover story is briefed for each mission and reiterated in the brief-back.

(1) When the mission is being conducted in vicinity of the RVN/Laos Border, VN personnel will claim they are a CIDG patrol based at the Special Forces camp from which they were launched and have become lost. The US personnel are Special Forces advisors on a patrol which became lost and they do not know the location where they were captured or detained. US team members are instructed to give only that information required in accordance with the Geneva Convention, name, rank, serial number, and date of birth.

(2) When a deep penetration mission is conducted, the VN team members claim they are on a body recovery mission resulting from an aircraft crash. Destination of the downed aircraft is specified to have been Thailand and the total number of personnel aboard is established. US personnel again follow the guidance as stated above.

b. The cover story for operations in Cambodia is that the team is conducting anti-infiltration patrols on the South Vietnam side of the border. No acknowledgement of conduct of cross-border operations into Cambodia will be made.*

* (TS) Msg, JCS, 5937/DTG 221958Z May 67.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

6 (TS) Radio Studies Group (RSG) Psychological Studies Group
 (CSOG-70 SO) These activities operate under the cover of
 the Voice of Freedom (VOF).

"VOF is a Vietnamese radio station operating under the Ministry of Defense, Republic of Vietnam. It has two transmitter locations near Hanoi which beam to North Vietnam. The studios are located in Saigon. American civilian advisors are furnished in programming management, supply and maintenance, and broadcasting to provide technical guidance. VOF programming aims at Reports on the progress made under democratic and free regimes in South Vietnam (SVN and Communist dominated countries, promoting understanding and relationships between people in NVN and SVN, and building a listening audience through an entertaining program of scheduled music, drama, features, news and commentary.*

7 (TS) Airborne Studies Group (MACSOG-36): This activity
 uses the cover of a Joint Translation Center (JTC) whose cover
 story is as follows

"The Joint Translation Center translates technical material for the AG Translation Division. The JTC employs Vietnamese and US civilians and military as translators, typists, and proof readers for French, English and Vietnamese publications. The JTC performs only those translations assigned by AG Translation Division but does work directly with those organizations requiring extensive translations on a continuous basis. All requests for translations must be personally approved by the MACV, AG Translation Division."

In general the "covers for action" are predicated upon mission requirements on a case-by-case basis. In the BORDEN(C) program, US and Vietnamese personnel utilize the cover of a hypertension study of selected prisoners of war in their contacts with Allied agencies.

8. (S) Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) MACSOG-80.
 The fact that the JPRC exists and is part of MACV is unclassified. The fact that it is part of SOG, however, is classified SECRET. Within SOG it uses the cover designator Recovery studies Group, (MACSOG-80) and uses the same "cover for status" as that prescribed for Headquarters SOG.

* (S) Directive, MACSOG, "Military Security, Cover Stories," 17 Aug 196
 ** (S) ibid.

~~TOP SECRET~~

h-11

appendix n

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

9. (S) Circus Studies Group (CCSG-35) This organization
uses the same "cover for status" as that prescribed for Head-
quarters SOG
10. (S) Support Facility, "Akron Prison (SUPPFAC WPA).
SUPPFAC has no cover story per se. One of the missions of the
Commanding Officer, SUPPFAC is to conduct liaison with Task
Force Alpha and this is the story used locally with no mention
being made of the classified mission.
11. (S) Monkey Mountain Forward Operational Base (MMFOB).
MMFOB occupies the same compound as USNAD and utilizes the
same "cover for status" as USNAD.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PART IV. EQUIPMENT (U)

A. (TS) ~~NON-ATTRIBUTABILITY~~

Guidance for covert and/or clandestine operations conducted by the U.S. Government has stressed the need for non-attributability to afford our government plausible denial. Before and since activation of SOG, requirements for equipment and material of this nature have been extensive. Listed below are type items which have been procured which have no identification as to place of manufacture and which could be identified with Communist Bloc Nations, or with the VC/NVA.

Foreign Weapons

Toilet Articles, Sewing Kits	Uniforms (including all items)
Sleeping Bags, Hammocks	Web Equipment, Rucksacks
Lensatic Compass, Protractor	Medical Kits, Litters
Sheath Knives, Ring Saws	Note Books
Wrist Watch, Stop Watch	Fishing Kits, Nets
Radios, Batteries, Flashlights	Parachutes
Cigarettes, Lighters	Mess Kits, Canteens

Most of this equipment was procured through one of three channels; the Counterinsurgency Support Office (CISO), or through local purchase.

B. (TS) ~~COMMUNICATIONS~~

1. (S) The VC/NVA have displayed a high capability to intercept, understand, DF, jam, and exploit transmissions. One of their jamming methods is simply to tune a portable transistor radio to some music, key their set (probably a captured PRC-25), and transmit the music on our frequency.

2. (S) A voice cipher capability has been devised and is now in use for the first time. The equipment being used is from the Nestor Family of devices. They are known as the KY-28 (for aircraft mounting), and the KY-8 (for fixed station use). Compatible radios used for vehicular or fixed station

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-19

Appendix H

Compatible radios used for vehicular or fixed station

~~TOP SECRET~~

installation used with the Hestor devices are the VPC-46, 47, 48, 49 and 125. The voice cipher system does not put out an audible signal which the enemy can hear, therefore, he cannot find a frequency to intercept, jam, or DF. SOG has been given its own random keying system. There are so many possibilities to this system that it is believed it would take 35 years of concentrated deciphering work to arrive at any one day's key list. The major drawback to the tactical field components is their weight and bulk. Weight of the PRC-77 is 22 1/2 lbs; of the KY-38, 23 1/2 lbs, total 46 lbs.

3. (S) A follow-on system of voice cipher devices is called the Saville Family. The KY-61 will be ready for tactical field use in the near future. The KY-61 is built into a package about the size of a pack of super-king size cigarettes. It will have its own ten pound transceiver built by RCA.

4. (S) To minimize the enemy's opportunity to either intercept or DF the signal source, another possibility being looked into is a CW Burst transmission system. This will be a 300 word per minute tape recorded system using the GRA-71 (electromechanical high speed keying device). The PRC-74B single side band radio may be the component set for the burst system. It will be of particular value for long range patrols having a transmission capability of 1500 to 7000 miles depending on proper wave propagation.

5. (S) The KY-3 Wide Band Voice Cipher Device for telephone systems is in use at two SOG installations; two at SOG Headquarters in Saigon and one at CCN in Danang. The KY-3 permits secure voice communications between SOG and the various headquarters with which SOG deals.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

C. (S) AIRCRAFT MOUNTED ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURE (ECM)
EQUIPMENT

The C-123 HEAVY HOOK and C-130 COMBAT SPEAR aircraft supporting SOG have certain ECM equipment mounted aboard which enhance their capability to survive in a hostile environment. Some of this equipment is listed and its use specified below:

1. (S) Warning Receivers that inform the crew that radars employed for AAA, SAM, and/or Airborne Intercept have located the aircraft.

2. (S) Warning Receivers/Finders give visual and aural signals, relative bearings from which the received signal is emanating, signal types, and signal strengths.

3. (S) Deceptive Repeaters which provide protection from attack by ground based conical scan fire control radars and by fighter aircraft employing conical scan Airborne Intercept radar.

4. (S) Chaff Dispensers which create false targets for confusion and "break-lock" assistance against radar.

5. (S) Tape REcorders (seven channels) which record inter-phone conversation, communications with the aircraft, and various threat signals for later analysis.

D. (S) THE NIGHTINGALE DEVICE

Nightingale is the nickname for a battle noise simulator. The battle noise simulator consists of a basic small arms simulation panel and additional pyrotechnic devices. The panel is a wire mesh screen about two feet by three feet in size to which approximately 115 M80 firecrackers and cherry bombs are attached. Initiation of the device is by M1 chemical time pencil. Time fuze is so connected to the device to give about seven minutes of simulated small arms fire after the pencil ignites the fuze. The simulators are designed to be waterproof and constructed to permit freefall airdrop. It may be delivered during a dummy insert by helicopter or high level parachute delivery. SOG uses about 100 of the devices per year.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-21

Appendix H

during a dummy insert by helicopter or high level parachute

~~TOP SECRET~~~~PART V. CODES AND CODE WORDS (U)~~~~A. (S) CODING SYSTEMS~~

Electronic coding systems are built into certain of the equipment presently in use and/or expected to be available in the the near future. In addition to these various electronic ciphering devices, the National security Agency (NSA) has developed several code systems for use in passing classified information with unenciphering voice transmission equipment. They are used with radio and telephonic equipment. These are low level codes known as USKAC - codes and are designed to pass information concerning personages (USKAC-234), items, installations, and coordinates (USKAC-199). Encoding and decoding sheets are made for each day and must be changed every 24 hours at midnight.

~~B. (S) CODE WORDS, NICKNAMES, AND SOG WORDS~~~~1. (S) Definitions~~~~a. Code Word~~

(1) A code word is a single, classified word, a classified meaning and allocated by CINCPAC. Used specifically for security purposes.

(2) Documents containing code words will be classified and marked according to the higher classification on the information contained in the document/message. If the information is unclassified the document/message does not automatically cause the document to be classified TOP SECRET or SECRET; however, code words used in conjunction with their respective meanings, implied or specifically states, cause the document to be classified TOP SECRET or SECRET as applicable.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. Nickname. A nickname is a combination of two unclassified words, assigned an unclassified meaning and allocated by the Plans Division from a CINCPAC and COMUSMACV approved list. A nickname is employed for administrative convenience. It is not designed, nor is it to be used, to achieve a security objective.

c. SOG Word. One or two unclassified words, assigned a classified or unclassified meaning for use only with SOG Headquarters and subordinate elements. Allocated by individual staff sections.*

2. (c) Current List. A current list Code Words, Nicknames, and SOG Words with their classified meaning appear as Tab 4 hereto.

* (U) Directive, MACSOG, "Military Security, Classification Guide (U)", 380.12 5 September 1969.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~Guide (U)~~

380.12 5 September 1969

H-23

Appendix B
Appendix

~~TOP SECRET~~PART VI. TECHNIQUES ~~(S)~~A. ~~(TS)~~ TECHNIQUES

The techniques of security, cover and deception are as wide and varied as the imagination of the leaders participating in a given program. Some of the techniques employed by the various elements of SOG appear below.

B. ~~(TS)~~ GROUND ELEMENTS

1. ~~(TS)~~ Preparation. In preparation for departure on a cross-border or in-country mission several steps are followed. Uniforms, weapons and equipment are prepared and inspected to insure adequacy for the mission and non-attributability. Often, there will be enemy items. Weapons are test-fired and radios are confirmed operable. Rehearsals of the mission are conducted on terrain similar to that of the mission area.

2. ~~(TS)~~ Briefings. Through briefings, study of maps and aerial photos, discussions with other personnel who have been in the same area, and rehearsals; US personnel of the reconnaissance team become very familiar with their area of operation. Vietnamese team members are briefed on the exact target area not more than 24 hours before insertion time. This takes place after the reconnaissance team has been sealed in its isolation area.

3. ~~(TS)~~ Reconnaissance. An aerial visual reconnaissance (VR) is conducted to make final selection of the insertion landing zone (LZ). Primary, alternate and, often, secondary LZs are selected. These landing zones must be at least two km apart to preclude mission aborts as a result of ground fire from a single weapon emplacement and/or rapid enemy reaction time. Care is exercised during the VR to avoid compromising landing zones or anticipated routes of movement from selected LZs.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-24

Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. (TS) Security. Passive measures of security and defense are always employed prior to insertion. These include such things as removing shiny objects, reducing potential noise makers within the Reconnaissance Team (metallic objects which might bang together, personnel with colds and therefore subject to sneeze or cough, etc.), using camouflage paint sticks on exposed skin, and camouflaged uniforms.

5. (TS) Insertions. Insertions are made at varying times during the day. For a period the trend was to insert at last light to give the team the protection of darkness almost immediately. Of late (September 1969) the desire seems to be to insert as early in the day as possible to give the RT maximum time for orientation and movement away from the insertion landing zone and to enhance extraction should it become necessary.

6. (TS) OK Report. Upon entry via helicopter, the initial "Team OK" Report and communications check is conducted. This report comes within 15 to 20 minutes after insertion and acts as a release for the troop-carrier helicopters and supporting aircraft. Until this report is received by the Forward Air Controller (FAC), the supporting aircraft remain fairly close at hand should it be necessary to extract the team due to compromise or injury.

7. (TS) Deception Technique. A deception technique employed at time of insertion is to put two RTs on the same LZ at the same time. The two RTs move away from the LZ in more or less opposite directions. In event that one of the teams come in contact with the enemy and is unable to evade, that team moves to an LZ for extract. The enemy is expected to believe that the normal one team was inserted. The other RT continues its assigned mission. Another technique is a form of stay behind.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

It is accomplished with a fresh RT coming in with helicopters slated for a relatively uncontested extract of another team. The insert team moves off the LZ and stays concealed and quiet for a period of listening and observation before continuing on its mission. This technique can also be used to initiate an ambush/prisoner capture patrol.

8. (TS) Communications Deception. Communications deception is sometime accomplished during insert by putting a Forward Air Controller (FAC) or a transmitter at a dummy insert point a considerable distance from the team's area and broadcasting a high quantity of dummy radio traffic. The inserted team practices proper radio procedure and holds radio use to the minimum.

9. (TS) Forward Air Controller (FAC): While teams are on the ground the Forward Air Controller (FAC) aircraft never flies directly over nor does he orbit the point at which the reconnaissance team (RT) is located. His most desirable position is approximately one mile from the team on the ground in an area which allows good communications with the RT and the Mobile Launch Team.

10. (TS) Initial Movement. Once on the ground, the RT moves rapidly away from the landing zone (LZ) on a predetermined azimuth other than the ultimate desired direction of movement. This initial movement is selected to afford immediate concealment for the team and to throw the enemy off as to the true base direction to the team's target area. Numerous direction changes, back-tracking and other deceptive maneuvers are accomplished as the RT progresses through its assigned mission. Rally points are selected and announced along the route of march.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

11. (TS) Remain Overnight Position When the Reconnaissance team (RT) selects a "remain over night" (RON) position, the team stops, remains silent, listening for as much as an hour, then cautiously conducts short-range reconnaissance all the way around the RON position. RON positions are often selected in heavy brush areas to minimize surprise attacks. No firm procedures are established for security in the RON position. Each team leader determines what measures will provide his RT the best protection. Claymore mines are often emplaced. Consensus seems to be that team members are kept within arms reach of each other during the night so as to preclude having to move to get the whole team alerted. Some RT leaders maintain one man awake throughout the night, others require 50% awake. Team members wear their equipment while they sleep in the RON position. They do not eat while in the RON position. Shortly before first light, the entire team is awakened and alerted. They remain in position for a period (perhaps an hour) of listening silence before continuing on the assigned mission. To avoid establishing a pattern, teams may move out of a RON position before first light.

12. (TS) Night Movement. Night movement is necessarily slower than day movement. Slower movement allows for periods of listening and more caution to avoid making noise. When a team recognizes it is being pursued, a method used to discourage and deceive the enemy is to throw grenades in the rear of the team's movement, then to the front as far as possible, as direction of movement is changed. Normal reaction for personnel attempting to evade an enemy at night is to move away from sounds of explosions. With this in mind, teams do just the opposite to confuse and deceive the enemy.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

13 (TS) Radio Contacts The number of radio contacts required of the teams vary with the operational concepts of the Command and Control (C&C) Detachments. Other than the initial "Team O." Report, from one to three contacts are required daily. These contacts must include team location, condition and intention. Spot contacts are made at anytime the team has something significant to report. Radio contact from the RON position is avoided unless a state of emergency exists. This precludes an enemy with electronic direction finding equipment pin-pointing the RTs position. Messages are encrypted in accordance with the Standard Operating Instructions (SOI) and transmissions are kept short commensurate with the amount of traffic and perishability of the information to be passed. Teams often carry the recently received AN/PRC 77 radio. In conjunction with the KY-38 voice enciphering equipment, these radios afford secure voice transmission, thereby permitting more definitive reporting without the necessity for encryption. This equipment is compatible with equipment mounted in Forward Air Controller (FAC) and Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) aircraft, at MLT sites, and the C&C Detachments.

14. (TS) Team Movement. Again, the team moves away from its RON position on an azimuth somewhat different from its base direction to the target area to throw the enemy off. The last man in the march column is responsible to wipe out tracks made by the team. In certain areas teams are authorized to implant non-attributable M-14 mines with self-destruction devices, times and/or booby-trapped Claymore mines or white phosphorous grenades, and CS powder to discourage trackers who may be trailing the team. The CS powder has been used to throw off trackers using dogs.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

15. (TS) Immediate Target Area. Activities in the immediate area of the target are noticeable by increased precautions and alertness. Point or linear targets are observed from a distance for some time before they are approached. Vantage points are selected which permit good observation of the target area and also permit covered, concealed routes of withdrawal from the target area. Continuous comparison is made of the terrain with that which appears on the map and was studied in previous reports and plans.*

16. (TS) Extraction. In preparation for extraction and during the extract operation team personnel are not permitted to let their guard down or relax. The team leader maintains continuous radio contact with the extraction helicopters and the use of call signs is eliminated to shorten transmissions. Teams often put out Claymore mines on likely avenues of approach or oriented in direction of known enemy locations. These mines will be detonated at a prescribed time, usually immediately prior to the extract aircraft coming in. Forward Air Controller (FAC) is notified before the detonation.

C (TS) HELICOPTER INSERTION/EXTRACTION TECHNIQUES

1. (TS) Visual Reconnaissance. Prior to insertion, an aerial visual reconnaissance (VR) of the operation area is performed. When possible, VRs are accomplished using Forward Air Controller (FAC) aircraft to allow both the team leader/unit commander and insertion helicopter unit commander to recon the landing zone (LZ). Visual reconnaissance (VR) aircraft avoid orbiting the target and bringing enemy attention to that area. FAC aircraft are a frequent, normal sight to the enemy and offer less probability of compromise.

2. (TS) Landing Zone. Landing zones (LZs) are not normally hit with preparatory fires which might cause enemy interest in

* () NOTE The RT Leader's Handbook contains a chapter on "Tracking and use of Human Senses in Obtaining Combat Intelligence." Much of this information is applicable to ground security techniques.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-29

Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

an area of insertion. When LZs are required to establish
 with preparatory fires, other deception techniques are
 employed to reduce possibility of compromise. Insertions
 follow preparatory fires immediately or are delayed several
 days while interest is shown in other areas by aircraft activities

3. (TS) Enemy Procedures. The primary goal on any infil-
 tration is to insert a team safely on the ground, undetected.
 A basic understanding of the enemy capabilities and procedures
 described below is important to successful completion of a
 mission.

a. Landing Zone Watchers: Consists of positioning
 people on or near obvious helicopter landing areas. They
 may be local militia or well trained military troops.
 They report the landing by radio, gunshots or other
 signalling devices. They will wait for reinforcements
 while tracking the team

b. Sky Watchers: The enemy positions people in trees
 or high points of ground at strategic locations throughout
 his area of operation to detect, flight-follow, and report
 aircraft.

c. Radio Monitoring It must be assumed that all radio
 transmissions are monitored and understood This includes
 FM, UHF, and VHF. All radio transmissions should be kept
 to a minimum and coded as much as possible.

d. Landing Zones Booby-Trapped. Obvious Landing zones
 (LZs) are sometimes booby-trapped. Mines, punji-stakes,
 and just a few of the devices used.

4. (TS) Friendly Techniques. Several techniques are
 used in cover and deception for helicopter insertions.

a. False Insertion Tactics. The purpose of a false in-
 sertion is to deceive the enemy and/or multiply the number

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

of possible insertions thus requiring him to look for the
 tear in more than one location. The false insert should
 be at least as realistic as an actual insert. Any false
 insertion should have an identical flight make up, be
 executed at the same time and should take place about four
 kilometers from an actual insertion. It must be realized
 that it is impossible to fly a formation of helicopters
 over enemy occupied territory without being seen or heard.
 The element of risk should be kept in mind for a false
 insert. Faking an insert into an enemy 50 caliber machine
 gun position is always a possibility. It is not usually
 necessary for the false insert aircraft to land, however,
 the fake must look realistic from the ground and from
 higher vantage points. The Flight Leader planning the
 false insert must keep in mind the positioning of his gun-
 ship support relative to the actual insert helicopter and
 LZ. It is possible to delay the required fire support in
 event of contact in the LZ by having the gunship follow the
 false insert.

b. Leap Frog Method (for small unit/team insertions).

Using two helicopters to carry troops with one additional
 chase ship. The chase ship is a required extra which is
 used to lift crew and troops out should the troop ship or
 a gunship have any emergency. Simultaneously, as one air-
 craft drops down, a low aircraft climbs. In mountainous
 terrain the lower aircraft drops below ridge lines, in
 open terrain nearly touching the ground, with sufficient
 delay to allow a dummy insertion. To avoid establishing
 a pattern of maneuvers, this "game" can be started prior
 to or upon insertion, continuing until enough areas have
 been included to confuse enemy search units attempting to

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

locate the team. Gunships either participate with the leap frog or join the lowest troop ship.

c. High/Low Aircraft/Lo Flight Troop Ships The C&C ship, flying high in the sky, directs contour (map of the earth) flying aircraft to the landing zone (LZ). Upon insertion, contour flying is continued and delays are made in other areas to simulate insertion.

d. Lo Level/High Level Pop-up. This technique requires two sets of three helicopters each. Set one flies low while set two flies high and to the rear. Set two drops to join set one for a time indicating possible insertion. Set one climbs high while set two continues low and makes insert. This alteration is continued in other areas to simulate insertion.

e. In Trail Formation. The insert aircraft occupies the number two position in a formation of five aircraft. All aircraft cross the landing zone (LZ) with the insert aircraft landing to discharge the team, then coming out to rejoin the formation in one of the follow-up positions.

f. On Site Insert/Extract: The element to be replaced secures the LZ for insertion of the replacement unit. Insertion and extraction is accomplished by the same aircraft. The unit arriving may go on to another mission or it may set up an ambush in vicinity of the LZ. In event an ambush is planned, one US member of the departing team may be retained to advise on the most suitable location and deployment.

g. A combination of techniques a and either c or d above.

h. "Nightingale Devices" Use of "nightingale devices" (pyrotechnic simulated fire fight mechanism and/or smoke screens with above methods on dummy LZs).

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. High level drop of night-vision devices or previously used LZs.

j. Planning. The Reconnaissance Team (RT) Leader/Unit Commander must be aware of the tactics planned by the Flight Element Leader to deceive the enemy. Discussions on employment of one or a combination of these techniques are conducted during coordination between team leader, flight leader and FAC.

5. (TS) Exfiltration. The purpose of an exfiltration is normally to remove friendly forces from enemy territory. Timing is an essential element during any exfiltration, particularly when the team is in contact with enemy forces.

a. The Forward Air Controller (FAC) will normally direct the entire extraction operation. He will be first to locate the team and he will attempt to determine location and degree of enemy resistance. The FAC will direct the gunships to the target and call for launch of troop-carrying helicopters based on his estimate of the situation. Usually, after the gunships are airborne and moving toward the target area, troop-carrying helicopters follow very shortly.

b. The FAC and team leader determine whether the team can move to a sitdown Landing Zone (LZ) or whether rope ladders, McGuire rigs or other extraction equipment will be required. The lead extract pilot continually monitors preparations for the extraction. The best sources of information for the troop-carrying helicopter pilots will generally be the team on the ground and the gunships covering the team.

c. In the normal extraction, the team is ready for extract and usually is located at a sitdown LZ. Troop-carrying helicopters are launched with or slightly after the first gunships and proceed to an orbit area in the vicinity of the planned extract point. In extractions, both normal and emergency

~~TOP SECRET~~H-33
H-33Appendix E
Appendix E

~~TOP SECRET~~

the extraction should be started out, prior to, before the
 troop-carrying helicopters are committed. Flying techniques
 covered in para 4 (infiltration) above apply full, to an
 extraction.

d. The lead extract pilot will fly over the area at a
 safe altitude to determine the exact location of the team,
 any obstacles on the LZ and what terrain features can be
 used to advantage during approach and departure. A rapid
 descent at 80 to 100 knots airspeed, erratic flight path
 and a final approach which is short and near treetop level
 has proven most effective. Landing or hover is as near
 the team as possible to save time on the LZ. When the
 team is aboard the aircraft, departure from the LZ should
 be vertical to the treetops, then close to treetops while
 using a moderately zigzag course. Ridge lines should be
 crossed at 90 degrees. A maximum performance climb to
 altitude is executed a minimum of two kilometers away from
 the LZ.

6. (TS) Emergency Extraction. An emergency extraction
 occurs when the team is in contact with the enemy or contact
 is imminent. The team may be at a sitdown Landing Zone (LZ)
 or they may be able to move to one. In an emergency situation,
 there is high probability that rope ladder, STABO, or McGuire
 rigs will have to be used.

a. Helicopter tactics used for location of the team,
 approaches to and departures from the LZ are the same as
 outlined for normal extraction. Timing is much more
 critical.

b. Gunships will be launched immediately upon de-
 claration of an emergency situation. Gunships and tactical
 close air support attempt to secure the LZ. When enemy

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

resistance has been subjected on tactical air and the first set of gunships have expended their munitions, the second set of gunships will break out or finish securing the LZ

c. Troop-carrying helicopters will have been launched shortly after departure of the gunships and will be on station. When the LZ is secure the troop-carrying helicopters are cleared to pick up the team. The last known enemy location and smoke from heavy ordnance will dictate the best direction and type of approach. Troop-carrying helicopter pilots will avoid flying over known enemy positions and will use smoke for cover whenever possible.

d. The extract pilot is responsible to control all machinegun firing from his aircraft. It is mandatory that door gunners locate the team before firing to preclude endangering friendly forces with friendly fire.

7 (TS) Security and deception techniques for insertion and extraction of platoon or larger forces employ similar methods as described above. More aircraft are involved. Landing zones (LZs) may or may not be large enough to sit more than one helicopter down at a time

8 (TS) More detailed information on helicopter tactics and techniques may be gained by studying the Draft Manual, 20th Special Operations Squadron, SEA Helicopter Operations and Tactics.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tab 1

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

1. (S) During the period 11 October through 4 November 1968, a CINCPAC OPSEC team conducted an operational security examination of the Military Assistance Command Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG) Vietnam. The purpose of this examination was to analyze operational techniques of MACSOG activities with a view towards identifying possible sources of enemy prior knowledge, and where operationally feasible, recommending ways to deny the enemy these sources.

2. (TS) At the time the OPSEC examination was initiated, the mission assigned to the Studies and Observations Group was:

"MACSOG in coordination with RVNAF Strategic Technical Directorate and various U.S. agencies plans and conducts cover/ clandestine operations in SVN as directed and in a manner that operations can be plausibly denied by the U.S. and RVN government."

However, as a cover, SOG appears as a staff section on the MACV organizational chart and is described as a MACV staff agency responsible for the preparation classified studies. Although a subordinate command of MACV, approval of SOG activities is maintained at CINCPAC, JCS, and in some cases at Presidential level. Political guidance of SOG activities is provided by the U.S. ambassadors, Saigon and Vientiane, Laos. Operational control of SOG forces is exercised by CGMUSMACV. The planning, liaison, training, and advisory support to the RVNAF which pertains to cover or cross-border operations is a joint MACV/CAS(CIA) responsibility.

3. (S) During the course of the examination, an extensive data base was accumulated concerning the details of all facets of SOG operations. This information was used continually by the CINCPAC OPSEC team in arriving at the findings which follow. The data base is not included in this report due to its sensitivity and the fact that recipients are either well informed concerning SOG operations or have ready access to the information.

4. (S) Due to the cessation of all bombing and other offensive operations treated below were halted. The attendant OPSEC findings were valid at the time of the examination (October 1968) and would again be valid in the event the same operations are resumed. Those activities and findings which are not currently applicable are treated in the past tense.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-36

Tab 1 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~(1) Signals of the FAC are transmitted by radio (VHF or UHF) to the ground stations. The ground stations are located in the vicinity of the target area. The ground stations are used to transmit signals to the FAC and to receive signals from the FAC. The ground stations are also used to transmit signals to the ground stations and to receive signals from the ground stations.~~

~~a. The FAC uses the following signals:~~

(1) Use of Insecure Radio Call Codes. The FAC uses unsecured use of insecure messages code in its communications. Insecure codes in use are the scramble, point-of-reference, and color pattern. Such codes do not provide the security necessary to protect sensitive SOF operational information. The activity uses the same scramble code for all reconnaissance teams and the same edition remains in effect for several weeks without changing.

(2) Clear Text Transmissions to FAC Sites. FAC communications to helicopter launch sites can provide enemy SIGINT with up to 1 1/2 hours forewarning of impending reconnaissance team inserts. This forewarning is available through a clear text transmission made by the FAC while over the target area advising the launch site that the mission (target nickname) is "go," with a TOT of.... This is followed by another transmission from the FAC to Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) requesting TACAIR assets be released, thus further confirming the "go" status. In addition, the FAC uses a static sign, e.g., COVLY, whereas inserted reconnaissance teams use daily changing call signs and most other FI stations use daily changing call signs. The static call sign of the FAC provides enemy SIGINT with easy linkage to inserted reconnaissance teams and other stations even though they change call signs.

(3) Availability of Secure Voice Encryption Equipment. Tactical secure voice encryption equipment (M-50) and associated PFC-77 radios are available in sufficient quantities in SOF to secure FI radios of Forward Operating Bases (FOB) and radio-relay sites. The equipment is not being used at this time because FAC aircraft do not have a secure voice capability (M-28), consequently stations in the otherwise secure net have to communicate with the FAC in an unsecure manner.

(4) Static Call Signs and Frequencies. Some ground radio-relay sites use static call signs and frequencies, thus providing the same linkage to reconnaissance teams as described in subparagraphs a(2) above.

(5) Insecure Telephone Hot Line Circuits. Hot line dedicated insecure telephone circuits are used between SOF headquarters and major subordinate elements. KAC-234 is used to conceal the identity of persons and activities using the hot lines; however, there is no means to protect the sensitive information that may be passed over these circuits.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-37

Tab 1 to
Appendix A

Appendix A

~~TOP SECRET~~

(1) Access to Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). It was noted that the SOG personnel, who are responsible for the maintenance of the FOBs, are also responsible for the security of the FOBs. It was observed that the SOG personnel are very careful in their handling of the FOBs, and that they are very aware of the need to maintain the security of the FOBs. It was also noted that the SOG personnel are very aware of the need to maintain the security of the FOBs, and that they are very aware of the need to maintain the security of the FOBs.

(2) Indigenous Access to FOBs. At one FOB it was observed that indigenous pilots apparently have free access to the FOB with its uncovered Top Secret LIDIS maps and associated documents.

(3) Target Markings on Maps. It was noted that several teams take into the operational area maps which are marked with the exact coordinates of the landing zones, observation points, and targets. When targets are "out of country" capture of these maps could reveal U.S./Allied actual area of operations.

b. ELDEST SC (U). The ELDEST SC program is designed to allow the U.S. government to plausibly deny its existence. A strict control of all contaminated ammunition through SOG channels by only SOG U.S. personnel is maintained from its contamination until its delivery to Forward Operating Bases. All packaged materials are carefully wrapped and bundled in unmarked cartons and transported to each site by U.S. personnel in SOG aircraft. However, the insertion of the ammunition by a combined U.S. indigenous team perhaps jeopardizes the security so carefully planned up to this point. The indigenous members of the inserting teams who observe U.S. personnel dispensing loose contaminated rounds along trails, bivouac sites, etc., probably realize that their U.S. team members are not allowing quality ammunition to fall into enemy hands. In addition, during the conduct of this examination, it was noted that an expansion of the ELDEST SC program is planned. This expansion includes the insertion of contaminated ammunition by other organizations than those presently utilized (SOG and selected teams from the 5th Special Forces Group, Navy SEALs, and [redacted]). The use of other organizations should be carefully considered in view of the sensitivity of this program.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

c. STRATA Operations (U)

(1) CH-3 Helos. Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition (STRATA) teams, and other agents of SOG that were to be inserted into MYA, were carried to the LZ by CH-3 helicopter from MKP. These helos are based at Udon, Thailand, and arrived at MKP immediately prior to SOG missions, thereby indicating that an operation was pending.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-28
.. 30

Tab 1 to
Tab 1 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

... of the ...
 ... of the ...
 ... of the ...
 ... of the ...



(b)(1)
 (b)(3)

(4) Stereotyped Operation. All inserts of STRATA teams and other agents were stereotyped by time of day and number of participating aircraft. The weather over NVN generally allows good visibility only between the hours of 1200-1500 daily. This factor also tends to stereotype FAC missions which checked on teams, and conducted visual reconnaissance of new landing zones (LZ). Seventh AF regulations also required all team inserts to be under the visual control of a FAC (23TASS).

d. MIDRIFF (C) Operations

(1) Presence of Unmarked SOG Aircraft at Nakhon Phanom (NKP). Singleton agents and agent teams, including U.S. and Vietnamese monitors, are transported to NKP from various locations in South Vietnam in C-123 and C-130 aircraft. Formerly, these agents were inserted primarily into NVN but have only gone into Laos since 1 November 1968. The same aircraft are also used in providing practically all the logistic support for the SOG support Facility, NKP (SUPFAC, NKP). When on a strictly logistical mission, the aircraft take off immediately after discharging cargo, but when in support of an operational mission the aircraft wait until agents and/or team handlers (U.S. and SVN) requiring transportation back to SVN, return to NKP. Therefore, their presence on the airway for an extended period of time indicates that either an insertion or extraction is being attempted.



(b)(1)
 (b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-20

Tab 1 to
 Tab 1 to
 Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~(b)(1)
(b)(3)

2. ~~SEA DRAGON~~ ~~Operations~~. ~~SEA DRAGON~~ ~~Boats~~ ~~(C)~~ ~~are~~ ~~operating~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~17th~~ ~~parallel~~ ~~in~~ ~~South~~ ~~Vietnam~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~area~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~17th~~ ~~parallel~~ ~~in~~ ~~North~~ ~~Vietnam~~. Although the island is a restricted area, it lies near the southern air approach to Da Nang, Air Base. It is likely that the volume of air traffic that can be seen passing near Paradise Island would have indicated, even to the most unobservant, that he was somewhere other than in North Vietnam. Recently, a South Vietnamese F-4G (White) aircraft flew over the island at 2000 feet broadcasting Cienet Noi propaganda to the Vietnamese living in the two villages on the island.

f. ~~PLCMIAN~~ (C) Operations

(1) To protect the ~~PLCMIAN~~ (C) boats transiting SEA DRAGON operating areas (OAs), COMSEVENTHFLT was notified well in advance about planned ~~PLCMIAN~~ (C) missions. SEA DRAGON units left their stations 1-2 hours before the boats were scheduled to transit and moved at least 12 miles seaward of established ~~PLCMIAN~~ (C) tracks. The withdrawal of SEA DRAGON forces in connection with the passage of ~~plowman~~ (C) PT boats was a predictable operational pattern that the enemy could have exploited to alert his naval, air, and coastal defense forces.

(2) The Coastal Surveillance Center (CSC) at Danang is a jointly manned (U.S. and Vietnamese) facility that controls JARRET TIE forces in the I Corps Tactical Zone. This activity was notified several hours in advance about planned ~~PLCMIAN~~ (C) operations. CSC was told when the boats would cross the 17th parallel going to and returning from missions and the number of boats involved. Because of the lack of firm security clearance data, the reliability of indigenous personnel must be considered questionable.

(3) The number of PT boats required for any particular type of mission reflects the area of intended operation. During the conduct of BIRROST missions (over the beach below 17 degrees North) in South Vietnam, only one boat is utilized. When regular ~~PLCMIAN~~ (C) operations were being conducted between 17-19 degrees North only two-three boats were employed whereas above 19 degrees North four to six boats were used.

~~TOP SECRET~~H 40
H-40Tab 1 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

"

1. The JFFC has, during the past 5 years, planned 57 operations to recover U.S. military personnel detained by the VC/NVA but at 57 of these planned operations, 35 recovery attempts were actually conducted, resulting in the release of 100 Vietnamese captives, and 10 U.S. personnel.

2. General Personnel Recovery Operations (JFFC) (1)

(1) The JFFC has, during the past 5 years, planned 57 operations to recover U.S. military personnel detained by the VC/NVA but at 57 of these planned operations, 35 recovery attempts were actually conducted, resulting in the release of 100 Vietnamese captives, and 10 U.S. personnel.

(2) Several reasons appear to contribute to the complete lack of success in JFFC has had in attempting to recover U.S. personnel. These are:

(a) The primary source of information pertaining to captured U.S. personnel is individuals who have escaped, or defected from a P. camp that contains Americans among the prisoner population. This is extremely perishable information since the VC/NVA are known to move P's around after the discovery of a missing prisoner or a deserter from their own ranks. This is especially true if the camp holds Americans. Since the average time lapse between the initial information of a P. camp location to actually conducting a recovery operation is 5-7 days, the chances of having a successful operation are exceedingly slim.

(b) This 5-7 day delay, prior to inserting recovery forces is due to two factors. First, the JFFC has no assets under its command or operational control. The forces employed for operations usually are those organizations, U.S. MACV, whose tactical area of operations includes the objective area. Secondly, before conducting a recovery operation, the forces employed almost always insist on having additional information on the target, i.e., ground recon, air visual recon aerial photos, etc. Per units will react immediately to that information, or that may be a scheme to ambush any recovery forces. In this case respect many commanders insist on preliminary air strikes and artillery fires prior to insertion of forces. Such preparatory fires, together with various methods of reconnaissance, only alert P. camp personnel to an impending U.S./allied operation.

~~TOP SECRET~~

11 11
11-41

Tab 1 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB 2

STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

MACSOG

3 Feb 1969

SUBJECT: Operations Security Examination of MACSOG Operations (S)

CINCPAC
ATTN: J3C4
PPO 96601

1. (U) Reference is made to:

- a. Letter, CINCPAC SEA SSO 000101-68, subject as above.
- b. Message, CINCPAC 302210Z Dec 68, subject as above.

2. (S) A detailed review of the CINCPAC report on a MACSOG operations security (OPSEC) examination (ref A) has been completed as requested (ref B).

3. (S) Action taken to correct or improve the security of SOG operations and comments pertaining to specific findings are provided incl 1.

4. (S) MACSOG appreciates the effort expended on our behalf by CINCPAC and believes that their recommendations in many cases will improve the effectiveness and security of our operations.

/s/
STEPHEN E. CAVANAUGH
Colonel, USA
Chief, SOG

Copy furnished:
Chief of Staff, MACV
MACJ2
MACJ3

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-43

Tab 2 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION (C)
SPECIFIC INFO - SECURITY INFORMATION (S)~~1. (S) PRAIRIE FIRE and DANIEL FORD Operations

a. Use of Insecure Homemade Codes (ref 5a(1)). The shackle codes presently used in F. communications are changed each day for each operation. However, in order to provide a better system for reporting grid coordinates by reconnaissance teams (RT's) MACSOG will adopt the Centers (ABCCC) and Forward Air Controllers (FAC). This device is secure, easy to carry and will inform the supporting FAC of a target location more rapidly than the present system.

b. Clear Text Transmissions to FAC Sites (ref 5a(2)). Secure voice communications (see para 1c below) between FAC's, helicopter launch sites and ABCCC will eliminate enemy forewarning of impending PT inserts. The subject of static call signs versus changing call signs has been thoroughly staffed by 7th Air Force (DOOT) in response to CINCPAC message 010006Z Jan 69. Conclusions are that changing FAC call signs would create more confusion than the security benefits attainable through their use for the tactical environment in which they operate. Also, when secure communicative means are used, call signs are no problem.

c. Availability of Secure Voice Encryption Equipment (ref 5a(3)). All SOG FAC aircraft will have operational secure voice capability (K-28) by 28 February 1969. Likewise, all Forward Operating Bases (FOB's) and radio-relay sites will be using their secure voice capability by this date.

d. Static Call Signs and Frequencies (ref 5a(4)). No COMSEC problem will exist in the use of static call signs and frequencies by ground radio-relay sites when secure voice equipment is fully operational (see para 1c above).

e. Insecure Telephone Hot Line Circuits (ref 5a(5)). Commanders of all SOG major subordinate units have been thoroughly briefed on this problem area. Command emphasis will be focused on individual security consciousness when any telephone or other insecure means of communications are used.

f. Security of Tactical Operations Center (TOC) (ref 5a(6)). All TOC's now have security guards on 24 hour duty, use a pass system for visitors and are selflighted.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-44

Tab 2 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

g. Indigenous Access to RTT TCC's (ref 5a(7)). Indigenous pilots no longer have free access to areas which contain classified maps and associated documents unless these materials are covered or otherwise secured. This subject was an agenda item at a 27 January 1965 Commanders Conference.

h. Target Markings on Rear Maps (ref 5a(9)). The RT's maps are designed and utilized in such a way that only the team leaders can identify positions accurately. An "offset" coordinate system is employed to make the area of operations (AO) appear to be in South Vietnam.

2. (TS) ELDEST SON Program (ref 5b). As a result of the increasingly widespread use of the unclassified nickname ELDEST SON, the name was changed to ITALIAN GREEN.

a. While it is realized that some indigenous personnel may be aware that US personnel are dispensing enemy ammunition during RT operations, no disclosure is made to them that the ammunition is actually contaminated. In addition, RT's only insert small quantities of loose ammunition which are normally concealed in a US team members pocket or pack. The techniques of insertion normally used are to place the ammunition in NVA/VC equipment such as packs, ponchos and pouches thereby concealing the actual contents of this to indigenous members of the RT. Insertion of large quantities such as boxes, cases, etc. into caches is accomplished by only US personnel on a special insertion mission.

b. Expansion of the ITALIAN GREEN program by utilizing additional units for insertion has been carefully considered from the standpoint of security. Only selected personnel in these units have been briefed. It has been determined that the improved effectiveness to be gained by utilizing additional units for inserting ITALIAN GREEN ammunitions outweighs the risk of disclosure of the program.

3. (TS) STRATA Operations

a. CH-3 Helos (ref 5c(1)). The CH-3 helicopters stationed at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB (NKP) in addition to the CH-3's from Udorn RTAFB have been approved for SOG operations. These operations now encompass flights to points throughout the PRAIRIE FIRE AO for purposes of moving normal RT's as well as STRATA teams. In addition to SOG flights, this squadron conducts approximately thirty flights a day for other miscellaneous purposes. It would be difficult for a visual observer to distinguish STRATA flights from others. Even if STRATA flights could be

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-45

Tab 2 to
Appendix A

Appendix B

~~TOP SECRET~~

discerned, this information above is not considered pertinent due to the lack of association with a specific geographical target area.

b. Equipment of Teams (ref 5c(2)). Current restrictions prohibit STRATA teams from operating in NV but permit their employment in the PTAINIE PIRF (PF) and DANIEL DOOTE (DE) AC's. Radios and batteries of US origin are in common usage by EVA and VC units in the PF and DE AC's. Therefore, no cover story should be required under present day concepts. If STRATA teams resume operations in NVN in the future, Chincom radios will be requested from the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC).

c. Combat Reporting Post, NKP (ref 5c(3)). The Combat Reporting Post (CRP) at NKP is not a SOG facility (it is a 7th AF unit) and is not directly associated with STRATA operations. This OPSEC team finding is not conclusive enough to comment on without first applying several assumptions or protraction.

d. Stereotyped Operations (ref 5c(4)). This finding is correct in stating that team and agent insert time periods are governed by the weather in target areas. This, of course, cannot be altered when employing helicopters without an all-weather, nighttime capability. The implication, however, that STRATA is the only program using these types and numbers of aircraft is erroneous. The majority of Search and Rescue (SAR) missions launched from NKP are composed of a similar FAC - helicopter aircraft package. The same type of FAC aircraft from the same squadron is used for SOG operations as well as for overt reconnaissance missions along the Laos-NVN border (see para 3c above).

4. (TS) KIDRIFF (C) Operations

a. Presence of Unmarked SOG Aircraft at NKP (ref 5d(1)). Operational missions (transporting teams to and from NKP) are now conducted by either (1) off-loading a team at NKP, continuing with logistics support stops and having another aircraft return to pick-up an exfilled team, or (2) off-loading a team at NKP, taking off and flying aircrew training sorties and returning to pick-up an exfilled team. Using this procedure all missions (operational as well as logistical) into NKP involve the same amount of aircraft ground time.

b. Communications Procedures by C-123's (ref 5d(2)). Manual Morse CW, HF transmissions are currently used on all flights (combat or logistics). When flying logistics missions, the American instructor pilot (IP) makes an occasional HF voice transmission to his home base (Nha Trang) to

~~TOP SECRET~~

4 46
4-70

180 2 10
Appendix H

TOP SECRET

report aircraft malfunctions. This is done only when no American radio operators are on board and the message cannot be understood by the Chinese radio operators. The low rate of voice transmissions (less than 1 percent) is considered insignificant. Similar three letter code groups are used for position reporting, or other logistics and combat missions. Hence, the probability of mission type distinction by IVT COMINT means is minimized.

5. (TS) HUMIDOR (C) Operations (ref 5c). Upon resumption of Paradise Island operations, a request will be submitted to restrict all airspace surrounding Paradise Island from ground level to unlimited in lieu of the current HODAN restriction which extends from ground level to 4000 feet. The aircraft overflight referred to in the OPSEC finding was processed as a violation by 7th AF.

6. (TS) PLOWMAN (C) Operations

a. (ref 5f(1)). Agreement with SEA DRAGON forces does require their movement to seaward from Operating Areas (OA) during PLOWMAN (C) operations. This is essential to preserve cover and eliminate any obvious connection between US and SSP forces. It is doubtful that this movement has any direct impact on predicting PLOWMAN (C) missions since SEA DRAGON units frequently leave assigned stations at irregular intervals for other reasons; i.e. to refuel, replenish, rearm; to conduct SAR operations, to change stations, to "turn-over" to incoming ships etc.

b. (ref 5f(2)). It is essential that the MARKET TIME control center know of movement of PLOWMAN (C) craft to prevent mutual interference, unnecessary challenges etc. However, this information need not be passed to indigenous personnel at this center nor displayed on summary plots. Therefore, only the duty operations officer (US) at the Coastal Surveillance Center will have information on movement of PLOWMAN (C) craft. He will utilize this information to keep MARKET TIME craft well away from the tracks of PLOWMAN (C) PTS's.

c. (ref 5f(3)). Prior to the arrival of the CINCPAC OPSEC group, changes in boat composition for various mission areas had been made so that a four boat mission was not identified with the "WHITE" OA. At the time of the cessation of operations, five, four, and three boat missions were randomly scheduled to all OA's.

d. (ref 5f(4)). Radio checks made prior to future PLOWMAN (C) missions will be limited to a single transmission and reception per boat, after electronic sensitivity checks. Further, similar radio checks will be held at random intervals apart from mission preparation.

TOP SECRET

H-47

Tab 2 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~7. ~~(TS)~~ Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC)

a. (ref 50(2)) The CPSEC findings referring to "reasons which appear to contribute to the complete lack of success the JPRC has had in attempting to recover U.S. personnel" were presented to the CPSEC team during JPRC briefings in the form of lessons learned and problems encountered. Rapid reaction to highly perishable intelligence is essential if any success is to be realized in prisoner recovery operations. The JPRC is continuing to stress this key factor in its coordination with field units tasked to conduct prisoner recovery operations. Although promptness of reaction time is a constant JPRC objective, this in itself is not proven sufficient. On a few occasions, units were launched into PW camp areas within 24 hours after an escaped PW was recovered. On these occasions the teams found recently abandoned facilities. The VC modus operandi obviously calls for moving all PW's immediately after they believe the facilities have been subject to compromise through a PW escaping, a guard defecting or other indications. The greatest gap in our overall recovery efforts is the inability to gain reliable intelligence regarding PW camp locations before the enemy realizes we possess this information. Although we have constantly levied this requirement on the various intelligence collection agencies i.e., 525th Military Intelligence Group; Detachment 6, 6409th Special Activities Group, etc. and supplemented these appeals with publicity regarding the reward program, we have not obtained the desired results.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-48

Tab 2 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB 3

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL	SUBJECT
MACSOG-21	OPSEC Survey (U)
THU. Director, Intel	From: Chief, Security

TO: Chief, SOG

Date: 20 Jun 69
MAJ Arheart/rpx/T-4397

1. (S) PURPOSE: To inform Chief, SOG of the findings of the SOG OPSEC Survey Team and to obtain his approval of recommendations based thereon.

2. (S) DISCUSSION:

a. At Tab A is the report of the OPSEC Survey conducted at direction of Chief, SOG. The report includes the current status of corrective action taken based on CIMPAC's survey, other items that provide prior knowledge to the enemy, and miscellaneous related observations and comments.

b. Where recommendations are appropriate they are contained in the body of the report following the finding. The section/activity responsible for taking corrective action is noted parenthetically.

3. (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That Chief, SOG approve the recommendations contained in attached report for subsequent implementation by designated "action offices."

b. That report be returned to Security for reproduction in requisite number of copies, control action, and distribution.

/s/
H.W. ARHEART
MAJ, USA
Team Coordinator

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-49

Tab 3 to

Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPORT OF OPERATIONAL SECURITY SURVEY (U)

2. ~~(S)~~ ~~SYNOPSIS:~~

a. References.

(1) CINCPAC Report, Subj: Examination of Military Assistance Command Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG) Operations (U), dated 1 December 1968 (Inclosure 1).

(2) MACSOG Ltr, Subj: Operations Security Examination of MACSOG Operations (S), dated 1 February 1969 (Inclosure 2).

b. At the direction of Chief, SOG, an Operational Security (OPSEC) Survey of SOG and its subordinate activities was conducted during the period 11 May through 10 June 1969. The purpose of the survey was two-fold:

(1) To follow-up the COMUSMACV OPSEC Survey of October-November 1968.

(2) To identify sources of enemy prior knowledge not previously identified by CINCPAC.

An additional mission performed concurrently was the presentation of a Communications Security (COMSEC) briefing based upon the COMSEC survey conducted by the 101st Radio Research Company in February 1969. The briefing was presented by members of the 101st Radio Research Company.

c. Members of the team were as follows:

Maj H. W. Areheart, Intel Representative and Team Coordinator
 Maj William E. Adams, O & T Representative
 Capt Robert T. Carlson, Commo Representative
 Capt William C. Schaffer, Commo Representative
 1LT Michael Williamson, 101st RRC
 SSG Thomas P. Focht, 101st RRC

d. The following activities were visited during the survey:

Command and Control North
 Quang Tri Launch Site
 Phu Bai Launch Site

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-50

Tab 3 to ..

Appendix A

~~TOP SECRET~~

Naval Advisory Detachment

Monkey Mountain FOB

Support Facility IFM

Air Operations Group
 1st Flight Detachment
 15th SOS
 20th SOS

Command and Control Central
 DaN to Launch Site

Command and Control South
 Duc Co Launch Site
 Quan Loi Launch Site

Camp Long Thann

Airborne Studies Group

e. The findings contained herein are based upon information obtained from interview with key personnel at the various locations, from written reports and SOP's of the activities, and from observation of operations of the various activities.

f. The survey was subject to the following limitations:

(1) Short observation period at each location. A longer observation period at each location during peak operational periods could possibly have resulted in discovery of more problem areas.

(2) Bad weather in the PRAIRIE FIRE AO contributed to reduced operations and the inability of the team to observe procedures during conduct of operations.

(3) The team visited CCS immediately after an operational stand-down in the SALEM HOUSE AO and a true picture may not have been obtained.

2. (TS) CURRENT STATUS OF ACTIONS TAKEN AS RESULT OF CINCPAC SURVEY.

The following comments are based upon, and keyed to, findings of the CINCPAC Survey and the SOG reply thereto.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-51

Tab 3 to
 Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

a. PRAIRIE FIRE and SALT HOUSE Operations

(1) Use of Insecure Homebase Codes (ref 5a(1)). The use of insecure codes has been reduced. Only in one area was the use of an unauthorized code by operational teams found. STRATA operations teams were still using an unauthorized color matrix type code. It was pointed out that STRATA operations had on hand the AWAC-270 (English) and RV. AL/2 (Vietnamese) STRATA code, an NSA approved code specifically designed for STRATA use. Snake codes and color codes were found at one other location, but they were employed in camp defense, not SOG operations. The signal officer concerned was advised that approved codes are available.

(2) Clear Text Transmissions to FAC Sites (ref 5a(2)). FAC aircraft are continuing to make clear text transmissions despite the fact all FAC aircraft and all C&C Detachments possess secure F1 equipment. The secure equipment is being used at launch sites under the control of CCH, however, it was only being used, "when they had something classified to say." They were duly informed that everything they said was classified. A directive will be prepared by SOG Commo to detail specific procedures for launch site to FAC communications. This will be followed up by inspections to insure that only approved secure means are employed.

(3) Availability of Secure Voice Encryption Equipment (ref 5a(3)). Sufficient secure voice equipment is now on hand to secure FAC to launch site to C&C circuits where such circuits are employed.

(4) Static Call Signs and Frequencies (ref 5a(4)). Ground radio relay sites now employ changing call signs.

(5) Insecure Telephone Hot Line Circuits (ref 5a(5)). The insecure telephone hotline remains a problem. KAC-234 is used to conceal the identities of persons and activities, however, KAC-199 SOG Operations Code and the various one time pad systems available are seldom if ever employed by hotline users. SOG Commo will initiate a program to include classes on what codes are available and how to use them.

(6) Security of Tactical Operations Centers (TOC) (ref 5a(6))

1 The CINCPAC report apparently refers to what is not CCH. The security of the CCH TOC is now excellent. It is fenced, lighted, and guarded.

~~TOP SECRET~~H 50
H-20Tab 3 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

2 Our reply to the CINCPAC finding is not correct for the other TOC's. Status of security at other locations is as follows.

a CCS. Security is poor due to physical arrangement of the Headquarters/TOC building. When the new TOC facility is completed security should be excellent. Plans call for fencing, lighting, and a guard.

b CCS. Security is fair. Since the TOC is located beneath the Headquarters complex, fencing is not practicable. Augmentation of existing security is necessary in the form of metal doors at all entrances and a guard at the main entrance to control access.

c IAD, SUPFAC, Air Operations Group. Security is excellent.

d Launch Sites (other than at HPR). Security is as good as possible under existing conditions. What is lacking physically is compensated for in security consciousness of the personnel assigned.

(b) Recommendations

1 That pending completion of the new TOC, CCS assign a guard at the headquarters entrance to control access therein. (ACTION: MACSOG-35)

2 That CCS assign a guard at the main entrance to the TOC to control access therein. (ACTION: MACSOG-35)

3 That metal doors be obtained for the CCS TOC. S2, CCS states that they have been requisitioned. (ACTION: MACSOG-40)

(7) Indigenous Access to TOC TOC's (ref 5a(7) CINCPAC report referred to indigenous pilots. This finding is not completely valid since these pilots fly in support of our missions and must have access to the maps. In those locations where a separate briefing area is maintained, their access to the TOC is controlled.

(8) Target Markings on Team Maps (ref 5a(8)) Our reply to CINCPAC stated that the off-set system is now in use. For those targets for which photo-maps are not available this may be possible but for those targets which are covered by photo-maps it is not possible due to the area coverage of the map. In most cases, maps are either covered with acetate and marked with grease pencil or markings are made directly on the photo-maps with grease pencil. These markings are easily removed. The current non-attributable photo-map is one of the least compromising items carried

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~H-53
H-53Tab 3 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

by the PT's. Teams are quite conscientious to return into these areas or to destroy them if necessary. This appears to be a problem they will be forced to live with. If the RT's are to bring out all of the desired information it is necessary for them to make some markings on their map. There is a reversion to another principle of clandestine/covert operations: "Does the prospective 'take' outweigh the risk involved?"

b. ELITE SOG PROGRAM (ref 5b)

Since the COMUSMACV OPSSEC inspection, this program has been re-named ITALIA GREEN and subsequently POLE DIA. These changes were necessitated because of the widespread use of the nickname, the turnover of personnel involved, and the sensitivity of the program. The stringent security measures are still employed in the administration of the program and the handling of the ammunition. The contamination phase, conducted on Orinaria, was terminated on 1 January 1969, thereby minimizing disclosure out of country and during shipments between there and the RVN. The number of units participating in the program was increased to include 7/1 Cavalry in I CTZ and 17PV LRRP Co in II CTZ. While this required additional disclosure of the program, only a very limited number of personnel were briefed. Operational personnel were provided with only enough information to accomplish insertions.

c. STRATA Operations (ref 5c)

(1) CH-3 Helos (ref 5c(1)). Since 1 November 1968, STRATA Teams have been employed only in the PHAIKID FIRE and SALEH HOUSE AO's and in the RVN. When these teams have been launched from Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, CH-3's based at NPN (also known as YCP) have been utilized. This type of helicopter is also used for insertion of PT RT's plus numerous other operations from NPN. Association of CH-3 helos with STRATA or other SOG operations would be virtually impossible to detect.

(2) Equipment of Teams (ref 5c(2))

(a) Finding. STRATA teams operating in the PT/SH AO's are dressed and equipped as NVA. Even though radios, compasses, maps, etc. of origin are used, this is not considered detrimental to their cover and security because these items are used by NVA/VC units operating in the area. However, it was noted by the OPSSEC team on 24 May that clothing was not uniform for all team members. US type jungle boots, hats, and some clothing was worn. However, consideration was not given to the type and color of uniform worn by the NVA in a particular target area. Evidence of jungle boot tracks and observation of the team was not NVA/VC.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-54

Tab 3 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

(3) Reconnaissance. That teams be provided clothing consistent with their cover and that sterile footwear, e.g., boots with tire tread soles (canals, etc) be issued to teams operating in enemy held areas. (ACTIO: 10000-40)

(3) Combat Reporting Post, F (ref 5c(2)) As stated in SOG's reply to CINCPAC, this is not a SOG facility and is not directly associated with STRATA operations.

(4) Stereotyped Operations (ref 5c(4)) STRATA teams are inserted utilizing the same technique and supporting air assets as PF or SH RT's plus other non-SOG elements. With the increase in air activity in the FF AO since 1 November 1968, identification of STRATA or PF operations by type of supporting air assets would be difficult because of numerous other operating elements using similar aircraft.

d. MIDRIFF (C) Operations (ref 5d)

(1) Presence of Unmarked SOG Aircraft at Nakhon Phanom (NPN) (ref 5d(1)). STRATA teams and PF RT's are still transported to NPN for insertion into the FF AO. The aircraft are parked in an area located a considerable distance from other aircraft parking areas and normally remain there for a period of 6 - 8 hours. Logistical support for SUPPFAC is normally accomplished with the same aircraft that are used to transport teams to NPN. Therefore the previous problem of unmarked aircraft remaining on the ground for an extended period of time during logistical missions is no longer applicable. However, the unmarked aircraft with black and green camouflage are still conspicuous and probably result in no small amount of curiosity on the part of base personnel. (see para 3c)

(2) Communications Procedures by C-123's (ref 5d(2)) SOG's reply to CINCPAC's finding is still valid. Manual Morse CW, HF transmissions are currently used on all flights, with occasional HF voice transmissions being made by US Instructor Pilots to report aircraft malfunctions.

e. HUMIDOR (C) Operations (ref 5e)

These operations are no longer conducted as a result of the 1 November 1968 bombing halt. All facilities are secured and are maintained in a caretaker status.

f. PLCSMAN (C) Operations (ref 5f)

These operations are no longer conducted as a result of the 1 November 1968 bombing halt.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-55

Tab 3 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

g. Joint Personnel Area or Corps (JPAC) (Ref 20)

(1) Finding. The problems encountered by the organization in the recovery of captured US military personnel were essentially the same as determined during the time of the CI/CPAC CPSEC inspection. Information concerning the location of US/Allied facilities is usually provided by personnel who have escaped or defected. This information continues to be extremely perishable because the US/Allied move the prisoners soon after the discovery of missing personnel. Moreover, US/Allied units are reluctant to conduct recovery operations based upon unverified information. Another problem in the JPAC effort is that US units feel they must obtain approval for operations from their higher headquarters rather than immediately exploiting that information they have. Since response time is of the utmost importance, obtaining of approval and the inherent coordination contributes to delays in the execution of recovery operations and thereby minimizes the chance of success. US/Allied field commands have been informed that they should initiate recovery action within their respective AO's when they receive credible information regarding the location of captured US/Allied personnel.

(2) Recommendation. That more extensive guidance be given to US/Allied commands. Commanders should again be informed that they can undertake recovery operations on their own initiative within their respective AO's. (ACTION: MACSOG-80)

3. (78) FINDINGS OF SOG CPSEC TEAM (6)

In addition to the findings of the CI/CPAC CPSEC Team, the following items are considered by the SOG CPSEC Team to be sources of prior knowledge to the enemy.

a. Unauthorized Personnel in SOG Installations

(1) Finding. Noted during the CPSEC survey were the visits and presence of personnel other than SOG members at SOG facilities. Those include US military and civilians who were either performing construction work, such as Seabees and engineers, or personnel who had been invited to the facility by SOG personnel in an attempt to obtain logistical or administrative support. Frequently these personnel visited the mess and club facilities where operational matters are sometimes inadvertently discussed.

(2) Recommendation. That only authorized personnel be permitted on SOG installations. Visits of unauthorized personnel should be held to a minimum and only for official purposes. (ACTION: MACSOG-21).

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-56

Tab 3 to
Tab 3 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. Access to SOG Aircraft

(1) Findings There appears to be no firm standard as to who is authorized to travel on SOG aircraft. Dependents of V personnel and friends of SOG members often travel while other SOG personnel, e.g., 5th Special Forces Group personnel, are denied access. This issue was raised by aircraft crewmen at 1ST Flight Detachment. As a case in point, a USN Chaplain travelled on a SOG C-130 from TS to Nha Trang in the company of a SOG member on 23 May. This was witnessed by OPSEC team.

(2) Recommendation. That only SOG members and Counterpart personnel be authorized to travel on SOG aircraft. (ACTION: MACSOG-32)

c. Embassy Registered ("T" Numbered) Vehicles

(1) Findings

(a) While not indicative of any particular operation, the use of "civilian" vehicles by US military personnel in uniform does attract attention, in violation of one of the basic principles of clandestine/covert operations - anonymity. Use of these vehicles is necessary for some activities, but each such vehicle should be justified by the user. Further, the use of blocks of numbers ties all of the activities using such vehicles together, especially true in the field. Most SOG units have several black T-numbered vehicles. Since Vehicles painted and marked in this manner are uncommon outside the Saigon area, attention is drawn to those facilities using them.

(2) Recommendations

(a) That SOG vehicles in the Saigon area be painted OD and marked with appropriate MACV bumper markings.

(b) That SOG vehicles in areas outside Saigon be painted and marked similar to other military vehicles in their area.

(c) That vehicles driven by personnel required to wear civilian clothing in the performance of their duties be excluded from (2a) and (b) above.

(d) That further exceptions be requested in writing, citing justification.

(ACTION: MACSOG-40)

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-57

Tab 3 to
Tab 3 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~d. Lack of Physical Security at Launch Sites

(1) Finding. All of SOG's launch site facilities are located on installations occupied by other US/Allied units. Except CTFHIC at IN, these sites are so located that a casual observer in the vicinity can witness the mission preparation, personnel, composition, departure and recovery of SOG teams. Moreover at several launch sites there is a shortage of adequate protective overhead cover to accommodate several teams and platoon size elements during mortar and/or rocket attack.

(2) Recommendation. That launch sites located on installations other than IN be re-located to areas separated far enough from other US/Allied personnel that activities at the launch site cannot be observed and that adequate cover be constructed at each location. (ACTION: MACSOG-33).

e. Identifiable Air Assets(1) Finding

(a) The composition of air assets used for the insertion and exfiltration of SOG teams can easily be identified because of unique aircraft and conspicuous camouflage markings. From CCH and CCC and their launch sites black and green VHA CH-34s are used as troop carriers in each air asset package. At CCH and the launch sites at Quan Loi and Duc Co camouflaged "huay" helicopters are used as both slicks and gunships. These aircraft are very conspicuous and easily identifiable because they are the only ones marked in this manner that are used in the areas of the launch sites.

(b) The same holds true for SOG's fixed wing assets. SOG is the sole user of black and green C-123's and C-130's in RVN. If they were painted in the same manner as other aircraft, they would not be as conspicuous. Their distinctive equipment is noticeable only to the trained observer but anyone can notice the different paint. Crew members with whom this matter was discussed do not feel that the night camouflage characteristics outweigh the conspicuousness.

(2) Recommendation. That air assets, particularly helicopters used for cross-border operations, be painted and marked like other aircraft in their base area and their areas of operations. (ACTION: MACSOG-32)

f. Clothing and Equipment

(1) Finding. All SOG RT's operating in the PT/SH AO's wear the US jungle boot. Enemy discovery of these distinctive boot prints has often

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-58

Tab 3 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

insulated by enemy surveillance of the team's COM-20 team and some about teams posing as PW's are not completely dressed in the proper cloth and in addition to the wearing of US jungle boots, the team wear faded US army T-shirt clothing. This permits the enemy to detect their identity from a considerable distance.

(2) Recommenation. That teams be provided clothing consistent with their cover and that sterile footwear, e.g., boots with tire tread soles, be issued to all SOG teams operating in enemy held areas. (see para 2c(2), above) (ACTION: MACSOG-40).

g. Frequency of Operations

(1) Finding. In certain areas of the SALEM HOUSE AO, operations are conducted so frequently, utilizing in some cases the same LZ's, that the NVA have employed effective early warning systems in an attempt to thwart these operations. Enemy observers on prominent terrain features can detect impending operations several minutes prior to insertion of the team.

(2) Recommenation. That reconnaissance operations in PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE AO's be limited to a certain number per month in any given base area. (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

h. Insertion Techniques

(1) Finding. Diversionary flight routes are used by the air assets when inserting teams in the SALEM HOUSE AO. Since the launch sites are in close proximity to the target areas, use of diversionary flight routes are not restricted by the operating range of the helicopters. In addition, contour flying and dummy insertion also deceive the enemy as to the actual insertion LZ. In the PRAIRIE FIRE AO, particularly for those operations launched from Phu Bai and Quang Tri, use of deceptive techniques is restricted by aircraft operating range because of the distance to the target area and altitude of terrain enroute to the target area.

(2) Recommenation. That launch sites for the PRAIRIE FIRE operations be located as close as possible to the target areas. (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

i. Divided Compound at CCC

(1) Finding. Route 14 passes through the middle of the CCC compound, affording observation to the enemy of camp fortifications, defensive positions, logistic facilities, and billeting areas, and enabling him to obtain an estimate of the strength of the compound. This

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-59

Tab 3 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

... reports ... reported ...

(2) Recommendation. That request is submitted to proper ...
 (ACTION: MACSOG-35)

i. Use of SSI Patch

(1) Finding. This is related to paragraph 3c and e, above, in that it attracts attention by being unusual.

(2) Recommendation. That consideration be given to the use of the CDR patch by both SSI and US personnel or that no patch be used.
 (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

h. Excessive Reports by Teams

(1) Finding. Teams are required to submit three status reports plus a RO report daily while on mission. Excessive time on the air and excessive numbers of broadcasts facilitate enemy intercept and/or DF.

(2) Recommendation. That the number of required reports be reduced to the minimum and that consideration be given to consolidating the RO report with one of the other status reports. (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

1. Format Reports

(1) Finding. Teams are currently using fixed formats for reporting. Use of a fixed format serves as an aid to the enemy cryptanalysts, especially if portions of the message are unencrypted.

(2) Recommendation. That when fixed format reports are used they be fully encrypted. (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

m. Use of SSD

(1) Finding

a. Certain highly sensitive reports are being transmitted in the clear on the SOG single side band net. FAC weather reports are a prime example. While weather reports, per se, do not appear to be highly sensitive, they can be used to link areas of operations and are indicators of whether or not operations will be conducted. All traffic on the SOG single side band net must be encrypted using the available low level codes and one time pads. The exception to this should be bona fide emergencies

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-60

Tab 3 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

and the time required for encryption may result in loss of lives.

(b) Selection and use of communications means is not in accordance with good security practices. In many cases radio communications which are slower and less secure are being used in preference to more rapid secure means because the less secure means appear to be more convenient. The SOG single side band net is the prime example of this violation. A classified message (all SOG messages are classified) must be off line encrypted, using 10 level codes and/or one time pads before it can be sent via the single side band net. This much more time consuming method is used rather than the simple process of typing the message on a teletype for transmission over on-line-secure teletype facilities. Additionally, the single side band net utilizes high frequency propagation and is much more susceptible to HFDF and traffic analysis. Despite the inherent advantages of speed and security MACSOG-35 personnel persist in using single side band communications in preference to teletype because the radio room is not nearby.

(2) Recommendation

(a) That a secure teletype circuit be used as a primary means of communications, when available, and the single side band be used strictly as a back-up means. (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

(b) That, when single side band is used, all traffic be encrypted with the exception of bona fide emergencies when encryption time could result in loss of life. (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

4. (15) OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

The following topics, while not sources of prior knowledge to the enemy, are closely related to operational security. These topics are a compilation of comments made by key personnel of the surveyed activities, observations by the OPSIC team, and miscellaneous related comments.

a. Assigned Maintenance Personnel

(1) Finding. The 15th SOG receives its maintenance support from the 14th maintenance Squadron. It is felt that the overall security of the organization would be enhanced if maintenance personnel were organic to the unit.

b. Civilian Cover for House 7 Personnel

(1) Finding. Personnel assigned to House 7 arrive in-country in

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

" 61
H-01

Tab 3 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

(1) Finding. The fact that JPRC is co-located with SOG Headquarters and the fact that the association between the two is classified SECRET presents an awkward situation. If JPRC could be re-located outside Building 3, even if still on MACV I Compound, it could identify itself

(2) Recommendation. That action be taken to document those personnel as civilians prior to departing COMUS. (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

c. Accelerated Launch Schedules

(1) Finding. In some cases launch dates are moved back by several days. When this occurs the team does not have adequate time for preparation, potentially resulting in sloppy performance, possibly increased casualties, jeopardized cover through reliance on marked maps (see para 2a(8)), and less than complete mission accomplishment.

(2) Recommendation. That launch dates not be moved back without sound justification. (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

d. SI Billets

(1) Finding. No SI billets exist in any of the SOG field elements. This matter of concern to several units. SI material could be sanitized by the authorized recipient and passed on to others in the unit who require it.

(2) Recommendation. That consideration be given for the authorization of SI billets at each SOG activity. (ACTION: MACSOG-20).

e. Mission Aborts

(1) Finding. In some cases teams prepare for a launch every day for as long as a week. After a certain period of time the individual is not psychologically prepared for combat.

(2) Recommendation. That consideration be given to cancelling a mission after it has been aborted or postponed once or twice. (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

f. Location of JPRC

(1) Finding. The fact that JPRC is co-located with SOG Headquarters and the fact that the association between the two is classified SECRET presents an awkward situation. If JPRC could be re-located outside Building 3, even if still on MACV I Compound, it could identify itself

~~TOP SECRET~~

11-02
11-02

Tab 3 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. Recommendation. That the feasibility of eliminating this

(2) Recommendation. That the feasibility of eliminating this intermediate headquarters be studied. (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

g. Elimination of the Intermediate Headquarters

(1) Finding. It is felt by certain field personnel in the field that MACSOG-35 is a needless intermediate headquarters. It attempts to function as such but is not staffed to do so. It is felt that operations could be much smoother if the C & C Detachment operated directly under the control of Chief, SOG, since SOG headquarters is adequately staffed to provide required staff assistance directly to the field.

(2) Recommendation. That the feasibility of eliminating this intermediate headquarters be studied. (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

h. Inconsistent Cover

(1) Finding. The cover story in the SAFE HOUSE AO is that the team made a navigational error and inadvertently strayed across the border. However, the teams are often attired in foreign uniforms and carry foreign weapons. This is not consistent with the cover story.

(2) Recommendation. That this matter be examined and the cover story revised or the teams attired and equipped in such a manner as to conform to the existing cover story. (ACTION: MACSOG-35).

i. CC&C Education. SOG Communications is planning a vigorous program of CC&C education. Included in the program is a planned communications officers conference to deal with communications problems and the preparation of documents and instruction to provide guidance for communications systems users.

j. Redesignation of Units. In accordance with guidance received from Chief, SOG, the subject of redesignation of subordinate units was considered. Two C & C Detachments were queried on the matter and their comments are consistent with the collective opinion of the team. If deemed necessary by Chief, SOG to change designations, the following recommendations are proposed:

(1) That the designation of MAD not be changed.

(2) That, if the components of Air Operations Group are redesignated, the redesignation be accomplished concurrently with repainting of aircraft.

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-63

Tab 3 to
Appendix H

TOP SECRET

(1) That C & C Detachments be redesignated as "C" Teams of the 5th Special Forces Group and that they, and the SOG and CIBD patches or no patches at all.

1. Recognition of SOG (Operational Camouflage). An overall recommendation of the CPICG team is that SOG drop the idea of secrecy and admit to being an operational unit, with units assigned, attached and in direct support. The out-of-country mission could of necessity remain highly classified, but a cover mission could be established along the lines of conducting unconventional warfare operations in and along the coast and interior borders of RVN. Such a change in approach could provide at least three major advantages as well as negating some of the comments mentioned above.

(1) The amount of classified matter within SOG would be reduced considerably. Documents classified solely because they show an operational capability or because they reveal an association between SOG and subordinate activities could be declassified. Concentration could then be brought to bear on documents relating to the classified mission.

(2) A sense of esprit de corps would be generated. Subordinate units, and their assigned personnel, would have a major headquarters to which they could openly and freely relate. Plaques, patches, glasses, and other souvenirs could be distributed and displayed openly, creating a unit esprit that does not now exist. The value of relating to a major unit has been exemplified throughout military history. A case in point is in the RVN now. Members of the "Big Red One" wear their patch with pride both while assigned and upon reassignment. This same esprit could be generated within SOG and it would no doubt result in higher morale, improved discipline, and, hopefully, an improved record of mission accomplishment.

(3) Efficiency reports and award citations could be written accurately, citing the accomplishments of the individual without having to write the description around the cover story that has long since been compromised.

(ACTION: MACSOG-C2).

/s/
H. W. APPELHART
Major, USA
Team Coordinator

TOP SECRET

H-64

Tab 3 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB 4

ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF
SOG WORDS, ITC WORDS, SOG WORDS,
AND CODE CALL SIGNS

ALACIA The Duc (SOG - 32 SOG word)

ALLEY CAT Call sign for ABBCC at night (PIL, Laos, Barrel Roll area) (SOG-32)

ARC LIGHT F-52 strike (SOG-32)

ARIZONA Cambodia (SOG-33 SOG word)

BARREL ROLL Northwest area of Laos (SOG-32)

BENSON SILENT IMA script inserts (SOG-3)

BIFROST Maritime training operations in I CTZ (SOG-31)

BLIND BOOM SOG word, SOG-35 Psyop material

BLUE EAGLE MC-121 flying psyop missions out of DMG/SGM (SOG-32, SOG-33)


~~BORDEN(C)~~ Diversionary program directed against the VC and IMA in Cambodia, Laos, and IMA. Under the Forae (C) program (SOG-34)

BRIGHT Call for GCI at Udon RTAB, Thailand (SOG-32)

BRIGHT LIGHT JERC recovery mission (SOG-34, SOG-80)

BROWN ALBATROSS MC-135 refueling tracks (also Red, White, Blue, Tan and Green) (SOG-32)

BROWN BORDEN Singleton agent (SOG-34)



CADO Maritime intelligence, psyops and cross-beach missions (SOG-31)

CALIFORNIA Russia (SOG-33 SOG word)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-65

Tab 4 to
Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EL BASS COMBAT plan for overground ops across the 9th
 Laos (SOG-31 plans)
 EYES ARE Singleton agent (SOG-31)
 FOOTBOY(C) SOG covert ops against NVN (SOG-31)
 FORTS(C) Disciplinary ops against NVN. Active sub-programs are
 Borden(C) and Odell(C) under Footboy(C) program
 (SOG-31)
 HAILSTONES NVA resupply containers (SOG-31)
 HAWAII Camp Long Thanh (SOG-33 SOG word)
 HEAVY HOOF SOG C-123s (SOG-32)

HILLSBORO Call sign of AFCCC during the day (DIZ, Laos (SOG-32))
 HITCHHIKER SOG word, scheduled personnel/logistic airlift
 (SOG-32)
 HUMIDOR(C) Psyops against NVN under Footboy (C) (SOG-33)
 ICE CUBES Leaflets (SOG-33 SOG word)
 IGLCO WHITE DCPG-sponsored anti-infil program. Formerly Muscle
 Shoals (SOG-31)
 INDIANCE(S) SOG marops in coordination with Market Time to prevent
 infil by sea into SVN (SOG-31)
 INVEPT Call sign of GCI radar at TPN RTAB, Thailand (SOG-32)
 IRON HAND Anti-SA missions (SOG-32)
 ITALIAN GREEN Old nickname for contamination of various types of
 Soviet Bloc ammunition. See Pole Penn (SOG-31)
 JELLY BEANS Mail (SOG-33 SOG word)
 LOKI SOG naval recon activities against NVN (SOG-31)

 (b)(1)
 (b)(3)
~~TOP SECRET~~

H-67

 Tab 4 to
 Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

WANG Communist China (SOG-33 SOG word)
 WINTER Air Ops in RVN in support of Footboy(C) (SOG-32)
 WIT Naval ops involving interdiction missions against RVN & AGSOB elements (SOG-31)
 WOLF RIVER Air supported anti-vehicular sub-system of the Igloo White program (SOG-31)
 WOLF RIVER Call sign for VHF radio located in SOG-32 (SOG-32)
 WOLF RIVER North Vietnam (SOG-33 SOG word)
 WOLF RIVER SOG ops in the DMZ (SOG-34)
 WOLF RIVER Notional agent teams in RVN, under Forae(C) program (SOG-33)
 WOLF RIVER Call sign for GCI radar at DMZ AB (SOG-32)
 WOLF RIVER Cu Lao Cham Island (SOG-33)
 WOLF RIVER Harops in support of Footboy(C) ops in RVN. Formerly Floutman(C) (SOG-31)
 WOLF RIVER SSRL pseudo-organization in RVN; under Footboy(C) (SOG-33)
 WOLF RIVER People's Front for Social Progress, Channel "C" (SOG-33)
 WOLF RIVER Radios (SOG-33 SOG word)
 WOLF RIVER Program by which various types of Soviet Bloc ammunition are contaminated and inserted into RVN/VN-held areas of Cambodia, Laos and RVN. Former nicknames for this program were ELDEST SON and ITALIAN CREEP (SOG-34)
 WOLF RIVER Project to incriminate North Vietnamese personalities as anti-regime, dissident elements; under Forae(C) never implemented (SOG-34)
 WOLF RIVER Cross-border operations into Laos (SOG-34)

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-68

 Tab 4 to
 Appendix H

~~TOP SECRET~~

PROTECT AREA 3000' ASV operation to capture 215 at 1968
 PROTECT AREA 3000' ASV operation to capture 215 at 1968

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

PROTECT AREA Harbor of Refuge broadcasts (SOG-32, SOG-33)
 ROLLING THUNDER ARVN in RVN of Tally Ho area (SOG-32)
 SALT HOUSE Cross-border ops in Cambodia, formerly Daniel Boone (SOG-34)
 SANITARIES (C) CSPL redemption coupons, under Foras (C) program; not active since 1 Nov 63 startdown (SOG-33)
 SEA DRAGON 7th Fleet coastal interdiction of 17 degrees N
 S.L.A. Search, Locate, Annihilate, and Monitor special mission sometimes performed by the GOC detachments (SOG-34)
 SMO' PLANTS SOG word, MA6 containers
 SOAP CHIPS Psyops booklets (SOG-33 SOG word)
 SSPL Sacred Sword Patriots League (SOG-33)
 STEEL TIGER Pangandle area of Laos (SOG-32)
 STRATA Short-term reconnaissance and target acquisition teams used for operation in RVN (SOG-32)
 TALLY HO Area extending from southern border of DMZ to the southern border of Route Package one (SOG-32)
 TAP HEELS Incapacitating gas (SOG-34 SOG word)
 TEAR DROPS Commodities for the Ho Chi Minh Trail (SOG-33 SOG word)
 THUNDERCLOUD Operations will be conducted to capture POW's and collect intelligence on PL/VC/MLA activities in the FFAO or other authorized areas. The operations will be of short duration, and designed to accomplish sophisticated intelligence collection missions. Indigenous agents will be spotted, assessed, and recruited from Cien Hoi Centers and POW compounds in RVN. Being former VC/MLA, these

~~TOP SECRET~~

H-69

Tab 4 to
Appendix H

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

TEBENOR(C)	Agent ops in RVN in support of Footcay(C) program (SOG-34)
TOPE POLE	Wiretap missions (SOG-31)
TRAM	In-country black propaganda (SOG-33)
URANOME(C)	Infil of agent-alluding forces in RVN under Forae (C) program never implemented (SOG-34)
URGENCY(C)	Return NVN fishermen to RVN as pseudo-agents (SOG-31, SOG-33)
WATERBOY	Call sign for the GCI radar at Dong Ha, RVN (SOG-32)
WILD WASEL	Acraft employing electronic detection equipment used to detect and destroy SAM sites (SOG-32)
YOUNG TIGER	SAC program for re-locating KC-135s to Taiwan in support of an increased J-52 effort.