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January 5, 2016

IMCL-HR

John Greenewald, Jr.

███████████████████

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is a response to your Freedom of Information Act request, FP-16-005324, for a copy of academic paper titled "Proposed Courses of Action Versus Hamas and Hezbollah" by BG Moscovici Azriel.

If you have any questions, please feel free to write: usarmy.carlisle.imcom-atlantic.mbx.foia@mail.mil or USAWC & Carlisle Barracks, FOIA Officer, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5222.

Sincerely,

Elton R. Manske
Director, Human Resources

Enclosures

PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION VERSUS HAMAS AND HEZBOLLAH

BY

BRIGADIER GENERAL MOSCOVICI AZRIEL
Israeli Army

USAWC CLASS OF 2011

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
01-02-2011	Strategy Research Project	

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Proposed Courses of Action versus Hamas and Hezbollah	
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Brigadier General Moscovici Azriel	
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
Dr. Wallace Terrill Strategic Studies Institute	

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013	
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Distribution B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies only

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

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14. ABSTRACT

In recent years, Iran strengthened its regional and global position through a wide array of alliances, spreading from Latin America to the borders of Israel. This has been done as to enhance Iran's role as a regional leader, and to undermine efforts to halt its nuclear project. Within this strategic context, Iran had developed prominent ties with the Lebanese "Hezbollah" and the Gaza based "Hamas". Such ties pose a continuous challenge to stability in the Middle East, and disrupt the prospects of peace talks between Israel and moderate Palestinians. If a wide armed conflict breaks out due to an attempt to foil Iran's nuclear project by force, these alliances might pose a serious military challenge. Such a challenge would be more serious to Israelis than to a non-regional observer, who would by nature see it as a secondary issue.

The paper will look at the contemporary challenge posed by those organizations, using the historic perspective of the Soviet revolution as a raw model. Forced by the necessity to form a new balance of power in the Middle East as a result of such a conflict several courses of action will be examined, and one will be recommended.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Ballistic Capabilities

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE	UNLIMITED	24	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
UNCLASSIFED	UNCLASSIFED	UNCLASSIFED			

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION VERSUS HAMAS AND HEZBOLLAH

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Brigadier General Moscovici Azriel

TITLE: Proposed Courses of Action versus Hamas and Hezbollah

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 1 February 2011   WORD COUNT: 5,077   PAGES: 24

KEY TERMS: Ballistic Capabilities

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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The paper will look at the contemporary challenge posed by those organizations, using the historic perspective of the Soviet revolution as a raw model. Forced by the necessity to form a new balance of power in the Middle East as a result of such a conflict several courses of action will be examined, and one will be recommended.

PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION VERSUS HAMAS AND HEZBOLLAH

An Ideology Based Revolution- The Historical Context

In modern history, there are three prominent examples of an ideology based revolution: the Chinese revolution, the Soviet revolution, and the Iranian Islamic revolution. All of them derive their origin, in an historical analysis from the French revolution. There is a significant difference, between those four revolutions and other numerous upheavals taking place in the history of nations. We claim that the most influential of the comparison factors when looking at those revolutions versus others is the fact that they can be considered as *ideology based revolutions*, aiming not just at the replacement of a ruler or a political party by another, but rather as being a total change of the political social and economic order in that society, the new order being based on a comprehensive and well articulated ideology[1].

Such revolutions have the inherent attribute of a two-phase process: an internal phase within the nation comprised of building institutions, and once this is completed to a certain stable level allowing the regime to gain enough confidence to indulge in foreign affairs- the creation of concentric disturbances within their environment, usually still functioning under the old order. This concentric turmoil is the result of an internal debate concerning the "export" of the revolutionary ideology. The main dilemma is often between those seeking to coerce the neighboring old order through a combination of political activity and military pressure, and those seeking to concentrate on the stabilization phase a new regime has inevitably to go through. The Napoleonic wars, for example, can be seen as the military expression of the tension caused by the French

Revolution's political outcome, the People's Republic, and the old monarchic system in Europe.

The Soviet case is a fine demonstration of this dilemma. One of the main pillars of Marxist ideology had always been its applicability to the decaying capitalist world, with the notion that capitalism is the last phase of the existing exploitive social order. Western Europe, with its substantial industrial base was even considered to be more prone to establish Marxist governments than other parts of the continent, because of its social layering. The Soviet revolution, whilst taking place, caused some revolt attempts in other European countries, especially Germany. Those coups failed to **seize** power but demonstrated that Marxism has profound roots in Western Europe. No wonder, therefore, that an acute debate went on through the 20's within the Soviet leadership regarding the "socialism in one country" approach. The approaches at debate were a one advocating for focus in stabilizing the newly formed USSR, versus the approach some other leaders (especially Trotsky) held, advocating that the new regime should support the potential adversaries of the West European existing political system, embodied by the Communist parties in Germany, England and France. The dispute was sharpened by the fact that the newly born nation was still struggling with some serious external threats, and when those were repelled -with lack of success in the implementation of the NEP industrialization oriented economic plan. It was not before Stalin took over and made the decision to focus the Soviet Union internal affairs that this debate was decided.

Generally, using this example as an historical context, the readiness and willingness of a revolutionary country to expand its influence is determined by the

2

combination of the two following factors: external pressure and animosity, and the pace of the nation's build up of its new institutions. The Soviet case represented a relatively quick pace of repelling external threats, having ended the military confrontation against enemy armed forces by 1921, and a very long and agonizing internal challenge phase. In the Iranian case, a relatively rapid phase of social transformation to the new regime's order and law can be noted, combined with the need to stand to a very significant and lasting external threat (the iraq-iran war). Therefore, as presented in the next part, it was not before the early 1990's Iran could make serious state sponsored and military oriented efforts to expand its influence to Lebanon and Gaza, and this was supported by some other local developments.

The Historical Background for the Formation of Hamas and Hezbollah

Hamas and Hezbollah were formed and forged during the last 20 years of the 20th Century, having Muslim radical ideology as their core foundation. These organizations were also strongly influenced by the political course of events in the Middle East during those years, the most conspicuous of those being the Iranian revolution.

As presented earlier, the Iranian revolution was based on a religious ideology, with economic and social factors helping to motivate its base of support. The revolution presented a serious challenge to the Muslim world's historical Sunni dominance, and immediately caused its polarization, as a result of the emergence of a newly formed extreme Shiite pole. The newly born Islamic state represented a change and offered a cure at the same time: a revival of the Islamic clergy led state based upon Muslim law. As a central part of its ideology it was suggested that the reason for the evident technological and economic inferiority the Muslim World's had compared to the West

3

resulted from the unwillingness of existing secular states to practice adherence to Islamic rule and principles. Iran presented itself as an alternate model for the other states to follow, portraying most of the existing regimes as serving the West's interests instead of their own people[2]. The almost immediate result was the formation of an anti-Iranian bloc within the Arab world, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and its neighboring gulf countries, Jordan and Iraq at its center. Much tension was caused by Iran's challenge to Egypt's traditional position as the Arab world's leader, with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signing and Sadat's support for the Shah as contributing factors. Generally, the Iranian regime made it clear from its very first days it sees the US and Israel as its sworn enemies, the Great and Small Satan, in addition to opposing and denouncing most of the existing Arab regimes.

As a result of its revolutionary nature and opposition to the existing order Iran began looking almost immediately for areas to expand its regional influence, Lebanon being the most important target. During the 1980s the infiltration process was implemented mainly throughout the provision of funds allocated to social and religious activities, accompanied by creating a cadre of Lebanese Muslims loyal to Iran's leadership, having Iranian education by this enhancing its public presence within the Shiite dominant areas[3] . A prominent Iranian representative, Muhammad Montat'ari, advocated for such ideas even as early as 1979, describing Lebanon as "the volcano of the Middle East and the only place in which fight against Israel takes place"[4]. The 1982 war in Lebanon between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), later to be known as the first Lebanon war, resulted in a continuous Israeli presence in wide areas of Lebanon. This was a significant contributing factor to the emergence of the

Shiite's as a hostile populace fighting against the Israeli occupation, a process also enhanced by the will to improve their economical situation and political influence in Lebanon. A contributing factor was the fact that Israeli forces were naturally concentrated in the Shiite-dominated southern parts of Lebanon. Iran intensified its interest in Lebanon at time when its military situation against Iraq improved allowing a chance to wage a "by proxy" insurgency continuous campaign against Israel. In the last 20 years, several parallel political processes took place in that aspect, creating the current internal situation in Lebanon. First, the Hezbollah overpowered the "Amal" movement in the internal Shiite balance of power. Secondly, its military arm became a force with significant capabilities supplied fully by Iran and Syria, with a continuous senior presence and a clear military chain of command, by a specially designated Iranian headquarters and ad-hoc forces and consultants, drawn from the "Al-Quds" force. This force is headed by a high ranking Iranian Revolutionary Guard officer, who is basically the theatre commander in the Iranian perspective, and has full authority for building up Hezbollah and for contingency plans, target list prioritization of its ballistic missile arsenal and other related activities .A military communication network totally distinct from the Lebanese army has been established, demonstrating the Hezbollah independence from the Lebanon government's military policies. The Hezbollah leadership mitigates the discomfort this situation raise in the eyes of many sectors in Lebanon by presenting itself as the true defender of the country, emphasizing its cooperation with the Lebanese army[5]. The evident military potential of this force will be presented later.

In Gaza the situation was a little different. Hamas was created as a religious movement and as the ideological successor of the "Muslim Brothers" movement. After the Palestinian Authority (PA) took over control of most of the Gaza Strip areas following the Oslo agreements, the Hamas movement became the main opposition to the PLO, having its strongest base in the radicalized Gaza. Arafat, while in power, oppressed Hamas when he felt their terror actions might damage the newly achieved legitimacy for his movement, and accompanied this by a policy of containment and balance of power, but with a clear PLO superiority. Although the relationship was strained when Iran denounced the PA as collaborators due to the Oslo accords, Arafat was later to invite a direct Iranian military arms re-supply role in Gaza, as expressed in the capture of the Iranian sent arms shipment (the 2002 "Karin-A" affair)[6].

During 2004 -2006, two major events contributed to the fall of Gaza into Hamas hands: Arafat's death, and the way in which Israel pulled out its occupying presence out of Gaza. Arafat's successor, Abu Mazen, did not have the same charisma and leadership as his predecessor has and was not that effective in its exertion. He was also increasingly identified with the corruption characteristics of the PA. Regarding the Israeli disengagement out of Gaza, there was no effort to try and leverage this unilateral decision in favor of the existing PA leadership. Rather, it was presented and implemented as a totally unilateral act, mainly aimed at Israel's domestic public opinion which traditionally is bound to repel any external forced step. Not surprisingly, this was presented persuasively by Hamas to the Gaza public opinion as their great victory and a proof to the correctness of their political approach. Those two factors, along with the growing embitterment over the internal corruption of the PA, led in the summer of 2006

to a military coup by Hamas, which also resulted in the tightening of the Iran-Hamas relations at the political and military level. Since Hamas took over power, arms smuggling from Sinai into Gaza have increased sharply, accelerating the build up process of Hamas with the Hezbollah as a raw model.

During the last six to eight years, Hezbollah obtained missile capabilities in quality and quantity not possessed by most of the countries in the world. Using the free Iranian supply and the free passage and supply granted by Syria, it has accumulated an estimated amount of 40,000-50,000 rockets and missiles, ranging between 10 to 250 km[7],[8]. Hamas is limited to some extent by the efforts made by Israel and Egypt to halt weapons smuggling into Gaza, but had succeeded in stockpiling an estimated 8,000-12,000 rockets and missiles, ranging from 10-80 km[9]. Most of the rockets, in both theatres, are stationed in residential areas as their operational firing zone, in order to prevent or to complicate as possible any attempt to attack them from the air or by ground forces.

Those numbers of rockets, combined with the geography and population distribution of Israel would cause a serious threat to the nation's populace, especially since that Hamas and Hezbollah are not restrained by rules of engagement, and they see civilians as their direct target. The operational implications of an anticipated terroristic in nature civilian targeting bombardment poses a very troubling scenario as far as Israel's home front is concerned, and will now be described.

<u>The Operational Scenario in the Lebanon and Gaza Theatres</u>

The operational scenario is founded on an underlying base assumption for the cause of the armed conflict: an attack on Iran's nuclear capabilities. This will be conducted by a coalition of nations, stretching from a broadly based international

7

coalition to a narrow based coalition, or in its extreme-a unilateral act by the US and/or Israel. In each of these possibilities, usage will be made in airspace or facilities or both of neighboring Arab countries, so a secret or a tacit agreement is a pre condition.

In any of these cases and even if Israel does not take part in the attack, the Hezbollah leadership made it clear it will attack Israel using its ballistic missile arsenal right from the very start of the confrontation. Hamas might have a more complex and less evident set of considerations, but cannot allow itself publicly to ignore such an event, and will join the attack using its arsenal. These steps are bound to be supported and encouraged by Iran, hoping to cause a split in the military effort and to defragment any type of coalition, similar to the logic that led Sadam Hussein's firing of 39 Scud missiles at Israel during the first gulf war[10].

The military potential is a grave one; Israel's home front will have to withstand a potential of thousands of rockets with improved accuracy and increased payloads, while most of its military is being mobilized and deployed, and during an ongoing aerial campaign (with more than reasonable chance of becoming a BM exchange scenario with Iran) is ongoing. In addition, one must remember Israel's military composite-a reserve based one, its deployment dependant of the mobilization capability in a limited number of facilities, without a possibility to have time shortening preparation steps, as they will reveal intentions.

The potential harm to the population and to the IDF capability of mobilization and deployment is grave, and would force Israel to have a campaign plan relating to those theatres along with its Iran related one. Taking all of those assumptions as basic ones, their operational meaning is that the Lebanese and Gaza theatres have to be defined as

8

secondary though important and central in the overall campaign plan, and an approach regarding the end states in those theatres must be introduced. Therefore, the paper's aim, from now on, is the development of an Israeli theatre strategy to both arenas, within the framework of the context, opportunities and constraints-should Israel find itself engaged in a war involving Iran.

Strategy and Feasible End States

Once presenting the challenge introduced by those two theatres and the imperative need for their inclusion in the overhaul campaign plan, we will determine the strategy and the incorporated feasible *end states* in, which in turn will constitute the baseline for the definition of a theatre strategy. Following that, permissible and significantly distinct courses of action (the ways) will be proposed, in an attempt to provide decision makers with a wide decision-making spectrum. Those courses of action will be subjected to a comparison by a set of parameters taking into account the general context, a wide military conflict between the West and Iran, by thus allowing us to frame our thoughts regarding the *regional end state* following such a conflict. The importance of the context is by providing decision makers the broad perception that a wide military confrontation with Iran does not engage just in its nuclear program (although it is the direct aim and cause of the conflict). Rather, this is a confrontation between the core component of the Islamic extremism and the West, and the implications of this understanding should lead our thinking regarding the strategy and possible end state

The strategy dominating the overhaul confrontation would include of the following components: (1)a long lasting weakening of the military strength and the political influence the Iranian led extremist axis giving way to a new regional balance of power,

9

(2)the total elimination of Iran's nuclear capabilities,(3) the creation of conditions for the rise of a different Iranian leadership by the removal of the current one, (4)and the creation of an atmosphere for negotiation and mitigation processes between moderate parties regarding regional issues, the Arab –Israeli conflict at their center. What was excluded, intentionally, is a nation build up or an attempt to abolish popular support in the region for radical Islamic ideas. The Iranian people would have to take their fate in their own hands, and support for radicalism would always sustain a certain level, as it is driven out of fanatic zeal. More specifically, the tangible sources of power of the Iranian led alliance should be damaged as much as possible, within the boundaries separating desired end state and the constraints affecting them.

The possible Lebanon and Gaza end states within this proposed overarching confrontations strategy would be one of the three: the military destruction of Hamas and Hezbollah, a severe and definitive blow to their military might and prestige resulting in their significant weakening as internal and regional actors, and a limited strike to their military power which will not have the desired effect of excluding them from of the regional set of influential actors. Those three end states would be compared by a set of defined parameters in order to choose the best of them, with special attention being given to the *cost to benefit ratio*, in a strategic context.

Once this is done and a course of action has been selected, ways and resources should be considered carefully again, making room for another iteration of solutions if necessary. Iteration might lead to a combination of "mixed" end states towards separate arenas. For example, a more definitive end state can be attached to one arena, and a more partial one for the other.

Parameters of Equating the Proposed End States

By far, the definition of parameters is the most important part of these considerations, should war breaks out and Israel would be forced to consider its options. After weighing the possible end states by using those parameters the recommended one will be decided. We will make a distinction between two categories of parameters: the generic ones and the specific context oriented ones. All of the articulation of the parameters will be done under the broad basic scenario boundaries: a wide regional military confrontation, as most of the proposed lines of action cannot be seen as admissible otherwise.

The *generic* parameters will be used as a first order tool of equating and measuring, and will take into account the *feasibility and acceptability* of the suggested lines of action. The second family of parameters will be, on the theoretical ground, an enlargement of the *suitability* parameter, which for itself is an adjustment to the specific context and conditions of the issue at hand. We will present now those *specific* parameters, as they constitute the most significant part of the judgmental process.

First and foremost, any course of action should entail a negligible chance of diverting attention or changing the allocation of operational resources from the main effort, which is dealing with Iran's nuclear program. In the Israeli perspective, every attempt should be made to limit the confrontation to Gaza and Lebanon, keeping Syria out of war. Secondly, it should point out an anticipated reasonable probability for a course of events leading to an *improved end state*, in comparison with the contemporary one. Thirdly, it should have at least a general view, supported by the local conditions in Gaza and Lebanon, of the *optional governing political power.* Fourthly, it should be a course of action leading to an end state supposedly recognized

11

and supported by most of the dominant influential factors in the international arena, with great attention to the U.N. Security Council and the "Quartet"[11] members. Fifthly, it must be an acceptable course of action to moderate Arab powers, which will have a potentially enraged public they must appease and contain in any case, due to the identity of the conflicts parties and its circumstances.

The conclusion of these parameters formulation exemplifies the delicate balance to be preserved: the effect has to be decisive enough as to destroy the Iranian led alliance and damage severely its military component-but cannot become the main effort. It has to gain a wide, partially tacit, international and regional support from a very wide variety of actors and stake holders, some of them Muslim and Arab countries. Most of its military part (in regard to Lebanon and Gaza), if not all, will have to be executed by Israel, a fact which adds complexity to all mentioned above: not to oppose publicly a US led action against Iran is one thing, and to support an Israeli action aimed at two of its fiercest enemies and Iran's allies is a totally different thing.

An Elaboration on the Military Aspects of Proposed Courses of Action

The paper will now elaborate the military implications of the three proposed courses of action vis-à-vis "Hamas" and "Hezbollah". This elaboration is critical for the *strategic communication* process between civilian administration and the military leadership, and it is our professional and moral obligation to present the consequences, implications, costs to benefits, risks and opportunities in regard to courses of operation. As a reminder, the three differ in their effect at the end of campaign: a limited strike, a decisive and capability disabling strike, and an attempt to destroy the military might and political strength of those organizations.

A limited strike would constitute of a disastrous aerial blow in the two theatres, maximizing the advantages Israel has in the areas of intelligence, aerial power and precision ammunition. The ground component of this course of action will be minimal, its duration will be short (measured in days), and it has good chances of being over shadowed by the "background noise" of the larger scale operation.

The other two courses of action, a decisive strike and an attempt to destroy the organizations, share some elements and differ substantially in others. What they share is mainly the same logics of gradual phase build up: an initial air and Special Forces strike maximizing Israel's advantages in intelligence, precision weapons and technology, followed by a ground maneuvering phase. The ground component maneuver phase can be characterized mainly by an infantry prioritized takeover of parts of terrain from which rockets can be launched, but containing a large number of infrastructure targets as well. The ground phase, for itself, will constitute two parts: the takeover, and the mopping up phase.

Both of the substantial ground component oriented courses of action will have to take into account the civilian population within the area, and will need to do everything possible to decrease the collateral damage effects to the populace. In regard to other DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic)[12] components, they do not include a nation build up phase or any Israeli involvement in the political course of events to follow, and suggest a rapid as possible (dependant of the level of achievement of the desired end states) ground force retreat to the internationally recognized border.

The identified courses of action differ substantially in the depth and length of operation, as a result of the effect they seek to achieve: if enemy assets are to be defeated in depth, a significantly longer and wider scale phase of area mopping will have to take place. The aim of this lengthy phase will be the destruction of terror infrastructures within a large area, detaining terror activists, undertaking search operations and so forth. This will be done from relatively secure strongholds captured at the end of the maneuver phase, and will result in a devastating effect, although time demanding. A more limited operation will have a different ratio between those two phases: there will have to be a more rapid take over phase aimed mainly at rocket launching zones, and a shorter and less profound mopping up phase, shortening the overhaul duration of the operation.

Regarding force allocation, there is a significant difference between aerial and land components. In the aerial perspective, after a couple of days an anticipated decrease in the validity and signature of relevant targets will take place ,so allocation of airpower will divert from hitting intelligence based targets to ground force support. Regarding the ground forces allocation and pattern of operation, a total of four divisions is a well established estimation for the aerial oriented course of action (mainly to secure sliding into unexpected situations in other fronts by the deterrence of the force in being), and a total of six to eight divisions, most of them composed of reservists, is a fair estimate for the other two proposed lines of action.

The paper will look now into the proposed courses of action and equate them by the suggested criteria, trying to recommend the best (or least worse) of them.

<u>Courses of Action Comparison</u>

The papers concluding part will recommend a course of action to be taken, under the circumstances described earlier. The context of a proposed line of action will have to take in account several viewpoints, having inherent internal folded tensions to be mitigated: the short range view (supporting decisive courses of action) vs. posing no significant diversion to the main effort, establishment of a long lasting deterrence vs. having a set of realistic end states and strategies, and an opportunity of removing some great hazards Israel will have otherwise to confront sooner or later vs. the "main effort" approach, giving a clear priority to the campaign against Iran.

In weighing the three, in principal, we can draw the following general conclusions: (1) All three lines of action are feasible and acceptable, but have a different cost to benefit ratio (2) The circumstances at hand create an opportunity to remove or at least decrease a great number of the hazards Israel faces. (3)The argumentation, therefore, should focus on the *suitability* of the possibilities, with the cost to benefit ratio as the main consideration.

<u>Course of Action Selection</u>

When considering several possibilities situated on the same scale, it is advised to examine the two extremes, as this might provide a better insight into the pros and cons of all the suggested ones.

The course of action aimed at the destruction of those two organizations, as described, will be lengthy in time, bloody in casualties to Israeli troops and local civilian population, is almost evident in causing any Arab counterpart to withdraw its support from the campaign, and is bound to unite all internal forces within Lebanon and Gaza, so a potential more moderate governing factor would be hard to find. To complete the

15

picture, experience shows that attempts of aspiring for too ambitious end states have a tendency not to achieve them, especially if international support and time are lacking.

At the other edge, a course of action constituting mainly of the exertion of air power will be unsatisfactory, to say the least, for the following reasons: its immediate operational outcome will be a very limited one due to low effectiveness of air attacks on a low signature enemy, and will not decay significantly even within the campaigns timeframe the extent of missiles to be rained upon Israel's home front. Politically, it will leave Hamas and Hezbollah as the great triumphants of the confrontation, as the only ones to withstand the might and fury of the new crusaders, a line of propaganda likely to be dominant at the aftermath of a regional confrontation.

There remains also the middle of the road possibility: a definitive blow, limited in time, limited in depth and extent of ground force take over. This course of action has a reasonable chance of gaining the support of most of the parties participating in the operation, although some of the participating parties will express only a tacit consent. An accompanying information campaign should emphasize that Israel has no territorial aspirations in Lebanon and Gaza, and seeks its security, putting the blame on Hezbollah and Hamas subordination to foreign rulers-might have a chance of causing a split between the public opinion, (especially in Lebanon with its substantial Sunni and Christian populations) and the organizations.

A second iteration trying to differentiate between the two theatres would discover that the rule and hold Hamas has in Gaza is much looser than might be seen at a first glance, as proven in the Israeli "Cast Lead" operation in Gaza in December 2009[13]. An attempt to undermine Hamas in Gaza will also boost the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations

to take place after the new balance of powers is restored. This process is currently in a stalemate, and will continue to be such as long as there is no unified government in the Palestinian side capable of delivering the consent of most of the populace

Therefore, the paper's recommendations summary is as follows:

- Lebanon

1) Damaging Hezbollah as much as possible in an series of air strikes and well pointed and limited in depth and time ground maneuver, 2) Preventing Syria from participation in the armed conflict by a policy of open and secret massages and deterring steps like stationing a force in being in the Golan, 3) causing as less damage as possible to the Lebanese army, under the assumption it is a part of the preceding solution.

- Gaza:

1) Destruction of the vast majority of Hamas power and infrastructure in attempt to cause its collapse, under a tacit or secretly agreed understanding with the Palestinian Authority this is in their best interest, in perspective of the "day after" to follow the campaign. There should be a rigorous analysis of the geographical centers of gravity, so that lines of effort could be directed against them, as a full occupation and mopping of the Gaza Strip would be non practical. The main consideration should be the operational effectiveness, as expressed in the strategic cost to benefit ratio: this should be profitable in the sense that the benefit gained by taking down Hamas would not undermined by a too heavy proportion of casualties, to civil population and IDF as well. Special attention

17

should be given to the time factor-a decisive take over, concentrating in

governmental symbols, and a transition to alternate authorities

This course of action, if promoted wisely in the pre attack policy co-ordination

process represents to our judgment the best cost to benefit ratio, and has the chances

of gaining support by the U.S and other prominent members of the international

community, and tacit consent by moderate Arab states.

Endnotes

[1] Theda Skocpol , State and social revolutions, (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge university press, 1979)

[2] This kind of rhetoric was broadly used by Iranian leaders including Khomeini himself, and was pointed especially at Saudi Arabia.

[3] Shimon Shapira, Hezbollah between Iran and Lebanon (Tel Aviv, Israel, Hakkibbutz Hameuchad,2000), 140-146

[4] Shimon Shapira, Hezbollah between Iran and Lebanon (Tel Aviv, Israel, Hakkibbutz Hameuchad, 2000), 86.This kind of ideas became attractive to Iranian leadership in correlation with the improvement of the military situation in the war against Iraq.

[5] As a result of the dispute over the communication network and control over Beirut's airport issues resulted in a tense conflict between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah two years ago.

[6] In 2002, while the Palestinian wave of terror at its peak, Israel intercepted a ship carrying weapons from Iran to Gaza. Arafat, at the demand of US administration for explanations-denied any tie to the issue, a claim easily proven false. This caused the administration and President Bush to lose any personal faith in Arafat afterwards.

[7] Information regarding quantities of missiles taken from: BG Alon Friedman, "Hezbollah stockpiles 40,000 rockets near Israeli border", interview by Richard Beeston, The Times, August 5,2009.

[8] Information regarding missile types, ranges and payloads taken from: Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, http://jtic.janes.com (accessed January, 26, 2011).

[9] Interview with a senior Israeli Intelligence official, "Haaretz", "Israeli Intelligence official: "Hamas Rockets can Reach Tel Aviv", November 15, 2010.The interview is a non attributed one because of sensitivity in regard to Egyptian-Israeli relations, as the source of almost all smuggled weapons comes from Egypt.

[10] During the first gulf war Iraq tried to provoke Israel to fully engage in the war, knowing this might lead the Arab component of the American led coalition to withdraw from the alliance. Israel, identifying its vital interest at the time as the destruction of Iraq's power—did not retaliate.

[11] The "Quartet" is an international four member body constituting the US, Russia, EU and the U.N.

[12] DIME is an acronym for the spectrum of national power components: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic. It represents the full range of a combination of measures to be taken in the continuous process of foreign policy implementation, and in conflict situations

[13] In December 2009, after numerous terror attacks on Israel's sovereign territory (most of them—by firing mortar bombs and "katiusha" rockets on civilian population), Israel attacked the Hamas in Gaza. The operation's result was decisive, and restored deterrence and a relative calm to the **Gaza** border, although it didn't challenge the Hamas regime's existence.